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The Stability and Consolidation of the Francoist Regime. The Case of Eastern Andalusia, 1936–1950

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Abstract

The stabilisation and longevity of Franco's regime can be explained by the interpenetration of society and the institutions of the 'New State' in three overlapping areas: firstly, in the sphere of the shared culture of the community of civil war victors; secondly, through repression, based on the decisive collaboration of those supporting Francoism, which cut short any possible opposition; thirdly, in the socio-economic sphere, where those making up the groups supporting the 'New State' would see their personal interests fulfilled. At the same time, the defeated would be ensnared in a maze of misery and silence, abandoning any political concerns and concentrating instead on survival. Accordingly, the regime proved able to win support from a broad range of social groups while also eliminating any signs of opposition.

The authoritarian regimes in inter-war Europe were not imposed from above on an immobile and passive society. On the contrary, their emergence, installation and consolidation came about due to the mobilisation of different social groups who, through their actions and perceptions, constituted and gave life to the new states. That is why, in order to understand their true nature, and the reasons behind their creation and consolidation, we need to analyse the interaction between those regimes and the societies in which they took root.

This article argues that, as regards internal factors, the stabilisation and later consolidation of Franco's regime can be explained by the interpenetration of society

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and the institutions of the 'New State' in three overlapping areas. This was achieved, first, through the shared and unifying culture of the community of civil war victors, forged by means of the construction of a sublimated imaginary. This imaginary was founded on two great myths: that of victory, which conferred a regenerative and sacralised nature on the military struggle, and that of the *Refundación Nacional* (National Refounding), a foundational myth that granted the dictatorial regime a new stage of glory and splendour, built on the ruins of the 'ignominious' republican experience. Secondly, repression, which had the decisive collaboration of those supporting Francoism, destroyed any possible opposition on the part of their potential enemies. Francoism proclaimed itself to be the new political order that would return to the nation its lost greatness, bringing relentless justice to enemies of the Fatherland (*Patria*). The dehumanised image of the vanquished that the dictatorship managed to impose came together with the heralding of a new era in which there would be space only for the religious, Catholic and spiritualised values of the Eternal Fatherland. We argue that this set of idealisations allowed the creation of a new emotional climate of identification with the new regime's essential aims, contributing to the adoption by many Spaniards of an attitude of adhesion to, and even loyal co-operation with, the 'New State' and its repressive institutions.¹ Thirdly and finally, in the socio-economic sphere, those making up the groups supporting the 'New State' saw their personal interests fulfilled, while the defeated were enclosed in a maze of misery and silence, abandoning any political concerns and concentrating on survival.

It is commonly accepted nowadays that, as with other inter-war authoritarian regimes, Francoism enjoyed a broad consensus among the population.² However, as in other European cases, the population's attitudes were not divided in any sharply differentiated way between consensus and dissent.³ There was a broad range of behaviour, from unconditional agreement to support with some moral or political dissent, to acceptance, passivity, demobilisation, accommodation, private disagreement and even direct opposition to the regime.⁴ However, as this article suggests, Francoism's policies would achieve stability for the regime, ensuring support among a heterogeneous set of social groups, as well as eliminating open opposition among dissidents. Furthermore, the consent that the regime enjoyed among a large section of the population existed alongside depoliticisation and the repression of possible opponents, who were forced to withdraw to the private sphere in search of support that would allow them to survive the terrible economic conditions of the post-war period. Therefore, it is impossible to understand Francoism without an understanding of 'consent' and 'repression', which were not opposites, but a

¹ E.g. Peter Anderson, *The Francoist Military Trials. Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945* (New York and London: Routledge, 2010).

² Manuel Ortiz Heras, 'Historia social en la dictadura franquista: apoyos sociales y actitudes de los españoles', *Spagna Contemporanea*, 28 (2005), 169–85.

³ Antonio Cazorla, 'Sobre el primer franquismo y la extensión de su apoyo popular', *Historia y Política*, 8 (2002), 312; Ismael Saz, *Fascismo y Franquismo* (Valencia: Prensa Universitarias de Valencia, 2004), 174–7.

⁴ Jordi Font, *¡Arriba el campo!: primer franquismo i actituds polítiques en l'àmbit rural nord-català* (Girona: Diputació de Girona, 2001), 227–38.

consequence of each other: both were present in the interconnection between the regime's institutions and society, in the active participation of the victors in the work of repression and the punishment meted out to the vanquished.

It is at local level, looking 'from below', that we can most vividly see the interaction between the regime and society. With this perspective, we focus our study on the south of Spain, assessing the emergence of a 'culture of victory' in different Andalusian cities of the Francoist rearguard during the civil war. Using the vantage point of various locations and provinces in eastern Andalusia, namely Málaga, Jaén, Granada and Almería, we show how this culture was a key element in creating a 'national community', looking first at the repression instituted by the victors and, second, at an autarchic political economy that punished the defeated and acted in the interests of the regime's supporters. The links between local realities and regional and national politics can thus be brought into relief, demonstrating how it was in the interaction between these spheres that the Francoist regime was culturally and socially mobilised.

The 'cultural community' of the victors

The imaginary of the civil war and the construction of an ultra-nationalist Francoist identity

From 18 July 1936, the rebels built up a great arsenal of mythologised stories and imaginaries. These were created to justify the military coup, giving meaning to their own fascistised, anti-republican and anti-democratic political project. The sublimated idealisation of the civil war by the rebel group was conveyed through a collection of cultural, mythical and symbolic components, imported from the most erudite traditions of the anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarian right.⁵ Over the course of the conflict, these discourses,⁶ myths and symbols became the cornerstones of the legitimising ideology of the Francoist 'New State'.

The importance of the historical construction of the political language of the fascistised, anti-democratic right and its civil war propaganda messages can best be understood through a 'culturalist' approach. Interrogating the discursive components and interpretative agencies that modelled the individual and collective behaviour of those supporting Franco's 'New State' is thus essential. The allegorical and sublimated recreation of the war by the rebels was manifested through a dense sedimentation of discursive recreations and metanarratives with a strongly mythogenic capacity. Almost all these elements, with their idealised and symbolic nature, powerfully shaped the perceptions by which individual or group actors interpreted the conflict's nature or justified as unavoidable the use of extreme violence against an enemy designated as

⁵ Ismael Saz, *España contra España. Los nacionalismos franquistas* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 77–99 and 105–55. See also Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Acción española. Teología política y nacionalismo autoritario en España, 1913–1936* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1998) and Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Historia de las derechas españolas. De la Ilustración a nuestros días* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000).

⁶ See Miguel Ángel Cabrera, *Postsocial History. An Introduction* (Lanham, MD and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), 22–4.

perverse and inhuman. It is clear that subjectivity conditions individual decisions and actions: social imaginaries define and order the way in which actors perceive, codify and interpret the reality that surrounds them, giving meaning to their perception of experiences and allowing them to have a personalised understanding of 'their world'.⁷ All this, then, acquires a special meaning if we accept the premise that actors retain individual or group agency within a dense network of highly idealised mental recreations and cultural perceptions, each of which takes a specific linguistic and conceptual formulation.⁸

The dehumanising images of the leftist enemy and the discourses discrediting the Republic came together in the midst of the climate of terror, death and revenge that flourished in the rebel rearguard, in an exalted interpretation of the civil war, understood as the final struggle for the soul of Spain. Once the 'New State' was in place throughout the national territory, the complex mixture of symbols, languages and cults that extolled the war's regenerative nature allowed the creation of the myth of a sacred national sacrifice with the salvation and purification granted by death. The sum of these imaginaries, with their strong emotive and mythogenic charge, managed to invest the Francoist regime with a sanctified and regenerative halo. The idealised vision that identified Francoism as the starting point of a glorious stage in the resurgence of the Fatherland became a powerful instrument used by the dictatorship to instil trust and support among an extensive and mixed range of individuals and social groups, from wealthy landowners to the small peasantry who had been badly affected by the Republic's left-leaning labour legislation, and the rural and urban middle classes who felt assaulted by anticlericalism and damaged by the combative strike politics of unionised workers. This was a significant part of the population and it played a decisive role in both repressive violence against the vanquished and the maintenance of the dictatorial 'New State'.

In short, Francoism was built on an idealised reconstruction of the war and the victory that had the potential to seduce and persuade not only the upper classes but also those intermediate and even popular social groups that were most harmed by the strikes and social upheaval of the republican years, by the overturn of traditional and religious values, or by the excesses of the revolution carried out in the republican rearguard during the civil war. This mythified reconstruction was based on a regenerative image of the war, on the myth of victory against the Fatherland's enemies – as represented by the 'abominable' democratic regime of the Second Republic – and an extensive programme of re-Catholicisation and the

⁷ Jordi Font, "'Nosotros no nos cuidábamos de la política'". Fuentes orales y actitudes políticas en el Franquismo. El ejemplo de una zona rural, 1939–1959', *Historia Social*, 49 (2004), 49–68, especially 52–4.

⁸ Miguel Ángel Cabrera, *Historia, lenguaje y teoría de la sociedad* (Madrid: Cátedra-Universitat de Valencia, 2001), 47–51; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, 'La historia de la práctica: nuevas tendencias en historia tras el giro lingüístico', *Ayer*, 62 (2006), 19–50, see 24–7; Andreas Reckwitz, 'Toward a Theory of Social Practices. A Development in Culturalist Theorizing', in Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ed., *Practicing History. New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 249–63; William H. Sewall, 'The Concept(s) of Culture', in Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 35–61.

re-establishment of traditional Spain. Through the construction of the myths of victory (over the enemies of Eternal Spain) and the post-war refounding of the nation, Francoism fostered a culture of identity among the victors, carving out a stereotyped and accusatory image of the 'pernicious' republican experience and contributing to the creation of a specific anti-democratic memory.

The anti-left imaginary and the gestation of anti-republican memory

The key ideas that acted as founding elements of the victors' ideological cohesion underwent an accelerated process of refinement and stylisation over the course of the war. The military confrontation was conceived as the supreme and definitive attack necessary to exterminate that monstrous enemy – the anti-Spain – that threatened the Fatherland. Military victory over Spain's enemies would end, once and for all, that prolonged decadence of the national spirit that had been underway since, at least, the construction of the liberal state at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This process of moral degeneration was seen as having intensified to an intolerable pace with the arrival of the Second Republic and its insidious permissiveness and unacceptable collusion with the growth and spread of the left, in its republican, Marxist and anarchist guises. From this perspective, those responsible for such a reprehensible betrayal of the national spirit should be definitively exterminated by extreme and 'purifying' violence, such as that triggered by the 1936 'glorious uprising'.⁹

The anti-leftist and dehumanising discourse regarding the enemy that developed in the rebel rearguard centred on the constant discrediting of the labour movement, as well as of republican and liberal ideologies. These were given disproportionate and debasing labels, attributing to them powerful and imaginary forces that conspired in a contemptible way against the Hispanicist essentialism firmly rooted in the traditions of Catholicism, patriotism, hierarchy and defence of the race. According to this viewpoint, the left-wing movements and democratic republicanism were the incarnation of the anti-Spain. This is shown in the following editorial published in the the Granadan daily, *Ideal*, on the meaning of the war:

Our struggle is not between the Army and other organised, patriotic forces. Battle is joined between honourable Spaniards, brought together in the ranks of the national Army, and the Marxist hordes ... It is crystal clear.

We fight:

Against the enemies of the Fatherland who want to subject [Spain] to the wretched slavery of Soviet Russia, watered with the blood – that cries out for justice – of twenty million people sacrificed to the fury of Marxism.

Against spineless governments that, shamefully abandoning their dignity and ignoring the interests of the Fatherland, act on the orders of our enemies, becoming a worthless tool for their destructive plans.

⁹ See 'La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el Movimiento (Tetuán, 21 de julio de 1936)', *ABC de Sevilla*, 23 July 1936; and Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena: 'Cara a la Nueva España', *ABC de Sevilla*, 9 Sept. 1936.

Against those who persecute our Religion, who have thrown Christ out of state schools in order to corrupt the soul [sic] of our young people and the Sisters of Charity out of the hospitals so that the dying may no longer commend their souls with their eyes fixed on the Crucifix, hearing sweet and pertinent words of consolation.¹⁰

The revolution that broke out in the republican rearguard during summer 1936 was worthy of close attention in the cultural construction of the discourse dehumanising and discrediting the left wing. The popular revolution was presented as a horrendous phenomenon of moral degradation and the absolute loss of values most purely cultivated by the spirit of Catholicism and Spanish nationalism. The civil war became the inevitable historical event that was to return to the Spanish nation its ancestral greatness and spiritual purity, violently usurped by the most extreme manifestations of left-wing revolution.¹¹ The anti-leftist discourse conceived by the rebels contained at least some of the following elements.

First, in almost all the accounts of the republican rearguard, there is a distorted description of the socio-economic transformations that were taking place in those areas. On many occasions it was concluded that those revolutionary changes meant, above all, an abominable and caricatured imitation of Soviet communist forms of social organisation and expressions of centralised economic planning.¹²

Secondly, the left wing's domination of 'loyal' territories in the republican rearguard had led to a painful aggravation of the accelerated historical process of moral degradation and national ruin. The 'red domination' of those territories which had not been quickly 'liberated' exacerbated a whole series of perverted values and a range of anti-patriotic forms of behaviour in the heart of local government bodies and municipal institutions. Such values and types of behaviour were tinged with the meanness, avarice and materialism of their perpetrators, who were seen as responsible for the most profound degradations possible in social, spiritual and cultural life.¹³

Thirdly and lastly, the 'frenzied anti-clericalism' that took place in practically all the population centres in the republican zone was considered to be one of the most prominent features of the degenerate and degraded character attributed to the left-wing 'enemies of Spain'. In the political language being structured in 'nationalist' Spain, the left was exclusively responsible for the varied acts of iconoclasm, sacrophobia and immense and collective hatred for religion, which spread like wildfire in the summer of 1936. This anti-clerical violence must be understood as the sudden and spontaneous expression of a profound desire to extirpate the old, unjust and hierarchical order that had traditionally been supported by the Catholic Church and its representatives. For that very reason, on many occasions the violence took the form of destructive and cathartic action, inspired by mystical beliefs in the

¹⁰ 'Contra quiénes luchamos', *Ideal*, 5 Aug. 1936; similarly, Álvaro Alcalá Galiano, 'La contrarrevolución', *ABC de Sevilla*, 12 Feb. 1936

¹¹ See 'La patriótica alocución del general Franco al iniciar el movimiento', *ABC de Sevilla*, 23 July 1936.

¹² 'Viviendo cuarenta días de comunismo rojo en Palma del Río', *ABC de Sevilla*, 16 Sept. 1936; 'El destino de España', *Ideal*, 9 Aug. 1936.

¹³ 'En Montefrío se estableció el régimen soviético', *Ideal*, 31 Aug. 1936; *Odiel*, 5 Aug. 1936.

virtues of purifying fire and the salvation of death as necessary tools for building a new socio-moral order.¹⁴ Blaming the left for the ‘atrocities’ of ‘frenzied’ anti-clericalism also had a greater effect as propaganda. In this way, these actions were presented as an unrestrained storm of anti-Catholic hate, which jeopardised the purest ancestral values upon which was constructed the Spanish essentialism still found among a very large proportion of the population.¹⁵

Civil war myths and the spiritualised exaltation of the nation

The feverish and suffocating climate of destruction, terror and death that suddenly transformed the civil war allowed for discursive constructions that exalted violence, dehumanised and demonised the enemy and sacralised the regenerative potential of wars, following the mythogenous and visionary politics of fascism.¹⁶ Once the civil war was over, the sublimated interpretation of the redemptive character bestowed on the conflict allowed the victors to see themselves as belonging to a kind of mythical community, forged in ties of blood and the glorious and sacred fight for the regeneration of the Fatherland.¹⁷

The symbolic foundations of the discourse created by ‘nationalist Spain’ converted those fighting against the Second Republic into true champions of an epic and profoundly ethical struggle that would lead to the complete extermination of Spain’s enemies and the definitive ‘regeneration of the Hispanic race’.¹⁸ The conflict’s ‘legitimising discourse’ redeployed a vast amalgam of linguistic-cultural elements, which were somehow present in a tradition of integrated, Catholic and reactionary nationalism with deep historical, ethical and political roots. This discourse thus served as a storehouse of the anti-modernist, reactionary, traditionalist, authoritarian and anti-liberal intellectual tradition that had been evolving since the end of the nineteenth century, though it had deeper roots.¹⁹ This discourse was profoundly affected by the intellectual and cultural currents of fascism, as well as by radical nationalism, Catholic traditionalism and anti-parliamentarianism. The Fatherland was

¹⁴ Mary Vincent, ‘“The Keys of the Kingdom”: Religious Violence in the Spanish Civil War, July–August 1936’, in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards, eds., *The Splintering of Spain. Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 68–89, especially 76–80.

¹⁵ See *Ideal* (Jaén edition), ‘Los vecinos de Arjona recuerdan aún con horror los crímenes cometidos durante el dominio rojo’, 6 May 1939 and ‘La columna del comandante Buiza toma Cazalla. El odio a la religión’, *ABC de Sevilla*, 15 Aug. 1936.

¹⁶ George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 159–81 and ‘Toward a General Theory of Fascism’, in George L. Mosse, *Masses and Man. Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1980), 159–96, 170–4.

¹⁷ See Sergio Luzzatto, ‘The Political Culture of Fascist Italy’, *Contemporary European History*, 8, 2 (1999), 317–34, here 322–4; James A. Gregor, *Mussolini’s Intellectuals. Fascist Social and Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 78–84.

¹⁸ See ‘Luces y resplandores de la Guerra’, *Ideal*, 4 Oct. 1936; ‘Discurso del Generalísimo Franco ante el micrófono de Radio Nacional’, *ABC de Sevilla*, 20 July 1937; and Antonio Gallego y Burín, *Seis discursos y una conferencia* (Granada: Talleres Tipográficos A. Márquez, 1937), 23–37.

¹⁹ Pedro Cerezo Galán, *El mal del siglo. El conflicto entre Ilustración y Romanticismo en la crisis finisecular del siglo XIX* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva and Universidad de Granada, 2003), 633–42.

reclaimed once again by the divine will, letting it play the sacrosanct role of spiritual and universal disseminator of Catholicism as it had done since time immemorial.²⁰ The civil war was designated as a landmark of colossal dimensions and transformatory prospects, through which the purest roots of Hispanic essentialism had been called once again to a titanic task of ethical, mental and mystical regeneration.²¹ To this must be added the vast process of creating a discourse full of symbolic components, confined to a powerful imaginary exalting the Eternal Nation, and installed on a mythified and allegorical paraphrasis. This paraphrasis, which incorporated numerous fascist components and had millenarian and messianic features – some of them taken from traditional Catholic doctrine – perceived the timeless existence of a Fatherland immersed in a permanent cycle of paradise, fall and redemption.²² What the propagandists and ideologists of nascent Francoist Spain did was nothing other than recover the discourses, philosophical traditions and political cultures of neo-Hegelian idealism, essentialist nationalism, fascism and anti-parliamentarian authoritarianism, many of which were available in the European anti-liberal intellectual storehouse.²³

One contribution to the discourse was populist ultra-nationalism and fascism. These called for the regenerative rejuvenation of the nation and a new political order that would overcome liberalism.²⁴ It is worth highlighting the symbolism used when unravelling the historical origins of the civil war. It was stated that the Spanish

²⁰ Eduardo González Calleja and Fredes Limón Nevado, *La Hispanidad como instrumento de combate. Raza e imperio en la prensa franquista durante la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid: CSIC, 1988), 31–45.

²¹ See 'El Frente Nacional', by Francisco de Cossío, *ABC de Sevilla*, 11 Sept. 1936; Juan Ignacio Luca de Tena, 'Cara a la Nueva España', *ABC de Sevilla*, 9 Sept. 1936; 'Discurso pronunciado por Pedro Sainz Rodríguez (Vicepresidente), en el transcurso del acto de Constitución del Instituto de España, celebrado en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Salamanca, el 6 de enero de 1938', *ABC de Sevilla* 7 Jan. 1938.

²² On the development of this paraphrasis, see Aristotle A. Kallis, 'To Expand or Not to Expand? Territory, Generic Fascism and the Quest for an "Ideal Fatherland"', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38, 2 (2003), 244–6; Emilio Gentile, *Politics as Religion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 141–2; Zira Box, 'La tesis de la religión política y sus críticos: aproximación a un debate actual', *Ayer*, 62 (2006), 223–4; Richard Steigmann-Gall, *El Reich sagrado. Concepciones nazis sobre el cristianismo, 1919–1945* (Madrid: Akal, 2007), 27–70 and 'Apostasy or Religiosity? The Cultural Meanings of the Protestant Vote for Hitler', *Social History*, 25, 3 (2000), 267–84; see also John F. Pollard, '“Clerical Fascism”: Context, Overview and Conclusion', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8, 2 (2007), 433–46. In the Spanish case, see Zira Box, 'Secularizando el Apocalipsis. Manufactura mítica y discurso nacional franquista: la narración de la Victoria', *Historia y Política*, 12 (2004), 133–60; Manuel García Morente, *Idea de la Hispanidad* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1961), 15–22, 'Ideas para una Filosofía de la Historia de España', in *Idea de la Hispanidad*, 179–209 and 'Raíces históricas del movimiento nacionalista', in *Obras Completas*, vol. II, 1937–1942 (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1996), 377–82. For an example of Catholic doctrine, see Isidro Gomá y Tomás, 'Carta Pastoral sobre el sentido cristiano-español de la Guerra', in his *Pastorales de la Guerra de España* (Madrid: Rialp, Rivadeneyra, 1955).

²³ See Manuel García Morente, 'España como estilo', in *Idea de la Hispanidad*, 34–45; Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, 'La inflexión autoritaria del liberalismo español', in Manuel Suárez Cortina, ed., *Las máscaras de la libertad. El liberalismo español, 1808–1950* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 434–9 and 446–9; Ismael Saz, *España contra España*, 82–6.

²⁴ Roger Griffin, 'El núcleo paligenético dell'ideología del "fascismo generico"', in Alessandro Campi, ed., *Che cos'è il fascismo?* (Rome: Ideazione Editrice, 2003), 97–122. See also Roger Griffin, ed., *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

nation had, in recent decades, been immersed in an irreversible process of decline. What was being evoked, then, was the metaphor of the infirm nation, threatened (or assaulted) by an (internal or external) enemy, understood as a multifarious range of invasive and harmful agents that would besiege the nation's unity and strength. As an answer to this process of debilitation, the infiltrating agents (Marxism, atheism, Judaism, freemasonry, anticlericalism, separatism, the regions' nationalist or 'anti-Spanish' feeling and even Soviet communism) and elements besieging the racial essences on which the nation's spiritual purity was based had to be eradicated. As Cardinal Gomá affirmed:

... the War is against those who take up arms in favour of Marxist materialism, that corrodes every stone in the magnificent edifice of Western civilisation, and fight against the spirit of Christianity and patriotism, of hierarchy and respect, without which Spain and Europe would regress two thousand years in their history.²⁵

For all these reasons, both the military uprising against the Republic and the civil war itself became interpreted as a group sacrifice imposed by God and an eschatological and sanctifying shedding of blood and death. Again in the words of Cardinal Gomá:

... the blood of thousands of Spaniards, spilt for their God and for their faith ... , tested in death as they were in their life as Christians, is a living supplication for Spain, that ascends to heaven from the earth that is soaked in it ... The blood of the first martyrs brought forth a harvest of Christians and will this not be the seed of a new, robust, Catholic Spain that so many Catholic Spaniards have given for her and her God?²⁶

The war, then, was presented as the collective historical endeavour that would reassert the Fatherland's damaged Catholic and traditionalist essentialism. Victory over the enemy, achieved by means of the sacrifice provided by blood and death, was interpreted as an event saturated with mystical, millenarian and regenerative energies.²⁷ The conflict was the crucible from which a New Spain would emerge, born from the abolition of the decrepit liberal-parliamentarian construction, and refounded and resuscitated thanks to the fusion of energies arising from its most noble and ancestral ideals.²⁸ The violent liberation of Spain from the enemy became an enterprise that would necessarily be sustained by a heterogeneous set of social and

²⁵ Isidro Gomá y Tomás, *El Caso de España. Instrucción a sus diócesanos y respuestas a unas preguntas sobre la guerra actual* (Pamplona: Diputación Foral de Navarra, 1936), 20–1.

²⁶ Isidro Gomá y Tomás, 'La Cuaresma de España. Carta Pastoral sobre el sentido cristiano-español de la guerra', in his *Por Dios y por España* (Barcelona: Rafael Casulleras, 1940), 87–127.

²⁷ 'Luces y resplandores de la Guerra', *Ideal*, 4 Oct. 1936. See also 'Discurso del Generalísimo Franco ante el micrófono de Radio Nacional', *ABC de Sevilla*, 20 July 1937; 'Granada celebra con esplendor el Día del Alzamiento. Discurso del Sr. Gallego Burín', *Ideal*, 19 July 1938, and 'La Bandera de la Victoria', *Ideal*, 15 Aug. 1936. On the importance of myth to fascist discourse, see Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 26–43, and more recently 'The Primacy of Culture: the Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 37, 1 (2002), 21–43.

²⁸ 'Luces y resplandores de la Guerra', and 'La bandera de la victoria', *Ideal*, 4 Oct. 1936 and 15 August 1936.

professional groups, united by their common anti-leftist, anti-democratic feeling and their desire for national regeneration.²⁹

The 'culture of victory'

The civil war changed everything, becoming seen as a providential, mythical and regenerative event. The 'Crusade' was understood as the decisive moment when Spain would be reborn from its ashes, becoming once again what it had been, purified by the blood of true Spaniards. After 1 April 1939, the war would not be forgotten, but would become a focus for the propaganda and politics of Francoist memory, legitimising the regime's existence and its policies.³⁰ In this way, a 'culture of war' developed that considered the fight to be unfinished, at least implicitly: Spain should complete its resurgence by purging its weakened body by means of sacrifice and isolation. An autarkic economic, cultural and political programme would achieve this. An interventionist policy was implemented by which the country renounced all imports and any international contact, closing the doors on pernicious external economic and cultural influences and looking inwards. After all, its borders contained not only all the economic and natural resources that would allow the nation to become great, but also the 'spiritual resources' that had once made it an empire.³¹

Spain had to return to its roots, to the 'eternal essence' that had once made it great. It had to close in on itself, looking to the countryside, 'Spain's eternal breeding ground'.³² Aware of its agrarian social origins, the 'New State's' discourses and proclamations contained extensive references to the Spanish countryside, praising its virtues and the peasants who lived there.³³ The countryside and especially Castile were identified as all that was truly Spanish, with the purity, Christian faith and courage that characterised the Hispanic race. This rural salvation was contrasted with the cities, those sites of republican evil, dens of Marxism, liberalism, atheism and anarchy. Agrarian policy would guarantee that the urban evils would be cleansed, nourishing 'the Spanish resurgence with sap'. Hence, the extreme protection of and intervention in prices and production in the 1940s: it was nothing less than a way of halting the city's profit-making and setting a limit on the hidden interests of private capital.³⁴

²⁹ 'Santiago y ¡Viva España!' and 'Contra quiénes luchamos', *Ideal*, 26 July 1936 and 5 Aug. 1936.

³⁰ Paloma Aguilar, *Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil española* (Madrid: Alianza, 1996), 57.

³¹ Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence. Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and 'From War Culture to Civil Society. Francoism, Social Change and Memories of the Spanish Civil War', *History and Memory*, 14, 1/2 (2002), 93–120.

³² Point 17 of the Unificación de Partidos (Unification of Parties) Decree, 19 April 1937, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 20 April 1937.

³³ E.g. Federico de Urrutia, '¡Arriba el campo!', in *Poemas de la Falange Eterna* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1938), 46–9. See also Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán, *La evolución del campesinado en España* (Barcelona: Península, 1979), 143–53.

³⁴ Evidence for this can be found in some of Francisco Franco's statements in those years, e.g., 'Vivir cara al campo', 27 May 1950 and 'Castilla, vivero de España', 2 March 1950, in *Textos de doctrina política. Palabras y escritos de 1945 a 1950* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1951), 507 and 185.

In terms of everyday life after the war, the 'New State' kept alive the spirit of the civil war and created a true 'culture of victory'. However, this was not merely imposed 'from above'. Received, and indeed formed in the local sphere, it allowed Francoism's followers to participate in and feel part of the 'community of victors'. The symbols and rites that constituted Francoism's official culture had already appeared during the conflict; over the course of the 1940s, they would come to dominate everyday life.³⁵ These highlighted the existence of an exclusive national community, emotionally linked to the postulates of national regeneration, the rejection of the past democratic-republican experience and the exaltation of traditional Catholic values. This became evident, for example, in the ritualised politico-religious celebrations and commemorations of the military victories of the civil war. For example, the recollections of the military uprising against the Second Republic, held in 1937, 1938 and 1939 throughout Francoist-held territory in Andalusia, turned into episodes of fervent communion, exalting a new era and a new state.³⁶ The Falangist militias' street parades were attended by crowds of people who professed their religious faith and nationalist ardour. Here, Catholic cult united with the symbols of a new secular religion that joyfully worshipped the Liberated Nation and blessed the providential return of the One Fatherland's imperial and Catholic splendour.³⁷ At many of these expressions of unconditional adhesion to the incipient Francoist state's principles, the populace participated in a celebration loaded with aesthetic, liturgical, mystical and almost sacralised components.

From this point of view, it is easier to understand the vigorous drama of the open-air mass or *misa de campaña*. These were held in public spaces, dominated by monumental stages with insignias and emblems that illustrated the fusion between 'the cross and the sword', and given a moving sensory and emotive theatricality. This is, at least, what can be gathered from the many bombastic celebrations of the 'Third Triumphal Year' held on 18 July 1938 both in the city of Seville³⁸ and in the other main towns and cities of 'nationalist' Andalusia.³⁹ These celebrations culminated in the ostentatious commemoration of victory in the civil war that took place in Seville on 17 April 1939 in the presence of Generalísimo Franco and General Queipo de Llano, with around 60,000 uniformed men and more than 300,000 people attending.⁴⁰

³⁵ Rafael Cruz, 'Old Symbols, New Meanings: Mobilising the Rebellion in the Summer of 1936', Ealham and Richards, *Splintering*, 159–76.

³⁶ See Julián Casanova, *La Iglesia de Franco* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2005), 72–4 and Giuliana di Febo, *Ritos de guerra y de victoria en la España franquista* (Bilbao: Desclee de Brouwer, 2002), 154–5.

³⁷ On 18 July 1937, well-attended civic-military-religious events were held in the largest towns and cities of nationalist Andalusia; almost all of them were the scene for a common pattern of commemorative events that attracted crowds of people, 'Toda la España Liberada por el heroico esfuerzo del Ejército celebra con brillantes actos la fecha 18 de julio', *ABC de Sevilla*, 20 Aug. 1937.

³⁸ Concha Langa Nuño, *Educación y propaganda en la Sevilla de la Guerra Civil* (Seville: Biblioteca de Temas Sevillanos, 2001), 51–2.

³⁹ 'España, redimida por Franco, vibró ayer de fervores patrióticos al conmemorar el 18 de julio', *ABC de Sevilla*, 19 July 1938; 'Granada celebra con gran esplendor el Día del Alzamiento', *Ideal*, 19 July 1938 and Cándido Ortiz de Villanos, *Crónica de Granada en 1938; II-III Año Triunfal* (Granada: Imprenta Urania, 1938), 145–6.

⁴⁰ 'Unas trescientas mil almas en plena exaltación patriótica', *Ideal*, 18 April 1939.

The symbols that made up the 'culture of victory' were forged at these events. These provided a means by which people could express their adhesion to the 'New State' even as they participated in its symbolic construction. Thus, the monarchical flag was adopted as the national flag and raised over official buildings after territory was taken. On 15 August 1936, in the city of Granada, the 'fervent crowd' saluted the flag solemnly to the sound of applause and shouts of '*Viva España*' in a ceremony at the cathedral.⁴¹ The flag was also used in other important ceremonies. In Cogollos (Granada), the bereaved used it to cover the coffins of their 'martyrs' during the civil war, which the villagers saluted with the Roman salute during the funeral.⁴² In later years, the flag presided over official, popular and religious festivals, adorning the streets and squares of towns and cities. Many of their inhabitants would hang it from their balconies and windows, bearing witness to their support – or perhaps fear – of the Francoist regime and making it part of the day-to-day scenery in those years.

The war meant the return of the national anthem (*Marcha de Granaderos*), as well as the use of other, secondary anthems (the Falangist *Cara al Sol*, the Carlist *Oriamendi*, the Spanish Legion's anthem, etc).⁴³ These were insistently present at official ceremonies, processions and religious events, showing that the 'true Spain' was inseparable from the Catholic religion. In Granada, for instance, a local newspaper stated that 'the populace stand and sing [all the anthems] together, with the same enthusiasm, because all sing to the great, noble, just and strong Fatherland, to which they have consecrated their effort and their lives'.⁴⁴ The use of war anthems was extended into the 'years of peace', paying homage to the martyrs of the 'Crusade' in their lyrics and indicating that those who remained alive and active in the regime were continuing to combat the enemy, lining up with their fallen companions, who – in the words of *Cara al Sol* – stood '*guardia sobre los luceros*' ('guard over the stars').

It was necessary to recover, through Catholicism and its Baroque and counter-Reformation spirit, the traces of the true Hispanic tradition and elements that could purify the 'Fatherland's sins'.⁴⁵ From early in the war, liturgical acts of reparation took place, masses were said at the front and in the rearguard, processions and pilgrimages were held, and, of course, crucifixes were returned to schools and public buildings. Religion and God, identified with nationalist Spain, were returned to their place, making them omnipresent in everyday life during the post-war period. Not even condemned republicans could escape these symbols: in January 1937, a ceremony was held to replace the crucifix in Granada Prison, with political prisoners lined up in the courtyard to listen to the head of the institution's triumphalist speech.⁴⁶ In towns

⁴¹ Claudio Hernández Burgos, 'La construcción de la Cultura de la Victoria en Granada, 1936–1951', unpublished dissertation, Universidad de Granada, 2009, 104.

⁴² 'Numeroso público asistió al entierro de los falangistas muertos heroicamente en Cogollos', *Ideal*, 26 Jan. 1937.

⁴³ A good example of this variety and of its meaning for one of the regime's ideologists is Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *La infantería española* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular, 1941), 67–79.

⁴⁴ *Ideal*, 17 Sept. 1936.

⁴⁵ Di Febo, *Ritos de guerra*, 27–38.

⁴⁶ *Ideal*, 19 Jan. 1937.

and cities, masses set the rhythms of daily life: attending Sunday mass became an act of support for the regime and, for some, a way of avoiding reprisals or being marked politically. Parish priests and clergymen became judges of the moral, religious and political conduct of their parishioners.⁴⁷ With the notion that Spain's 'purification' was only possible through penitence, a great many religious celebrations were held during the civil and post-war periods at which the political and the religious went hand in hand. These became acts in which the population participated, showing their Christian faith and patriotism. All these manifestations fitted in with the desire expressed by both the Catholic Church and the Francoist 'New State' to remove the deep roots of secularism and atheist materialism fostered by the Second Republic. In this way, Spanish society was re-Catholicised, offering Francoism's supporters an opportunity to participate in and show their adhesion to this 'culture of victory'. These supporters used gestures to combine the religious and the political in ways that reflected the identification between the two that lay at the very heart of the crusade.⁴⁸ Particularly noteworthy were the missionary campaigns carried out in remote rural areas, the dramatised mass missions in large population centres and the group celebrations of christenings or Catholic weddings held to make amends for the damage suffered by the Church under the Republic's secular and anti-religious legislation. Most of these ritualised representations were intended to stage the return of that traditional, essentialist and anti-modern religiosity upon which large parts of the middle classes and the oligarchies had been building their particular status. In this frenzied anxiousness to re-Catholicise, an important element was the consecration of many towns and cities to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which had a clearly expiatory aim. Some of these consecrations became tremendous manifestations of the crowd's Catholic fervour, as in June 1945 in Guadix (Granada) where an impressive throng of 50,000 people crowded around the cathedral, which was crowned by a majestic image of Christ.⁴⁹

However, the most intense public liturgies were those that formed a glorious climax to the re-Catholicisation of the 1940s, the two Great Popular Missions held in the cities of Jaén and Granada. The Holy Mission in Jaén took place between 18 February and 9 March 1947. This involved the participation of a total of twenty-six Redemptorist and Claretine missionaries, presided over by Bishop García y García de Castro. During the event, the priests, stationed in numerous places of worship, preached to the different guilds, trades and corporations of the city, to representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and to workers in general (bricklayers, carpenters, railway workers, peasants, mechanics, etc). The Holy Mission ended with two grand, crowded events: the Stations of the Cross on 26 February that ended in the Plaza de Santa María, in front of the cathedral, with a huge gathering of more

⁴⁷ Conxita Mir, *Vivir es sobrevivir. Justicia, orden y marginación en la Cataluña rural de posguerra* (Lleida: Milenio, 2000), 189–237; Ramón García Piñeiro, 'Boina, bonete y tricorno. Instrumentos de control campesino en la Asturias franquista (1937–1977)', *Historia del Presente*, 3 (2004), 45–64.

⁴⁸ Mary Vincent, 'Expiation as Performative Rhetoric in National-Catholicism: The Politics of Gesture in Post-Civil War Spain', *Past and Present*, 203, Suppl. 4 (2009) 235–56.

⁴⁹ Hernández Burgos, 'La construcción de la Cultura', *Patria*, 6 June 1945, 149–50.

than 40,000 of the faithful, and the concluding masses held on Sunday 2 March, at which more than 15,000 communions were given.⁵⁰

The Holy Mission in Granada took place from 16 to 30 October 1949, and 103 missionaries from all over Spain took part. Religious events were held day and night in all of the city's churches as well as in improvised spaces, with pious lectures intended for all sections of society. So that the 'missionary's voice would reach to the last house and the most remote and secluded corner', the majority of the churches and religious buildings were fitted with exterior loudspeakers. Even the busiest streets and squares of the city centre (Puerta Real, el Embovedado, Plaza del Campillo, Plaza de la Mariana, Plaza Bib-Rambla, Calle San Matías and Calle Navas) were provided with giant loudspeakers, broadcasting the speeches that Archbishop Balbino Santos y Olivera gave on Radio Granada. At the end of each day, a general gathering of missionaries and parishioners took place in el Embovedado, an iconic location in the city centre where the Granadan bourgeoisie strolled and chatted during the evening *paseo*, now transformed by an altar with a foliage cross, five metres high and two metres wide. After two weeks of hectic liturgical activity, the triumphant balance sheet drawn up by the Granadan church documenting the scope of the 'Great Mission' was the following: average attendance at each of the general gatherings, 70,000 to 80,000; communions given during the mission, 120,000; illicit matrimonial unions convalidated, 544.⁵¹

These devotional and patriotic ceremonies were directly related to memories of the civil war. For this reason, the regime took care to fill public space with symbols and rites closely linked to memory of the conflict. The civil war occupied the streets and squares: the changing of place names began very early on, erasing any trace of the republican period and putting in place new myths and heroes of the 'anti-Spain's' defeat. For example, in February 1937, shortly after taking the city of Malaga, the Francoist authorities announced that street names would be changed, removing indications of those 'men who were rebelling because of the poison of their ideas; because of the cruelty and ferocity of their instincts; because of the ruin they brought upon our Fatherland', in this way cleansing any trace, even the names, of this 'false Spain'.⁵²

Remembrance of the war's martyrs and heroes became a central element of the post-war liturgy. These men would be the ideal models for the new regime: an example of masculinity, courage, heroism, purity, faith and sacrifice. They had fertilised the future of the 'New Spain' with their blood.⁵³ They should not be forgotten and were to be ever present in the victors' imaginary. A good example of this is their presence in the public sphere, with their names being given to the new

⁵⁰ *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Obispado de Jaén*, March 1947; *Ideal*, Jaén edition, 12 Feb. 1947 and 4 March 1947.

⁵¹ *Crónica de la Santa Misión General de Granada*, *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Granada*, Número Extraordinario, Jan. 1950, 111–2.

⁵² Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Ministerio del Interior. Caja 3910, 20 Feb. 1937.

⁵³ Mary Vincent, 'The Martyrs and the Saints: Masculinity and the Construction of the Francoist Crusade', *History Workshop Journal*, 47, Spring (1999), 68–98.

streets and roads of the resurgent Fatherland. Now, victors and vanquished would live in and travel through streets inscribed with the names of the victors. This was not merely the case for exalted and far-off names such as José Antonio Primo de Rivera or Francisco Franco, but also provincial and even local heroes. In the town of Santa Fe (Granada province), next to a street bearing the name of José Antonio we find others with the names of the two soldiers who led the coup in the nearby provincial capital, and two more streets dedicated to inhabitants of the town itself.⁵⁴ The civil war and its memory 'made equal' those who fought and gave their blood for Spain, perpetuating their memory and binding together the community of the victorious.

Crosses were erected in honour of the fallen in every town and city. They occupied the most important places, bearing the names of those who had 'fallen for God and Spain'. The crosses linked past, present and future: they placed the living and the dead on the same temporal plane. As in other European nations during the inter-war period, the nation was not only made up of those alive at that time, but also previous generations who had died, and future generations who were yet to come and who were to ensure the eternity of the 'Fatherland'.⁵⁵ On many occasions, the construction of the crosses was promoted by those who identified themselves with the victorious group, for example by spontaneously undertaking popular subscriptions to honour the memory of their relatives.⁵⁶ The crosses to the fallen dominated local life, occupying the main streets or squares. One example is that of Montefrío (Granada), whose council agreed in 1943 to raise theirs on the hill overlooking the place, so that it could be 'visible from everywhere in the town'.⁵⁷ The reminder of the civil war cast its shadow over the lives of all the residents.

On a great many occasions, these inaugurations became acts of *desagravio* ('redress') and support. For example, the inauguration of the Cross for the Fallen in Alcalá la Real (Jaén) in 1941 was preceded by a mass-funeral in the important abbey church of Santa María la Mayor. This was attended by the town's *fuerzas vivas* or local worthies, relatives of martyrs, ex-combatants, those persecuted or imprisoned by the republican authorities and all fervent supporters of Francoism: the 'community of victory'. After the service, which was led by the vicar-general of the diocese, all those present filed out and met before the monument; here speeches were made, flags were raised, anthems were sung and the spirit of the 'Crusade' was revived once again.⁵⁸

As in other inter-war Fascist regimes, Francoism reordered time to legitimise and perpetuate itself.⁵⁹ The long shadow of the civil war was extended, with the reorganisation of the calendar to perpetuate and celebrate remembrance of the

⁵⁴ Archivo Histórico Municipal de Santa Fe (AHMSF), 273 Libro de Actas of the Comisión Gestora, 17 April 1937, 14 April 1937 and 31 March 1937.

⁵⁵ Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, 49.

⁵⁶ José Luis Ledesma Vera and Javier Rodrigo, 'Caídos por España, mártires de la libertad: víctimas y conmemoración de la Guerra Civil en la España postbélica (1936–2006)', *Ayer*, 63 (2006), 244.

⁵⁷ E.g. Archivo Histórico Municipal de Montefrío (AHMM), Libro de Actas of the Ayuntamiento of Montefrío (1941–1945), Comisión Gestora 10 April 1943.

⁵⁸ 'Inauguración del monumento a los caídos en Alcalá la Real', *Diario Jaén* 16 Sept. 1941.

⁵⁹ Martin Sabrow, 'Time and Legitimacy: Comparative Reflections on the Sense of Time in the Two German Dictatorships', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6, 3 (2005), 351–69.

conflict. It would be impossible to escape reminders of the victory, which conveyed meanings that distilled the victors' shared culture in each discourse, ceremony and newspaper item. Popular and secular festivals were abolished. Religious festivals and ones linked to the Francoist regime were imposed: National Catholicism was established in the public sphere, creating a space for and transmitting its ideology – but also penetrating into the private sphere, into families and into individuals' faith, beliefs and morals.⁶⁰

Political and religious commemorations suffocated the lives of Spaniards: the anniversary of the Glorious National Uprising, 'Victory' day, the death of *El Ausente* (the Absent One), the Caudillo's saint's day, commemoration of St Theresa, etc. In parallel with this, local religious festivals were spectacularly revitalised. All these involved the remembrance of those who had died in the conflict as well as the iconoclastic attacks of the Republic and civil war. As in Christian tradition, it had been necessary to sacrifice some of their sons to save Spain and ensure a new order. In Malaga, for example, these religious manifestations were presented as a way of purifying the streets, the bodies and the minds of Spaniards. In this way, the myths and the spirit of the civil war were perpetuated, making them part of the language, memory and symbology of post-war Spain, perpetuating the division into victors and vanquished.⁶¹

The 1940s were marked by this 'culture of victory', exemplified by rites, symbols, festivals and celebrations. As in fascist Italy, such rites became integral elements of society, which, by participating in their representation and confirmation, felt identified with the regime that carried them out.⁶² In fact, these 'victory rites' gave shape to an integrated community of victors that was separate from those who had lost the war.⁶³ The 'New State's' social base was present at these ceremonies, thus creating an imagined community identified as the 'true Spain', which awaited 'justice' against the abominable republican enemies, contaminated beings who were remote from God and pernicious to the Fatherland's health and future.

The time of 'justice': repression and destruction of the enemy

This thick sediment of cultural, allegorical, liturgical and discursive components conferred stability on the Francoist regime. However, its importance lay not only in this, but also in its interaction with society, as well as in its pervasiveness and effects over time. Its fluidity allowed it to overlap with and give meaning to the repression

⁶⁰ Ángela Cenarro, 'Los días de la "Nueva España": entre la "Revolución Nacional" y el peso de la tradición', *Ayer*, 51 (2003), 115–34. For Valencia, see Gil Manuel Hernández i Martí, 'Nacional-catolicismo y calendario festivo en Valencia', in Javier Tusell, Susana Sueiro, José María Marín y Marina Casanova, eds., *El régimen de Franco (1936–1975)* (Madrid: UNED, 1993), 531–41.

⁶¹ Michael Richards, 'Presenting Arms to the Blessed Sacrament: Civil War and Semana Santa in the City of Málaga, 1936–1939', in Ealham and Richards, *Splintering*, 221–2.

⁶² Emilio Gentile, *Il culto del Littorio* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2003), 82–4.

⁶³ Pedro Payá, 'Violencia, legitimidad y poder local. La construcción simbólica de la dictadura franquista en una comarca alicantina. El Vinalopó medio, 1939–1948', *Pasado y Memoria*, 1 (2002), 197–222.

and socio-economic interests that were also essential to the 'New State's' survival. Some towns in Eastern Andalusian offer us a perfect vantage point for observing this interaction, revealing not only the links between culture and reality but also those between local and national politics.

We cannot understand Francoism without repression, a true pillar of the 'New State'.⁶⁴ The machinery of terror and annihilation – extra-judicial killings, military trials, the Law of Political Responsibilities, exile, prison, concentration camps – was essential for the paralysis and elimination of possible opponents. The violence was so brutal that in 1999, one study estimated that Francoist repression, including the civil war and post-war periods, claimed a startling 150,000 victims. Even today new local studies are appearing, increasing this figure and recovering the names of those who disappeared.⁶⁵

In inter-war authoritarian regimes, repression and violence were not simply imposed from above: in Nazi Germany, the civil population played an active role in policing, control and repression, participating and collaborating 'from below' by means of denunciations, reports and testimony.⁶⁶ In the Spanish case, recent studies have shown the decisive and enthusiastic participation of the population in the annihilation and punishment of the republicans. By analysing military trials in Los Pedroches (Cordoba), Peter Anderson has shown that in 70 per cent of cases, proceedings began on the initiative of members of civil society who, keen to obtain 'Franco's justice' and fair retribution for the death of family members, were quick to denounce their neighbours. Their denunciations and statements show a view of the republican enemy as monstrous and unnatural, the civil war as a unique event and the punishment and annihilation of the vanquished as the reward expected from Franco's regime.⁶⁷

The application of the Law of Political Responsibilities created similar tendencies. As is known, this measure went beyond the mere physical punishment of the vanquished: in addition to the death penalties and prison sentences imposed by military courts, the Political Responsibilities tribunals determined the confiscation of

⁶⁴ Ángela Cenarro, 'Muerte y subordinación en la España franquista: el imperio de la violencia como base del "Nuevo Estado"', *Historia Social*, 30 (1998), 5–22.

⁶⁵ Santos Juliá, ed., *Víctimas de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), 410. Javier Rodrigo, *Hasta la raíz. Violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la dictadura franquista* (Madrid: Alianza, 2008).

⁶⁶ Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁶⁷ Anderson, *The Francoist Military Trials*; Peter Anderson, 'Singling Out Victims: Denunciation and Collusion in the Post-Civil War Francoist Repression in Spain, 1939–1945', *European History Quarterly*, 39, 1 (2009), 7–26; and Peter Anderson 'In the Interests of Justice? Grass-roots Prosecution and Collaboration in Francoist Military Trials, 1939–1945', *Contemporary European History*, 18, 1 (2009), 25–44. This argument was previously expressed in Ángela Cenarro, 'Matar, vigilar y delatar: la quiebra de la sociedad civil durante la guerra y la posguerra en España (1936–1948)', *Historia Social*, 44 (2002), 65–86. Conxita Mir, 'El sino de los vencidos: la represión franquista en la Cataluña rural de posguerra', in Julián Casanova, ed., *Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002), 123–93. Francisco Cobo Romero, 'Represión y persecución de minorías y disidentes en las dictaduras fascistas europeas del periodo de entreguerras (Los apoyos sociales y la colaboración de ciudadanos comunes. La Alemania 'nazi' y la España Franquista)', *Espai/Temps*, 45 (2005), 13–50, see 44–9.

the accused's property, in this way making the future difficult for that person's family.⁶⁸ With the head of the family dead or in prison and his property confiscated, his family members would be plunged into poverty, another corridor in Francoism's maze of repression. In Andalusia, the municipal authorities did not hesitate to publish reports regarding the political activities and ideas of the accused, using residents' testimony to this end. Mayors, local Falange leaders, Civil Guard officers, parish priests and even military commanders wrote an enormous number of reports, reproducing that official discourse that presented the republican enemy as subhuman, cruel and barbarous. For example, in the file of the socialist day labourer José María Arco Soto, of Montefrío (Granada), all the authorities gave evidence against him. According to the local Falange head, 'during the period of red domination, he was the leader of the hordes'; the Civil Guard said that 'under Marxist rule he committed all kinds of outrages'; and the mayor stated that this 'enthusiastic propagandist and perpetrator of Soviet ideas' opposed the 'Glorious Uprising' with the 'aim of achieving the installation of a Marxist regime'.⁶⁹ Arco Soto was taken to the Provincial Prison in Granada. Even in 1945, when repression was still underway, some residents of the town added to the reports of the authorities and inspectors by stating that he had no property.⁷⁰

The participation of a section of society in repression went beyond denunciations and reports. Some individuals would even form part of the machinery that ensured residents were stripped of their property by participating in the process of confiscation. The judge would appoint an inspector from among the local inhabitants to carry out the appropriate investigations, asking for information from banks and land registry offices, speaking to neighbours, etc.⁷¹ This arduous task meant an obvious political commitment to Francoism: these men would visit the houses of relatives of the accused, making an inventory of items of value and further terrifying the families. Given their common values and ideas, they did not hesitate to participate in a punishment they considered just and appropriate for the annihilation of a 'subhuman Republican enemy'. In the town of Montefrío, of the twenty-eight complete files analysed, we found no fewer than twenty different inspectors; some of them even lent their services to different proceedings.⁷² Both right-wing inspectors and technicians, marked by the experience of the war and the 'culture of victory', did not hesitate to participate in the processes that dispossessed republican or socialist families of their property. For instance, Alfonso Pérez García acted as an inspector in various actions against his neighbours. A farmer and small property owner, he had been a councillor for Acción Popular (Popular Action) and head of the Catholic trade union in the

⁶⁸ See the pioneering study, Conxita Mir, Fabián Corretgé and Joan Sagués, *Repressió econòmica i franquisme: L'actuació del Tribunal de Responsabilitats Polítiques a la província de Lleida* (Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat, 1997).

⁶⁹ Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Granada (ARChGR), Responsabilidades Políticas file of José María Arco Soto, 5 Sept. 1941, 23 Nov. 1941 and 13 Jan. 1937.

⁷⁰ Ibid., Statements of 31 March 1945.

⁷¹ E.g. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Justicia, box 256, file of Juan María Álvarez Jiménez.

⁷² We refer to twenty-eight '*expedientes de incautación de bienes*' (property confiscation files) deposited in the AGA, Justicia section, box 256.

town during the Second Republic. At 38 years old, after the uprising, he was arrested by the republicans; nonetheless, he managed to escape and fled to the rebel area, where he joined the Falange and took up office in one of the 'New State's' first town councils. By 1940 he was already head of the Montefrío Hermandad de Labradores (Brotherhood of Farmworkers), the agricultural trade union of the Francoist regime.⁷³

The division between victors and vanquished was stark. The socio-economic profile of the accused fitted with that of the republicans, who belonged to the lower and lower-middle classes: of the twenty-eight defendants, only ten of them had any kind of property and these people had only small or very small properties.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the inspectors belonged to the heterogeneous middle classes: eighteen out of twenty of them had urban or rural property.⁷⁵

It is thus clear that Francoism's social supporters shared both the regime's values and beliefs, and the morality it advocated. Many people's behaviour was conditioned by fear and coercion: in Franco's Spain, too, there existed a 'self-policing society'.⁷⁶ It was the very residents of Spanish towns and cities who became the censors of the ideas, attitudes and habits of their fellow citizens. Francoism granted them the possibility of participating in social and moral control, watching over the country's 'health' and many did not hesitate to make the most of this opportunity. The fear of being denounced, of being singled out for negative treatment by the authorities, became widespread and everyday: the early post-war was the beginning of self-censorship, internal exile and, above all, silence. Francoism's supporters thus became repositories of a disciplinary and sovereign power that was able to seal their enemies' fate with the ability to decide between life and death.⁷⁷

The political economy of 'Franco's justice': satisfying the interests of the victors and destroying the vanquished

By participating and collaborating with the regime's institutions, Francoism's supporters would obtain their own 'justice' in material terms. In the context of the terrible economic crisis of the post-civil war period, they would see their private interests fulfilled, obtaining a just reward for their contribution to installing and maintaining the regime. In this sense, too, those who had lost the war would also face their neighbours, the victors, and suffer the terrible consequences of political autarchy.

⁷³ Archivo Histórico Provincial de Granada (AHPG), section AISS, boxes 7197 and 7218.

⁷⁴ E.g. AGA, Justicia. Comisión Provincial de Incautación de Bienes de Granada. Box 256, file of Antonio Blanco Ruiz, 24 Oct. 1936; and file of Pedro Peregrina Mazuela, 14 Dec. 1936.

⁷⁵ AGA, Justicia, box 256. Padrón of the inhabitants of Montefrío, 1922. Catastro de Rústica. Padrón de Urbana of 1940.

⁷⁶ We apply here the concept of Robert Gellately: *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). See also Óscar Rodríguez Barreira, "'Cuando lleguen los amigos de Negrín . . .'" Actitudes individuales y opinión pública ante la II Guerra Mundial en una provincia del Sur. Almería, 1939-1945', *Historia y Política*, 18 (2007), 295-323.

⁷⁷ Michel Foucault, *Hay que defender la sociedad* (Madrid: Akal, 2004), 206.

There has been criticism of the irrationality of the autarchy's economic model.⁷⁸ Yet, these arguments not only fail to consider the autarchic model's cultural and political goals, but also focus on the results for the Spanish economy as a whole, which show that economic growth came to a halt and that economic crisis characterised the post-war years. However, a more careful local analysis shows the cultural and political coherence of autarchy: Francoism's social base avoided the poor economic conditions and, in some cases, progressed economically; in contrast, the most disadvantaged classes came face to face with poverty.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the 'culture of victory' legitimised and sanctioned the enrichment of those who had won the war, justifying the lenience of the authorities towards fraudulence and corrupt practices even as it legitimised the punishment of those outside the regime's social bases, demanding from them the sacrifice necessary for the economic independence and redemption of Spain.

Autarchy meant the adoption of a highly interventionist system. For the regime the civil war was unending and controlling their neighbours' food supply provided its lieutenants with an unprecedented weapon. These new men, drawn from Francoism's social base, ex-combatants marked by the experience of the civil war and imbued with the official culture of Francoism, controlled the production, sale and distribution of food and products in each area.⁸⁰ The administration of ration cards, which lasted until 1952, was in their hands: the survival of their neighbours depended on their decisions.

The regime's supporters enjoyed the authorities' indulgence. Perhaps the best example of this was the *estraperlo* or black market. According to an English traveller writing in 1946, the entire Spanish nation, rich and poor alike, was involved in the black market, yet the army, the authorities, the large Francoist bureaucracy and the regime's supporters were not punished for this.⁸¹ Those who were caught out were almost always from the lowest classes: in Almería province, almost ninety out of 100 of those charged with black market-related offences belonged to the lowest classes: unemployed, day labourers, workers and a striking number of widows. Out of 100, eighty-six had no property or economic capacity at all.⁸²

Furthermore, Francoism's social bases were better equipped to face the situation. The heterogeneous rural middle classes (some small- and medium-sized businessmen and industrialists, but above all small and large farmers and even landlords) had access

⁷⁸ E.g. Carlos Barciela and María Inmaculada López Ortiz, 'El fracaso de la política agraria del primer franquismo, 1939–1959. Veinte años perdidos para la agricultura española', in Carlos Barciela, ed., *Autarquía y mercado negro. El fracaso económico del primer franquismo, 1939–1959* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), 55–93.

⁷⁹ Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco, '*Hambre de siglos*'. *Mundo rural y apoyos sociales del franquismo en Andalucía Oriental (1936–1951)* (Granada: Comares, 2007), 378.

⁸⁰ Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco, '"Hombres nuevos": el personal político del primer franquismo en el mundo rural del sureste español (1936–1951)', *Ayer*, 65 (2007), 237–67. See also Francisco Cobo Romero and Teresa María Ortega López, 'No sólo Franco. La heterogeneidad de los apoyos sociales al régimen franquista y la composición de los poderes locales. Andalucía, 1936–1948', *Historia Social*, 51 (2005), 49–71.

⁸¹ The National Archives, Kew, London, FO 371/60377, *Report* 18 April 1946.

⁸² Archivo Histórico Provincial de Almería (AHPA), GC, Almería Fiscalía Provincial de Tasas Files, 1945, boxes 734 and 735.

to food and resources, ensuring their survival through direct consumption or by means of a small black market tolerated by the authorities. It was even possible for some to enrich themselves spectacularly. The municipality of Santa Fe produced some surprising results. Between 1936 and 1951, of the twenty administrators with agricultural interests, twelve became property owners or increased the size of their land holdings (more than 44 per cent), twelve maintained their properties intact (44.4 per cent) and only three saw their properties reduce in size (11.11 per cent).⁸³ One example is Fausto Rodríguez Rodríguez who, in 1936 at 40 years of age, did not work his own land. After joining the Falange, fighting the civil war, holding party positions (assistant local head in 1940, head of the Hermandad de Labradores from 1944 to 1960) and being a local councillor between 1944 and 1947, his prospects improved remarkably. His defence of the 'values of the Crusade' and close adherence to the regime bore fruit: in 1945 he obtained just over 2 hectares of land; in 1951 this had increased to over 12 hectares of agricultural land in Santa Fe alone.⁸⁴

The socio-economic repression provides evidence that the culture of victory went hand in hand with harsh social realities. The Montefrío smallholder Pérez García, referred to above, collaborated with the Political Responsibilities Tribunal in persecuting the town's left-wing families. He acted as an inspector in most of the actions against the defeated, actively delivering and directing the processes. He shared that 'culture of victory', participated in a number of the regime's local institutions and was also rewarded for repressing the vanquished. The socio-economic results of his political loyalty are evident: owning just 0.15 hectares in 1936, in 1946 he farmed 3.72.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, for the vanquished there was only hunger and misery: in short, socio-economic repression. The lowest classes did not have productive resources. Many families had been destroyed by the execution of the head of the family and/or the exile or imprisonment of family members. Away from the prisons and cemeteries, life went on: the families of those on the losing side had to avoid hunger and it was necessary to struggle to survive. Great political dreams were forgotten and replaced with a day-to-day fight that often involved breaking the laws of the day in order to cling to life, carrying out silent resistance that would mark the terrible years of the 1940s.⁸⁶ People resorted to the black market in order to survive, although the authorities, informed by the regime's active supporters, were a constant obstacle in this regard. While the regime turned a blind eye to the bourgeois black market, with its large goods vans of wheat, the 'black market of the poor' was punished with fines that, if unpaid, would mean the accused were taken straight to labour

⁸³ AHMSE, Appendix of the catastro de rústica. AHPG, Hacienda, Catastro de rústica. Cédulas de propiedad. Leg. 223/1 and 223/2.

⁸⁴ AHMSE, Appendix of the catastro de rústica. AHPG, Hacienda, Catastro de rústica. Cédulas de propiedad. Leg. 223/1 and 223/2; AHMSE, 279 Libro de actas of the Comisión Gestora, Comisión Gestora 26 Sept. 1944; AHPG, AISS boxes 7111, 7219 and 7203.

⁸⁵ AHPG, Hacienda, Catastro de rústica. Cédulas de propiedad, Leg. 192/4–192/6.

⁸⁶ James Scott, *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); 'Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 13, 2 (1986), 5–35.

camps.⁸⁷ Repression also occurred outside the prisons: the very legal system was a weapon ready to be used against the weakest.⁸⁸ However, the constant fight against legality would alleviate the conditions of the most underprivileged, as it involved silent resistance and protest which showed that those who remained outside the community of victory were still present in society.⁸⁹

The extreme economic situation conditioned post-war life. Dying of hunger became a sad possibility for some. The perpetuation of the regime undermined the majority's dreams of redemption, to the advantage of Francoism. The regime's social policy was aimed at creating support: institutions such as Auxilio Social (Social Aid) were intended to attract the population, not only by attempting to instil the regime's ideology in those who received aid, but also by offering paternalist services that would alleviate the difficult post-war conditions.⁹⁰ In Almería, the Frente de Juventudes (Youth Front) also carried out this welfare role, and perhaps for this reason the majority of its militants belonged to the lowest classes or were children of those on the losing side of the civil war.⁹¹ Francoism was not averse to carrying out a social or ideological policy in order to integrate and recruit the masses.⁹² Recent research into Seville province seems to indicate that sometimes the regime was successful: we should not ignore the Falangist programme's powers of integration, as shown by the large number of Falange members belonging to the lowest classes.⁹³ Nevertheless, what is certain is that the 'discourse of victory', designed to exclude and differentiate, made the integration of the vanquished highly problematic.

Conclusion

During the inter-war period, the Western world was shaken by a profound economic, political and cultural crisis. In a context in which the old liberal order was generally discredited and new political formulas emerged, the nation was conceived as a live and profoundly cohesive organism. In this new context, fascism turned around the traditional forms of political experience, contributing to the loss of faith in democracy and traditional liberal elites, who were designated as 'decrepit' and 'ineffective'. Fascism arose as a movement of political action, and was profoundly imbued with a forceful rejection of the representative and parliamentary system of pre-war liberalism.

⁸⁷ Miguel Gómez Oliver and Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco, 'El estraperlo: forma de resistencia y arma de represión en el primer franquismo', *Studia Histórica. Historia Contemporánea*, 23 (2005), 179–99.

⁸⁸ Juan Francisco Gómez Westermeyer, 'Historia de la delincuencia en la sociedad española: Murcia 1939–1949', Ph.D. thesis, Universidad de Murcia, 2006.

⁸⁹ Ana Cabana, 'Minar la paz social. Retrato de la conflictividad en Galicia durante el primer franquismo', *Ayer*, 61 (2006), 267–88.

⁹⁰ Ángela Cenarro, *La sonrisa de Falange: Auxilio Social en la guerra civil y en la posguerra* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2005), 148–59.

⁹¹ Óscar Rodríguez Barreira, 'El Frente de Juventudes en Almería. Análisis político-social de una delegación de FET-JONS en los 40', unpublished research project, Universidad de Almería, 2002.

⁹² Carme Molinero, *La captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2005), 210–11.

⁹³ José Antonio Parejo, *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas* (Seville: Bosque de Palabras, 2008), 95–8.

The fascists called for a reconceptualisation of the nation, now understood as a vital community possessing a memorable shared past, which was frequently revealed through myths, fables, allegories and symbols.

The rise of Francoism was no exception. Franco's regime was a product of a civil war that involved the crystallisation of an ideology uniting both previously existing and new cultural components with a fascist or intensely fascistised origin. In the rearguard and on the front line, a 'culture of victory' would be created that, not without difficulty, would grant unity to the rebel group. This culture was not only imposed from above, but also developed from a combination of existing traditions and new situations. At that time, mythical and regenerative elements arose that made it possible to see the 'Crusade' as the decisive moment when the 'true Spain' would rise from its ashes. These visions were embraced by heterogeneous right-wing groups and by the varied range of social classes who fought to end the Republic. In the clamour of battle, this culture became an element of unity among the victors.

The civil war ended. Yet Franco's regime advocated the perpetuation of its memory and non-reconciliation: the 1940s became a continuation of this culture of war, with constant reminders of the 'Crusade' and an idea of Spain that discriminated between victors and vanquished. The 'community of victory' remained alive in the post-war period, integrating and giving strength to Francoism's political project.

As some of the local examples given in this article show, the 'culture of victory' conditioned the lives, perceptions and actions of Francoism's supporters, making it possible for the community of victors and the regime itself to interact. This explains the direct involvement of many men and women in the work of repression, control and policing of the so-called 'enemies of Spain' and the participation that the regime's supporters were ready to provide. Through a variety of institutions, the management of power followed the same logic of the 'culture of victory': the victors would negotiate the difficult post-war conditions and even obtain tempting benefits, while the vanquished, the lowest classes, would live trapped by poverty and hunger, a continuation of the repressive maze in which they would find themselves in Franco's Spain.

The 'culture of victory', constructed on mythical approaches that arose during the civil war, became an essential element – although not the only one – used by the regime in its search for stability and longevity. Francoism's supporters, those heterogeneous middle classes that actively participated in the movement's birth during the civil war and in its continuity during the post-war period, extracted from those mythical approaches a 'corpus' of ideas and values in which to believe. It was this culture that helped them to interpret the convulsed world in which they lived as a reality that was in need of profound regeneration, giving them the necessary justification to eliminate the enemy and guarantee their own economic progress.