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The Concept of Poetic Invention in Sixteenth-Century England

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A mis padres,

con inefable gratitud

Contents

Introduction

The term *invention* had a considerably wide range of meanings in the sixteenth century: it referred to a mental faculty, the application of that mental power, its products (such as poems or plays, or any other objects unrelated to art), and to the idea behind an artifact or work of art that occurred in the deviser's mind and that guided the generative process. Furthermore, all arts and sciences (poetry included) were thought to have been invented and therefore were inventions themselves, and certainly invention was a praiseworthy aspect in good literary compositions. Ultimately, invention pointed at man's capacities to create in the wider sense of the verb. As Ullrich Langer has stated, "in the European Renaissance the term invention has many senses, several of which inform poetic theory and literary criticism: a 'discovery', a 'finding', the 'faculty of discovery' but also the 'thing found'; something close to 'imagination', 'wit', and positively or pejoratively a 'technique' or 'artifice'", and "Dominating the concept of poetic invention is the meaning of *inventio* in (mainly Latin) rhetorical theory"[1].

According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, *invention* entered the English lexicon in the final decades of the thirteenth century through the Old French voices *invencion*, *envention*. The *OED* recognizes that 'invention' had acquired by the sixteenth century meanings that define it as "The action of devising, contriving, or making up; contrivance, fabrication", "A fictitious statement or story; a fabrication, fiction, figment", and as "Something devised or produced by original contrivance; a method or means of doing something, an instrument, an art, etc. originated by the ingenuity of some person, and previously unknown; an original contrivance or device". The first of the eleven meanings that the *OED* records for invention is "The action of coming upon

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[1] (Langer 2000, 136)

or finding; the action of finding out; discovery (whether accidental, or the result of search and effort)", which nowadays is archaic but remains in the phrase the "Invention of the Cross"[2]. This meaning of *invention* as the action of 'finding' is precisely that of rhetorical invention: "The finding out or selection of topics to be treated, or arguments to be used", firstly appearing in English in Hawes's *Pastime of Pleasure* (1509).

Inventio is traditionally taken as the Latin version of the Greek εὕρεσις, meaning "a finding, discovery", or "invention, conception", and related to the verb εὑρίσκω, meaning "to find out, discover" or "devise, invent". Invention is the first of the five parts of classical rhetoric and encompasses the three modes of proof (*pisteis*) or modes of persuasion: *ethos*, or persuasion through the character of the orator; *pathos*, persuasion through raising the passions of the audience; and *logos*, the proofs on which discourse itself depends[3]. These three elements become in the Latin tradition the well-known *delectare* (emotional proof), *movere* (passional proof) and *docere* (rational proof), of which Horace would assign to poetry the famous *aut prodesse....aut delectare* (line 333 of Horace's *Ars Poetica*)[4]. Furthermore, 'invention' and the topics belong to the field of dialectic or logic. Given that the final aim of my doctoral research is investigating into the meanings of poetical invention in sixteenth-century England, and that rhetoric appears a more clearly related discipline than logic or dialectic in this respect, throughout the present work I will focus my attention on rhetoric rather than on dialectic or logic. Hence, even though it is undeniable that poetry and logic have been closely related at specific points in history, for the purposes of my study it is rhetoric the sister field that demands closer observation. My focus on rhetoric should not be

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[2] *Invention of the Cross* alludes to the finding of the Cross in AD 326 by Helena, mother of Emperor Constantine, and, from this event, the Church festival on May 3.

[3] For this reason, Howell argues that for Aristotle "persuasion is a complex human reaction triggered by a rational belief in the truth of the orator's thesis, by an emotional acceptance of the thesis as in some way pleasurable, and by an ethical acceptance of the orator's character as that of a man of good sense, good morals, and good will" (Howell 1980, 54). Aristotle distinguished two types of arguments: firstly, the examples, real of fictive events that allow induction and rational thinking by analogy; secondly, the *enthymema,* deductions, syllogisms with plausible premises.

[4] (Solmsen 1941, 39). According to Friedrich Solmsen, "The system of 'proofs' (*pisteis*) may be called the core of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", and indeed the attention that Aristotle pays in his *Rhetoric* to *heuresis* is a novelty considering that the sophistic tradition tended to stress *taxis* and *lexis*. In addition to this, Aristotle also went against tradition by not "organizing the rhetorical material under the heading of the *partes orationis* (*moria logou*): proem, narration, etc." (Solmsen 1941, 37).

interpreted as a denial or underestimation of the far-reaching relations between poetry

and logic in the sixteenth century, which have been extensively explored by scholars

such as Rosemond Tuve, who in fact asserts the following on this subject:

> The connections of poetry with logic, though less apparent, held with equal firmness
> and unself-consciousness. The subtlest methods of dialectic were not denied to poetry as
> an art of persuasion if the latter's own peculiar conditions could also be met. But poetry
> was chiefly considered to be 'grounded in' logic in that it was thought of as reasonable
> discourse, arranging thought in an orderly manner. The laws of logic were the laws of
> thought, and the poet must know and use them; he will not otherwise be able to
> approach truth or direct the mind of man toward it. This last appears to me to be the
> basic Renaissance understanding of the didactic function of poetry.[5]

Rosemond Tuve furthermore asserts that, with time, the close workings of poetry

and logic gave way to poetic images similar to the ones produced by logic, for it was

with ease that "poets moved from the province of logic to that of poetic"[6]. Thus,

devising poetic images derived from logical processes was "chiefly a matter of the

transference of habitual modes of thought which had been engrained by years of

familiarity, of practice, of analysis"[7]. In this manner, Rosemond Tuve bridges the gap

between invention in logic and poetic invention, for "writers trained for years in finding

matter for persuasive, demonstrative, expository, or disputative discourse, by the means

of playing the mind down certain prescribed paths, do not forget this useful process

when they turn to the 'finding' of ways to shape poetic subjects"[8]. Even at the end of

sixteenth-century England, we still find authors loyal to the medieval view that poetry is

part of logic. One of them was the Italian refugee Alberico Gentili, who in his

Commentatio ad l[egem] III C[odicis] de prof[essoribus] et med[icis], published in

Oxford in 1593, affirmed that "poetry may be considered to be a part of logic no less

than rhetoric is", and that

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[5] (Tuve 1972, 282-283)
[6] (Tuve 1972, 284)
[7] (Tuve 1972, 284)
[8] (Tuve 1972, 310). For more on this subject, see Rosemond Tuve, "Imagery and Logic: Ramus and Metaphysical Poetics." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 3.4 (1942): 365-400.

> *The poetic art, which hands down precepts about writing a poem, is no doubt a part of logic, since it is engaged in propounding the construction of examples; just as rhetoric is a part of dialectic, since it teaches about the enthymeme.* And the example and the enthymeme are instruments of logic. The art of poetry lies in this, that it should teach how examples are to be constructed by poets – how to propose a subject to be imitated or shunned.[9]

A result of this coexistence, interdependence and mutual influence between rhetoric, logic or dialectic and poetics, is that these three fields share a number of common terms while at the same time each art enriches these words with different shades of meaning and implications. Scholars such as Wesley Trimpi have reflected on the fact that many terms from literary theory were originally taken from the discourses of rhetoric and logic, which may often explain the complexity of each term's connotations:

> Discussions of literary theory drew most extensively upon the terminologies of philosophy and rhetoric, both of which had their conservative (specialized) and liberal (unspecialized) forms. For philosophy the 'liberal' form was the 'specific' question of ethics which defined the good in relation to particular human action; for rhetoric it was 'generic' question of justice and equity implicit in any particular case. Since the objectives and methods of each of these disciplines were antithetical to those of the other, the terms borrowed from them bequeathed to literary theory an inherent instability. In their most liberal forms, however, the two disciplines most nearly approached each other and offered their terms to the literary theorist at a point where such terms might least reflect their antithetical origins.[10]

For other critics such as John M. Steadman, the polysemous nature of literary terms such as 'invention' is an indication of "the difficulty that critics experienced in correlating and reconciling the terminology of logic and rhetoric and in imposing this terminology on literature and the visual arts"[11].

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[9] (Binns 1999, 89). In Latin: "dialecticae pars poetica non minus, quam rhetorica censeatur: (…) Haec scilicet ars, quae de scribendo poemate praecepta tradit, quia in constitutione exempli tradenda occupatur, pars est dialecticae: sicut et rhetorica eiusdem pars est, quoniam de enthymemate docet. Et exemplum, atque enthymemata sunt instrumenta logica. Ars poetica in eo est, ut doceat, quomodo conficienda exempla a poetis sint, qui quid velit imitandum, aut fugiendum proponere" (Binns 1999, 88). The italics in this quotation, as well as the italics of the rest of the quotations in this thesis, are mine unless stated otherwise.

[10] (Trimpi 1974, 1)

[11] (Steadman 1974, 183). Steadman extensively discusses the various meanings of invention in the Renaissance in the following way: "Invention (literally 'finding') originally referred to the choice of argument; the orator selected his proofs from among the commonplaces (topics) of invention. This term was later extended to other arts and sciences. The poet's theme or subject was his 'argument' or

In the Renaissance, invention was a necessary requirement for the good orator and the outstanding poet. If through his invention the orator had to discover arguments and proofs, the poet exercised his own invention partly through imitation. The centrality of the concept of poetic invention in the sixteenth century is apparent: invention was a *sine qua non* condition for good poetry, and an indispensable term for sixteenth-century poets in describing the process of excellent poetry writing. The chief two concepts associated with poetic invention in sixteenth-century English writings on poetry are, on the one hand, imitation or mimesis, inherited from literary theories stretching back to Classical Antiquity, and, on the other, imagination, an already existing notion in other disciplines and an incipiently developing one within the field of literary terminology. The working hypothesis of this doctoral research is that, in the history of the relation between imitation, invention and imagination, the sixteenth century constitutes a key moment of transition. From the predominant and omnipresent notion of imitation inherited from classical theory, to the indisputable importance assigned to imagination by the Romantics in later centuries, the Renaissance concept of invention appears caught in between, carrying a clearly distinct meaning nonexistent in Classical theory, and never again alive after the radical shift initiated by Romanticism. As a result, invention holds but a marginal place in current meta-poetic discourse, for, as Grahame Castor remarks, "in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with the triumph of the 'romantic' view of art as an independent product of the human mind (…) invention was superseded by the concepts of genius, originality, and creative imagination"[12]. Thus, the sixteenth-century concept of poetic invention, while still oozing with the implications of its parent-concept (that of rhetorical invention),

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invention; and the rhetorical background of medieval poetics is apparent in terms like *troubadour* and *trouvère*. Musical compositions are 'inventions'; so are scientific discoveries and technological innovations, thanks to Bacon's rhetorical education. The same term was also applied to the 'conceit,' an image or argument based on the correspondence between two different things or ideas, and it thus became closely associated with wit and ingenuity. The same designation could also be applied to an entire poem or story, and to an emblem or device.
  In painting, 'invention' could refer to the subject, to a symbol or iconographical motif, or on occasion to composition and design as well" (Steadman 1974, 180).

[12] (Castor 1964, 86)

smoothly guides the passage from the Classical notion of literature as imitation to the conception of literature as the product of the author's creative imagination and original thinking.

Although imagination became prevalent in literary discourse from the late eighteenth century onwards, and ever since then irreplaceable, it was the Renaissance that laid the foundation for 'imagination' as part of standard literary terminology, for imagination had been previously discussed only in studies of the human mind, often related to the theory of the humors. This shift by which imagination was transplanted into literary discourse occurred discretely, as imagination was considerably distrusted in the sixteenth century and later on. Ancient thought had not formulated a theory of the poetic mind partly because poetry had been then explained as the result of the phenomenon of divine inspiration, partly because the Greeks had focused their attention on the link between poetry and external reality, and not on the axis uniting the mind of the artist with the artistic object. As a result, imagination (rather, fantasy) does not appear in Aristotle's *Poetics*, but, instead, in *De anima*, containing his discussions on the nature of the soul. Neither did the Middle Ages elaborate a consistent and systematic theory upon the faculty of poetic insight, and, as Murray Bundy remarks, although "There was much interest in the psychology and the ethics of the imagination, and there were mystical views of the symbolic imagination with which Dante was acquainted", "save for Dante's use of these views, there was little pointing directly to our modern concept"[13]. It was only in the late Middle Ages that rhetorical notions were adapted to explain poetry and instruct students in poetry-writing; hence, concepts such as *inventio*, *dispositio*, and *elocutio* were introduced with slight modifications into medieval poetics. During the Renaissance, these (originally) rhetorical concepts growing in the field of poetics bloomed and mutated to develop new meanings. It was this terminological metamorphosis that opened the way for imagination to pass, later on, from the domain of 'psychology' into the meta-literary arena.

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[13] (Bundy 1930b, 536)

Among the significant number of studies devoted to Renaissance understandings of imagination, it is worthwhile to mention Baxter Hathaway's *The Age of Criticism: The Late Renaissance in Italy*, which discusses in detail the concept of imagination in Renaissance Italy, focusing on the thought of Francesco Patrizi, Sperone Speroni, Tomitano, Girolamo Fracastoro, Francesco Robortelli, Mazzoni, Torquato Tasso, Daniele Barbaro, and Giovani Battista Gelli. Then, sixteenth-century French poetry has been thoroughly studied in a number of works, such as Warner Forrest Patterson's foundational *Three Centuries of French Poetic Theory: A Critical History of the Chief Arts of Poetry in France*, Robert John Clements's *Critical Theory and Practice of the Pléiade*, or Terence Cave's *The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance*. Brian Barron's chapter "Poetry and Imagination in the Renaissance" specifically focuses on the notion of imagination by paying attention to actual poems rather than exclusively concentrating on theoretical works[14], and Matthew W. Maguire's *The Conversion of Imagination: From Pascal through Rousseau to Tocqueville* continues investigating the concept throughout seventeenth-century France. In the French context, Grahame Castor's *Pléiade Poetics* undoubtedly constitutes the most important study of reference for my work, as Castor dives deeply into the exploration of the interrelation between the concepts of invention, imitation and imagination, in the context of Renaissance French literature. Castor observes two facets in the term invention: on the one hand, invention held the implication of 'finding' and consequently became "the first step in the Aristotelian process of imitation"[15]; on the other, "Invention was the name used to designate the element of originality, as we would nowadays call it, in a work of art"[16], and so, "in this sense it was the opposite of

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[14] Barron's chapter is included in *Poetry in France: Metamorphoses of a Muse*. Keith Aspley and Peter France ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992. 61-82).

[15] (Castor 1964, 11)

[16] Grahame Castor is cautious to make clear that "the sixteenth-century concept of invention is by no means equivalent to the modern concept of creative imagination, nor are our ideas and attitudes concerning imagination tout court the same as those of Ronsard and his contemporaries", for among other things, "In the sixteenth century the concepts of invention and imagination were embedded in a system of metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology which differs in a number of very important respects from the one we use today" (Castor 1964, 12).

imitation (of other authors)"[17]. In addition to this, Castor remarks that both invention and imagination "embody, in part at least, sixteenth-century views on the active functions of the mind in relation to reality", given that "In both processes the mind is at grips with things outside itself, using them for its own purposes, which in our context are the production of poetry"[18]. Throughout my study I will repeatedly refer to Castor to underline similarities or differences between the conclusions of his research on invention and imagination in France, and my research, centered in England.

In *The Mirror and the Lamp*, M. H. Abrams explains the movement from imitation to imagination as the leaving behind of the Renaissance and Neoclassic metaphor of the mirror and its replacement by the typically Romantic metaphor of the lamp, which draws attention to the mind of the literary creator as a source of creative energy that illuminates the world –in contrast with the conception of literature as a mirror that reflects, even if distortedly, the outside reality. Although scholars owe much to Abram's analyses of these concepts, in this dissertation I do not take the concepts of imitation and imagination as full antonyms, for their connection goes well beyond (and is far more complex than) mere opposition. Indeed, the critic C. O. Brink aptly states that "imitation does not preclude imagination, and did not preclude it in Latin letters"[19]; A. J. Smith asserts that in Classical Antiquity "The material could be common, and even negligible, the manner of its application was to be individual; originality lay not at all in what you said but in the way you said it, or at least, in the new use you made of old matter"[20]; and Brian Vickers affirms that, in the Renaissance, the expectation was for writers to "achieve *originality* through a process of *imitation*"[21]. Also, even if in comments on poetry from the sixteenth-century invention opposes absolute imitation (as inventing ultimately means that the author does not draw upon other authors for material but relies on his own genius to come up with a novel subject, story, or manner

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[17] (Castor 1964, 11)
[18] (Castor 1964, 12)
[19] (Brink 1953, 20)
[20] (Smith 1964, 216)
[21] (Vickers 2003, 1)

or style to approach it), invention is not synonymous with imagination or the purely Romantic notion of originality, and even, as Roland Mortier explains, "l'opposition entre imitation et originalité devient un faux problème: l'une est licite lorsqu'elle n'est pas copie servile et l'autre seveut l'antonyme de la convention ou du cliché"[22].

The separating line between inventive writing and imitation often becomes extremely fine in the sixteenth century, as it appears manifest in the case of sixteenth-century translations. According to Sébillet, in his time the *version* was "the most common and better received poem by great poets and learned readers"[23], which makes the critic Robert J. Clements conclude that "there might be actually little difference between a creative work and an imitation"[24]. Clements asserts that "While the poems presented as original works had a large element of translation in them", "pieces presented as translations often had a large share of free creation in them"[25], and that "Sometimes the distinction became so fine that the Pléiade poet must have been uncertain whether to call the work a translation or not" –as Clements claims happens with some mid-century translations from Petrarch, which "could be considered either original or plagiarized works, as you wish"[26]. This critic twists things further in his conclusion:

> One would normally be tempted to conclude from this that only the *paraphrastes* and *imitateurs* could be classed as creators by the Pléiade, and the *traducteurs* and *translateurs* as mere copyists. This did not always prove to be the case, however. Jamyn, Lavardin, Salel, Belleau (as translator of Anacreon), who did no more than translate, were praised for the natural qualities (naïveté), originality, sweetness, utility of their writings, just as though they were creating new works out of their own imagination, and were judged as independent artists.[27]

It needs be admitted that, when analysing sixteenth-century literary compositions, on some occasions it is hard for the critic to label a work as a translation or an invention

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[22] (Mortier 1982, 24)
[23] In French: "le Poème plus fréquent et mieux reçu des estimés Poètes et des doctes lecteurs" (Sébillet 1990, 146). Unless stated otherwise, the translation of extracts from works by Sébillet, Peletier, Ronsard and other French authors have been carried out by Rose Delale and me.
[24] (Clements 1942, 262)
[25] (Clements 1942, 262)
[26] (Clements 1942, 262)
[27] (Clements 1942, 264-265)

by an author inspired or influenced by another's writings in a different tongue. On other occasions, the problem arises when comparing an alleged translation with its source text, only to discover the great liberties taken by the translator when rendering the work into a different language, which almost make the translation independent from its model. Nevertheless, if in the practice a differentiation between a translation, a version, or an invented composition may be blurry, when focusing on the terminological distinctions present in sixteenth-century meta-literary comments, we discover that, at least at the level of the theory, differences do exist between the concepts of translation, imitation, and invented work. Effectively, even if the efforts of the translator or the imitator are acknowledged when their work is of outstanding quality, the highest praise is always awarded to the works produced by the writer's "own invention". For instance, in the sixteenth century Du Bellay affirmed that translations were not enough to elevate the status of the French tongue and to put it on a par with the Classical languages; to achieve that, France needed instead works sprung from the invention of poets. Thus, the praise of invention in the Renaissance anticipates the more overwhelming one of originality during Romanticism and later. Certainly, even if the much praised sixteenth-century invention is different from Romantic originality, it still points at what is novel, non-imitatory, and non-translated.

The fact that in the sixteenth century invention was a requirement for a poet to be crowned with glory and fame explains that imitators of the time tried to make their works pass as inventions, and used their prefaces to highlight their inventiveness. Likewise, it is quite unsurprising that translations frequently advertised themselves as imitations, as in this scheme of thought imitations were less removed from true inventiveness than translations. Invention was definitely hailed as the necessary natural gift for poetry composition endowed to a few chosen poets who could of course then train it to improve their poetic skills. Unlike the rare gift of invention, imagination was perceived as universal, as present in everybody, as an essential mental faculty that grants thinking. Indeed, it is not sixteenth-century notions of imagination but the

sixteenth-century concept of poetic invention that is the true predecessor of the Romantic idea of originality.

My doctoral research traces the development and transformations of 'invention' from Classical Antiquity, through the Middle Ages, the early Renaissance, and the sixteenth century. I aim to show how, from being a rigid rhetorical and logical concept, 'invention' gradually entered the field of poetics, and how poets and playwrights, particularly during the sixteenth century and all over Western Europe, employed it when describing their own creative works and when conceptualizing the poetry-writing process. Not only did invention allude to a necessary mental requirement a good poet had to have, but also referred to the most precious quality of a literary composition, to the essence that distinguished it from previous works and made it special, to what separated it from slavish imitation of worshipped models and from translation, and, in short, what awarded everlasting poetic glory to an author. It is my claim that invention occupied a transitional step between the classical concept of literary *mimesis* and the powerful Romantic notions of literary imagination and originality. The conceptual richness of 'invention' no doubt lies in its intermediary position, as it concentrates many of the complexities and tensions of the Renaissance.

Chapter 1 of this work offers a general overview of the history of rhetorical (and, more briefly, logical) invention from Antiquity to the end of the sixteenth century in Europe, with a special focus on England. Hence, it starts by discussing Plato and Aristotle's conception of rhetoric and its different parts, to continue with the transformation of the Greek *ευρήσεις* into the Latin *inventio* (the direct antecessor of the English 'invention'), its development through the Middle Ages and the continental Renaissance, and its final treatment in sixteenth-century England both at grammar schools as well as at universities. Chapter 2 discusses the history of the interrelation between rhetoric and poetics from Antiquity until the end of the Middle Ages. Its goal is to illustrate how, for centuries, both rhetoric and poetics influenced each other to the point that, during the Middle Ages, the rhetoricized *artes poetriae* began to employ

rhetorical terminology (notions such as *inventio*, *dispositio* or *elocutio*) to conceptualize the process of poetry writing. It is from this moment onwards that invention became a household term to refer to the first stage of poetic composition. Chapter 3 provides an overview of how rhetoric influenced poetics throughout the Renaissance, particularly in Italy, France, and England, and explores the role of the translations of Aristotle's *Poetics* into the vernaculars in reshaping the general notions on poetics of the time. Furthermore, Chapter 3 analyses in detail the connection between the strong anti-poetic sentiment in sixteenth-century England and the Protestant Reformation, and goes through some of the well-known defences of poetry (the first serious reflections on poetry of Renaissance England) that followed the attacks against poetry and tried to prove them wrong.

The powerful idea of mimesis or imitation, inherited from Classical Antiquity, is the main subject of Chapter 4, which explores the origins of the concept in Ancient Greece and its transformation through the Italian, French and English Renaissance. In the English context, imitation will again be placed within the framework of the Reformation, and its consequent differences with Italian ideas on imitation will be pointed out. Additionally, particular attention will be aimed at the relation between the work of art and nature, the work of art and its models and predecessors, and the anxiety that often manifests in Renaissance authors that attempted to emulate their models by diverging from them in praiseworthy ways. In addition to drawing from a myriad of sources and authors, Chapter 4 will finally analyse Sidney's and Shakespeare's ideas on poetry and imitation more in detail.

The occurrences of the concept of invention in sixteenth-century English works receive full attention in Chapter 5. With the purpose of satisfactorily elucidating the meanings and contexts in which this notion appears, five different types of written works have been combed: first, books of rhetoric; second, works discussing poetics; in the third place, writings that relate (rather, contrast) invention to translation; fourthly, emblem books; and finally, entries in sixteenth-century dictionaries. A study of all this

material evinces the importance within literary discourse of the concept of invention, not only in England but also in France and Italy, the countries taken as major references by English Renaissance writers. Invention is made the heart and essence of Renaissance poetry (*i.e.*, fiction), understood in opposition to imitation and translation, and seen as far closer to emulation, imagination, fantasy, fancy and wit. Concurrently, on some occasions invention is still associated to the rhetorical implication of 'finding' typical of the Classical rhetorical definition of invention, and of medieval ideas on poetic and rhetorical invention. Finally, it will be remarked that invention did have a negative side and was at times distrusted in the sixteenth century because of its active nature and uncooperativeness with reason.

The connection between invention and imagination in the sixteenth century will be developed further in Chapter 6, which begins by tracing the origins of the theory of inspiration and discusses its rather scarce presence in sixteenth-century English works on poetics. The development of the concept of imagination will be explained within the sixteenth-century Italian, French, and, specially, English poetic thought. It will be seen how imagination, in origin a concept found in physiology and works on the human mind and soul, was gradually introduced within literary discourse to the extent that it often became intimately associated with invention. Imagination's dark side is exponentially higher than invention's, and, as with other literary terms, its connotations were affected by the Protestant Reformation –which associated imagination and its products with Papistry and Catholicism. As with imitation, the analysis of both Sidney's and Shakespeare's works will more profoundly reflect upon the particular uses of imagination in literary or meta-literary writings.

Finally, the Conclusions of this doctoral dissertation will look beyond sixteenth-century thought and focus instead on the evolution of the concepts of invention and imagination during the seventeenth century, a time when modern science was beginning to establish and conform itself with the work of Sir Francis Bacon and the members of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge, as well as with the

ideas of Thomas Hobbes and early British Empiricists such as John Locke. Although it was a time when the subsequent Romantic notions of imagination, originality, and creative genius were still in their embryonic phase, the anxiety of influence that Harold Bloom identifies as operating in Shakespeare (though not, according to Bloom, in most of his contemporaries[28]) is, I would argue, equally widespread among virtually any ambitious Renaissance author. Indeed, it was precisely the sixteenth-century concept of invention that contained and carried this straining and far-reaching poetic anxiety that encouraged emulation while condemning plain and unassuming imitation.

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[28] Bloom in fact asserts that "Shakespeare belongs to the giant age before the flood, before the anxiety of influence became central to poetic consciousness" (Bloom 1997, 11).

1

Rhetorical Invention up to and through the Sixteenth Century

The concept of invention comes from the field of rhetoric and dialectic or logic, hence the importance of closely tracking the appearance of this notion in Antiquity and its evolution until the end of the sixteenth century within the European rhetorical and logical tradition. The present chapter discusses the ideas about invention held by the most important authors that reflected upon invention up until the end of the sixteenth century. Among the Ancients we find the thought of Aristotle, Cicero, the unknown author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian, and Hermogenes of Tarsus; in the Middle Ages the works by, among others, St. Augustine of Hippo, Boethius, Hrabanus Maurus, Peter of Spain and John of Salisbury stand out; and during the Renaissance, scholars such as George of Trebizond, Lorenzo Valla, Rudolphus Agricola, Juan Luis Vives, Philipp Melanchthon and Petrus Ramus continued reflecting upon invention (either within the field of rhetoric or dialectic). In addition to offering a general overview of the most relevant contributions up to and through the Renaissance in this matter, this chapter analyzes the manner in which both rhetoric and logic were present as subjects of study in the educational system of Western Europe in general, and in the English one in particular, both at the level of grammar schools as well as at the level of universities. Finally, the treatises on rhetoric and dialectic published in English during the sixteenth century will be dealt with, remarking their greater or lesser success, the readership they targeted, their major sources and models, and their views on the central concept of invention.

1.1. Rhetorical Invention: From Aristotle to Ramus

Born in fifth-century BC Sicily, the art of rhetoric had already a considerable tradition by the time Aristotle wrote his *Rhetoric* (*c*. 330 BC). Aristotle was not a mere follower of tradition but the introducer of many major changes. In fact, Aristotle can claim to have systematized the art. Before Aristotle, for instance, forensic oratory had been largely privileged over both deliberative and epideictic oratory, which meant neglecting proofs while focusing on emotions. Before Aristotle as well, Plato had spoken his mind about rhetoric in the dialogues *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, making manifest his distrust of the way rhetoric was generally understood at the time. From Plato's viewpoint, rhetoric aimed at sheer persuasion and production of belief, and not at the acquisition of knowledge. Instead, Plato was of the opinion that the perfect orator had to possess knowledge of the truth and the soul in order to know what is probable and to be able to read the soul of the audience to be persuaded. Aristotle, on his part, dealt in the three books of *Rhetoric* fundamentally with three subjects: first, with the theory of the rhetorical argument, that is, the *enthymeme*; secondly, with the ways of appealing to the audience's prejudices and emotions; and thirdly, with the basic virtues of style (e.g., clarity and appropriateness), and with how to employ the metaphor. Aristotle opens the first chapter of Book III discussing the different parts of rhetoric:

> There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangement of the parts of the speech.
> (…)
> …it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character. In the first place, following the natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself – what gives things themselves their persuasiveness–; in the second place, their arrangement by style; and in the third place, delivery, which is of the greatest importance, but has not yet been treated of by any one.[1]

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[1] (Aristotle 2000, 345; 1403B)

What Aristotle refers to as "the sources of proofs" has been labelled a "theory of argumentation" that constitutes the backbone of rhetoric and "at the same time provides the decisive link between rhetoric and demostrative logic and therefore with philosophy"[2]. This "theory of argumentation" corresponds to what Roman rhetoricians later identified as *inventio*, understood as the finding of arguments and proofs along with the development and refutation of other arguments. *Inventio*, according to the *Ad Herennium*, was the "devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing"[3]. Even if Aristotle only mentions three points in rhetoric, his description constituted the basis of the subsequently widely accepted division of rhetoric into invention, arrangement, style, delivery and memory –memory being a later addition entering the scheme in the Hellenistic period. The Greek verb εὑρίσκω, meaning 'to discover' or 'to find', and the noun εὑρήσεις are the ancestors of the Latin concept of *inventio*, and therefore of the English 'invention'. Unfortunately, invention remains understood throughout Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and both Plato and Quintilian made references to it without accompanying the word with an exact definition.

Ars and *ingenium*, technique and the personal skills of the orator, come together to carry out the process of *inventio*: personal ability is channeled by technique, which provides the orator with the necessary systematization to overcome the unreflective finding of ideas. Probably the greatest means to invent in rhetoric was by using the topics, and, in fact, the system of the places (τόποι in Greek, *loci* in Latin) has been defined as the "chief engine of rhetorical invention"[4], a storehouse that supplies the orator with material for his speech. Thus, topics or places "consist in basic 'search' formulas which can lead to the discovery of a fitting idea"[5]; they are "points of

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[2] (Ricoeur 1996, 324)
[3] (Cicero 1968, 7; I.2.3.). In Latin: "Inventio est excogitation rerum verarum aut veri similium quae causam probabilem reddant" (Cicero 1968, 6).
[4] (Monfasani 1976, 243). Ever since Cicero and Quintilian, though, the theory of the topics seems to transcend the limits of *inventio* and *argumentatio*, affecting the other parts of discourse as well (Saiz Noeda 1998, 739-741).
[5] (Lausberg 1998, 119)

departure which have to be available in a concrete situation for a discussion"[6], or "a kind of table of empty forms that can be of assistance in looking for arguments"[7]. Hence, topics are not arguments in themselves but rather heuristic devices. Definition, genus, species, wholes, parts, relatives, comparisons, opposites and witnesses fall within the list of the topics. Some critics recognize Protagoras as the devisor of the concept of the *topoi,* for he explained "the art of finding the Pro and contra on all questions which could be put forward in a speech"[8]. For others, Aristotle's *Topics* and *Rhetoric* would systematize and develop this theory whose origins they locate in Anaximander[9]. As Friedrich Solmsen remarks, "The tópoi had before Aristotle been ready-made arguments or commonplaces" and "referred invariably to particular subjects in the sense that the orator had his ready-made commonplaces", but Aristotle

> replaces this method by an altogether different system of *tópoi*, conceiving the *tópos* as a 'type' or 'form' of argument of which you need grasp only the basic structural idea to apply it forthwith to discussions about any and every subject. Once you have grasped the *tópos* of the 'More and Less' you will be able to argue: If not even the gods know everything, human beings will certainly not know everything; or, Whoever beats his father will certainly also beat his neighbours.[10]

Even though Aristotle's *Topics* does not include a definition of the term[11], his *Rhetoric* describes the topic as an element of an enthymeme, and in the *Metaphysics* he defines elements of demonstrations as "the primary demonstrations which are contained in a number of other"[12]. Aristotle distinguished two sets of *topoi*: a group of dialectical *topoi* for discussions of philosophical and scientific nature, and another of rhetorical *topoi*. Dialectical *topoi* have been traditionally defined as "logical principles to be used to examine an intellectual proposition", as strategies that "take on a commonplacing

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[6] (Grassi 1980, 42)

[7] (IJsseling 1976, 30)

[8] (Untersteiner 1954, 29)

[9] Lloyd (1966) defends this position. For more on the origins and historical development of the analytic *topoi* see (D'Angelo 1984).

[10] (Solmsen 1941, 40)

[11] Aristotle has been "accused" of making "the topics one of the central elements in *Rhetoric* without ever explicitly defining what they are" (Leff 1983, 24).

[12] (Aristotle 1968, 219; V.III.3)

function by which similarities and differences are created within a particular dispute"[13],

or as relational principles "enabling a person to locate and analyze the ways in which a

specific predicate may be attributed to a subject"[14]. In contrast, Aristotle viewed

rhetorical topics as "an amalgam of miscellaneous molds into which rhetorical

arguments usually are cast"[15]. The differences between both types of places have also

been explained by saying that while dialectical places (such as definition, genus,

species, and the like) contributed to truth and knowledge, rhetorical places were

generally related to ethics and "more adaptable to persuasion of the emotions than to

intellectual conviction of a scientific sort", and "were also used for amplification and

embellishment of the oration"[16]. Certainly, Aristotle's logic has no proper content of its

own but deals with the purely formal process of rational thinking. While dialectic is

more concerned with likeliness of statements, rhetoric instead focuses on their capacity

to persuade[17]. Aristotle furthermore distinguished between common or universal topics

(*koinoi topoi*) and special or subject specific topics (*eide*). The first are a group of

twenty-eight lines of argument to be used in whichever type of discourse independent of

any specific subject matter. The second group, *eide*, have a limited extension since they

apply to certain subjects and provide content for particular types of discourse such as

epideictic or ceremonial, deliberative or political, or judicial[18].

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[13] (Heidlebaugh 2001, 85)

[14] (Ochs 1969, 425)

[15] (Ochs 1969, 425)

[16] (Lechner 1962, 228)

[17] Gordon Leff has summarized the difference between topical theory in rhetoric and dialectic in Aristotle in the following way: "In both faculties the topics deal with inference; thus in both faculties they prove opposite sides of an issue indifferently, and they consist in principles or strategies that enable an arguer to connect reasons with conclusions for the purpose of effecting a proof. The nature of inference in dialectic and rhetoric, however, differs significantly, and hence the topics proper to each of these faculties assume a different character. Dialectical argument is predicative, and its fundamental elements are the terms of a proposition. (...) Consequently, dialectical topics provide a lore of predicables, and the key issue is the way in which terms relate to one another within the propositions of an argument. In rhetoric, however, it is the proposition and not the term which emerges as the atomic unit of discourse" (Leff 1983, 25).

[18] Scholars such as Ellen Quandahl believe that "Aristotle's common topics are part of a theory of interpretation rather than a collection of devices for invention", and consequently, "it is both more Aristotelian and more useful to understand composing as interpretation and not invention" (Quandahl 1986, 128). The source of which she considers an "error in traditional readings is the assumption that the topics are Aristotle's system of invention. These readings may owe a great deal to Cicero, whose *Orator* gives a quick and rather dogmatic review of topics" (Quandahl 1986, 135). For more on Aristotle's notion of the topics, see S. J. William Grimaldi, "The Aristotelian Topics", *Traditio*, 14 (1958): 1-16.

In the Latin context, Cicero places rhetoric and dialectic under the concept of *disserere*, indicating that both have to do with discourse. Cicero argues that systematic treatment of discourse is made up of two parts: the first being invention, identified with the topics, and the second, judgment. For Cicero, invention is primordial and involves the discovery of new arguments, while judgment tests arguments, proves conclusions, and verifies statements. Dialectic typically has the form of an argumentation in dialogue, whereas rhetoric produces an *oratio*, an uninterrupted discourse; the *ratio disputandi et loquendi* corresponds to dialectic, while the *ratio dicendi et ornandi* corresponds to the rhetorician. Cicero's *Topica* is not an explication of Aristotle's *Topics* but Cicero's singular interpretation of the former merged with his own beliefs. Indeed, it has been stated that both Cicero and Quintilian show a more judicial and practical approach to the doctrine of the topics in contrast with the more philosophical overtones of Aristotle's postulates regarding it[19].

At the beginning of his *Topica*, Cicero explains that Aristotle's *Topics* "contained a system developed by Aristotle for inventing arguments so that we might come upon them by a rational system without wandering about"[20]. Topics fall for Cicero in two categories: technical places from which arguments are derived by art, and atechnical places from which they are derived without art. Since *De oratore* displays exactly the same topics as *Topica*, and since in *Topica* Cicero dealt with rhetorical matters such as the *genera oratorum* or the status doctrine, it seems that both the rhetorician and the dialectician draw their arguments from the same source, and even use the same method of topical invention. Certainly, as Cicero's *Topica* makes manifest, dialectical *topoi* were eventually incorporated into the rhetorical repertoire, thus blurring rhetorical and dialectical theories of invention. Furthermore, Cicero produced the first identification of arguments with places when he divided the latter into internal and external, a division that, until that moment, was exclusive to arguments[21]. In the *Topica*, Cicero defines "a

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[19] (Saiz Noeda 1998, 738)
[20] (Cicero 1960, 383; I.2)
[21] (Luján Atienza 2003, 177)

topic as the region of an argument, and an argument as a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a matter about which there is some doubt"[22]. For doing all this, Cicero has been found responsible for the Renaissance confusion between dialectical and rhetorical invention, as humanists in this followed Cicero instead of Aristotle[23].

In the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the distinction between common and special topics disappeared, and topics became "text bound"[24], turning into a strategy to search for material to develop parts of the text rather than continuing being heuristic devices that fostered the process of knowledge inquiry. By the time of Quintilian, topics had come to stand for familiar quotations, recurrent sayings or arguments. In these circumstances, commonplaces were not used for invention but memorized, and commonplace books "became collections of aphorisms and verses rather than arts of invention"[25]. This has been connected with the fact that, by the end of Cicero's lifetime and throughout Quintilian's career, the political climate of the Empire "became increasingly hostile to invention of any kind" and to "open-ended inquiry"[26]. Nonetheless, Quintilian did not regard topics as ends in themselves, but as means for the

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[22] (Cicero 1960 387; II.8). Quintilian distinguishes between commonplaces and *argumentorum loci*, defining the latter very much like Cicero: "areas in which Arguments lurk and from which they have to be drawn out" (Quintilian 2001, 375, 377; V.10.20). In Latin: *sedes argumentorum, in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda* (Quintilian 2001, 374).

[23] (González 1987, 322). For more on Cicero's rhetorical system, see Donovan J. Ochs, "Cicero's Rhetorical Theory. With Synopses of Cicero's Seven Rhetorical Works" in *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric* (James Jerome Murphy, Richard A. Katula, Forbes I. Hill, and Donovan J. Ochs, eds. Mahwah, N.J.: Hermagoras Press, 2003. 151-200).

[24] (Lauer 2003, 23)

[25] (McKeon 1998, 44)

[26] (Lauer 1984,134). To the assumption defended by many critics that the change from the political system of the Republic to that of the Empire resulted in a decay of rhetoric, Jeffrey Walker responds that "although there certainly were changes in sociopolitical conditions and rhetorical practices, there was no 'decline of rhetoric' in any meaningful sense in either the Hellenistic or the Roman period" (Walker 2000, ix). Furthermore, regarding the general view that rhetoric depends or blooms within a democratic political system, Jeffrey Walker states that rhetoric can actually rather be seen as "democracy's condition of possibility" (Walker 2000, x). Elaine Fantham, however, holds the opposite view and believes that since with the arrival of the "imperial administration there was no need for the *suasio* of deliberative oratory; with a perverted or despotic administration there was no possibility of a *dissuasion*". Eventually, argues Fantham, under the Empire "for any man of action and principle, oratory finally became irrelevant or futile" (Fantham 1978, 116). This critic describes the aftermath of this change of circumstances in the following terms: "Of the orators, some used their skill to impress the audience, applying the display of epideictic to the 'real world' of public life; others doggedly persevered in the study of the rhetorical classics, hoping to maintain the constructive relationship between the past and their own generation which had been taught by the theorist under the rubric of *imitatio*. But neither choice could rescue their performance from the mediocrity to which a changed society had doomed them" (Fantham 1978, 116).

student of rhetoric to improve his argument building skills and his ability to form persuasive discourses. In other words, for Quintilian the topics were highly helpful training devices that would exercise the natural persuasive capacity of future orators, and so, they should be used as scaffolds for the students' natural talents. Additionally, the situations an orator can face are so varied that they would challenge even the most rigorous organization of the topics[27]. Students ought not to have, then, a stiff approach to the topics, but should be aware that these cannot be used mechanically, for, inevitably, when students "say the same things in several cases, they will either produce the disgust we feel for cold, twice-served-up food, or else will be disgraced by the detection of their wretched stock-in-trade, so familiar to the audience's memory"[28]. On the contrary, students should not "cling religiously" to their prepared thoughts and overlook or obviate any "brilliant impromptu slant" that may occur to them while speaking, since according to Quintilian "it is deeply stupid to reject any gift the moment brings"[29].

In late Antiquity and the Byzantine period, Hermogenes of Tarsus (second half of the 2nd century AD) was believed author of *On Stases* (or *On Issues*), *On Invention*, *On Ideas* (or *On Types of Style*), and *On Method of Forcefulness*, which became so authoritative in rhetoric that commentaries were written to explicate them, and at the time even overshadowed Aristotle's *Rhetoric*[30]. *On Invention* targeted elementary students of rhetoric who would learn the techniques of declamation (understood as preparation for public speaking in assemblies of civic society and the law courts), and who would be taught how to speak in public on judicial or deliberative themes. *On*

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[27] Gordon Leff affirms that this is the reason why "Quintilian disclaims any intention to devise a fully rigorous and exhaustive topical system" (Leff 1983, 33).

[28] (Quintilian 2001, 295; II.4.29-30). In Latin (p. 294): "Necesse vero his, cum eadem iudiciis pluribus dicunt, aut fastidium moveant velut frigidi et repositi cibi, aut pudorem deprensa totiens audientium memoria infelix supellex".

[29] (Quintilian 2001, 371; X.6.5-6). In Latin (p. 370): "Sed si forte aliqui inter dicendum offulserit extemporales color, non superstitiose cogitatis demum est inhaerendum. (…) Nam ut primum est domo adferre parafam dicendi copiam et certam, ita refutare temporis munera longe stultissimum est". For more on the rhetoric developed by the Romans, see John O. Ward, "Roman Rhetoric and its Afterlife" in *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric* (William J Dominik and Jon Hall, ed. Malden: Blackwell, 2007. 354-366).

[30] Currently, only *On Stases* and *On Ideas of Style* are thought to be the work of Hermogenes of Tarsus.

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Invention was used by many later Greek, Byzantine, and Renaissance students to learn how to construct a declamation. Interestingly, *On Invention* remarkably differs from previous discussions on the matter. George A. Kennedy, editor and translator of the text, notes that it "differs radically from earlier discussions of its subject, omitting much traditional teaching (such as the functions and virtues of the parts of the oration), creating much new terminology, and giving traditional terms, including *epikheirema* and *enthymeme,* unusual meanings"[31] –which may be due to either little knowledge or much disinterest in earlier treatments of invention. Kennedy invariably translates *heuresis* as 'invention', and observes that all throughout the treatise "the author uses *heuresis* in the sense of the sources, topics, or techniques of finding what to say"[32].

The most representative contributions to rhetoric in the Latin Middle Ages were the handbooks on letter writing (*ars dictaminis*), verse composition (*ars poetriae*), and thematic preaching (*ars praedicandi*), along with the many commentaries to *De Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium.* Each of the three medieval rhetorical genres appeared at different times: the *ars dictaminis* was born in the 1080s; the *ars poetriae*, in the 1170s; and the *ars praedicandi*, in about 1200[33]. Of course, the *ars praedicandi* or art of preaching is rooted in "pre-Christian Jewish liturgies, with alterations made by Jesus, St. Paul and other speakers of the New Testament period"[34], and is the only one of the three *artes* to survive "into modern times in basically the same form"[35]. In contrast, the *ars dictaminis* is an authentically medieval invention[36]. The classical rhetorical theory of the Middle Ages was fundamentally dependent upon the Ciceronian *juvenilia*, that is, Cicero's *De Inventione* (known as *rhetorica prima* or *rhetorica vetus*), and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (called *rhetorica nova*), and upon commentaries of these classical texts, since it was not until 1421 that Gerardo Landriani

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[31] (Rabe and Kennedy 2005, xvii)
[32] (Rabe and Kennedy 2005, 5)
[33] (Murphy 2005, 13)
[34] (Murphy 2005, 19)
[35] (Murphy 2005, 25). For more on rhetorical invention in some *ars praedicandi* manuals, see Harry Caplan's "Rhetorical Invention in Some Mediaeval Tractates of Preaching", *Speculum* 2, No. 3 (1927): 284-295.
[36] (Murphy 1974, 194)

retrieved Cicero's *De Oratore*, *Orator* and *Brutus*[37]. Cicero was thus acknowledged *magister eloquentiae*, and when rhetoric entered the curriculum of medieval universities, it was essentially Ciceronian rhetoric.

If Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchis* and *Topics*, both dealing with invention, were popular during the Middle Ages, his *Rhetoric* –not to mention his *Ars poetica*, which went virtually ignored– did not enjoy the same success. The *Rhetoric* became available in the Latin West in the thirteenth century through translations from Arabic, William of Moerbeke being responsible for the most widely used translation, completed *circa* 1270. J. J. Murphy remarks that "encyclopedists like Isidore and Cassiodorus ignore Aristotle's rhetorical theories, and the later compendium writers like Alcuin, Notker Labeo, and Anselm of Besate seem to be unaware of the book's existence"[38]. Then, even though Boethius sees himself as a student of Aristotle, he believes Cicero's rhetoric should constitute the model to follow. Furthermore, the *Rhetoric* is not mentioned in Oxford University statutes until 1431, and even then it appears together with works by Cicero, Ovid and Virgil. Before the fifteenth century it also did not play a noteworthy role in Italy, which was dominated by solid Ciceronianism. In conclusion, Aristotle lacked generalized popularity in the theory of discourse during the Middle Ages, particularly when compared with Cicero's enviable position, for, as has been noted, "there is hardly a major medieval writer who does not mention Cicero whenever there is occasion to speak of discourse"[39].

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[37] In this way, the standard text of Cicero's *Topica*, along with *De sophisticis*, used for introductory courses on dialectic by the end of the twelfth century, were chiefly known through Boethius's version. Guadalupe Lopetegui Semperena discusses one particularly successful commentary on Cicero's *De Inventione* (dating from 4th century and still influential in the Renaissance) in her article "El comentario de Mario Victorino al *De Inventione* de Cicerón." *Revista de Retórica y Teoría de la Comunicación* 7 (2004): 43-62.

[38] (Murphy 1974, 91)

[39] (Murphy 1974, 107). Indeed, "Though used by Cicero, the subsequent direct influence of the *Rhetoric* was rather slight until modern times. The primary reason for this is that it does not deal, at least not specifically, with a number of features of theory which were regarded as especially important in later centuries: stasis theory, the characters of style, and figures of speech" (Kennedy 1989b, 190). Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was certainly considerably distributed, but as a work of moral philosophy rather than on discourse (Murphy 1974, 132).

Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, on its part, enjoyed outstanding popularity in the earlier Middle Ages. It increased its presence and influence during the twelfth century, and truly stood out in the fifteenth, when the humanist Poggio Braccolino found the complete text in the monastery of St. Gall in 1416. Until then, Quintilian had been known for the greater part of the Middle Ages through either some fragments in *florilegia*, the pseudo-Quintilian *Declamationes* (also known as *De causis*), or the two versions of the *textus mutilatus* of the *Institutio* (which nonetheless maintained the section on *inventio* close to Cicero's *De inuentione*). From AD 200 to the fall of the Roman Empire in AD 410 (that is, during the second sophistic period), rhetoric as a practical field of discourse lost force. The stress was then laid on stylistic eloquence and decoration, hardly introducing any innovations in inventional theory; consequently, invention scarcely served an epistemic purpose, but was rather taken as a way to discover pathetic appeals that helped supporting the imperial policies of the time[40]. With the spread of Christianity, efforts were made to apply rhetoric to the interpretation of the Scriptures and the inquiry and communication of Divine truths. Indeed, in the early Middle Ages the liberal arts were considered instrumental to the training of good readers and interpreters of Scripture.

St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), for instance, believed that rhetorical invention was highly useful for theology, since as an art of exegesis it conducted to the discovery of meaning in Sacred Texts, which he believed stored all the truth to be known. Augustine's highly influential *De doctrina Christiana* (396-426), considered "the only extensive discussion of rhetoric from a Christian point of view by an ancient writer"[41], states that "there are two principles on which every treatment of Scriptures depends: the means of discovering {*modus inveniendi*} what is to be understood, and the means of

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[40] Janice M. Lauer observes that "in the Roman empire invention was narrowed to function largely in ceremonial discourse and rarely served an epistemic purpose" (Lauer 2003, 37-38). Rita Copeland maintains a different position. From her studies she sustains that "In late antiquity, rhetoric's force as a praxis diminishes, not because it comes to be identified with figures and tropes, but – just the opposite – because as a formal study it concentrates almost entirely on inventional theory, and leaves the practical problem of negotiating linguistic usage to the grammarians" (Copeland 1995, 62). In this situation, grammatical *enarratio* replaced rhetoric "as the master discourse" (Copeland 1995, 62).
[41] (Kennedy 1994, 267)

setting forth {*modus proferendi*} that which has been understood"[42]. These two principles correspond to invention, based on exegesis, and to style or *elocutio*. Since Augustine thought that truth had a divine character he rejected "any glorification of rhetoric and any conception of truth as a product of language or the result of speech delivered by man"[43]. This constituted a revolution in classical education if readers bear in mind that, from Isocrates onwards, the right speaking had been inseparable from the right thinking and the right living. In contrast, from Augustine's perspective, one need not be a rhetorician to be a good Christian. Nevertheless, Augustine's novel understanding of rhetorical invention had little to do with the more academic study of rhetoric from the Carolingian period onwards, since this was a rather conservative tradition that merely produced commentaries on the Ciceronian *juvenilia* rather than novel treatises on rhetoric[44].

Anicius Manlius Boethius (*c.* 480–524), author of *Consolatio Philosophiae* and other seven treatises on dialectical and rhetorical issues, was another important figure in the history of rhetoric and logic during the Middle Ages. Boethius summarizes and systematizes different traditions of topical theory at the same time that he develops it in a rather philosophical way. His major interest was distinguishing the different arts of discourse from each other, particularly dialectic and rhetoric[45], an issue to which he devoted the fourth book of his major rhetorical work, *De differentiis topicis*, widely known in the Middle Ages as *Topica Boetii*, and used in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as a textbook of rhetoric. To the question of why *De differentiis topicis*

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[42] Rita Copeland's translation. Quoted in (Copeland 1995, 154).

[43] (IJsseling 1976, 45)

[44] (Copeland 1995, 158). Augustine's understanding of invention did have an impact, nonetheless, upon late medieval rhetorical poetics, the *artes poetriae*, where "the *modus inveniendi* is achieved through –and is identical with– the *modus interpretandi*" (Copeland 1995, 160).

[45] Even though Boethius identifies considerable similarities between rhetoric and dialectic, he also singles out certain differences between both: "all the differences between the two faculties lie in subject matter, methodology, and goal: in subject matter, because the subject matter of thesis and hypothesis are their respective domains [dialectic and rhetoric, respectively]; in methodology, because dialectic proceeds by interrogation, rhetoric by uninterrupted discourse and because dialectic indulges in complete syllogisms, and rhetoric in enthymemes; in goal, because rhetoric seeks to persuade the judge, while dialectic tries to extract what it wants from the adversary" Quoted in (Leff 1978, 9).

exercised such a significant influence on later medieval rhetorical theory, Michael C. Leff gives the following explanation:

> The answer lies in Boethius' implicit rejection of classical models premised on the attempt to adapt theory to the practices of law courts and legislative assemblies. The other writers of the late classical and early medieval period sought to reproduce classical lore on its own terms. Their definition of rhetoric and their treatment of its precepts were still tied to the functions of the classical orator. Thus, the theory they preserved was anachronistic; it described types of discourse that no longer had any practical use; more important, it proceeded on the assumption that rhetoric was a separate entity that governed a special class of subjects. In *De differentiis topicis* these presuppositions were unnecessary. The civil question was located and subordinated in relation to the rules of propositional analysis. Whatever the subject matter of rhetoric, its arguments could be reduced to forms that were controlled by dialectic method.[46]

Moreover, during the Middle Ages Cicero's *Topica* was mainly known through Boethius's commentary, and so, his *De differentiis topicis* became the source for the topical doctrine of medieval logic[47]. Boethius affirmed that topics were both used by dialectic and rhetoric for the purposes of invention, even if the nature of rhetorical topics was different from that of dialectical ones. For Boethius, dialectical topics are prior to rhetorical ones, and, as a result, rhetoric cannot do without dialectical topics whereas dialectic does not need rhetorical ones. This is partly the case because dialectic has to do with universality, with abstract matters, whereas rhetoric focuses on the particular. In effect, following Boethius's scheme, rhetoric becomes subordinate to dialectic, which explains why many medieval universities such as Paris or Oxford considered dialectic a superior means of invention, leaving rhetoric out of their curricula. Somewhat based on Boethius's discussion of the topics, the *Summulae logicales* by Petrus Hispanus became a widespread elementary text in logic from the late thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth[48].

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[46] (Leff 1978, 22-23). John O. Ward also explores this matter in the following terms: "The revolutionary nature of the medieval adaptation of classical rhetorical theory was precisely the conviction that this theory could be used in contexts that diverged markedly from the classical patterns. This was a conviction that, on the medieval model, magnificently inspired the Renaissance, and without that inspiration and conviction, Renaissance rhetorical theory and practice would have been very different indeed" (Ward 1995, 233-234).

[47] (Bird 1962, 311)

[48] (Bird 1962, 313). Petrus Hispanus was a contemporary of St. Thomas Aquinas and, like the latter, a pupil at Paris of St. Albert the Great. His work on dialectic was an introductory textbook for teenage

Hrabanus Maurus (780–856) is the next great figure in the history of rhetoric during the Early Middle Ages. Disciple of Alcuin, author of the *Disputatio de rhetorica et de virtutibus* (*c.* 794), a discussion of rhetoric and its relation to kingship, he was an advocate of eclecticism and believed that ancient or modern knowledge could be of use to the Christian world order. The theories developed by Augustine, Cassiodorus, Isidore, Alcuin, Gregory the Great, Cicero, or Quintilian could thus serve this purpose. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Carolingian Age, the organization of the *trivium* and *quadrivium* started to emerge based on Martianus Capella's encyclopaedic work *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii et de septem Artibus liberalibus libri novem* (*c.* 470), which described the joining of Mercury (*i.e.*, eloquence) to philology (*i.e.*, the love of theory or reason) before the seven liberal arts acting as bridesmaids. Martianus's work was extremely popular: at least 243 manuscripts exist in European libraries, many of which date from the Carolingian Age, the time when commentaries on Martianus's encyclopedia started being written[49]. Thus, through Capella, the Roman concept of the seven liberal arts passed to the Middle Ages divided into the *trivium*, encompassing the arts of words (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic or logic), and the *quadrivium*, made up by the arts of things (geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music). Rhetoric was nonetheless but a minor part of the medieval liberal arts because university students first learned grammar and then moved to dialectic without undergoing a course on rhetoric at all[50]. In fact, it has been observed that "Martianus's book on rhetoric was one of the least popular parts of his work"[51].

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students inspired by Aristotle's logical works, and his "places are derivative, it seems, chiefly from those in book II of Boethius' work *On the Different Kinds of Topics*, which, in turn are from those of Themistius" (Ong 2004, 63). Walter Ong asserts the following when talking about Petrus Hispanus's influence: "For the last decade or two the impression has been growing that Peter of Spain is probably the most important of all scholastics and his *Summulae logicales* the most widely read of all scholastic works. This impression is founded on the originality and influence of his logic but it is confirmed by examining his work in relation with Ramus and Ramus' predecessor, Rudolph Agricola, both of whom reacted against him" (Ong 2004, 55). This is generally true for most northern European humanists criticising scholasticism.

[49] (Kennedy 1999, 199)

[50] It should be nevertheless remarked that, at the time, the way each centre of knowledge organized and taught the *trivium* and the *quadrivium* was entirely independent: "Prior to the thirteenth century, different schools could be distinguished not only in terms of an emphasis on the *trivium* to the virtual exclusion of the *quadrivium*, but, among those that emphasized the *trivium*, differences obtained because of an

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, rhetoric was definitely taught even if deemed less important than logic. The *Metalogicon* (1159), a well known defence of eloquence by John of Salisbury (*c.* 1120–1180), was scarcely on behalf of rhetoric, paying far more attention to grammar and non-sophistical logic. Again, in Henri d'Andreli's *Battle of the Seven Arts* (after 1236) the stress was on grammar and its charge against the logic of Paris, and after the twelfth century, logic and the Aristotelian *libri naturales* dominated the arts curricula in Northern universities. In this manner, in the Middle Ages rhetoric lost its pedagogical and cultural preeminence first to grammar and, after the twelfth century, to logic[52]. The process of pushing rhetoric to the background in the twelfth century is intimately related to the founding of the great universities and their focus on law, medicine, and theology, since the study of dialectic was deemed of remarkable usefulness in introductory courses to the three degrees. In these circumstances, rhetoric was taught to young boys exclusively at school level alongside grammar. Hence, at its best, "Rhetoric was the gateway through which medieval scholars came to dialectic, law and literary achievement"[53].

The passing from the twelfth to the thirteenth centuries represented a decisive moment of change regarding the manner in which secular learning was organized. While in the twelfth century the liberal arts still seemed able to contain all secular knowledge, in the thirteenth this ceased to be so, partly due to the change in the centres of knowledge (cathedrals or monasteries were replaced by faculties or universities), but chiefly due to the great amount of new literature coming from the Arabic world, including the entire Aristotelian corpus, which challenged the (until then valid and useful) divisions that together tied up all secular learning[54]. Instead of rejecting the

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emphasis on dialectic in one place and on grammar in another. Further, the very character of grammar differed from school to school depending on whether study focused on grammarians or on the reading of classical texts. The time when the liberal arts were preeminent in education was not a time when schooling was uniform" (McInerny 1986, 249).

[51] (Kennedy 1999, 199)

[52] (Monfasani 1976, 243)

[53] (Bolgar 1982, 85)

[54] The so-called "Twelfth-Century Renaissance" meant a revival of learning which "generated a desire for knowledge beyond that provided by the few classical sources that were then available. The military

liberal art scheme, the solution laid in making it "revert to what it had been in the classical setting", when the "arts had been subservient parts of *paideia* for Plato and Aristotle"[55]. The thirteenth century witnessed, according to Richard McKeon, the culmination of two different processes by which, on the one hand, rhetoric was made part of logic, and, on the other, rhetoric became an instrument of theology[56]. Consequently, views on invention influenced logic, rhetorical theory, and theology. Brian Vickers sums up the way in which, during this century, manuals of logic took over the *topoi* of rhetorical invention:

> Logic became the most important university subject, as seen by the Paris curriculum of 1215, where even the set text for rhetoric, book IV of Boethius' *De differentiis topicis,* subordinates rhetorical argumentation to dialectical theory. The subordination of rhetoric to dialectic was increased by the fact that the basic textbook of Latin rhetoric until *c.* 1150, the *De inventione,* failed to deal with three of the five divisions of rhetoric, *elocutio, pronuntiatio* and *memoria.* Limited to *inventio* and status-theory, rhetoric was seen as an inferior branch of logic, concerned with particular rather than general issues.[57]

If Plato had been the philosopher par excellence during the twelfth century, Aristotle became "The Philosopher" during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and his *Rhetoric* a textbook in ethics and psychology[58]. Meanwhile, the three new medieval rhetorical arts (*ars dictaminis*, *artes praedicandi*, *artes poeticae*) borrowed from classical invention, used the topics for remembering, amplifying, and describing material for their own purposes. Curiously enough, it was the rediscovery of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* and Cicero's *De oratore*, two works that exerted great

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resurgence of Europe made possible the recovery of Greek learning, which had been preserved in the Moslem world. At the same time, Western scholars were introduced to original Arabic philosophy and science. These developments in turn occasioned further changes in the intellectual world: Aristotelianism, Scholasticism, and the rise of universities" (McInerny 1986, 248).

[55] (McInerny 1986, 258)

[56] (McKeon 1987, 152)

[57] (Vickers 1988, 725). The importance of logic at Paris from 1215 onwards has been explained in the following way: "Aristotle's *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations* became the basic texts in dialectic at Paris with the official curriculum approved by Robert de Sorbonne in 1215, and in fact the process of oral *disputatio* became such an integral part of the classroom instruction at the university level that its use continued in some places into the eighteenth century. Paris, 'The Mother of Universities,' set the pattern for virtually every other foundation of the Middle Ages, and thus dialectic moved from the elementary curriculum into a permanent place as the organizing principle for higher studies" (Murphy 2005, 169).

[58] (McKeon 1987, 170)

influence upon Italian humanism, what rushed the decline of these three medieval rhetorical arts ultimately based on Ciceronian notions.

Undoubtedly, logic received the lion's share of attention at Paris in the thirteenth century, to the point that "it was merely an option for feast days to lecture on the philosophers, the rhetorics, the *quadrivium*, Donatus, Aristotle's *Ethics* and the fourth book of Boethius's *Topics*"[59]. In fact, Book IV of Boethius's *Topics* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* were the only required texts on rhetoric mentioned in the middle of the century in Paris[60]. Similarly, at Oxford, Book IV of Boethius's *Topics* along with some parts of the *Ad Herennium* were also considered in the thirteenth century[61].

Petrarch (1304–1374), in many respects the founder of the humanist movement, shared with Cicero a belief in the linkage between language, social bonding and altruism, considering eloquence an aid to practical ethics. Even if in a way similar in function to the notaries and teachers of rhetoric and grammar of the later Middle Ages, humanists displayed an unparalleled and unprecedented enthusiasm for classical literature and other arts, going as far as to assert that they owed their knowledge to classical antiquity and not to the Middle Ages[62]. The discovery and recovery of a

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[59] (Lewry 1983, 45-46)

[60] P. Osmund Lewry clarifies that "The evidence has yet to be adduced that the *Ad Herennium* received the full treatment of commentary at this time; the manuscripts have so far eluded us, and the statement that it was taught is only supported by borrowings in commentaries on other texts, treatises and collections of citations to define the parts of rhetoric, the parts of an oration and the kinds of cause" (Lewry 1983, 62).

[61] (Lewry 1983, 62). Recapitulating, R. R. Bolgar sums up the trajectory of medieval rhetoric in the following terms: "We have therefore in the Middle Ages four successive, though somewhat overlapping periods. The years 450-700 see the final collapse of the old Roman civilisation. From 650-850 we have the gradual development of a new attitude to the pagan past and the emergence of an educational system that will enable medieval man to make good use of the classical heritage. From 800-1200 we have four centuries during which the rhetorical tradition of antiquity is explored from several points of view and its possibilities are developed. From 1200 to the point when humanism becomes dominant in the fifteenth century, we have an epoch when the study of rhetoric is relatively speaking neglected, but knowledge of it reaches a wider public through a number of channels" (Bolgar 1982, 85).

[62] From Brian Vicker's perspective, "Although some assertions of independence from medieval traditions need to be viewed with caution, this claim seems largely justified" (Vickers 1988, 724). Then, George Alexander Kennedy has pointed out that "the Italian humanists were intoxicated with the language and literature of antiquity and sought to recover all possible knowledge of it and to make that knowledge the basis of the twin ideals of wisdom and eloquence in the culture of their times, which they regarded as awakening from a long sleep" (Kennedy 1999, 227). Other critics such as C. C. Greenfield have pointed out that "the humanists are the heirs of the medieval rhetoricians who saw in the classics the best models of eloquence and felt that a new curriculum should be based on reading the classics and appropriating their style and thought" (Greenfield 1981, 17).

number of classical texts, the publication of translations and commentaries of them, the writing of new works based on the classics, and, decades later, the invention of the printing press facilitated the spread of classical knowledge. The earlier humanists did not focus on systematic philosophy, but on the disciplines of the *studia humanitatis* (grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history, and moral philosophy), the term 'humanist' being precisely used the later fifteenth and earlier sixteenth centuries to refer to the professional teacher of those *studia humanitatis*[63]. As Donald Lemen Clark puts it, "The typical humanist was more interested in literature than in theology, in rhetoric than logic. He was likely to be a teacher, a writer of school and college text-books, as well as a writer of poetry or artistic prose in Latin or the vernacular"[64]. Humanists devoted much of their time to philological and historical criticism, and through the study of the new material they ascertained that in classical times rhetoric had been a fundamental practice, "a noble and creative art characteristic of human beings at their best" and not "the arid study of the medieval trivium"[65]. The fifteenth-century commonplace of deploring the darkness of the Middle Ages was precisely based on this idea that medieval times lacked the shining and revealing light of eloquence[66]. In fact, certain scholars place rhetoric at the heart of the definition of the Renaissance itself: thus, for some "the *renascentia litterarum*" is "primarily a *renascentia rhetorica*"[67]; for others, what truly united humanists "was a conception of eloquence and its uses", an eloquence that exclusively led "toward virtue and worthwhile goals", and that "could arise only out of a harmonious union between wisdom and style"[68]. Even the humanist *uomo*

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[63] Gray (1963, 500) points out that "Before the word 'humanist" gained general currency, the humanists were referring to themselves and to their colleagues by other names – sometimes 'philosophers,' often 'poets.' Most frequently, however, they called themselves 'orators.' By this, they meant not that they made a living by the teaching or practice of oratory, but that they wished to be known as men of eloquence. An 'orator' could have made his career in government, in the Church, in leisured study and collecting, in teaching or writing or scholarship. He might have written poetry or history or commentaries on classical texts; he might have composed treatises on moral or political philosophy; he might have devoted himself to translation or editing". For more on the concept of 'humanist' see (Campana 1946).
[64] (Clark 1951a, 196)
[65] (Kennedy 1999, 227)
[66] (Clark 1951a, 196)
[67] (Plett and Heath 1983, 598)
[68] (Gray 1963, 498)

universale had to be, necessarily, an exceptional orator[69]. Eloquence unquestionably became an ideal of the age, and speeches or works in oratorical form were published, such as the renowned *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1487) by Pico della Mirandola. Therefore, it was no coincidence that in the fifteenth century rhetoric was liberated from dialectic and the *quadrivium*, and highly stressed at university and schools[70]. If the rising humanism dominated the field of eloquence and moral philosophy, scholasticism controlled that of logic and natural philosophy[71]. Humanists attacked scholastic logic on the grounds that it did not have any real utility in human life but was merely abstract knowledge with no direct application. Certainly, humanists favoured practical studies (rhetoric, ethics, issues of education, literature) over what they considered non-practical ones (logic, metaphysics, epistemological matters, and natural philosophy), while stressing the inability of the scholastics to persuasively communicate important truths[72].

The Renaissance reignited debates over the nature of invention. George of Trebizond or Trapezuntius (1395–1472 or 1473) broke the ice in this respect by publishing *Rhetoricorum libri V* (1433–4), the first complete rhetoric produced in the Renaissance. *Rhetoricorum libri V*'s first three books deal with invention, the fourth with arrangement, and the fifth with ornamentation, delivery, and memory. Aristotle's dialectic had been undergoing a double development by which, on the one hand, scholasticism rescued the Aristotelian *organon* giving it a realistic character while, on the other, nominalists reduced logic to a linguistic analysis nothing to do with the *res*. Through this first humanist treatise on rhetoric, George of Trebizond tried to glue together the pieces resulting from the medieval fragmentation of rhetoric in the different

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[69] (Clark 1951, 196)
[70] (Vickers 1988, 741)
[71] The view that humanism was the philosophy of the Renaissance that appeared in opposition to scholasticism, the old philosophy of the Middle Ages, has been discarded by the studies conducted by, among others, P. O. Kristeller. Both humanism and scholasticism originated about the same time (towards the end of the thirteenth century), and both developed simultaneously. As Walter Ong suggests, "Humanism and scholasticism, therefore, must be studied not as movements opposed to one another, but as interacting ones", due to the complexity of their interaction and the fact that humanism was "in great part the product of the scholastic mind" (Ong 2004, 93).
[72] (Gray 1963, 501)

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artes. Trebizond assigned the topics back to rhetoric, after medieval logicians had appropriated them, and carried out a synthesis of the Byzantine and Latin traditions[73].

Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457), who like Trebizond served as secretary to the Pope, was a rival of Trebizond, surpassing him in popularity as a teacher of rhetoric in Rome. Valla was an unconditional advocate of Quintilian, as well as a critic of Aristotelianism and scholasticism. Shortly before the publication of Trebizond's *Introduction to Dialectic* (1438), Valla wrote his *Dialectica* in the late 1430s, in which he completely absorbed dialectic into the realm of rhetoric. Valla's line of thought has been summarized as follows: "Dialectic is nothing other than a type of refutation, and refutations themselves are part of invention. Invention is one of the five parts of rhetoric"[74]. Moreover, he stated that, of the three duties of the orator (to teach, to please, and to move), only one was proper to the dialectician: to teach (*docere*). Even though Aristotelian logicians took into consideration Valla's work from the moment it was written, it was in the early decades of the sixteenth century when his humanist dialectic became a serious competitor with traditional Aristotelian logic within the teaching system[75].

The Dutch scholar Rudolphus Agricola (1444–85) is next in the chain of redefining the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, as well as in playing a key role in bringing the humanist program of classical studies from Italy to northern Europe. Not

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[73] (Vickers 1988, 729)

[74] (Leff 1978, 18). At this point it might be worth clarifying a potentially confusing terminological issue between the terms 'logic' and 'dialectic'. Richard McKeon affirms the following in this regard: "The fact that the third art of the *trivium* was sometimes called logic, sometimes dialectic, is due in part to the old opposition of Aristotelian logic to Platonic dialectic. They were merged in the early Middle Ages: the logical element lacks grounding in Aristotelian logical principles because the *Posterior Analytics* was untranslated, unreported, and unknown; the dialectical element owes more to Aristotle's formulation of dialectic in the *Topics* than to the dialectic Plato used in the dialogues, and that Aristotelian element was known by way of Cicero and Themistius whom Boethius mingled in his *On Topical Differences*" (McKeon 1972, 164). Also, in the *Summulae logicales* "the impression is left that dialectic and logic are one and the same thing" (Ong 2004, 56). Moreover, it has also been stated that "pour la plupart des humanistes, le mot 'dialectique' n'a pas un sens parfaitement fixé. C'est ainsi que, vers la fin du XVIe siècle, Pacius emploiera indifféremment 'dialectique' et 'logique', et que Mélanchthon appelle 'dialectique' à la foir l'analytique (au sens d'Aristote) et les topiques" (Margolin 1999, 198). Then, Ong (2004, 100) says the following particularly dealing with Agricola's work: "dialectic is taken here in a large, loose, and practically indefinable sense to cover the whole field of discourse, in its rational, emotional, and other elements; it is practically everything that has to do with discourse short of grammatical structure and actual delivery".

[75] (Jardine 1982, 800)

only did he translate from Greek into Latin Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* (4th century), for hundreds of years the chief schoolbook of rhetorical composition in Byzantium, but he wrote his *De Inventione Dialectica* (1479), which subordinated rhetoric to dialectic and displaced Petrus Hispanus and Paul of Venice's titles as introductory works to dialectic. Agricola believed that the end of every discourse is *docere*, the proper part of dialectic, while both *delectare* and *movere* are secondary. In *De Inventione Dialectica*, Agricola claimed that rhetoric had usurped many of dialectic's traditional materials, and that *inventio* as well as *dispositio* belonged to dialectic. Consequently, only *elocutio*, delivery, and memory were the proper parts of rhetoric. Furthermore, his convincement that invention was the greater part within logic has led scholars affirm that "the Northern humanists transformed logic, in all but name, into an expanded version of rhetorical invention"[76]. Agricola's three books are exclusively concerned with invention, and not with judgment, the second part of dialectic about which he never got to write.

Within invention, Agricola treats the topics, rethinking, redefining and rearranging what Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Boethius and Themistius (as collected by Boethius and George of Trebizond) had said about them, finally offering his own list of twenty-four. Agricola considered a system of places or *loci* as the foundation stones of rational thought and meaningful communication[77]. In *De inventione dialectica*, Agricola grouped all places of invention under dialectic, fully disregarding the traditional theoretical distinction between rhetorical and dialectical *loci*. In other words, for Agricola there is no distinction between rhetorical and dialectical topics: there is simply one category of topics that can be turned to any discourse, and these exclusively belong to dialectic. Ironically, the divorce of rhetoric from dialectic produces a type of dialectic terribly influenced by rhetorical models, to such an extent that it has been observed that Agricola "sees arguments in rhetorical, rather than traditionally dialectical terms in that

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[76] (Monfasani 1976, 303)
[77] (McNally 1968, 167)

he is concerned with probable, not absolute, truths"[78]. The circulation of *De inventione* was very intense between 1515 and 1530, especially in the Rhénano-Flemish region and in France, where numerous editions and commentaries on the work were published. In fact, from the first edition of *De inventione* in 1515 until 1579, the work underwent around forty editions[79], and by 1530 the new logic devised by humanists like Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola displaced almost entirely the logic of high scholasticism, dominating logic teaching in northern Europe till the eighteenth century[80]. Indeed, in the great changes in thought between 1500 and 1700, Agricola's work was remarkably influential: Erasmus approved of Agricola's ideas; the Protestant educator Johann Sturm also helped spreading them[81]; and the thought of Juan Luis Vives, Philipp Melanchthon, and particularly Petrus Ramus owed much to Agricola[82].

Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) also conceived of invention as a part of dialectic, and, except for *elocutio*, he thought rhetoric shared the rest of its components with other arts. In 1520 Vives denounced scholasticism as gangrene that had to be eradicated through the introduction of a new approach to learning in all arts and sciences. Rhetoric was not

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[78] (Rebhorn 2000, 42). (Vasoli 1999, 85) also stresses the major influence of rhetoric upon dialectic in Agricola's system. Other scholars have stated that Agricola and Northern humanists seized upon the Ciceronian distinction within logic of the function of finding (*invenire*) and judging (*iudicare*) because it opened the way to the rhetorization of logic (McNally 1967, 394; Monfasani 1976, 303). For Walter Ong, "directly or indirectly, the two parts of dialectic which Agricola proposes enter the general logical tradition largely through the second book of Cicero's *Topics*, a work rooted in the rhetorical rather than in the logical tradition" (Ong 2004, 112).

[79] (Rebhorn 2000, 42; Jardine 1982, 801)

[80] (Jardine 1977, 144). Lisa Jardine explains humanist dialectic as being "a program of logic teaching built around Aristotle's and Cicero's *Topica,* and Boethius's systematization of the loose and largely non-syllogistic types of *argumentatio* treated in the *Topica*, in his *De differentiis topicis* and *In Topica Ciceronis*. While it covers most of the material of Aristotle's *Organon,* it does not, like medieval treatments of the *Organon,* organize the material around the syllogism" (Jardine 1977, 145).

[81] Johann Sturm considered the specific task of dialectic to find, to judge, and to put in place (*invenire*, *iudicare*, and *collocare*) the different arguments in the clearest and most appropriate way.

[82] In fact, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine remark that "Agricola exerted a far-reaching personal influence in the Low Countries during his lifetime as an inspirational teacher and a man of integrity" to the extent that "None of Agricola's works on education was publicly available during his lifetime, and his influence derived solely from his exemplary life" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 125). An instance of this can be found in the reception of Agricola's most important pedagogical work, the *De invention dialectica* (*c.* 1480), which "appears to have influenced the 'methodical' school of Erasmian pedagogical humanism initially by its reputation alone" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 126). As Grafton and Jardine point out, "The story of the recovery and publication of this work is a revealing example of how prior assumptions on the part of intellectuals and teachers colour their perception of the importance of a single specific text, and shape its subsequent reception and interpretation" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 126). For more on Lorenzo Valla and Agricola's thought on rhetoric and dialectic, see Peter Mack, *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic* (Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 1993).

an exception, and he sought to revitalise the art by not merely repeating the ancients but by adding new ideas to the extant rhetorical body. In *De disciplinis*, Vives denounced the existence of some flaws within classical rhetorical doctrine, for instance, the fact that wisdom, virtue, and rhetoric were inseparable for the Romans, and so they believed that the good orator had to be a good man. In addition to this, Vives disagreed with the five-part division of classical rhetorical theory, calling this partition as imprecise and redundant, as both memory and invention were not exclusive to rhetoric, but essential to all the arts –nonetheless, Vives attributed the invention of arguments exclusively to dialectic. Delivery was not a part of rhetoric either because good orators could persuade simply through their writings without having to rely on gesture. Finally, since it is impossible to set definite rules for the different parts of an oration, he also questioned disposition as a part of rhetoric. In this manner, after all his reasoning, elocution remained the only true constituent of rhetoric. If in *De disciplinis* Vives argued that rhetoric needed to be reformed, *De ratione dicendi* (1532), a treatise on rhetoric in three books, presented the reforms themselves. Under the section "De inventione" included in *De conscribendis epistolis* (1534), Juan Luis Vives affirmed that invention arises from *ingenium* or wit, memory, judgement, and experience or *usus rerum*. In addition to this, from Vives's point of view, the *loci* of argumentation have as main task the establishment of connections between the various subjects of knowledge. He compares their function to the inscriptions that simplify the work of the pharmacists and drug sellers (*pharmacopolae et unguentarii*) because they inform of the contents of every pill bottle[83].

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[83] Don Abbott identifies an "attempt to restructure rhetoric" within the Spanish Renaissance rhetorical tradition on the part of authors such as Juan Luis Vives, Juan Huarte de San Juan (1529?–1588?), and Baltasar Gracián (1601–1638). They signal the beginning of the Golden Age, its middle, and its end, and thus, the inception, midpoint, and completion of the process of restructuring. Abbott points out, in the first place, dissatisfaction with the functions and forms of traditional rhetoric. "More specifically", Abbott states "invention as an argumentative concept is dismissed; *inventio* as a term disappears almost entirely while its duties are delegated to the imagination. The pivotal terms in this restructuring are, therefore, invention and imagination" (Abbott 1983, 95). In order to restructure rhetoric, Vives rejected invention, Huarte reclaimed invention and assigned it to the imagination, and Gracián went about the problem "by continuing the dominance of the imagination over invention while restoring the 'rules' that had been so repugnant to Vives and Huarte" (Abbott 1983, 103). "So while invention ceased to serve as the primary

The Protestant theologian, reformer, and professor of Greek and rhetoric at Wittenberg, Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), adopted Agricola's division of dialectic and rhetoric in *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo* (1531) –even though his *Institutiones rhetoricae* (1521), a revision of his earlier *De rhetorica* (1519), had placed judgment and arrangement within rhetoric. Taking Cicero and Quintilian as his main sources, Melanchthon applied rhetoric to theological ends, developing the topics in a relevant manner. The diffusion of Melanchthon's textbooks on dialectic and rhetoric was considerable, and he collaborated to reform German Protestant universities, shaping them to his own methodological convictions – soon, his ideas travelled beyond German borders and pervaded the thinking of Northern humanists[84].

The most influential figure in the history of rhetoric in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was, nonetheless, Petrus Ramus or Pierre de la Ramée (1515–1572), a former student of Johannes Sturm whom he had heard lecturing on Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*. Ramus reduced the question of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic to a method of teaching, at the same time that he limited the realm of rhetoric. Ramus sought to put an end to the mutual contamination of the arts of logic and rhetoric, and in order to achieve this end he searched for criteria to delimit their boundaries and so avoid that the same material was taught in both fields. The great relevance of his enterprise appears when bearing in mind that, from the viewpoint of Renaissance learning, logic and rhetoric chiefly supported the entire theory of communication of the time. Ramus has been said to take up the matter "where Agricola had left it"[85], and continue thence forward, with the difference that whereas Agricola's dialectic made no issue of being anti-Aristotelian, Ramus's did. In this regard, Ramus

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part of rhetoric and the term *inventio* fell into disuse, its function, somewhat altered, continued unabated" (Abbott 1983, 103).

[84] For instance, the unauthorised version *De rhetorica libri tres* (1521) of his actual work became the main source of Leonard Cox's *The Art Or Crafte of Rhetoryke* (Vickers 1988, 723). Paul Oscar Kristeller has observed that "Melanchthon, the defender of rhetoric against philosophy (...) had more influence on many aspects of Lutheran Germany than Luther himself and (...) was responsible for the humanistic tradition of the German Protestant schools down to the nineteenth century" (Kristeller 1961, 87). Melanchthon's importance within the humanistic tradition especially had an impact on the transformations of reading and interpretation practices during the sixteenth century (Stillman 2002, 368).

[85] (Kennedy 1999, 250)

has been defined as a "a reviser of the old order rather than an innovator, a practical man of the Renaissance who in reforming Aristotelian logic uses the tools of Aristotelian logic"[86].

According to Ramus, dialectic was divided into invention (based on the theory of the topics) and judgment (which included disposition and memory)[87]. Dialectic was for him "a mode of arguing that starts with true propositions and then, working by means of definitions, dichotomies, and syllogisms, concludes with knowledge about specifics that is true, universal, and timeless"[88]. On the contrary, Ramus defined rhetoric as *doctrina bene dicendi*, an adaptation of Quintilian's *scientia bene dicendi*, and thought of it solely in terms of style and delivery. Indeed, for him rhetoric was divided into two parts, *elocutio* and *pronunciatio*, and, unlike Quintilian, who defined the orator as *vir bonus bene dicendi peritus*, Ramus detached morality from rhetoric, implying that a good orator was not necessarily a good man too. In addition to this, Ramus gave rhetoric an inferior position to dialectic, for he thought it simply took the truths grasped by reason and presented them vividly to the imaginations of an audience to move its will and appetites. Additionally, for Ramus and his successors clarity and simplicity were so indispensable to facilitate the memorization of the theory that their detractors accused them of superficiality –indeed, Ramus had limited invention to ten places from which all arguments for any subject could, in principle, be generated[89]. Finally, Ramus described his logic as *imago naturalis dialecticae*, for he believed that art should imitate nature. Precisely one of his criticisms of Aristotle was that the Greek philosopher, from

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[86] (Padley 1985, 96)

[87] For more on the concept of judgment and its relationship with invention, see Richard Peter McKeon, "The Methods of Rhetoric and Philosophy: Invention and Judgment" in *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan* (Luitpold Wallach, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. 365-373).

[88] (Rebhorn 2000, 8)

[89] (Kennedy 1999, 252). Grafton and Jardine argue that Ramist theories were found so disturbing at the time because "Ramus deliberately discarded the difficulty and rigour of high scholastic schooling and thereby attracted those who regarded education as a means to social position rather than as a preparation for a life of scholarship (or of theological debate)" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 168). This implied an institutional threat, as he proposed an education useful and applicable outside the universities, and by doing so, won the approval of the mercantile class. Grafton and Jardine also recognize in this the final move from humanism to the humanities.

Ramus's point of view, did not imitate nature. For the sake of coherence, Ramus took many of his rhetorical and logical examples from 'nature', from actual orators and poets, instead of tailoring them to illustrate his theoretical principles. Ramus, like the Puritans, conceived of a concurrence of God in nature and believed that the spark of reason was the image of God in men –which is why it is believed that Ramus's "emphasis on dialectic was consistent with Puritan sentiments about preaching and plain thinking"[90]. Ramism rapidly spread throughout Europe, and its influence on logic remained alive in the universities until 1630. Ramist ideas were opposed in Italy except at Bologna, and, in general, met with hostility in Spain, with the exception of some figures like his follower Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, also known as *El Brocense*, who taught at the University of Salamanca, and whom Ong identifies as the earliest disciple of Petrus Ramus beyond the borders of France[91]. Nevertheless, in northern Europe Ramus achieved greater popularity, Protestant Germany being the area of his greatest influence, "where almost every chair of philosophy eventually came to be occupied by a Ramist", even if at Protestant universities the Melanchthonian logic in general use was based on Aristotle[92].

At the same time that all the previously mentioned titles entered the market of books on rhetoric, Cicero's *De inventione* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* continued to flourish in the Renaissance. The *Ad Herennium* reached 140 editions with notes and commentaries and *De inventione* nearly the same number. Regarding Cicero's mature rhetorical works, between the years 1477 and 1600, the *Topica* saw 77 commentaries, *De partitione oratoria*, 71, and *De oratore*, 56. Of Cicero's speeches

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[90] (Kennedy 1999, 252). In fact, Ramus converted to Protestantism in 1561 and was killed in the Saint Bartholomew's Day massacre of Huguenots in 1572, when Catholics throughout France murdered Protestants. This elevated him to the status of a kind of Protestant saint.

[91] (Ong 2004, 264). "In Spain, the first place to which Ramism had migrated outside France, it had been early nipped in the bud when Ramus became a Protestant and when his disciple Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas got into trouble with the Inquisition. What obtained for Spain, obtained also for the Spanish Netherlands. Ramism never developed in Italy or in other countries or districts which remained Catholic, less because of any real antipathy for what the Ramist development fundamentally meant than because of suspicious attaching to Ramus as a Protestant" (Ong 2004, 305).

[92] (Padley 1985, 94). The Lutherans supported Philip Melanchthon (himself a Lutheran) against Ramus on the grounds that Ramistic principles were an offshoot of Calvinism. For more on Ramism, see Pierre Albert Duhamel, "The Logic and Rhetoric of Peter Ramus." *Modern Philology* 46.3 (1949): 163-71.

almost 500 commentaries were produced, of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* seven new versions appeared in the sixteenth century, and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* underwent 18 editions by 1500, and another 130 by 1600[93].

1.2. Rhetoric in England before the Sixteenth Century

Although twelfth-century schools of northern France and England appear to have taught both rhetoric and dialectic alongside grammar, in the thirteenth century, with the crystallization of university curricula, rhetoric was deliberately excluded in higher education[94]. As a consequence, the *ars rhetorica* was relegated to lower levels, which explains why the numerous medieval commentaries to Cicero's rhetorical works are products of schools and not of universities. Moreover, the three major rhetorical genres of the Middle Ages –*ars dictaminis*, *ars poetria*, and *ars praedicandi*– flourished outside the university context. Another significant fact is that while the earlier post-classical works by Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore are considerably close to the classical tradition of Quintilian, rhetorical treatises produced in medieval England and Germany fundamentally restrict rhetoric to style, as works such as *The Court of Sapience* (1483) illustrate. This simplification resulted from the limited knowledge of classical tradition during the medieval period, an ignorance that particularly affected those parts of western Europe more distant from the Mediterranean basin, where the heritage of Classical antiquity was better preserved. As a result, the medieval tradition survived in England over a hundred years longer than it did in Italy[95]. For instance, Ascham's *Scholemaster* (1570) contains the first references in England to Cicero's *Orator* (one hundred years after its first printing), and to Dionysius of Halicarnassus's *De compositione verborum* (first printed in 1508 by Aldus, then again by Estienne in

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[93] (Vickers 1988,720-721)
[94] (Murphy 1989, 369)
[95] As Brian Vickers puts it, "England, isolated by sea, was additionally disadvantaged compared to other countries north of the Alps, so that fruits of the Italian Renaissance reached there with much delay" (Vickers 2003, 3).

1546, and in 1550 by Sturm –in fact, Ascham's friendship with Sturm may explain why he was acquainted with such a work). Similarly, the *On the sublime* by pseudo-Longinus was published in Basel in 1554 by Robortelli, then reissued three times, and finally, as late as 1636, edited at Oxford by Langhorne. What is more, no Elizabethan writer refers to it or acknowledges its mere existence until 1633, when Thomas Farnaby's *Index Rhetoricus* cites it as an authority.

Unlike thirteenth-century writers in France and Italy, who published treatises on rhetoric in the vernacular and thus developed a viable rhetorical tradition, educational records, library catalogues, and literary allusions make manifest the lack of an English rhetorical tradition before the early fifteenth century[96]. Indeed, it is quite illustrative that Caxton had no native English rhetoric to print: it was only in the sixteenth century that Stephen Hawes and Thomas Wilson published their works, and it would take another century for Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to appear in the English language. The only two books on rhetoric that Caxton published were the thoroughly Ciceronian Traversagnus's *Epitome Margarita Eloquentiae* (1479), the first book on rhetoric published in England[97], and the anonymous allegorical poem, long attributed to Lydgate, *The Court of Sapience*, printed by Caxton around 1481, and which described, among other topics, the seven liberal arts in a purely medieval way[98]. Both the scant and general references

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[96] (Murphy 1964, 2; Murphy 1965)

[97] Traversagnus's *Epitome Margarita Eloquentiae* does not only have the merit of being the first book on rhetoric published in England, but it has also been said to partake in a double revolution, "one of subject matter and the other of pedagogy" (Murphy 1989, 367). When Traversagnus came to Cambridge's Faculty of Theology in 1476, he not only lectured on Aristotle's *Ethica Nichomachea* and Saint Augustine's *De civitate dei*, but also on the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. This was certainly a revolution if we take into account that Cambridge was at the time an Aristotelian university, and that introducing Ciceronian rhetoric into the Aristotelian curriculum of course meant challenging the university's tradition and the ideology underlying it. The closing sentence of the work, *ad eloquendam divina accomodatum* ("accommodated to divine eloquence") illustrates Traversagnus's idea that "rhetoric is a human analogue of God's language; therefore, rhetoric is to be learned and used for the purposes of God" (Murphy 1989, 371). The book's second revolution took place in the arena of pedagogy, for it became the first textbook in English history, since every student in the class had his own copy. In Traversagnus's *Epitome*, *inventio* occupies almost the entire work, and its accounts largely depend on the treatment of *inventio* of the *Ad Herennium*. For more on the *Margarita eloquentiae*, see Ronald H. Martin's "The *Epitome Margaritae Eloquentiae* of Laurentius Gulielmus de Saona" (In *Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society*, Leeds: Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society, 1971, pp. 103-126).

[98] (Murphy 1972). For more on the early history of printed books on rhetoric, see James Jerome Murphy, "Rhetoric in the Earliest Years of Printing, 1465-1500." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*.70 (1984): 1-11.

to rhetoric in some of Chaucer's works and in Gower's *Confessio Amantis* (*c.* 1390), which contains the first known discussion of rhetoric in the English language, constitute exceptions in the English literature of the time and show the two writers' little acquaintance with the principles of the art[99]. In fourteenth-century England, it was to *ars grammatica* that the most popular books on the arts of discourse belonged: the rulebooks of Donatus, Priscian, and Alexandre de Villadieu. Indeed, leaving aside religious or theological works, the *Barbarismus* and *Graecismus* were the most common volumes in libraries and schools, for which reason it has been argued "that Chaucer and his contemporaries may have participated in a 'grammatical' rather than a 'rhetorical' tradition"[100].

1.3. The Teaching of Rhetoric and Dialectic in Sixteenth Century England

Despite humanist efforts, in the school curriculum of Tudor England rhetoric remained, as in the Middle Ages, at a lower level than logic or dialectic. Classical rhetoric was studied in grammar schools and at both Oxford and Cambridge chiefly using continental editions and translations, for Cicero's rhetorical treatises did not begin to be printed in England until the 1570s (and even then with continental commentaries), and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* not until the seventeenth century. It was the schoolmasters of Tudor England who first began the study of the *Rhetoric*: Vives knew it, Sir John Cheke knew it, and Ascham studied it[101]. Nevertheless, even if the latter work was known in sixteenth-century England, it then virtually had no influence upon English rhetoric, and although between 1572 and 1578 John Rainolds lectured on the *Rhetoric*, his rhetorical theory and style have been described as "completely anti-Aristotelian"[102]. What is more, for Lawrence D. Green the 'innovations' "offered by writers in England were either

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[99] (Murphy 1962, Murphy 1964)
[100] (Murphy 1964, 3)
[101] For more on the history of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the English context, see Marvin T. Herrick, "The Early History of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in England", *Philological Quarterly* 5 (1926): 242-257.
[102] (Duhamel 1953, 501)

accomodations to local conditions or, increasingly, accomodations to the developing English language" of rhetorical treatises and schoolbooks imported from the Continent[103].

It would not be until John Colet made his appearance on scene that the situation actually changed in England, for Colet is accountable for formulating the backbone of literary humanism in the country. John Colet delivered *Lectures on St. Paul's Epistles* at Oxford (1497–1498) and interpreted the first chapter of *Genesis* in a letter to his friend Radulphus in a very different way than what was customary at the time. Colet employed the grammatical method of the Italian humanists, the Neo-Platonists, and the early Patristic writers (*i.e.*, St. Jerome among others) instead of the dialectical one of the scholastics such as Peter Abailard, for whom theology, philosophy, and dialectic aimed at the study of Scripture –for which reason dialectic became the key part of the *trivium*– while he neglected in his commentaries the literal text and the writer of the piece under discussion because he believed that grammar could be dangerous due to its relations to poetic fiction. In contrast, John Colet, whose ideas fully determined and shaped the curriculum of St. Paul's School, put the transmission and spread of the message of Christ before any theoretical or doctrinal content, and for this, among Colet's enthusiastic followers it is possible to find "grammarians like Cheke, Lupset, Lily, and Ascham, or preachers like Latimer, Pole, and Andrews, who turned more often to Jerome than to Augustine, and to Aquinas hardly at all"[104]. Likewise, the figure of Sir John Cheke is also indisputably remarkable in sixteenth-century academic life in England, and Cheke was certainly greatly appreciated both in professional as well as personal terms by other fellows and his own students, upon whom he exerted indelible influence[105].

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[103] (Green 2001, 599)

[104] (Duhamel 1953, 510). This same critic explains that "St. Jerome was the 'grammatical doctor,' as Augustine was the 'dialectical doctor,' of the Church", and that "it was upon Jerome that Erasmus had modeled his life and work" (Duhamel 1953, 507).

[105] Elizabeth Sweeting in effect asserts that "Scholarship in England is centred in the activity of individual and of small groups rather than in a continuous tradition", and that Sir John Cheke's circle in Cambridge actually constituted "The germinal centre of mid-sixteenth-century scholarship in England" (Sweeting

1.3.1. Grammar Schools

Cicero was one of the great protagonists in sixteenth-century grammar schools, where there was a renewed interest in rhetoric[106]. Joseph Freedman points out three main reasons for the generalized use of Cicero's writings in sixteenth and seventeenth-century rhetorical instruction: first, an edition of Cicero's collected works could be used as a textbook for various levels and purposes, a fact that was clearly advantageous given that books were still expensive at the time; secondly, copies of Cicero's works were relatively easy to obtain; and thirdly, Cicero was at that moment unanimously regarded as a major authority[107]. Furthermore, although during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries academicians like Clemens Timpler questioned Cicero's authorship of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the fact that the book was easily available, in vogue, and highly useful for rhetorical instruction, would have made rhetoric teachers of the period somewhat indifferent to its authenticity[108]. When considered as a whole, however, the skills taught at the 360 Elizabethan grammar schools in 1575 did not represent the traditional full course in classical rhetoric, for there were omissions and adaptations that particularly affected invention. There was, for instance, no general treatment of

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1964, 91). Furthermore, Sweeting asserts that Cheke "lives rather in the mental outlook of others than in his published work, which is by no means fully representative of his own caliber" (Sweeting 1964, 91).

[106] Thomas Whitfield Baldwin's *William Shakespere's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944) constitutes a greatly detailed study of sixteenth century English grammar schools' curriculum, and the book thoroughly considers rhetorical training in this context.

[107] Joseph Freedman also claims that rhetorical instruction in academic institutions throughout Europe was divided into theoretical instruction (which would include lectures, instruction in small groups or "grades", and private instruction) and practical instruction (referring to written and oral exercises, and memorization), and that, while within the theoretical instruction Cicero was read alongside many other authors, in most cases he was the principal or only referent within the practical rhetorical instruction (Freedman 1986, 243).

[108] (Freedman 1986, 242). John O. Ward examines four tracts on the *Ad Herennium* authorship question written between *c.* 1480 and 1505. His study shows the key role played by close readings of the full and newly discovered text of Quintilian's *Insitutio Oratoria* in the process of questioning the attribution of the *Ad Herennium* to Cicero. The main arguments for the inauthenticity of the text were that Quintilian never cited the *Ad Herennium* nor referred to any "Herennius", and that when he could probably be referring to the book, he attributed it to Cornificius and not to Cicero (Ward 1995, 248). Hence, "by the early sixteenth century, the improbability of Ciceronian authorship had been revealed and the primacy of the text was at an end" (Ward 1995, 232-233), even though "Its dethronement did not imply its disappearance" (Ward 1995, 280). Also on this issue, see (Monfasani 1987, 112-113), where it is claimed that Lorenzo Valla was completely convinced of the Ciceronian authorship of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.

invention, and the consideration of the forms of argument was deferred to university courses on dialectic[109].

Renaissance grammar schools used as manuals of elementary exercises the works of the Greek rhetoricians Hermogenes (fl. AD 161-180) and Aphthonius (fl. AD 315). Hermogenes had been very popular in the Middle Ages, and widely known through Priscian's Latin translation. Nonetheless, in the sixteenth century Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* became the textbook of Latin composition par excellence. It identified fourteen different kinds of elementary exercises, such as the retelling of a fable or myth, the short narrative and the commonplace. Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* was so successful that Richard Rainolde adapted it in English under the title of *A book called the Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563)[110]. To promote copious style, various kinds of textbooks were devised. Some were intended to achieve varied diction, and others to amplify a theme. The highly popular commonplace book, often considered a "by-product of rhetoric", belongs to the latter group. Commonplace books supplied young students of rhetoric with both ideas and words by collecting excerpts from the classics, a practice Roger Ascham approved of in *The Scholemaster* as long as it was done wisely and students did not use commonplaces compiled by others. Commonplace books chiefly resulted from three facts: from "the humanist desire to expedite *inventio* by having at hand massive stores of material for 'imitation', both in content and style"; from "the habit of collecting commonplace material inherited from the middle ages, when *florilegia* and conflated commentaries multiplied beyond anything dreamed of in antiquity"; and finally, from the humanist doctrine of imitation, which encouraged

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[109] (Mack 2002, 46)

[110] Richard Rainolde's *A booke called the Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563) is actually an adaptation of Reinhard Lorich's edition of Aphthonius's, translated into Latin in 1542. William G. Crane (1937) extensively discusses Rainolde's treatise, effectively taking it as a translation of Aphthonius. In the opinion of Francis R. Johnson, "the skeleton of the work coincides with Lorich's textbook in all essential details, although the words are those of an adapter rather than of a translator, and the illustrative examples are either Rainolde's original compositions or his free arrangements of materials found in his source" (Johnson 1943, 443).

taking as models expressions or passages written by renowned authors of Antiquity[111].

The most popular Latin commonplace books were Cato's *Disticha de monbus* (translated in 1477 as the *Dictes and Sayings of the Philosophers*); Erasmus's *Adagia* (1539 *et seq.*) and Lycosthenes's *Apophthegmatum* (1555), based primarily upon Erasmus and which, along with Lycosthenes's *Parabolae* (1557), was many times reissued all throughout Europe, entering the Stationers' Register in 1579. Due to the great success of Latin commonplace books, English handbooks of similar characteristics began to appear as well. Among Tudor books containing collections of places we find William Baldwin's popular *Treatise of Morall Phylosophie* (1547); Richard Taverner's *Garden of Wysdom* and his *Second Booke of the Garden of Wysedome* (both 1559); Thomas Blage's *Schole of wise Conceyts* (1569); William Phiston's *The vvelspring of wittie Conceites* (1584), and Francis Mere's *Palladis Tamia: Wit's Treasury* (1598)[112].

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[111] (Ong 1968, 58). As J. M. Lechner observes, "the commonplace book with its encyclopedic array of topics or places was thought of as a compendium of knowledge displayed in a systematic pattern of some kind and producing a 'circle' of learning or a unity of the arts and sciences", thus satisfying "the thirst for accumulating universal knowledge, so characteristic of the Renaissance writers" (Lechner 1962, 234). For Corbett, commonplace books were "less an aid for the learning of form than a resource for the finding of subject-matter" (Corbett 1971, 249).

[112] When talking about *topoi* we refer to categories such as 'definition', 'adjuncts', 'division', 'causes', 'effects', or 'witnesses'. Nevertheless, these very rarely become *headings* of commonplace books, and instead we discover as headings umbrella terms such as 'government' or 'virtue'. Lechner states that while rhetorical as well as dialectical commonplaces in ancient Greece and Rome "were the general and universal ideas used in all argumentation and persuasion", in the Renaissance the concept of the commonplace changes to be viewed fundamentally in two divergent ways: as 'analytic' and as 'subject' topics (a distinction which in some way corresponds, though not fully matches, Aristotle's division between the 'common' and 'special' *topoi*): "The 'analytic' topic was usually thought of as a concept which could be used in asking oneself questions about a subject and which would generate ideas concerning the subject: for example, such 'places' as definition, division, etymology, and relation, when applied to a particular subject, would 'spin out' the full meaning of that subject. The 'subject' topic or heading, on the other hand, represented a heading more usable for organizing material gathered in a commonplace book, where one 'located' an argument named according to the subject matter of its contents, such as virtue, physics, peace, or ethics. Such topics could hardly function as questions to 'spin' an idea. Under the 'subject' topic one could find a store of material for expanding and adorning one's discourse" (Lechner 1962, 229-230). Lechner also explains the Renaissance distinction between dialectical and rhetorical topics by asserting that while the purpose of the dialectical commonplace was to move "the argument from the 'hypothesis' (particular matter) to the 'thesis' (general truth)", rhetorical topics were imbued with a more specifically oratorical or persuasive approach instead (Lechner 1962, 231).

Francis Goyet, on his part, distinguishes three types of topics or meanings of *lieux* in sixteenth century books: "Le premier type désigne les lieux communs au sens d'amplification: le développement oratoire d'une majeure ou grand principe – sens I. Le deuxième type comprend 'lieux communs' (…), c'est-à-dire des têtes de rubrique, dans quelque catalogue que ce soit – sens II. Enfin, le troisième type correspond aux lieux – tout court – au sens de 'sieges des arguments': sens III" (Goyet 1996, 58). Goyet asserts that the second type was a creation of the sixteenth century, "à partir et à cause de Mélanchthon" (Goyet 1996, 675).

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the teaching of rhetoric in English grammar schools such as Eton, Westminster, or Saint Paul's was still organized in the form of the medieval *trivium*, even if new handbooks coming from the Continent and written by Agricola, Melanchthon, Mosellanus, Susenbrotus or Erasmus gradually began to exert their influence. For instance, Erasmus's *De copia* (1512), which aimed to make classical rhetoric palatable to young schoolboys, was one of the most popular and widely used textbooks in the Renaissance, going through eighty editions in just the sixteenth century[113]. John Colet, dean of St. Paul's school in London, encouraged Erasmus to write it in order to satisfy a pedagogical need that, far from being exclusive to England, affected all Northern Europe[114]. By the middle of the century, texts on rhetoric written in the English language started to be printed, partly because some English schoolmasters would have considered it advantageous to train their students in their native tongue. Not coincidentally, this happened at a time when authorized English translations of the Bible began to appear, and English replaced Latin in the liturgies of the newly independent Anglican Church.

1.3.2. Universities

At Oxford and Cambridge, prospective priests, school teachers, royal servants or statesmen, country gentlemen, doctors, academics, poets, historians, playwrights, tradesmen and lawyers received courses on Classical literature, rhetoric, and dialectic, as these subjects were at the centre of university teaching[115]. Dialectic continued to hold

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[113] C. S. Baldwin saw the first part of the book as dealing with *elocutio*, and the second with *inventio*. Thomas O. Sloane (1991) views it as focusing on *inventio* and giving priority to forensic oratory.

[114] The statutes of St. Paul's School in 1512 –the year of the publication of Erasmus's *Copia* too– have been taken to mark the beginning of English humanist poetics (Kinney 1986, 446).

[115] In the sixteenth century, and for the first time, the idea that gentlemen should also be clerks, in the sense that they should be learned and educated men, became widespread. Certainly, "ignorance and indifference to letters in the aristocracy was not new in the sixteenth century; what was new and radical was the suggestion that things should be otherwise" (Hexter 1950, 4). For example, it was difficult to find among the Crown servants who worked close to Queen Elizabeth one that had not received university education. Moreover, university studies were far from being only for the higher aristocracy, and by the

pre-eminence, given that all candidates for degrees had to participate in disputations. Dialectic was therefore treated as a practical skill which students learned to invent arguments, and organise persuasive discourses. Meanwhile, rhetoric appeared in the curriculum as a way of learning the principles of discourse, and it was not taught continuously or as an independent subject at Oxford and Cambridge until around 1431, and even during the fifteenth century rhetoric was not firmly established in the curriculum[116].

Regarding rhetoric, at the booklists of both universities, Cicero's *Orations* and his rhetorical works, including the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, occupy the first positions in terms of frequency of appearance. They are followed by Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, Cicero's *De oratore* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and lastly, by a small but relevant number of copies of Hermogenes. Regarding the Renaissance manuals of rhetoric most commonly found on these lists, Erasmus's *Ecclesiastes* and works by Melanchthon and Talon appear at the top[117]. At Cambridge, the first of the four years of undergraduate studies was devoted to rhetoric, taking as major authors Quintilian, Hermogenes, and Cicero. At Oxford, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *Orations* and his rhetorical works were given priority. At the university level, the course of rhetoric went hand in hand with the analysis of classical texts and the composition of new writings, and hence, rhetorical (and dialectical) notions were widely applied when reading classical literature. John Rainolds's lectures on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at Oxford university, adopting Agricola's and Juan Luis Vives's perspectives, illustrate how Aristotle's assumptions regarding rhetoric are useful in a modern context and consistent with a Christian mentality. Rainolds's lectures, which constitute the "only known

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third quarter of the sixteenth century, for every five men enrolled at university as *filii plebei*, three said to be gentlemen's sons (Hexter 1950).

[116] (Murphy 1960, 345). This explains Clark's assertion that in England "the Renaissance university was still more medieval than humanistic" (Clark 1951, 197).

[117] (Mack 2002, 52)

complete text of an Elizabethan lecture course on rhetoric"[118], assume full knowledge of the rhetoric manual on the part of the students.

Still, in the university booklists, texts on dialectic comfortably outnumber those on rhetoric. Aristotle here becomes the central author, studied through his own texts and not through medieval commentaries on them. Cicero's *Topica*, Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*, and Aristotle's *Topica*, stand out among the listed books. Seton, Case, Sanderson and Thomas Wilson were the authors of books on logic written in English also used as textbooks at universities in England. They all share the same focus on the topics and various reflections on the influence of Agricola's approach. At Cambridge, for instance, the most widely used manuals in the second half of the sixteenth century were Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*, Melanchthon's *Dialectices* (1527) and *Erotemata dialectices* (1547), Caesarius's *Dialectica* (1532), Seton's *Dialectica* in Peter Carter's annotated edition (1572)[119], and Ramus's *Dialecticae institutions* (1543)[120].

Between 1574 and 1620 Ramism gained considerable popularity in England[121]: Dudley Fenner translated both Ramus and Talaeus in *The artes of logike and rhetorike, plainelie set foorth* (1584 and 1588); Abraham Fraunce translated Talaeus in *The Arcadian rhetorike: or the praecepts of rhetorike made plaine by examples* (1588); Charles Butler wrote *Rameae rhetoricae libri duo* (1597), reprinted throughout the following century, and Thomas Blundeville translated *The Art of Logike* (1599), one of the reasons why he has been recognized as "the chief compromiser between Ramist and earlier logic in Tudor times"[122]. Given these circumstances, by 1570 Aristotelian supremacy in logic and rhetoric began to lose its pre-eminence. Oxford was still the

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[118] (Mack 2002, 52)

[119] Seton's *Dialectica* was used as the elementary textbook in Cambridge at least up to the turn of the century. His work gave simple treatment of Agricola's and Melanchthon's books as an introduction to Aristotle's more complex writings on logic.

[120] (Jardine 1974, 50)

[121] Howell (1980, 119), however, talks about the years that go from 1574 to 1681 as the period in which Ramism enjoyed its greatest vogue in Britain. In this respect, see Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Ramus and English Rhetoric: 1574-1681." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 37 (1951): 308-10. Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine state that "in the 1570s and 1580s in England it was a just-permissible sign of intellectual radicalism to profess Ramism - a somewhat voguish intellectual stance" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 195).

[122] (Ong 1968, 66)

English bastion of Aristotelianism, and even though W. S. Howell deems impossible an absolute disinterest in Ramus's theories at Oxford, in general terms, Oxford proved hostile to Ramism. Nevertheless, Puritanical circles in Britain, particularly in Scotland and at Cambridge, warmly welcomed Ramism. A former pupil of Ramus, the Earl of Murray, Regent of Scotland, spread Ramist ideas in Scotland, which resulted in St Andrews becoming "the first centre of Ramism in Britain"[123]. Roland MacIlmaine then published in London in 1574, and for the first time in Britain, the earliest Latin version of Ramus's *Dialecticae libri duo*, as well as its first translation into English. In contrast with Oxford's more conservative position, there was a willingness on the part of some professors at Cambridge to spread Ramism within the university, considering Ramist thought an indicator of progress. This was the case of Laurence Chaderton or Chatterton, and Gabriel Harvey, both from Christ's College (although Chaderton would later become Master of Emmanuel College). Gabriel Harvey was then a young professor of rhetoric at Cambridge who gave in 1575 and 1576 three discourses with Ramist overtones, and who published in 1577 his *Ciceronianus*, where he described how he had been a blind follower of Cicero, and how he converted to Ramism. Controversy between Aristotelians and Ramists reached its peak at Cambridge in the 1580s and 1590s, with a confrontation between Everard Digby and the Ramist William Temple, and with another argument between Thomas Nashe and the Ramist Gabriel Harvey. Ramism, nonetheless, according to Walter Ong "never became academically respectable on a large scale within the universities"[124]. Still, fifteen editions of the *Dialectic* and five of the *Rhetoric* were published in England between 1574 and 1600, to which have to be added a high number of continental printings present in the country as well.

1.4. Treatises on Rhetoric and Dialectic in English

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[123] (Padley 1985, 94)
[124] (Ong 1968, 65)

Peter Mack counts twenty English-language manuals tackling discourse in different ways that were printed in the sixteenth century. Mack believes the manuals cover six different types of teaching which he groups into six categories[125]. The first group includes three letter-writing manuals: Fulwood's *Enemie of Idleness* (1568) –an adaptation of *Le stile et maniere de composer, dicter, et escrire toute sorte d'epistre* (1566), itself an adaptation of Erasmus–, Abraham Fleming's *A Panoplie of Epistles* (1576) and Day's *English Secretary* (1599). The second category is made up of four manuals of style, Richard Sherry's *A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (1550), Henry Peacham's *Garden of Eloquence* (1577), Book III of George Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589) and John Hoskins's *Directions for Speech and Style* (1599). The third consists of Richard Rainolde's *Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563), which was a translation/adaptation of Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata*, and the fourth category encompasses four university manuals on the whole of rhetoric: Leonard Cox's *Arte or Crafte of Rethoryke* (1530), Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* (1553), Dudley Fenner's *Arte of Rethorike* (1584), and Abraham Fraunce's *Arcadian Rhetorike* (1588) –the last two being translations and adaptations of Ramist rhetoric books. In the fifth group, Peter Mack puts together manuals covering the whole of dialectic: Thomas Wilson's *Rule of Reason* (1567), Thomas Blundeville's *Logike* (1599), which translates and adapts Melanchthon's treatise, Ralph Lever's *The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft* (1573), McIlmain's translation of Ramus's *Logic* (1574), and its adaptation by Abraham Fraunce in his *Lawyer's Logike* (1588). Finally, the sixth category is formed by Niels Hemmingsen's *The Preacher* (1574), and Hyperius's *The Practice of Preaching* (1577), which are preaching manuals translated from two Latin texts on theology[126]. To summarize, the first three clusters (grouping letter-writing manuals, manuals of style and Richard Rainolde's work) are English versions of standard

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[125] (Mack 2002, 77-78)

[126] Only four out of these twenty English manuals were printed more than twice during the sixteenth century: Thomas Wilson's *Rule of Reason* (printed seven times), his *Art of Rhetoric* (eight times), Angel Day's *The English Secretary* (nine times), and William Fulwood's *Enimie of Idlenesse* (ten times). As for Henry Peacham's *Garden of Eloquence*, it was only printed once in each of its above mentioned two editions.

grammar school textbooks strongly based on, generally, Latin Continental models[127]; the fourth category includes books dealing with the whole of rhetoric[128]; the fifth, with the whole of dialectic, and the sixth, with works on preaching.

1.4.1. Books on Logic

The main three English works on logic of the early Renaissance were highly influenced by Agricola's accounts on invention and place-theory. The three popular titles were John Seton's *Dialectica* (1545), Wilson's *Rule of Reason. Conteyning the Arte of Logique* (1551), the only one written in English, and Peter Carter's *Annotationes* (1563). Thomas Wilson's *The Rule of Reason*, the first English logic, combined within a broadly Aristotelian framework "a section on judgment derived from Melanchthon's *Erotemata dialectices* with a section on invention taken from Agricola and Boethius"[129]. Wilson believed that logic had two parts: *judicium*, "Framing of thinges aptlye together, and knitting words, for the purpose accordingly", and *inventio*, "Finding out matter, and searchyng stuffe agreable to the cause"[130], and he effectively treated judgment first, and invention second[131]. Wilson also described logical invention as "the storehouse of

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[127] (Mack 2002, 77)

[128] It would still be possible to make subdivisions within this category and arrange in various ways English books on rhetoric. For instance, Heinrich F. Plett and Peter Heath recognize that rhetoric in the Renaissance formed "no monolithic block", and distinguish in England and France two social variants, the "humanistic" and the "courtly": "Whereas the humanistic rhetoric addresses the classless *respublica litteraria* of all intellectually enlightened persons, the courtly is directed to a social elite, the aristocrats and such 'gentlemen' as wish to emulate them. Where the humanistic rhetoric strives toward an ethical renewal of man by way of persuasion (*genus deliberativum*), the courtly seeks primarily a stabilization of the political regime through the praise (*genus demonstrativum*) of its leading representative, the ruler. Where the humanist rhetoric envisages a moralizing of social being, the courtly aims to aestheticize it" (Plett and Heath 1983, 598-599). Plett (1983) also comments on the humanist versus courtly distinction, identifying Scaliger's *Poetices* (1561) as representative of the former, and George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589) as an instance of the latter.

[129] (Mack 2002, 78)

[130] (Wilson 1551, B1^r)

[131] Reverting the two parts of dialectic by making judgment or disposition first and invention second also occurs in Ralph Lever, John Seton, and Thomas Blundeville's works. Walter Ong argues that even though it has been called an Aristotelian practice, actually "it derives more directly from Boethius than from Aristotle, although it was supported by the fact that the Aristotelian treatises concerned with the three acts of the intellect (simple apprehension, judgment, and ratiocination) (...) are commonly placed in the *Organon* before the *Topics*" (Ong 2004, 112).

places"[132], and the places as "the restyng corner of an argument, or els a marke whiche giveth warnyng to our memory, what we maie speake probablie, either in the one parte or the other, upon all causes that fall in question"[133]. Additionally, Wilson takes Agricola's distinction of twenty-four places –ten 'internal' and fourteen 'external'–, and translates them into English without acknowledging their source.

John Seton, whose *Dialectica* targeted the Cambridge schoolboy, is thought to be "more scholastic, less humanistic in his treatment of logical subjects" than Wilson[134]. Unlike Wilson, Seton made explicit his Agricolan dependence, either to express agreement or disagreement with the Dutch author. Finally, despite Ramus's increasing popularity at the time of Peter Carter's *Annotationes*, and in spite of the fact that the presses had stopped producing copies of Agricola's *De inventione*, Carter used Agricola's list and definition of the places in his own work, even though he followed the Boethian rather than the Agricolan explanation of them[135].

1.4.2. Books on Rhetoric

The allegorical poem *The Pastyme of Pleasure* (1509) by Stephen Hawes is probably the first English language work to discuss rhetoric in the sixteenth century, and also perhaps the earliest to treat systematically the doctrines of Geoffrey of Vinsauf in the English tongue[136]. Hawes's work gives an account in verse of the Ciceronian five-part rhetoric, attacking in its ninth chapter those who question its reputation. Nevertheless, it was *The Arte or Crafte of Rhethoryke* (1535) by Leonard Cox, the first rhetoric in

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[132] (Wilson 1551, J5^v)
[133] (Wilson 1551, J6^v)
[134] (McNally 1968, 173)
[135] James Richard McNally summarizes the trajectory of logic in England in the following manner: "logic in England was originally that of medieval scholasticism; this scholastic logic was altered for a time by exposure to Agricolan dialectic; but the humanistic alteration of English logic eventually yielded to the greater strength of scholasticism, which again held sway until challenged by Ramus" (McNally 1968, 177).
[136] (Murphy 1962, 404). Murphy (1972, 249) remarks that "Vinsauf had a vogue among fifteenth century English writers, possibly beginning with Merke's *De moderno dictamine* (1404) which includes eighteen quotations from the *Poetria nova*".

English. Cox's work is partly a translation of Melanchthon's *Institutiones Rhetoricae* (1521) and partly a commentary by Cox on certain features of rhetoric following a study guide written by a student of Melanchthon's. Since the 1521 version that Cox used was an early work by Melanchthon, it still did not reflect the influence that Agricola would later have upon the German author. This explains why Cox identified four parts of rhetoric (judgment, invention, disposition, and style), and dealt chiefly with invention without even discussing style. Then, the year 1550 saw the publication of Richard Sherry's *A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes, Gathered out of the Best Grammarians and Oratours*[137], to which was appended a translation of Erasmus's *On the Education of Children*. Indeed, Sherry's main sources were Erasmus and Mosellanus. Even if Sherry did not reduce rhetoric to style, his treatise solely discussed figures and tropes, illustrating their use by means of contemporary English examples.

Sherry's *Treatise* and Susenbrotus's *Epitome troporum ac schematum et grammaticorum et rhetorum* (*An Epitome of the Tropes and Schemes of Grammarians and Rhetoricians*), published in 1540, were the two major influences of Henry Peacham's *The Garden of Eloquence*, first published in 1577. *The Garden* is a manual of style containing the definition and illustration of a list of figures of speech. In addition to Susenbrotus and Peacham, the treatise includes material from other authors such as Cicero, Quintilian, Trapezuntius, Erasmus, and Melanchthon. Plus, Peacham's employment of binary oppositions, definitions and examples for each figure have made scholars such as Wayne A. Rebhorn suggest that Peacham "was affected by Ramist methods and its restriction of rhetoric to style"[138]. Angel Day's *The English Secretary*

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[137] When in 1555 the second edition was published, it appeared as a bilingual Latin-English version with a different subtitle: *Profitable for All That Be Studious of Eloquence, and in Especial for Such as in Grammar Scholes Doe Reede Most Eloquent Poets and Orators.*

[138] (Rebhorn 2000, 223). In this respect, it is interesting to remark that J. Donald Ragsdale, who focuses on English books on style published between 1600 and 1800, reveals the existence of a close relationship between figures of speech and invention (Ragsdale 1965, 165). In Ragsdale's words: "When the figurist rhetorics of the late Renaissance are termed 'stylistic', one may easily infer that a treatment of invention is missing. From an examination of these stylistic rhetorics, however, one must conclude that there are many figures of speech which very closely correspond to the logical, emotional, and ethical modes of proof in the classical theory of invention. Invention is indeed present, even though a formal treatment is admittedly absent" (Ragsdale 1965, 167).

(1586), which discusses the duties of a secretary and classifies types of letters, also gives an account of figures and tropes based on Susenbrotus, and takes Erasmus's *De conscribendis epistolis* as the chief model for his letter-writing manual.

Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* was the first fully-fledged English rhetoric book, which became also a great editorial success by going through eight editions between 1553 and 1585. Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* was not a textbook for use in school, but a book aimed at young adults with an interest in law, the Church, or entering public life. In it, rhetoric appears mingled with the moral values of Christianity and the ethical values of classical literature[139]. Due to the great success of Wilson's manual, some authors argue that it was intended for those studying law at the Inns of Court[140]. Cicero's *De inventione* and, particularly, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* were Wilson's major sources –along with Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, Melanchthon's *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*, Erasmus's *De conscribendis epistolis* and *De copia*, Sherry's *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes*, and, for the treatment of emotional persuasion, Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*[141]. Wilson based his views on the five-part Ciceronian distinction, set them out in a readable way, and illustrated them with examples and practical comments. Although Wilson included in his rhetoric a list of general and specific topics, he referred readers to his work on dialectic for detailed treatment. According to Wilson, the end of humanist rhetoric was "The findyng out of apte matter", "called otherwise Invencion", "a searchyng out of thynges true, thynges likely, the whiche maie reasonably sette furth a matter, and make it appere probable"[142].

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[139] In this respect, Mark E. Wildermuth (1989, 43-44) stresses that Wilson's "deeply held conviction that a fully articulated Ciceronian system of communication is the most appropriate means of propagating the Christian faith". Hence, "Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* not only provides a means of communication applicable in both the religious and secular realms, but also deals decisively with complex problems in homiletic theory and practice that were debated by sixteenth century Protestants both in England and on the continent". *The Arte of Rhetorique* becomes, from this perspective, "a successful effort to demonstrate to Wilson's contemporaries, (...) that Latin rhetoric represents the best option for preaching God's Word".

[140] According to Walter Ong, this hypothesis would explain the editorial success of *The Arte of Rhetorique* at a time when "learned or academic works in English seldom went beyond one more or less experimental edition", and is coherent "with the fact that its numerous illustrative examples relate to law, the pulpit, and public affairs" (Ong 1968, 54).

[141] (Engelhardt 1947)

[142] (Wilson 1982, 31)

Thus, invention appears essential in sixteenth-century (non-Ramist) English works on rhetoric, which give privileged treatment to rhetorical invention in the same way that, as will be made manifest in the following pages, sixteenth-century discussions of poetry and poetics in England highlight the necessary relevance of poetic invention.

2

Poetics and Poetic Invention up to the Sixteenth Century

The transfer of the rhetorical/logical notion of invention into the realm of poetics occurred during the Middle Ages, when the fields of rhetoric and grammar became extremely close and confused. Since Antiquity, rhetoric and poetics had been highly interrelated, and indeed both rhetoric and poetry were considered sister arts, and rhetoric was deemed beneficial for the poet while poetry was also thought to have a positive impact upon orators. The present chapter will thus concentrate upon the unquestionable link between poetics (and poetry) and rhetoric from Ancient Greece and Aristotle's postulates to the end of the Middle Ages and John of Garland's theories, hence commenting upon the ideas on this matter explained in works by, among others, Longinus, Cicero, Quintilian, Horace, Matthew of Vendôme, Geoffrey of Vinsauf, and John of Salisbury. It will be seen how, from the infrequent and asystematic occurrences of the terms εὑρήσεις and εὑρίσκω in the writings on poetry in Greek and the equally scarce and imprecise use of *inventio* and *invenio* in Latin works to refer to poetry or any mental capacity that the poet activates when writing poetry, by the thirteenth century the medieval rhetorical *artes poetriae* written in Latin had appropriated *inventio* to denote the first stage of the process of writing poetry. This terminological inclusion would prove highly successful and become widely accepted in commentaries on poetry thence forward, even if its meaning and connotations naturally varied in the centuries to come.

2.1. The Relationship between Rhetoric and Poetics

Both the Ancients and their Renaissance heirs thought of oratory and poetry as cognate arts due to their undeniable interdependence. Plato's *Phaedrus* treated poetry and rhetoric together, and Aristotle –although considering rhetoric as wholly distinct from the poetic art, the former being non-mimetic and mainly aimed at persuasion, the latter having a mimetic nature– alluded in Book III of the *Rhetoric* to the *Poetics*. Cicero constantly drew upon poetry and the plays of Terence to illustrate rhetorical principles, and in *De oratore* he stated that

> The truth is that the poet is a very near kinsman of the orator, rather more heavily fettered as regards rhythm, but with ampler freedom in his choice of words, while in the use of many sorts of ornament he is his ally and almost his counterpart; in one respect at all events something like identity exists, since he sets no boundaries or limits to his claims, such as would prevent him from ranging wither he will with the same freedom and licence as the other.[1]

Quintilian also illustrated observations on rhetoric with examples from the poets, and Aphthonius, author of the popular *Progymnasmata Rhetorica*, affirmed in the first sentence of the book the relationship between poetry and rhetoric by stating that "In the beginning the fable belonged to the poets. Afterwards, because it was suitable for instructing boys, it was adopted by the rhetoricians"[2]. In this manner, rhetoric was generally used by poets (within this category I also place playwrights[3]) for characterization purposes, for instance, to prepare speeches given by characters or explain situations, and poetry was employed by the orator to support his speeches, enhance their vividness and strengthen their persuasiveness, and to offer examples. The mutual benefits that rhetoric and poetry obtained from each other were thus no mystery.

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[1] (Cicero 1979, 51, 53; I.16.70). In Latin: "Est enim finitimus oratori poeta, numeris astrictior paulo, verborum autem licentia liberior, multis vero ornandi generibus socius, ac paene par; in hoc quidem certe prope idem, nullis ut terminis circumscribat aut definiat ius suum, quo minus ei liceat eadem illa facultate et copia vagari qua velit".

[2] In Latin: "Fabvla traxit à poëtis originē, qua Rhetores etiam communiter vtuntur, quòd admonitionibus sit idonea, & erudiendis imperitioribus apta" (Aphthonius 1605, B1ʳ).

[3] In fact, Richard Harland explains that "in Greek culture, lyric poetry played a much smaller part than epic and drama", and so, "When Plato and Aristotle theorise about *poiesis*, their conceptual framework derives from epic and drama, and is not well suited to the lyric form at all" (Harland 1999, 2).

It has been asserted that in Classical Antiquity "rhetorical theory was both more fully developed and more widely understood than poetic theory", and that, "overall, poetics can be regarded as parallel to and overlapping with rhetoric"[4]. Indeed, as J. J. Murphy has remarked, it is significant that while the ancient world produced a considerable number of books on rhetoric, writings about poetry (that is, prescriptive documents regarding what we nowadays call literature) were comparatively much scarcer[5]. For instance, there was no Greek word to designate the assembly of precepts for instruction in non-oratorical discourses, and there was no complete preceptive system specifically addressing the composition of good poetry[6]. Aristotle's *Poetics*, restricted to drama, is the major exception, even if Aristotle's approach is more prone to definition than to prescriptive advice on composition. When exploring the reasons behind the existence of far more treatises on rhetoric than on poetics since Classical times, we find that, in the first place, while students of rhetoric constituted a decent sized educational market in Antiquity, prospective poets were considerably fewer[7]; secondly, since at least in Ancient Greece, the theory of poetic inspiration was the prevailing thought regarding poetic composition, writers praised the excellencies of poetry rather than teaching how to write poetry, which, from their perspective, ultimately depended on the intervention of divinity[8]. Rhetoric, thus, became the greatest influence for the study and teaching of poetry, and explains to a certain extent the approach of critics to poetic composition and its rules[9]. After all, though having different purposes and features, both rhetoric and poetry address an audience and share

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[4] (Kennedy 1999, 136)

[5] (Murphy 1974, 27)

[6] J. J. Murphy (1974, 27-28) nonetheless distinguishes in the production of new literature and its relation to previous models between 'criticism', from the Greek term *kritikos*, meaning "able to judge" and able to recognize the worth of a composition, and *mimesis* or imitation, based on the recognition of some good qualities and the reproduction of an admired model.

[7] (Russell 2001, 3)

[8] (Clark 1922, 6). Clark moreover asserts that "By far the greater bulk of classical treatises on poetic is devoted to characterization and to the technique of plot construction" (Clark 1922, 7), not to any other more philosophical matters.

[9] Jeffrey Walker conversely believes that, originally, in Antiquity, rhetoric derived from the poetic tradition, and from thence extended to discourses of public and private life. In Walker's own words, "what came to be called rhetoric was neither originally nor essentially an art of practical civic oratory", but rather "originated from an expansion of the poetic/epideictic domain, from 'song' to 'speech' to 'discourse' generally" (Walker 2000, ix).

a similar concern with style, figures, tropes, and rhythm. The relegation of rhetoric to the context of the classroom with the end of the Republic in Rome turned metre and subject-matter into the main differences between rhetoric and poetry: while poetry enjoyed greater freedom and licence (*licentia*), oratory had bigger restrictions that tied it to reality. In this respect, Longinus says that poetical instances can "show an exaggeration which belongs to fable and far exceeds the limits of credibility, whereas the most perfect effect of visualization in oratory is always one of reality and truth"[10]. Similarly, Lucian asserts that "Poetry enjoys unqualified freedom", that "Its sole law is the poet's will", and that, "If he wants to harness a team of winged horses, or make people run on water or over the top of the corn, nobody grumbles"[11]. Another commonality between rhetoric and poetics was the major theme in Horace –and in subsequent literary criticism derived from his work– of *decorum*, a virtue of rhetorical style too.

The relationship between rhetoric and poetics in Ancient times is nowhere materialized better than in the exercises of *progymnasmata*. Until the fifth century BC, Greek schools required the memorization and understanding of poetic texts, even though students were not expected to write their own compositions. It was the early sophists who, for the first time, encouraged inventiveness on the part of their pupils. Progymnastic exercises were exercises in composition, preparatory to the writing and delivery of declamations, and aimed to train students in *inventio*. Chapter 28 of the anonymous treatise *Rhetoric for Alexander* (4th century BC) contains the first reference to *progymnasmata*, and Aelius Theon of Alexandria, a Greek school master of the second century, wrote the earliest surviving textbook on the composition of *progymnasmata*. After enjoying popularity in the Hellenistic period, some of these exercises were adopted by Roman teachers in schools of grammar and rhetoric. The first extant Latin handbook of *progymnasmata* dates from the sixth century: it is Priscian's Latin paraphrase of a Greek work attributed to Hermogenes, the most important

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[10] (Longinus 1999, 223; XV.8)
[11] In Lucian's *De conscribenda historia* 6. Quoted in Russell (2001, 16).

rhetorician of the second century. Another widely known treatise of this sort was Aphthonius of Antioch's, a student of Libanius in the second half of the fourth century who followed Hermogenes very closely. The work had an authoritative place in Byzantine education, and in the late fifteenth century was translated into Latin by Rudolph Agricola[12].

All textbooks of *progymnasmata* give patterns for the students to follow. The series of exercises in writing and speaking are organized according to their level of difficulty, so that they gradually become more complicated[13]. Each exercise is then based on previous ones, repeating already known material but always adding something new. Aphthonius describes fourteen different exercises: *mythos*, or fable, which consisted in the student's writing a simple fable in imitation of those by Aesop; *diēgēma*, or narrative; *chreia*, or anecdote; *gnōmē* or maxim; *anaskeuē*, or refutation; *kataskeuē*, or confirmation; *koinos* topos, or commonplace; *enkōmion*, or praise; *psogos*, or invective; *synkrisis*, or comparison; *ēthopoeia*, or personification; *ekphrasis*, or description; *thesis*, or argument; and *nomou eisphora*, or introduction of a law[14]. Exercises in *progymnasmata* –particularly fables, narratives, descriptions, and comparisons– were preparations for both the study of rhetoric and poetic composition, and Latin poetry is often called rhetorical because it exhibited techniques learned in lessons on rhetoric[15]. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was a rise and fall of *progymnasmata*: they rose with the popularity of Priscian's grammar, with which they frequently appeared, and fell with the bursting in of the humanistic grammars by Lily, Colet and Erasmus, which superseded Priscian. Then, the Latin Aptithonius "rose with the Lily grammars as part of the new movement in humanistic grammar school training in Latin theme writing", and with the rise in the mid-sixteenth century of Ramism and its

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[12] Nicolaus, who had studied with the Neoplatonists Plutarch and Proclus in Athens, wrote another treatise about *progymnasmata* that was used as a textbook in the Byzantine period.

[13] "The *progymnasmata* progresses from concrete, narrative tasks to abstract, persuasive ones; from addressing the class and teacher to addressing a public audience such as the law court; from developing a single prescribed point of view to examining several and arguing for a self-determined thesis" (Hagaman 1986, 25).

[14] For a more complete account see (Kennedy 1994, 203-206).

[15] (Kennedy 1972, 384)

simplification of the topics[16]. In fact, the year 1681, which according to Howell marks the end of the Ramist epoch, approximately coincides with the end of the Aphthonian pre-eminence.

2.2. Poetics in Antiquity

2.2.1. Aristotle's *Poetics*

Aristotle's *Poetics* (written between 347 and 322 BC) is the mandatory starting point for any reflection on literary ideas in the Western world. Considered "the earliest surviving work to be exclusively concerned with the discussion and analysis of poetry as an art"[17], and "the fountain-head of most later criticism"[18], Aristotle's *Poetics* did not gain exceeding popularity in classical times. Horace, Cicero, and Quintilian did not refer to it in their works, and the book was entirely lost during the Middle Ages. After Plato had severely criticized poetry for being pedagogically harmful[19], at least potentially, Aristotle restored poetry to a high position and conceded it ethical and philosophical value[20]. Aristotle pictured three types of sciences: the theoretical sciences, which include metaphysics, mathematics, and physics; the sciences of action or the practical sciences, encompassing ethics and politics; and thirdly, the sciences of making or the poetic sciences, to which category the useful and the fine arts (technology and poetics) pertain. Aristotle argued that poetry stored a reality superior to facts, that it dealt with universals, and that its target was to describe what might have been in the past or should be in the present. As J. E. Spingarn puts it, "poetry has little regard for the actuality of

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[16] (Clark 1952, 262-263)
[17] (Halliwell 1999, 3)
[18] (Russell 2003a, 869)
[19] For more of Plato's ideas on poetry, see (Greene 1918).
[20] In fact poetics would later become "a philosophical science of poetry", and "ever since the middle of the sixteenth century, Aristotle's *Poetics* has been central to all attempts to discuss the nature of poetry philosophically" (Curtius 1979, 146).

the specific event, but aims at the reality of an eternal probability"[21]. Plus, according to Aristotle, poetry –particularly dramatic poetry– had cathartic and purifying effects upon human emotions. Hence, poetry encloses morality, even if its aim is not primordially moral. Additionally, for Aristotle *mimesis* or imitation is at the very roots of poetry, *mimesis* itself being one of the defining features of human beings. Aristotle thus thought of poetry as a sister art to music, dancing, and painting, all of them arts of *mimesis*:

> Since the poet, like a painter or any other image-maker, is a mimetic artist, he must represent, in any instant, one of three objects: the kind of things which were or are the case; the kind of things that people say and think; the kind of things that ought to be the case.[22]

In other words, Aristotle argues that the poet does not deal with "actual events" but concentrates instead on "the *kinds* of things that might occur and are possible in terms of probability or necessity"[23], which is what chiefly differentiates the poet from the historian. Poetry is thus engaged with the universal, whereas history is concerned with the particular. It is therefore the mimetic quality of poetry and its focus on the universal that constitute its defining features, and not its being written in verse. In this respect, Aristotle asserts that "the poet should be more a maker of plots than of verses, in so far as he is a poet by virtue of *mimesis*, and his *mimesis* is of actions"[24]. Unsurprisingly, then, the five kinds of poetry that Aristotle mentions in his *Poetics* (dramatic, dithyrambic, nomic, satiric, and epic, on which he exclusively focuses, and within which he places lyric poetry) have as a common denominator *mimesis*, not verse. Hence, it appears that the basic distinction between poetical and rhetorical literature for Aristotle is that poetry is mimetic while rhetoric, nonmimetic[25]. This, of course, does not prevent Aristotle from seeing strong links between both rhetoric and poetics. For instance, thought and diction, two of Aristotle's six divisions of tragedy, are properly treated in his work on rhetoric as well, although thought is the only one defined in the

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[21] (Spingarn 1976, 18)
[22] (Aristotle 1999, 125-127; 1460B)
[23] (Aristotle 1999, 59; 1451B)
[24] (Aristotle 1999, 61; 1451B)
[25] (Howell 1980, 49) is also of this opinion.

same way in both *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*[26]. Also, when speaking of style, Aristotle admits in the *Rhetoric* that "The poets, as was natural, were the first to give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand"[27]. Still, rhetoric and poetry are, after all, clearly distinct for Aristotle, and, as he affirms in his *Rhetoric,* "there is something inspired in poetry"[28].

Ancient Greek authors did not employ the terms *εὑρήσεις* and *εὑρίσκω* to refer to the composition of poetic discourse. Instead, inspiration was what explained the poetical process, at the same time that *heuresis* and *heurisko* were limited to the meanings of 'to discover' and 'to find', occasionally coming closer to our present day 'invention' when understood as a term pointing at the origins of an object or an activity. *Heuresis*, thus, was not part of the common lexicon employed in Ancient Greece to describe the poet's task, and so, it was not particularly used as a literary term to refer to the composition of poems, the function of the poet, or the way the poet's mind operates. With the purpose of showing the meanings and contexts in which both *heuresis* and *heurisko* were employed at the time, Appendix 1 collects all their appearances in some of the major writings by Plato, Aristotle and other Greek authors who reflected on poetry.

2.2.2. Post-Aristotelian Poetics in Greece

Demetrius's *On Style*, "the earliest post-Aristotelian treatise on literary theory to survive complete", Longinus's *On the Sublime*, and Dionysius's *On Literary Composition* have been described as "the three most important extant post-Aristotelian treatises on literary

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[26] Thought is understood as "all effects which need to be created by speech: their elements are proof, refutation, the conveying of emotions (pity, fear, anger, etc.), as well as enhancement and belittlement" (Aristotle 1999, 97; 1456B).

[27] (Aristotle 2000, 349; 1404A)

[28] (Aristotle 2000, 381; 1408B). For more on Aristotle's *Poetics*, see Stephen Halliwell, "Aristotle's Poetics" in *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* (George A. Kennedy, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 149-183).

technique and criticism"[29]. Demetrius's *On Style* (2nd century BC), conventionally and mistakenly attributed to Demetrius of Phaleron (*c*. 360-280 BC), focuses on the theory of the four styles and is "firmly embedded in the sophistic tradition of the early practical handbooks of rhetoric"[30]; Longinus's *On the Sublime* (AD 1st century) deals with inspired writing; and Dionysius's treatise *On Literary Composition* (*c*. 30 BC) comments upon the arrangement of words and phrases in poetry and prose leading to beauty and/or pleasure[31]. In short, they explore the difficulty of teaching poetry by conceiving it as the result of individual genius (*On the Sublime*), the study of the best writers to imitate (*On Literay Composition*), and of guidelines to follow for those interested in pursuing a literary career (*On Style*).

2.2.2.1. Longinus's *On the Sublime*

Until the nineteenth century, the rhetorician Cassius Longinus (AD 3rd century) was thought to be the actual author of *On the Sublime*, "the most significant and valuable critical treatise after Aristotle"[32], and of which around two thirds have survived until our day. The first printed editions date to 1554–5, and the first printed Latin translations from 1566–1572, even though Latin translations in the form of manuscripts had been circulating before those dates[33]. The work, however, did not become influential until much later: Niccolo da Falgano's Italian translation of 1560 remained in manuscript, and the first published English version (by John Hall) did not appear until 1652. Longinus had in fact profound impact on seventeenth-century English letters, influencing, among others, John Milton (1608-74), Alexander Pope (1688-1744), Joseph Addison (1672-1719) and John Dennis (1657-1734)[34], although it was from

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[29] (Usher 1985, 3)
[30] (Usher 1985, 4)
[31] Since in *On Literary Composition* not a word relates composition to persuasion, it is thought that Dionysius was chiefly writing for teachers and students of grammar instead of students of rhetoric.
[32] (Clark 1922, 16)
[33] (Fyfe 1999, 155)
[34] (Flory 1996, 160)

1674 onwards, when the neoclassical French poet and critic Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux published his *Traité du sublime ou du merueilleux duns le discours, traduit du grec de Longin*, that *On the Sublime* began having major impact upon literary criticism[35].

On the Sublime was intended to help young students through study and imitation of great literary models to understand elevation in style. 'Sublimity' is defined as a kind of excellence of discourse and hailed as the distinctive element of the greatest poets and prose writers. It is a lasting and powerful impression that keeps exerting amazement upon the reader even after going through the same passage multiple times. The powerful effects of the sublime are described in the following way:

> Invariably what inspires wonder, with its power of amazing us, always prevails over what is merely convincing and pleasing. For our persuasions are usually under our own control, while these things exercise an irresistible power and mastery, and get the better of every listener. Again, experience in invention [Longinus uses the term εὑρέσεως] and the due disposal and marshalling of facts do not show themselves in one or two touches but emerge gradually from the whole tissue of the composition, while, on the other hand, a well-timed flash of sublimity shatters everything like a bolt of lighting and reveals the full power of the speaker at a single stroke.[36]

Longinus identifies five productive sources of the sublime in literature, which can be classified in two groups: congenital, and coming from art. Both "the power of grand conceptions" and "inspiration of vehement emotion" fall into the first group[37]. To the second belong "the proper construction of figures" of thought and speech, "nobility of language" (choice of words, the use of metaphor and "elaborated diction"), and "dignified and elevated word-arrangement"[38]. Although personal natural genius explains to a large extent the capacity to create sublime works of literature, Longinus believed that natural genius could greatly profit from the teachings of art, and that art was far from constituting an element that marred natural abilities:

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[35] For a discussion of the influence of Longinus thought upon English literary criticism, see Thomas Rice Henn, *Longinus and the English Criticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934).

[36] (Longinus 1999, 163-165; I.4)

[37] Longinus clarifies this: "Now if he thought that sublimity and emotion were the same thing, and that one always essentially involved the other, he is wrong. For one can find emotions that are mean and devoid of sublimity, for instance feelings of pity, grief, and fear. On the other hand, many sublime passages are quite without emotion" (Longinus 1999, 183; VIII.2).

[38] (Longinus 1999, 181; VIII.1)

> We must begin now by raising the question whether there is an art of sublimity or emotion, for some think those are wholly at fault who try to bring such matters under systematic rules. Genius, it is said, is born and does not come of teaching, and the only art for producing it is nature. Works of natural genius, so people think, are spoiled and utterly demeaned by being reduced to the dry bones of rule and precept. For my part I hold that the opposite may be proved, if we consider that while in matters of elevation and emotion Nature for the most part knows no law, yet it is not the way of Nature to work at random and wholly without system. In all production Nature is the first and primary element; but all matters of degree, of the happy moment in each case, and again of the safest rules of practice and use, are adequately provided and contributed by system. We must remember also that mere grandeur runs the greatest risk if left to itself without the stay and ballast of scientific method and abandoned to the impetus of uninstructed temerity. For genius needs the curb as often as the spur.[39]

According to Longinus, both poets and orators can attain the sublime, but passion is more typical of the poets. Another difference between poetics and rhetoric is, for Longinus, that while the poetic is unrestricted by fact, the orator is bound by the actual. As a result, Longinus argues, exaggeration and 'visualizations' (*phantasiai*) fall typically within the realm of poetry, even if visualizations do have specific though different purposes and functions in oratory:

> these examples from poetry show an exaggeration which belongs to fable and far exceeds the limits of credibility, whereas the most perfect effect of visualization in oratory is always one of reality and truth.
> (...)
> What then is the use of visualization in oratory? It may be said generally to introduce a great deal of excitement and emotion into one's speeches, but when combined with factual arguments it not only convinces the audience, it positively masters them. (...) There, besides developing his factual argument the orator has visualized the event and consequently his conception far exceeds the limits of mere persuasion. In all such cases the stronger element seems naturally to catch our ears, so that our attention is drawn from the reasoning to the enthralling effect of the imagination, and the reality is conceded in a halo of brilliance.[40]

Sublimity and wonder go beyond what is convincing and pleasing, and this, of course, draws great separation between sublime rhetoric and poetry and plain one.

2.2.3. Poetry in Rome

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[39] (Longinus 1999, 165; II.2)
[40] (Longinus 1999, 223-225; XV.8-XV.12)

In Roman grammar schools, as in Greek ones, reading and analysing poetry was paramount, and the technical features of poetry −versification, identification of figures and tropes− were discussed in works on grammar, a tradition that continued into the Middle Ages. In the Roman school system, the *ars grammatica* included correctness in speaking or writing (*ars recte loquendi*) plus the analysis and interpretation of renowned authors (*enarratio poetarum*)[41]. In other words, in Roman times teachers of grammar were in charge of teaching dissemination, interpretation, imitation, and analysis of what we currently understand as literature, which was seen as a preparatory stage before the learning of rhetoric, the art of speaking well (*dicendi peritus*)[42].

The end of *enarratio* was an overall judgment from an aesthetic viewpoint. It encompassed a commentary of the form, *verborum interpretatio*, and another of the content, *historiarum cognitio*. Latin grammarians' explanation consisted of a quick and sketchy introduction followed by a detailed commentary of each word and line. It essentially aimed to explain the rhythm of the verses, difficult terms, and poetical constructions[43]. The exercises employed in *enarratio poetarum* often went beyond the limits of the grammatical concept of correctness, and usually entered a field reserved to the rhetorician. The clash between grammar and rhetoric was denounced by Quintilian, who complained at the beginning of Book II that the grammar teacher frequently exceeded the limits of his discipline and entered the domain of rhetoric:

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[41] Quintilian firstly distinguished two parts of grammar, the art of correct speech and the interpretation of the poets (Quintilian 2001, 103; I.4.2), and later he added a third part (Quintilian 2001, 103; I.4.3): the art of writing, that is, composition. Quintilian dedicated an entire chapter (Quintilian 2001, 199-209; I.8) to discuss the reading of the poets, the *lectio*, stating that only the morally valuable poets should be read, namely, Homer and Virgil, and the lyric poets with some exceptions.

[42] The concept of 'literature' did not acquire its current meaning until the eighteenth century: "The modern concept of 'literature' as published works of aesthetic quality developed out of the term 'belles lettres' in the seventeenth century in France and the eighteenth century in England. In Greece and Rome there was no exact equivalent of 'literature' in this sense. Its place was taken by the tacit assumption that the traditional literary genres— epic, lyric, and tragic poetry, for example— had special prestige. The only prose genres that came to be regarded as inherently 'literary' were oratory, historiography, and some philosophical writing, such as the dialogue form. This view prevailed throughout the medieval and Renaissance period, and these are the literary forms discussed by critics until the eighteenth century, when the novel and other genres began to emerge as also deserving critical attention" (Kennedy 1999, 127). It has been also pointed out that "it is only with the rise of scientific discourse that literature is assigned its privilege and its limits as a product for leisure consumption and for university study" (Cave 2004, 158).

[43] (Marrou 1970, 342)

> *Grammatice* (it has been translated *litteratura* in Latin) must learn to know its own limits, especially as it has advanced so far beyond the modest bounds which its name implies, within which its earlier professors confined themselves. At its source a tiny trickle, it has gathered strength [from historians and critics] and now flows in full flood, having come to comprise not only the principles of correct speech (in itself no inconsiderable matter) but the knowledge of almost all the major arts. Rhetoric for its part, named as it is from the power of speaking, must not shrink its proper duties or rejoice to see burdens which belong to it taken up by others; indeed, by surrendering some of the work, it has almost been driven out of its rightful possessions.[44]

Quintilian maintains a separation between the subjects of grammar and rhetoric in terms of method, and specifies that the *grammaticus* works almost entirely through *imitatio*, that is, through copying or paraphrasing models, while the *rhetoricus*, on the other hand, works fundamentally through precepts. In Book X, Quintilian discusses the relations between rhetoric and poetry in the following terms:

> Theophrastus says that reading the poets is very useful for the orator, and many adopt his view, and not without good reason. *From the poets we can get inspiration in thought, sublimity in language, every kind of emotional effect, and appropriateness in character-drawing; above all, minds jaded by the daily wear and tear of the courts are excellently refreshed by the delightfulness of such things.* Cicero therefore thinks that this is the reading for our hours of rest. But let us remember that *the orator should not follow the poet in everything – neither in his freedom of vocabulary, nor in his licence to develop Figures – and that poetry is designed for display.* Quite apart from the fact that it aims exclusively for pleasure and pursues this by inventing things that are not only untrue but also unbelievable, it also has a special defence for its licence, namely that it is bound by metrical constraints and so cannot always use the literal expressions, but is driven by necessity off the straight path and into certain byways of language; it is obliged, therefore, not only to change words but to extend, shorten, transpose, and divide them.[45]

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[44] (Quintilian 2001, 265; II.1.4-5). In Latin (p. 264): "Nos suum cuique professioni modum demus: et grammatice, quam in Latinum transferentes litteraturam vocaverunt, fines suos norit, praesertim tantum ab hac appellationis suae paupertate, intra quam primi illi constitere, provecta; nam tenuis a fonte adsumptis [historicorum criticorumque] viribus pleno iam satis alveo fluit, cum praetor rationem recte loquendi non parum alioqui copiosam prope omnium maximarum artium scientiam amplexa sit: et rhetorice, cui nomen vis eloquendi dedit, official sua non detrectet nec occupari gaudeat pertinentem ad se laborem: quae, dum opera cedit, iam paene possessione depulsa est".

[45] (Quintilian 2001, 267; X.1.27-29). In Latin (p. 266): "Plurimum dicit oratori conferre Theophrastus lectionem poetarum multique eius iudicium secuntur; neque immerito: namque ab his in rebus spiritus et in verbis sublimitas et in adfectibus motus omnis et in personis decor petitur, praecipueque velut attrita cotidiano actu forensi ingenia optime rerum talium iucunditate reparantur; ideoque in hac lectione Cicero requiescendum putat. Meminerimus tamen non per omnia poetas esse oratori sequendos, nec libertate verborum nec licentia figurarum: genus ostentationi comparatam, et, praeter id quod solam petit voluptatem eamque fingendo non falsa modo sed etiam quaedam incredibilia sectatur, patrocinio quoque aliquo iuvari, quod alligata ad certam pedum necessitatem non semper uti propriis possit, sed depulsa recta via necessario ad eloquendi quaedam deverticula confugiat, nec mutare modo verba, sed extendere corripere convertere dividere cogatur".

Thus, Quintilian explains how poetry can be helpful for the orator ("inspiration in thought, sublimity in language, every kind of emotional effect, and appropriateness in character-drawing"), and also enumerates those aspects the orator should not incorporate from the poet (particularly when it comes to "freedom of vocabulary" and the poet's "licence to develop Figures"). Additionally, Quintilian remarks the way in which verse conditions the production of poetry and affects the manner in which the poet writes in contrast with the *modus operandi* of the orator. Like Cicero, Quintilian defends the usefulness of poetry in oratorical discourses, which again suggests that the theoretical separation between both arts is far from drastic, even if he warns against the vices of poetic license and their dangers in oratory[46]. Hence, imitation and fiction inevitably appear as constituent parts of oratorical discourse, even if in a lesser degree than in poetry[47].

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[46] Horace also discusses the limits of the fantastic in poetry. Even though the poet is recognized some licenses when writing, Horace is against "extravagant conceits" without "head nor tail": "If a painter chose to join a human head to the neck of a horse, and to spread feathers of many a hue over limbs picked up now here now there, so that what at the top is a lovely woman ends below in a black and ugly fish, could you, my friends, if favoured with a private view, refrain from laughing? Believe me, dear Pisos, quite like such pictures would be a book, whose idle fancies shall be shaped like a sick man's dreams, so that neither head nor foot can be assigned to a single shape. 'Painters and poets,' you say, 'have always had an equal right in hazarding anything.' We know it: this licence we poets claim and in our turn we grant the like; but not so far that savage should mate with tame, or serpents couple with birds, lambs with tigers" (Horace 1978, 451, lines 1-13). In Latin:

> Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam
> iungere si velit, et varias inducere plumas
> undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
> desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne;
> spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici?
> credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
> persimilem, cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae
> fingentur species: ut nec pes nec caput uni
> reddatur formae. "pictoribus atque poetis
> quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas."
> scimus, et hanc veniam petimusque damusque
>   vicissim ;
> sed non ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut
> serpentes avibus geminentur, tigribus agni. (Horace 1978, 450)

[47] If imitation and fiction are part of oratory, critics such as Utrera Torremocha argue, rhetorical discourse must be, at least to a certain extent, a type of mimetic discourse too: "Desde tal evidencia, resulta difícil entender el discurso retórico como género no mimético y alejado, por ello, de la literatura. La imitación, aunque planee contra ella el fantasma de la verdad, es inevitable en la oratoria" (Utrera Torremocha 1998, 1520).

Equally embedded in the grammatical tradition are the treatises by Aelius Donatus (fl. AD 350) *De partibus orationis* (*Ars minor*) and *Ars maior*. The former is a description of the eight parts of speech, and it became so popular in the Middle Ages that the name 'Donat' or 'Donet' came to stand for 'elementary textbook'. *Ars maior*'s third book, known as *Barbarismus*, has been seen as "the first recorded intrusion of *grammatica* into a field heretofore appropriated by *rhetorica*" due to the fact that the book deals with tropes and figures[48]. Indeed, the period of the Second Sophistic (*c*. AD 50 to 400) showed great interest in oratorical declamation, produced works on *declamationes* and *progymnasmata*, exercises on how to prepare and deliver fictitious speeches at school, and encouraged the use of imagination in classroom exercises of declamation[49].

2.2.3.1. Cicero's *Pro Archia-Poeta*

In his panegyric of literature entitled *Pro Archia Poeta*, Cicero not only defends the Greek poet Archiae, but literature in general, and for this reason, the humanists elevated Cicero's oration *Pro Archia* almost to the status of "sacred text"[50]. Among Cicero's arguments in defence of the Greek poet there is the statement that reading literature is a means to improve one's oratorical skills:

> Do you think that I could find inspiration for my daily speeches on so manifold a variety of topics, did I not cultivate my mind with study, or that my mind could endure so great a strain, did not study too provide it with relaxation? *I am a votary of literature*, and make the confession unashamed; (...) I have the better right to indulgence herein, because *my devotion to letters strengthens my oratorical powers*, and these, such as they are, have never failed my friends in their hour of peril.[51]

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[48] (Murphy 1974, 32-33)

[49] (Murphy 1974, 35)

[50] (Gray 1963, 503). Archiae was the Greek poet whom the family of General Lucilli patronized, and the prosecution against Archiae was in reality a way the Pompeians employed to vex Lucilli himself.

[51] (Cicero 1961, 21; vi 12-13). In Latin: "An tu existimas aut suppetere nobis posse quod cotidie dicamus in tanta varietate rerum, nisi animos nostros doctrina excolamus, aut ferre animos tantam posse contentionem, nisi eos doctrina eadem relaxemus? Ego vero fateor me his studiis ese deditum: (…). Atque hoc adeo mihi concedendum est magis, quod ex his studiis haec quoque crescit oratio et facultas, quae quantacumque in me est, numquam amicorum periculis defuit" (Cicero 1961, 20; vi 12-13).

In other words, Cicero takes poetry as inspiration for his speeches, relaxation from stress, and an element that strengthens his abilities as an orator. Another argument in favour of poetry is that it encourages men to behave well by providing good models of action:

> *All literature, all philosophy, all history, abounds with incentives to noble action*, incentives which would be buried in black darkness were the light of the written word not flashed upon them. How many pictures of high endeavour the great authors of Greece and Rome have drawn for our use, and bequeathed to us, not only for our contemplation, but for our emulation! These I have held ever before my vision throughout my public career, and have guided the workings of my brain and my soul by meditating upon patterns of excellence.[52]

That is, poetry has an ethic and moral value that works towards the general improvement of society by offering citizens excellent models to emulate. What is more, Cicero states that even if poetry did not foster virtue among men (which it does), it would still be worth reading just for pleasure's sake: "But let us for the moment waive these solid advantages; let us assume that entertainment is the sole end of reading; even so, I think you would hold that no mental employment is so broadening to the sympathies or so enlightening to the understanding"[53].

2.2.3.2. Horace's *Ars Poetica*

Horace's famous didactic poem *Ars poetica*, written between 23 and 13 BC, gathers most of his views towards literature and its history. Since Horace wrote the *Ars poetica* for young men who wished to become poets, his work was structured as a textbook with some general statements about poetry, particularly about drama and epic. The *Ars*

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[52] (Cicero 1961, 23; vi 14). In Latin: "Sed pleni sunt omnes libri, plenae sapientium voces, plena exemplorum vetustas: quae iacerent in tenebris omnia, nisi litterarum lumen accederet. Quam multas nobis imagines non solum ad intuendum, verum etiam ad imitandum fortissimorum virorum expressas scriptores et Graeci et Latini reliquerunt, quas ego mihi semper in administranda re publica proponens animum et mentem meam ipsa cogitatione hominum excellentium corformabam" (Cicero 1961, 22; vi 14).

[53] (Cicero 1961, 25; vii 16). In Latin: "Quod si non hic tantus fructus ostenderetur et si ex his studiis delectatio sola peteretur, tamen, ut opinor, hanc animi adversionem humanissimam ac liberalissimam iudicaretis" (Cicero 1961, 24; vii 16).

poetica stands within a grammatical and rhetorical tradition often considered to stem from an extension of the *enarratio poetarum*[54]. It is not, however, a poetic in the Aristotelian sense, for the Roman *ars* meant a body of rules, a guide in composition, rather than a philosophical treatise. The *Ars poetica* became, in this way, a prescriptive document with fairly general precepts, sometimes deemed dependent upon "personal experience and observation of literature"[55], and probably of not much aid to a reader who, eager to learn how to write a play or a poem, exclusively relies upon it. "Though I write naught myself," says Horace, "I will teach the poet's office and duty; whence he draws his stores; what nurtures and fashions him; what befits him and what not; whither the right course leads and whither the wrong"[56]. Among the first pieces of advice that Horace offers prospective poets is carefully choosing a fine topic, as it will determine the rest of the process of poetic creation:

> Take a subject, ye writers, equal to your strength; and ponder long what your shoulders refuse, and what they are able to bear. Whoever shall choose a theme within his range, neither speech will fail him, nor clearness of order.[57]

Horace recognizes the difficulty of dealing with topics never discussed before, and rather believes that imitating or using already extant texts as raw material is far easier and less risky:

> If it is an untried theme you entrust to the stage, and if you boldly fashion a fresh character, have it kept to the end even as it came forth at the first, and have it self-consistent.
> *It is hard to treat in your own way what is common: and you are doing better in spinning into acts a song of Troy than if, for the first time, you were giving the world a*

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[54] Mary A. Grant and George Converse Fiske show in their article "Cicero's 'Orator' and Horace's 'Ars Poetica'", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 35 (1924): 1-74, that Cicero's *Orator* is part of the rhetorical breeding soil from which Horace's *Ars Poetica* springs.

[55] (Murphy 1974, 32)

[56] (Horace 1978, 475, 477; lines 306-308). In Latin (Horace 1978, 476):
    munus et officium, nil scribens ipse, docebo,
    unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam,
    quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error.

[57] (Horace 1978, 453; lines 38-41). In Latin (Horace 1978, 452):
    Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, aequam
    viribus et versate diu, quid ferre recusent,
    quid valeant umeri. cui lecta potenter erit res,
    nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.

theme unknown and unsung. In ground open to all you will win private rights, if you do
not linger along the easy and open pathway, if you do not seek to render word for word
as a slavish translator, and if in your copying you do not leap into the narrow well, out
of which either shame or the laws of your task will keep you from stirring a step.[58]

Of course, Horace confesses, developing further a topic that has been previously
elaborated entails some difficulties as well, and the poet in this case should avoid
lingering "along the easy and open pathway" and rendering "word for word as a slavish
translator". That is, even if discussing an old and public matter, every poet should avoid
turning into an unsure copier who cannot contribute to the subject in his own distinctive
way, which would make him "win private rights". Innovation within tradition is,
therefore, praised over sheer repetition of what is known. Finally, for Horace, nature
becomes a source of inspiration for the poet: "I would advise one who has learned the
imitative art to look to life and manners for a model, and draw from thence living
words"[59]. To teach and delight, *prodesse* and *delectare*, constitute the ends of poetry for
Horace: "Poets aim either to benefit, or to amuse, or to utter words at once both pleasing
and helpful to life"[60]. Horace paraphrases the same idea in the following terms:

He has won every vote who has blended profit and pleasure, at once delighting and
instructing the reader. That is the book to make money for the Sosii; this the one to
cross the sea and extend to a distant day its author's fame.[61]

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[58](Horace 1978, 461, 463; lines 125-135). In Latin (Horace 1978, 460):
 si quid inexpertum scaenae committis et audes
 personam formare novam, servetur ad imum,
 qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.
 Difficile est proprie communia dicere; tuque
 rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
 quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus.
 publica materies privati iuris erit, si
 non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem,
 nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus
 interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum,
 unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex.

[59] (Horace 1978, 477; lines 317-318). In Latin: "respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo / doctum
imitatorem, et vivas hinc ducere voces" (Horace 1978, 476).

[60] (Horace 1978, 479; lines 333-334). In Latin: "Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae / aut simul et
iucunda et idonea dicere vitae" (Horace 1978, 478).

[61] (Horace 1978, 479; lines 343-346). In Latin (Horace 1978, 478):
 omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci,
 lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.
 hic meret aera liber Sosiis, hic et mare transit
 et longum noto scriptori prorogat aevum.

In the Augustan period, the study of rhetoric was compulsory to carry out any literary activity, and therefore it became the discipline *par excellence*[62]. Unsurprisingly, thus, as a literary critic Horace proves to have a conception of the qualities of the poet similar to the one Cicero had regarding those of the orator[63]. The poet is not someone who merely writes in verse, but someone who, on the one hand, possesses some natural qualities, innate talent and genius (*ingenium*), and, on the other, has been trained in the *ars*, knows certain technical skills, rules and precepts, and has *sapientia* (understood not as unprocessed accumulation of knowledge, but as the result of the study of philosophy and a long-meditated understanding of things). The opposition *ingenium–ars* is, considering what has been just said, false and purely methodological[64].

2.2.3.3. *Inventio* in Latin writings about poetry

The three major Latin "literary theorists", Cicero, Quintilian and Horace, do not generally employ the terms *invenire* or *inventio* to refer to the process of poetry writing or the tasks of the poet, and never use it to allude to the poet's mental capacities, the divisions of poetry, or poetry's essence. In fact, no fragment whatsoever in the work of Quintilian suggests a link between *inventio* and poetry, and only very few in Cicero and Horace's do. In the case of Cicero, it is worthwhile to point out the following two extracts, which employ *invenire* simply to talk about the creation of poetry as an art, not about the composition of actual poetic works. Cicero states the following in *Brutus*:

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[62] (Delgado Escolar 1991, 560)

[63] In the case of poetry, though, Cicero is of the opinion that it depends, a hundred per cent, upon the natural qualities of the poet: "And yet we have it on the highest and most learned authority that while other arts are matters of science and formula and technique, *poetry depends solely upon an inborn faculty*, is doked by a purely mental activity, and is infused with a strange supernal inspiration. Rightly, then, did our great Ennius call poets 'holy,' for, they seem recommended to us by the benign bestowal of God" (Cicero 1961, 27; viii 18). From this perspective, thus, poetry is an entirely holy or divine art that cannot be taught.

[64] (Delgado Escolar 1991, 563)

The same thing I take it is true of all the other arts; nothing is brought to perfection on *its first invention*. We cannot doubt that there were poets before Homer, as we may infer from the songs which he introduces into the feasts of the Phaeacians and of the suitors.[65]

Then, in Cicero's *Orator* we find the following passage:

Accordingly, just as in the realm of poetry verse was *discovered* by the test of the ear and the observation of thoughtful men, so in prose it was observed, much later to be sure, but by the same promptings of nature, that there are definite periods and rhythmical cadences.[66]

Regarding Horace, in his tenth satire of Book I, he talks about Lucilius as the "inventor" of satires: "This satire, which Varro of the Atax and some others had vainly tried, was what I could write with more success, though falling short of the *inventor*; nor would I dare to wrest from him the crown that clings to his brow with so much glory"[67]. Then, in the first poem of Book II of his *Epistles*, we find the following:

Through this custom *came into use* the Fescennine licence, which in alternate verse poured forth rustic taunts; and the freedom, welcomed each returning year, was innocently gay, till jest, now growing cruel, turned to open frenzy, and stalked amid the homes of honest folk, fearless in its threatening.[68]

If we turn to the *Ars Poetica*, we also find two fragments worth quoting:

Thespis is said to have *discovered* the Tragic Muse, a type unknown before, and to have carried his pieces in wagons to be sung and acted by players with faces smeared with

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[65] (Cicero 1962, 67; xviii). In Latin: "…et nescio an reliquis in rebus omnibus idem eveniat: nihil est enim simul et *inventum* et perfectum; nec dubitari debet quin fuerint ante Homerum poetae, quod ex eis carminibus intellegi potest, quae apud illum et in Phaeacum et in procorum epulis canuntur" (Cicero 1962, 66; xviii.71).

[66] (Cicero 1962, 457; liii.178). In Latin: "ut igitur poeticae versus *inventus* est terminatione aurium, observatione prudentium, sic in oratione animadversum est, multo illud quidem serius sed eadem natura admonente, esse quosdam certos cursus conclusionesque verborum" (Cicero 1962, 456; liii.178).

[67] (Horace 1978, 119; I.x.40-49). In Latin (Horace 1978, 118; I.x.40-49):
hoc erat, experto frustra Varrone Atacino
atque quibusdam aliis, melius quod scribere possem,
inventore minor; neque ego illi detrahere ausim
haerentem capiti cum multa laude coronam.

[68] (Horace 1978, 409; II.I. 145-150). In Latin (Horace 1978, 408; II.i.145-150):
Fescennina per hunc *inventa* licentia morem
versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit,
libertasque recurrentis accepta per annos
lusit amabiliter, donec iam saevos apertam
in rabiem coepit verti iocus et per honestas
ire domos inpune minax.

wine-lees.[69]

> As at pleasant banquets an orchestra out of tune, an unguent that is thick, and poppy-seeds served with Sardinian honey, give offence, because the feast might have gone on without them: so a poem, whose birth and *creation* are for the soul's delight, if in aught it falls short of the top, sinks to the bottom.[70]

As the examples above make manifest, *inventio* did not have a place in poetic theory in Latinity. Certainly, the above extracts show how isolated, scant and asystematic the occurrences of the term *inventio* were when discussing poetic matters, and how the (old fashioned and, by that time already formulaic) theory of inspiration was used much more frequently to discuss poetic issues. In fact, Quintilian (who never employs *inventio* to discuss poetry) comments upon poetical inspiration on several occasions in his *Institutio oratoria*. Consider, in this respect, the following extract:

> No one is surprised *the frequent practice of the greatest poets was to invoke the Muses* not only at the beginning of their works but also later on, when they came to some particularly important passage, to repeat their vows and as it were offer up fresh prayers; surely then I may be pardoned for doing what I omitted to do when I first began this work, and calling on all the gods to help me, and in the first place on that God than whom no other power gives such present help or looks with more favour on learning; may he inspire me with genius equal to the new expectations he has aroused for me, may he be favourable to me and come willingly to my aid, and make me what he has believed me to be.[71]

Also, Quintilian refers to what he calls *poetico spiritu*, poetical inspiration, in the fragments below. In the first, he discusses poetry as a source of inspiration for orators

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[69] (Horace 1978, 473; l. 275-277). In Latin (Horace 1978, 472; l. 275-277):
    ignotum tragicae genus *invenisse* Camenae
    dicitur et plaustris vexisse poemata Thespis,
    quae canerent agerentque peruncti faecibus ora.

[70] (Horace 1978, 481; l. 374-378). In Latin (Horace 1978, 480; l. 374-378):
    ut gratas inter mensas symphonia discors
    et crassum unguentum et Sardo cum melle papaver
    offendunt, poterat duci quia cena sine istis:
    sic animis natum *inventumque* poema iuvandis,
    si paulum summo decessit, vergit ad imum.

[71] (Quintilian 2001, 177,179; IV.4-5). In Latin (p. 176, 178): "Quod si nemo miratur poetas maximos saepe fecisse ut non solum initiis operum suorum Musas invocarent, sed prouecti quoque longius, cum ad aliquem grauiorem venissent locum, repeteret vota et velut noua precatione uterentur, mihi quoque profecto poterit ignosci si, quod initio quo primum hanc materiam inchoaui non feceram, nunc omnis in auxilium deos ipsumque in primis quo neque praesentius aliud nec studiis magis propitium numen est invocem, ut, quantum nobis expectationis adiecit, tantum ingenii *adspiret* dexterque ac volens adsit et me qualem esse credidit faciat".

(again illustrating how both oratory and poetry were thought as cognate arts), and in the second, he recovers the myth of poetic composition as the result of divine inspiration:

> Theophrastus says that reading the poets is very useful for the orator, and many adopt his view and not without good reason. From the poets we can get *inspiration* in thought, subliming in language, every kind of emotional effect, and appropriateness in character-drawing; above all, minds jaded by the daily wear and tear of the courts are excellently refreshed by the delightfulness of such things.[72]

> So with poetry: everyone agrees that it came originally from the outpourings of *inspiration*, and was generated by the ear's sense of measure and the observation of regularly recurring intervals, the feet contained in it being a later discovery.[73]

2.3. Poetics in the Middle Ages

According to scholars such as Ernst Robert Curtius, in the times of the Empire the influence of rhetoric upon the practice of poetry was so great that a phenomenon of rhetorization of Roman poetry occurred[74]. With the advancement of the Empire and the virtual disappearance of opportunities for genuine political and judicial oratory, poetry became "a natural outlet for rhetorical training"[75]. Paul Prill argues that the scholars at the intersection of the classical and medieval periods handed on to the Middle Ages the idea "that poetry was best understood from the precepts of rhetoric rather than those of grammar"[76]. Prill provides as examples three commentators on Virgil: Donatus, Macrobius, and Fulgentius. Firstly, Tiberius Claudius Donatus argued in the preface to his *Interpretationes Vergilianae* (late 4th century) that the highest oratory was found in

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[72] (Quintilian 2001, 267; X.27). In Latin (p. 266): "Plurimum dicit oratori conferre Theophrastus lectionem poetarum multique eius iudicium secuntur; neque inmerito: namque ab his in rebus *spiritus* et in uerbis sublimitas et in adfectibus motus omnis et in personis decor petitur, praecipueque uelut attrita cotidiano actu forensi ingenia optime rerum talium †libertate† reparantur".

[73] (Quintilian 2001, 225; IX.4.114). In Latin (p. 224): "sicut poema nemo dubitauerit *spiritu* quodam initio fusum et aurium mensura et similiter decurrentium spatiorum obseruatione esse generatum, mox in eo repertos pedes".

[74] (Curtius 1979, 148)

[75] (Prill 1987, 131)

[76] (Prill 1987, 133). According to D. L. Clark, "The seven liberal arts of mediaeval education carried the blending almost to the absorption of poetic by rhetoric" (Clark 1922, 43). From this scholar's perspective, for the Middle Ages poetry was composed of two constituents: a profitable subject matter (*doctrina*), supplied by the allegory; and style (*eloquentia*), which in the English Middle Ages meant rhetoric (Clark 1922, 55). Clark defends that the traditional division of rhetoric was then transferred to poetry, at the same time that both rhetoric and poetics were restricted to diction, the trait they had in common.

the poets. Then, Macrobius, a pagan Neoplatonist and a philosophic and scientific authority all throughout the Middle Ages, stated in his *The Saturnalia* (early 5th century) that Virgil was a better orator than Cicero, for he was convinced that Virgil composed by following the rules of rhetoric –this being the way medieval poets themselves typically proceeded[77]. Finally, Fabius Planciades Fulgentius noted in his *The Exposition of the Content of Virgil* (late 5th or early 6th century) that the poem follows the precepts of demonstrative rhetoric, designed to teach moral behaviour by example.

The greatest interest in rhetoric and poetics in the early Middle Ages occurs during the Carolingian Renaissance (late eighth and ninth centuries), when the application of rhetoric to poetry can be seen, for instance, in poems such as Alcuin's *Versus de Patribus Regibus et Sanctis Euboricensis Ecclesiae*, considered the first medieval narrative poem. The poem is actually the elementary rhetorical exercise of *conversio*, which implies turning poetry into prose and vice versa. The confusion around the discipline that should analyse literary texts was not a novelty, since it went back, as has been seen, to the times of Quintilian, who attempted to clearly separate grammar and rhetoric by writing down each one's attributions. Both grammarians and rhetoricians, for instance, taught the figures and tropes (which occupy a central position in rhetorical *elocutio*, and which were essential for grammar in the process of *enarratio*[78]), and used textual paraphrase exercises in their classes (even if in grammar lessons this meant rewriting texts and simplifying their syntax and vocabulary, while in rhetoric this exercise was related to style and textual embellishment).

The intersection of rhetoric and grammar became even more pronounced with the emergence of the medieval *artes poetriae*, partly the product of Cicero, Quintilian, and

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[77] Indeed, it has been remarked that Macrobius already saw "in poetry everything that the Middle Ages saw in it: theology, allegory, universal knowledge, rhetoric" (Curtius 1979, 444).

[78] For Suzanne Reynolds, this creates a problem on the level of correctness, for a number "of the linguistic features so dear to the rhetorician or to the poet were considered to be faults from a formal grammatical point of view" (Reynolds 1996, 21). Precisely to avoid such confusion and prevent the blurring of the boundary separating grammar and rhetoric, Quintilian made "it clear that grammatical debates on the number, kinds and species of the tropes are of no interest to the orator; what concerns him is the oratorical application of the tropes as part of the affective work of persuasion" (Reynolds 1996, 22). In other words, the main difference between grammar and rhetoric does lay on the level of function.

Horace's legacies. Indeed, the *artes poetriae*, which refer to both prose and verse composition, constitute a crossover of the grammatical *enarratio poetarum* and ancient rhetorical precepts of composition. According to Rita Copeland, the *artes* in fact used the grammarian's methods of textual analysis for discursive production purposes[79]. The medieval *artes poetriae* primarily taught composition using examples not only to illustrate the theory, but also to propose them as models for new texts. Consequently, the *artes poetriae* are in effect preceptive grammars or rhetorics of versification that advice authors on how to compose poems through rules derived from experience in teaching and analysis. Indeed, they are more practical than theoretical in nature, since they do not really offer a disquisition on theoretical principles even if, of course, they are built upon them[80]. Given that teachers of the medieval *artes poetriae* were not rhetoricians but experts on grammar, composition fundamentally consisted in *enarratio* or textual exposition[81], and textual exegesis, and was studied through the traditional *progymnasmata*[82]. Thus, since grammar teachers were in charge of teaching poetry, they were naturally the ones to write down the new poetic principles. As a result, the schoolmaster became "not only a literary critic, but a literary theorist"[83].

Medieval writers acknowledged that grammar was the first of the subjects, and that it prepared the way for rhetoric and further learning. Thus, while the *ars rhetorica* did not become a subject at universities until nearly the end of the medieval period, from the twelfth century onwards *ars grammatica* was the first subject at all European universities, as even the student of logic had to learn grammar first and foremost, and at elementary schools grammar was so central that 'grammar school' came to mean elementary school itself. In the history of medieval grammar, the twelfth century constitutes a turning point: before 1200, grammar basically signified syntax and *figurae*,

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[79] (Copeland 1995, 175)
[80] (Kelly 1991, 37)
[81] Rita Copeland remarks that, since medieval *enarratio* went beyond the restrictions imposed by Quintilian upon grammar, "In practice, grammatical *enarratio* comes to supplant rhetoric as the master discourse" (Copeland 1995, 62).
[82] See Auerbach (1993) for a standard discussion of many of these features of composition.
[83] (Murphy 1979, 4)

and it was a field dominated by Priscian, Donatus, and their commentators. However, *c.* 1200 the monolithic *ars grammatica* of Donatus and Priscian cracked, and after 1200 specialized grammatical works on both *metricum* and *rithmicum* appeared together with two new widely accepted textbooks: Alexander of Villedieu's *Doctrinale* and Eberhard the German's *Graecismus*[84]. By then, the commonplaces were no longer devices for discovering arguments, but strategies for remembering, amplifying, describing, and constructing figures. After the twelfth century, the conceptualization of poetry had also changed, as it was then viewed mainly as a kind of versified rhetoric, a sort of argumentation or persuasion and a form of composition, no longer a branch of grammar[85]. As such, it was treated in terms of style and rhetorical figures and subordinated to logic or morals −which is why poetry was recommended as school reading. Indeed, poetry was not recognized as an independent art, and, thus, had no separate place in the scheme of the Seven Liberal Arts[86].

Finally, the confusion between poetry and prose should be mentioned. Medieval authors considered writing to have three main forms: the prosaic, the metrical or syllable-measuring, and the rhythmical or accentual. Nevertheless, there was no term in the Middle Ages that referred both to metrical and rhythmical poetry[87]. As a consequence, the *ars dictaminis* ended up being divided, at least in theory, into metrical, rhythmical, and prose *dictamina*, thus embracing both prose and poetry even when in practice it exclusively treated prose letters. Furthermore, the boundaries between poetry and prose were so blurry that even the concept of 'prose' was equivocal: in the Middle Ages there was *dictamen prosaicum* or artistic prose; *sermo simplex* or 'plain' prose, the

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[84] (Murphy 1974, 144)

[85] Atkins remarks that "this conception prevailed until the close of the medieval period −but not without modification" (Atkins 1943, 183): "Richard of Bury, for instance, was to claim for poetry the dignity of a *scientia* as opposed to a *facultas*, that is, a body of knowledge based on universal principles, as opposed to a mere technique founded on skill and experience" (Atkins 1943, 184).

[86] In this respect, it is worth mentioning Petrarch's response from Padua to Benvenuto da Imola on February 9, 1373, to the latter's inquiry of why poetry was not counted among the liberal arts. Petrarch's answer was that poetry "is beyond all the liberal arts and takes them all in", and that "sometimes it is greater to be left out, just as the prince is left out of the number of great citizens" (Petrarch 1992, Vol. II, 588).

[87] *Poesis* denoted a long poem, like the *Iliad*, but *poesis*, *poema*, *poetica*, and *poeta* do not tend to appear very often in the early Middle Ages. About 1150 the word *poetria* appears, it being the ancestor of the English 'poetry'.

normal vehicle for letters and history, chronicles, and science; and rhymed prose, and *prosimetra* or mixed prose, in which prose alternates with verse. Although in general terms 'prose' was taken to mean free discourse, in the early Middle Ages *prosa* also stood for 'rhythmic poem'[88].

2.3.1. Latin Works on Verse Composition

From 1175 to *c.* 1280, six Latin works outlining precepts for verse composition were written by European teachers of grammar. These works took Horace's *Ars Poetica* as their model (leaving out any discussion of drama, though), were studied all throughout the medieval period, and were preceptive, as each provides advice to writers eager to compose verse. For authors of medieval works on verse composition such as Matthew of Vendôme, Geoffrey of Vinsauf (author of the most popular medieval art of poetry), John of Garland, John of Salisbury, Hugh of St. Victor, Gervase of Melkley, Eberhard the German, or Guilheim Molinier, there seems to be some faculty or *ars,* some "basic metapoetic principle" prior to any particular genre[89]. As a result, it appears that the poet or the prose-writer should first master some elemental skill of *compositio* before specializing in a particular type of composition. This also implies, first, the existence of a "rhetoric of discovery, shaping, and phrasing that every poet uses, independent of – and prior to– the particular literary genre in which he writes"[90]; secondly, that such a metapoetics could be taught in schools, and thirdly, that the genre was solely a way to give shape to general poetic skills. This common and basic education was essentially rhetorical (more precisely, Ciceronian), but, ironically enough, administered by teachers of grammar, which resulted in a further blending of both domains, and an additional stress on style and figures[91].

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[88] (Curtius 1979, 148-154)
[89] (Murphy 1979, 3)
[90] (Murphy 1979, 1)
[91] Charles Sears Baldwin observes that in the Middle Ages *poetria* "meant generally the study of style, and specifically the study of stylistic decoration" (Baldwin 1926, 195). On her part, Rita Copeland talks

2.3.1.1. Matthew of Vendôme

Matthew of Vendôme's *Ars Versificatoria* is the earliest surviving medieval handbook of poetry. Vendôme was a teacher of grammar first at Orléans and then at Paris in the mid-twelfth century. In addition, Vendôme wrote for elementary students, giving definitions and topics, discussing the forms of words, commenting on the use of tropes and figures, or the faults in style. In Paris, shortly before 1175, he composed his *Ars Versificatoria* in prose with numerous verse examples, chiefly tackling versification at an introductory level, addressing beginners. The *Ars Versificatoria* is divided in four parts ("Ideas", "The Form of Words", "The Quality of Expression", and "The Execution of the Subject in Poetic Fables") and constituted an introduction to writing on *materia* that was already chosen for the student. Matthew's instruction focuses on the choice and arrangement of words and on rhetorical embellishment. This explains why *inventio* and *dispositio* are absent from this treatise: due to its elementary level, the book supplies the student with the *materia* ready to ornament, so there is no need whatsoever for *inventio* or *dispositio*. The same applies to the versificatory treatise by Gervais of Melkley, and Eberhard the German's didactic Latin poem *Laborintus*, a manual on grammar and poetic composition which Edmond Faral dates between 1208–1213 and 1280[92].

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about "The 'grammaticization' of rhetoric in the medieval *artes poetriae*", asserting that "late medieval attempts to approach poetics through rhetorical precept were nothing less than 'projections' of grammar onto rhetoric", and so, that for most of the previously enumerated authors "invention itself becomes in large part a grammatical category". Thus, "all the important rhetorical work would be transferred to amplification, abbreviation, and ornamentation of the *materia* that tradition has selected", which, as a result, "makes *inventio* virtually identical with *elocutio*" (Copeland 1995, 166). Rita Copeland, continues explaining that "in these rhetorical poetics, *inventio* can often assume the existence of a textual legacy, an inherited tradition of written authority which will provide a topical reserve. In this theoretical context, the place - the topos - out of which one invents is provided in palpable textual authority. This process of invention through textual reception is presented in the *artes poetriae* in ways that are nearly identical with the apparatus of hermeneutics in the tradition of *enarratio poetarum*. The apparatus for reading or analyzing texts in the manner of the grammarian-exegete (e.g., the attention to style or to authorial intention), which allowed medieval hermeneutics to appropriate ancient textual authority, is here, in the *artes poetriae*, applied to writing out of that body of textual authority" (Copeland 1995, 160).

[92] See Edmond Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle* (Paris: E. Champion, 1924). *Laborintus* was the only one of the six most popular works of its kind in this period that was printed in the fifteenth century: it appeared at Leipzig in 1499 or 1500.

2.3.1.2. Geoffrey of Vinsauf

It would not be until the early thirteenth century that the next major title in this field appeared: Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria Nova* (1200-1215, including revisions, deletions, additions), which addressed more advanced students and was written in the form of a hexameter poem. The title of Vinsauf's work, *Poetria nova*, also known as "Galfredi rethorica", is reminiscent of both Horace's *Ars poetica* (also known as *Poetria* during the Middle Ages) and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, or *Rhetorica nova* (the *Rhetorica vetus* being Cicero's *De inventione*, a source of inspiration for Vinsauf, who took a great deal of his theory of composition from it and applied it to the writing of poetry). Jane Baltzell Kopp argues that the title *Poetria nova* indicates Vinsauf's "claim that he would supplant the Latin poet Horace as arbiter of poetic doctrine", and that he presented "'new doctrines to replace the older ones"[93]. Indeed, Vinsauf's *Poetria* has been seen as a semi-conscious effort to update Horace's precepts to the context of medieval schools[94].

Vinsauf's work became a basic textbook for the teaching of the *ars poetriae*, and it was so popular during the Middle Ages that around two hundred manuscripts have been found all throughout Europe dating from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. It is only from the sixteenth century onwards that the book starts to disappear: there are only three manuscripts and two commentaries dating from the sixteenth century, and just one from the seventeenth. The centrality of the *Poetria nova* in the later Middle Ages was indisputable: shortly after the appearance of Vinsauf's work, at some point between the years 1213 and 1216, Gervase of Melkley cites Geoffrey by name in his *Ars versificaria*, where he also refers to Vinsauf's *Poetria nova* and his manual for beginners *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi* (*c.* 1180, rev. *c.* 1210), considerably influential in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and in the teaching

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[93] (Kopp 1985, 30)
[94] (Calvo Revilla 2008, 18)

of rhetoric at Oxford[95]. In England, Stephen Hawes's *The Pastime of Pleasure* (1509) is most likely the first English language work to treat Vinsauf's doctrines systematically[96]. Additionally, notes on certain manuscripts as well as some university charters indicate that Vinsauf's book was taught at medieval schools and in a few universities in Central Europe[97]. Without a doubt, it seems that the success of the *Poetria* is closely related to the fact that it appealed to both students, as well as a larger audience partly made up of contemporary writers in the vernacular languages[98].

Geoffrey of Vinsauf tackles in his work the three areas that he considers necessary for writing good poetry: *ars*, or knowledge of precepts and rules; *imitatio*, or the imitation of great writers, and *usus*, or diligent practice. Not only are the five parts of classical rhetoric present in Vinsauf's work, but they constitute the organizing principles of his *Poetria*. For this reason, the work is seen both as dealing with rhetoric, as well as with poetics, and each commentator privileges one field over the other. For instance, Marjorie Woods distinguishes "literary or textual commentaries", found "in manuscripts containing collections of works taught in the lower schools", which "emphasize the *Poetria nova* as a poem"[99], from "theoretical commentaries", related to the teaching of rhetoric at university level, and consequently, focusing on rhetorical theory[100]. Textual commentaries were the first to appear, while theoretical ones are linked to the development of curricula in Central European universities.

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[95] (Woods 1991, 60)

[96] Some critics have investigated the way in which Chaucer may have been influenced by Geoffrey of Vinsauf. In this respect, see Karl Young's "Chaucer and Geoffrey of Vinsauf", *Modern Philology* 41, No. 3 (1944): 172-182, which particularly focuses on the relationship between Chaucer's *The Nun's Priest's Tale* and the *Nova poetria*.

[97] (Woods 1991, 56). Marjorie Woods argues that "what one learned about rhetoric from this text in a lower school was not a simpler version of what one could learn later at a university; rather, the approaches were, in their most extreme forms, mutually exclusive: The schools concentrated on the textual and literary aspects of rhetoric and the universities on rhetorical theory" (Woods 1991, 55).

[98] (Calvo Revilla 2008, 23)

[99] (Woods 1991, 57)

[100] (Woods 1991, 58). Guizzardo of Bologna and Pace of Ferrara, two late thirteenth/early fourteenth-century Italian pre-humanists, wrote commentaries on the *Poetria nova* of a mixed nature, and consequently cannot be included within any of the two groups, but rather, make up a third group of their own (Woods 1991, 61). Marjorie C. Woods has additionally elaborated on Vinsauf's commentators in "Literary Criticism in an Early Commentary on Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria Nova*" in *Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies* (R. J.

Beginning with invention, Vinsauf moves to the arrangement of material, then to considerations on style, and finally, devotes some time to both memory and delivery. The part of Vinsauf's work revolving around *inventio* and *dispositio* is brief when compared to that in which style is explained. The work finishes with some quick notes on memory and *actio* (only treated in medieval commentaries by Vinsauf and John of Garland). The scholar Ana María Calvo Revilla argues that, in addition to these five rhetorical parts, Vinsauf also dedicates some time to the rhetorical operation of *intellectio*, occurring before invention and the rest of the constituent operations of discourse, in lines 43-49[101]:

> If a man has a house to build, his impetuous
> hand does not rush into action. *The measuring line*
> *of his mind first lays out the work, and he mentally*
> *outlines the successive steps in a definite order.*
> *The mind's hand shapes the entire house before*
> *the body's hand builds it*. Its mode of being is
> archetypal before it is actual... [102]

Also, in Revilla's opinion, verses 50-56 simultaneously allude to *intellectio* as well as to *inventio*:

> ...Poetic art may see
> in this analogy the law to be given to poets: let the
> poet's hand not be swift to take up the pen, nor his
> tongue be impatient to speak; trust neither hand
> nor tongue to the guidance of fortune. To ensure
> greater success for the work, *let the discriminating*
> *mind, as a prelude to action, defer the operation of*
> *hand and tongue, and ponder long on the subject*

Schoeck, ed. Binghamton: State University of New York, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, 1985. 667-673).

[101] (Calvo Revilla 2002, 288; Calvo Revilla 2008, 32-34). Some rhetoricians from the fourth century AD such as Sulpicio Víctor and Aurelio Agustín added to the traditional five parts of rhetoric a sixth one: *intellectio*. For more on *intellectio*, see (Albaladejo Mayordomo and Chico Rico 1998; Arduini 2000, 59-72; Chico Rico 2002, 25).

[102] (Vinsauf 1967, 16-17). In Latin (Vinsauf 2008, 134):
Si quis habet fundare domum, non cumt ad actum
Impetuosa manus: intrinseca linea cordis
Praemetitur opus, seriemque sub ordine certo
Interior praescribit homo, totamque figurat
Ante manus cordis quam corporis; es status ejus
Est prius archetypus quam sensilis...

> *matter*. Let the mind's interior compass first circle
> the whole extent of the material...[103]

Douglas Kelly, however, believes that invention implies choosing the material for the composition, and deciding the manner in which to meet specific ends. That is, invention needs both "raw source material (*materia remota*) and authorial changes in, and adaptation of, that material (*materia propinqua*)"[104]. Hence, Kelly considers that what Geoffrey of Vinsauf calls an "archetype" precedes the identification of source material, and that "this conception provides a context that gives meaning to the source material and indicates where and how it might be adapted to the author's intention"[105]. In any case, it cannot be denied that reflection before action is, according to Vinsauf, fundamental for the success of the enterprise:

> As a prudent workman, construct the whole fabric
> within the mind's citadel; let it exist in the mind
> before it is on the lips... [106]

As it is evident, invention (and *intellectio*, according to Calvo Revilla) has a paramount role for Vinsauf within poetic creation, strengthening the pillars upon which any literary production is built. Moreover, Vinsauf reflects the medieval divorce between teaching (*docere*) and delighting (*delectare*) by focusing on the former. Style and ornament (*verba*) are thus subordinate and secondary to invention (*res*). This principle is particularly present in lines 60-70:

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[103] (Vinsauf 1967, 17). In Latin (Vinsauf 2008, 134):
　　...Ipsa poesis
　　Spectet in hoc speculo quae lex sit danda poetis.
　　Non manus ad calamum praeceps, non lingua sit ardens
　　Ad verbum: neutram manibus committe regendam
　　Fortunae; sed mens discreta praeambula facti,
　　Ut melius fortunet opus, suspendat earum
　　Officium, tractetque diu de themate secum.
　　55 Circinus interior mentis praecircinet omne
　　Materiae spatium.
[104] (Kelly 1978, 233)
[105] (Kelly 1978, 233)
[106] (Vinsauf 1967, 17). In Latin (Vinsauf 2008, 134):
　　 Opus totum prudens in pectoris arcem
　　Contrahe, sitque prius in pectore quam sir in ore.

> When due order has arranged the material in the
> hidden chamber of the mind, let poetic art come
> forward to clothe the matter with words. Since
> poetry comes to serve, however, let it make due
> preparation for attendance upon its mistress. Let
> it take heed lest a head with tousled locks, or a
> body in rumpled garments, or any final details
> prove displeasing, and lest in adorning one part it
> should in some way disfigure another. If any
> part is ill-groomed, the work as a whole incurs
> censure from that one part. A touch of gall makes
> all the honey bitter; a single blemish disfigures the
> entire face. *Give careful thought to the material*,
> therefore, that there may be no possible grounds
> for reproach.[107]

Invention logically appears as "a very long and laborious process, since the success of the poem will depend mostly on its *materia*"[108]. Finally, since reason is the one that invents and finds the subject matter within the mind, the creation of poetry is for Vinsauf a completely rational process, alien to the inspiration and madness that classical authors attributed to it:

> If you wish to remember *all that reason invents*,
> or order disposes, or adornment refines, keep in
> mind this counsel, valuable though brief: the little
> cell that remembers is a cell of delights, and it
> craves what is delightful, not what is boring.[109]

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[107] (Vinsauf 1967, 17). In Latin (Vinsauf 2008, 135):
   Mentis in arcane cum rem digesserit ordo,
   Materiam verbis veniat vestire poesis.
   Quando tamen servire venit, se praeparet aptam
   Obsequio dominae: caveat sibi, ne caput hirtis
   Crinibus, aut corpus pannosa veste, ve lulla
   Ultima displiceant, alicunde nec inquinet illud
   Hanc poliens partem: pars si qua sedebit inepte.
   Tota trahet series ex illa parte pudorem:
    Fel modicum totum mel amaricat; unica menda
   Totalem faciem difformat. Cautius ergo
   Consule materiae, ne possit probra vereri.
[108] (Kelly 1966, 272)
[109] (Vinsauf 1967, 87). In Latin (Vinsauf 2008, 228):
    Omnia quae repetit ratio vel digerit ordo
    Vel polit ornatus si vis meminisse, memento
    1975 Hujus consilii, quamvis brevis, oficiosi:
    Cellula qua meminit est cellula deliciarum,
    Deliciasque sitit, non taedia.

2.3.1.3. John of Salisbury

In the English context, it is with the scholar-monk Bede (673-735) that critical literary activities begin in England. The next national figure following him in this respect is Alcuin (735-804), to whom the treatises *On Orthography*, *On Grammar*, and *On Rhetoric* (793) are ascribed. It would not be until the twelfth century that we would find the next important literary contribution in England, that of John of Salisbury (1115/1120-80). The reasons behind this three-century silence are to be found in the political turmoil related to the Danish invasions and settlements (787-1017), the Norman Conquest in 1066, and its consequences. As J. W. H. Atkins remarks, "it was that the earlier centres of education, the monastic schools with their libraries, were now almost wholly destroyed, and the rudiments of culture, painfully acquired during the preceding centuries, were ruthlessly swept away by the Danish inroads"[110]. John of Salisbury, described as "one of the finest humanists of the twelfth century"[111], held the post of secretary to two Archbishops of Canterbury (Theobald and Thomas Beckett) and, furthermore, was a poet. He thought of himself as an academic skeptic, and treated problems suggested by the history of philosophy. In fact, in the twelfth century, poets and philosophers were concerned with almost the same issues, since both, for instance, reflected upon the relation of reason and faith, as the works by Bernard and Thierry of Chartres, Abailard, or Hugh of St. Victor demonstrate[112]. Imitation of nature was, for John of Salisbury, the essence of the art of poetry, and in his *Metalogicon* (1159) Salisbury argued that the *artes liberales* originate in nature. In Salisbury's point of view, poetry's close relation to nature was shared by grammar, to which poetry was also ascribed. Indeed, John of Salisbury was convinced that poetry could not be understood separate from grammar, as otherwise, it could not be included within the liberal arts.

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[110] (Atkins 1943, 59)
[111] (Laarhoven 1987, ix)
[112] (McKeon 1987, 188). McKeon also states that "The problems, the visions, and sometimes even the language of philosophy have served the purposes of poets; and philosophers have borrowed poetic modes of expression and have speculated on the nature and effects of poetry, on the criteria of poetic values, and on the fate deserved by poets" (McKeon 1987, 167).

Entheticus de Dogmate Philosophorum, written in verse[113], has two sections of our interest. The first, entitled "The road to arts and eloquence" (par. 13), establishes "a powerful intellect" as necessary to master any art, including eloquence:

> *The powerful nature of intellect quickly masters all*
> *the arts*, if the following file goes hand in hand:
> the hearing of the word, the reading of books,
> skilful care, quietness suitable for study, and faithful devotion.
> If anyone desires to be regarded as outstanding in eloquence,
> these will undoubtedly give him what he wants:
> *a powerful intellect*, the use of a heart retentive of memory,
> the wealth of art, the instrument of the voice, and frequent speech.[114]

In this manner, for John of Salisbury, in order to master any art, one has to possess several qualities. Firstly, a "powerful intellect", which should be accompanied by attentive study of books, attention to the sound of words, a quiet, patient and laborious disposition towards learning, strong Christian faith, good memory, powerful voice, and fluency and confidence when speaking in public. Then, in a reference to Martianus Capella in "The marriage of word and reason" (par. 17), John of Salisbury also stresses the role of the intellect before any other quality of the mind, such as imagination, since, like Vinsauf when dealing with poetry, for John of Salisbury eloquence is a purely rational act. The extract below in fact talks about Philology as a symbol for reason:

> Mercury is a symbol for word, *Philologia for reason*;
> Philosophy orders these to be joined.
> If the use of reason assists the Genius of words,
> the husband will be famous through his wife's dowry.
> But *if he lacks reason, he is considered almost naked,*
> *so that he is scarcely able to cover his filthy buttocks*.[115]

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[113] Jan van Laarhoven, editor and translator of the English edition of the book, explains that this work was written in verse because, in what has been called the "renaissance of the twelfth century", poetry and classical prosody became fashionable. "Thus, 'poetry' possessed something of the glitter of settled erudition, the air of classical dignity and prominence" (Laarhoven 1987, 19).

[114] (Salisbury 1987, 116). In Latin (p. 117):
    Ingenii natura potens cito possidet omnes
    artes, si fuerit ista sequela comes:
    auditus verbi, libromm lectio, sollers
    cura, quies studiis apta, fidelis amor.
    Optat in eloquio si quis praeclarus haberi,
    indubitanter ei, quod cupit, ista dabunt:
    ingenium pollens, memoris quoque pectoris usus,
    artis opes, vocis organa, sermo frequens.

Classical theories on inspiration and the irrationality of the poet seem, once again, a thing of the past. For these medieval authors, if reason is absent from the author's mind, nothing of worth will ever result from his textual attempts. Without reason, he is naked and has nothing of value to offer[116].

2.3.1.4. John of Garland

Finally, another important treatise is John of Garland's *De arte prosayca, metrica et rithmica*, written in hexameters and originally composed around 1229. The work is divided in seven parts discussing the doctrine of invention, the way to select material, its arrangement and ornamentation, parts of letters and common faults in writing them, issues of amplification and abbreviation, memory, and examples of letters and of rhythmical and metrical composition. As Geoffrey of Vinsauf before him, John of Garland bases much of his teachings about invention and disposition on Horace, and stresses the importance of invention by alluding to Horace's *Art of Poetry*: "*Sicut dicit Horatius in poetria de inventione materie et electione, prius debemus invenire quam inventa eligere, et prius eligere quam electa ordinare*"[117]. Also like Geoffrey of Vinsauf's treatment of *inventio* and *dispositio*, Garland's is fairly brief and shows the dependence of ornamentation to the careful organization the author gives to his poem. Nevertheless, and as Douglas Kelly remarks, in contrast with Vinsauf, "In John's *Poetria*, invention consists in giving suitable answers to the following questions

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[115] (Salisbury 1987, 118). In Latin (p. 119):
       Transit in amplexu Stilbontis Philologia,
       hocque pie fieri nostra Capella docet.
       Mercurius verbi, rationis Pkilologia
       est nota, quae iungi Philosophia iubet.
       Si Genio verbi rationis suppetat usus,
       uxoris darus dote maritus erit.
       At sibi si ratio desit, prope nudus habetur,
       ut queat obscoenas vix openre nates.

[116] For more on the link between poetry and rhetoric in the English Middle Ages, see Donald Lemen Clark, "Rhetoric and the Literature of the English Middle Ages." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 45 (1959): 19-28.

[117] Quoted in (Kelly 1966, 275), which refers to *Romanische Forschungen*, XIII, 887.

('species inventionis'): *ubi, quid, quale, qualiter, ad quid*, each of which he analyzes in detail"[118]. Charles Sears Baldwin also notes that John's treatment of invention "shows how faint in his time were even the echoes of its ancient function", for "*inventio* in his practise is purely verbal and leads, as fatally as all other approaches, to the lists of figures"[119].

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[118] (Kelly 1966, 275)
[119] (Baldwin 1926, 191)

3

Sixteenth-Century Poetics

If during the Middle Ages rhetoric and poetics had been in close contact, the Renaissance continued this trend, even if by the mid-end of the century poetics began to gain greater autonomy from rhetoric –which appears manifest, for instance, in the new connotations that the notion of invention started to acquire. The present chapter is conceived as an introduction to Renaissance poetics, and as such, explores the new conceptualization of poetry developed by humanism (inseparable from the recovery and translations to the vernacular of Aristotle's *Poetics* and the commentaries that read it against Horace's *Ars poetica*), and the evolution of poetics within the Italian, French and English contexts. In this manner, sixteenth-century Italian, French and English works on poetics will be enumerated and described, and in the case of England the widespread anti-poetic sentiment (its origins, development, and repercussions upon poetry and poetics) will be analyzed in detail. Finally, English defences of poetry will be treated in depth, revealing that often the defences themselves enclose contradictions and conflicts between opposing ideas that reflect the complex and divided position of many of their authors.

3.1. Rhetoric and Poetics in the Renaissance

The Renaissance concept of 'poetics' typically alluded to an *ars poetica*, that is, a treatise on literary composition following Horace's *Ars poetica*, or to a manual that taught the techniques of verse composition (metre, stanza form, diction, figures and tropes, etc.). The meaning of *poetica* as a branch of literary criticism treating poetry emerges in the late sixteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle's *Poetics*, which tend

to be, nevertheless, deeply rhetorical, combining Aristotle with Cicero or Horace. Particularly in early Humanism, poetry was seen as a form of eloquence, Petrarch being one of the main exponents of this view. Dante's *De vulgari eloquentia* and *Convivio* also demonstrate his agreement with the notion of the poet as orator[1]. Nevertheless, with the consolidation of the movement, the humanists gradually began to regard poetics as autonomous, making figurative language the chief characteristic of poetry, and rhetoric only secondarily related to it. The intimate relation between rhetoric and poetry in the Renaissance also appears, for instance, in Erasmus's letter to Andrew Ammonius on December 21, 1513, in which Erasmus states that what particularly delights him "is a rhetorical poem and a poetical oration, in which you can see the poetry in the prose and the rhetorical expression in the poetry"[2]. Even Petrus Ramus admitted commonalities between poetry and rhetoric, seeing both of them (along with history) eager to deceive their audiences into drawing conclusions they had no intention to draw, and regarding the orator, the poet and the historian as failed teachers[3]. When Julius Caesar Scaliger's *Poetices* was published in 1561, rhetoric was still fundamental to understand the theory of oratory and poetry, and to examine the practice of both, as poetry was still regarded as rhetorical. Nevertheless, it is equally true that by then poetry was more differentiated from oratory, and that the rhetorical terminology in literary criticism had begun to undergo certain modifications as a result of the better knowledge of Aristotle's *Poetics*, whose influence was unstoppable beginning with the printing of Paccius's 1536 Latin version, and Franciscus Robortellus's 1548 commentary on it.

Brian Vickers is one of the scholars that has repeatedly stressed the intimate connection between rhetoric and poetics in the Renaissance by stating that "The modern reader approaching Renaissance texts in the expectation of finding a clear-cut distinction between rhetoric and poetics will soon be disappointed"[4]; that "To approach a rhetorical culture like the Renaissance with post- or even anti-rhetorical expectations

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[1] (Grassi 1980, 76)
[2] Quoted in (Kinney 1986, 31)
[3] (Ong 2004, 253)
[4] (Vickers 1988, 715)

is obviously anachronistic"[5]; that poetry in the Renaissance "used techniques of proof and persuasion"[6]; and even that "Any attempt to define a poetics uninfluenced by rhetoric in this period would be futile"[7]. Moreover, Vickers is of the opinion that rhetoric absorbed poetics in the Renaissance[8]. Likewise, for D. L. Clark, rhetoric "furnished the methods, the teachers, and in many cases the subject matter for this instruction in poetry", and believes that "the renaissance theory of poetry was rhetorical in its obsession with style, especially the figures of speech, in its abiding faith in the efficacy of rules; and in its belief that the poet, no less than the orator, is occupied with persuasion"[9]. Similarly, Kibedi Varga argues that in the Renaissance poetics is seen as a second rhetoric, as a "versified rhetoric"[10], and George Alexander Kennedy affirms that "Until the romantic movement, poetry was not a matter of free expression but an application and development of the thought of the poet within the arts of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic as understood at the time"[11].

However, this is not a unanimous opinion among scholarship, as W. S. Howell, for instance, sustains a radically different view, criticizing the thesis "that rhetoric assumed control over poetics" during the Renaissance[12]. From Howell's perspective, the fact "that didacticism, and persuasiveness, and concern for audience, and concern for thought content, and concern for style" are also present in poetics does not enable us to conclude that poetics is subordinated to rhetoric, for all those factors "must be regarded

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[5] (Vickers 1988, 715)
[6] (Vickers 1988, 715)
[7] (Vickers 1988, 716)
[8] (Vickers 1988, 718)
[9] (Clark 1922, 100). Persuasion in poetry is, according to Clark, explained by the belief in the Renaissance that the final goal of poetry was moral improvement, a notion derived from the middle ages, classical rhetoric, and the criticism of the Italian Renaissance (Clark 1922, 104).
[10] "En somme, il ne s'agit donc même pas de la coexistence de deux disciplines, la rhétorique et la poétique, traitant chacune de formes différentes de la littérature, mais d'un rapport plus complexe, d'un rapport de subordination. La poétique classique a perdu toute autonomie, elle est profondément 'rhétorisée' et il ne suffit pas de parler à ce sujet de 'confusión entre poétique et rhétorique', comme font certains critiques (anciens et modernes). Ce n'est pas que de la confusion: (…) il y a eu aussi la volonté délibérée de *soumettre* la poétique à la rhétorique" (Varga 1970, 12-13).
[11] (Kennedy 1999, 249)
[12] "Renaissance poetics" referring to "fictional literature of all kinds, whether in prose or verse" (Howell 1980, 121).

as the common properties of rhetoric and poetics"[13]. Instead, the ultimate difference between rhetoric and poetics lies in the fact that "the oration conveys its delights, and its persuasions by the methods of statement and proof", and "the poem, by the methods of fiction"[14]. In this respect, I do agree with Howell, even though I must admit that, from the point of view of a post-Romantic mind, it is difficult not to be struck by the manner in which poetry was influenced by rhetoric in the Renaissance –an unsurprising influence if we bear in mind the rhetorical, logical and grammatical training of Renaissance poets. In any case, even if I admit thorough rhetorical influence and conditioning upon poetics (for instance in the use of rhetorical terminology to discuss poetry, or the existence of numerous discourses that, when highlighting the differences between orators and poets, actually stress the links between both), I do not believe that poetics is subordinated to rhetoric from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, even if in the not long past Medieval times it certainly seemed so.

3.2. Humanism and Poetics

The economic prosperity that Italy experienced in the second half of the thirteenth century had a very positive effect on poetry, which became a flourishing field, a symbol of renewal for the humanists, and one of the constituents of the so-called *studia humanitatis* along with rhetoric, history, and moral philosophy. Humanist poetics was highly influenced by two main intellectual traditions. On the one hand, the Latin rhetorical tradition: Cicero, Quintilian, and Horace were the sources of inspiration for the humanists to define the educated man as an eloquent speaker who works for the community. On the other, Neoplatonism, which exerted profound impact upon the

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[13] (Howell 1980, 105)

[14] (Howell 1980, 107). Among the many other titles relating Renaissance rhetoric and poetics or literary theory we find Charles Sears Baldwin and Donald Lemen Clark's *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice: Classicism in the Rethoric and Poetic of Italy, France and England: 1400-1600* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1959); Wayne A. Rebhorn's *The Emperors of Men's Minds: Literature and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Marc Fumaroli's *L'âge de l'eloquence: Rhétorique et "res literaria" de la Renaissance au seuil de l'époque Classique* (Genève: Droz, 2002).

cultural, intellectual and religious life of Europe for over two hundred years. Renaissance Neoplatonism was the creation of the fifteenth-century Florentines Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who studied and translated the works of Plato and other ancient philosophers, and are traditionally associated with the so-called 'Platonic academy' in Florence[15]. Renaissance Neoplatonics looked back to Antiquity, to the newly discovered classical texts and commentaries, through Christianity and the medieval rhetorical tradition, which bridges the classical and humanist ages. Concetta Carestia Greenfield discerns three Neoplatonic themes of humanist poetics. In the first place, she identifies the assumption "that temporal creation reflects the immutable design and harmonious proportions of the heavens"[16]. Secondly, she cites the theory of poetic madness and inspiration, already present in Plato's *Phaedrus*, which establishes the divine basis of poetry and collaborates in strengthening the connections between poetry and prophecy, and consolidating the idea (traceable to Homer and Hesiod) that the poet *vates* is born and not the result of hard training[17]. The

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[15] James Hankins sets out to prove "that the 'Platonic Academy of Florence,' at least as it has been presented by modern scholarship, is largely a myth", and that if "Ficino did have an academy of a sort", "it was a thing quite different, and much less important, than has generally been thought" (Hankins 1991, 433). Hankins's conclusions can be summarized in the following three points:
1. "Ficino's 'academy' was not a 'lieta brigata di platonici,' nor a 'libera societa di eruditi,' nor again a 'Platonic confraternity' meeting at Careggi under the patronage of the Medici. It did not include among its membership all the leading philosophers and literary men of Florence. On the most plausible interpretation of the contemporary evidence, his 'academy' was simply a private gymnasium loosely associated with the studio, similar in kind to the private gymnasia run by Giorgio Antonio Vespucci or Ugolino Verino. (...) We can definitely exclude [from the academics of the "academy"] all those whom Ficino declared never to have been among his 'auditores,' including Cristoforo Landino, Leon Battista Alberti, Benedetto Accolti, Demetrius Chalcondylas, Angelo Poliziano, Pier Leone da Spoleto, and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. (…) There is no evidence that the gymnasium met at Careggi; the texts we have point to some venue within the city, probably at Ficino's father's house on the Via S. Egidio next to S. Maria Nuova" (Hankins 1991, 457-458).
2. "there is no compelling reason to qualify Ficino's academy as a 'Platonic' academy. No contemporary source does so. And indeed, one would not expect a private gymnasium to limit itself to readings of Platonic philosophy, though such readings certainly took place" (Hankins 1991, 458).
3. "Ficino's gymnasium was not a creation of Medici patronage, and no member of the Medici family was ever part of it. Neither Cosimo nor Lorenzo is ever, to my knowledge, described as an 'academic' in Ficino's works or other contemporary sources" (Hankins 1991, 459).
For more on this issue, see (Hankins 2002); and for more on Neoplatonism in general, see Michael J. B. Allen, "Renaissance Neoplatonism", in *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* (Glyn P. Norton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 435-441).
[16] (Greenfield 1981, 24)
[17] In this respect, Greenfield asserts the following: "The one specific passage that the humanists repeat verbatim in each of their treatises on poetics is from the *Pro Archia poeta*, where Cicero explicitly states that there is a difference between *talent*, which is acquired by exercise and technique, and *inspiration*, which is acquired by birth and received by means of an afflatus" (Greenfield 1981, 25). Then, in the

concept of the *poeta vates* also relates to the humanist notion of the *poeta theologus*, suggesting the identification of the poet with the theologian, and of the poem with sacred truths and texts. Indeed, by making God the subject matter of poetry humanists were effectively making poetry a theology. The idea of *poeta theologus* is of Greek origins and was common in classical and medieval times, when it was adapted to Christian interpretation. As a consequence of this trend, Virgil and Dante were sometimes referred to as theologians. In the third place, there is the Neoplatonic theme of the association of poetry with philosophy. The scholastic Aristotelians certainly thought that poetry was not theology, that it did not use allegory in the way the Bible did, and that it contained no truth. For one thing, the statement of the humanists that poetry was theology sounded heretical to the scholastics, even though, of course, when humanists refer to theology "they do not mean scholastic theology, but the kind of intuitive knowledge about nature and the universe of the Aristotelian poet-theologians"[18]. Furthermore, the humanists *poetica* alluded to "the ability to write poetry in Latin, the reading and interpretation of the ancient poets, and the theorizing about both enterprises"[19]. This understanding of *poetica* originated a number of controversies with the scholastics, who opposed the humanists' willingness to broaden the meaning of the *studia humanitatis*. For all these reasons, the scholastics attacked the humanist notion of poetry, a fact that spurred the appearance of humanist defences of poetry in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries[20].

Middle Ages, more specifically in the seventh century, Isidore of Seville "wrote in his *Etymologiarum sive originum libri* that the poet is to be viewed as a *vates* or 'seer' because of the underived nature of his poetic capacities" (Grassi 1980, 83).

[18] (Greenfield 1981, 44)

[19] (Greenfield 1981, 21). Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine make a distinction between "humanism", understood as "the zealous faith in an ideal", and the "humanities", "a curriculum training a social élite to fulfil its predetermined social role" (Grafton and Jardine 1986, xvi). They argue that the direct consequence of humanism was not producing perceptible results on moral grounds or in terms of preparing students for life as much as making them fluent in ancient tongues (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 122).

[20] The history of the relation between humanism and scholasticism is complex, and, as usual, different critics hold different views. Scholars like John M. Steadman, for example, have demystified the clear cut opposition between humanism and scholasticism. In Steadman's opinion, during the Renaissance "scholastic and humanistic learning frequently tended to combine" (Steadman 1974, 12): "School divines lectured from texts edited by humanist scholars. Conversely, philosophers like Pico della Mirandola and poets like Donne and Cleveland made extensive (though sometimes facetious) use of the terminology of

In order to fully understand the humanist notion of poetics, it is essential to comprehend the role that Horace and Aristotle's ideas on poetry played upon humanist thought, as well as the evolution of the interpretation of both ancient authors throughout time. Without taking all this into account, it would be impossible to explain the approach to poetics of the literary commentaries that flourished throughout the sixteenth century in Europe.

3.2.1. Horace in the Renaissance

Horace's *Ars poetica* had been widely known in the late Middle Ages, and the book became by far the most popular, comprehensive and influential authoritative text on poetic composition for the humanists[21]. In the age of printing, Horace's work was usually read against the background of two sets of explanatory annotations, one by Porphyrion ($3^{rd}/4^{th}$ century), and another supposedly by Helenius Acron (5th century). Further commentaries written by the humanists appeared in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the three most important being the work of Cristoforo Landino (Christophorus Landinus), published in Florence in 1482; the commentary by Tosse Bade (Iodocus Badius Ascensius), first published in Paris in 1500 and the most frequently reprinted of the commentaries written in the sixteenth century; and finally, the commentary by Aulo Giano Parrasio (Ianus Parrhasius) printed in Naples in 1531. Read against these three commentaries, Horace's *Ars poetica* "becomes a vehicle for the whole range of views on poetic theory available up to about 1530"[22]. In England, even though Horace had been known for many years before, it was from 1567 onwards that

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the schools. Attacks on Aristotelian doctrine were often couched in Aristotelian terms. Reformation theologians might simultaneously inveigh against the scholastic doctors as sophists and against the humanists as neopagans, but many of them had been trained both in classical literature and in scholastic theology. Though humanists continued to attack scholasticism as a relic of monastic ignorance and to condemn its technical vocabulary as barbarous, the majority of schoolmen in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had tasted the fruit of humanistic learning" (Steadman 1974, 12-13). Indeed, rather than a reaction against scholasticism, humanism can be best understood as a rival discipline.

[21] Horace's *Ars* actually exerted "an almost uninterrupted influence on poetic from classical antiquity to the Renaissance" (Greenfield 1981, 22).

[22] (Moss 2000, 71)

his influence became definite and extensive with Drant's rendering of the *Ars Poetica* into English.

According to G. M. A. Grube (1965) there were three major Horatian concepts (the first two also present in Cicero) that determined the development of humanist poetics: the civilizing effect of poetry; the recognition of utility and delight as the ends of poetry; and the importance of considering literary decorum. Horace's theory has been sometimes seen in the Renaissance and later as rhetorical or close to rhetorical precepts because it puts forward that the features and demands of the target audience of the poem invariably and fundamentally determine the internal structure of the poem itself[23]. The rhetorical readings that the humanists did of Horace's *Ars poetica* would ultimately determine the relation between poetry and rhetoric for sixteenth-century authors.

3.2.2. Aristotle's *Poetics* in the Renaissance

The fact that Aristotle gave separate treatment to rhetoric and poetics means that, for him, oratory and poetry were two differentiated and independent arts which, nonetheless, did have points of intersection. Unlike Horace's *Ars poetica*, Aristotle's *Poetics* was largely neglected in Antiquity and at all enjoyed uninterrupted popularity in Western Europe. In fact, Aristotle's fragmentary essay *On the Poets* seems to have been better known, and Aristotle's disciple Theophrastus had far more influence than his master on subsequent critical thought[24]. The introduction of Aristotle's *Poetics* to medieval Europe owes much to the twelfth-century abridged version of the book by the Arab philosopher Averroes, whose *Paraphrases Averroes* (*Middle Commentary on the*

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[23] (Weinberg 1961, vol. I, 71-72) has nonetheless pointed out that "in proper and complete rhetorical approaches, one essential element –absent from Horace– enters at all times into consideration: the character of the orator (or poet) as it really is (Quintilian) or as it is made to appear to be (Aristotle's *Rhetoric*)". Consequently, Weinberg asserts that "If Horace's thesis is a rhetorical one, it is incomplete rhetoric because it omits this essential aspect". G. M. A. Grube highlights, rather, that the phrase 'Ars Poetica' was not the original title of Horace's text, as this was 'Letter to the Pisos'. Grube accuses this artificial title of being "misleading", for "*ars* or *texne*" are names "given to the rhetorical textbooks, and it makes us expect the kind of logical structure of the parts which is quite foreign to a Horatian epistle, also a completeness of treatment which is absent" (Grube 1965, 238).

[24] (Hardison 1970, 57)

Poetics) was known in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries only in limited circles in European universities[25]. Averroes's work was translated into Latin in 1256 by Hermanus Alemanus, and in the fourteenth century by Mantinus of Tortosa in Spain[26]. Despite Hermanus's early version, it appears that Dante, Boccaccio and very likely Petrarch as well, never got to know the *Poetics*[27]. Aristotle's *Poetics* also re-entered the West through bishop of Corintius William of Moerbecke's translation from Greek into Latin, finished in 1278 –that is, around twenty years after the Latin translation from Arabic. Of this version, which went virtually ignored, there are only two extant manuscripts from the thirteenth century. Since the recovery of both the Greek language during the fifteenth century and the original Greek texts, Italian scholars were no longer dependent upon medieval commentaries of the *Poetics*, and from around the 1470s they could directly study the original text. Giorgio Valla's 1498 translation into Latin did not have an immediate impact on literary criticism, and it would not be until the publication in 1536 of Alessandro Pazzi's revised Latin version accompanying the original in Greek that Aristotle became a landmark in literary criticism too. In this manner, by mid-sixteenth century, "the whole of the *Poetics* had been incorporated in the critical literature of Italy"[28].

Indeed, the sixteenth century witnessed the publication of numerous commentaries to the *Poetics*, which became a recurrent subject in academic discussions. These

[25] According to Hardison, "The version of the *Poetics* that influenced the Middle Ages was not Greek but Arabic": "the source of the Arabic tradition is a Greek manuscript dating before the year 700 and independent of the archetype that is the source of Paris 1741 and its descendents. (…) Around the year 900 the Greek manuscript was translated into Syriac by Isac ibn-Hunain. Fragments of Hunain's translation are preserved in the *Butyrum sapientiae*, a thirteenth century miscellany of philosophic and other lore compiled by Bishop Gregory Barhebraeus, and in the *Dialogues* of Jacob bar Sakko (c. 1241), and are reprinted by Margoliouth in his *Analecta orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam*. The Syriac translation was, in turn, converted into Arabic around 920 by Abu Bishr" (Hardison 1970, 59). Later, Avicenna believed that the *Poetica* was a logical work and therefore part of the *Organon*, and divided the *Poetics* into seven sections. Averroes, the greatest of the Medieval Arab philosophers who deeply influenced the Latin West, introduced two ideas alien to Aristotle but from then onwards widely assimilated to the Greek philosopher's thought: that poetry is a branch of logic, as Al-farabi and Avicenna had remarked before him, and that poetry was the art of praise and blame – both praise and blame were rhetorical techniques explained in detail in Books I and III of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (Hardison 1970, 63).

[26] The Averroes paraphrase in Alemannus's translation was published at Venice in 1481 and 1515, while new translations of Averroes based on the fourteenth century Hebrew version appeared thanks to Abraham de Balmes (1523; 1560) and Jacob Mantino (1550; 1562).

[27] (Spingarn 1976, 16)

[28] (Spingarn 1976, 138)

commentaries are classified into *commenti maggiori*, or greater commentaries, dealing with the entire book (such as those by Robortello, Castelvetro, Vettori, Maggi, Piccolomini), and partial commentaries dealing with some specific passage (such as those by Trissino, G. B. Giraldi Cinzio, or Tasso). The first of the commentaries was Francesco Robortello's (Franciscus Robortellus) *In librum Aristotelis de Arte Poetica Explicaciones* (1548), which accompanied the translation with a thorough commentary of every passage of the book. In 1550 Vincenzo Maggi (Vicentius Madius) and Bartolomeo Lombardo (Bartholomaeus Lombardus) published in Venice *In Aristotelis librum de poetica communes explanationes*, which showed the Counter-Reformation's influence by giving a Catholic interpretation of Aristotle. In the vernacular, the most remarkable commentaries are those by Ludovicus Castelvetro (1570) and Alessandro Piccolomini (1575).

The chief commentaries on Aristotle's *Poetics* in the Italian sixteenth century were all fundamentally rhetorical, as they saw the *Poetics* through the lens that poetry and drama were designed to improve the audience morally by means of rhetorical devices[29]. Averroes had interpreted the *Poetics* as a treatise on epideictic rhetoric, and Francesco Robortello, in his 1548 commentary, reemphasized this conclusion. The tremendous influence of rhetoric upon poetics is also manifest in the structure of the works on poetry produced at the time. For instance, Girolamo Vida's *De arte poetica* (1527) is a verse treatise after the manner of Horace organized in three books dealing with, respectively, the training of the poet and the defence of poetry, *inventio* and *dispositio,* and *elocutio*. Then, Antonio Minturno's *De poeta* (1559) eclectically discussed poetry, different genres within it, and style, mingling theories by Horace, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. Julius Caesar Scaliger's *Poetices* (1561) is another eclectic work that fused many different sources and critical discourses, and treated a variety of topics such as genres, verse forms, poetic forms, style and rhetorical figures, or ancient and modern poets.

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[29] (Vickers 1988, 719)

Certainly, even if the work was still approached from the rhetorical or platonic assumptions of the commentators, the reintroduction of the *Poetics* to Western criticism provided a wide range of topics for the literary critic: the nature of imitation, dramatic conventions, plot structure, etc. From the 1540s to the mid 1550s, there was a wave of Italian commentaries trying to relate the *Ars poetica* to Aristotle's *Poetics*, and to see the one in the light of the other[30]. The idea that Horace had read Aristotle's work and used it as a starting point became widespread and was supported by critics such as Vincenzo Maggi, who argued that Horace's epistle to the Pisos stemmed from Aristotelian ideas. Consequently, from this perspective, Aristotle's and Horace's postulates could not enter into conflict but had to agree, and surely many commentaries aimed at highlighting the points in common between the two landmark works[31]. What is more, readings of Horace were not employed to achieve better understanding of Aristotle, but, on the contrary, Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* were used to throw light upon Horace's *Ars Poetica*[32]. Thus, Horace's and Aristotle's views were blended together in Renaissance criticism, beginning with commentaries on the *Ars Poetica* and on the *Poetics*, to the point that, as Herrick remarks, "The reader of an Elizabethan work like Sir Philip Sidney's *Defense of Poesy,* for example, finds it impossible to determine whether Aristotle or Horace is ultimately responsible for many of the author's observations"[33].

The view that Horace interpreted Aristotle remained alive for a long time −so much so that Dryden would affirm in 1668 in his *Essay of Dramatic Poesy* that "Of that book which *Aristotle* has left us, περὶ τες Ποιητιχης, Horace his *Art of Poetry* is an excellent

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[30] According to Herrick (1946, 4) Parrhasius's commentary (1531) constitutes the first Horatian commentary to make any distinct use of Aristotle's *Poetics*. In 1555 the great Basle edition of Horace's works appeared, containing commentaries on the *Ars Poetica* by Acron and Porphyrio, Landinus (1482), Grifolus (1550), Denores (1553), and Luisinus (1554).

[31] (Weinberg 1961, vol. I, 152)

[32] As Herrick argues, then, "the formation of sixteenth-century literary criticism, in large part, consisted of expanding and formulating Horatian precepts in the light of Aristotle's theory of poetry" (Herrick 1946, 106). Although, as Herrick notes, "After the revival of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, the sixteenth-century commentators soon discovered the superior value of Aristotle's systematic theory of poetry as compared with that of Horace. Robortellus, for example, found that the *Poetics,* together with the *Rhetoric,* provided a sounder, more methodical means of teaching the discipline of poetry than did the excursive *Ars Poetica.* Certainly Madius would have agreed with Robortellus" (Herrick 1946, 107).

[33] (Herrick 1946, 1)

comment"[34]. As a consequence of this, the interpretation of Horace's *Ars poetica* did not change substantially after Aristotle's *Poetics* entered the literary criticism scene, for, as Bernard Weinberg remarks, the theorists of the period only discovered "the accidental – and sometimes the forced – resemblances between the two", while "their real opposition was not even suspected"[35]. Thus, it would only be much later that, for example, Horace's belief in imitation as the essence of poetry was called into question[36]. Certainly, it was this combination of multiple sources (Horace, Aristotle, Cicero) that constituted the foundation of Renaissance poetic theory, well established by the end of the sixteenth century, which was propagated by, among others, Italian, French, and English critics.

3.3. Poetical Theories in Italy in the Sixteenth Century

J. E. Spingarn identifies the translation of Horace's *Ars Poetica* into the vernaculars as the spur for the initiation of national literary criticism. Italy leads the movement due to

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[34] (Dryden 1695, B4ʳ). Of course, the hypothesis that Horace was acquainted with Aristotle's *Poetics* has been greatly questioned by scholars such as G. M. A. Grube, who states that even if various assertions in Horace's *Ars Poetica* seem to derive from or coincide with Aristotle's *Poetics*, these points are peripheral, not the backbone theories of Aristotle's work: "It seems therefore most unlikely that Horace had read the *Poetics*. The same is true of the *Rhetoric*, and in any case this was much less relevant to his subject. Whatever is Aristotelian can easily be accounted for by an intermediate source or sources" (Grube 1965, 239).

[35] (Weinberg 1961, vol. I, 155)

[36] The scholar Craig La Driere maintains that "Horace nowhere says that 'alle Poesie ist *mimesis*'", and hence, it can be demonstrated that Horace did not think mimesis was essential to poetry, as Aristotle did (La Driere 1939, 288). La Driere believes that for neither Cicero nor Horace the idea of imitation appears as a criterion for marking the poetic, but instead, they underline *incitatio* as "the primary requisite of poetry" (La Driere 1939, 297). La Driere points at a classification in three groups that Horace would have suggested in lines 73-82 of his *Ars poetica*, where he would have recognized a mimetic type of poetry, a non-mimetic one, and finally a third sort that would combine the previous two. Instead of pointing at Aristotle, La Driere signals the tenth century manuscript of the *Tractatus Coislinianus* as displaying an organization based on a division of poetry into *amimetos* or *mimetike*, much more in accord with Horace's ideas. J. W. H. Atkins equally doubts that Horace's ideas on imitation coincide with Aristotle's: "It is true that in the comparisons he [Horace] makes between poetry and an imitative art such as painting, an imitative process in poetry would seem to be implied; and elsewhere his conception of the drama is definitely that of 'an imitation of life', as when, for instance, he advises poets to look to life and manners for their models. But along with this, he has also in mind as his conception of poetic activity a process of 'invention' (πλάσσειν), according to which the poet gave free play to his fancy, thus creating something new, a blend of fact and fiction. It was in short a creative process which aimed at producing fictions meant to please, stories corresponding to little or nothing in real life. And here Horace was plainly influenced by Hellenistic doctrine, though he sets limits to the degree in which the fanciful and the absurd should be recognized in poetry" (Atkins 1934, 75-76).

Dolce's early Italian translation (1535), followed by that by Jacques Peletier du Mans in France (1545), Drant's English version (1567), and Espinel (1591) and Zapata's (1592) Spanish translations. For his part, O. B. Hardison distinguishes three stages in Italian criticism during the sixteenth century. Firstly, there was a Platonic and rhetorical stage in which Horace's *Ars Poetica* was read through the platonic and neoplatonic doctrine, which emerged in late fifteenth-century Florence, and its ideas regarding *furor poeticus*. Up to the end of the century, Platonic views remained popular, pervading the work of Girolamo Fracastoro and Torquato Tasso[37]. Francis Robortello's *Explications of the Poetics of Aristotle* (1548) inaugurated the second phase of Italian criticism, which includes other commentaries on Aristotle's work such as Julius Caesar Scaliger's (1561) or Lodovico Castelvetro's (1570). Finally, the third phase began at the end of the century and is characterized by the emergence of various schools of criticism differing in their consideration of Homer and Virgil, the worth of the Divine Comedy, and the legitimacy of literary forms such as the romance and the tragicomedy[38].

Among the earliest sixteenth-century books on poetics written by Italian writers is found the commentary by Marco Girolamo Vida *De arte poetica* (1527), with Horace's *Ars poetica*, rhetorical theories, and the conviction of the centrality of divine *furor* in the process of poetic composition as fundamental pillars. Vida effectively recognizes some advantages in the poet's mastering of oratorical practices: "The orator's art, then, is the source whence the poet may learn how to direct the minds and feelings of his readers and to plant in their souls various sympathies, so that, powerful through his art in a way marvelous to tell, the poet is able to command them at will"[39]. Also in the first half of the century we find Giovanni Giorgio Trissino's Parts I-IV of *La poetica* (1529), Bernardino Daniello's *La poetica* (1536), based in large part on Horace, and Girolamo

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[37] H. B. Charlton asserts that "Platonic philosophy had been developed a considerable time by Renaissance scholars before it was definitely incorporated into literary criticism", and so, that "although Platonism became a great force in thought through the labours of Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), it did not become a definite component of the criticism of poetry until the time of Fracastoro's dialogue *Naugerius* (1555)" (Charlton 1913, 14-15).

[38] (Hardison 1967, 5)

[39] (Vida 1976, 77). In Latin: "Discitur hinc etenim sensus, mentesque legentum / Flectere, diversosque animis motus dare, ut illis / imperet arte potens (dictu mirabile!) vates" (Vida 1976, 76).

Fracastoro's dialogue *Naugerius sive de poetica dialogus* (*c.* 1540), concerned almost entirely with the ends of poetry. In the second half of the century, the 1550s are dominated by Girolamo Muzio's *Arte poetica* (1551), which takes Horace's *Ars poetica* as its basic text, deriving but few suggestions from Aristotle. Aristotle and Horace are also Giovanni Pietro Capriano's chief sources when writing *Della vera poetica* (1555), where he lists fiction, imitation and verse as the basic requirements of a poem. That same year Fracastoro published *A Latin dialogue* (1555), where he treats poetry as a form of eloquence, thus merging poetic in rhetoric. Then, Antonio Sebastiano Minturno draws upon the *Ars poetica*, Airstotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, Platonic theories, and ideas from Quintilian and Cicero's rhetorical writings to compose his *De poeta* (1559). Poetic style is nonetheless conceived in rhetorical terms, and thus poetry's aims are to teach, to delight, and to move, the poet being equally concerned with *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, *pronuntiatio*. In fact, the book has been considered "the first of the really extensive arts of poetry, the first to attempt a detailed discussion of every aspect of doctrine and technique, the first to broaden considerably the range of references and 'authorities'"[40].

In the following decade, Bernardino Partenio's *Imitation in poetry* (*Della imitatione poetica*), published in 1560, regarded imitation as natural, common, and even necessary, and a year later the impressive *Poetices libri septem* (1561) by Julius Caesar Scaliger was published posthumously. Scaliger has been considered "by far the most influential of the Aristotelians", and his *Poetices* "the bible of the early Neoclassicists in France and England"[41]. Scaliger's is a long work of exceptional erudition and encyclopaedic character which views poetry as exercising, or able to exercise, functions of ethical persuasion on its audience. Hence, poetry would have a practical aim within social ethics. Scaliger, a Veronese exiled in France, cited authorities from Classical Antiquity who constitute almost the totality of the examples he used to illustrate stylistic concepts and rules. He stated the superiority of the Latins over the Greeks, lamented his own

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[40] (Weinberg 1961, vol. II, 737)
[41] (Hardison 1967, 4)

early Ciceronianism, and felt nothing but pure admiration towards Virgil. Scaliger's treatise sees as its immediate predecessor Vida's poetics, and in its turn, had remarkable impact upon the rise of French, English, and German classicism. Around a year after the publication of Scaliger's work, and also posthumously, Giovanni Giorgio Trissino's *La quinta e la sesta divisione della poetica* appeared in print (although it had been written around 1549). The next work on poetics published in this decade was Minturno's *Arte poetica thoscana* (1563), a manual of vernacular poetry conceived and structured as a book of reference in which Minturno takes the principles of writing in Latin and applies them to literature in the vernacular.

In the 1570s, Ludovico Castelvetro published his *Poetica* (1570) and Giovanni Antonio Viperano wrote his *De poetica libri tres* (1579). Viperano identified some flaws in Horace's work and in a way devoted his treatise to elaborate on his divergent ideas. The next decade, a number of important texts on poetry also appeared: Francesco Patrizi's *Della Poetica* (1586), Giason Denores's *Discorso* (1586) and his *Poetica* (1588), mainly based on Aristotle's *Poetics* and said to come "at a moment when the great body of exegesis on the *Poetics* has been completed", and "the authority of Aristotle is being seriously questioned"[42]. Under the influence of Aristotle's *Poetics*, Tasso composed between 1568 and 1570 the *Discorsi dell'arte poetica e in particolare sopra il poema eroico*, later amplified in *Discorsi dell'arte poetica* (1587) and *Poema eroico* (*c.* 1590), where he applied the rhetorical headings of *inventio* and *dispositio* to distinctively poetic notions. Finally, at the end of the century we find Tommaso Campanella's *Poetica* (*c.* 1596, though the original Italian text got published only in 1944). Campanella holds an extreme Catholic position with respect to poetry, and he is concerned with how to write the perfect Christian poem. He rejects Homer on the grounds of his being a pagan poet, criticizes Aristotle's admiration of the Greek poet, and deems this fact a source of corruption of Aristotle's thought.

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[42] (Weinberg 1961, vol. II, 790)

Despite the invaluable relevance of the production of Italian critics in the sixteenth century on the subject of poetics, J. W. H. Atkins points out the limited acquaintance of English authors with Italian sixteenth-century theories on poetry, with few exceptions such as Sir Philip Sidney, and notes that not even one of the previously mentioned treatises was rendered into English during the Elizabethan period[43]. Atkins is of the opinion that English theorizing differs from that of the Italian critics chiefly due to the former's slight acquaintance with Aristotle's ideas on poetry, which was at the roots of the Italians' postulates. Indeed, although Ascham's *Scholemaster* (1570) contains the first reference in Early Modern England to Aristotle's *Poetics*, Sidney's *Defence* (published already in the last decade of the century) represents its integration into English criticism. More than that, it is with Sidney that "the Aristotelianism of the Italian renaissance makes its first appearance in English criticism"[44]. At the same time, however, Atkins admits that substantial Italian influence may have worked indirectly upon English authors through England's numerous borrowings from Italian sources, as the mere presence in England of the Italianate forms of 'apologies' and 'discourses' illustrate[45].

3.4. Poetical and Rhetorical Theories in France

French literary criticism closely follows the steps of the Italian, and at the same time anticipates the later criticism in England and Spain. In contrast with Italian criticism, of

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[43] "Sidney, for one, undoubtedly wrote with some acquaintance with Daniello, Minturno, Scaliger, and Castelvetro; while Harington apparently made use of Cinthio, Pigna, and others. For the rest, however, the evidence for an intimate knowledge of the main body of Italian theory is slight and unconvincing, little more than could be explained by the casual use of doctrines in the air at the time (...). It is not only that definite references by English critics to these Italian scholars are extremely rare; whereas the authorities freely mentioned are Cicero and Quintilian, Plato, Horace, Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and others rendered familiar by earlier Humanists (...). This argument of course is by no means conclusive, as the Elizabethans, it is well known, were not careful always to acknowledge debts of this kind; and, moreover, greater weight would normally be attached to the authority of the ancients. At the same time it is also worth noting that no single treatise of these important Italian critics was translated into English during this period; though versions sf other foreign works bearing on literary matters were by no means uncommon" (Atkins 1947, 344-345).
[44] (Clark 1922, 83)
[45] (Atkins 1947, 345)

a more philosophical nature in its treatment of aesthetic matters, sixteenth-century French criticism is far more practical in the sense that it is oriented more towards giving advice to prospective poets on how to write verse compositions[46]. Indeed, the Italian philosophical approach would not appear in France until the seventeenth century.

In the first half of the sixteenth century, economical and cultural relations between Lyon and Italy were so strong that the French city became an important humanistic centre. In this renovating context, the poetical group of the Pléiade appeared, with Joachim Du Bellay's *Deffence et illustration de la langue française* (1549) as its literary manifest and the most relevant treatise to be written in France on the new poetry[47]. Published just one year after Thomas Sébillet's *L'Art poétique françois* (1548), which still showed remnants from medieval treatises regarding rhyme and versification, Du Bellay's work was written out of the irritation that Sébillet's had produced in him, although eventually both Du Bellay as well as Ronsard apparently developed high regard for Sébillet[48]. Even if Sébillet did not break with the past, he introduced and advanced a set of new ideas in French criticism: Sébillet replaced the term *rimeur* for that of *poete*, rejected the idea that poetry was a superficial pastime, saw virtue as the source of all arts, regarded poetry as the result of divine inspiration, and thought that art and exercise made the most of the natural gifts of the poet.

The poets of the Pléiade raised questions regarding the nature of poetry: whether it was solely a branch of rhetoric, *la seconde rhétorique*, or whether it had independent existence and its own essence. In sixteenth-century France there were in fact a number of expressions (*art de première rhétorique*, *art de seconde rhétorique*, *poétrie*, and *poésie*), the meanings of which merit explanation. Firstly, *art de première rhétorique*

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[46] (Spingarn 1976, 172)

[47] The poetry of the Pléiade has been understood in the following terms: "En schématisant à l'extrême, on serait tenté d'opposer la poésie de la Pléïade entre 1550 et 1560 à la poésie des guerres de religion, comme une poésie du bonheur, de la joie de vivre, de l'équilibre individuel et égoïste à une poésie douloureuse et tragique, dominée par les problèmes sociaux et nationaux. L'époque heureuse et voluptueuse de la poésie correspondrait au rêve humaniste d'un accord de l'homme avec lui-même et de l'homme avec l'univers, à une exaltation de la vie ; l'époque tragique serait celle d'une prise de conscience des contradictions sociales, qui rejettent ce rêve dans l'utopie" (Weber 1981, 735).

[48] (Sabatier 1982, 130)

focuses on prose and not verse, although some of its principles apply to both. It relies heavily on classical erudition and appears fundamentally appropriate for the orator. Then, *art de seconde rhétorique* believes that poetry cannot be taught but that versification may be learned, and so these arts are in reality handy manuals full of precepts for the would-be poet. As for the French *poétrie*, it is a compendium of stories ready for the poet to versify. Finally, an *art poétique* in France is concerned with poetic inspiration, questions about the essence of poetry, its proper subjects, the genres, issues of vocabulary, versification, translations and versions, etc.[49].

Within sixteenth-century French literary criticism, poetry is generally conceived of as a *seconde rhétorique*, which has led some critics assert that "No modern European literature ever assumed a closer alliance between rhetoric and poetics than French literature did until the nineteenth century"[50]. For instance, Pierre Fabri's *Le grand et vray art de pleine rhétorique* (1521) puts forward that composition for both the orator and the poet means going through the operations of invention, disposition, and elocution, the only difference being that the poet has the metrical and prosodic element to take into account; in other words, for Fabri verse constitutes the distinctive factor of poetry. Similarly, Jacques Peletier in a chapter of his *Art Poétique* (1555) entitled "De la Composition du Poème en général" states that "all types of writings consist of three main parts, which are invention, disposition, elocution"[51]. The rest of the major exponents of the French poetic scene –Sébillet, Du Bellay, Ronsard, or Laudun d'Aigaliers– also describe poetic composition in rhetorical terms by referring to invention, disposition, and elocution in the process of writing poetry. Thomas Sébillet would in fact go as far as to wonder, like Macrobius, whether Virgil or Cicero was the

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[49] (Patterson 1935) has extensively dealt with the distinctions between all these terms.

[50] (Sellstrom 1961, 425). For more on this matter, see Alex L. Gordon, "The Ascendancy of Rhetoric and the Struggle for Poetic in Sixteenth-Century France" in *Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric* (James Jerome Murphy, ed. Berkeley: University of California, 1983. 376-384).

[51] In French: "Toutes sortes d'Écrits s'accomplissent de trois parties principales, qui sont Invention, Disposition, Élocution" (Peletier 1990, 251). Unless stated otherwise, the translations from Peletier, Ronsard and Sébillet that appear in this work are mine and have been revised by ____.

greatest rhetorician, and in *Art poétique français* (1548), Sébillet links poetry to rhetoric tightly, as the following extract discussing the all-important invention illustrates:

> The foundation and first part of the poem is invention. It should not be surprising that I give invention the first part in the art of poetry, when the rhetoricians have also named it the first part of their entire art. Indeed rhetoric is as present throughout the poem, as it is throughout the oration. Although the orator and the poet are so close and linked, and therefore similar and alike in many things, they mainly differ in that one is more restrained in numbers than the other. Macrobius confirms this in his Saturnales, when he calls into question who was the greatest rhetorician, Virgil or Cicero. However well-versed and learned in all the parts of rhetoric is he who wants to practice French poetry, he nonetheless needs to be a greater expert in invention, as it is the part more closely shared with the orator; and from which all the elegance of his poem results.[52]

Shortly after this fragment, Sébillet states that "the surplus of invention that consists in the art, the poet will take from philosophers and rhetoricians"[53]. Indeed, for Sébillet poets have to be aware of rhetorical techniques, while, at the same time, orators can take advantage of their knowledge of poetry; in sum, rhetoric and poetry can learn much from each other: "And in the same way that the future orator benefits from the lesson of the poet: the future poet can likewise enrich his style, and make fertile his otherwise barren field, thanks to the lesson of French historians and orators"[54]. Joachim du Bellay in his *Deffence* (1549) in this respect affirms that "the poet and the orator are as it were two pillars that support the structure of every day language"[55].

Nevertheless, even though it is acknowledged that poetry and rhetoric have an indisputable link, it is also pointed out that poetry has its own domain and its own

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[52] In French: "Le fondement et *première partie du Poème ou carme, est l'invention. Et ne doit-on trouver étrange si je donne en l'art poétique les premières parties à celle, laquelle les Rhétoriciens ont aussi nombrée première part de tout leur art. Car la Rhétorique est autant bien épandue par tout le poème, comme par toute l'oraison.* Et sont l'Orateur et le Poète tant proches et conjoints, que semblables et égaux en plusieurs choses, diffèrent principalement en ce, que l'un est plus contraint de nombres que l'autre. Ce que Macrobe confirme en ses Saturnales, quand il révoque en doute, lequel a été plus grand Rhétoricien, ou Virgile, ou Cicéron. Supposé donc que celui qui se veut exercer en la Poésie française, soit autrement bien versé et entendu en toutes les parties de Rhétorique, il doit toutefois être plus expert en l'invention, comme celle qu'il a particulièrement plus commune avec l'Orateur: et de laquelle résulte toute l'élégance de son poème" (Sébillet 1990, 57).

[53] In French: "Le surplus de l'invention qui consiste en l'art, prendra le poète des Philosophes et Rhéteurs" (Sébillet 1990, 58-59).

[54] In French: "Et tout ainsi que le futur Orateur profite en la leçon du Poète: aussi le futur Poète peut enrichir son style, et faire son champ autrement stérile, fertile, de la leçon des Historiens et Orateurs français" (Sébillet 1990, 60-61).

[55] (Du Bellay 2004b, 65). "le Poëte, et l'Orateur sont comme les deux Piliers, qui soutiennent l'Edifice de chacune Langue" (Du Bellay 2001, 119).

particularities. For instance, Jacques Peletier in his *Art Poétique* (1555) differentiates

them in terms of the subject matter of their compositions, the profile of their respective

audiences, and the language each tends to use or should use:

> Thus, one of the principal differences between the poet and the orator is that one can play with all kinds of arguments, while the other is confined to specific things. Because the orator will not have to make the gods talk, deal with love, festive games, Hades, the stars, regions, fields, meadows, fountains and such beautiful things in writings: but will have to restrict himself to the causes of his clients, move the feelings, deduce his reasons, and refute those of his adversary. In these last two points, the poet participates as well: but he discusses them succinctly, because he that speaks to eternity has to touch only the knot, the secret and essence of an argument, and be more resolute, leaving small matters aside. The orator, who speaks to present men, and most frequently to the people, complies by having an effect, and using an appropriate fashion to gain his audience if only for one hour. (…) Words also have to be different for the Poet and the Orator. As, for instance, in Latin, the orator would never say *altum* for the sea, or the stern for the whole vessel. The same occurs with similar figurative words, which it is not convenient to enumerate here, but that will be mentioned when suitable.[56]

Thus, in terms of subject matter poetry tends to be more abstract and elevated than

rhetoric, which is less free in this respect and seems more constrained by the immediate

circumstances surrounding the speech, such as the profile of the audience and the

speech's purpose. After all, as Ronsard puts it in his *Abrégé de l'art poetique françois*

and his 1572 preface to the *Franciade*, the orator ultimately seeks to persuade, while the

poet only wishes to represent the *vraisemblable*[57].

Du Bellay's *Deffence* (1549) constitutes the landmark of French literary criticism in

the sixteenth century, demarcating the passage from the later Middle Ages and its stress

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[56] In French: "Ainsi voilà l'une des principales différences qu'il y a entre l'Orateur et le Poète, que cettui-ci peut s'ébattre en tous genres d'arguments, cettui-là est astreint aux choses particulières. Car l'Orateur ne pourra pas chercher l'occasion de faire parler les Dieux, de traiter l'Amour, les Jeux festifs, les Enfers, les Astres, les régions, les champs, les prés, les fontaines et telles beautés d'Écrits: Mais se tiendra dedans les causes de ses clients, mouvra les affects, déduira ses raisons, réfutera celles de son adversaire. Et en ces deux derniers points, le Poète y entre aussi: mais il les traite succinctement. Car lui qui parle à une éternité, doit seulement toucher le nœud, le secret et le fond d'un argument, et parler plus résolument, laissant les menues narrations. L'Orateur, qui parle aux hommes présents, et le plus souvent au peuple, fait assez s'il a une action, et une façon convenable à pouvoir gagner ses gens seulement pour une heure. (...) Les mots aussi doivent être différents au Poète et á l'Orateur. Comme par exemple, en Latin, l'Orateur ne dira pas *altum* pour la mer: ni la poupe pour toute la navire. Et autres semblables mots figurés, lesquels n'est ici commode de déclarer par le menu, sinon par ci-après ainsi que le lieu se présentera" (Peletier 1990, 249-250).
[57] Ronsard receives the lion's share of attention in Rita Guerlac's "Rhetorical Doctrine and Some Poems of Ronsard", included in *Essays on Renaissance Poetry* (Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell University Press, 1980, 291-310).

on rhetorical and metrical structure, to the Renaissance "formation of a poetic language, the introduction of new *genres*, the creation of new rhythms, and the imitation of classical literature"[58]. This was also the time when Italian criticism was becoming truly influential in France, and when French educated men visited Italy, and Italians, France. Du Bellay illustrates this introduction of classical and Italian ideas into French linguistic and literary criticism to the point that Dante's *De Vulgari Eloquio* (1529, in the Italian version of Trissino) has been identified as the model of his *Deffence*[59]. Moreover, following the Italian poetical doctrines stemming from Neoplatonism, Du Bellay's work proclaims the excellence of the poet and the quasi sacred character of his creation. Among the many Italian influences of the *Deffence* we find Sperone Speroni's *Dialogo delle lingue* (1542), and Bartolomeo Ricci's *De imitatione libri tres* (1541), with which it shares similar views towards imitation. Du Bellay's *Deffence*, nevertheless, shows no signs of acquaintance with Aristotle's *Poetics*, even though it is likely that he had known of its existence through Italian critics[60]. Instead, it is Scaliger's *Poetices*, written and published in France, which is responsible for the introduction into French criticism of the Aristotelian poetical canons[61]. Curiously enough, despite the key role of Du Bellay within French humanism and the enormous influence of French critics in England, Du Bellay was not quoted there as a critical authority but rather as a well known literary model, particularly in the 1580s. Instead, it was Du Bartas and Ronsard who primarily caught the attention of English criticism[62].

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[58] (Spingarn 1976, 173)

[59] "The two works, allowing for the difference in time and circumstance, resemble each other somewhat in spirit and purpose as well as in contents and design" (Spingarn 1976, 180). "The purpose of both books is the justification of the vulgar tongue, and the consideration of the means by which it can attain perfection; (...) it is no insignificant fact that the first critical work of modern France should have been based on the first critical work of modern Italy" (Spingarn 1976, 181).

[60] "There is indeed no well-established allusion to the *Poetics* in France before this time. None of the French humanists seems to have known it" (Spingarn 1976, 184).

[61] (Spingarn 1976, 177). Later on, in the seventeenth century, the Dutch scholars Daniel Heinsius and Gerardus Vossius played a considerable role in spreading Aristotle's influence in France. For more on this subject, see, *The Influence of Heinsius and Vossius upon French Dramatic Theory*, Eidth G. Kern, ed., Vol. 26 of Johns Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Languages (Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins Press, 1949).

[62] In this respect, Anne Lake Prescott asserts that "few Englishmen explicitly commented upon Du Bellay as one who helped start a movement or change a direction, and those who wrote about French literature credited its refining to Marot or Ronsard, not to him" (Prescott 1978, 42).

3.5. Rhetoric and Poetics in Renaissance England

Renaissance England was not an exception in attributing strong links between rhetoric and poetics in the same way that Italian and French criticism had done before[63]. Arthur Kinney argues that knowledge of rhetoric is compulsory to understand English prose fiction in the sixteenth century, and to grasp how authors like Thomas More and George Gascoigne managed to metamorphose rhetoric into a successful creative poetics; "Rhetoric as poetic thus becomes, in the sixteenth century, a chief means of humanist writing"[64]. Like in the Middle Ages, sixteenth-century English poetics continued making use of rhetorical terminology derived from direct classical sources and interpretations by medieval authors, and, to some extent, by that of French and Italian Renaissance critics writing on poetry. In addition to this, the contribution of some native figures cannot be forgotten either, and, for instance, in the development of literary terminology in England, the scholar L. A. Ebin underlies the significance of Lydgate's works. According to this critic, Lydgate is accountable for the creation of "a new critical language, coining words where none existed" and "assigning new meanings to terms that had been found in English before his time but that were not applied to poetry"[65]. Ebin particularly refers to terms such as 'enlumyne', 'adourne', 'enbelissche', 'aureate', 'goldyng', 'sugrid', 'rethorik', and 'eloquence', which became widespread in fifteenth-century critical language. Lydgate's use of the terms 'rhetorik' and 'elloquence' is specially significant, particularly because both are taken as marks of praise and signal

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[63] Some critics have stated that "The literature of the English Renaissance was profoundly rhetorical", that "Verse and prose were conceived primarily as instruments of persuasion or proof" (Harrier 1976, 370), or that English rhetoricians fused rhetoric and poetics "granting the poet and the orator equal status, similar methods, identical goals -to move, to teach, to please", only "distinguishing between them sometimes through the traditional dichotomy of media, prose against verse, sometimes through the presence or absence of fiction" (Vickers 1983, 412).

[64] (Kinney 1976, 440). Particularly regarding Gascoigne, Michael Mack has pointed out that his work shows "The extent to which sixteenth-century poetic theory draws on rhetorical theory" (Mack 2005, 35). Moreover, Mack asserts that in *Certayne notes of Instruction concerning the making of verse or ryme in English* (1575) "Gascoigne presents a theory of poetic invention whose debt to rhetorical invention is obvious" (Mack 2005, 35). For more on the theory behind literary prose writings in Renaissance England, see Paul Salzman, "Theories of Prose Fiction in England: 1558-1700" in *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* (Glyn P. Norton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 295-304).

[65] (Ebin 1988, 20)

excellence in poetry, and because they widely differ from the way they had been used by previous authors such as Chaucer, who practically never used them to refer to poetry or, when he did, used them with negative connotations[66]. Thus, for Lydgate 'rethorik' means successful style in poetry or oratory, and 'rhetor' becomes "a mark of distinction or skill, attained by only the best of poets, who combine the orator's mastery of language with a worthy vision and purpose"[67]. However, Lydgate mentions invention briefly and does not stress the poet's powers of invention; instead, he invests most of his efforts to discuss the importance of to 'adourne', 'enbelissche', and 'enlumyne' the literary creation.

A later instance of the manner in which rhetoric and poetics clashed in Renaissance England can be found in Richard Rainolde's *A Booke Called the Foundacion of Rhetorike* (1563), where Rainolde speaks of invention both as part of rhetoric as well as of poetry writing. He defines narration as "an exposicion, or declaracion of any thyng dooen in deede, or els a settyng forthe, forged of any thyng, but so declaimed and declared, as though it were doen", and containing "inuencion of matter"[68]. For Rainolde there are three types of narrations: "historicall, of any thyng contained, in any aunciente storie, or true Chronicle"; "Poeticall, whiche is a exposicion fained, *set forthe by inuencion of Poetes*, or other"; and "ciuill, otherwise called Iudiciall, whiche is a matter of controuersie in iudgement, to be dooen, or not dooen well or euill"[69]. Of these three types, Rainolde only attributes invention to the poetical sort. Then, in *A Discourse of English Poetrie* (1586), William Webbe records that "a good and allowable Poet, must be adorned with wordes, plentious in sentences, and if not equall to an Orator, yet very neere him, and a speciall lover of learned men"[70]. Webbe makes rhetoric and poetry the

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[66] As L.A. Ebin explains, whereas "Chaucer uses these terms only rarely; each appears only six times in his writing, and, when he uses these words, he either does not apply them directly to poetry, or with a few notable exceptions, he introduces them with an ironic or a pejorative meaning. Lydgate, in contrast, uses each term more than thirty times, very frequently together, and always as terms of commendation. Eloquence in Lydgate's writing is a positive attribute of style and refers to the way writers or orators use their medium elegantly, effectively, and appropriately" (Ebin 1988, 29).
[67] (Ebin 1988, 32)
[68] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. xii^r)
[69] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. xii^r-xiii^v)
[70] (Webbe 1586, L2^v)

same in style and with an equal concern for persuasion, the only difference being that oratory is in prose and poetry in verse. Additionally, for Puttenham, like for other English Renaissance authors such as Harvey and Chapman, it is verse and not imitation the characteristic mark of poetry and the feature that differentiates it from oratory. Furthermore, since Puttenham understood rhetoric as beauty of speech, and since prose, which he considered the vehicle for rhetoric, was surpassed in beauty by poetry, Puttenham concluded that poetry was better to persuade:

> It is beside *a maner of vtterance more eloquent and rethoricall then the ordinarie prose*, which we vse in our daily talke: because it is decked and set out with all maner of fresh colours and figures, which maketh that it sooner inuegleth the iudgement of man, and carieth his opinion this way and that, whither soeuer the heart by impression of the eare shalbe most affectionatly bent and directed.[71]

As Wayne A. Rebhorn has pointed out, even though Puttenham's "work is technically a poetics, rather than a rhetoric manual, much of what Puttenham says about poetry derives from or is identical with classical and Renaissance teachings about rhetoric"[72]. As for criticism about Elizabethan prose fiction, it is located in either prefaces to individual works, or within Sir Philip Sidney's *An Apology for Poetry*. Before Sidney, the most substantial discussions of prose fiction can be found in William Painter's *The Palace of Pleasure* (1566) and Geoffrey Fenton's *Tragical discourses* (1567) –translations and adaptations of continental short stories by Boccaccio, Bandello, Belleforest, and Marguerite de Navarre–, as well as in George Pettie's *Petite Palace of Pettie his Pleasure* (1576), containing adaptations of classical stories.

There have been a number of attempts on the part of modern critics to classify the literary criticism produced in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England. For instance, D. L. Clark singles out William Webbe's *Discourse of English Poetry* (1586) as the first attempt in England to write a systematic and comprehensive poetics. Before that date, Clark believes that Ascham and Wilson had approached poetry merely from a rhetorical

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[71] (Puttenham 1970, 8)
[72] (Rebhorn 2000, 203)

perspective; that Gascoigne and James I solely produced manuals of prosody[73], that Lodge and Harington exclusively defended poetry against Puritan attacks, and that Sidney, although doing much more, still kept the idea of the defence as his priority.

J. E. Spingarn (1976), for his part, distinguishes five different stages. The first one, characterized by a 'rhetorical' study of literature, would begin with Leonard Cox's *Arte or Crafte of Rhetoryke* (*c.* 1530) and include Wilson and Ascham's works. The second, primarily concerned with metrical issues and linguistic matters, would begin with Gascoigne's *Notes of Instruction concerning the making of Verse* (1575), and encompass Puttenham's *Arte*, Harvey's *Letters* and Webbe's *Discourse*. The third stage would be defined by its philosophical and apologetic overtones, would inaugurate in England the influence of Italian theories on poetry, and would be represented, among other titles, by Sir Philip Sidney's *Defence of Poesy* (published posthumously in 1595) and Samuel Daniel's *Defence of Ryme* (1603). The fourth stage of criticism in England would cover the first half of the seventeenth century, having Ben Jonson as its central figure, and the fifth would occupy the second half of century, showing great French influence.

Then, Wilbur Samuel Howell (1980) distinguishes three types of literatures: non-mimetic writings (orations, historical writings, and philosophical arguments), mimetic writings (tragedy, comedy, epic poetry, and prose narrative), and the literature of the fable, which deals with imagined events and characters. For Howell, English literary critics in the Renaissance identified poetry with fable, that is, with the Latin *fabula*, "a narrative of imagined characters taking part in imagined events", which "could be mythical, or legendary, or fictitious, or quasi-historical, or historical", and which could be narrated in "realistic terms, or in terms of romance, or allegory"[74]. For them, the

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[73] Regarding the work of James I on poetry, *The essayes of a prentise, in the diuine art of poesie* (1584), J. J. Blanchot (1984) has remarked that the treatise does not belong to the tradition of the fifteenth and sixteenth century Scottish "Makars", but that it is instead fundamentally influenced by French and English Renaissance theories, thus only mentioning the most recent poets without drawing examples from Scottish poets separated by one century from James I's time. For a detailed study of James I's literary ideas, see Ronald S. Jack's "James VI and Renaissance poetic theory", *English* 16 (1967): 208-11.
[74] (Howell 1980, 87)

fable was the essential principle of poetry, which made it distinct. Stephen Hawes's *The Historie of Graunde Amoure and La Bell Pucel, Called The Passetyme of Pleasure* (1509) would illustrate this idea of poetry as fable and of poets as composers of fables. The extract quoted below is preceded by a general commentary upon rhetoric entitled "How he was received of Rhetorike, and what Rethoryke is", which finishes by promising an elaboration on each of the five parts of rhetoric (invention, imagination, fancy, good estimation, and the "retentise memory", according to Hawes). The moment Hawes is discussing the second of these parts of rhetoric, imagination, poetry appears. The following discussion on poetry shows how poets were thought to compose fables, how these fables could shed light on truth and serious matters, and how rhetoric and poetics were believed to be intimately related:

> And secondlye, by imagination
> To drawe a matter, ful facundious
> Full marveylous, is the operation
> To make of nought, reason sentencious
> Clokyng a trouthe, wyth coloure tenebrous
> *For often under, a fayre fayned fable*
> *A trouthe appeareth, greatly profitable*
>
> *It was the guyse, in olde antiquitye*
> *Of famous poetes, ryght ymaginatise*
> *Fables to fayne, by good aucthoritye*
> They were so wyse, and so inventyfe
> Theyr obscure reason, fayre and sugratyse
> Pronounced trouthe, under clowdy fygures
> By the invention, of theyr fatall scriptures[75]

Thomas Wilson, in his *Arte of Rhetorique*, first published in 1553, also talks about fables as the result of the poet's activity. For him, fables have a didactic purpose, can have persuasive ends, and with them poets address issues of importance related to morals or the seeking of truth:

> *The saiynge of Poetes and all their fables are not to be forgotten*, for by them we may talke at large, and winne men by perswasion, if we declare before hande that these tales were not fayned of suche wise menne without cause, neither yet continued untyll this

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[75] (Hawes 1554, D1ʳ)

> tyme, and kepte in memorie without good consideration, and therupon declare the true meanynge of all suche writinge. For undoubtedlye there is no one tale among al the Poetes, but under the same is comprehended some thinge that perteyneth, eyther to the amendemente of maners, to the knowledge of trueth, to the settynge forthe of Natures woorcke, or elles to the understandinge of some notable thynge done.[76]

Moreover, Renaissance critics used Horace's *Ars Poetica* to define the artistic function of the literature of fable. As a result, they regarded instruction and pleasure as the ends of poetry. In this way, the aesthetic aim of the fable is extended into the terrain of didacticism, and teaching delightfully, fostering virtue, and discouraging vice appear as the supreme aspirations of poetry. Indeed, during the Renaissance poetics were attached to ethics, and literary works were not considered autotelic; far from that, their worth was always measured depending on their practical impact upon human life. The fact that the value of poetry was often explained in rhetorical terms by, for instance, asserting that poetry could have noticeable persuasive effects (on some occasions even more outstanding than orations') did not affect the perception of poetry as poetry. Thomas Wilson, also in his *The Arte of Rhetorique*, admits that orators take advantage of fables for "sometymes feined Narrations and wittie invented matters (as though they were true in deede) helpe wel to set forwarde a cause, and have great grace in them, beyng aptly used and wel invented"[77]. Likewise, for Richard Rainolde "Poetes firste inuented fables, the whiche Oratours also doe vse in their perswasions, and not without greate cause, both Poetes and Oratours doe applie theim to their vse"[78]. Even Sidney in his *Defense* connects poetry and fables in the sentence "it pleased the heavenly Deity, by Hesiod and Homer, under the veil of fables, to give us all knowledge, Logic, Rhetoric, Philosophy natural and moral, and *quid non*?"[79].

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[76] (Wilson 1982, 387-388)

[77] (Wilson 1982, 394)

[78] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. iii^v-Fol. iii^r). Of course, Rainolde's quotation shows that he does not limit the role of poets to composing fables. Fables appear, from his perspective, as one of the products of poetic craft, but not the sole one. Fables, thus, can definitely be of use in other types of poetic creation.

[79] (Sidney 2002, 116). From the perspective of Richard Harrier, Sidney's *Defence* "argues the essential unity of *ratio*, *oratio*, and 'poesy'"; in other words, the idea that "poetry, oratory, and reason worked through participation in man's divine essence" (Harrier 1976, 379).

Nevertheless, some differences are undeniably recognized between rhetoric and poetry, one of them being the different natural requirements each art demands on the part of the poet and the orator. Sir Philip Sidney discusses in the following way the implications of the ever repeated Latin saying *Orator fit, poeta nascitur*:

> For poesy must not be drawn by the ears, it must be gently led, or rather it must lead; which was partly the cause that made the ancient-learned affirm it was a divine gift, and no human skill, since all other knowledges lie ready for any that hath strength of wit; a *poet no industry can make, if his own genius be not carried unto it*. And therefore is it an old proverb, *orator fit, poeta nascitur*.[80]

In other words, if proficiency in rhetoric was seen as the result of exercise, study, and constant practice, poetry relied much more on the natural abilities of the poet. From this perspective, poetry could not be taught in the same way that rhetoric was taught in schools. Thomas Lodge, author of *A defence of poetry, music and stage plays* (1579), was one of the voices in favour of considering writing poetry a heavenly gift. In his own words: "I reson not that al Poets are holy, but I affirme that Poetry is a heauenly gift, a perfit gift, then which I know not greater pleasure"[81]. Unfortunately, Lodge's opinion was not unanimously shared in sixteenth-century England; far from it, poetry became the target of vociferous and bitter attacks that accused it of immorality and uselessness, and which portrayed it as a powerful and horrid indomitable force that could easily corrupt the morals and true religious beliefs of defenceless English citizens.

3.6. Attacks and Defences of Poetry in Sixteenth-Century England

While poets and poetry underwent great attacks during the Renaissance due to poetry's connection with feigning, fiction, and the theatre, rhetoric and the orator received comparatively light treatments. Attacks against rhetoric were on the grounds that rhetoric operated in the realm of opinion, probability and contingence, and therefore

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[80] (Sidney 2002, 109)
[81] (Lodge 1853, 14)

could not promise absolute truths. According to Brian Vickers, "in England, as in Italy, during the Renaissance, rhetoric had a surprisingly good press"[82]. Objections to poetry became even fiercer in the last third of the Cinquecento, and from the later sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, writing poetry was stigmatized as an effeminising activity able to foster political disorder. What is more, the early English Protestants appropriated antipoetic sentiment and entangled it with religious matters. Thus, the voices against poetry in the sixteenth century were widely distributed, enjoyed authority, and were even held as a sign of moral credibility and respectability. Renaissance antipoetic sentiment modelled and shaped the works of authors like Sidney, Spenser, and Milton. As for the defenders of poetry, since the sixteenth century classified the art of poetry as part of moral philosophy, it then became mandatory to defend poetry on moral grounds. Philosophers, poets, humanists with extensive readings on ancient doctrine and the thought of the Church Fathers, university professors and orators sincerely devoted themselves to the hard task of defending poetry.

3.6.1. Anti-Poetic Sentiment

Platonic doctrine was one of the major sources of objections to poetry for both medieval and Renaissance attackers. The difference was that, since poetry in medieval times had but a modest position, it did not receive too much vehement criticism. However, with the humanist stress on poetry and its elevation to a status almost equal to theology, attacks on poetry multiplied and turned more virulent. The two major Platonic arguments for the condemnation of poetry were, firstly, the ignorance of the artist, since the poet was a mere imitator three removes from the truth according to the theory of

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[82] (Vickers 1983, 412). There are, of course, very well known exceptions to this, for instance, and within the English context, the vehement *Oratio Contra Rhetoricam* (written sometime between 1544 and 1552) by John Jewel (1522-1571). John Jewel, later Bishop of Salisbury, performed brilliantly at Oxford University, receiving his degree from Corpus Christi College in 1540. Soon he was appointed Reader of Rhetoric at Corpus Christi, a position he successfully filled until, before long, he became a bitter enemy of Rhetoric. The *Oratio* was published in 1848, and, due to the virulence of the arguments and Jewel's personal interest in eloquence, some critics like Rebhorn even see it as probably ironic (Rebhorn 2000, 161).

Ideas and the different degrees of knowledge, and secondly, the fact that poetry appeals to the irrational part of the soul which can only see appearances. From this perspective, poetry had a problematic relationship to truth and morality, as it was associated with lies, falsehood and deceit, and with the excitement of emotions and ignoble passions. In addition to moral objections, the supposed lack of utility of poetry was also at the basis of its damnation during the Renaissance, when poetry was presented as a distracting force that drew men away from work, and as an unprofitable occupation for decent men[83]. Although at first the confrontation about poetry took place between humanists and scholastics, by the mid-1400s some humanists were also writing attacks on poetry[84]. For instance, in his dialogue *Veritas fucata, sive de licentia poetica, quantum poetis liceat Veritate abscendere* ("Truth Dressed Up: Or of Poetic License: To What Extent Poets May Be Permitted to Vary from the Truth") (1522), Juan Luis Vives focused on demarcating some limits to poetic creativity, even though he acknowledged that the boundaries would be transgressed anyway: "How long do you think the poets, a band of wandering and free men, will suffer with a calm soul these limits?"[85]. Then, in *De Tradendis Disciplinis* (1532) Vives recognized that poetry could present some problems to morality, for which reason censorship was the solution: "This would be, as in a garden; a gardener only leaves the healthy herbs, and weeds out all the poisonous plants. In this way poetry will be kept from ignominy and the readers from an evil poison"[86].

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the translators of the Bible, Tyndale and Coverdale, stigmatized poetry as pernicious and contrasted the partial truth poetry conveys with the full truth and teachings of the Sacred Text. Works of fiction were thus thought of as filthy sources of corruption that distracted from what is really worth reading. *An Answer to Sir Thomas More's Dialogue* (1530) was William Tyndale and John Frith's reply to *A Dialogue Concerning Heresies* (1529), Thomas More's

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[83] (Fraser 1970, 9; Spingarn 1976, 5-6)
[84] (Herman 1996, 35)
[85] Quoted in (Herman 1996, 36)
[86] (Vives 1913, 128)

refutation of Lutheranism in the form of a fictional dialogue in which reality and fiction mingle in a complex way. Tyndale deliberately writes in his own voice against More's work, to which he partly objected on the grounds of More's play with fictitious elements to deal with religious controversies. In addition to this, Reformers attacked many of the practices of the Catholic Church arguing that they had no direct scriptural authority, and were only based on human imagination. In this manner, for Tyndale, Catholics replaced worshipping God for "a worshepinge of thine awne imaginacion"[87], a terrible thing to do since "nothinge bringeth the wrath of god so sone and so sore on a man / as the ydolatry of his awne imagination"[88].

By linking fiction to Catholicism, Tyndale made antipoetic sentiment part of the programme of Protestantism, and, consequently, spread it out through all levels of society. From then on, the two discourses were unavoidably fused together[89]. Naturally, if the general assumption was that imagination was the source of poetry, for the Reformation, the terms 'poetry' and 'poet' summarized their objections to Catholicism[90]. This explains why Tyndale refers to Catholics and their practices as giving "thēselues onely unto poetrye, & shut up the scripture"[91]. Certainly, antipoetic sentiment fitted nicely with the Reformers' insistence upon the idea that human faculties were essentially corrupted as a result of the Fall, for which the products of the mind were suspicious –particularly those of the imagination. This is why Tyndale claims that until "man cast away his owne imagynacyons & reason / he can nat

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[87] (Tyndale 1528, P1^r)

[88] (Tyndale 1528, Q1^v). Peter C. Herman provides numerous instances from Tyndale's work against imagination (Herman 1996, 37-43), and asserts that "In Tyndale's theology, one either follows God or the imagination. No middle road, no third possibility, exists" (Herman 1996, 39).

[89] (Herman 1996, 37). The scholar Jonas Barish even finds a relation between the Puritan anti-theatrical prejudice and the Puritan representation of Catholic mass, which could be then qualified as too theatrical: "There was unwelcome theatricality also in the mimetic aspect of the sacrament, in the idea that the officiating priest was reenacting the original sacrifice, and in the element of displacement, of vicariousness, in the ceremony. It was not for the priest to *represent* the community, as an actor represents other men on a stage, but simply to instruct it. It was for each individual Christian to make his own sacrifice, to offer himself to God as best he could. The mass, like the theater, made the spectator too passive, and the priest-performer too much of a surrogate" (Barish 1981, 165).

[90] Lawrence A. Sasek remarks that "the word 'feigned' appears regularly as a pejorative term indicating that the puritans thought of fiction not as an imaginative view of reality, but as simple falsehood", and that the words 'poet' and 'poetical' also had unfavorable connotations (Sasek 1961, 64). This subject will be discussed later on in this chapter in more detail.

[91] (Tyndale 1548, D2^r)

perceyue god / & understande the vertue and power of the blode of Christ"[92]. Tyndale's 'colleagues' (John Frith, Miles Coverdale, and George Joye among others –Calvin too demonized imagination) shared this feeling which they even revealed in their translations[93].

The increasing antipoetic and anti-theatrical sentiment that spread from about the 1570s onwards coincided with a revival of the early English Protestantism, and so, for instance, in 1573 the Protestant publisher John Day printed an edition of *The whole workes of W. Tyndall, John Frith and Doct. barnes.* Puritan hostility to art in general, and the stage and poetry in particular, began to gain force in the sixteenth century in treatises like John Northbrooke's *A Treatise against Dicing, Dancing, Plays, and Interludes* (*c.* 1577). For Russell A. Fraser, it is precisely this same year, on November 3rd, that drama was for the first time publicly condemned: the context was a Sunday sermon at Paul's Cross in London, a city at the time gripped by the plague. In the sermon, the preacher identified sin as the cause of the plague, and the origin of sin, in plays, which consequently made plays accountable for the plague[94]. The attack on the part of preachers and divines against poetry in consequence spurred a wave of criticism from writers against preachers opposing poetry. One of the authors that responded to the preachers' attacks is Thomas Nash, who, in his *Pierce Penilesse* (1592), includes a section entitled "A inuectiue against the enemies of Poetry" where he uses as an argument against those divines their lack of invention and their extensive borrowings:

> With the enemies of Poetry I care not if I haue a bout, and those are they that tearme our best Writers but babling Ballat-makers, holding them fantastical fooles that haue wit, but cannot tell how to vse it; I my selfe haue beene so censured among some dull headed * Diuines: who deeme it no more cunning to write an exquisit Poem, than to preach pure Caluin, or distill the iuice of a Commentary into a quarter Sermon; Proue it when you will, you slow spirited Saturnists, that haue nothing but the pilfries of your penne, to pollish an exhortation withall: no eloquence but Tantologies, to tye the eares of your Auditory vnto you: *no inuention but heere is to be noted*, I stole this note out of Beza or Marlorat : no wit to moue, no passion to vrge, but onely an ordinary forme of preaching, blowen vp by vse of often hearing and speaking; and you shall finde there

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[92] (Tyndale 1536, B5ᵛ)
[93] (Herman 1996, 40-43)
[94] (Fraser 1970, 13). On the following pages, Fraser gives more examples of preachers' attacks on plays.

> goes more exquisite paynes and purity of wit, to the writing of one such rare Poem as Rosamond, than to a hundred of your dunsticall* Sermons.
>
> *Should we (as you) borrow all out of others, and gather nothing of our selues, our names would be baffuld on euerie Booke-sellers stall, and not a Chandlers Mustard-pot but would wipe his mouth with our wast paper.* New Herrings new we must cry, euery time we make our selues publique, or else we shall be christned with a hundred newe tytles of Idiotisme.[95]

Indeed, Thomas Nash here discusses the pressure authors suffer to come up with something new, a pressure that, he claims, preachers were unaware of. Thus, Nash accuses priests of letting their ability to invent rust while instead relying on old and repeated sermons without any appealing novelties. In this context, Nash wonders how priests dared compare their monotonous and undemanding writing of sermons with the challenging task of poets, whom they not only undervalued but also criticized.

Nevertheless, not all attacks against poetry came from divines or Puritans, and as C. S. Lewis notes, if in England "most of the attackers were Protestants", "so were most of the defenders"[96]. The Puritans could not totally condemn poetry because it was present in Scripture as well, a fact which then triggered two opposite reactions to poetry on the Puritan side: on the one hand, the thought that human poetry was incomparable to that of the Scriptures, irrespective of the heavenly uninspired poet's skills and efforts; on the other, the idea that the poetry of the Bible sanctioned human poetry and so there was nothing wrong with the latter, even if the Scriptures were *sui generis*[97]. Robert Southwell provides an example of this way of thinking when in his *Saint Peters complaint, with other poemes* (1595) affirms the following:

> Poets by abusing their talent, and making the follies and fayninges of loue, the customary subiect of their base endeuours, have so discredited this facultie, that a Poet, a Louer, and a Liar are by many reckoned but three wordes of one signification. *But the vanity of men, cannot counterpoyse the authority of God, who deliuering many partes of Scripture in verse, and by his Apostle willing us to exercise our deuotion in Himnes and Spirituall Sonnets, warranteth the Arte to bee good, and the use allowable.*[98]

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[95] (Nash 1592, F1$^{\mathrm{r}}$)

[96] (Lewis 1966, 318). Fraser also points out that "the hatred of poetry is not peculiar to the Puritan" (Fraser 1970, 7).

[97] (Sasek 1961, 65-66)

[98] (Southwell 1595, A2$^{\mathrm{r}}$)

Southwell therefore distinguishes between the art of poetry in general, approved by God and consequently "good" and "allowable", and the particular poetic production of poets, which he despises and considers discrediting for the art. Indeed, the Puritans distinguished between what for them was good and proper literature, and what was popular or immoral, deemed idle and dangerous amusement[99]. Plays could be useful and acceptable provided that they were not immoral and helped in some way to spread Christian virtues and ideas –although they were seen with suspicion regardless their moral qualities if they became too successful and drew people away from sermons[100]. Leonard Cox's *The Art or Crafte of Rhetorique* (1532) gathers some commonplaces used to discredit poetry fundamentally based on the idea that poets have to be distrusted because they are liars. Cox uses Plato as his major authority to back up his argument:

> That what thynge poetes or commune fame doth eyther prayse or dispraise ought nat to be gyuen credence to / but rather to be suspecte. For ones *it is the nature of poetes to fayne and lye* / as bothe Homere and Virgile / which are the princes and heddes of al poetes to witnesse thē selfe. Of whome Homere sayth / that poetes make many lies / and Virgile he saith: The moost part of the sene is but deceyte. *Poetes haue sene blake soules vnder the erthe / poetes haue fayned and made many lyes of the pale kyngdome of Plato / and of the water of Stigie / and of dogges in hell.* And agayne cōmune rumours howe often they ben vayne / it is so open that it nede nat to be declared. Wherfore his trust is that the hearers wyll more regarde his saynge than fayned fables of poetes / and fleyng tales of lyght folkes / whiche ar for the more parte the grounders of fame & rumours.[101]

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[99] Lawrence A. Sasek explains that "The term 'popular' was a common denominator applicable to the theatre and to the romances and ballads that the puritans disliked. Of course, the categories overlapped, but the test of popularity with the masses was applied even more often than the moral criterion. The puritans could accept the Homeric and Virgilian heroes, but not Robin Hood; the morality of the former could be and was rationalized while the latter was never seriously examined. The imaginative literature that appealed to the more vulgar of the public, those for whom the preachers developed their plain style and their methical, practical sermons, was condemned because of the fact of the appeal. The reason can be stated generally as a feeling that such reading was a waste of time which had better be given to sermons, edifying works, and religious exercises. The better its artistry, the greater its appeal was to draw men away from more important business, and hence the more dangerous it became" (Sasek 1961, 110).

[100] Gregory Smith (1904, Vol. I, xv-xvii) in fact distinguishes two types of Puritan arguments against poetry: firstly, a historical argument based on the distrust of plays, songs and tales on the part of the patristic tradition, and secondly, a moral argument particularly aimed at the Italian influences and at stage-plays –though detractors were "more concerned with the social bearings of the playhouse than with the intrinsic immorality of the plays" (Smith 1904, Vol. I, xvii). Jonas Barish has effectively noted that very often throughout history antitheatrical prejudice has more strongly emerged precisely when drama and plays have been most successful, since it was then seen as a competing discourse with church and state (Barish 1981, 191). Barish singles out as an exception medieval church drama and the street drama that developed out of it, to which there was no body of antitheatrical writings due to the fact that this type of theater sprung from Christianity and maintained close links with the Church.

[101] (Cox 1532, B6^v-B6^r)

Similarly, in Sir Thomas Elyot's the *Defence of Good Women* (1540), in a dialogue between the misogynist Caninius and the woman's defender Candidus, the latter attacks poetry relying on the opinions of classical authors:

> The authors whom ye so moche do set by, for the more part were *poetes, which sort of persōs among the latines & grekes were neuer had but in smal reputatiō. For I could neuer rede that in any weale publike of notable memory, Poetes were called to any honorable place, office, or dignite*. Plato out of the publike weale whiche he had deuysed, wolde haue all poetes utterly excluded. Tulli, who next unto Plato excelled all other in vertue and eloquence, wolde not haue in his publyke weale any poetes admitted. *The cause why they were soo lyttell estemed was, for as moche as the more parte of theyr invencions consysted in leasynges, or in sterynge up of wanton appetytes, or in pourynge oute, in raylynge, theyr poyson of malyce*. For with theyr owne goddes and goddesses were they so malaparte, that with theyr aduoutries they fylled great volumes.[102]

According to Candidus the main fault of poets is that "they excede the termes of honestye"[103]. Then, at a certain point in *A booke called the foundacion of rhetorike* (1563), Richard Rainolde illustrates the rhetorical exercise of 'destruccion' (defined as an "oracion, a certain reprehension of any thyng declaimed, or dilated, in the whiche by order of art, the declaimer shall procede to caste doune by force, and strengthe of reason, the contrarie induced"[104]), using the proposition "It is not like to be true, that is said of the battaill of Troie" as the subject matter of his oration. The first part of Rainolde's example, entitled "The reprehension of the aucthor, and of all Poetes", serves as a magnificent summary of some of the ideas generally held at the time against poetry and the vices of poets. This time, Plato's arguments against poetry are mixed with other objections of a more Christian nature[105]:

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[102] (Elyot 1540, B4^r-B6^v)

[103] (Elyot 1540, B6^r). The curious relation between anti-poetic sentiment and the defence of women has been interpreted as a way to demonstrate the moral reliability and probity of the speaker. Consequently, "far from undercutting Candidus's credibility, his antipoetic bias serves to increase his moral authority" (Herman 1996, 45). Furthermore, it suggests that attacks of the misogynists towards women are more appropriate to poets than to women.

[104] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. xxv^v)

[105] Rainolde did not share the negative views against poetry manifested in the excerpt. The proof is in his eulogy to Homer some pages before the selection. Rainolde asks, referring to the Greek poet, "What Region, Isle, or nacion is not, by his inuencion set foorthe: who although he were blinde, his minde sawe

> Not without a cause, *the vanities of Poetes are to bee reproued, and their forged inuencions to bee reiected*: in whose writynges, so manifestlie are set forthe as a truthe, and Chronicled to the posteritie of ages and times, soche forged matters of their Poeticall and vain wittes. *Who hath not heard of their monsterous lies against God, thei inuentyng a genealogie of many Goddes procreated, where as there is but one God*. (...) The feigne also the heauē to haue one God, the sea an other, helle an other, whiche are mere vanities, and false imaginaciōs of their Poeticall wittes. The like forged inuencion haue thei wrote, of the mightie and terrible battaill bruted of Troie, for a beautifull harlot susteined ten yeres. In the whiche, not onely men and noble péeres, gaue the combate of battaile, but the Goddes toke partes against Goddes, and men wounded Goddes: as their lies exceade all nomber, because thei bee infinite, so also thei passe all truthe, reason, and iudgemente. These fewe examples of their vanities and lies, doe shewe the feigned ground and aucthoritie of the reste. *Accordyng to the folie and supersticiousnes of those tymes, thei inuented and forged folie vppon folie, lye vpon lye, as in the battaill of Troie*, thei aggrauate the dolour of the battaill, by pitifull and lamentable inuencion. *As for the Poetes them selues, Plato in his booke, made vpon the administracion of a common wealth, maketh theim in the nomber of those, whiche are to bee banished out of all common wealthes.*[106]

Then, Edward Dering in *A Briefe and Necessary Instruction* (1572) condemns works of fiction on the grounds that they "kindle in mens hartes and the sparkes of superstition, that at last it might flame out into the fire of Purgatorie"[107].

There are numerous instances in which the word 'poet' was used as a term of abuse in the sixteenth century. For example, a letter sent in 1572 by Gascoigne's creditors to the Privy Council denounced that Gascoigne was unfit for Parliament because, in addition to being a spy and an atheist, he was a "common rhymer"[108]. This use of the word was still alive in the seventeenth century, as can be seen in Milton's derogatorily calling King Charles I "a more diligent reader of Poets, then of Politicians", and his *Eikon Basilike* (1649) "a peece of Poetrie"[109]. George Puttenham largely dwells on the anti-poetic sentiment of the Renaissance in his *Arte of English Poesie*, where he says that it was then customary to use the term 'poet' almost as an insult. Attached to the concept of 'phantasy' as it was, poetry was thought to be for idle men only with nothing but air in their minds. Puttenham denounced the situation in the following terms:

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all wisedome, the states of all good kyngdomes and common wealthes" (Rainolde 1563, F1ᵛ). Hence, through this statement Rainolde establishes a relationship between poetry and truth.
[106] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. xxvʳ-Fol. xxviᵛ)
[107] (Dering 1572, A3ᵛ)
[108] Quoted in (Herman 1996, 21)
[109] Quoted in (Herman 1996, 21)

> *For as well Poets as Poesie are despised, & the name become, of honorable infamous, subject to scorne and deri-/sion, and rather a reproch than a prayse to any that vseth it*: for commonly who so is studious in th'Arte or shewes him selfe excellent in it, they call in disdayne a *phantasticall: and a light-headed or phantasticall man (by conuersion) they call a Poet.* (...) and among men such as be modest and graue, & of litle conuersation, nor delighted in the busie life and vayne ridiculous actions of the popular, they call him in scorne a *Philosopher*, or *Poet, as much to say as a phantasticall man*, very iniuriously (God wot) and to the manifestation of their own ignoraunce, not making difference betwixt termes.[110]

Then, *The Schoole of Abuse* (1579), a book by Stephen Gosson against poetry, music, and plays, encourages readers through moral arguments to refrain from practising or following any of those three activities:

> Let us but shut uppe our ears to Poets, Pypers, and Players, pull our feete back from resort to Theaters, and turne away our eyes from beholding of vanitie, the greatest storme of abuse will be ouerblowen, and a fayre path troden to a mendemēt of life. Were not we so foolish to taste euery drugge, and buy euery trifle, Players would shut in their shooppes, and carry their trash to some other Countrie.[111]

The Schoole of Abuse is probably one of the most popular instances of a work against poetry and poets, through whose "fables" or "plaine tearmes" Gosson believes they "unfold theyr mischiefe, discouer their shame, discredit themselues, and disperse their poyson through all the worlde"[112]. From his perspective, and recalling again Plato's words, it was "No marueyle though Plato shut them out of his Schoole, and banished them quite from his common wealth, as effeminate writers, unprofitable members, and utter enimies to vertue"[113]. At the roots of Gosson's objection to poetry (*i.e.*, all kinds of fiction) lies its fictive character, which he cannot justify. Similarly, for Gosson acting is lying, hence his condemnation of drama:

> I trust they wil graunt me that every lye is sinne, for the deuill is the father of all lyes (...). Let us therefore consider what a lye is, a lye is (...), an acte executed where it ought not. This acte is discerned by outward signes, every man must show himselfe outwardly to be such as in deed he is. Outward signes consist eyther in words or gestures, to

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[110] (Puttenham 1970, 18)
[111] (Gosson 1587, D7ᵛ)
[112] (Gosson 1587, A6ʳ)
[113] (Gosson 1587, A7ʳ)

declare ourselues by words or by gestures to be otherwise then we are, is an act executed where it should not, therefore a lye.

   The profe is euident, the consequēt is necessarie, that in Stage Playes for a boy to put one the attyre, the gesture, the passions of a woman; for a meane person to take upon him the title of a Prince with counterfeit porte, and traine, is by outwarde signes to shewe them selues otherwise then they are, and so with in the compasse of a lye...[114]

Attacks against drama sometimes overlap with antipoetic sentiment, although many attacks on poetry do not mention drama at all. Both poetry and drama are criticized by virtue of allegedly fomenting social disorder and encouraging vice, even though it has been remarked that Renaissance anti-theatrical sentiment is "much more closely tied to anxieties generated by social mobility and changing gender roles than attacks on poetry, which certainly include these fears, but keep coming back to the problems and dangers of imitation or fictionality"[115]. Nevertheless, Gosson does not radically dismiss poetry, for he recognizes the "right vse of auncient Poetrie" related to martial service and military courage in men[116].

The Schoole of Abuse was dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney, whose *Defence* replies to the *Schoole*. It appears that Gosson did not dedicate his work to Sidney out of 'follie',

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[114] (Gosson 1582, E5ᵛ-E5ʳ)

[115] (Herman 1996, 15) In this respect, Fraser believes that "drama allows a physical dimension to the representation of chimeras, and is in this respect more pernicious than popular fiction" (Fraser 1970, 9).

[116] Stephen Gosson's *The Schoole of Abuse* is indeed an instance of a middle-class Protestant critique of the Court. Gosson implicitly criticizes English court life, seeing it as decadent and exclusively concerned with leisure and pleasures such as music, dancing or banqueting, and unconcerned with discipline and service. In contrast, Gosson looks back with nostalgia to the picture of a warrior aristocracy. As Robert Matz explains: "The Elizabethan nobility lacked military experience even compared to their predecessors under Henry VIII. Elizabeth's reluctance to involve England in expensive foreign wars, the ongoing centralization and bureaucratization of the English state, which shifted the locus of power to administrative functions within the court, the rise of the professional soldier, and the development of a system of national defense less reliant on feudal retaining, all helped to continue the pacification of the Tudor elite" (Matz 2000, 61). Certainly, while the predominant conception of nobility in the Middle ages was that of a caste of warriors, in the Renaissance it started to be connected with "aesthetic refinement, knowledge of classical and modern literatures as well as art and music, its taste and good manners" (Rebhorn 1993, 241-242). Gosson's objections thus link the poetic delight to an immoral idleness of the upper classes –indeed, Puttenham's book addressed idle courtiers interested in writing poetry: "our chiefe purpose herein is for the learning of Ladies and young Gentlewomen, or idle Courtiers, desirous to become skilful in their owne mother tongue, and for their priuate recreation to make now & then ditties of pleasure, thinking for our parte none other science so fit for them & the place as that which teacheth *beau semblant*, the chiefe professiō aswell of Courting as of poesie" (Puttenham 1970, 158). Nevertheless, as Matz remarks, "Puttenham also assumes that such recreative poetry will do political work at court", and so "this work is as much linked to the courtier's personal ambition as it is to an ethos of public service" (Matz 2000, 64).

as Spenser believed, but on the basis of their shared Protestant activism[117]. Unlike Gosson, Sidney highlights the delight of poetry, and the courtier's right to pleasure, for Sidney attempts to reconcile Protestant and courtly values. However, this negotiation between divergent social codes ends up reproducing in the *Defence* the contradictions it aimed to solve, thus demonstrating the Renaissance ambivalence towards poetry[118]. Sidney's conflicts manifest themselves as well in a letter to his friend Edward Denny, in which Sidney does not include any poetry book in his list of titles that a courtier should read; in a letter to his brother Robert (written about the time of the *Defence*) where Sidney subordinates poetry to history; and in the character of Astrophil, taken to illustrate how poetry weakens men, renders them unfit for service, politically passive, and prone to poetry[119].

Jacob Bronowski interprets Gosson's ideas on poetry as stemming from the conviction that the right use of poetry is an ideal locked in the mind of the poet, and that its mere wording is an act of the senses that unavoidably spoils the ideal. From this perspective, the pleasure derived from poetry becomes a sensual pleasure, as the poem is both made as well as perceived through man's infected senses. Unlike sensible human poetry, the poetry of the Bible was directly inspired by God to man. Bronowski suggests

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[117] On this issue, Arthur Kinney (1972) argued that Sidney's *Defence* responded to Gosson's work parodically to disguise their shared opinions on poetry, while Robert Matz states that "while Sidney shares Gosson's Protestant emphases on profitable service he resists the anticourtly agenda of middle-class Protestantism" (Matz 2000, 60). For Matz "The *Defence* does not subordinate courtly pleasure to Protestant politics, but defends the court from Protestant criticisms of its pleasures, including criticisms of poetry" (Matz 2000, 58).

[118] In fact, Herman argues that "Sidney, Spenser, and Milton never could completely rebut the charges levelled by Stephen Gosson and the other Muse-haters because they may well have partially agreed with their charges" (Herman 1996, 14).

[119] (Herman 1996, 28). Certainly, Sir Philip Sidney was a contradictory personality: on the one hand, he is a Calvinist and a defender of a Protestant league; on the other, coming from upper nobility, he actively participated in activities of Court life such as jousts or masques, and seriously engaged in writing (and defending) poetry. Unlike many other poets or playwrights of his century, he was powerful enough not to need or depend on any patrons, but was his own. In this respect, Sidney appears to have more freedom and liberty than the rest –at least in economical terms. Edward Berry argues that Sidney's true vocation was serving the state and that his personal desires did not revolve around the contemplative activity of poetry writing –which even among other forms of contemplation, such as history or moral philosophy, was inferior. As Berry remarks, "For men of Sidney's status, poetry was at best a courtly game – to be pursued with great energy and passion, perhaps, like other games, but not to be confused with the serious business of life" (Berry 1998, 142). Lisa M. Klein (1998) discusses further how the *Apology* reflects the tension between Sidney's literary career and his Protestant activism; between a defence of poetry as an active force able to move men to virtuous action, and the promotion of public action through public (and even military) service.

that Sidney understood poetry exactly like Gosson, and that for both "the poem is only the shadow of an ideal poetry: a shadow cast through the senses"[120]. Nevertheless, while for Gosson the good is always inferior to the abuse, for Sidney the good surpasses the abuse because he is willing to accept that, after all, man cannot write, receive, or be moved by poetry without his senses. In contrast with Bronowski's views, the scholar Andrew D. Weiner believes that for Sidney extremely good poetry managed to rule sensual perception out of the equation, for it appealed directly to the imagination working upon a non-infected will and consequently skipped contact with man's corrupted senses[121].

In addition to Sir Philip Sidney's *Defence*, Thomas Elyot's *Boke Named the Governour*, Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* –Elizabethan England's great epic poem–, and John Milton's *Lycidas* and *Comus, L'Allegro Il Penseroso,* and *Ad patrem*, which answered some of Milton's father's charges against poetry, reflect a conflict within the defences of poetry[122]. All of them constitute important examples of the difficulty in successfully confronting the Muse-haters, and illustrate how defences of poetry are often divided and ambivalent. For instance, Elyot's major work, *Boke Named the Governour* mediates "between conflicting imperatives of profit and pleasure, work and play"[123]. Elyot wrote for two opposed and related groups: on the one hand, merchant and gentry classes that were becoming wealthy and politically significant, and, on the other, a nobility whose position in society was being challenged by the former group[124]. This social conflict was also reflected in the clash of Protestant and courtly codes, and in that of profit and pleasure. Additionally, Spenser located at the centre of *The Shepheardes Calendar* (1579) an argument over poetry, and in *The Faerie Queene* (1596) he attempted to defend poetry by showing instances of the right and

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[120] (Bronowski 1939, 39)
[121] (Weiner 1978, 40)
[122] (Herman 1996, 20; Matz 2000)
[123] (Matz 2000, 25)
[124] "He could write for these two groups because he lived their opposition", since his father "was at the center of the economic and administrative transformations of the early sixteenth century" (Matz 2000, 25).

wrong uses of it. However, by doing so he instead achieved a demonstration of the difficulty in separating both sorts, particularly throughout the final book. Moreover, although Spenser does not forget the pleasant side of poetry, he nonetheless shows a tendency toward discipline, and so it seems that Spenser defined his poetry more in terms of Protestant-humanist restraint and industry[125]. A similar tension is found in the works of John Donne, who despite being ordained a priest, did not criticize poetry but rather defended it in some of his sermons by stressing its ethical power. Moreover, Donne often referred to the divinely inspired Scriptural poetry which, of course, escapes perversion. Indeed, even though Donne was aware of the risks of the uses of poetry, he believed that, ultimately, good poetry was connected with Scripture by its purpose, and that, like preaching, poetry was also a way of teaching[126].

Thomas Moffett is another representative of antipoetic sentiment in Sidney's time. Moffett was a physician, a friend of the Sidney family, and the tutor of William Herbert, Sir Philip Sidney's nephew. In 1594 he finished a biography of Sir Philip Sidney, *Nobilis or A View of the Life and Death of a Sidney*, intended for the latter's nephew, to whom he wished to present Sir Philip Sidney as a perfect model to follow, even in his attitude towards Protestant faith. In order to meet this end, Thomas Moffett omitted or altered any fact that could blemish Sidney's political-religious reputation, including the chronology of his literary career. This indicates that Moffett considered poetry and fiction a stain in Sidney's idealized portrayal as a political figure and a flawless representative of Protestantism[127].

John Harington's *Orlando furioso in English heroical verse* (1591) also deals with the anti-poetic sentiment at the end of the sixteenth century. To his book Harington adds

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[125] (Matz 2000, 110)

[126] For more on John Donne's defence of poetry, see Lynette McGrath's article "John Donne's Apology for Poetry", *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 20, No.1 (1980): 73-89.

[127] Sidney's reputation as an exponent of English Protestantism is shown, for instance, in the dedicatory letter to Sidney that accompanied the translation of Philips van Marnix's Protestant work *The Beehive of the Romish Church* (1579). In the letter, written by the publisher John Stell, Sidney's disposition was praised as "so vertuous, as that you are a mirror among men, & your course of life so praiseworthye as that you may be well thought a blossome of true Nobility: your worshipfull minde also being beautified & enriched with such rare ornaments, as that you among the rest, glister like a star" (Marnix 1636, *4-*5).

a section entitled "A briefe and summarie allegorie of Orlando Furioso not unpleasant nor unprofitable for those that have read the former Poeme". In it, Harington reproduces the attacks against poetry on the part of a religious man whose name is left unsaid:

> *the torments of* Arrius Sabellinus, *and other wicked heretikes, are continually augmented by the numbers of them, who from time to time are corrupted with their sedicious and pestilent writings*; If it had stayed ther, it would never have troubled me, but immediatly followes, *The like they hold of dissolute Poets, and other loose writers, which have lest behind them lasciuious, wanton, and carnall deuises, as also of negligent parents, masters, teachers, & c.*[128]

Harington confesses that these words worked as a "cooling card" to him, since "this was not a malicious taunt of a wry-looking *Zoylus*, but a grave reprehension, and commination of a deuout and deuine writer"[129]. Due to this diatribe, Harington decides to dwell largely on the "Allegorie" that runs all throughout his work in order to demonstrate to his readers the moral benefits derived from reading the story. Harington makes it clear that his goals do not include defending poetry in general, defining the nature of poetry or the job of the poets, or assessing the writings of previous authors. For this, Harington says readers can check either *The Arte of English Poesie* or Sidney's *Defence*[130]. Following this, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the persistent anti-poetic sentiment overtly manifests itself in writings such as John Melton's *A Sixe-folde Politician* (1609), which states that poets' "conceits are likest Tobacco of any thing: for as that is quickly kindled, makes a stinking smoake, & quickly goes out, but leaues an inhering stinke in the nostrils and stomackes of the takers, not to be drawne out, but by putting in a worse sauour, as of Onions and Garlick"[131]. Years later, Thomas Gainsford affirmed in *The Rich Cabinet* (1616) that poetry "is a mere excrement of an

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[128] (Harington 1591, Mm2ʳ)
[129] (Harington 1591, Mm2ʳ)
[130] Peter Herman believes that "Much of Harington's argument against poetry's enemies, despite his dismissive attitude towards them, is either cribbed from Sidney (with all the contradictions) or is deeply ludic, such as his attempted equation between the *Aeneid* and the *Orlando*" (Herman 1996, 21). Indeed, although Harington's *A Brief Apology for Poetry* was published four years prior to Sidney's *Defence*, Sidney's work had been written around 1583, and circulated in manuscript form for a couple of years before being printed. This explains how Harington knew it and was influenced by it when writing his own *Apology*.
[131] (Melton 1609, D2ʳ)

idle frency, a drunken fury, a scorne of wise men, a popular iollitie, a common may-game, a storehouse for balladmongers, an Inne for rimers, and an idle and vnprofitable pastime"[132], and that "Players, Poets, and Parasites doe now in a manner ioyne hands, and as Lucifer fell from heauen through pride: these haue fallen from credit through folly", being "as odious, as filthy pictures are offensiue to modest eyes"[133].

3.6.2. Defences of Poetry

Before this increasingly adverse climate towards poetry, it was poets, playwrights, translators, and several other men related in some way to what is today called literature who set out to defend the best they could the right of authors to feign, imaginative writing in general, fiction and poetry. Poetry in the Renaissance was still mainly valued as the handmaid of philosophy and considered worthy because of its connection to theology; of course this typically medieval allegorical interpretation of literature solved the charge of immorality of poetry at the expense of its connection to ethics and its loss of independent value[134]. The allegorical side of poetry was also used to defend it against charges of triviality, lying, and immorality by asserting that poetry revealed some concealed truth, had a connection to history or theology, and either set examples of virtue or attempted to dissuade from vice through negative exemplarity. To Platonic objections, Renaissance theorists replied that Plato himself had asserted that good poets were divinely inspired, and that therefore it was contradictory that the result of their activity was immoral or false. Later, drawing on Aristotle, Renaissance defenders of poetry attempted to present the mimetic character of poetry in a positive light, and in this regard Neoplatonism put forward that poets directly imitated divine ideas by

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[132] (Gainsford 1616, P8ʳ-Q1ᵛ)

[133] (Gainsford 1616, Q5ᵛ)

[134] The allegorical character of poetry was present in works by "Wilson, Ascham, and Lodge, Nashe, Harington, and Chapman; and in a modified form it was later on submitted by Reynolds" (Atkins 1947, 349). M. H. Abrams calls "pragmatic theory" the type of criticism that looks at the work of art "as a means to an end, an instrument for getting something done, and tends to judge its value according to its success in achieving that aim" (Abrams 1976, 15).

elevating themselves over the sensible and material world to the truer realm of the divine. For Neoplatonism, therefore, both art and nature equally copied the same original, and so, it was quite possible that the products of art should sometimes excel nature[135]. Finally, poetry was frequently defended in the English Renaissance through the Horacian doctrine of its ability to teach and delight –although even from the times of Horace, making poetry fulfil both aims had been problematic and somewhat contradictory in terms of the profile of the addressed audiences: for example, while Horace associated moral profit with Roman elders, he linked pleasure with the young members of the Roman aristocracy. Curiously enough, the first defences of poetry in England are contained in works dealing with rhetorical teachings rather than with specifically poetical matters. Certainly, it would not be until the decade of the 1570s that works written with the sole purpose of defending poetry made an appearance.

3.6.2.1. Defences of Poetry in Books on Rhetoric

Many works on rhetoric supported and defended poetry because they perceived it as a sister art from which the orator could benefit. Stephen Hawes's *The historie of Graunde Amoure and La Bell Pucel, called The passetyme of pleasure* (1509) dedicates an entire chapter to the discussion of the first part of rhetoric, invention, which he then accompanies with a "commendation of Poetes" –this of course shows the strong link between rhetoric and poetics, particularly when it comes to invention. Hawes dwells on the popular criticism against poetry and defends the task of poets by pointing out the utter ignorance of those who criticize them:

> For now the people, whiche is dull and rude
> If that they do reade, a fatall scripture
> And can not moralise, the similitude
> Whiche to their wittes, is so harde and obscure
> Then will they saye, that it is sene in ure

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[135] The Neoplatonic response is found in works such as the *Furioso*, the *Liberata*, the *Arcadia*, or the *Faerie Queene*.

> That nought do poetes, but depaynt and lye
> Deceiuyng them, by tongues of flattery.[136]

In other words, ignorant people criticise poetry ("fables") because they are unable to understand it or extract from it all the moral teachings it contains. Sir Thomas Elyot in *The boke named the governour* (1531) says regarding this that in the same way that "there maye no man be an excellent Poete, nor oratour, unlesse he haue parte of all other doctrine, specially of noble philosophy", "no man can apprehende the very delectation, that is in the lesson of noble poetes, vnlesse he haue redde very moche, and in dyuers autours of dyuers lernynges"[137]. Indeed, Sir Thomas Elyot extensively defended the labour of poets, whom he differentiated from mere versifiers, that is, mediocre authors writing in verse. In this way, Elyot reserved the name of poets for superior writers who communicated relevant teachings often with philosophical overtones:

> they that make verses, expressynge thereby none other lernynge, but the crafte of versifienge, be not of auncient writers named poetes, but only called versifyers. For *the name of a Poete (wherat nowe, specially in this realme, men haue suche indignation, that they vse only poetes and poetry in the contempte of eloquence) was in auncient tyme in highe estymation: in so moche that all wysedome was supposed to be therin included. And poetry was the first philosophy that ever was knowen*, whereby men from theyr chyldehode were brought to the reason, how to liue wel, lernynge thereby not onely maners and naturall affections, but also the wounderful warkes of nature, myxtyng serious mater with thynges that were pleasaunt ...
> (...)
> But sens we be nowe occupied in the defence of Poetes, it shall not be incongruent to our matter, *to shewe what profytte maye be taken by the dyligente redynge of auncient poetes: contrary to the false opinion that nowe rayneth, of them that suppose, that in the warkes of poetes is conteyned nothynge but baudry (such is their foule word of reproche) and vnprofytable leasynges....*[138]

Similarly, Thomas Wilson admits in *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553) that poets were learned men who spoke in a less open way, so that to understand the moral teachings encoded in their writings, one had to make an effort:

> *The Poetes were wise men*, and wished in harte the redresse of thinges, the whiche when for feare they durst not openly rebuke, thei didde in coloures paynte theim oute, and

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[136] (Hawes 1554, D3^v)
[137] (Elyot 1537, G2^v)
[138] (Elyot 1537, F7^v-F7^r)

> tolde menne by shadowes what they shoulde do in good south: or els *because the wycked were unworthy to heare the truth, they spake so, that none myght understande, but those unto whom they pleased to utter their meaninge, and knewe them to be menne of honeste conversation.*[139]

In fact, Wilson goes as far as to state that "undoubtedly there is no one tale emonge al the Poetes, but under the same is comprehended some thinge that perteyneth eyther to the amendemente of maners, to the knowledge of trueth, to the settynge forthe of Natures woorcke, or elles to the understandinge of some notable thynge done"[140]. For this reason, Wilson believes that the orator can take advantage of the works of the poets and use the poets' compositions in rhetorical orations to persuade the audience; that is, for Wilson, orators can legitimately appropriate poetry for the purposes of rhetorical persuasion. Similarly, Richard Rainolde in *A booke called the foundacion of rhetorike* (1563) states that "Poetes firste inuented fables" (a fable being "a forged tale, cōtaining in it by the colour of a lie, a matter of truthe"[141], "goodlie admonicion" and "vertuous preceptes of life"[142]) and that "Oratours doe applie theim to their vse" too[143].

3.6.2.2. Defences of Poetry in Works on Poetics

Gregory Smith remarks that the earliest and deepest reflections upon poetry in the English Renaissance were actually defences of the art against the vigorous criticism of the Puritans[144]. Richard Willis's *De re poetica disputatio* (1573), appended to Willis's *Poematum Liber* and highly influenced by Platonic views on poetry, was the first formal defence of poetry to appear in England. *De re poetica disputatio* was a collection of Latin poems written for Winchester scholars and published sometime between November 12, 1573 and March 25, 1573/4. The work consists of three parts: the first

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[139] (Wilson 1982, 388-389)
[140] (Wilson 1982, 388)
[141] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. iii^v)
[142] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. iii^r)
[143] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. iii^r)
[144] These defences, according to Smith (1904, Vol. I, xv-xvii), could employ two basic arguments: first, a historical one for which poetry "is of hoary antiquity, is found with all peoples, and has enjoyed the favour of the greatest"; and, secondly, an argument that exploited the excellence of poetry's nature, its moral force and artistic pleasure (Smith 1904, Vol. I, xxi).

one deals with the origins of poetry; the second one with the positive qualities of poetry (excellence, usefulness and delight), and the third, with a response to some objections to poetry on the grounds of its supposed worthlessness, its appeal to the senses, and its potentially dangerous effects. To this negative side of poetry pertain claims of lusty love poetry, fictitious and false poetry, poetry's relation to performances on stage, inspiration and madness (therefore poetry's separation from reason), and all Platonic claims against the art. Willis affirms that the function of the poet is both to imitate what exists as well as "to feign what does not exist"[145] and that "the poets' feigning of things should not be turned into a fault; just as it is not considered shameful for mathematicians to imagine in the sky so many circles which do not exist. (…) And whatever poets feign, at least they do so in such a way that they teach what is profitable and what is not"[146]. Although Willis's work had limited influence, it nonetheless provides a good overview of the way poetry was seen in England at the time. A. D. S. Fowler has remarked that *De re poetica* takes the form of a classical judicial oration to discuss and respond to the charges traditionally aimed at poetry[147], and that much of the material used by Willis comes from either Scaliger's *Poetices* (1561) and, in the case of the calumnies against poetry, from Vives's *De causis corruptarum artium* Book II[148].

Along with Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poëseos* (*c.* 1572), Wills's *De re poetica disputatio* is one of the few essays on poetry of sixteenth-century England to be written in Latin, as most of them were in English. In fact, J. W. Binns (1990, 1999) identifies just four formal Latin treatises on poetry printed in England in the period up to 1640: Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poëseos* (*c.* 1572), Richard Wills's *De re poetica* (1573), Alberico Gentili's *Commentatio ad l[egem] III C[odicis] de*

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[145] (Wills 1958, 121). In Latin: "Poetae non solum est ea fingere quae non sunt, sed & illa quae sunt, imitari" (Wills 1958, 120).

[146] (Wills 1958, 121). In Latin: "effictio autem rerum poetis vitio verti non debet, sicut neq. mathematicis probro datur, quod in coelis tot effingant circulos, qui nusquam sint. (…) quae vero finxerunt poetae, eo fecerunt, vt alios quid vtile, quid non docerent" (Wills 1958, 120).

[147] (Fowler 1958, 21)

[148] (Wills 1958, 25). Atkins instead highlights that the ideas on poetry Willis's work displays are "based largely, as in medieval times, on patristic and post-classical teaching, on doctrines of Eusebius, Jerome, Cicero, Strabo, and others" (Atkins 1947, 110).

prof[essoribus] et med[icis] (*Commentary on the Third Law of the [title of the Justinian] Code on Teachers and Doctors*) (Oxford, 1593 and Hanau, 1604), and the second of Caleb Dalechamp's *Exercitationes duae* (London, 1624)[149]. To these four we should add English printings of two continental works, Buchler's *Phrasium poeticarum thesaurus* (first printed in England at London in 1624) with an appendix entitled "Reformata Poeseos Institutio", and the *Prolusiones academicae* of the Jesuit Famianus Strada (first printed in England at Oxford in 1631). Binns remarks that even if England did not have at the time a formal work on poetry written in Latin that could match Julius Caesar Scaliger's *Poetices* (1561), the treatises of Minturno, or the commentaries by Robortello and Maggi, the English Latin treatises on poetry offer instead "a clear formal statement of poetic theory as it was understood in the English universities"[150]. Certainly, Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poeseos* and Caleb Dalechamp's second *Exercitatio* of 1624 have in common that both were "first delivered as formal academic orations as part of the procedure for university graduation"[151]. For his part, Alberico Gentili was an Italian Protestant refugee appointed Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University in 1587 (a position he held until 1608) who delivered an earlier draft of his treatise at one of Oxford University's graduation ceremonies sometime between 1583 and February 1591/1592. Finally, Richard Willis's *De re poetica* addressed the pupils at

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[149] The theologian and opponent of stage-plays John Rainolds has been attributed the *Oratio in laudem artis poeticae* (*c*. 1572), a Latin speech in praise of poetry delivered at Oxford in the 1570s. The arguments in favour of poetry are based on its persuasive force to orient men towards good and knowledge. In reality, John Rainolds's work is chiefly a different version of Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poëseos*. As J. Binns demonstrates, "John Rainolds's *Oratio in laudem artis poeticae* and Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poëseos*, are in large part, sentence by sentence, the same work, though there are many differences of word order and phraseology, and certain sections of both works have no counterpart in the other" (Binns 1975, 205). J. Binns shows that the *Oratio in laudem artis poeticae* first appeared in print under John Rainolds's name a few years after his death and suggests that he may not even have written it himself. Indeed, Rainolds was an undergraduate at Corpus Christi, Oxford, and later "was incorporated M.A. on 14 July 1572, on the same day as Henry Dethick, who was also (…) very likely a member of Corpus Christi College. Herein, perhaps, lies an explanation of how the same treatise came to be linked to the two names. If Rainolds were a member of the audience which Dethick addressed, and was interested in the theme of Dethick's oration – which, given Rainolds's intellectual interests, is not unlikely – then it would be understandable if he at some time came by a manuscript of Dethick's oration. It is possible, for example, that Dethick submitted a draft of his *Oratio* to Rainolds for criticism, and that a manuscript copy was made for Rainolds's own use, which was later inadvertently passed off as Rainolds's work by the editor of his literary remains" (Binns 1975, 207).
[150] (Binns 1990, 141-142)
[151] (Binns 1990, 142)

Winchester College, although it remains uncertain whether it was ever delivered there[152].

In 1579 Thomas Lodge published *A defence of poetry, music and stage plays* as a means to contest the attacks of Gosson's *Schoole of Abuse*, which was, in Lodge's opinion, "fuller of wordes then judgement, the matter certainely as ridiculus as serius"[153]. To illustrate the generalized and powerful antipoetic sentiment of the time, it will suffice to say that Lodge's *Defence* faced the opposition of London's city fathers to its publication, since it was they who had commissioned Gosson's text. As a result, the only possible solution for Lodge was to distribute the book privately and anonymously one year later[154]. Lodge's aim was to make Gosson "ouer looke his Abuses againe", "so shall he see an ocean of inormities which begin in his first prinsiple in the disprayse of Poetry"[155], which for Lodge was "a heavenly gift, a perfit gift"[156]. The arguments Thomas Lodge employed to defend poetry were based on the esteem poetry enjoyed among some classical authorities, as well as among some medieval authors like Saint Augustine or Chaucer. Looking at praises of poetry by renowned authors of the past is a device also used by Sir Philip Sidney in the well-known final part of his *Defence* (1595):

> I conjure you all that have had the evil luck to read this ink-wasting toy of mine, even in the name of the Nine Muses, no more to scorn the sacred mysteries of Poesy, no more to laugh at the name of poets, as though they were next inheritors to fools, no more to jest at the reverent title of a rhymer; but to believe, *with Aristotle*, that they were the ancient treasurers of the Grecians' divinity; to believe, *with Bembus*, that they were the first bringers-in of all civility; to believe, *with Scaliger*, that no philosopher's precepts can sooner make you an honest man than the reading of Virgil; to believe, *with Clauserus*, the translator of Cornutus, that it pleased the heavenly Deity, by Hesiod and Homer, under the veil of fables, to give us all knowledge, Logic, Rhetoric, Philosophy natural and moral, and *quid non*?; to believe, *with me*, that there are many mysteries contained in Poetry, which of purpose were written darkly, lest by profane wits it should be abused; to believe, *with Landino*, that they are so beloved of the gods that

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[152] Indeed, it is no coincidence that both Willis and Dethick had been pupils at Winchester College (run by Christopher Jonson from 1560 to 1571), since at the time it was one of the main centers fostering an interest in poetic theory (Binns 1990, 149).
[153] (Lodge 1853, 3)
[154] (Herman 1996, 22)
[155] (Lodge 1853, 3)
[156] (Lodge 1853, 14)

whatsoever they write proceeds of a divine fury; lastly, to believe themselves, when they tell you they will make you immortal by their verses.[157]

When Sir Philip Sidney's contemporaries, to shield their own anti-poetic sentiment, took the arguments of famous authors of the past who did not particularly recommend poetic activity (namely Plato), Sidney counter argued in extracts such as the following:

> Plato found fault that the poets of his time filled the world with wrong opinions of the gods, making light tales of that unspotted essence, and therefore would not have the youth depraved with such opinions. Herein may much be said; let this suffice: *the poets did not induce such opinions, but did imitate those opinions already induced*. For all the Greek stories can well testify that the very religion of that time stood upon many and many-fashioned gods, not taught so by the poets, but followed according to their nature of imitation.[158]

Another argument traditionally employed by the defenders of poetry is the claim that poetry is as old as civilization itself. Sidney too uses it when he states in his *Defence* that "no memory is so ancient that hath the precedence of Poetry"[159]. Similarly, George Puttenham links the origins of poetry to the formation of human communities:

> The profession and vse of Poesie is most ancient from the beginning, and not as manie erroniously suppose, after, but before any ciuil society was among men. For it is written, that Poesie was th'originall cause and occasion of their first assemblies.[160]

Since Puttenham claims that poetry was the direct cause of the first human gatherings, it is no surprise that the chapter to which the previous extract belongs is entitled "How Poets were the first priests, the first prophets, the first Legislators and politicians in the world". The title in itself becomes, thus, a declaration of George Puttenham's principles, which revolve around the conviction that "It can not bee therefore that anie scorne or indignitie should iustly be offred to so noble, profitable, ancient and diuine a science as Poesie is"[161].

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[157] (Sidney 2002, 116)
[158] (Sidney 2002, 107)
[159] (Sidney 2002, 105)
[160] (Puttenham 1970, 6)
[161] (Puttenham 1970, 9)

Sixteenth-century defences of poetry necessarily had to address the accusation of immorality too. In so doing, poets presented poetry as a type of literature that fostered virtue and that not only promoted delight (*delectare*), but also useful teachings (*docere*). In this way they fought against the idea that poetry was superficial and morally perverse. For example, Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poëseos* (*c*. 1572) describes the benefits derived from poetry both in moral as well as didactic terms:

> O inexplicable power of Poetry, O power never sufficiently praised! O most distinguished of all things that have ever existed on the earth, and most worthy of admiration! Poetry, poetry is the goddess who bestows immortality upon mortals, and all who enjoy her embraces lead a life that is eternal. *Poetry calls to the contemplation of sublimer things inexperienced young men who are swift in pursuing the dangerous food of pleasure and the objects of desire. Poetry lifts up to a knowledge of higher things men's minds, which are most fouled by the mire of earthly uncleannesses. Poetry promises things more exalted than the nature of man can succeed in embracing, better than impiety ought to desire, greater than infirmity can dare to hope for.*[162]

Furthermore, Dethick goes on to depict poetry as a heavenly gift bearing its ultimate task of civilizing humankind:

> To this is added the fact that the art of poetry left its heavenly abode and migrated to the earth, *not to bestow any contemptible blessing on men, but in order to lead them from gross ignorance to learning, from civil strife to friendship, from extreme shamefulness to honor, from barbarous savageness to civilization*. I do not understand what greater gift than that can be bestowed by anyone.[163]

Later in the century, John Harington in his *Orlando furioso* (1591) says the following respecting the connection between poetry and virtue:

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[162] (Binns 1999, 37). In Latin: "O inexplicabilem Poetriae facultatem, O nunquam satis laudatam potentiam. O rerum omnium quae in terris unquam extiterunt longe praeclarissimam, et admiratione dignissimam. Haec, haec est illa dea, quae mortalibus immortalitatem parit, cuius amplexibus quicunque perfruuntur, vitam in omni aeternitate traducunt. Haec imperitos adolescentes ad insidiosas voluptatum escas, et blandimenta praecipitantes, ad sublimiora quaedam contemplanda revocat, haec hominum mentes terrestrium sordium caeno foedissimas, ad rerum coelestium cognitionem extollit, haec altiora, quam hominis ingenium valeat complecti, meliora quam impietas debeat optare, maiora, quam infirmitas audeat sperare pollicetur" (Binns 1999, 36).

[163] (Binns 1999, 45). In Latin: "Huc accedit, quod ars poetica aethereis sedibus relictis, in terras dimigravit, non ut aliquot contemnendo beneficio hominess afficeret, sed ut a crassa ignorantia, ad literas: ab intestinis dissidiis, ad amicitiam: ab extrema turpitudine, ad honestatem: a barbara feritate, ad humanitatem traduceret. Quo quid ab ullo tribui posit amplius non intelligo" (Binns 1999, 44).

> to speake after the phrase of the common sort, that terme all that is written in verse Poetrie, and rather in scorne then in praise, bestow the name of a Poet, on euerie base rymer and balladmaker, this I say of it, and I thinke I say truly, that *there are many good lessons to be learned out of it, many good examples to be found in it, many good vses to be had of it, & that therfore it is not, nor ought not to be despised by the wiser sort, but so to be studied and imployed*, as was intended by the first writers & deuisers thereof, which is to *soften and polish the hard and rough dispositions of men, and make them capable of vertue and good discipline*.[164]

Then, Thomas Nash, who in *Pierce Penilesse* (1592) defines poetry as "the hunny of all flowers, the quintessence of all Scyences, the Marrowe of Witte, and the very Phrase of Angels"[165], also employs the argument of the moral profits derived from poetry extending to the entire nation as part of his defence of the art:

> To them that demaund what fruites the Poets of our time bring forth, or wherein they are able to approue themselues necessarie to the state. Thus I answere. *First and formost, they haue cleansed our language from barbarisme, and made the vulgar sort here in London (which is the fountaine whose riuers flowe round about England) to aspire to a richer puritie of speach*, than is communicated with the Comminaltie of anie Nation vnder heauen. *The vertuous by their praises they encourage to be more vertuous; to vicious men they are as infernall hags to haunt their ghosts with eternall infamie after death*. The Souldiour in hope to haue his high deedes celebrated by their pens, despiseth a whole Armie of perills, and acteth wonders exceeding all humane coniecture. Those that care neither for God nor the diuell, by their quills are kept in awe.[166]

In other words, Nash underlines the ability poetry had to improve the vernacular and elevate it to a superior status, which in its turn favored the image of the entire country itself. Additionally, he argues that since poetry encourages virtue and denounces vice, celebrated figures hope for the recognition of their good deeds in immortal poems, while despicable men dread the power that those same poems have for perpetuating their bad reputations. Alberico Gentili's *Commentatio* (1593), cast in the form of a legal treatise, wonders why grammarians, logicians, painters, and rhetoricians enjoyed what he calls "immunity" and privileges under the law while that same immunity was denied to poets. His investigation into this matter is accompanied by a defence of poetry and poets in moral terms, affirming that poetry raises better citizens:

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[164] (Harington 1591, ¶3ʳ)
[165] (Nash 1592, F2r)
[166] (Nash 1592, F2ᵛ)

> If philosophers have immunities, why not *poets, who are the philosophers most especially suitable for the instruction of the state? For poetry, like rhetoric, is an instrument of active civil philosophy. For through poets and poems it makes the morals of the citizens good.* And just as rhetoric fulfils this function with words through orators, so does poetry through poets with invented deeds and fictitious actions.[167]

After giving much thought to this matter, Gentili concludes that "poets enjoy no prerogative of immunity (...) because immunities are only granted to teachers of the arts, and not to others: and so poets have no more prerogative and privilege than anyone else". Furthermore, for Gentili it appears "that immunities were granted to teachers of the art of poetry, no less than to rhetors and other teachers of the liberal arts, even though they were not granted to the poets themselves"[168].

Sir Philip Sidney also denies that poetry is based on lies in his *Defence*, where he states that "of all writers under the sun, the poet is the least liar"[169], and that "the ever-praiseworthy Poesy is full of virtue-breeding delightfulness, and void of no gift that ought to be in the noble name of learning"[170]. Furthermore, Sidney distinguishes a "first and most noble sort" of poets whom he calls "vates" who "do merely make to imitate, and imitate both to delight and teach". Sidney elaborates on this idea by saying that they

> *delight to move men to take that goodness in hand*, which without delight they would fly as from a stranger, *and teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved*: which being the noblest scope to which ever any learning was directed, yet want there not idle tongues to bark at them.[171]

On these grounds, the poet appears as more efficient than the historian, and Sidney states that "the best of the historian is subject to the poet; for whatsoever action, or faction, whatsoever counsel, policy, or war stratagem the historian is bound to recite,

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[167] (Binns 1999, 91). In Latin: "Si philosophis sunt immunitates, cur non et poetis, qui philosophi sunt instituendae civitati maxime idonei ? Est poetica, quemadmodum rhetorica, instrumentum activae philosophiae civilis : nam per poetas, et poemata mores civium bonos facit. Et sicut verbis per oratores hoc praestat rhetorica: ita poetica per poetas factis fictis et fictis actionibus" (Binns 1999, 90).

[168] (Binns 1999, 117). In Latin: "At age, ostendamus tandem, cur poetae nulla immunitatis praerogativa fruantur. Dicimus, id esse, quia artium doctoribus tantum datae immunitates sunt, non aliis. Igitur nec poetis ulla supra alios praerogativa, et privilegium sit. (...) Et itaque hoc conficio, tributas immunitates esse etiam praeceptoribus artis poeticae, non minus quam rhetoribus, et reliquis liberalium artium doctoribus : etsi ipsis poetis tributae non sint" (Binns 1999, 116).

[169] (Sidney 2002, 103)

[170] (Sidney 2002, 116)

[171] (Sidney 2002, 87)

that may the poet (if he list) with his imitation make his own, beautifying it both for further teaching, and more delighting, as it pleaseth him"[172]. Thus, according to Sidney, poetry aims both to teach and delight the audience: poetry imitates to please, and pleases in order to teach better, and the poet's abilities to teach and delight are superior to any other man's. To achieve this double end, poets imitate only what may and should be. *Imitatio* becomes a double-edged instrument: if employed rightly, it is a powerful force for good and virtue; but it may present risks and lead to error. Definitely, Sidney was aware that, unlike poetry in Scriptures, the poetry composed by man was fallible and prone to error[173]. Still, poetry's main value lay in its capacity to rectify man's fallen will and orient it towards God –which is why Sidney held the Psalms in such a high position, since their immediacy to convey desire for divine presence embodied poetry's purest aspiration[174].

Julius Caesar Scaliger was one of the sources of Sidney's *Defence* in terms of terminology, conceptual categories, and ideas about poetics. Like Sidney, Scaliger replied to the charges against poetry, both in his famous *Poetices Libri Septem* as well as in his defence *Contra Poetices Calumniatores Declamatio* (*Against the Slanderers of Poetry*), "buried in the seldom read edition of his letters and orations first published in 1600, forty-two years after his death"[175]. Scaliger categorized philosophers, orators, historians, and poets according to the degree of precision in their employment of words. Philosophers come first, being the most precise; orators follow them, and then come historians and poets. For Scaliger the main difference between the poet and the historian is that poets imitate both actual and fictitious events, and that poetry's end is to instruct in pleasurable form. Scaliger's defence of poetry in his *Contra Poetices Calumniatores*

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[172] (Sidney 2002, 93)

[173] According to Nandra Perry, this partly stems from the complex relation between language and desire, for although misdirected desire "can render language opaque", "properly oriented desire can convert it into a vehicle of divine presence" (Perry 2005, 394).

[174] Mary and Sir Philip Sidney indeed translated the Psalms into English. For more on Renaissance defences of poetry in general, and Sir Philip Sidney's in particular, see Margaret W. Ferguson, *Trials of Desire: Renaissance Defenses of Poetry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), which also focuses on Joachim du Bellay and Torquato Tasso.

[175] (Hall Jr. 1948, 1125)

Declamatio, apart from counter-arguing Plato's attacks, defends poetry by, like Sidney

after him, relating it to God:

> As to eulogizing poetry, I have neither sufficient space nor eloquence. Now if the most ancient things are the most noble -as, for example, certain first beginnings and foundations of things to come in the bosom of nature- music came before prose. For breathing and singing are of this class and are a kind of poetry; that is the very foundation of our life. If the most gentle and soothing things are the most noble, what are worries but inducements to death? These worries are banished by poetry. If the wisest things are the most noble, the order of the heavens or of the universe and the things which are therein is nothing else than an appropriate harmony. Nor, if you wish, do you work less with rhetorical ornaments in prose. (...) if you should eliminate those ornaments which are used in the worship of God most high, you would eliminate God himself. These are all poetic ornaments. If you do not accept my thesis, you will have to eliminate the stories from the Bible.[176]

Of course, there are other arguments for poetry in the face of criticism. John

Harington, for instance, discusses the particular attack against poetry by Cornelius

Agrippa, whose *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque excellentia*

verbi Dei declamatio (*On the Uncertainty and Vanity of the Arts and Sciences*), written

between 1527 and 1528, and published in Antwerp in 1531, constitutes another of the

foundational texts against the literary art. The book satirizes the pretensions of the

learned disciplines and various superstitions that had attached themselves to Christianity

during its history. Because of its highly ironic nature, the seriousness of its attacks on

specific professions, doctrines, and practices has been questioned by some scholars[177].

Agrippa attacks poetry in the following terms:

> An Art invented to no other purpose, but with lascivious Rhymes, measure of Syllables, and the gingling noise of fine words, to allure and charm the Ears of men addicted to folly; and furthermore, with the pleasing inticements of Fables, and mistakes of feigned Stories, to insnare and deceive the mind. Therefore hath she deserv'd no other title, than to be the female Architect of falshood, and the preserver of idle and fond Opinions. And though we may pardon so much of her as countenances Madness, Drunkenness, Impudence, and Boldness; yet who can bear with patience her undaunted Confidence in maintaining Lyes? For what corner of the Earth hath she not fill'd with her hair-brain'd Trifles and idle Fables![178]

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[176] (Hall Jr. 1948, 1130)
[177] See (Rebhorn 2000, 76), for instance.
[178] (Agrippa 1694, C3ʳ)

John Harington replies to Agricola's charges of poetic deception, falsehood, irrationality, madness, and vice, with these words:

> *Cornelius Agrippa*, a man of learning & authoritie not to be despised, maketh a bitter inuective against Poets and Poesie, and the summe of his reproofe of it is this (which is al that can with any probability be said against it:) That it is a nurse of lies, a pleaser of fooles, a breeder of dangerous errors, and an inticer to wantonnes. I might here warne those that wil vrge this mans authoritie to the disgrace of Poetrie, to take heed (of what calling so euer they be) least with the same weapon that they thinke to giue Poetrie a blow, they give themselves a maime. For *Agrippa* taketh his pleasure of greater matters then Poetrie; I marvel how he durst do it, saue that I see he hath done it, he hath spared neither mysters nor scepters. The courts of Princes where vertue is rewarded, iustice maintained, oppressions relieued, he clas them a Colledge of Giants, of Tyrants, of oppressors, warriors: the most noble sort of noble men, he termeth cursed, bloodie, wicked, and sacrilegious persons. Noble men (and vs poore Gentlemen) that thinke to borrow praise of our auncestors deserts and good fame, he affirmeth to be a race of the sturdier sort of knaues, and lycencious liuers.[179]

As can be seen, Harington replies to Agrippa's objections to poetry by discrediting all his criticism in general.

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[179] (Harington 1591, ¶4^v)

4

Imitation up to and through the Sixteenth Century

The present chapter follows the evolution of the understanding of imitation from Antiquity through the sixteenth century, focusing, in Ancient Greece, on the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to this matter; in Latinity, on Cicero's, Quintilian's, Horace's, Seneca's and Plotinus's ideas; and in the Renaissance, upon the opinion of Italian and French critics, before proceeding to discuss the understanding of imitation of English men of letters. In this manner, the debate between Ciceronians versus eclectics will be discussed, as well as the moderate stand of the English in this subject, in accordance with the mentality of the Reformation. Slavish imitation is rejected time and again, as are the conscious concealment of one's sources of imitation and practices such as plagiarism. Sidney as well as Shakespeare will both receive special attention, as they raise the question of the connection between art and nature, and the hierarchical relationship that exists between both. It will be made manifest that throughout this centuries-long discussion about imitation (both in a rhetorical as well as in a poetical context), the concept of invention constantly appears either explicitly or implicitly, the general assumption being that even if imitation of the models and past authors is necessary to maintain tradition, to gain experience, to train one's natural talents, and to have a model to surpass, imitation alone is not sufficient, and no remarkable author was ever content with being a mere imitator but always attempted to stand out by doing something different that obeyed his particular talents or tastes.

4.1. Modes or Types of Imitation

From Classical Antiquity to the end of the eighteenth century, imitation remained a key word in the critical vocabulary of art, and definitions of art would typically include imitation or closely related terms such as 'representation', 'feigning', 'counterfeiting', 'image' or 'copy'. Indeed, imitation was such a central element in literary production and criticism that it has even been asserted that "To quote all that was said in praise of imitation would exhaust rather than inform"[1]. In Antiquity, the term imitation or *mimesis* was used by a variety of authors implying different meanings, since it could refer to, for example, "imitation of men in action, imitation of ideal truth, imitation of appearances, true or false, in a phenomenal world", or a rhetorical exercise concerned not with the topic or the subject matter of a speaker or a writer, but with his manner of going about it[2]. Harold Ogden White distinguishes three basic attitudes in classical times towards composition: first, the centrality of imitation; second, the idea that "fabrication is dangerous"; and thirdly, that subject-matter is *publica materies*, common property[3]. Of the three, White states that "independent fabrication" is less central than the other two in classical theory, although authors such as Horace allude to it when advising young authors to dwell on widely known subjects rather than treating "a theme unknown and unsung"[4]. Similarly, Isocrates in *Panegyricus* X states the following:

> And it is my opinion that the study of oratory as well as the other arts would make the greatest advance if we should admire and honour, not those who make the first beginnings in their crafts, but those who are the most finished craftsmen in each, and *not those who seek to speak on subjects on which no one has spoken before, but those who know how to speak as no one else could*.[5]

Of course, it is indisputable that it is far easier to follow an already extant path than to create a new one, and so, "fabrication" indeed appears "dangerous" in the sense that

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[1] (Clark 1951b, 13)
[2] (Clark 1951b, 11)
[3] (White 1973, 6)
[4] (Horace 1978, 461)
[5] (Isocrates 1966, 125)

it is easier for the writer to make mistakes or to prove unsuccessful in his writings if his subject matter or his approach to it diverges from the trodden path. However, the centrality of the theory of imitation in Classical times does not exclude that, in classical literary practice, imitation and borrowing are constantly denounced if they fall into piracy or secretive and servile imitation. In other words, the undeniable relevance of imitation does not legitimize all forms of imitation, as, for example, concealing the models to which one is indebted is simply not approved. In reality, the ideal form of imitation results from combining appropriate old material with the new, and expressing the blend in such a novel and personal manner that the new treatment improves the previously existing topic[6]. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, *imitatio* disappeared from general favour as a key literary concept, for it was then outshone by the glittering Romantic notion of originality, understood in opposition to imitation[7].

In Antiquity, the term 'mimesis' could have three different connotations depending on the ideological background of the author that employed it. Certainly, 'mimesis' could be understood within the Platonic doctrine of imitation as an image-making faculty that copies an ideal and true realm in the sensible world; also, it could be conceived within the Aristotelian framework as the copying of human actions, or within the rhetorical context as copying or emulating models[8]. It is furthermore possible to distinguish different classes of imitation according to the imitative model or to the type of relation of likeness established between the model and the copy; that is, the dynamics between the imitated object and the product that results from the process of imitation. With this criterion in mind, the scholar John Muckelbauer has distinguished three

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[6] (White 1973, 8). Thus, "Roman writers regarded a Latin adaptation from the Greek as a new work, whether the adaptation was of material, of form, or of both, and the first adapter of any type of literature claimed honors more or less equivalent to those awarded its 'inventor'" (White 1973, 12).

[7] Scholars such as Mihai Spariosu have nonetheless suggested that the opposition to imitation in Romanticism has been simplified, and that Romanticism, far from abandoning imitation as an element of literary composition, redefined it: "while openly rejecting *mimesis* (in the sense of imitation), expressive or romantic theories are secretly controlled by it" (Spariosu 1984, xviii).

[8] John Muckelbauer in this respect observes that "The imitation of an ideal world by the actual world became the province of ancient philosophy; the imitation of the actual world by a poet or actor became the concern of ancient literature; and the imitation of a renowned orator or teacher by a student became the terrain of ancient rhetoric" (Muckelbauer 2003, 65).

modes or movements of imitation. Firstly, there is the movement of the "repetition-of-the-same" or reproduction, which attempts an absolutely faithful and exact replica of the model. Thus, the relation between model and copy is "one of exact duplication with no alteration", hence producing a fundamentally conservative imitation often opposed to invention[9]. In Antiquity, this type of imitation appears most obviously in the training of students who follow the style in writing of previous models through the practice of copying, memorizing and translating. Variation appears in this system by the natural and particular differences among the students, by the variety of the models that suited each student's own particular tendencies, and the distinctive and miscellaneous result of the students' imitation, which blended and distorted tradition in a unique way. In this context, novelty within "repetition-of-the-same or reproduction" arises from imitation itself. The second movement of imitation is "repetition-of-difference", which produces a type of variation external to the dynamics of imitation itself. It regards variation as a necessary outcome of imitative repetition and denies the possibility of identical reproduction of the model. Hence, for it, invention is a compulsory component of the process of imitation[10]. Finally, the third mode of imitation is "difference and repetition", or inspiration, in which identification of the relation of likeness between model and copy becomes problematic, and the distinction between imitation and invention, impossible.

Another categorization of different modes or types of imitation has been carried out by the scholar Thomas M. Greene, who distinguishes four different types of imitation according to the way each text faces history and its model. First, Greene talks about a "reproductive" or "sacramental" imitation which rehearses the model text liturgically,

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[9] (Muckelbauer 2003, 68). "In a more literary venue, a number of recent attempts to separate the term *mimesis* from its traditional translation as 'imitation' continue to align imitation with this reproductive movement. The current tenor, it seems, tends to prefer a literary sense of *mimesis* that is more concerned with variation than with mere repetition-of-the-same, and so these analyses attempt to draw a line between *mimesis* and imitation. Such attempts to dissociate the two terms is premised on the notion that imitation necessarily refers to this reproductive movement of repetition-of-the-same. As a result, several studies have attempted to recover a more creative sense of mimesis, one that they contrast with the rote, mechanical repetition of imitation" (Muckelbauer 2003, 73-74).

[10] According to Jonathan Bate, that "good imitation involves difference as well as similarity is a cardinal principle of Renaissance poetics" (Bate 2001, 87).

for the dignity of the model places it beyond alteration and criticism and elevates it almost to a sacred status. According to Greene, this sacramental type of imitation "could not in itself produce a large body of successful poetry", but instead "condemned the reproductive poet to a very elementary form of anachronism, since any reproduction must be made in a vocabulary that is unbecoming the original and whose violations remain out of artistic control"[11]. Thus, this quasi-religious reverence to the model only led to literal repetition and not to creative imitation.

A second type of imitation identified by Greene is the "eclectic" or "exploitative" imitation (what Renaissance rhetoricians termed *contaminatio*), which points at the echoes, allusions, phrases, and images included in one work but referring to another. It is characterized, when not employed wisely, by treating "all traditions as stockpiles to be drawn upon ostensibly at random"[12]. Thirdly, we find the "heuristic" type of imitations, which advertise "their derivation from the subtexts they carry with them, but having done that, they proceed to *distance themselves* from the subtexts and force us to recognize the poetic distance traversed"[13], thus confronting the dilemma of being modern but at the same time admitting dependency on predecessors. In this way, they overcome their dependence by acknowledging a type of "conditional independence"[14]. The last class of imitation, the "dialectical" imitation, grows out of the heuristic sort and does not make one text dependent on another but sees the relation as a kind of dialogue in which two epochs, civilizations, or *mundi significantes* participate. The text thus becomes "the locus of a struggle between two rhetorical or semiotic systems that are vulnerable to one another and whose conflict cannot easily be resolved"[15]. Parody hence becomes one of the boundaries of dialectical imitation.

Finally, some authors have distinguished between rhetorical and poetic imitation: if rhetoric deals with the general and fundamental principles of the art, some books on

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[11] (Greene 1982, 38)
[12] (Greene 1982, 39)
[13] (Greene 1982, 40)
[14] (Greene 1982, 41)
[15] (Greene 1982, 46)

poetry explain to a large extent poetry-writing in terms of imitation. For instance, the critic Elaine Fantham (1978b) believes that poetic imitation is more specific than rhetorical imitation, and that while the orator looks at reality or law to choose the subject matter of his oration, the poet typically extracts his subject matter from literary tradition. Moreover, poetic imitation seems more specific because production in poetry is dependent on a certain type of argument, specific diction and genre conventions. José Carlos Fernández Corte (1998) argues that rhetorical imitation is a common system of categories and therefore more general, whereas poetic imitation can only be textual. Certainly, this scholar uses the concept of text as a criterion to distinguish both types of imitation, and so differentiates between textual and non-textual imitation. Literary imitation is thus defined by a pragmatic consideration, as a conceived text deliberately presented as literature to which is attributed a status different from the one without textual existence.

4.2. Imitation in Ancient Greece

The Greeks lacked a word to express creative imagination and the poet was seen as producing "fabrication" rather than being an original creator[16]. Herodotus was the first to use, with reference to poetry, the name of the agent *poietés* and the verb *poiein*, but the idea of creation currently assumed in poetry was alien to them. The association of the creative element to *poiesis* and the assimilation of *poietés* to *creator* derive in fact from Jewish and Christian theological speculations[17]. Plato did not use the term 'imitation' with a fixed literal meaning, and he did not delimit it to a particular subject matter[18]. For him, since one of the meanings of imitation was the making of images, the imitator consequently became a maker of images who only knows of appearances, as

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[16] (Curtius 1979, 398)

[17] (Gil 1966, 14)

[18] Instead, "it is sometimes used to differentiate some human activities from others or some part of them from another part or some aspect of a single act from another; it is sometimes used in a broader sense to include all human activities; it is sometimes applied even more broadly to all processes –human, natural, cosmic, and divine" (McKeon 1936, 3).

opposed to the maker of realities who has knowledge of being. For Plato, truths in poetry are imitations of the Good; likewise, falsehoods are imitations of lies in the soul, of objects without any external existence. The problem with imitation is that it appeals to the faculty that is deceived by the illusions of sense, not to that which is able to rationally correct the variety of appearances. The imitative poet who aims to be popular is neither able nor willing to please the rational part of the soul, and his creations have an inferior degree of truth. In general terms, poetry feeds the passions instead of addressing reason, which constitutes the real problem for Plato regarding poetry, as that goes hand in hand with untruth and lack of knowledge. According to the scholar J. Tate, Plato distinguished two types of imitation, a good and a bad one. The good imitation is carried out by men of understanding, philosophers, and lovers of wisdom and beauty with a knowledge of the ideal realm and therefore the capacity to produce beautiful and harmonious works. For Plato, there was unfortunately no extant poetry that belonged to this class, but only the kind resulting from the sort of imitation to be condemned, which merely imitates the sensible world[19].

Aristotle's position towards *mimesis* in poetry can be summarized by the belief that poetry is a mimetic art whose object is human action, the portrayal of which involves representing *éthé*, that is, good and/or bad characters and manners. Whereas Plato distinguished a series of gradations of meaning in imitation, Aristotle restricted imitation to the single meaning of "works of human art"[20]. Another difference between the two Greek philosophers is that while Plato accused poetry of unreality, Aristotle distinguished between the real and the actual: hence, although the historian also uses

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[19] J. Tate calls the bad type of imitation "imitation in the literal sense", whereas he denominates the good type of imitation imitative "in an analogical sense" (Tate 1928, 23). In another article (Tate 1932), this critic proves that the distinction between good and bad poetry Plato made in the *Republic* is supported by all Platonic dialogues dealing with imitation. For more on the Platonic theory of poetry applied to the arts, see W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis; Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its Meaning to Us* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962).
[20] (McKeon 1936, 26)

images, these are restricted to facts, to narrating what has happened, while the poet deals with what may happen according to probability or necessity[21].

Mimesis had been used by Aristotle to refer to a natural faculty that facilitates man's learning process. For Aristotle, man is the most imitative of all beings, learning first by imitation and taking a natural delight in the contemplation of works of imitation. Imitation is the distinguishing element between the arts and nature, and art always imitates nature according to Aristotle; hence, for Aristotle the distinguishing mark of the poetic is not verse but *mimesis*. The poet is a poet by virtue of the imitative nature of his work. Poetry, therefore, is not a mere copy of life or pure phantasy, but a way to reveal the general and permanent characteristics of human thoughts and behaviours[22]. *Mimesis* does not posit a relation of copy-to-original, for it can present things as they are or as they appear or as they ought to be; in Aristotle's words: "Since the poet, like a painter or any other image-maker, is a mimetic artist, he must represent, in any instance, one of three objects: the kind of things which were or are the case; the kind of things that people say and think; the kind of things that ought to be the case"[23]. In the Aristotelian context, then, imitation of nature is not understood as simple reproduction of what already exists, but, in the same way that nature is dynamic and creative, art also has a margin of freedom and liberty of action from the actual.

4.3. Imitation in Ancient Rome

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[21] It is for this reason that it has been asserted that Platonic and Aristotelian approaches to art do not contradict each other but are rather "mutually incommensurable" (McKeon 1936, 24).

[22] (Gil 1966, 14)

[23] (Aristotle 1999, 125-127; 1460B). Halliwell discusses this issue in the following terms: "The 'likeness' in virtue of which art works are mimetic need not involve a reproductive or duplicating relationship to an 'original'; those works which *are* of this kind – e.g., portraits – form only a subclass of the category, and their mimetic status is *independent* of this fact about them. (...) This position diverges sharply, therefore, from the influential Platonic idea of artistic representation as a *mirroring* of the world. Equally, the distinction sometimes drawn between mimesis and imagination (...) has no obvious relevance to Aristotle's case, since his understanding of mimesis does not exclude, indeed it explicitly embraces (cf. *Poetics* 25.1460b8-11 once more), the imaginary or imaginative" (Halliwell 1990, 493).

Cicero learned rhetoric in Greek from Greeks, and so was trained through imitation of masterpieces in a different language. Nevertheless, the Latin Crassus and his generation also became models of oratory for Cicero and his contemporaries, and in *De oratore* Cicero believed in the efficacy of the pupils' imitating Latin models, their teachers, and/or other senior contemporaries. Isocrates, a great advocate of the method of teaching through imitation, and a teacher to numerous famous pupils, became the centre of Cicero's understanding of *imitatio* as the prime cause of stylistic growth and the source of continuity and development. Direct experience and memory are the pillars of imitation, and, if they fail, both *imitatio* and continuity become impossible.

Isocrates's understanding of mimesis within rhetorical training is explained in his speech *Against the Sophists*, where he argues that "the teacher should provide in himself so good a model that the pupils who take on his imprint and are able to imitate him instantly show in their speaking more grace and charm than is found in the others"[24]. In this tradition, the teacher aims to reproduce his own excellences in the instruction of his pupils, and Isocrates described the teacher in *Antidosis* 208 as possessing both the knowledge he has received from previous models, as well as other knowledge he has independently discovered and gathered, hence improving the one collected from his own instructors[25]. In contrast with his predecessors, Isocrates stressed the responsibility of the teacher to offer the highest standards, was not a rigid teacher, and acknowledged more than one good style. According to Cicero, personal talent and stylistic choice are the ingredients of one's own personal idiom, and the good teacher should help the pupil maximize his own natural potential. Hence, due to their personal abilities, different pupils trained in the same school under the supervision of the same teacher and following the same authors may end up showing different qualities and proving different from each other.

Imitation appears for Cicero as a major cause of the evolution of oratory: "Why now is it, do you suppose, that nearly every age has produced its own distinctive style of

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[24] Quoted in (Fantham 1978b, 12)
[25] (Fantham 1978b, 12-13)

oratory?", Cicero wonders rhetorically[26]. Cicero indeed thought that each generation has a common style distinct from the previous generation's, even if they are connected through imitation. Hence, Cicero sustains a "theory of evolution through imitation" based, not on exact reproduction, but on the following of models to achieve personal improvement, which eventually results in the general improvement of the author's tradition[27]. Along with *imitatio*, the terms *similis* and *aemulatio* are also recurrent in Latin works on literary production, such as the treatise *On imitation* by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*c*. 60 BC–after 7 BC) illustrates. *Similis* alludes to the willingness to make something or someone similar to a model, while *aemulari* denotes an attempt to try to rival, equal or surpass the model. Both terms are intrinsically linked to each other, for imitation aimed to follow a model in order to, ultimately, emulate it[28]. On his part, Longinus recommends bearing in mind the great literary figures of the past when writing in order to emulate them:

> 14. We too, then, when we are working at some passage that demands sublimity of thought and expression, should do well to form in our hearts the question, "How might Homer have said this same thing, how would Plato or Demosthenes or (in history) Thucydides have made it sublime?" *Emulation will bring those great characters before our eyes, and their shining presence will lead our thoughts to the ideal standards of perfection.* Still more will this be so, if we also try to imagine to ourselves: "How would Homer or Demosthenes, had either been present, have listened to this passage of mine?"[29]

The scholar G. W. Pigman III discusses the existence of what he calls "eristic metaphors", a type of analogy for imitation at the heart of the distinction between

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[26] (Cicero 1979, 267; II.22.92). In Latin: "Quid enim causae censetis esse, cur aetates extulerint singulae singular prope genera dicendi?".

[27] (Fantham 1978b, 11). In this respect, David Alexander West and Tony Woodman stress "the richness, impetus and creative originality" of the process of literary imitation, for imitation "is neither plagiarism nor a flaw in the constitution of Latin literature. It is a dynamic law of its existence" (West and Woodman 1979, ix).

[28] Dionysius of Halicarnassus's treatise *On imitation* is preserved only in fragments, and it consisted of three parts. The first dealt with the nature of imitation in general; the second with the choice of writers for imitation (no matter whether they were poets, philosophers, historians, or orators), and the third with the methods of imitation. A fragment defines *mimesis* as "an activity receiving an impression of a model through inspection of it," while "emulation" (*zelos*) is "an activity of the soul moved toward admiration of what seems fine" (Kennedy 1994, 164). According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, imitation is "a copying of models with the help of certain principles," and some sort of psychological elevation, as it is an "activity of the soul inspired by the spectacle of the seemingly beautiful" (McKeon 1936, 28).

[29] (Longinus 1999, 215; 14.2)

imitation and emulation. These metaphors can be of two sorts depending on the type of *eris* in question: good *eris* "stimulates men, even lazy men, to increase their substance out of a desire to compete with their neighbors", while bad *eris* "stirs up war and suffering"[30]. Cicero's *Tusculanae disputationes* IV.17 recognizes two meanings of *aemulatio*: the imitation of virtue, on the one hand, and, on the other, the anxiety of desiring what one lacks but somebody else possesses:

> But rivalry is for its part used in a twofold way, so that it has both a good and a bad sense. For one thing, rivalry is used of the imitation of virtue (but this sense we make no use of here, for it is praiseworthy); and rivalry is distress, should another be in possession of the object desired and one has to go without it oneself.[31]

Hence, *aemulatio* differs from *imitatio* in that the former can show a negative and envious side leading to malice which imitation does not necessarily possess[32], as Erasmus makes clear in the following extract:

> Imitation aims at similarity; emulation, at victory. Thus, if you take all of Cicero and him alone for your model, you should not only reproduce him, but also defeat him. He must not be just passed by, but rather left behind.[33]

Translation was also intimately related to imitation, despite the obvious differences between the two. Rita Copeland distinguishes translation from imitation in Roman theory both in terms of an interior anatomy, as well as in terms of exterior form. Firstly, in terms of an interior anatomy, translation is seen as "an act of transference rather than of transmission", and "as a pattern of transference, substitution, and ultimately displacement of the source"[34]. From the point of view of Roman rhetorical theory, difference from the source is the object of translation, and consequently, translating becomes "comparable to the act of inventing one's own argument out of available

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[30] (Pigman III 1980, 16)

[31] (Cicero 1966, 345, 347). In Latin: "Aemulatio autem dupliciter illa quidem dicitur, ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit; nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur - sed ea nihil hoc loco utimur; est enim laudis - et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo, quod concupierit, alius potiatur, ipse careat" (Cicero 1966, 344, 346).

[32] According to Pigman III, it is this dark side what prevents "aemulatio from becoming a technical term for a particular type of imitation" (Pigman III 1980, 18).

[33] Quoted in (Pigman III 1980, 24)

[34] (Copeland 1995, 30)

topics"[35]. In other words, to translate is to reinvent the source, producing a new text suited to the particular historical circumstances of the target audience. Secondly, in terms of exterior form, while imitation is an organic recreation from an earlier text, translation is replicative and "aims to match form and substance in a different language", differentiating the product of the translation from its original[36]. Ultimately, the Romans wished to displace through difference the very much admired Greek culture, and the replication of translation obeyed this political agenda[37].

Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, published *c.* AD 95 after a twenty-year teaching career, encapsulates various teaching methods inherited from the Greeks and largely systematized by the Romans. For Quintilian, there are three essentials in the education of the ideal orator: power of speech, imitation of great models (choosing particular qualities to imitate in each of the selected authors), and diligence of writing. From Quitilian's text as well as from *Rethorica ad Herennium*, imitation seems to appear both as an exercise in schools, as well as procedure of practice and acquisition of *copia rerum et verborum* for the proper orator. For Quintilian, constant exercise boosts the natural aptitudes of the orator, as well as his technical knowledge. Imitation of good authors proves fundamental to gradually master style, but, for this, one has to first select the authors one wishes to imitate, preferably among both the ancients and the moderns[38]; then, the best qualities of each author have to be identified; and finally, a

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[35] (Copeland 1995, 30)

[36] (Copeland 1995, 30)

[37] The relations between translation and imitation did not wear off and continued to be present throughout the Renaissance. For instance, in the sixteenth century, Jacques Peletier understood translation as a kind of imitation, imitation being a more general concept. In his own words: "The truest form of imitation is translation: because to imitate is nothing but wishing to make what another does: thus, the translator subjects himself not only to the invention of another, but also to his disposition, and furthermore, to as much as the elocution as he is capable of within the possibilities of the target language". In French: "*La plus vraie espèce d'Imitation, c'est de traduire*: Car imiter n'est autre chose que vouloir faire ce que fait un Autre: Ainsi que fait le Traducteur qui s'asservit non seulement à l'Invention d'autrui, mais aussi à la Disposition: et encore à l'Élocution tant qu'il peut, et tant que lui permet le naturel de la Langue translative" (Peletier 1990, 262).

[38] Cicero saw the great benefits, at least for the young student, of imitating one single model. Quintilian is categorically against slavish imitation of one model, as well as Seneca. Regarding the use of several models, Quintilian asserts: "Apart from the fact that a wise man should always, if possible, appropriate what is best in any model, it is also true that the whole enterprise is so difficult that those who concentrate on one model will hardly find any part of it within their grasp. Consequently, since it is scarcely given to man to produce a complete reproduction of a chosen author, let us keep the excellences of a number of

general analysis of every work is needed. Only the excellences of the model (or models) have to be imitated, obviating and avoiding the models' recognized faults and negative mannerisms. Then, the imitator should carry out an exercise of introspection to discover the extent to which what he has learned from his model adjusts to his own needs or limitations. Only by doing this will he be able to add to the virtues of the model his own virtues, and hence maximize his acquisition of *copia*, both in terms of words and figures, of circumstances and people, and of decorum.

The imitative exercises used by Greek and Roman teachers of rhetoric were chiefly three: translation, memorization, and paraphrase, from verse to prose, or vice versa. However, Quintilian recognizes that imitation alone is not enough, and greater qualities in an orator, such as invention, surpass it. Certainly, although in a first moment of oratorical instruction imitation is highly useful, by itself it does not ensure the development of rhetoric. Imitation needs to be carried out moderately and discretely, bearing in mind that no sharp wit is solely happy with what others have said before him, and therefore cannot be satisfied with imitation. Indeed, while imitation is necessary to establish and secure the survival and continuity of any tradition, invention accounts for its very beginning, as well as for its growth and renewal[39]. Hence, if imitation is *utile*, useful, and inescapable in the process of learning, invention is for Quintilian the *primum fruit*, for it came first and holds the preeminent position: "It cannot be doubted that a large part of art consists of imitation. Invention of course came first and is the main

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authors before our eyes, so that one thing stays in our minds from one of them, and another from another, and we can use each in the appropriate place" (Quintilian 2001, 335; X.2.26). In Latin: "Nam praeter id quod prudentis est quod in quoque optimum est, si possit, suum facere, tum in tanta rei difficultate unum intuentes vix aliqua pars sequitur. Ideoque cum totum exprimere quem elegeris paene sit homini inconcessum, plurium bona ponamus ante oculos, ut aliud ex alio haereat, et quo quidque loco conveniat aptemus" (Quintilian 2001, 334).

[39] Pernille Harsting discusses the different contexts in which the term *inventio* is employed by Quintilian contrary to imitation: "In the *IO*, Quintilian uses the noun *inuentio* (and the verb *inuenire*) both as a technical rhetorical term and in the general sense of the word. As a technical term, *inuentio* is used about the first of the five *officia oratoris* or *partes oratoriae*. In a more general sense, *inuentio* can be used about the process or the power of inventing as well as about that which is invented - and in both these latter cases *inuentio* denotes either something rediscovered (...) or something totally new (...). In the context of *IO* X.2, however, *inuentio* and *inuenire* are used in the general sense only, and, with one exception, always in contrast to *imitatio*, as the power or process of innovation and creation" (Harsting 1998, 1327-1328).

thing, but good inventions are profitable to follow"[40]. According to Quintilian, we have to be grateful to imitation because it "makes the principles of everything so much easier for us than for those who had no antecedents to follow", nevertheless, we should also be aware that imitation can work "to our disadvantage unless we handle it with caution and discrimination"[41]. Consequently, imitation is not an end in itself, but a means to produce one's own invention by acquiring knowledge and skills, since "nothing does grow by imitation alone"[42]:

> for one thing, only a lazy mind is content with what others have discovered. What would have happened in the days when there were no models, if men had decided to do and think of nothing that they did not know already? Nothing of course would have been discovered. So why is it a crime for us to discover something which did not exist before?[43]

Quintilian goes on to state that "it is a disgrace too to be content merely to attain the effect you are imitating. Once again, what would have happened if no one had achieved more than the man he was following?"[44]. What is more, Quintilian is of the opinion that "it is generally easier to improve on something than simply to repeat it", and so, "Total similarity is so difficult to achieve that even Nature herself has failed to prevent things which seem to match and resemble each other most closely from being always distinguishable in *some* respect"[45]. Finally, Quintilian states that "whatever resembles

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[40] (Quintilian 2001, 323; X.2.1). In Latin: "Neque enim dubitari potest, quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. Nam ut invenire primum fuit estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi" (Quintilian 2001, 322).

[41] (Quintilian 2001, 323; X.2.3). In Latin: "Et hercule necesse est aut similes aut dissimiles bonis simus. Similem raro natura praestat, frequenter imitatio. Sed hoc ipsum quod tanto faciliorem nobis rationem rerum omnium facit quam fuit iis qui nihil quod sequerentur habuerunt, nisi caute et cum iudicio adprehenditur, nocet" (Quintilian 2001, 322).

[42] (Quintilian 2001, 325; X.2.8). In Latin: "nihil autem crescit sola imitatione" (Quintilian 2001, 324).

[43] (Quintilian 2001, 324-325; X.2.4-5). In Latin: "Ante omnia igitur imitatio per se ipsa non sufficit, vel quia pigri est ingenii contentum esse iis quae sint ab aliis inventa. Quid enim futurum erat temporibus illis quae sine exemplo fuerunt, si homines nihil, nisi quod iam cognovissent, faciendum sibi aut cogitandum putassent? Nempe nihil fuisset inventum. Cur igitur nefas est reperiri aliquid a nobis, quod ante non fuerit?".

[44] (Quintilian 2001, 325; X.2.7). In Latin: "Turpe etiam illud est, contentum esse id consequi quod imiteris. Nam rursus quid erat futurum, si nemo plus effecisset eo quem sequebatur?" (Quintilian 2001, 324).

[45] (Quintilian 2001, 327; X.2.10). In Latin: "Adde quod plerumque facilius est plus facere quam idem; tantam enim difficultatem habet similitudo ut ne ipsa quidem natura in hoc ita evaluerit ut non res quae simillimae quaeque pares maxime videantur utique discrimine aliquo discernantur" (Quintilian 2001, 326).

another object is bound to be less than what it imitates"[46], and that, after all, "the greatest qualities of an orator are inimitable: his talent, invention, force, fluency, everything in fact that is not taught in the textbooks"[47]. In this situation, emulation becomes the principle of growth for Quintilian, the spur of invention. *Aemulatio* can be defined as the willingness to outdo one's models or *exempla* with the purpose of surpassing them, as the piece that enables the transition from imitation's static preservation of tradition, to the expansion that comes with invention. The perfect orator digests and assimilates the best qualities of his models in order to invent how to correct and perfect them. The differences between model and copy are thus the result of an invention by which the imitator-emulator does not pursue an exact reproduction of the model, but its improvement by adding to its positive elements the personal contribution of his own genius.

Unlike Quintilian when discussing oratory, Longinus believes that high literature is not attainable through training, but is essentially dependent on a natural predisposition that cannot be acquired in schools. Longinus indeed recommends the emulation of the great historians and poets of earlier times in order to gain inspiration, but not to learn literary devices from them. Hence, for Longinus *mimesis* is no mechanical skill or teachable technique, but something closer to inspiration and prophecy[48]. In accordance

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[46] (Quintilian 2001, 327; X.2.11). In Latin: "Adde quod quidquid alteri simile est, necesse est minus sit eo quod imitatur" (Quintilian 2001, 326).

[47] (Quintilian 2001, 327; X.2.12). In Latin: "Adde quod ea quae in oratore maxima sunt imitabilia non sunt, ingenium, inventio, vis, facilitas et quidquid arte non traditur" (Quintilian 2001, 326). The following table, devised by Pernille Harsting, shows schematically the adjectives attributed by Quintilian to both imitation and invention, and the more positive connotations of the ones placed under *inventio* (Harsting 1998, 1331):

Imitatio	*Invenire (Inventio)*
utile (2.1)	praecipuum (2.1)
pigrum ingenium (2.4)	perfectus orator (2.9)
sequi (2.9)	contendere (2.9)
posterior (2.10)	prior (2.10)
idem facere (2.10)	plus facere (2.10)
alienum propositum (2.11)	exemplum (2.11)
imitatio facta est (2.11)	natura et uera uis (2.11)
declamationes (2.12)	orationes (2.12)
adsimulata materia (2.12)	uera materia (2.12)

[48] Based on Longinus's thoughts, D. A. Russell has identified five principles to achieve successful *mimesis* from Longinus's perspective:

with Quintilian, Horace recognizes the importance of having good models and imitating great literary figures, and sees this imitation as a secure way of guiding the novel poet into literature. At the same time, however, Horace does warn the would-be poet against slavish copying of tradition: "In ground open to all you will win private rights, if you do not linger along the easy and open pathway, if you do not seek to render word for word as a slavish translator, and if in your copying you do not leap into the narrow well, out of which either shame or the laws of your task will keep you from stirring a step"[49]. These lines of the *Ars poetica* constitute an imperative to appropriate that which is *publica materies* through the reinventive faculties of *dispositio* and *elocutio*, at the same time that variation for the better appears compulsory to gain "private rights".

Another important name in Roman literary criticism is Seneca (*c.* 4 BC–AD 65), who in his *Epistulae morales* 84 puts forward some metaphors for imitation that would have an enormous influence in the Renaissance. Firstly, Seneca ponders on the indeterminacy of whether bees collect honey from flowers or actually produce it themselves through some kind of process. Hence, their merit may simply lay on the act of gathering, or rather, in making. In this way, this apian metaphor may or may not be used in a transformative sense: it may present either the poet as collector (following somebody else's work), or the poet as maker (emulating it)[50]. Then, in his Epistle 79.6

(i) The object must be worth imitating.
(ii) The spirit rather than the letter must be reproduced.
(iii) The imitation must be tacitly acknowledged, on the understanding that the informed reader will recognize and approve the borrowing.
(iv) The borrowing must be "made one's own", by individual treatment and assimilation to its new place and purpose.
(v) The imitator must think of himself as competing with his model, even if he knows he cannot win. (Russell 1979, 16)

[49] (Horace 1978, 463; lines 131-135). In Latin (Horace 1978, 460):
    publica materies privati iuris erit, si
    non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem,
    nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus
    interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum,
    unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex.

[50] The scholar G. W. Pigman III distinguishes three different versions of imitation (following, imitation, and emulation) and three types of analogies, images, or metaphors in writings on imitation (transformative, dissimulative, and eristic), which do not strictly correlate with the three classes of imitation. Pigman asserts that, among the transformative class of metaphors, the most extended subtypes are the apian and the digestive metaphors. The apian metaphor would still be present in the Renaissance, as the following fragment from Ronsard's sonnet "A M. Des Caurres" illustrates by exemplifying the

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Seneca recognizes the importance of the models, stressing that novelty in young authors does not lay so much on the subject matter of their compositions as in the way their thoughts are arranged and expressed:

> It makes a great deal of difference whether you approach a subject that has been exhausted, or one where the ground has merely been broken; in the latter case, the topic grows day by day, and what is already discovered does not hinder new discoveries. Besides, *he who writes last has the best of the bargain; he finds already at hand words which, when marshalled in a different way, show a new face. And he is not pilfering them, as if they belonged to someone else, when he uses them, for they are common property.*[51]

Indeed, Seneca recommends finding a subject with potential, one that, although previously treated by other authors, is not yet exhausted. Furthermore, the pertinent arrangement and elocution of a matter that is "common property" seems to ultimately set the difference between various literary compositions that grow from the same seed. The second image of transformative imitation employed by Seneca is the image of digestion, which goes beyond simple gathering and indicates a transformative kind of

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parallelism between the workings of the bees with the imitative-creative practice of the poets: "Thus, that in the month of April we see, going from flower to flower, from garden to garden, the ingenious bee, fluttering and looting a ruby harvest, its feet stained of various colours; from science to science and from author to author, from hard work to hard work, from marvel to marvel, you fly feeding in different ways the ear of the French, who is delighted to be your listener. It is no longer necessary to vainly burden our studies with so many books: the one that you bring to us is worth a thousand, approved by the Muses, and can learnedly satisfy all spirits. Its brightness is sufficient; men do not need stars in the morning, once the sun has risen". In French:

> Ainsy qu'au mois d'avril on voit, de fleur en fleur,
> De jardin en jardin, l'ingenieuse abeille
> Voleter et piller une moisson vermeille,
> En ses pieds peinturez de diverse couleur;
> De science en science et d'autheur en autheur,
> De labeur en labeur, de merveille en merveille,
> Tu voles repaissant diversement l'oreille
> Du François, tout ravy d'estre ton auditeur.
> Il ne faut plus charger du faix de tant de livres
> Nos estudes en vain: celuy que tu nous livres
> Seul en vaut un millier, des Muses approuvé,
> Qui peut à tous esprits doctement satisfaire.
> Sa clairté nous suffit, l'home n'a plus que faire
> D'estoiles au matin, quand le jour est levé. (Ronsard 1866, 357-358)

[51] (Seneca 1962, 203, 205). In Latin: "Multum interest, utrum ad consumptam materiam an ad subactam accedes; crescit in dies et inventuris inventa non obstant. Praeterea condicio optima est ultimi; parata verba invenit, quae aliter instructa novam faciem habent. Nec illis manus inicit tamquam alienis. Sunt enim publica" (Seneca 1962, 202, 204).

imitation by which the subject behaves as an active filter[52]. Dissimulative imitation is certainly recommended to disguise the relationship between text and model: "This is what our mind should do: it should hide away all the materials by which it has been aided, and bring to light only what it has made of them"[53].

Finally, Plotinus (AD 204–270) retained the frame of Plato's distinction between sensible and intelligible worlds with the difference that he viewed the artist as directly imitating the Ideas, and not their sensible reflections in material objects. The model to follow was therefore unavailable to the external senses, and only reachable through imagination and thought. Since Plotinus conceived of the work of art as potentially reflecting the ideal more accurately than nature itself, art was elevated to a position closer to the Ideas and to God himself. The artist ceased being a craftsman to become a creator that uses the same patterns God employed to model the universe. By making the eye of the mind look within the artist, it was eventually affirmed that Ideas were not locked away in a transcendental realm, but held a second residence within the human mind. As a result, artists became more intuitive and introspective, and turned from sense experience to more personal and subjective visions. Thus, in the Renaissance, when this Neoplatonic conception of art was profoundly present, Platonist aesthetics ended up locating the Ideas both within and outside the mind.

4.4. Imitation in the Renaissance

Humanism was from its very roots and essence a movement based on the imitation of the greatness and wisdom of ancient classical authors before what was then regarded as the rancid legacy of the 'Dark Ages', that is, the medieval past[54]. Humanist textual

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[52] G. W. Pigman III (1980, 8) lists many authors who use this type of metaphor, including Quintilian, Macrobius, Petrarch, Poliziano, Erasmus, Calcagnini, Dolet, Florido, Du Bellay, Sidney, and Jonson.
[53] (Seneca 1962, 281). In Latin: "Hoc faciat animus noster: omnia, quibus est adiutus, abscondat, ipsum tantum ostendat, quod effecit" (Seneca 1962, 280).
[54] Green notes that "The sense of the loss of a precious past was a common element in the humanist enterprise not only in Italy but through Europe; outside of Italy however it tended to be less acute and more readily balanced by the hope of revival" (Greene 1982, 32). Thus, "In England the medieval past

practices opposed the medieval model of interpretation that read all texts allegorically and *in Christo*, and instead privileged a historical and philological approach to past texts[55]. Indeed, the awareness of Renaissance men that they lived in a distant time from the Classical past explains that the interpretation of texts, both sacred and secular, was made dependent upon the recovery of a remote language and history and the application of the philological method[56]. In this context, imitation was not only a central pedagogical practice in the teaching of the classical tongues, grammar and rhetoric, but an essential element to understand fields as varied as historiography, the visual arts, politics, music, philosophy, and, of course, poetics[57].

The discovery of the Ancient world definitely imposed tremendous anxiety and strain upon the humanists, who instead of falling into a general paralysis, spurred their wits to attempt to produce equally worthy literature. The Renaissance inherited at least three different concepts of imitation: the Platonic doctrine of imitation as copy of material or sensible reality –which acquired with Neoplatonism new shades of meaning; the Aristotelian mimesis or imitation of universal models of human behaviour and human actions representing them; and the rhetorical theories regarding imitation of the models, since Classical times an instrument and an incentive for authors to improve. Thus, imitation became in the Renaissance a creative force, a guideline for the writing of excellent literature following outstanding models and discovering ways to surpass them. Unsurprisingly, then, imitation was in the Renaissance generally acknowledged as

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was not so consistently identified with night, burial, and death", and instead what really made English authors self-conscious was the rudeness of their vernacular, which Greene takes synecdochically and interprets as a general sense of embarrassment towards the nation's cultural poverty (Greene 1982, 33).

[55] As François Rigolot puts it: "Medieval *imitatio* posited fictional texts as extensions of a unique source of undifferentiated truth: the Holy Scripture, an infinitely expandable master text. By contrast, Renaissance imitative theory became increasingly metaphoric: it tended to posit the relationship to paradigmatic figures as strictly one of analogy" (Rigolot 1998, 561).

[56] For more on the Renaissance perception of the past, see Peter Burke's *The Renaissance Sense of the Past* (London: Edward Arnold, 1969).

[57] For Nancy Struever, rhetorical imitation provided in this scenario "a model of continuity in change" (Struever 1970, 64); for Richard Waswo (1987), *imitatio* is a strategy for negotiating the epistemological crisis in which early modern authors were immersed; and, according to Perry, *imitatio* in the Renaissance became "a strategy for acknowledging and accommodating the historical distance separating early modern authors from the classical and sacred traditions that authorized their own aesthetic", allowing "early modern authors a large measure of creativity within an at least provisionally stable field of signification" (Perry 2005, 368).

essential in the process of literary production, and the debates that sprung around it did not question its efficiency or importance, but rather raised questions about the best modes or methods of imitation, and the best model or models to imitate. It was around this last issue –the establishment of authors as models of literary imitation in every genre– that a phenomenal controversy confronted the so-called eclectics against the Ciceronians.

4.4.1. Ciceronians *vs* Eclectics

Sixteenth-century theorists writing in the vernacular languages found in the classical authors the best models to elevate their mother tongue to the status of a literary instrument on par with Latin or Classical Greek. Concurrently to the legitimizing process of the vernaculars, there was the heated debate around whether there should be only one model to imitate, or more than one –a debate that became a burning issue about which all great writers of the time had something to say. The first discussions on this matter dealt with Latin prose, and on whether Cicero should be the exclusive model to follow. Later on, in a parallel though less polemic argument, Virgil was established as the absolute model for poetry first by Vida in 1527, and later by Scaliger in 1561. In prose, Ciceronians advocated the strict imitation of Ciceronian usage and style as the sole criterion of eloquence, whereas the anti-Ciceronians or eclectics defended the desirability of imitating the most admirable qualities of the best authors.

There were four relevant moments of crisis in the Ciceronian vs. anti-Ciceronian controversy, its roots traceable to the Quattrocento quarrel between Poggio Bracciolini (who embraced a theoretical notion of Cicero as the supreme model) and Lorenzo Valla. The quarrel signaled the differences between two generations of humanists and anticipated the chief controversies around imitation that would occur at the end of the following century. Indeed, by the end of the fifteenth century, Poliziano, a great defender of eclecticism, confronted Paolo Cortese, a convinced Ciceronian. At the

beginning of the sixteenth century, we find the epistolary debate between cardinal Pietro Bembo, a one hundred percent Ciceronian who advocated a kind of vernacular Ciceronianism by establishing as fixed models Petrarch for poetry and Boccaccio for prose, and Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, an intellectual heir of Poliziano and an advocate of an eclectic type of imitation based on Platonic theories about innate Ideas and the cult to trascendental Beauty. This debate was followed by the epistolary argument between Giraldi Cinthio and Celio Calcagnini, who passionately discussed the famous 128 line of Horace's *Ars Poetica*: *difficile est proprie communia dicere* ("It is hard to treat in your own way what is common")[58]. The participation of Erasmus in the controversy with the publication of his dialogue *Ciceroninnus. De optimo dicendi genere* (1528), a satire against radical Ciceronianism which ironically alluded to Cicero's *De optimo genere dicendi*, would make the argument expand beyond Italy and throughout Europe[59].

Erasmus's objection to Ciceronianism originates in his opinion that eloquence should accommodate the historical circumstances that surround the speaker or writer. In other words, according to Erasmus, a true Ciceronian would adapt the Ciceronian ideal of eloquence to the particular circumstances of his time and place. Hence, given that things have changed since the time of Cicero, it is utterly impossible to speak with decorum about the present if one obstinately sticks to a distant Ciceronian past. If decorum means suiting speech to the general historical conditions of the present, a good sixteenth-century orator or writer necessarily has to keep his feet away from Cicero's footsteps. Thus, Erasmus discusses the impossibility of true Ciceronianism when one has to refer to realities unknown to Cicero (the Church, for instance). In these circumstances, imitating Cicero is, quite frankly, not enough:

> Does the present situation of this century seem to correspond with the ways of those times in which Cicero lived and spoke, since the religion, governmental power, magistracies, commonwealth, laws, customs, pursuits, the very appearance of men –

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[58] (Horace 1978, 461)
[59] (García Galiano 1988, 35-36)

> really just about everything – have changed radically? ... *Furthermore, since everywhere the entire scene of human events has been turned upside down, who today can observe decorum in his speech unless he greatly differs from Cicero? ...* Wherever I turn, I see everything changed, I stand on another stage, I see another theatre, even another world.[60]

In other words, in order to successfully imitate, the imitator has to be aware of the differences between his own day and the historical circumstances that surrounded the model. The idea of historical decorum adds to the list of *inimitabilia* the temporal factor. Erasmus's *De duplici copia verborum et rerum* (1512), which he dedicated to John Colet, also contains Erasmus's defence of a liberating form of imitation, one which favours the discovery by the imitator of his own personal style through the imitation of several remarkable authors. Juan Luis Vives understood imitation in similar terms, for he also insisted on historical decorum and highlighted that, while mere imitation was not enough, *aemulatio* would prove a more advisable alternative[61].

For Erasmus it was obvious that Christianity was the major difference between the time of Cicero and his own. For this reason, he viewed Ciceronians as impious, for true eloquence was sustained in the imitation of Christ, right belief was a precondition of eloquence, and the final aim of the liberal arts (thus of philosophy and oratory) was achieving better knowledge of Christ. Erasmus furthermore stressed the Christian identity of the imitator before his pagan classical models. In 1535, a year before his death, Erasmus published his *Ecclesiastes sive de Concionandi ratione libri IV*, considered a logical sequel of his *Ciceronianus*, on this occasion dealing with sacred eloquence versus the secular one discussed in *Ciceronianus*. Imitation in *Ecclesiastes* becomes imitation of Jesus Christ and the apostles, orators in the name of the Father, and thus locates Christian eloquence in the imitation of Christ. The same year of the publication of *Ecclesiastes*, the most virulent replication to *Ciceronianus* appeared in

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[60] Quoted in, and translated by, (Pigman III 1979, 158-159). In Latin: "Uidetur praesens seculi status, cum eorum temporum ratione congruere, quibus uixit ac dixit Cicero, quum sint in diuersum mutata religio, imperium, magistratus, respublica, leges, mores, studia, ipsa hominum facies, denique quid non?... Porro quum undequaque tota rerum humanarum scena inuersa sit, quis hodie potest apte dicere, nisi multum Ciceroni dissimilis?... Quocunque me uerto, uideo mutata omnia, in alios to proscenio, aliud conspicio theatrum, imo mundum alium".

[61] (Pigman III 1979, 168; Pineda 1994, 42)

France: Etiènne Dolet's *De Imitatione ciceroniana* (1535), which claimed before Erasmus a true separation of religion from the literary art[62].

Scholars in England did not engage so strongly in the Ciceronian controversy as their colleagues in Italy and France. Elizabethan literary criticism was quite uniform, mainly displaying a fairly moderate Erasmian approach to *imitatio* as compared to earlier works developed by French and Italian critics[63]. For one thing, England started to participate in the Early Modern literary scene when the debate had passed its height. For another, the iconoclastic and anti-ceremonial features of Elizabethan Protestantism may have favoured associations of poetry and slavish imitation with Catholicism and papistry. Hence, a restrained and reasonable approach and practice of *imitatio* enjoyed almost total unanimity among Elizabethan literary theorists. Moderation in imitation appeared, in this manner, hand in hand with religious moderation. From this perspective, it is unsurprising to read how Sir Philip Sidney's tutor Hubert Languet warns him to "beware of *falling into the heresy* of those who think that the height of excellence consists in the imitation of Cicero"[64]. William Webbe, on his part, states in *A Discourse of English Poetrie* (1586) that "an immitation should not be too *servile or superstitious*, as though one durst not varry one iotte from the example"[65], and that "One should not altogether treade in the steppes of others, but sometime be may either

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[62] The debates over the imitation of consecrated authors had moreover an effect on the perception of reading, which was different for Ciceronians and eclectics. On the one hand, the Ciceronian faction "stresses the universality of nature as located in, and perceived by, the human mind", so that reading becomes for the Ciceronian "the repetition of a perfect or near perfect discourse" (Cave 2004, 148). On the other, the anti-Ciceronian position "extends virtually *ad infinitum* the range of texts to be read and stresses, not universal nature, but the individual nature of the reader as the agent by which this assemblage of materials is gathered, selected, and given meaning" (Cave 2004, 148-149). As a result too, if in order to rewrite venerable texts these have to be transformed, in a way their authority is weakened. In this respect, for Terence Cave, the sixteenth century witnessed, in northern Europe at least, a fundamental shift in the status of the reader, for "reading becomes, in various senses, a much more prominent activity", moving closer to our current understanding of it (Cave 2004, 143).

[63] Erasmus's vision of a uniquely Christian eloquence was disseminated in England by his humanist friend John Colet. Elizabeth Sweeting explains sixteenth century English critics' relative disinterest by saying that "They had not the same zest for pure scholarship as the men of Italy in the very heart of the Revival of Learning, nor the desire to draw up rules for a dictatorship of letters which is manifest in France" (Sweeting 1964, 90). Similarly, Meyrick Heath Carré remarks that if the new learning was hailed in Italy "as a revelation", in England it did not have a revolutionary impact, for "the reading and imitation of the classics and of the modern *belles lettres* were absorbed into the traditional scheme of medieval thought" without producing any dramatic rupture (Carré 1949, 180).

[64] (Bradley 1912, 22-23)

[65] (Webbe 1586, K4r)

into such waves as have not beene haunted or used of others"[66]. From Webbe's viewpoint, not only is it possible to emend poems, but it is actually necessary:

> The emendations of Poemes be very necessary, that in the obscure poyntes many thinges may be enlightned, in the baser partes many thinges may be throughly garnished. Hee may take away and put out all unpropper & unseemely words, he may with discretion immitate the auncient wryters, he may abridge thinges that are too lofty, mittigate thynges that are too rough, and may use all remedies of speeche throughout the whole worke. The thinges which are scarce seemely, he may amende by Arte and methode.[67]

Regarding English Protestant thoughts on the issue of *imitatio Christi*, it should be said that, since from the Protestant perspective "salvation is not effected through the imitation of Christ's life, but through the atoning work of his death", Protestant critics "tend to associate *imitatio Christi* with the same excesses for which Erasmus castigates the Ciceronians: idolatry (typically defined as privileging the 'outward' humanity of Christ over His divine essence) and anachronism (understood in this context as a failure to recognize the unbridgeable gap between unfallen and fallen human nature)"[68].

4.4.2. Italians on Imitation

The views of sixteenth-century Italian critics regarding imitation can be visually represented on a gradient in which one extreme would be occupied by the eclectics Francesco Patrizi and Castelvetro, and the other by Bembo and Scaliger (with their

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[66] (Webbe 1586, K4^r)

[67] (Webbe 1586, L1^r)

[68] (Perry 2005, 373-374). Javier Gomá Lanzón elaborates on the subject of imitation and Protestantism in the following terms: "Durante la Edad Media y el Renacimiento la imitación mantuvo ese carácter literal o externo de copia o repetición de la vida terrena de Jesús y sirvió generalmente a la causa de los movimientos de renovación de la Iglesia. Francisco de Asís quería imitar la pobreza del maestro y, con los términos de la carta de Pedro, escribe al hermano León en la carta 7: *sequi vestigia et pauperitatem suam* (Christi). Bernardo de Claraval predica la imitación de la humildad de Cristo. Eckhart, el Taulero y la *devotio moderna* enseñaron y vivieron la imitación de toda la vida terrestre de Jesús. En este espíritu se mueven la *Imitatio Christi* de Kempis, la *Vita Christi* de Ludolfo de Sajonia, Ignacio de Loyola, Teresa de Jesús, Juan de la Cruz y en la Francia del XVII Pedro de Bérulle.

La imitación meramente externa se exponía fácilmente al desprestigio durante el Renacimiento. En el protestantismo, Lutero menospreció la imitación romana, que él asociaba con un cristianismo de obras y con un vano intento del cristianismo por merecer delante de Dios. En lugar del Cristo modelo, Lutero prefiere el Cristo salvador, y en lugar de la imitación de obras, el seguimiento por la fe, la cual nos eleva a la condición de hijos de Dios" (Gomá Lanzón 2005, 385).

highest admiration for Virgil and Cicero) and by the servile Vida (who almost advises new poets to steal from the Ancients). The rest of the critical voices from the 1540s till the end of the century would occupy the gradient's middle grounds, for they generally reiterate the classical doctrine that imitation is based on carefully selecting good models, reinterpreting them personally and surpassing them if possible.

Marco Vida's *De arte poetica* (1527) sees Classical authors as fundamental for any young poet to know and consult for material, disposition, and wording, and he crowns Virgil as the king of verse. Refusing the Ancients and writing independently from them leads inexperienced poets nowhere. Vida's poem *De arte poetica* is structured in three books. In Book 1 Vida talks about the history of poetry and its divine origins, describes the early education that the poet should receive, and lists the skills necessary for success. Book 2 is devoted to invention and disposition, and Book 3 to elocution. The theory of imitation plays an important part in Vida's notions of poetry, as he asserts that "art functions only by imitating nature, and conforms to it closely. For the poets have set Nature before them as their sole mistress, and in whatever their undertaking they always follow her footsteps"[69]. In fact, imitation is so key for Vida that he does not condemn the borrowing of the invention or elocution of previous poets as long as disposition (the part in poetry that for him truly makes a difference) is changed so to conceal the theft:

> But when you are attempting thefts from the polished poets, proceed with particular caution: *remember to conceal what you have stolen by altering the forms of the words and to escape detection by switching word order*. Give everything a new countenance and a wholly new form. Once this task is complete (and it will not occupy you long), you yourself will scarcely recognize the altered words of the ancient poet.
> (…)
> Therefore, my pupils, let each of you follow my example; *commit your thefts fearlessly and draw your booty from every quarter. For he is a hapless poet* (though there are many to be found) *who trusts rashly in his own powers and skill* and, as though he stood

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[69] (Vida 1976, 73). In Latin: "Praeterea haud lateat te nil conarier artem, / Naturam nisi vt assimulet, propiusque sequantur. / Hanc vnam ante oculos sibi proposuere magistram: / Quicquid agunt, hujus simper vestigial servant" (Vida 1976, 72). Ralf G. Williams asserts that "Vida's poem was written just before the introduction of Aristotle's *Poetics* into the mainstream of Renaissance literary criticism" (Williams 1976, xxix), which means that Vida's judgment of poetry as an art of mimesis is independent from the Aristotelian theory upon the same matter.

in no need of another's aid, brashly refuses to follow the trustworthy steps of the ancients, abstaining, alas, too much from taking booty, having decided *to spare "others' property" – a vain scrupulosity this*, an effort not sanctioned by Phoebus. Their rejoicing on that account is pitiably short-lived, however, and often they survive their own monuments; unpraised, they have wept ere their final day for their dead offspring, and yet living, have seen the funeral of their own fame.[70]

Vida's recommendation to poets to steal from past authors could not be more explicit, and he even believes that being scrupulous about this theft dooms a poet's chances of consolidating a successful career in literature. Vida elaborates further on this matter of the theft from the classical poets in the following terms:

As these observations indicate, it is from the ancient poets that we ought always to learn how to express ourselves. *Their golden words are our food and their best ornaments of style our eagerly sought plunder*. Note how, what we may fit to our own use the spoils and noble trappings of the ancients, *we appropriate in one instance their brilliant inventions, in another the order they employ, in others yet the spirit of their words, and even the words themselves* – for one need not be ashamed of having sometimes spoken with another's tongue.[71]

In other words, Vida is unashamed to confess that stealing the invention, disposition and elocution of previous authors is a novel poet's best choice for succeeding. Imitation in his case derives not only to servile following, but to the worst form of plagiarism. Following Vida's thought, Bernardino Daniello defends in *La Poetica* (1536) the classical notion that the matter of literature is common property, and, consequently, that everyone has the right to use it freely. Then, Antonio Minturno, author of *L'Arte Poetica* (1563), recommends memorization of the teachings of classical authors such as Horace and claims that fiction should be masked under the appearance

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[70] (Vida 1976, 99-101). In Latin: "Quum vero cultis moliris furta poetis, / Cautius ingredere, & raptus menor occule versis / Verborum indiciis, atque ordine falle legentes / Mutato. nova sit facies, nova prorsus imago. / Munere (nec longum tempus) vix ipse peracto / Dicta recognosces veteris mutata poetae./ (…) / Ergo agite o mecum secure accingite furtis / Una omnes, pueri, passimque avertite praedam. / Infelix autem (quidam nam saepe reperti) / Viribus ipse suis temeré qui sisus, & arti, / Externae quasi opis nihil indigus, abnegat audax / Fida sequi veterum vestigia, dum sibi praeda / Temperat heu nimium, atque alienis parcere crevit; / Vana superstitio, Phoebi sine numine cura. / Haud longum tales ideo laetantur, & ipsi / Saepe suis superant monimentis, illaudatique / Extremum ante diem foetus flevere caducos, / Viventesque suae viderunt funera famae" (Vida 1976, 98; 100).

[71] (Vida 1976, 99). In Latin: "Atque ideo ex priscis simper quo more loquamur / Discendum, quorum depascimur aurea dicta, / Praecipuumque avidi rerum populamus honorem. / Aspice ut exuvias, veterumque insignia nobis / Aptemus. rerum accipimus nunc clara reperta, / Nunc seriem, atque animum verborum, verba quoque ipsa: / Nec pudet interdum alterius nos ore loquutos" (Vida 1976, 98).

of reality, following the laws of likeliness, so that the poem should represent the true forms of things –in other words, the poet ought to imitate truth in such a way that readers take it as true. Finally, Torquato Tasso's *Discorsi del Poema Heroico* (1594) recommends imitating the outstanding Greek, Latin and Italian poets, and Jacobus Pontanus's *Poeticarum Institutionum Libri III* (1594) asserts that no "excellent poet [save Homer] has ever arisen without imitation"[72].

On the opposite extreme of the gradient, Hieronimo Muzio and Giraldi Cinthio, authors of, respectively, *Arte Poetica* (1551) and *Discorsi* (1554), criticized servility to past authors, and their theories on imitation regarded Vida's narrowing views about translating as in a lack of liberty for the poet. Then, Giovanni Pietro Capriano, author of *Della vera poetica* (1555), regards imitation as the defining element of poetry, even though he lists fiction and verse as two other basic requirements of a poem[73]. Capriano distinguishes between natural poetry and moral poetry, and for him, while the former imitates natural things, only produces pleasure, and is not restricted by the principle of likeliness but has to do instead with the fictional or the allegorical, the latter implies imitating human actions, is bound by rules of probability, and produces both pleasure and utility, for which reason he considers it superior to the first kind. As for Julius Caesar Scaliger, he claims in his *Poetices* (1561) that following classical poets at a short distance is highly advisable for the young poet. However, if imitation is essential for the poet's training, as he sets to demonstrate in his treatise, the poet should eventually try to emulate his model, avoid slavish imitation, and create a personal poetic world. "De imitatione et indicio", which precedes Book V of *Qui et criticus*, contains Scaliger's

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[72] Quoted in (White 1973, 29). For more on the theory and practice of imitation in Renaissance Italy, see Martin L. McLaughlin's *Literary Imitation in the Italian Renaissance: The Theory and Practice of Literary Imitation in Italy from Dante to Bembo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

[73] Bernard Weinberg states that within Capriano's system "imitation refers to the process of representation" and "fiction implies the choice of unreal objects or their representation as unreal" (Weinberg 1961, vol. II, 733).

most detailed exposition of imitation and argues that Virgil is the most perfect model in verse to imitate because he managed to create a more perfect nature than the real one[74].

Franceso Patrizi is so vehemently against slavish imitation that, in his *Retorica* (1562), he sets up a straw figure representing the theory of imitation built by various authorities and demolishes it through the *reductio ad absurdum*. Then, Patrizi's second volume of his *Poetica* (1586), *La deca disputata*, is chiefly devoted to attacking Aristotle's theory of poetry as imitation. First and foremost, Patrizi criticizes the polysemy of *mimesis* within Aristotle's postulates, and in fact identifies six different meanings of the term which Baxter Hathaway very aptly schematizes in the following list:

(1) all nouns taken as imitations of things, an interpretation borrowed by Aristotle from the *Cratylus* of Plato, in which Plato had asked whether words should be thought of as imitators, imitations, symbols, signs, similar, images, figures, or declarations
(2) the rhetorical concept of *enargeia* (putting scenes concretely and vividly before our eyes) extended to mean imitation
(3) the fable or plot of an action thought of as an imitation of an action
(4) imitation consisting of the relation between an action presented on a stage and a real-life action
(5) an extension of the principle in 4 to include epic and dithyrambic poetry
(6) a further extension including musical accompaniment.[75]

Then, Castelvetro manages to base his *Poetica d'Aristotele Vulgarizzata et Sposta* (1570) completely upon Aristotle with the particularity that he rejects what he understands is the Aristotelian doctrine of imitation and substitutes it with his own. Following Aristotle, meter is not the defining feature of poetry, but imitation is: "the mere use of metre does not make one a poet, and what distinguishes one kind of poet from another is not his kind of metre but his kind of imitation, and especially the kind of matter he imitates"[76]. Additionally, Castelvetro denies that the poet is a divinely inspired agent and that poetry resembles painting. For Castelvetro, the sole aim of poetry is pleasure, delight and recreation for the common people, and so he dismisses

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[74] White states that if "Thirty years before he had followed Bembo in limiting prose to the servile imitation of Cicero", Scaliger later tried "to confine poetry to a similar imitation of Virgil" (White 1973, 23).
[75] (Hathaway 1962, 10)
[76] (Castelvetro 1984, 16)

utility or profit as legitimate ends of poetry –thus going against Horace's doctrine. Since the audience will only feel pleasure out of poetry if they identify themselves with the characters, the play has to be endowed with a considerable dose of credibility and verisimilitude which, if granted, works on the audience's imagination involving them in the plot and making events pass as real. Hence, unlike Aristotle, Castelvetro does not consider any action adequate matter for poetry, and rather limits poetry's subject matter to possible or probable actions that reflect the actual world –often resulting in poetic imitation of everyday life happenings or fictions shaped as historical events. Credibility becomes thus a necessary (though not sufficient) requisite for pleasure, for a touch of the marvelous is also required to produce pleasure in the audience. In sum, for Castelvetro poetics appears as a branch of history that pursues pleasure for the audience and glory for the author[77].

Leaving exceptions such as Vida aside, imitation in the Renaissance usually means emulation of authors of reference. In fact, one of the few points of agreement between Pico and Bembo regarding imitation is their preference for attempting to surpass rather than to simply follow: for Pico, all good authors have done more than limiting themselves to imitation, and Bembo agrees that surpassing the model is the aim to reach, but that in order to do so, one necessarily has to devote to a single model. For Bembo, these are the steps to take:

> First, we should imitate the one who is best of all; next, we should imitate in such a way that we strive to overtake him; finally, all our effort should be devoted to surpassing him once we have overtaken him. Accordingly we should have in our minds those two outstanding accomplishers of very great matters, emulation and hope. But emulation should always be joined to imitation.[78]

Certainly, mere imitation was distinguished from emulation at a theoretical level in the critical literature produced in sixteenth-century Italy. For instance, Bartolomeo

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[77] Castelvetro's ideas are so unique that, as Andrew Bongiorno asserts: "in a century in which the end of poetry was universally understood to be utility as well as pleasure and Virgil was worshiped as the prince of poets, Castelvetro could stubbornly deny that poetry had any other end than pleasure and could dare vilify Virgil as a thief (...), a liar (...) and finally a non-poet" (Bongiorno 1984, xiv-xv).
[78] Quoted in (Pigman III 1980, 20)

Ricci's *De imitatione* (1541) distinguishes three ways of approaching a model, asserting that "following, imitation, and emulating are three entirely different species" even if "they are similar and do belong to one class"[79]. According to Ricci, following (*sequi*) means walking in somebody else's footsteps; imitating (*imitari*) aims at equality; and emulating (*aemulari*) is oriented to producing something better. Following is thus tantamount to non-transformative imitation, for it implies gathering or borrowing phrases, sentences, or passages directly from the model(s)[80]. Emulating, on the contrary, implies surpassing the model, which naturally clashes with dissimulation, and both become exclusive: disguising the relations between text and model would be pointless in this case because if the model is not recognized, then the superiority and victory over it would not be perceived by the reader.

4.4.3. Imitation and the Pléiade

The authors of the Pléiade attacked the style of the French poetic tradition and considered necessary a breaking-off with it through a new language more proper for lyrical expression. In this context, humanist imitation appeared to be a great opportunity for enriching the French language and literature, and indeed the French wished for their native tongue the exuberant fruits Italian was already enjoying and exhibiting. However, France had to approach imitation differently from Italy; for one thing, the Italians already had a prestigious body of literature produced in the vernacular thanks to Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio. Bembo, for instance, in favour of the exclusive imitation of Cicero in Latin prose, proposed Petrarch and Boccaccio as models to follow in verse. In contrast, the poets of the Pléiade rejected the national poetical tradition in French and

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[79] Quoted in (Pigman III 1980, 3). G. W. Pigman III acknowledges that "Ricci makes no effort to use the concepts precisely" and often seems to identify imitating and following together, drawing a single opposition between poetic imitation and emulation.

[80] G. W. Pigman III recognizes, though, that "a certain amount of transforming occurs by virtue of inclusion in a new context, and complete transcription without changing a word is very rare indeed" (Pigman III 1980, 32).

turned their eyes to Antiquity or Italy for their models[81]. Joachim du Bellay's *Déffence* (1549) explains the advantages of imitating in the following terms:

> just as discovery was the most praiseworthy achievement for ancient writers, so good imitation is the most useful, especially for those whose language is not yet particularly rich and abundant. But whoever undertakes this task should be aware that it is no simple matter to put oneself in the place of a good author and mimic his traits. Even Nature is unable to do as much, as can be discerned by some minute difference in things which seem otherwise nearly identical.[82]

Du Bellay believes that without imitation the French language would not be able to create great works of art like those of the Classical times: "without imitating the Greeks and Romans, we cannot give our language the excellence and brillance of the more famous languages"[83]. Classical poets thus became the models to follow, and just as the Romans had taken from Greek all that was useful and beneficial for them, the French were entitled to do the same with the Classical tongues in a process of appropriation and assimilation of the past to their advantage and for their own purposes[84]. Du Bellay believes that the poet needs to know the classical authors and the most important modern poets to the point of completely assimilating them in order to avoid turning imitation into ignoble reproduction of thoughts and feelings of other authors. Assimilation instead grants natural and personal transformation of the models into the

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[81] (Weber 1981, 118). Indeed, "France found in Italy a competitor as well as a model" – "a recent model of imitator to be imitated" (Carron 1988, 572).

[82] (Du Bellay 2004b, 51-52). In French: " …tout ainsi que ce feut le plus louable aux Anciens de bien inventer, aussi est ce le plus utile de bien immiter, mesmes à ceux, dont la Langue n'est encor' bien copieuse, et riche. Mais entende celuy, qui voudra immiter, que ce n'est chose facile de bien suyvre les vertuz d'un bon Aucteur, et quasi comme se transformer en luy, veu que la Nature mesmes aux choses, qui paroissent tressemblables, n'a sçeu tant faire, que par quelque notte, et difference elles ne puissent estre discernées" (Du Bellay 2001, 93).

[83] (Du Bellay 2004b, 65). In French: "C'est que sans l'immitation des Grecz, et Romains nous ne pouvons donner à notre Langue l'excellence, et lumiere des autres plus fameuses" (Du Bellay 2001, 120).

[84] Kees Meerhoff particularly discusses the role of imitation within Ramism and the Ramist ideal of emulation of classical authors: "c'est dire que les ramistes ont été extrêmement sensibles au problème essentiel de l'époque humaniste, celui de l'imitation. Forcés de s'exprimer et de communiquer dans la seule langue admise dans les cercles savants, le latin, ils ont lutté contre 'l'effet de répétition', le déjà-dit, le lieu commun ; ils ont tenu à affirmer leur 'différence' en posant comme principe que *l'analyse* des textes ne vaut rien sans la *genèse*, autrement dit que la lecture n'est rien sans la production de textes nouveaux. En soi, ce principe n'a rien d'extraordinaire : dès l'Antiquité on a affirmé que *l'imitatio* doit toujours aboutir à *l'aemulatio* ; mais les ramistes l'ont repris avec l'agressivité d'angry young men, et surtout en se servant d'un moyen moderne, autrement efficace : leur fameuse *méthode*. C'est ainsi que de l'approche méthodique des textes de Cicéron et de Quintilien ('analyse') naîtra la *Rhetorique* latine ('genèse'), comme la *Dialectique* était née de l'analyse critique de la logique d'Aristote" (Meerhoff 1986, 180).

distinctive style of every author, and renders them in agreement with the spirit and mentality of his contemporaries. In *Déffence*, Du Bellay discussed his "théorie de l'innutrition" in the following terms:

> If the Romans did not undertake translation, then how, one might ask, were they able to enrich their language as they did, even to the point of almost equalling Greek? *They did it by imitating the best Greek authors, transforming themselves into them, consuming them, and after having digested them well, by converting them into blood and nourishment.* They each chose the best author, according to their natural inclination and the topic they wished to discuss, and diligently observed his most unusual and exquisite qualities. Then, in the manner of grafts, as I explained before, they fastened and incorporated him into their own language.[85]

As a result of the assimilation of the literary features of the most renowned authors, novel writers would be able to express their own thoughts with greater quality and perfection. Du Bellay's tremendous insistence upon imitation, together with his not recognizing French authors as models to follow, caused criticism to flood in, and a year later he rectified his clear-cut position in the preface to the second edition of *L'Olive* (1550). In it, he moderated his views regarding the extent to which other literatures should be followed, although he remained firm in his rejection of French writers as models. In those pages, Du Bellay continued describing imitation as a theory of innutrition grounded on the conviction that writers should not slavishly imitate their models but allow the thoughts and style of those models to penetrate in their own writings. To the accusations that Du Bellay had stolen from past writers by attributing to himself words that in reality he had translated from previous authors, Du Bellay replies negatively, and in such a way that it is made manifest to the present day reader the magnitude of the accusations, which Du Bellay feels to be shameful and embarrassing – and utterly false, for indeed literary theft was heavily condemned at the time by the literary community. Du Bellay nonetheless recognizes that one likely consequence of

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[85] (Du Bellay 2004b, 50-51). In French: "Si les Romains (dira quelqu'un) n'ont vaqué à ce Labeur de Traduction, par quelz moyens donques ont ilz peu ainsi enrichir leur Langue, voyre jusques à l'egaller quasi à la Greque ? Immitant les meilleurs Aucteurs Grecz, se transformant en eux, les devorant, et apres les avoir bien digerez, les convertissant en sang, et nouriture, se proposant chacun selon son Naturel, et l'Argument qu'il vouloit elire, le meilleur Aucteur, dont ilz observoint diligemment toutes les plus rares, et exquises vertuz, et icelles comme Grephes, ainsi que j'ay dict devant, entoint, et apliquoint à leur Langue" (Du Bellay 2001, 91).

his perfect assimilation of models is that he may unconsciously draw on them in his

writings without being aware of the extent of their influence. However, their

unconscious influence upon him is far from constituting enough reason for him being

derogatorily called a thief:

> Then I am accused of bragging that I created what in fact I translated word for word
> from others. I am tempted to give them the answer that Virgil gave some vicious critic
> who accused him of borrowing Homer's poetry. I believe I have sufficiently defended
> the practice of imitation elsewhere. So I will not answer this point in any detail. Those
> who would weigh the relative merits of ancient Latin and modern Italian writers,
> plucking out all those beautiful borrowed feathers by which the latter soar, risk leaving
> them dressed as Horatian crows. *From reading good books, certain elements have
> become imprinted on my mind. When I then come to set out my own views on any given
> subject, rather than resurface in my memory as borrowings, these elements just flow
> readily through my pen. Must we therefore label them stolen property?*[86]

Almost two centuries before Du Bellay's words, in a letter to Boccaccio written

from Pavia on October 28, 1365, Petrarch had similarly dwelt on dissimulation about

unconscious verbal reminiscences and the difficulties of avoiding them. In the letter,

Petrarch informs Boccaccio about his young secretary Giovanni Malpaghini's

inclination towards poetry, about the boy's possessing "a force of character and a power

of self-control", "a mind that is keen and flexible", "a memory that is rapacious, and

capacious, and, best of all, tenacious", plus, more importantly, "a great deal of

invention", "a fine enthusiasm, and a heart that loves the Muses"[87]. Petrarch affirms

being confident that the boy "will develop vigour of thought and expression, and work

out, as the result of his experiments, a style of his own, and learn to avoid imitation, or,

better, to conceal it, so as to give the impression not of copying but rather of bringing to

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[86] (Du Bellay 2004a, 111-112). In French: "Et puis je me vante d'avoir inventé ce que j'ay mot à mot
traduit des aultres. A peu que je ne leur fay la responce que fist Virgile à un quiddam Zoile qui le
reprenoit d'emprunter les vers d'Homere. J'ay (ce me semble) ailleurs assez deffendu l'immitation. C'est
pourquoy je ne feray longue response à cet article. Qui vouldroit à ceste balance examiner les escritz des
anciens Romains et des modernes Italiens, leur arrachant toutes ces belles plumes empruntées dont ilz
volent si haultement, ilz seroint en hazard d'estre accoutrez en corneille Horacienne. Si par la lecture des
bons livres je me suis imprimé quelques traictz en la fantaisie, qui après, venant à exposer mes petites
conceptions selon les occasions qui m'en sont données, me coulent beaucoup plus facilement en la plume
qu'ilz ne me reviennent en la memoire, doibt-on pour ceste raison les appeler pieces rapportées?" (Du
Bellay 1950, 157-158).
[87] (Petrarch 1970, 288)

Italy from the writers of old something new"[88]. Indeed, similarity between text and model can be achieved either on purpose or unconsciously, as a result of having digested or assimilated previous readings. In this respect, Petrarch states that if he quickly read authors like Ennius and Plautus and memorized something from their texts, he would store it as having been written by someone else because he felt the readings alien to his own thoughts. In contrast, if Virgil, Cicero, Horace, or Boethius were the author at stake, since he had digested their works so effectively, he would store the words and thoughts without thinking them not his own. As a result, certain phrases may come to his pen without his consciously knowing that they originally belonged to someone else. This is precisely what Petrarch discovers when his young secretary points out that the words *atque intonat ore* of his sixth bucolic had previously been employed by Virgil, a fact which an astonished Petrarch communicates to Boccaccio:

> I was astounded, for I realised, as he spoke, what I had failed to see when writing, that this is the ending of one of Virgil's lines, in the sixth book of his divine poem. I determined to communicate the discovery to you; not that there is room any longer for correction, the poem being well known by this time and scattered far and wide, but that you might upbraid yourself for having left it to another to point out this slip of mine; (…). *I want you to join me in praying Virgil to pardon me, and not harden his heart against me for unwittingly borrowing – not stealing – these few words from him,* - who himself has stolen outright, many and many a time, from Homer, and Ennius, and Lucretius, and many another poet.[89]

Thus, Petrarch even considers correcting the Latin expression, and laments that the poem was already too well known to change it. Still, he seems to have a guilty conscience about it, which is why he lets Boccaccio know and prays Virgil pardon him. Indeed, Petrarch condemns slavish imitation and literary theft (he is clear about this when he states that he had committed "unwittingly borrowing – not stealing" from Virgil), and he even disapproves of it in the works of the very much praised Latin poets.

Fast forwarding some years in the French context, Michel de Montaigne in his essay "On Books" ("Des livres", 1580) openly and unabashedly recognizes that his

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[88] (Petrarch 1970, 289-290)
[89] (Petrarch 1970, 292-293)

writings greatly profit from imitation and the inevitable assimilation of the best literary figures of the past, whom he repeatedly has read. At the same time, in the extract below, he denounces the existence of a good number of fierce critics that seem eager to attack the borrowings from past authors by modern ones writing in the vernacular:

> I do not count my borrowings: I weigh them; if I had wanted them valued for their number I would have burdened myself with twice as many. They are all, except for very, very few, taken from names so famous and ancient that they seem to name themselves without help from me. *In the case of those reasonings and original ideas which I transplant into my own soil and confound with my own*, I sometimes deliberately omit to give the author's name so as to rein in the temerity of those hasty criticisms which leap to attack writings of every kind, especially recent writings by men still alive and in our vulgar tongue (...). *Myself, who am constantly unable to sort out my borrowings by my knowledge of where they came from*, am quite able to measure my reach and to know that my own soil is in no wise capable of bringing forth some of the richer flowers that I find rooted there and which all the produce of my own growing could never match.[90]

This being said, Montaigne nevertheless criticizes the extensive borrowings from other authors and the creation of new works through a technique of *collage*, that is, by putting together different arguments or parts of books by other authors:

> It has often occurred to me that those of our contemporaries who undertake to write comedies (such as the Italians, who are quite good at it) use three or four plots from Terence or Plautus to make one of their own. In one single comedy they pile up five or six tales from Boccaccio. *What makes them so burden themselves with matter is their lack of confidence in their ability to sustain themselves with their own graces*: they need something solid to lean on; not having enough in themselves to captivate us they want the story to detain us.[91]

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[90] (Montaigne 1993, 458). In French: "Je ne compte pas mes emprunts, je les poise. Et si je les eusse voulu faire valoir par nombre, je m'en fusse chargé deux fois autant. Ils sont tous, ou fort peu s'en faut, de noms si fameux et anciens qu'ils me semblent se nommer assez sans moi. Ès raisons et inventions que je transplante en mon solage et confons aux miennes, j'ay à escient ommis parfois d'en marquer l'autheur, pour tenir en bride la temerité de ces sentences hastives qui se jettent sur toute sorte d'escrits, notamment jeunes escrits d'hommes encore vivants, et en vulgaire (…). Car moy, qui, à faute de memoire, demeure court tous les coups à les trier, par cognoissance de nation, sçay très bien sentir, à mesurer ma portée, que mon terroir n'est aucunement capable d'aucunes fleurs trop riches que j'y trouve semées, et que tous les fruicts de mon creu ne les sçauroient payer" (Montaigne 1969, 78-79).

[91] (Montaigne 1993, 461). In French: "Il m'est souvent tombé en fantasie comme, en nostre temps, ceux qui se meslent de faire des comedies (ainsi que les Italiens, qui y sont assez heureux) employent trois ou quatre arguments de celles de Terence ou de Plaute pour en faire une des leurs. Ils entassent en une seule Comedie cinq ou six contes de Boccace. Ce qui les faict ainsi se charger de matiere, c'est la deffiance qu'ils ont de se pouvoir soustenir de leurs propres graces ; il faut qu'ils trouvent un corps où s'appuyer ; et, n'ayant pas du leur assez dequoy nous arrester, ils veulent que le conte nous amuse" (Montaigne 1969, 81-82).

Like Montaigne, Petrarch approved of reasonable imitation of the models, at the same time that both authors deemed necessary to preserve the imitator's personal traits and features when writing in order to avoid slavish and unproductive imitation. Petrarch elaborated on this idea in another letter to Boccaccio, probably written in 1359, in which he "disclaims all jealousy of Dante":

> I feared, however, in view of the impressionableness of youth and its readiness to admire everything, that, if I should imbue myself with his [Dante's] or any other writer's verses, *I might perhaps unconsciously and against my will come to be an imitator. In the ardour of youth this thought filled me with aversion.* Such was my self-confidence and enthusiasm that I deemed my own powers quite sufficient, without any mortal aid, to produce an original style all my own, in the species of production upon which I was engaged. It is for others to judge whether I was right in this. But I must add that if anything should be discovered in my Italian writings resembling, or even identical with, what has been said by him or others, it cannot be attributed to *secret or conscious imitation. This rock I have always endeavoured to avoid, especially in my writings in the vernacular*, although it is possible that, either by accident or, as Cicero says, owing to similar ways of thinking, I may ignorantly have traversed the same path as others.[92]

In other words, in his youth, Petrarch feared becoming an imitator –even if unconsciously and unwillingly– if he read the production of great literary figures (particularly those writing in Italian), and he wished to rely instead upon his own particular genius and ability to do something not previously done. The idea of turning into a mere imitator and copier certainly mortified Petrarch. In another letter from Venice dated April 9, 1363, Petrarch asserts the following: "Set to work, do not mistrust yourself, mix the new with the old", for "It is silly to trust only in what is old" and "Those who invented these things were just human beings, too"[93]. Petrarch goes on to say:

> Let us not be influenced either by that trite, vulgar saying that there is nothing new, or nothing new to be said. Since Solomon and Terence wrote this, how much luster has accrued to philosophy, how much improvement to poetry, how much light to history! (…) Nothing is so refined, so perfected that something cannot be added to it.[94]

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[92] (Petrarch 1970, 183)
[93] (Petrarch 1992, Vol. I, 59)
[94] (Petrarch 1992, Vol. I, 59-60)

In other words, invention is encouraged above anything else and unquestionably before unproductive imitation. Petrarch continues with his reflection on the right kind of imitation in the following terms:

> *An imitator must see to it that what he writes is similar, but not the very same*; and the similarity, moreover, should be not like that of a painting or statue to the person represented, but rather like that of a son to a father, where there is often great difference in the features and members, and yet after all there is a shadowy something, – akin to what our painters call one's *air*, – hovering about the face, and especially the eyes, out of which there grows a likeness that immediately, upon our beholding the child, calls the father up before us.[95]

From this appropriate type of imitation, Petrarch differentiates an incorrect sort, based on copying the very same words used by one's models, thus falling into plagiarism (a term Petrarch does not employ, however):

> In brief, *we may appropriate another's thought, and may even copy the very colours of his style, but we must abstain from borrowing his actual words*. The resemblance in the one case is hidden away below the surface; in the other it stares the reader in the face. The one kind of imitation makes poets; the other – apes. It may all be summed up by saying with Seneca, and with Flaccus before him, that we must write just as the bees make honey, not keeping the flowers but turning them into a sweetness of our own, blending many very different flavours into one, which shall be unlike them all, and better.[96]

Du Bellay is equally concerned with innovation, thus facing the tension between literary imitation and individual genius. For Du Bellay, imitation is not enough, and so he vindicates in the second preface to his *L'Olive* a certain amount of innovation within imitation: "I will just add that those who have read the works of Virgil, Ovid, Horace, Petrarch, and many others whom I have sometimes read rather heedlessly, will find that in my writing, there is far more original thought than there is artificial or fastidious emulation"[97]. Likewise, even if Jacques Peletier in his *Art Poétique* (1555)

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[95] (Petrarch 1970, 290)
[96] (Petrarch 1970, 291)
[97] (Du Bellay 2004a, 112). In French: "Encor' diray-je bien que ceulx qui ont leu les œuvres de Virgile, d'Ovide, d'Horace, de Petrarque, et beaucoup d'aultres que j'ay leuz quelquefois assez negligemment, trouverront qu'en mes escriptz y a beaucoup plus de naturelle invention que d'artificielle ou supersticieuse immitation" (Du Bellay 1950, 158). Due to statements of this kind, Jean-Claude Carron concludes that Du Bellay's position seems to be that "One imitates not in order to copy others, or to

acknowledged the importance of imitation, he still considered invention necessary for a poet to stand out. After the manner of Quintilian, Peletier says:

> However, the poet that has to excel should not be a faithful and permanent imitator. On the contrary, he should endeavor not only to add something of his own, but moreover to be able of doing better on various points. (…) From sheer imitation, nothing great is ever achieved: following the path of another man is proper of a lazy man of little courage. He that follows will always be the last.[98]

Imitation becomes, from this perspective, a useful tool for novel poets. However, it can turn against them when overused and when it becomes the only means by which an author writes. Imitation prepares the way for a poet to succeed, nonetheless, solely by itself and without the final prod of invention and personal genius, no poet would ever enjoy the sweet laurels of widespread literary recognition[99].

4.4.4. Imitation in England

Imitative exercises in sixteenth-century English schools were key in the teaching of the classical languages, grammar and rhetoric. They typically involved two steps: analysis and genesis. In the stage of analysis, students under the supervision of the teacher closely studied the model to observe how its excellences agreed with the precepts of art. Then, in the stage of genesis they attempted to produce something similar to the analyzed model. Memorizing, translating and paraphrasing were also very common imitative exercises in Renaissance schools[100]. Sir Thomas Elyot in *The boke named the*

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overtake them on their own ground, but rather to become oneself, to achieve self-recognition" (Carron 1988, 570).

[98] In French: "Il ne faut pas pourtant que le Poète qui doit exceller, soit imitateur juré ni perpétuel. Ains se propose non seulement de pouvoir ajouter du sien, mais encore de pouvoir faire mieux en plusieurs points. (...) *Par seule imitation rien ne se fait grand*: c'est le fait d'un homme paresseux et de peu de cœur, de marcher toujours après un autre. Celui sera toujours dernier, qui toujours suivra" (Peletier 1990, 256).

[99] For more on literary imitation in sixteenth-century France, see Ann Moss, "Literary Imitation in the Sixteenth Century: Writers and Readers, Latin and French" in *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* (Glyn P. Norton, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 107-118).

[100] Double translation, for instance, continued being an essential exercise in Tudor schools until well into the seventeenth century. Latin was the language of most textbooks and the one in which students were expected to write. In double translation exercises, the schoolboy would turn a Latin passage into English,

governour (1531) indeed encourages the young scholar to imitate Classical authors: "if the chylde were induced to make vearsis by the imytation of Virgile & Homere, it shulde mynister to hym moche dylectation and courage to study"[101]. *Nobilitas Literata* (1549), written by Ascham's German Protestant acquaintance Johannes Sturm and translated into English in 1570 by Thomas Browne under the title of *A Ritch Storehouse or Treasurie for Nobilitye and Gentlemen*, is another suggestive document on imitation in the sixteenth century[102]. Then, Sir Thomas Wilson regards imitation as a highly positive strategy for an orator to work to improve, and explains in his *The three orations of Demosthenes* (1570) that Demosthenes was a great admirer of both Plato and Thucydides, and that he imitated both to the point that he "did borrowe whole sentences of" Thucydides, "his chiefe arguments and best reasons", and that he did "imitate wholy Thucidides invention"[103]. Wilson sees this process of imitation as the direct cause of Demosthenes's oratorical excellence: "For no doubt Demosthenes by suche imitation and paynefull labor, came to that heigth of perfection, whereof he beareth the name, that is, to bee the chiefe Orator of all Greecelande, yea of all the worlde besides, I may well say"[104].

Roger Ascham, in his book on the teaching of Latin *The Schoolemaster* (1570), takes imitation as one of the "six wayes appointed by the best learned men, for the learning of tonges, and encreace of eloquence"[105]. Ascham defines imitation as "a facultie to expresse liuelie and perfitelie that example: which ye go about to follow"[106]. As a strategy to learn languages, Ascham recommends imitation only to advanced

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and then perhaps back into classical Latin. Paraphrasing, the practice of turning poetry into prose and vice versa, was first advised by Quintilian, and then recommended by Erasmus for the curriculum of St. Paul's School, even if the "Renaissance humanists who believed in the inviolable relationship between matter and form objected vehemently to this practice" (Corbett 1971, 248). Roger Ascham was one of the detractors, and he objected to paraphrase arguing that the student was always bound to do worse than the original writer of the text "bicause the Author, either Orator or Poete, had chosen out before, the fittest wordes and aptest composition for that matter" (Ascham 1904, 243).

[101] (Elyot 1537, D8^r)

[102] The book in fact anticipates John Hoskin's *Directions for Speech and Style* (1599).

[103] (Wilson 1570, 4^r)

[104] (Wilson 1570, *4^r)

[105] (Ascham 1904, 242). The other strategies are *translatio linguarum*, *paraphrasis*, *metaphrasis*, *epitome* and *declamatio*.

[106] (Ascham 1904, 264)

students, to whom it "would bring forth more learning, and breed vp trewer iudgement, than any other exercise that can be vsed"[107]. Ascham distinguishes in *The Schoolemaster* three kinds of imitation: the imitation of the actions of men in plays, the imitation of authors in matters of writing (and within this type of imitation he places the controversy of Ciceronians *vs* eclectics), and the way to imitate the chosen model(s):

> There be three kindes of it [imitation] in matters of learning.
> The whole doctrine of Comedies and Tragedies, is a perfite *imitation*, or faire liuelie painted picture of the life of euerie degree of man. (...)
> The second kind of *Imitation*, is to follow for learning of tonges and sciences, the best authors. Here riseth, emonges proude and enuious wittes, a great controuersie, whether, one or many are to be folowed: and if one, who is that one: *Seneca*, or *Cicero*: *Salust* or *Caesar*, and so forth in Greeke and Latin.
> The third kinde of *Imitation*, belongeth to the second: as when you be determined, whether ye will follow one or mo, to know perfitlie, and which way to folow that one: in what place: by what meane and order: by what tooles and instrumentes ye shall do it, by what skill and iudgement, ye shall trewelie discerne, whether ye folow rightlie or no.
> This *Imitatio*, is *dissimilis materiei similis tractatio*: and also, *similis materiei dissimilis tractatio*, as *Virgill* folowed *Homer*: but the Argument to the one was *Vlysses*, to the other *Aeneas*.[108]

Imitation was understood at the time of the Tudors as a means of innovation, and following specific models was common and natural to writers of Tudor humanist fiction[109], as the correspondence between Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet illustrates. In a letter from Hubert (dated November 19, 1573 and sent from Vienna), Sidney's tutor tells him the following:

> I send you an epistle of Pietro Bizarro of Perugia, that you may have before your eyes his surpassing eloquence, and make it your model. You will now perceive how unwisely you English acted in not appreciating all this excellence, and not treating it with the respect it deserves.[110]

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[107] (Ascham 1904, 268)

[108] (Ascham 1904, 266-267). Italics are Ascham's. For more on the subject of imitation in Ascham and Sturm, see Marion Trousdale, "Recurrence and Renaissance: Rhetorical Imitation in Ascham and Sturm." *English Literary Renaissance* VI (1976): 156-79.

[109] (Kinney 1986, 11). As Robert S. Miola explains: "Tudor writers ranged widely and eclectically, always and unpredictably joining classical and nonclassical sources. They practiced a fluid, innovative *imitation* that combined Greek and Roman authors with sources that were biblical, Italian, medieval, and contemporary. Such imitation of classical literature brought forth creations resonant with a rich and strange intertextuality" (Miola 2001, 144).

[110] (Bradley 1912, 4)

On December 5, 1573, Sidney responded from Venice to Hubert's encouragement of imitation in the following terms: "I read through the charming epistle of Pietro Bizarro of Perugia, and culled certain flowers, which, as I could do nothing better, I imitated"[111] – of course, we may as well think that if Sidney saw room for improvement he would have undoubtedly aimed to emulate those flowers he mentions. Nash discusses imitation in his very first work, *Anatomie of Absurditie* (1589), in the following terms:

> Turning over Histories, and reading the liues of excellent Orators and famous Philosophers, let us with Themistocles, set before our eyes one of the excellentest to imitate, in whose example insisting, our industry may be doubled, to the adequation of his praise.[112]

Then, George Puttenham's *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589) explains the origins of human language in humans' ability to imitate: "an excellent capacitie of wit" makes human beings "more disciplinable and imitatiue than any other creature"[113]. Finally, Huarte de San Juan's *The examination of mens wits* (1594) also discusses the mental particularities of good imitators. According to Huarte, "Gracious talkers, and imitaters, and such as can hold at bay, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrarie to the understanding, and to the memorie", for which reason, "they neuer prooue learned in Grammer, Logicke, Schoole-diuinitie, Phisicke, or the lawes"[114]. Then, the following extract from Robert Greene's "To the Gentlemen Students of both Uniuersities", included in his *Menaphon* (1589), severely criticizes servile imitation:

> euerie moechanicall mate abhorres the english he was borne too, and plucks with a solemne periphrasis, his vt vales from the inkhorne: which I impute not so much to the perfection of arts, as to *the seruile imitation of vainglorious tragoedians*, who contend not so seriouslie to excell in action, as to embowell the clowdes in a speach of comparison; thinking themselues more than initiated in poets immortalitie...[115]

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[111] (Bradley 1912, 6-7)
[112] (Nash 1589, E4ᵛ)
[113] (Puttenham 1970, 143)
[114] (Carew 1594, I1ʳ). In Spanish: "Los graciosos, decidores, apodadores y que saben dar una matraca, tienen cierta diferencia de imaginativa muy contraria del entendimiento y memoria. Y, así, jamás salen con la gramática, dialéctica, teología, escolástica, medicina ni leyes" (Huarte 1991, 158).
[115] (Greene 1589, **1ʳ)

In other words, it is "vainglorious tragoedians" that practice "seruile imitation" resulting in, according to Robert Greene, a proliferation of the despised inkhorn terms. In his *Defence of Poetry*, Thomas Lodge also throws the use of other author's arguments and sentences back in Gosson's face, thus accusing him (without explicitly saying it) of merely repeating what others had said, of not inventing nor putting forward anything new:

> Tell me GOSSON was all your owne you wrote there? did you borow nothing of your neyghbours? Out of what booke patched you out Cicero's Oration? Whence set you Catulin's Inuectiue. Thys is one thing, *alienam olet lucernam, non tuam*; so that your helper may wisely reply upon you with Virgil:
> *Hos ego versiculos feci: tulit alter honores.*
> I made these verses, others bear the name.[116]

Once more it is made manifest that, in the same way that imitation was taken with a grain of salt in Italy and France, where it was often regarded as a double-edged sword, England was not all-for imitation alone, and certainly not for the type of imitation that would result in plagiarism[117]. Although not strictly constituting plagiarism, Petrarch explicitly discusses a situation in which somebody's work was mistakenly attributed to a different person. In a letter from 1362-1363 to Angelo di Pietro Stefano dei Tosetti, Petrarch comments on some poorly written short works that had lately been attributed to him. In Petrarch's own words: "the people attributing them to me are doubly in the

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[116] (Lodge 1853, 28)

[117] Harold Ogden White in fact notes a considerably high number of adverse criticism against imitation in the final quarter of sixteenth century England, and a parallel increase in the emphasis of what he calls (quite anachronistically, to my taste) "originality" (White 1973, 118). White understands this increase as a consequence of the "greatly augmented literary activity of the time", together with "the growing self-consciousness of English writers": "In their first enthusiasm for the classics and for the Renaissance masters of the Continent, they had imitated whole-heartedly, often uncritically. But as the flood of imitative composition continued to rise, they realized that much of it was inferior work" (White 1973, 118). White affirms that Elizabethans tried to amend the situation through a reinterpretation of classical theory which resulted in praising "individual fabrication" "through individual adaptation, reinterpretation, and, if possible, improvement of the best which each writer could find in the literature of his own and earlier days" (White 1973, 119). Furthermore, Max W. Thomas argues that "there is a concomitant anxiety about the improper appropriation of texts" in the Early Modern period, for imitation was then caught "Between the residual medieval tradition of *compilatio* and the humanistic practices of *copia* and *inventio*": "*Compilatio* and its cognates, in their earliest deployments during late antiquity, were derived from *compilo*, 'plundering.' Plunder is double-edged: both a term of opprobrium for ill-gotten gains and a quasi-officially sanctioned means by which to make such gains (particularly through raids on rival colonial powers and, of course, colonies themselves). Property is theft. The early modern period is not so far different from the medieval period in finding this both the fundamental principle of generativity and, simultaneously, the potential pitfall of misappropriation" (Thomas 2000, 282).

wrong: they rob their author of his work and burden me with what is not mine"[118].
Before the prospect of either being stolen or attributed to somebody else's work, it is
highly illuminating that Petrarch asserts the following: "I would rather that any grace of
my own be hidden away than that another's disfigurements be stuck and stamped on my
face"[119]. Although it was not until 1709 that the first copyright legislation appeared in
England, Joseph Hall is credited with the first recorded use of the English term
'plagiary' in his *Virgidemiarum* (1598)[120], and there were in fact references to
'plagiaries' (*i.e.*, "people who misappropriate texts") already in early seventeenth-
century works. For instance, the volume of poetry *The Passionate Pilgrim* (1599) was
published by the printer William Jaggard with the phrase "By W. Shakespeare" on its
title page even in its third edition (published in 1612), which also included new material
by the poet and playwright Thomas Heywood, who denounced that his name did not
appear and that consequently his work was being attributed to somebody else[121].

In order to illustrate the actual acknowledgment of one's sources by sixteenth-
century writers, I will focus on the case of Thomas Watson's *The hekatompathia or
Passionate centurie of loue* (1582), "the first English sequence of uniform poems held

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[118] (Petrarch 1992, Vol. I, 65)
[119] (Petrarch 1992, Vol. I, 66)
[120] According to the *OED*, the adjective 'plagiary' meaning "that plagiarizes" appears for the first time in print in Joseph Hall's *Virgidemiarvm* (1598): "*Virgidemiarvm* IV. ii. 17 Alike to thee as leeue As..an, *Hos ego*, from old Petrarchs spright Vnto a Plagiarie sonnet-wright". The word *plagiarius*, literally 'kidnaper', had been for the first time used by the Latin poet Martial to refer to a literary thief (See epigram *Ad Fidentinum Plagiarium*).
[121] (Thomas 2000, 277). Max W. Thomas explains: "Some of those references occur in attacks against practices of textual misappropriation which are themselves word-for-word reproductions or translations of other texts, entirely without attribution. Perhaps the most famous such case is Ben Jonson's *Discoveries*, which has been condemned as plagiarism since Dryden, because even as he decries those who use other's words excessively, even wantonly, Jonson himself is 'merely' lifting and reproducing extant arguments, that is to say, he practices what he preaches against" (Thomas 2000, 277). Max W. Thomas's study concludes "that early modern 'plagiarism' is less a matter of appropriation than of adulteration", and "that many early modern writers are not concerned with claiming but with eschewing credit for texts" (Thomas 2000, 280). Brian Vickers also explains that the idea of plagiarism certainly existed in Renaissance England before the passing of a legislation to protect authors from the reprehensible practice: "As for plagiarism, some recent writers (misled by Foucault's claims that individuality was only discovered in the eighteenth century) have argued that Renaissance authors had no concept of their literary compositions as constituting personal property. It is true that a copyright law, in our sense, was not formulated until later, and that the legislation enforced by the Stationers Company tended to protect the rights of the printer or publisher rather than the author. But Elizabethan and Jacobean writers had a keen sense of their individual identity and of their moral rights to the works they had composed" (Vickers 2003, 29).

together by the common theme of love"[122], for which reason Watson has been denominated the introducer of the sonnet sequence in England. Watson usually calls his short love poems 'passions', or, less frequently, 'sonnets', although they do not match the present-day understanding of the term, as most of the passions were eighteen lines long written in iambic pentameter and organized in three sextets. *The hekatompathia* is divided in two parts: the first made up of seventy-nine passions, love poems built on Petrarchan tropes; the second, of twenty-one passions that enunciate anti-Petrarchan sentiments. Each passion is preceded by a short paragraph written in prose explaining classical allusions or identifying the sources of the themes sung in the poem. Very often, this prose explication labels the poem as a translation or an imitation of a previous one, thus acknowledging the influence or the indebtedness to previous writers[123]. Watson's headpieces have a clear didactic purpose, and transmit at the same time the classical tradition as well as the new fashions of Italy and France. Despite his efforts, Watson's work did not exert great influence upon renowned authors, and instead it was Sidney's *Astrophel and Stella* the one inspiring followers[124].

In *The hekatompathia*, Thomas Watson makes explicit his borrowings and acknowledges his influences and the works which he translates precisely because he is aware of the importance of poetic invention. Thus, at the beginning of his work he makes clear that "my birdes are al of mine own hatching" and that "I rather take vpon me to write better then *Charilus*, then once suppose to imitate *Homer*"[125]. For this reason, Watson takes care to mention the original writer of the lines he translates or

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[122] (Heninger 1964, ix). Indeed, it was both the first to be published and the first to be written, since the work was composed before July 1581, thus before *Astrophel and Stella* (Murphy 1957, 419).

[123] In this, as S. K. Heninger observes, Watson follows "a Continental vogue for annotating sonnets - e.g., Bembo's prose regularly interspersed Petrarch's *Sonetti e canzoni*, and the commentary of Muret and of Belleau separated Ronsard's *Amours*. Watson found precedents for self-commentary in many of his Italian models, from Dante's *Vita nuova* to Parabosco's *Lettere amorose*, and in his English predecessor, George Gascoigne" (Heninger 1964, ix-x).

[124] As Murphy explains: "Watson rejected the quatorzain and chose an eighteen-line form which he called a sonnet, yet no one followed his example. Further, among all the letters, critical essays, dedications, and other Elizabethan records after 1582, there is no mention of Watson's slender volume. For all the records tell us, *Astrophel and Stella* in manuscript may have found more readers than the *Hecatompathia* in print.

Yet a perusal of the Elizabethan sonnet sequences, and some other lyrical sequences, will reveal that the *Hecatompathia* was still very much alive and that it had left its mark on certain poets. These were unfortunately the mediocre ones; the more gifted show little sign of his influence" (Murphy 1957, 419).

[125] (Watson 1964, 7)

imitates, at the same time that he highlights any variation from them in case he does not fully copy a previous poem. Watson's honesty makes him for instance acknowledge in V that "All this Passion (two verses only excepted) is wholly translated out of *Petrarch*", or in XL that the poem "is almost word for word taken out of *Petarch* (…) All, except three verses, which this Authour hath necessarily added, for perfecting the number, which hee hath determined to vse in euery one of these his Passions"[126]. Finally, Watson literally admits that he has sometimes borrowed the invention of other authors. Thus, in passion LVII he states that "the Authour (…) groundeth his inuention, for the moste part, vpon the old Latine Prouerbe *Consuetudo est altera natura*"[127], and in LXI Watson affirms that "The inuention of this Passion is borrowed, for the most parte from *Seraphine Son. 125*"[128].

4.4.4.1. Imitation in Sidney and Shakespeare

Sidney's *Defence*, written around 1583, circulated in manuscript before it was posthumously published in 1595, when it appeared in two different editions: Olney's *Apologie for Poetrie* and Ponsonby's *Defence of Poesie*. When Sir Philip Sidney

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[126] (Watson 1964, 19) and (Watson 1964, 54). Watson translates or closely imitates Petrarch in numerous occasions, as in passions number VI, said to be "a translation into latine of the selfe same sonnet of *Petrarch*" (Watson 1964, 20); XXI, where Watson imitates "*Petrarch, Sonetto 221*" (Watson 1964, 35); XXXIX, "the fifte Sonnet in *Petrarch part.1*" (Watson 1964, 53); LXVI, the "*Petrarch Sonette 133*" (Watson 1964, 80); XC (Watson 1964, 104); and the epilogue, which Watson affirms being "faithfully translated out of *Petrarch, Sonnet 314.2*" (Watson 1964, 116). On other occasions, it is Ronsard the one translated or imitated, as in the case of passions number XXVII (Watson 1964, 41); XXVIII (Watson 1964, 42); LIIII (Watson 1964, 68); LXXXIII (Watson 1964, 97). In addition to this, Watson recognizes having imitated other authors to write his own poems in passions number VII (Watson 1964, 21), XXII (Watson 1964, 36), XXXIIII (Watson 1964, 48), XXXVIII (Watson 1964, 52), XLIII (Watson 1964, 57), XLVII (Watson 1964, 61), LI (Watson 1964, 65), LIII (Watson 1964, 67), LV (Watson 1964, 69), LVI (Watson 1964, 70), LXV (Watson 1964, 79), LXVIII (Watson 1964, 82), LXX (Watson 1964, 84), LXXV (Watson 1964, 89), LXXVII (Watson 1964, 91), LXXVIII (Watson 1964, 92), LXXIX (Watson 1964, 93), LXXXV (Watson 1964, 99), LXXXVI (Watson 1964, 100), LXXXIX (Watson 1964, 103), XCI (Watson 1964, 105), XCIII (Watson 1964, 107), XCIIII (Watson 1964, 108), XCVI (Watson 1964, 110), XCVIII (Watson 1964, 112), XCIX (Watson 1964, 114), and C (Watson 1964, 115). In most of them, he explains the extent of his imitation, and whether he has varied the source texts that were taken as models.
[127] (Watson 1964, 71). Thomas Watson refers to himself in all the prose commentaries preceding his poems as 'the author', thus talking about himself in third person singular, and not thinking of himself as an imitator or a translator.
[128] (Watson 1964, 75)

discusses in his *Defence* the nature of poetry, he defines it in Aristotelian terms by calling it an art of imitation: "Poesy therefore is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in the word *mimesis*, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth – to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture – with this end, to teach and delight"[129]. Of course, this does not mean that Sidney's understanding of imitation was an exact reproduction of Aristotle's, for although apparently sharing a number of common ideas –such as the rejection of poetic imitation as mere photographic representation –, they ultimately differ in some basic points. To begin with, for Sidney the higher objects of the poet's imitation are "things as they ought to be", while Aristotle is more inclusive and opens the range to things as they were or are and as they are said or thought to be. Furthermore, for Sidney the poet can have glimpses of the ideal world by transcending things and aiming at the absolutes, whereas Aristotle thinks that the poet discovers the universal form in the concrete object[130]. Finally, Aristotle would not agree with Sidney's notion that the poet "doth grow in effect into another nature, making things either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in Nature"[131]. Indeed, Aristotle does not think that the poet has to idealize the material offered to him by nature even if he tries to surpass and overcome her: after all, the perfection of universal forms is realized in the concrete.

Further discussions on the part of Sidney regarding imitation in poetry include the assertion that a poet needs "three wings to bear itself up into the air of due commendation: that is, Art, Imitation, and Exercise"[132], and his definition of imitation is to "borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be"[133]. The latter

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[129] (Sidney 2002, 86). Ursula Kuhn talks about three sorts of imitation in poetry as discussed by Sidney in his *Apology*: imitation of "authors dealing with religious subjects", "imitation of authors dealing with philosophical (moral and natural) or historical subjects", and "imitation of 'real poets' (vates)" (Kuhn 1974, 148-149).

[130] Kishler summarizes this difference in approach by saying that Aristotle's poet "becomes more philosophical in that he apprehends and mirrors forth the universality of his subject", whereas "Sidney's poet has a tendency to transcend philosophy" (Kishler 1963, 63).

[131] (Sidney 2002, 85)

[132] (Sidney 2002, 109)

[133] (Sidney 2002, 87)

statement suggests that Sidney's idea that poetry is an imitative art goes beyond copying nature and ultimately rests in the microcosm of the mind of the poet, which contains ideas that the poet is willing to let out in the form of images[134].

Some scholars have interpreted Sidney's points of disagreement with the Aristotelian notion of imitation as the result of a desire on the part of Sidney to reconcile the divergent Aristotelian and Platonic conceptions of *mimesis* in the *Defence*[135]. From this perspective, Sidney does not restrict himself to eclectically gathering different traditions with the intention of making up a hybrid thought, but builds a consistent synthesis from several contradictory lines. This would also explain that for Sidney poetic imitation is closer to poetic imagination and to the imitation of a god-like creativity (as will be seen in Chapter 6) than to the superficial imitation proper to the rest of the arts, which solely copy external Nature. Of course, this turns poetic imitation into the purest and highest kind of mimetic activity, and elevates the poet over the rest of the imitators.

According to other critics, the unresolved conflict in Sidney between Protestantism and Court life, between duty and pleasure, poetry and public service, also manifests in Sidney's use of imitation. Paul Allen Miller, who highlights the vast classical and Petrarchan imitation in *Astrophil and Stella*, views Sidney's use of imitation "as a means of imparting a certain stability to an ego otherwise in danger either of being absorbed into one of the period's competing discourses, or of simply being torn

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[134] Walter R. Davis in fact believes that Sidney, in his discussion of mimesis in poetry, failed to specify that which the poet imitates (which does not appear to exist in nature but only in the mind of the poet), and that his speech rather moves "from the idea of copying, toward the idea of producing an affective image" (Davis 1969, 29). Davis furthermore affirms that Sidney's poetic theory is both Platonic as well as Christian: "Platonic in its origins, since it goes beyond Nature to Ideas for imitation, and Platonic in its status, since it mediates between Ideas of things as they should be and the material, things as they are"; and Christian because "the poet as a little God not only possesses and shows Ideas, but he bodies them forth, he creates, in word and image, flesh for the divine Idea" (Davis 1969, 31).

[135] This is John C. Ulreich, Jr's position and my own, which goes beyond Levao's (1987) argument that Sidney contrasted Aristotelian and Platonic theories against each other, and Craig's (1980) belief that Sidney held them in tension. Ulreich summarizes his thought saying that "In its most comprehensive definition, therefore, poetic making is both an Aristotelian representation of what Nature has brought forth in her chief work, the conceiving imagination of man, and a Platonic figuring forth, a shadow of the invisible process by which God creates that other Nature" (Ulreich 1982, 83).

asunder"[136]. In this way, imitation enables *Astrophil and Stella* to work on two levels: on an external level based on imitation and literary presentation, and on a deeper allegorical level of self-reflection. In this state of things, imitation goes beyond any superficial stylistic consideration and allows transmission of complex political and theological sentiments in a socially acceptable manner[137].

Leaving theoretical hypotheses aside, the reality is that Sir Philip Sidney, like most of his contemporaries, held imitation as a pillar of poetry, even if, at the same time, he condemned servile followings of previous models, for example, severe cases of servile Petrarchism. Unsurprisingly, then, we find in the *Defence* the following extract:

> Many of such writings as come under the banner of unresistible love; if I were a mistress, would never persuade me they were in love; so coldly they apply fiery speeches, *as men that had rather read lover's writings (and so caught up certain swelling phrases which hang together. . .), than that in truth they feel those passions...*[138]

In other words, Sidney rebels against the loss of spontaneity in poetry that results from the frequent reading and close following of previous literary works. If the poet buries his own genuine feelings under a pile of already extant literature, the effect is the production of unreality and phoniness. Exacerbated imitation therefore degenerates into cold reproduction and destruction of real emotion. Likewise, in *Astrophel and Stella* Sidney emphasizes the same reaction to the overwhelmingly reproduced Petrarchan mode. The introductory poem to the sequence points out the futility of "turning others leaves" because, despite the frequent convenience of imitation, particularly for the poet who is beginning, "others feete" usually end up becoming "straungers" in the poet's

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[136] (Miller 1991, 503). Miller goes on to state that "imitation and its sanction of legitimacy provide Sidney with a way of mediating between contradictory historical and ideological tendencies, while nonetheless preserving the apparent coherence of his poetic ego. That coherence or stability, however, is largely a surface effect, for the poetry itself is often, in spite of its best intentions, subversive in both personal and political terms. And it is generally most subversive when the rhetoric of imitation is most clearly in view, subtly undermining both Sidney's subject position in Elizabethan society and the ideology which created it" (Miller 1991, 503).

[137] (Miller 1991, 518)

[138] (Sidney 2002, 113)

way. The alternative to uncomfortable and unproductive imitation is whispered in the imperative to the poetic voice by his Muse: "Foole (...) looke in thy heart and write"[139].

The subject matter of imitation does also appear in Shakespeare's poetic production[140]. In fact, Sonnet 53 and Sonnet 84 particularly refer to imitation and copying, and provide more information regarding how the subject was treated as a literary *topos* in sixteenth-century England. Both sonnets have in common the praise of the poetic voice's beloved one, and among the shared strategies that the poetic voice employs in both to enhance the beauty of his lover we find the repeated statement that his lover's breathtaking features are inimitable. Sonnet 53 runs as follows:

> What is your substance, whereof are you made,
> That millions of strange shadows on you tend?
> Since every one hath, every one, one shade,
> And you, but one, can every shadow lend.
> *Describe Adonis, and the counterfeit*
> *Is poorly imitated after you;*
> *On Helen's cheek all art of beauty set,*
> *And you in Grecian tires are painted new.*
> Speak of the spring and foison of the year;
> *The one doth shadow of your beauty show,*
> The other as your bounty doth appear,
> And you in every blessed shape we know.
>   *In all external grace you have some part,*
>   *But you like none, none you*, for constant heart.[141]

In these lines, the poetic voice places the beauty of the lover completely out of reach for both nature and natural elements (spring and its implications) and unparalleled by all previous historical landmarks of human beauty (Adonis, Helen of Troy). The beauty of the lover is depicted as an ideal, almost as a Platonic idea that exists in a different realm and to which nothing that can be perceived through the senses can compare. The rest of the beautiful sensible things or people are thus mere shadows of the incomparable and outshining beauty of the beloved one; they are nothing but poor

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[139] (Sidney 1591, B1^r)

[140] Another outstanding playwright of the sixteenth century, Christopher Marlowe, has been studied from the perspective of the role that imitation plays in his works. For instance, Timothy D. Crowley focuses on the analysis of imitation and the satire rooted in that same imitation in *Dido, Queen of Carthage*. Crowley in fact regards this play as a "playful parody, satirizing the convention of *imitatio*", at the same time that it remains bound through imitation to Virgil and Ovid (Crowley 2008, 438).

[141] (Shakespeare 2000, 47-48)

copies, failed attempts to counterfeit the insurmountable original. The superior status of the original is therefore unreachable for the copies, which inevitably appear as invariably inferior. Sonnet 84 tells a similar story:

> Who is it that says most, which can say more
> Than this rich praise, that you alone are you–
> In whose confíne immurèd is the store
> Which should example where your equal grew?
> Lean penury within that pen doth dwell,
> That to his subject lends not some small glory,
> But he that writes of you, if he can tell
> That you are you, so dignifies his story.
> *Let him but copy what in you is writ,*
> *Not making worse what nature made so clear,*
> *And such a counterpart shall fame his wit,*
> *Making his style admired everywhere.*
>   You to your beauteous blessings add a curse,
>   Being fond on praise, which makes your praises worse.[142]

Once again, the lover is the model, the inimitable ideal to follow. In this case, the lover is depicted as the product of Nature or rather, as a representative of the power and excellence of nature ("what nature made so clear"). As such, the artist, the writer, wishes to copy it in order to improve his writings and attain poetic glory ("And such a counterpart shall fame his wit"). However, despite the skills of the hard-working poet, it remains implicit that even if he does not "make worse" his model, his written copy will perforce not surpass the original's virtues and excellence. As will be seen in the following chapters, Shakespeare's ideas regarding invention and imagination also illustrate some of the most widespread views regarding both concepts in sixteenth-century England, and at the same time expand, complete and twist his apparently straightforward views on imitation. Certainly, the poet is far from being a humble imitator for Shakespeare, someone who stares with awe at Nature or at a model (literary, human), as he appears to be represented in the above sonnets. On the contrary, no one epitomizes better than Shakespeare the poet's liberation from any ties and forceful subjections, the lifting vigor of the poet's own invention, the growth and exploration

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[142] (Shakespeare 2000, 72, 75). For more on this sonnet and the topic of imitation, see (Montgomery 1996, 120).

through his poetic works of another nature (maybe even better than the known one), and

the freely ranging of the zodiac of the poet's inventive wit.

5

Invention in Sixteenth-Century English Works

The present chapter is dedicated to investigating the concept of invention in sixteenth-century England. To fully grasp the complex meaning of the notion of invention, books on rhetoric, on poetics, defences of poetry, prefaces to translations, books of emblems, entries to sixteenth-century dictionaries, and literary pieces will be examined. These sources suggest that, at the time, invention was still associated with the rhetorical idea of 'finding' while new shades of meaning closer to imagination, fantasy, fancy and wit started to become dominant even in rhetorical contexts. Common to all these different understandings is the centrality of invention in the process of poetry writing, in the process of assessing the literary worth of a work —a trend found in Italian and French as well as English criticism— and the fact that they turn invention into a criterion to distinguish an original work from a translation. Nonetheless, despite the generally positive press that invention enjoyed at the time, this concept also had a negative side; because it was praised in literary circles for its capacity to make things up, fantasize and depart from reality, it was in others (primarily in religious groups) that those same faculties and active powers were criticized, greatly distrusted, and associated with falsehood, lies and, ultimately, sin and heresy.

5.1. Invention in Sixteenth-Century English Books on Rhetoric

In rhetorical terms, invention invariably continued to be associated in sixteenth-century England with the search and device of arguments for discussion, and with the theory of the *loci*, topics or places. Nevertheless, even though supposedly the basic ideas on rhetorical invention as displayed by non-Ramist should agree, an in-depth study of the

definitions of rhetorical invention provided by sixteenth-century English authors reveals significant variations. Moreover, differences between the definitions do not obey the temporal factor, and so, it is not the case that a perteptible change at a precise moment irrevocably transformed thenceforth the understanding of the concept. Instead, different views, approaches, and shades of meaning in rhetorical invention coexisted in sixteenth-century England. More specifically, it is possible to distinguish two distinct clusters that ought not to be taken in opposition to each other, or as representing two confronted factions of rhetoricians, but instead, as indicators of the existence of two slightly different perspectives towards rhetorical invention.

One group of works stresses the idea that arguments are housed within the humand mind, therefore including in their definitions terms such as 'find', 'search', or 'seek' to refer to the implications of invention. The second group, apart from retaining those terms, additionally introduces in its treatment of invention words related to imagination and creativity such as 'imagination', 'fantasy', 'fancy', or 'wit'. The lexical choice of each cluster suggests that while for the first group arguments pre-exist in the human mind, and consequently orators just have to limit themselves to retrieving them, the second conceives of the mind as having a more active mechanism, and that the process of coming up with arguments for a discourse requires entering the domains of creativity, imagination and fancy. The idea in this case is that one does not simply look for an argument, but one creates it. Furthermore, the second category understands invention in opposition to imitation; in fact, the term 'invention' is often then stressed by the accompanying expression 'of one's own' to mark that the writer is using his own arguments and nobody else's. Even though the word 'originality' is of course absent in the discourse of the second category, the emphasis on invention as the antithesis of imitation suggests that innovation underlies invention.

5.1.1. Invention as a Finding Process

The view that rhetorical invention is purely a mental process of finding arguments appears for the first time in John Lydgate's *Here begynnethe the boke calledde John bochas descruinge the falle of princis princessis & other nobles* (1494), in the chapter "A chapiter agayne ianglers and dyffamers of rethorike", where it is expressed in the following terms:

> The fyrst of them [the parts of rhetoric] called Invencyon
> By whiche a man dothe in his hert *fynde*
> A secrete grounde sounde on *reason*
> With circūstaūces that nought be left behynde
> Fro poynt to poynt /*imprīted in his mynde*
> Touchyng the matter/ the substaūce & the great
> Of whiche he cast/notably rentreat[1]

Hence, what the orator has to "fynde" is based on reason and already "imprinted in his mynde". Thomas Wilson gives a similar definition of invention, as he understands invention in his *The Arte of Rhetorique* as "a *searchyng out* of thynges true, or thynges likely, the whiche maie reasonably sette furth a matter, and make it appere probable"[2]. To those that "will prove any cause and seke onely to teache thereby the truthe" he recommends consulting "the places of Logique", for they "geve good occasion to finde out plentifull matter"[3]. In fact, Wilson's definition of dialectical invention in his *The Rule of Reason* is also highly illustrative and coherent with his own concept of rhetorical invention:

> the other parte [of logic] shalbe sette forth whiche is called Inventio, whereby we maie *finde* argumentes, and reasons, meete to prove every matter where upon question maie ryse. This parte is *the store house of places wherein argumentes reste* (...). Like as they therefore that digge for golde in grounde, do *search* narrowly the vaynes of the yearth, and by diligent markyng the nature thereof, at length *finde out* the mine, which ones beyng *founde*, they strayght bryng to lyght, for the onely behove of man: So he that will reason wysely, aswell for the commune profite of other, as for his owne private gayne, must be a very diligent labourer, and consideryng matters are put to the proube, wherein

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[1] (Lydgate 1527, fo. C.lxiiiᵛ)
[2] (Wilson 1982, 31)
[3] (Wilson 1982, 31-32)

> often resteth doubte, his parte must be evermore to marke the nature of his cause and to *seke* confirmation therof in every parte. First, by the definicion, the cause, the effecte and propre office. Agayne, to se what is contrarie, what is like, and what thinges be incidēt thereunto, the which all when he hath done, he shall se at length that some one argument above al other, serveth best to confirme his cause, the whiche when with travayle, he hath *founde out*, he maie bryng to light and use accordyng to his will.[4]

In this excerpt, Wilson visually represents the act of finding an argument: to come up with an argument an orator has to "finde" it in the "store house of places, wherein argumentes reste", in the same way that gold-seekers "digge for golde in grounde", searching "narrowlie the vaines of the yearth", and "markyng the nature thereof" until "at length finde out the Mine". The human mind is thus a mine of buried arguments waiting for the logician or the rhetorician to find them, uncover them, and bring them to light. Neither Lydgate nor Wilson seem to acknowledge in their definitions any creative activity of the mind that goes beyond the unburial of already extant arguments. Thomas Wilson reaffirms his standpoint in the following extract also from *The Rule of Reason*, where he defines what a place is:

> A place is, the restyng corner of an argumēnt, or els a marke, whiche giueth warnyng to our memory what we maie speake probablie, either in the one parte, or the other, upon all causes that fall in question. Those that be good *hare finders*, will sone *finde* the hare by her fourme. For, when they se the grounde beaten flatte rounde about, & faire to the sight: thei haue a narow gesse by al likelihod, that the hare was there a litle before. Likewyse the *hontesman*, in huntyng the foxe, wil sone espie when he seeth a hole, whether it be a foxe borough, or not. *So he that will take profite in this parte of logique, must be like a hunter, and learne by labour, to knowe the boroughes. For these places be nothyng els, but couertes or boroughes, wherein if any one searche diligentlie, he maie fynde game at pleasure.*[5]

In this case, Wilson compares a logician to a hunter, and the argument to an animal hiding in its burrow. Therefore, in order for an orator or logician to be good at invention he needs not a fantastic imagination or creativity, but rather an excellent nose to detect the "boroughs" where arguments are hidden in order to appraise them and employ them in discourse. In fairly similar terms, in his *The arte of logicke* (1599) the Ramist Thomas Blundeville explains logical invention by saying that "Invention *findeth out*

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[4] (Wilson 1551, J5ᵛ-J6ᵛ)
[5] (Wilson 1551, I6ᵛ)

meete matter to proove the thing that yee intend"[6]. This aligns with a definition of invention in terms of something that is hidden and has to be found that was quite widespread both among rhetoricians and logicians.

5.1.2. Invention as a Finding Process and as Imagination, Fantasy, Fancy and Wit

If in the first group the idea of inventing is a matter of looking attentively within one's mind to find appropriate arguments, other sixteenth-century authors expanded their understanding of invention to include the fundamental role of a more active side of the psyche in the inventing process, viewing imagination, fantasy, fancy and wit as key mental activities in the development of argumentation. William Caxton's *The myrrour: [and] dyscrypcyon of the worlde with many meruaylles* (1527) is the first of the set of works that believe that invention is based upon imagination. Caxton is very clear in this respect when he briefly defines the parts of rhetoric: "The fyrst is invēcio/ as to *ymagyn* the mater which thou intendest to shew/ which must be of trew thyngs/ or lyke to be trew & to note well how many thynges in that mat ought to be spoken"[7]. Thus, to complete the first part of rhetoric, the orator has to start by imagining the subject matter, and deciding, probably with the help of the theory of the topics, "how many thynges in that mat ought to be spoken".

Leonard Cox's *The Art or Crafte of Rhetorique* (1532) exemplifies the complex understanding of invention when caught inbetween "finding" something that seems to be hidden in one's mind, and something which the mind itself has to give existence. Cox states that "who someuer desyreth to be a good Oratour or to dyspute and commune of any maner thynge" should "haue foure thinges"[8], invention, judgment, disposition, and eloquence, of which the first one, invention, is "the moost difficile or harde", and the one about which "the Rethoriciens whiche be maisters of this Arte: haue

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[6] (Blundeville 1599, B1ʳ)
[7] (Caxton 1527, D3ʳ)
[8] (Cox 1532, A4ʳ)

writen very moche & diligētly"[9]. Cox defines invention in the following terms, alluding to it when exploring the meaning of judgment:

> The fyrst is called Inuencion / for he must fyrst of all *imagin or Inuent in his mynde* what he shall say.
> The seconde is named Iugement. For he must have wyt to deserne & iuge whether *tho thynges that he hath* [f]*ounde in his mynde* be conuenient to the purpose or nat. [10]

Cox's description of invention is highly complex because it blends two completely different conceptions of it. In the first place, Cox puts invention on a par with imagination by equating 'to imagine' and 'to invent' ("imagin or Inuent"). When defining judgment, Cox refers to the things that the orator "hath [f]ounde in his mynde" as a consequence of the process of inventing. Thus, Cox appears to be unable to escape from the idea of 'finding' when describing invention. This is again related to the theory of the places, to which Cox alludes when discussing invention:

> Inuencion is comprehended in certayn places / as the Rhetoriciens call them / out of whom he that knoweth ye faculty may *fetche* easely suche thynges as be mete for the mater that he shall speke of / which mater the Oratours calleth the Theme (...). The theme purposed: we must after the rules of Rhetorique *go to our places* that shall anō shew vnto vs what shall be to our purpose.
> (...)
> As if I sholde make an oracion to the laude & prayse of the Kynges highnes: I must for the Inuencyon of suche thynges as be for my purpose *go to places of Rhetorique / where I shall easely finde (after I know the rules) that that I desyre*.[11]

In other words, the places are the core of the theory of invention, and so, whenever Cox speaks about finding, he means that the rhetor should go to the list of places he stores in his mind –which are formed by long hours of study and memorization– and "fetche" the most appropriate one depending on the theme he is about to tackle. At the same time, invention as finding is so closely tied to imagination that Cox treats 'to invent' and 'to imagine' as interchangeable, which indicates that he perceives no contradiction or exclusiveness between the concepts. Finding the proper place or *topos*

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[9] (Cox 1532, A5^v)
[10] (Cox 1532, A4^r)
[11] (Cox 1532, A5^v- A5^r)

is probably just the first step of invention, which would then very likely need imagination to elaborate on the chosen topic in order to satisfactorily complete the full process of inventing. Still, the association between invention as finding and imagination also raises questions about the basic understanding and implications of imagination in the sixteenth century, and even whether Cox's statement merely shows a generalized confusion between both terms at a moment of terminological transition.

In this respect, analysing the adjectives that premodify the notion of invention proves hugely helpful in figuring out the full meaning of the term. Ralph Lever's *The arte of reason rightly termed witcraft* (1573) illustrates the implications of the verb "to invent" in the following extract dealing with the creation of new words in English:

> For as time doth *inuent* a *newe forme of building*, a *straunge fashion of apparell*, and a *newe kinde of artillerie*, and munitions: so doe men *by consent of speache*, frame and *deuise new names*, fit to make knowen their *strange deuises*.[12]
> (...)
> they that will haue no *newe woordes deuised* where there is want, seme not well to consider howe speache groweth, or wherefore it was *deuised by man*: for *names are not giuen unto things afore the things themselues be inuented.*[13]

Lever shows that inventing implies man's devise of something that did not exist before, something "newe" and "straunge" that may be a building, a weapon, or words. In *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), George Puttenham employs the verb 'to devise' in a similar context, when he contrasts writing and translating poetry: "in *Chaucer* and *Lidgate* th'one writing the loues of *Troylus* and *Cresseida,* th'other of the fall of Princes: both by them translated not deuised"[14]. In all likelihood, 'to devise' was one of the closest synonyms to 'to invent' in the context of sixteenth-century literary production.

Adjectives in Richard Rainolde's *A booke called the foundacion of rhetorike* (1563) are also illustrative. In the extract quoted below, Rainolde explains logic as a closed fist, and rhetoric as an open hand –following a traditional comparison dating

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[12] (Lever 1573, *v^v)
[13] (Lever 1573, *vii^v)
[14] (Puttenham 1970, 65)

back to Zeno the Stoic that regained considerable popularity during the Renaissance[15]–,

and in these definitions he mentions invention:

> *Logike* is like faith he to the fiste, for euen as the fiste closeth and shutteth into one, the iointes and partes of the hande, & with mightie force and strength, wrappeth and closeth in thynges apprehended:
> (...) *Rhetorike* is like to the hand set at large, wherein euery part and ioint is manifeste, and euery vaine as braunches of trees sette at scope and libertee. So of like sorte, *Rhetorike* in moste ample and large maner, dilateth and setteth out small thynges or woordes, in soche sorte, with soche aboundaunce and plentuousnes, bothe of woordes and *wittie inuencion*, with soche goodlie disposicion, in soche a infinite sorte, with soche pleasauntnes of Oracion, that the moste stonie and hard hartes, can not but bee incensed, inflamed, and moued thereto.[16]

In this example, "wittie" is the adjective associated with invention. In the next

fragment, taken from a part of Rainolde's work where he comments on different

exercises for the training of rhetoricians, similar modifiers accompany 'invention':

> Aristotle the famous Philosopher, did traine vp youthe, to be perfite in the arte of eloquence, that thei might with all copiousnes and *ingenious inuencion* handle any cause.
> Nothing doeth so moche sharpe and acuate the *witte* and capacitee of any one, as this kinde of exercise.
> It is a goodly vertue in any one man, at a sodain, *to vtter wittely and ingeniouslie, the secrete and hid wisedome of his mynde*: it is a great maime to a profounde learned man, to wante abilitee, to vtter his exquisite and profounde knoweledge of his mynde.[17]

Here, "ingenious" refers to invention, and "wit", "wittely" and "ingeniouslie" also

describe it. In addition to this, Rainolde talks about "the secrete and hid wisedome of his

mynde", which reminds us of Wilson's comparisons of the logician to a gold-seeker and

a hunter in search of hidden boroughs within their minds. Once again, the human

psyche is considered a kind of mysterious chest containing occult treasures. A conscious

effort should thus be made on the part of the orator to find the rich thoughts in his mind.

In such a context, the use of "wittie" and "ingenious" can be understood in two different

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[15] "The favorite metaphors used during the Renaissance in referring to logic and rhetoric were Zeno's analogies of the closed fist and the open hand. The closed fist symbolized the tight, spare, compressed discourse of the philosopher; the open hand symbolized the relaxed, expansive, ingratiating discourse of the orator" (Corbett 1969, 288).
[16] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. i^r-Fol. ii^v)
[17] (Rainolde 1563, Fol. liiii^v)

ways. On the one hand, it could be thought that for an orator to mine his mind for the arguments he needs –and that might appear listed in the theory of the places–, he should be both "wittie" and "ingenious" due to the difficulty of the enterprise. On the other, "wittie" and "ingenious" might point at the imaginative and creative faculties of the orator, who might not simply limit himself to act as a hunter, but also as a creator. In any case, this hypothesis is not supported by the appearance in Richard Rainolde's text of words such as 'imagination', 'fancy', 'fantasy'/ 'phantasy' or 'creativity', which are completely absent from his work.

At this point, a brief note about the notion of 'wit' in the sixteenth century seems appropriate. Willian G. Crane remarks that, in the latter half of the sixteenth century, "wit was particularly associated with rhetorical devices, such as proverbs, maxims, similes, examples, apophthegms, definitions, and set descriptions", which school rhetoricians used for the amplification and embellishment of topics[18]. In Old English 'wit' referred to the mind, and in the plural alluded to the five senses or mental faculties in general. In the sixteenth century, translators rendered into English the Latin voice *ingenium* as 'wit', "especially where the context dealt with rhetoric and the expression of thought"[19]. As a result, 'wit' became "often almost synonymous with 'mental acumen'", and at times connoted "a flow of ideas and words ample for the development of any topic at length, along with quick comprehension of thought and readiness in answering"[20]. Indeed, it appears that in the sixteenth century 'quick' was one of the most frequent adjectives preceding 'wit', as Lyly's *Euphues and His England* (1580) suggests when one of the characters of the book enumerates the three ingredients "which argued a fine wit": "inuention, conceiuing, and aunswering"[21]. Invention also

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[18] (Crane 1937, 8)
[19] (Crane 1937, 9)
[20] (Crane 1937, 9)
[21] (Lyly 1580, I2ʳ). Crane considers Lyly's *Euphues: The Anatomy* of *Wyt* "the best-known work exemplifying what was regarded as wit in the sixteenth century. This is particularly appropriate, since *Euphues* itself testifies to the relation between wit and rhetoric" (Crane 1937, 10).

appears in Gabriel Harvey's definition of wit as "an affluent spirit, yeelding inuention to praise or dispraise, or anie wayes to discourse (with iudgement) of euerie subiecte"[22].

Angel Day's *The English Secretorie* (1592) clearly relates the concepts of wit and invention in a satisfactory self-expression: "Of this then the parte especiall and intendment most principall, consisteth, (as by experience is found) in *the use and exercise of the Pen, the wit and Invention togethers*"[23]. Day then distinguishes two different sorts of men: the ones that despite being educated and learned are unable to express themselves as they would like to (but in theory should given their knowledge), and a second category of men that, in spite of being somewhat less well-learned, manage to make the most of their wits, invention, and imitative faculties. What becomes relevant for us is, again, that invention and wit are linked to each other in the explanation of the second sort of men:

> Some againe in whom there is lesse Skill, greater Ignoraunce of learned knowledge, and farre meaner application every way, wherewith to be enabled with sufficiency, have neverthelesse a conceipt to rise, *and are in wit so prompt and capable of any thing laid before them, as by and by there wanteth not*, (though in truth when they have done, they can not learnedly answer for it) *neither invention, nor imitation*, wherewith in very commendable sort to performe what them seemeth good on a sodaine to deliver in writing.[24]

Curiously enough, wit is not described as synonymous with invention (which is differentiated from imitation) but instead points at some natural faculty inherent in every man that has nothing to do with rhetorical training. That invention is distinct from wit and is opposed to imitation is also supported in *Ortho-epia Gallica: Eliots fruits for the French* (1593), where John Eliot praises Homer by saying, among other things, that the "inventions" of his poems are "inimitable":

> Truly his wit was admirable, his *inventions inimitable*, his discourses naturall, his verses flowing, full of art, and vvhich haue infinit graces the more we consider them: beside a hidden sense in them, & the fountaine of all human sciences springing out of them, as we

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[22] (Harvey 1597, D2ʳ)
[23] (Day 1592, 139)
[24] (Day 1592, 137-138)

see a thousand and a thousand sundrie peeces of his poesies flie into the bokes of Philosophers, Geographers, Orators, and Historiographers.[25]

This manner of praising Homer is remarkable because it shows, in the first place, that invention is a key part in the process of poetry-writing, and that, secondly, it is resistant to and opposed to imitation. Certainly, Homer is praised on the grounds that his invention is unique, unrepeatable and non-reproducible, which is precisely what makes Homer's works so valuable.

The examination of mens wits (1594), the translation into English of Huarte de San Juan's *Examen de ingenios para las ciencias* (1575), also provides an insight into the notion of invention and its relation to wit. Although written in Spanish, the moment Huarte's book was translated into English, it started to influence English letters and thought and, with time, became part of the English tradition. In fact, the rendering of Huarte's title into English underwent several editions up until the eighteenth century[26]. Juan Huarte's *Examen de ingenios* explains the causes and variety of natural human abilities from a physiological point of view, with its roots in Galen and the theory of the humours[27]. According to Huarte, the brain is controlled by three qualities or humours (hot, moist, and dry[28]), and the three faculties of the mind (understanding, imagination,

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[25] (Eliot 1593, G1ʳ)

[26] Huarte exerted great international influence, as the number of non-Spanish editions of his books shows. In total, there have been counted thirty three editions (both old and modern) in Spanish, twenty five in French, eight in English, seven in Italian, three in Latin, three in German and one in Dutch. Huarte's work had three French translators, three English translators, two Italians, one Latin, one German, and one Dutch. After five Spanish editions, the *Examen de ingenios para las ciencias* was included in the Portuguese Inquisitorial Index of forbidden books, in 1583 in the Spanish one, and a year later in the *expurgatorio*, with a mention to the passages that should be deleted.

[27] The pillars of Huarte's work are the physiological/psychological theories of the Hippocratic and Galean branches of medicine, predominant until well into the eighteenth century. This doctrine is based on a series of correspondences between the four cosmic elements (fire, earth, water and air), the four primary qualities (heat, dryness, humidity and coldness), and the four humours (blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile), which combination produces the four temperaments. Thus, every person has a predominant humour which corresponds to a particular physiological character with specific moral and physical qualities. For more on Huarte de San Juan and his *Examen de ingenios*, see: Mauricio de Iriarte, *El Doctor Huarte de San Juan y su Examen de Ingenios* (Santander: Aldus, 1939); Esteban Torre, *Ideas lingüísticas y literarias del Doctor Huarte de San Juan* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1977); Luis García Vega and José Moya Santoyo, *Juan Huarte de San Juan: Patrón de la Psicología española* (Madrid: Ediciones Académicas, 1991).

[28] Although there are four primary qualities of the body (coldness, dryness, humidity and heat), coldness is but a passive quality only at work to cool the natural heat of the body, and so, it does not directly intervene in the formation of one type or other of wit. Consequently, heat, dryness and humidity determine all types of wits.

and memory) are determined by the temperature and moisture of the brain. In this manner, cold and dry are related to understanding, heat to imagination, and moisture to memory.

For Huarte, eloquence derives from the imagination, and he remarks that the art of persuasion results from a union between memory and imagination, whereas wisdom derives from the imagination, copiousness in language from memory, and ornament from the imagination. Huarte locates the rational soul in the brain, which consequently profoundly determines wit and intelligence. There are three faculties of the rational soul: memory, imagination and understanding. According to Huarte, understanding and eloquence are inimitable, and eloquence does not usually reside in men of great understanding. Moreover, the qualities required to become a good orator do not coincide with the ones required to be a good man from a moral point of view. Indeed, since imagination is a prerequisite for eloquence, and men of imagination are of a hot complexion, they tend to fall into vices such as pride, gluttony, or lechery, and are therefore more inclined to evil[29]. These ideas about the human mind are not particular to Huarte, but seem to be quite widespread throughout Europe. If Huarte believed that eloquence derived from the imagination, and so, good orators need not be men of great understanding, so did Pierre de La Primaudaye, author of the book *L'Academie Française*, translated into English in 1586 by Thomas Bowes under the title of *The French Academie*. La Primaudaye also distinguished three parts within the spirit: mind, understanding, and memory. According to La Primaudaye, the "quickest wits haue woorst memories, and contrarywise":

> Now bicause one of you (my companions) touched this, that they which haue a ready and quick wit, commonly want memorie, & that they which hardly learne, retaine and keepe better that which they haue learned, I will giue you this reason with *Plutark*, that hardnes of beleefe seemeth to be the cause why men comprehend slowly. For it is verie

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[29] Don Abbott observes that "this rather scurrilous nature of the preacher presents certain theological problems for Huarte, who is, for the most part, content to separate divinity, a product of understanding, from preaching, a product of the imagination. Huarte does hint, however, that this separation may be overcome by divine intervention" (Abbott 1983, 100).

euident, that to learne, is to receiue some impression: whereupon it followeth, that they which resist lest, are such as soonest beleeue.[30]

Like Huarte, Ascham stated in *The Schoolemaster* (1570) that those with quick wits and "inuentiuest heades" are men of less understanding than those with slower minds and tongues:

And of all other men, euen those that haue inuentiuest heades, for all purposes, and roundest tonges in all matters and places (...) commit commonlie greater faultes, than dull, staying silent men do. For, quicke inuentors, and faire readie speakers, being boldned with their present habilitie to say more, and perchance better to, at the soden for that present, than any other can do, vse lesse helpe of diligence and studie than they ought to do: and so haue in them commonlie, lesse learning, and weaker iudgement, for all deepe considerations, than some duller heades, and slower tonges haue.[31]

Indeed, Ascham illustrates the widespread distrust of the time to what the human mind is able to do by itself, for his ideas on invention are associated with fancy and errors, and so, acquire negative connotations. Consider the passage below in this respect:

And surelie mens bodies, be not more full of ill humors, than commonlie mens myndes (if they be yong, lustie, proude, like and loue them selues well, as most men do) *be full of fansies, opinions, errors, and faultes, not onelie in inward inuention*, but also in all their vtterance, either by pen or taulke. [32]

Examen de ingenios is a study of the different abilities of various sorts of men, and aims to help every man recognize himself in its descriptions and hence learn his strong and weak points. This knowledge would enable readers to choose a science that agrees with their natural capacities. Hence, the book is not only descriptive, but has the practical purpose of helping every person to find out their inherent skills, apply them to the science that best suits them, and then, find the type of job in which they will be truly efficient and, maximally useful to society. In this manner, the ultimate goal of Huarte's book is social and political, for he wanted his studies to have an impact on the good

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[30] (Bowes 1586, G6ᵛ)
[31] (Ascham 1904, 263)
[32] (Ascham 1904, 263)

workings of the state by making citizens carry out jobs most in accordance with their intuitive skills.

Huarte discusses the "so famous sentence of *Aristotle*, Our understanding is like a plaine table, wherin nothing is pourtraied" by saying that, whatever some men "know and attaine, it behooves that first they heare the same of some other, and are *barren of all invention* themselves"[33]. In the expression "barren of all invention", invention denotes the outcome of the capacity to invent, and so, "barren of all invention" means the absence of ideas stored in the mind. If the mind is a *tabula rasa*, it is empty and contains nothing; it is just a blank canvas on which it is possible to draw anything. In the extract below, invention is opposed to imitation and plagiarism, and in it Huarte argues the importance of invention for the progress of the sciences, the necessity that new generations come up with new ideas, and the uselessness of new books repeating what is already known:

> for the order and concert which is to be held, to the end that sciences may dayly receive increase and greater perfection, is to ioine *the new invention of our selves*, who live now, with that which the auncients left written in their bookes. For dealing after this manner, each in his time, shall adde an increase to the arts, and men who are yet vnborne, shall enjoy the invention and travaile of such as lived before. *As for such who want invention, the common wealth should not consent that they make bookes*, nor suffer them to be printed, because they *do nought else saue heape vp matters alreadie deliuered, and sentences of graue authours, returning to repeat the selfe things, stealing one from hence, and taking another from thence*, and *there is no man, but after such a fashion may make a booke*.[34]

In this manner, according to Huarte, authors that lack invention should be prevented from writing and publishing books, as they do nothing but copy without contributing to

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[33] (Carew 1594, F2ᵛ). In Spanish: "aquella sentencia de Aristóteles tan celebrada: *intellectus noster est tamquam tabula rasa in qua nihil est depictum*, porque todo cuanto han de saber y aprender lo han de oír a otro primero, y sobre ello no tienen ninguna invención" (Huarte 1991, 116).

[34] (Carew 1594, F2ʳ). In Spanish: "Porque el orden y concierto que se ha de tener para que las ciencias reciban cada día aumento y mayor perfección es juntar la nueva invención de los que ahora vivimos con lo que los antiguos dejaron escrito en sus libros; porque haciéndolo de esta manera, cada uno en su tiempo, vernían a crecer las artes, y los hombres que están por nacer gozarían de la invención y trabajo de los que primero vivieron. A los demás que carecen de invención, no había de consentir la república que escribiesen libros, ni dejárselos imprimir; porque no hacen más de dar círculos en los dichos y sentencias de los autores graves, y tornarlos a repetir; y hurtando uno de aquí y tomando otro de allí, ya no hay quien no componga una obra" (Huarte 1991, 117).

the growth of science and knowledge. Huarte therefore asserts that invention is the basic

requirement for any decent writer and any good orator:

> The first thing which a perfect Orator is to go about (having matter vnder hand) is *to seeke out arguments and conuenient sentences*, whereby he may dilate and prooue and that not with all sorts of words, but with such as give a good consonance to the eare: (...). *And this (for certain) appertaineth to the imagination*, fithens therin is a consonance of well pleasing words, and a good direction in to sentences.
> The second grace which may not be wanting in a perfect Orator, is *to possesse much invention*, or much reading, for if he rest bound to dilate and confirme any matter whatsoever, with many speeches and sentences applied to the purpose, *it behooueth that he haue a very swift imagination*, and that the same supplie (as it were) the place of *a braach, to hunt and bring the game to his hand*, and when he wants what to say, *to deuise somewhat as if it were materiall*.[35]

As can be seen, Huarte employs Wilson's image of the orator as a hunter of

arguments with the difference that for Huarte the hunting dog chasing the game is the

orator's imagination ("the place of *a braach, to hunt and bring the game to his hand*"),

a faculty Wilson did not even mention. In the extract above, Huarte seems to devise a

hierarchy of faculties necessary to the orator, so that if one is insufficient or fails, he can

rely on the others to decently continue with his discourse. Firstly, Huarte signals

imagination "to seeke out arguments and conuenient sentences" or "to deuise somewhat

as if it were materiall" –again mixing the two understandings of invention as finding

and as devising, but in this case applied to imagination. Secondly, he asks for "much

invention" or, were this not possible, for "much reading" (*i.e.*, the capacity to remember

what others have said before). Also, in the extract above, Huarte acknowledges the

importance of choosing appropriate sentences and words to produce a persuasive

discourse, approaches invention as a grace, and asserts that the more inventive an orator

is, the better. Reading is only considered an emergency resource to make up for the lack

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[35] (Carew 1594, K2^r). In Spanish: "Lo primero que ha de hacer el perfecto orador, teniendo ya el tema en las manos, es buscar argumentos y sentencias acomodadas con que dilatarle y probarle; y no con cualesquiera palabras, sino con aquellas que hagan buena consonancia en los oídos. (…) Esto cierto es que pertenece a la imaginativa, pues hay en ello consonancia de palabras graciosas y buen propósito en las sentencias.
La segunda gracia que no le ha de faltar al perfecto orador es tener mucha invención o mucha lección. Porque si está obligado a dilatar y probar cualquier tema que se le ofreciere con muchos dichos y sentencias traídas a propósito, ha menester tener muy subida imaginativa, que sea como un perro ventor que le busque y traiga la caza a la mano; y, cuando faltare qué decir, lo finja como si realmente fuera así" (Huarte 1991, 174)

of the innate inventive capacity, with the difference that, while invention provides renewed and endless ideas and arguments, the stock of reading, of knowledge that can be absorbed from books, is finite:

> In lieu of their owne inuention, oratours may supply the same with much reading, *forasmuch as their imagination faileth them*: but in conclusion whatsoever bookes teach, is bounded and limited; and *the proper inuention is a good fountain which alwaies yeeldeth forth new and fresh water*.[36]

For Huarte, "wisdome apperteineth to the imagination, copiousnesse of words and sententes to the memorie", and "ornament and polishment to the imagination"[37]. Invention also falls within the capacity of imagining, as he continually stresses. In fact, invention is productive and "proper" as long as the orator imagines, as long as he is able to write books containing ideas different from the ones already stated by previous authors. Invention succeeds if "new and fresh" ideas spring from it and if the imaginative powers of the orator are always in movement and renewing themselves. Should the orator's invention and imagination ever come to a standstill, the orator would be, Huarte says, like that preacher appointed to make a funeral oration which displeased the audience so much that "they did nought els than smile and murmure":

> This preacher uerily was *not endowed with any inuencion of his own*, but was driven to fetch the same out of his books, and to perform this, great studie and much memorie were requisite. *But those who borrow their conceits out of their owne brain, stand not in need of studie, time, or memorie*: for they find all ready at their fingers ends. Such will preach to one selfe audience all their life long without reapeating any point touched in twentie yeares before; *whereas those that want inuention*, in two Lenis cull the flowers out of all the books in a whole world, *and ransacke to the bottom all the writings that can be gotten*; and at the third Lent must go and get themselves a new auditory, except

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[36] (Carew 1594, K3ᵛ). In Spanish: "En lugar de invención propia, se pueden aprovechar los oradores de la mucha lección, ya que les falte la imaginativa; pero, en fin, lo que enseñan los libros es caudal finito y limitado, y la propia invención es como la buena fuente, que siempre da agua fresca y de nuevo" (Huarte 1991, 175). The image of invention as a fountain was widely used in the sixteenth century. For instance, it appears in the 1574 translation *The logike of the moste excellent philosopher P. Ramus martyr*, where one can read that "this first place of invention is the fountayne of all sciences" (MacIlmaine 1574, B2ᵛ).

[37] (Carew 1594, K3ᵛ). In Spanish: "La prudencia ya hemos dicho y probado atrás que pertenece a la imaginativa; la copia de vocablos y sentencias, a la memoria; el ornamento y atavío, a la imaginativa" (Huarte 1991, 175).

they will heare cast in their teeth, This is the same which you preached vnto vs in the yeare before.[38]

In similar terms, Leonard Cox discusses the importance of a preacher's having invention in composing his sermons so not to bore his audience:

> Likewise the vnapt disposicion of the precher (in orderyng his mater) confoundeth the memory of his herers / and briefly in declarynge of maters: *for lacke of inuencion and order with due elocucion: great tediousnes is engendred to the multitude beyng present* / by occasion wherof the speker is many tymes ere he haue ended his tale: either left almost aloon to his no litle confusiō: or els (which is a lyke rebuke to hym) the audience falleth for werynes of his ineloquent language fast on slepe.[39]

The repeated reference to invention in sermons on the part of many authors discussing rhetoric signals that preachers were one of the largest and most representative groups of orators in the sixteenth century, even if they were not the most reputed one.

5.2. Invention in Sixteenth-Century English Poetics

When analyzing what sixteenth-century English poetics say about poetical invention, one perceives five clearly distinguished ideas. In the first place, for the authors of poetics, invention was paramount in the process of writing poetry, as they could not understand poetry without invention. Secondly, invention was necessarily linked to other concepts such as imagination, a fact which, as has been seen, was stressed by some books on non-Ramist rhetoric. In the third place, invention and imitation were understood in opposition to each other: while imitation implied repetition of something for which another author is accountable, invention was seen as the production of

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[38] (Carew 1594, K3ʳ-K4ᵛ). In Spanish: "Este predicador, realmente, no tenía propia invención: todo lo había de sacar de los libros, y para esto es menester mucho estudio y memoria. Pero los que toman de su cabeza la invención, ni han menester estudiar, ni tiempo, ni memoria; porque todo se lo hallan dicho y levantado. Éstos predicarán a un auditorio toda la vida sin encontrarse con lo que dijeron veinte años atrás; y los que carecen de invención, en dos cuaresmas desfloran todos los libros de molde y acaban con los cartapacios y papeles que tienen, y a la tercera es menester pasarse a nuevo auditorio, so pena que les dirán: 'éste ya predica como antaño'" (Huarte 1991, 176).
[39] (Cox 1532, A3ʳ)

novelty. Fourthly, and for the same reason, invention was opposed to translation as well, since the translator appears to take or borrow the invention of the poet that devised the original work. Finally, invention was, on some occasions, subtly related to ideas on inspiration, which were remarkably absent in the treatment of rhetorical invention.

5.2.1. Invention as Paramount

Already in 1538, Thomas Elyot in his *The Dictionary of Syr Thomas Eliot Knyght* states that Homer's *Illiad* and *Odyssey* "are worthy to be radde, for the meruailous inuention, and profytable sentences in them contained"[40]. In other words, the fact that a book has good invention makes it advisable and worthy to be read, thus invention appears separate from the book's value in terms of *elocutio* and *dispositio*. In this manner, already in the first half of the sixteenth century, invention appears as an independent criterion for assessing literary merit. In the second half of the century, books on poetics continued to stress the unavoidable requirement of invention for a literary work to make a difference, obtain the applause of the critics, and become a success. There are few books on poetics that do not mention invention at all, including, Henry Dethick's *Oratio in laudem poëseos* (*c*. 1572) and Alberico Gentili's *Commentatio* (1593). Indeed, both authors defend and praise poetry and the poet without ever mentioning the poet's or the poetic work's invention. What is even more perplexing is that, at one point in his *Oratio*, Henry Dethick talks in rhetorical terms about a number of requirements a good poetic composition should have without making the slightest allusion to invention:

> For who would not freely allow that to select the choicest words, to arrange them when once chosen as appropriately as possible, to pronounce them when once arranged as charmingly as possible, pertains especially to the craft of poetry?[41]

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[40] (Elyot 1538, K2v)

[41] (Binns 1999, 49). In Latin: "Nam quis libenter non concedat, verba decerpere quam lectissima, discerpta disponere, quam aptissime, disposita pronunciare quam venustissime, ad artificium poeticum maxime pertinere" (Binns 1999, 48).

In this way, Dethick refers to *elocutio*, *dispositio* and even *pronuntiatio* in poetry completely neglecting *inventio*. The case of Richard Wills's *De re poetica disputatio* (1573) is different, for even if he does not thoroughly discuss invention, the concept is definitely present in his treatment of poetry. Wills describes poetry as imitation, and asserts that poetry "rests entirely on imitation" and has as its ultimate purpose "to teach delightfully"[42]:

> The poet, then, is the maker of an 'imitation' in metrical form, of a work of this kind; the work itself which he produces is the poem; and *poesis*, the method and design and form of the poem. Finally there is poetry, the art by which we are taught and trained in this poetic form which we have called *poesis*. (…) In the same way εὑρετής is an inventor, εὕρημα the thing he invents, the act of inventing εὕρησις, and the art of invention εὑρετική.[43]

In this manner, Wills includes *heuresis* in his treatment of poetry, even if the link between the two remains implicit. Later on, Wills affirms that the function of the poet is both to imitate what exists as well as "to feign what does not exist"[44], therefore splitting his understanding of poetry between imitation and the idea of 'feigning', which is appreciably closer to imagination and invention. As for John Hoskins's *Directions for Speech and Style* (*c.* 1599), it was not a complete *ars rhetorica*, for apart from its discussion on letter-writing, it focused almost exclusively on pronunciation and elocution. Moreover, the Ramist Omer Talon's *Rhetorica* was one of the avowed sources of Hoskins's work, while another of his masters, Johann Sturm, had discussed in his book elocution alone. Despite the Ramist influence upon Hoskins, his *Directions for Speech and Style* did mention invention even if briefly and merely at the beginning of the volume in "To the Forwardness of Many Virtuous Hopes in a Gent[leman] of the

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[42] (Wills 1958, 53). In Latin: "Quamobrem totum in imitatione tertium hoc genus orationis est positum; atq. iste eius finis ad illum alterum extremum nos ducit, nempe cum delectatione docere" (Wills 1958, 52).

[43] (Wills 1958, 55-57). In Latin: "Est igitur Poeta metricae imitationis, sive operis eiusmodi effector. Opus ipsum quod efficitur, Poema. Poesis, ratio atq. Poematis forma. Denique ars qua docemur, & ad hanc instituimur conformationem, quam Poesin diximus, Poetice est. vt sit gratia exempli, Homerus Poeta, Ilias Poema, ratio, forma, atq. ingenij conformatio secundum quam Ilias facta est, Poesis; habitus ipse praeceptis artis, studio, & exercitatione comparatus, Poetice. quemadmodum εὑρετής ‖ inuentor, εὕρημα id quod inuenitur, inuentio εὕρησις, ars inueniendi εὑρετική" (Wills 1958, 54-56).

[44] (Wills 1958, 121). In Latin: "Poetae non solum est ea fingere quae non sunt, sed & illa quae sunt, imitari" (Wills 1958, 120).

Temple by the Author". Hoskins reflects, in the context of letter-writing, on the uncertainty and lack of fixed rules for invention, which seems to move by sheer conjecture:

> In writing of letters there is to be regarded the invention and the fashion. For the *invention, that ariseth upon your business, whereof there can be no rules of more certainty or precepts of better direction given you than conjecture can lay down of all the several occasions of all particular men's lives and vocations.* (...)
> When you have invented, (if your business be matter and not bare form, nor mere ceremony, but some earnestness), then are you to proceed to the ordering of it and the digestion of the parts; which is sought out of circumstances. One is the understanding of the person to whom you write; the other is the coherence of the sentences. [45]

George Gascoigne recognizes invention as the starting point of any worthwhile literary work, for without a "fine and good" invention, Gascoigne doubts that anything praiseworthy will ever result. Invention's centrality runs parallel to Gascoigne's difficulties explaining how to achieve good invention: "the rule of Invention, which of all other rules is most to be marked, and hardest to be prescribed in certayne and infallible rules"[46]. In *The poesies of George Gascoigne Esquire* (1575) Gascoigne stresses the importance of invention on several occasions, the following extract being but one example of that general praise:

> *The first and most necessarie poynt that ever I founde meete to be considered in making of a delectable poems is this, to grounde it upon some fine invention*. For it is not inough to roll in pleasant woordes, nor yet to thunder in Rym, Ram, Ruff, by letter (quoth my master Chaucer) nor yet to abounde in apt vocables, or epythetes, unlesse the Invention have in it also *aliquid salis*. By this *aliquid salis*, *I meane some good and fine devise, the wing the quicke capacitie of a writer*: and where I say some good and fine invention, I meane that I would have it both fine and good.[47]

Gascoigne seems to understand "fine and good" invention as synonymous with avoidance of clichés and predictable topics. He instead recommends approaching a topic in a new fashion, pointing out that which is usually obviated. In order for the poet to

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[45] (Hoskins 1935, 4)
[46] (Gascoigne 1575, T3ᵛ)
[47] (Gascoigne 1575, T2ʳ)

stand out among the rest, Gascoigne offers an example related to the writing of love

poetry in praise of a woman:

> If I should undertake to wryte in prayse of a gentle woman, I would neither praise hir christal eye, nor hir cherrie lippe, &c. *For these things are trita & obvia. But I would either finde some supernaturall cause whereby my penne might walke in the superlative degree*, or els I would undertake to aunswere for any imperfection that shee hath, and thereupon rayse the prayse of hir commendacion. Likewise if I should disclose my pretence in love, *I would eyther make a straunge discourse of some intollerable passion,* or finde occasion to pleade by the example of some historie, or discover my disquiet in shadowes per Alegoriam, *or use the covertest meane that I could to avoyde the uncomely customes of common writers*.[48]

Even though this discouragement of repetition of "uncomely customes of common

writers" cannot yet be called a longing for originality, the wish for being unpredictable

is certainly already there. Furthermore, Gascoigne places good invention before

elocution and rhyme, for invention "beyng founde, pleasant woordes will follow well

inough and fast inough"[49]. In fact, Gascoigne recommends the following to the young

writer: "Your Invention being once devised, take heede that neither pleasure of rime,

nor varietie of devise, do carie you from it"[50]. Hence, elocution and rhyme are but

complements that should not divert the attention of the writer from what ought to be his

major concern, invention:

> 6.I would exhorte you also to beware of rime without reason: my meaning is hereby that *your rime leade you not from your firste Invention*, for many wryters when they have layed the platforme of their invention, are yet drawen sometimes (by ryme) to forget it or at least to alter it, as when they cannot readily finde out a worde whiche maye rime to the first (and yet continue their determinate Invention) they do then eyther botché it up with a words that will ryme (howe small reason soever it carie with it) or els they alter their first worde and so percase decline or trouble their former Invention: *But do you alwayes hold your first determined Invention, and do rather searche the bottome of your braynes for apte wordes, than chaunge good reason for rumbling rime*.[51]

Among the type of adjectives that accompany the term 'invention' in sixteenth-

century poetics, we do not infrequently discover adjectives expressing rareness or

oddity employed with positive connotations. For example, the correspondence between

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[48] (Gascoigne 1575, T3ᵛ)
[49] (Gascoigne 1575, T3ᵛ)
[50] (Gascoigne 1575, T3ᵛ)
[51] (Gascoigne 1575, T4ʳ)

Edmund Spenser and Gabriel Harvey published under the title *Three poper, and wittie, familiar letters* (1580), offers several instances of this. To begin with, when Spenser discusses his intention to write a volume on the route of the river Thames, he summarizes the book's novelty in the following way: "I minde shortely at convenient leysure, to sette forth a Booke in this kinde, whyche I entitle, *Epithalamion Thamesis*, whyche Booke I dare undertake wil be *very profitable for the knowledge, and rare for the Invention, and manner of handling*"[52]. Then, Gabriel Harvey praises Colin Clout's (*i.e.*, Spenser's) "Dreames" using the following arguments:

> I like your Dreames passingly well: and the rather, *bicause they favour of that singular extraordinarie veine and invention*, whiche I ever fancied moste, and in a manner admired onelye in Lucian, Petrarche, Aretine, Pasquill, and all the most delicate, and fine conceited Grecians & Italians: (for the Romanes to speake of, are but verye Ciphars in this kinde:) *whose chiefest endeuour, and drifte was, to have nothing vulgare, but in some respecte or other, and especially in liuely Hyperbolicall Amplifications, rare, queint, and odde in every pointe, and as a man woulde saye, a degree or two at the leaste, aboue the reache, and compasse of a common Schollers capacitie.*[53]

While vulgarity (understood as something too common and ordinary) is marked with negative connotations, adjectives such as "singular", "extraordinarie", "rare", "queint", or "odd" become expressions of praise and points in favour of the text. If vulgarity is within the reach of "common schollers' capacities", the unusual, strange, and extraordinary constitute the territory of the elite. Later on, Harvey states the following regarding Spenser's work:

> To be plaine, I am voyde al iudgement, if your Nine Comoedies, wherunto in imitation of Herodotus, you give the names of the Nine Muses, (and in one mans fansie not unworthily) *come not neere Ariostoes Comoedies, eyther for the finenesse of plausible Elocution, or the rarenesse of Poetical Invention*, than that Eluith Queene doth to his Orlando Furioso, which notwithstanding, you wil needes seeme to *emulate, and hope to overgo,* as you flatly professed your self in one of your last Letters.[54]

Again, in this extract, "*the rarenesse of Poetical Invention*" appears as a literary quality that an author should strive to achieve, and at the same time that it is emulation

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[52] (Spenser 1580, A4^r)
[53] (Spenser 1580, F1^r)
[54] (Spenser 1580, F1^r-F2^v)

and not imitation what is recommended: the final goal is not to merely replicate a previous work but to surpass it and "overgo" its merits. Likewise, in the context of legitimizing poetry by demonstrating that in the past it was a lofty activity, George Puttenham uses the expression "rare invention" as one of the reasons why a literary work would deserve being published:

> Since therefore so many noble Emperours, Kings and Princes haue bene studious of Poesie and other ciuill arts, & not ashamed to bewray their skils in the same, let none other meaner person despise learning, nor (whether it be in prose or in Poesie, if they them selues be able to write, *or haue written any thing well or of rare inuention*) be any whit squeimish to let it be publisht vnder their names, for reason serues it, and modestie doth not repugne.[55]

In other words, a work merits publication either if it is well-written or if it possesses "rare invention", that is, if it deals with something different from what other works have previously discussed or if it approaches a known theme in an unexpected way. Closely related to this view is Sir Philip Sidney's claim in his *Defence* that "the skill of the artificer standeth in that *Idea* or fore-conceit of the work, and not in the work itself"[56]. In this manner, invention appears, once again, paramount.

The relevance of invention also lays at the heart of the Gabriel Harvey-Thomas Nashe quarrel, which lasted for years and has been considered "the first English discussion in which accusations and denials of literary theft assumed importance"[57]. The disagreement began with Nashe's epistle "To the gentlemen students of both Universities" prefixed to Robert Greene's *Menaphon* (1589). It criticized those who "feed on nought but the crummes that fal from the translators trencher"[58], and those who

> must borow inuention of *Ariosto*, and his Countreymen, take vp choyce of words by exchange in *Tullies Tusculane*, and the Latine Historiographers store-houses; similitudes, nay whole sheetes and tractacts *verbatim*, from the plentie of *Plutarch* and *Plinie*; and to conclude, their whole methode of writing, from the libertie of Comical fictions, that haue succeeded to our Rethoritians, by a second imitation: so that, well

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[55] (Puttenham 1970, 22-23)
[56] (Sidney 2002, 85)
[57] (White 1973, 84)
[58] (Greene 1589, **2ᵛ)

> may the Adage, *Nil dictum quod non dictum prius*, bee the most iudiciall estimate, of our latter Writers.[59]

A few years later, in *Pierce Penniless His Supplication to the Devil* (1592), Thomas Nashe went against stolen literary property, this time in the context of "stolen" sermons:

> I my selfe haue beene so censured among some dull headed * Diuines: who deeme it no more cunning to write an exquisit Poem, than to preach pure Caluin, or distill the iuice of a Commentary into a quarter Sermon; Proue it when you will, you slow spirited Saturnists, that haue nothing but the pilfries of your penne, to pollish an exhortation withall: no eloquence but Tantologies, to tye the eares of your Auditory vnto you: *no inuention but heere is to be noted, I stole this note out of Beza or Marlorat*:[60]

Nashe's attacks finally encountered a reply in Gabriel Harvey's *Pierce's Supererogation; or, A New Praise of the Old Ass: A Preparative to Certain Larger Discourses Entitled Nashe's S. Fame* (1593). As Harold Ogden White remarks, in this work Harvey sarcastically praises Nashe's "fresh invention", "new Indies of Invention", "bottomlesse pitt of Invention", *"nimble and climbinge reach of Invention"*, and "socket-worne invention"[61], at the same time accuses Nashe of imitating and borrowing from Greene, Lyly, Tarlton, Gascoigne, and Marlowe. The truth is that Harvey distrusted the recurrent claims that Nashe made of his alledged "unborrowed" invention, and suspected actual servile following. Nashe, on the other hand, accused Harvey, among other things, of appropriating material from him and from other authors[62].

5.2.2. Invention in Italy and France

The stress on invention is far from being a unique trait of English poetics, and instead constitutes a feature common to Italian and French criticism too. Ullrich Langer summarizes the importance of invention in sixteenth-century Italian literary criticism in the following fragment:

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[59] (Greene 1589, **2ᵛ-**2ʳ)
[60] (Nash 1592, F1ʳ)
[61] (White 1973, 88)
[62] For the full account of the Gabriel Harvey-Thomas Nashe quarrel see (White 1973, 84-96).

Giason Denores in his 1553 commentary on the *Ars poetica* likens invention to the 'soul' of poetry. For Giovambattista Giraldi Cintio, the poem can be compared to a body, of which the subject-matter [*il soggetto*] is the bones which hold the flesh together. The choice of subject-matter, the first thing a poet considers, derives from invention (*Discorso . . . intorno al comporre dei romanzi*, 1554). More hyperbolically, Alessandro Lionardi praises invention as constituting the beginning and foundation of the poetic composition because it derives from the noblest causes: 'first from quickness of wit [*ingegno*], a gift of Nature; then from having read, heard, and seen many things, and finally ... from art, which shows us its decorum and aptness'.[63]

Within Italian criticism, one of the authors that chiefly emphasized the centrality of invention in the process of poetry-writing was Ludovico Castelvetro in his *Poetica d'Aristotele* (1570). For Castelvetro, poetry is the result of the hard work of highly qualified minds that have undergone some training. That means that poets are not born, but are trained to acquire poetic skills:

If we then inquire which of these two men will produce the better poetry or the better oratory, the rational answer will be that *the far better poetry or oratory will be produced by the one with a perfect comprehension of his art, not by the one endowed with a perfect nature*. And this will be so not because art can surpass the perfection of nature and teach more than nature, but because it is easier to teach the whole of an art to a man not wholly impenetrable to ideas than to find one endowed with all the gifts of nature, which are never allotted to one man but are distributed among many. And so because art can offer more doctrines to the single poet or orator than his nature and those doctrines can be taught with ease to many, *art is of greater profit than nature to both the poet and the orator*.[64]

Castelvetro seeks support for his views in his interpretation of Aristotle's ideas on the subject:

Aristotle makes it clear that he does not regard poetry as a special gift of God, vouchsafed to one man rather than to another, as are prophecy and other similar gifts, which are neither natural nor shared by all mortals. In fact by insisting that imitation and music are "natural" to men (4. 48b 5) he doubtless means to condemn, though he does not do so openly, the opinion which some attribute to Plato, that poetry is infused in men through divine madness.[65]

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[63] (Langer 2000, 137-138)
[64] (Castelvetro 1984, 44)
[65] (Castelvetro 1984, 37)

Castelvetro here rejects theories of divine poetical inspiration, and from his viewpoint, the poet is a craftsman, an artist that needs training if he wishes to succeed. This means that any virtues or outstanding qualities of the poet's work are due solely to his own efforts. For Castelvetro, the origin of invention is not heavenly but strictly human. Furthermore, remaining coherent with his general opinion about imitation (explored in the previous chapter), Castelvetro rejects any form of imitation at the level of invention; in this manner, not only does invention not descend from a superior being, but it also does not come from another human source, namely, another poet. To illustrate this point, Castelvetro compares the work of the poet with that of the builder of a house:

> the builder of a house takes his brick, mortar, and wooden doors, cabinets, etc. from the several arts that produce them and uses them in the form in which he receives them to give body to his conception of a house. He is not a maker of the things he has received from others but a maker of houses, and for that reason he is given the name of builder and not that of woodworker or other artisan. *But the poet differs from the builder in this, that he invents not only the whole plot*, i.e., its general design and the disposition of its parts, *but also some of the particulars which give it body, not borrowing all of them from others*, whereas the builder depends upon others for all he needs to realize his conception of the house as a whole and of the disposition of its parts.[66]

In a chapter entitled "Poets Not Imitators in Aristotle's Sense", Castelvetro continues elaborating on this idea in the following words: "a poet cannot legitimately fashion a plot that merely reproduces that of another poet, and if he does the resulting work would be not a poem but a history or a piece of stolen property"[67]. Castelvetro is therefore vehemently against those who consciously appropriate the subject matter and the language of others. According to Castelvetro, these are not poets but thieves, for the poet is primarily an inventor, and no invention means no poetry:

> the person who merely puts a known story into verse shirks the labor of invention; yet *invention is the most difficult part of the poet's art*, and it seems it was with an eye to *the poet as inventor* that the Greeks gave him a name that signifies "maker".[68]

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[66] (Castelvetro 1984, 275)
[67] (Castelvetro 1984, 42)
[68] (Castelvetro 1984, 50)

Bearing the previous statement in mind (that poetry requires personal invention), Castelvetro makes the bold claim that Boccaccio, Ariosto, Petrarch, Virgil, Plautus, Terence, Seneca, and Apuleius fall under the category of thieves, as their poetry lacks invention of their own. Castelvetro explains his accusation in the extract below:

> there are two classes of men, those wise enough to find their own way in life and those who must rely upon the counsel of others (we need not take into account those who can do neither), so there are two classes of artificers, those wise enough to discover the necessary principles of their art for themselves and by their precept and example to offer guidance to their fellows, and those who are unable to discover a single principle of the art they practice but can only follow the precepts and examples of others. This is especially true of *poets, some of whom take no notice of other poets, but invent their own matter and their own modes of figurative speech, while the rest cannot turn their backs on matter previously invented by others or on the figures of speech already used by them.* (...) I am of the opinion that poets of this latter kind must never for a moment be tolerated... I am unable to applaud these poets, who seem to me to resemble children and the duller sort of men, who ape the actions of others and acquire knowledge not by the exercise of their reason but mechanically, by imitation and practice.[69]

Certainly, Castelvetro conceives of invention and imitation as perfect contraries and in mutually exclusive terms: if there is no invention in poetry, then, there is sole imitation, and so, we cannot really talk about proper poetry but about cheeky and dishonest literary fraud. This was not the first time that Virgil was accused of having invented nothing and merely borrowing from Homer, as seen in Sperone Speroni's criticism in *Discorsi sopra Virgilio* (1563-1564). In any case, despite the radical assertions of Castelvetro, his "outburst against imitation appears to have disturbed his immediate successors but slightly, if at all"[70].

In the French context, books on poetics by the members of the Pléiade appeared before any of the sixteenth-century English poetics, and consolidated many of the views that English authors would later defend in their works, among them, the centrality of invention. For instance, in *Art poétique français* (1548), Sébillet states that "sap and wood (…) are the poets' invention and elocution"[71]. Then, Joachim du Bellay in his

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[69] (Castelvetro 1984, 41)
[70] (White 1973, 27). For more on Castelvetro's ideas on poetry, see Bernard Weinberg, "Castelvetro's Theory of Poetics" in *Critics and Criticism: Essays in Method* (R.S. Crane [et al.], eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. 146-168).
[71] In French: "la sève et le bois (...) sont l'invention et l'éloquence des Poètes" (Sébillet 1990, 56).

Déffence (1549) regarded invention as "the principal and primary tool of a speaker's equipment", and by extension, due to the way he links oratory with poetry, of the poet too[72]. Jacques Peletier in his *Art Poétique* (1555) affirms that invention "flows through the poem, like blood through the body of an animal: so that it [invention] can be called the life or soul of the poem"[73]. Finally, Pierre de Ronsard in *Abrégé de l'Art poétique français* (1565) regards invention as an essential element in poetry that springs both from nature as well as from serious training and awareness of the work of previous writers: "the main point is invention, which comes from both good nature, as well as the lesson of good and ancient authors"[74]. Just like Peletier, Ronsard portrays poetry as a living organism by using images drawn from nature and the workings of living bodies to refer to poetry: "thus poetry cannot be pleasant or perfect without beautiful inventions, descriptions, comparisons, which are the nerves and life of a book that wants to overcome the centuries in order to remain the conqueror of memory and master of time"[75].

5.3. Invention and Translation in the Sixteenth Century

Since Classical Antiquity, the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric made use of translation exercises for teaching purposes: in grammar, translation was a special aspect of textual commentary or a form of commentary, and in rhetoric, it was an exercise and an art form, a special kind of imitation. Imitation through translation is certainly an active rhetorical faculty of heuristic nature, for once a text is translated, it acquires a

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[72] (Du Bellay 2004b, 48). In French: "premiere, et principale Piece du Harnoys de l'Orateur" (Du Bellay 2001, 86). Margaret W. Ferguson explores "the problems raised by Du Bellay's effort to combine a theory of invention with a theory (or theories) of imitation", and argues "that this effort reveals an ambivalence toward the ancients that produces both an 'offensive' and a 'defensive' stance" (Ferguson 1978, 276).

[73] In French: "est répandue par tout le Poème, comme le sang par le corps de l'animal: de sorte qu'elle se peut appeler la vie ou l'âme du Poème" (Peletier 1990, 252).

[74] In French: "le principal point est l'invention, laquelle vient tant de la bonne nature, que par la leçon des bons et anciens auteurs" (Ronsard 1990, 468).

[75] In French: "ainsi la poésie ne peut être plaisante ni parfaite sans belles inventions, descriptions, comparaisons, qui sont les nerfs et la vie du livre qui veut forcer les siècles pour demeurer de toute mémoire victorieux et maître du temps" (Ronsard 1990, 471).

kind of primary status, and so can become a rhetorical model in itself. In a way, it appears that translation can lead the way to invention: through acute understanding the translator aspires to enter the language of the original, which in its turn is expected to shape the target language[76]. In the Middle Ages, the Roman model of translation as displacement reappeared, and this understanding of translation as the spur of rhetorical invention can be found in what Rita Copeland calls "secondary" translations. Chaucer's *Legend of Good Women* and Gower's *Confessio amantis* constitute great examples of "secondary" translations, for unlike "primary translations", they "define themselves expressly in terms of difference: they call attention to their own position in a historical rupture and in so doing advance their own claims to displace their sources"[77]. As a consequence, they use the techniques of exegetical translation as strategies of topical invention to create a vernacular substitute for the original. In the *Prologue* to the *Legend of Good Women*, Chaucer calls himself an *auctor* and therefore turns his translations into *auctoritates*, intending them be read not as translations or supplements to previous works –for they precisely efface their source[78]. Gower's *Confessio amantis* similarly asserts that it would be difficult to read the tales as mere translations[79].

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[76] In the Roman context, "translation is figured as an aggressive hermeneutics: it reinvents Greek *eloquentia,* it generates new models, it displaces its Greek sources, and in general is described in the active terms of a rhetorical project" (Copeland 1995, 34). Although Roman literature is not completely based upon direct translation, the theoretical formulations of Roman authors on the subject ended up dominating ideas on translation in the Middle Ages and later. For instance, Patristic theory uses some of the classical commonplaces about translation, and borrows terminology from Roman theory. Nonetheless, it rejects contestation, displacement, and appropriation as fundamental goals of translation, a position immanent in those same Roman formulas that it appropriated. Because the patristic position is chiefly concerned with the translation of the Bible and theological texts, translation theory here is fundamentally oriented to retrieving truthful meaning. Nevertheless, in the later Middle Ages the patristic model of translation is not the approach taken by literary translations into the vernacular. Instead, it "is a rhetorical motive of textual appropriation, akin to that of Roman translation, but which the Middle Ages finds in a newly empowered force and broadened scope of hermeneutical action" that accounts for it (Copeland 1995, 175). Rita Copeland talks about Augustine as a turning point in this respect: "Augustine and his heirs, the 'preceptive grammarians,' restore rhetoric to a powerful discursive role by identifying invention with the activity of exegesis, the *modus inveniendi* with the *modus interpretandi*. Augustine achieves this by giving rhetorical control over to readers, empowering readers to make the text meaningful. (...) This definition of rhetorical invention has important implications for vernacular translation, and ultimately for the status of translation as a form of academic discourse in the vernacular. If invention can be understood as a hermeneutical performance on a traditional textual source, this model of invention can also extend to certain forms of vernacular exegetical translation" (Copeland 1995, 179).
[77] (Copeland 1995, 180)
[78] (Copeland 1995, 186)
[79] This is what Rita Copeland denominates "full-fledged rhetorical appropriation" (Copeland 1995, 202).

In the Renaissance, the rediscovery of Greek and Latin texts was central in the history of *translatio studiorum*, and it led to engagement with the study of philology and the production of numerous commentaries interpreting the texts. The most essential difference between medieval and Renaissance theories/practices of translation is that, as a result of the emphasis on philology of the earlier humanists, translators of the sixteenth century were deeply concerned with the fidelity and accuracy of their work and were highly conscious of the special features of every language and of those that made every author unique −which they strove to preserve in their translations[80]. Translation moreover became an instrument of mediation between the masterpieces of the past and those to come[81]. Indisputably, Leonardo Bruni's *De intetpretatione recta* (*c*. 1426) in the Italian context, Étienne Dolet's *Manière de bien traduire d'une langue en l'autre* (1540) in the French one, and, in England, Lawrence Humphrey's *Interpretatio linguarum* (1559), by far contain the largest and most complete body of early Renaissance reflections on translation[82].

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[80] Indeed, for Elizabeth Sweeting the difference between the translation activity in the Middle Ages and that of the Renaissance is that while writers of the Middle Ages drew freely upon past literature incorporating and adapting it without acknowledgement, Renaissance men of letters developed an acute appreciation of the individual character of every author which translators attempted to preserve as much as possible (Sweeting 1964, 47). See also (Worth-Stylianou 2000, 132). This of course also raised questions as to the actual possibility of rendering into a different tongue the particular genius of every author, and many concluded that full equivalence between two languages was unattainable: "the poets' claim that translation was unable to illustrate the new language was one of the most salient aspects of the awareness that characterizes the renewal in sixteenth-century France of the notion of *translatio studii*" (Carron 1988, 569). For example, the problem for Du Bellay (as well as for many others, particularly in the French context) was that translation could never completely capture the characteristic *grace* of the original composition: "I will never believe that we can learn all this from translations, because it is impossible to render the meaning with the same grace as the author has used. Since every language has a special quality all its own, if you try to express its essence in another language according to the rules of translation, which consist of sticking closely to an author's words, your style will be stilted, cold, and lacking in grace" (Du Bellay 2004b, 48). In French: "Je ne croyray jamais qu'on puisse bien apprendre tout cela des Traducteurs, pour ce qu'il est impossible de le rendre avecques la mesme grace, dont l'Autheur en a usé : d'autant que chacune Langue a je ne sçay quoy propre seulement à elle" (Du Bellay 2001, 87-88). On his part, Barthélemy Aneau disagrees with Du Bellay in *Le Quintil horacien* (1550) when affirming the following: "n'est requise la méme grâce, mais la semblable, égale, ou plus grande, si elle vient á propos" (Aneau 1990, 199).

[81] As Michel Magnien points out, " Si l'*inventio*, mais aussi l'*elocutio* antiques peuvent se réincarner dans les langues modernes *via* la traduction, la rivalité avec les modèles antiques, cette volonté de les surpasser qui anime tout cicéronien, pourront s'accomplir en une autre langue que le latin, et alors tous les espoirs seront permis" (Magnien 1999, 364).

[82] Leonardo Bruni's *De intetpretatione recta* (*c*. 1426) was the first formal treatise on translation in the Renaissance; it "ascribed to the translator a creative role" and "exalted him to a lofty position" (Worth-Stylianou 2000, 128). Bruni believed in the necessary "displacement of the source text, in order for it to be retrieved the more fully in the new idiom" (Worth-Stylianou 2000, 128). For this, the translator should

In the context of Renaissance England, translation was also part of the education system, for it was present in Grammar Schools in the form of, for example, exercises to learn the Classical languages. Roger Ascham's *The Schoolemaster* (1570) contains detailed treatment of translation (its benefits and multiple exercises) for the purposes of teaching Latin. For Ascham, translation is the "most common, and most commendable of all other exercises" to teach foreign languages[83]. To back up his position, Ascham turns to Quintilian, who "also preferreth translation before all other exercises"[84], and to Pliny, who Ascham says that he places exercises of translation before all the rest:

> Ye perceiue, how *Plinie* teacheth, that by this exercise of double translating, is learned, easely, sensiblie, by litle and litle, not onelie all the hard congruities of Grammer, the choice of aptest wordes, the right framing of wordes and sentences, cumlines of figures and formes, fitte for euerie matter, and proper for euerie tong, but that which is greater also, in marking dayly, and folowing diligentlie thus, the steppes of the best Autors, *like inuention of Argumentes*, like order in disposition, like vtterance in Elocution, is easelie gathered vp: whereby your scholer shall be brought not onelie to like eloquence, but also, to all trewe vnderstanding and right iudgement, both for writing and speaking[85].

As can be seen here, Ascham defines the benefits of translating in rhetorical terms, one of the advantages being that translation contributes to the invention of arguments and to the perfection of the speaker's elocution.

Furthermore, translation was seen in the sixteenth century as an act of patriotism, as a way to make the whole country have access to the knowledge ciphered in a different tongue[86]. In the prefaces to the translations of the time, translators justified their works on the basis that they had in mind the intellectual needs of their fellow citizens. Thus, John Bourchier, Lord Berners, affirmed in the preface to *The first volum of sir Iohan Froyssart of the cronycles* (1523) that he judged "the four volumes or bokes of sir Johan

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have deep philological and rhetorical knowledge, which would enable him to convey the intended exact force of the author of the original text. For further analyses of Renaissance theories on translation, see (Furlan 2002).

[83] (Ascham 1904, 243). Paraphrasis, metaphrasis, and exercises of epitome, *imitatio* and *declamatio* are the other strategies to teach tongues that Ascham recognizes.

[84] (Ascham 1904, 243)

[85] (Ascham 1904, 244-245). William E. Miller nevertheless affirms that before the double translation exercises that Ascham attributes to Pliny, the latter instead "seems to have had in mind alternative possibilities: translation from Greek into Latin *or* from Latin into Greek (essentially Cicero's idea)" (Miller 1963, 168).

[86] (Matthiessen 1931, 3)

Froyssart of the countrey of Neyuaulte / written in the Frenche tongue", "comodyous / necessarie / and profytable to be hadde in Englysshe", having in mind the "pleasure" of "the noble gētylmen of Englande / to se / beholue / & rede: the highe enterprises / famous actes / and glorious dedes / done and atchyued by their ualyant aūceytours"[87]. Similarly, William Fulwood, the translator into English of *The Castel of Memorie* (1562) explains in the preface to the book that the "twoo severall causes" that resolved him to publish his translation were his own "exercise and commoditie", but also, "chiefely and especially", "the common utilitie and profite" of his "natiue country"[88]. Sir Thomas Wilson in the preface to *The three orations of Demosthenes* (1570) explains as well that he underwent his translation of Demosthenes because he could not "suffer so noble an Orator and so necessarie a writer for all those that love their Countries libertie, and welfare, to lye hid and unknowne"[89]. By the end of the century, John Harington would confess in his "A briefe and summarie allegorie of Orlando Furioso not unpleasant nor unprofitable for those that have read the former Poeme" included in his *Orlando furioso* (1591) that when he finished his translation, he felt proud that in his "young yeares" he had employed his "idle houres to the good liking of many, and those of the better sort"[90].

Translation moreover favoured the entire nation by enlarging the national language's lexicon. Indeed, it was generally felt in the sixteenth century that English lacked many words that the Classical languages registered, and these missing terms in the English vocabulary were made more evident when translating. So, writing works in English or translating them into English became a means to enrich the language, for the translator was many times the one that first noticed the empty spaces and was

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[87] (Berners 1523, A3ᵛ)
[88] (Fulwood 1562, A6ʳ)
[89] (Wilson 1570, 2ʳ)
[90] (Harington 1591, Mm2ʳ). The idea of translating as an act of patriotism and helping one's community appears in French writings of the time as well. For instance, in Jacques Peletier du Mans's *L'art poétique d'Horace* (1545), a translation into French of Horace's *Ars*, Peletier explains his drive to translate Horace in the following manner: "j'ai mieux aimé servir au bien publiq en communicant plusieurs belles traditions, sans lesquelles n'est aucunement possible d'ouvrer en poesie" (Peletier 1950, 115). In other words, in this case the translation of Horace's work becomes a means to foster or improve the writing of poetry in French, which in its turn would have greater benefits for the entire nation.

challenged with the question of how to fill them up. Furthermore, since the image of England as a nation was also tied to the English language, in these circumstances a strong language would in some way also affect the perception of England both from within the country as well as from abroad[91]. Translators, not without controversy and detractors, faced the responsibility of creating words in English to fill in the gaps or directly importing with slight or no changes the original foreign terms. The translator into English of *The logike of the moste excellent philosopher P. Ramus martyr* (1574) criticizes in "The epistle to the Reader" those "that thinkethe it not decent to wryte any liberall arte in the vulgar tongue, but woulde haue all thinges kept close eyther in the Hebrewe, Greke, or Latyn tongues"[92]. For the translator, it is natural that every man speaks and writes in their own mother tongue, and claims that even the great figures of the Latin civilization had translated from the Greek and borrowed terms from the Greek language:

> What, shall we thinke shame to borrowe eyther of the Latin or Greke, more then the learned Cicero did? Or finde some fitt wordes in our owne tongue able to expresse our meaning as Aristotle did? Shall we I saye be more vnkynde to our natiue tongue and countery then was thiese men to theirs?[93]

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[91] As Ian Lancashire explains, "the most powerful patron of early modern English was Henry VIII" (Lancashire 2005, 30), and for over two centuries there existed an informal policy supervised by the Crown "to expand the vocabulary of English by importing words from European languages" through measures such as "awarding patronage to printers of dictionaries and grammars, usually expressed as copyright protection and public approval" (Lancashire 2005, 33).

[92] (MacIlmaine 1574, A8^r)

[93] (MacIlmaine 1574, A8^r-B1^v). Horace himself was far from opposing the creation of new words when writing or adding new meanings to already extant words. In fact, as he explained in his *Ars poetica*, Horace regarded the Greek language as a source of new terms: "with a nice taste and care in weaving words together, you will express yourself most happily, if a skilful setting makes a familiar word new. If haply one must betoken abstruse things by novel terms, you will have a chance to fashion words never heard of by the kilted Cethegi, and licence will be granted, if used with modesty; while words, though new and of recent make, will win acceptance, if they spring from a Greek fount and are drawn therefrom but sparingly. Why indeed shall Romans grant this licence to Caecilius and Plautus, and refuse it to Virgil and Varius? And why should I be grudged the right of adding, if I can, my little fund, when the tongue of Cato and of Ennius has enriched our mother-speech and brought to light new terms for things? It has ever been, and ever will be, permitted to issue words stamped with the mint-mark of the day" (Horace 1978, 455 – lines 46-59). In Latin (Horace 1978, 454):
> In verbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis
> dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum
> reddiderit iunctura novum. si forte necesse est
> indiciis monstrare recentibus abdita rerum,
> fingere cinctutis non exaudita Cethegis
> contingent, dabiturque licentia sumpta pudenter:
> et nova fictaque nuper habebunt verba fidem, si

Despite these obvious benefits derived from translation, translators and poets in sixteenth-century England (and France) repeatedly stressed the differences between writing a literary work (in prose or verse) and translating it. At the heart of these differences one finds the concept of invention, which is precisely what elevates authentic literary writings over translations, and consequently what places the process of literary creation in a level above translation. At the roots of this dissimilar

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Graeco fonte cadent parce detorta. quid autem
Caecilio Plautoque dabit Romanus ademptum
Vergilio Varioque? ego cur, adquirere pauca
si possum, invideor, cum lingua Catonis et Enni
sermonem patrium ditaverit et nova rerum
nomina protulerit? licuit semperque licebit
signatum praesente nota producere nomen.

Likewise, the French also conceived of translation as a means to improve the French language at a time in which vernaculars were still struggling with Latin. Étienne Dolet, in his "Au Lecteur" prefixed to *La Manière de Bien Traduire d'une Langue en aultre* (1540), says of his work that "s'il ne reforme totallement nostre langue, pour le moyns pense que c'est commencement qui pourra parvenir à fin telle que les estrangiers ne nous appelleront plus barbares" (Dolet 1950, 78). However, other authors such as Du Bellay state that translation to French of classical works, as useful and necessary as it proves to enrich the language, is not enough to make the vernacular rise to the status of Latin or Italian: "This activity of translation, however laudable, strikes me as neither the only nor the most adequate means to raise our vernacular onto a par with the other more famous languages" (Du Bellay 2004b, 47). In French: "Toutesfois ce tant louable labeur de traduyre ne me semble moyen unique, et suffisant, pour elever nostre vulgaire à l'egal, et Parangon des autres plus fameuses Langues" (Du Bellay 2001, 85). Certainly, Du Bellay believes that the French language is not so poor that it cannot become the language in which great invective works can be written. From his viewpoint, it is mandatory to produce works in French in order to demonstrate the talent of French minds and the potential of their mother tongue: "Whoever looks carefully will find that our French language is not so impoverished that it cannot accurately express a borrowed concept. Nor so infertile that it cannot produce on its own the fruit of some original thought, through the diligent effort and ingenuity of its proponents, if there be any so dedicated to their country and to themselves to devote their attention to it" (Du Bellay 2004b, 46-47). In French: "Et qui voudra de bien pres y regarder, trouvera que nostre Langue Françoyse n'est si pauvre, qu'elle ne puysse rendre fidelement, ce qu'elle emprunte des autres, si infertile, qu'elle ne puysse produyre de soy quelque fruict de bonne invention, au moyen de l'industrie, et diligence des cultiveurs d'icelle, si quelques uns se treuvent tant amys de leur païz, et d'eux mesmes, qu'ilz s'y veillent employer" (Du Bellay 2001, 83). Thus, it is not that Du Bellay considers translation useless, for in fact he claims that "it is not a bad thing, but rather entirely laudable, to borrow thoughts and words from a foreign language in order to appropriate them to one's own" (Du Bellay 2004b, 52). In French: "ce n'est point chose vicieuse, mais grandement louable, emprunter d'une Langue etrangere les Sentences, et les motz, et les approprier à la sienne" (Du Bellay 2001, 94). It is rather that Du Bellay thinks translation is not enough to elevate French and take it into the next level: "So I ask you people who merely translate, do you think that if these famous authors had bothered to do translations, they would have raised their language to the height and perfection which we now observe? However much skill you devote to this effort, do not think that you can make our language, which is still crawling, so much as lift its head and rise to its feet" (Du Bellay 2004b, 51). In French : "Je vous demande donq' vous autres, qui ne vous employez qu'aux Translations, si ces tant fameux Aucteurs se fussent amusez à traduyre, eussent ilz elevé leur Langue à l'excellence, et hauteur, où nous la voyons maintenant? Ne pensez donques, quelque diligence et industrie que vous puissiez mettre en cest endroict, faire tant que nostre Langue, encores rampante à terre, puisse hausser la teste, et s'elever sur piedz" (Du Bellay 2001, 92). For more on the new words entering the sixteenth-century English language in general, and the lexis of rhetoric in particular, and the attitude of rhetoricians towards this phenomenon, see Edward E. Hale Jr., "Ideas on Rhetoric in the Sixteenth Century." *PMLA* 18.3 (1903): 424-44.

appreciation we find the generalized (and previously discussed) praise that invention received at the time. The basic reasoning was that since translators do not invent but copy the invention of other writers, the work of a translator necessarily remains inferior to that of the creator. In France, Joachim du Bellay is one of the great champions of poetic invention over translation. Indeed, in his *Déffense* (1549) Du Bellay went as far as to call bad translators traitors, following the Italian saying *traduttore, traditore*. In contrast, he thought true poets belonged to an altogether different and superior class of men, primarily due to their inventive abilities:

> What shall I say about those who should really be called traitors rather than translators? This is because they betray the authors they attempt to explain, depriving them of their glory, and by the same token, seducing ignorant readers by switching white for black. To make a scholarly name for themselves, they translate on trust languages of which they know nothing, such as Hebrew or Greek. What is more, to make a better impression, they take on the poets. These are precisely the kind of writers whom, if I were willing and able to translate, I would not tackle. *Above all others, poets possess divine creativity*, stylistic grandeur, verbal magnificence, profundity of thought, an audacious variety of figures, and a thousand other poetic charms.[94]

Some years later, Jacques Peletier recognized translation as the truest kind of imitation, partly because it appropriates someone else's invention:

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[94] (Du Bellay 2004b, 49-50). Although in the English translation the term 'invention' does not appear, the French original does include it. Indeed, in English it has been rendered as "divine creativity", another proof of how the term 'invention' has practically disappeared from current literary terminology: "Mais que diray-je d'aucuns, vrayement mieux dignes d'estre appellés Traditeurs, que Traducteurs? Veu qu'ilz trahissent ceux, qu'ilz entreprennent exposer, les frustrant de leur gloire, et par mesme moyen seduysent les Lecteurs ignorans, leur montrant le blanc pour le noyr : qui, pour acquerir le Nom de Sçavans, traduysent à credict les Langues, dont jamais ilz n'ont entendu les premiers Elementz, comme l'Hebraique, et la Grecque : et encor' pour myeux se faire valoir, se prennent aux Poëtes, genre d'aucteurs certes, auquel si je sçavoy', ou vouloy' traduyre, je m'adroisseroy' aussi peu *à cause de ceste Divinité d'Invention*, qu'ilz ont plus que les autres, de ceste grandeur de style, magnificence de motz, gravité de sentences, audace, et varieté de figures, et mil' autres lumieres de Poësie" (Du Bellay 2001, 89-90). Nonetheless, Du Bellay's criticism to certain translators does not prevent him from recognizing the benefits of translations, and Du Bellay later specifies that: "This does not apply to those who translate the greatest Greek and Latin poets on the command of princes and great lords, because the obedience due to such individuals needs no excuse in this domain. I am speaking rather to those translators who undertake such things frivolously and with a merry heart, as they say, and with the predictable results" (Du Bellay 2004b, 50). In French: "Ce que je dy ne s'adroisse pas à ceux, qui par le commandement des Princes, et grands Seigneurs traduysent les plus fameux Poëtes Grecz, et Latins : pour ce que l'obeïssance, qu'on doit à telz Personnaiges, ne reçoit aucune Excuse en cet endroit, mais bien j'entens parler à ceux, qui de gayeté de coeur (comme on dict) entreprennent telles choses legerement, et s'en acquitent de mesmes" (Du Bellay 2001, 90-91).

> The truest form of imitation is translation: because to imitate is nothing but wishing to make what another does: thus, the translator subjects himself not only to the invention of another, but also to his disposition, and furthermore, to as much as the elocution as he is capable of within the possibilities of the target language.[95]

James I, in "To the favourable Reader" preceding his *The essayes of a prentise, in the diuine art of poesie* (1584), claims that "translations are limitat, and restraind in somethings, more then free inventions are"[96]. James I recognizes this lack of freedom in translations as an element that renders the job of the translator more problematic, for he cannot deviate from the path opened by the author. In other words, copying the "free inventions" of previous authors is one of the reasons why translating is, according to James I, more difficult than writing something new. In this case, James I agrees with what Robert Peterson, translator of *Galateo ... Or rather, A treatise of the ma[n]ners and behauiours* (1576), had said about translation eight years before in a poem prefaced to the body of his translation: "Translatours can not mount: for though, ther armes with wings be spread, / *In vaine they toile to take the flight, their feete are clogd with lead*"[97].

The alleged lack of freedom of the translator becomes one of James I's major arguments to excuse himself for the quality of his translation. The great praise of invention together with the recognition that translation is based on following someone else's invention makes James I admit that his job as a translator cannot be compared to the one carried out by the author he is translating:

> *Bot sen Inuention, is ane of the cheif vertewis in a Poete, it is best that ze inuent zour awin subiect, zour self*, and not to compose of sene subiectis. Especially, *translating any thing out of vther language, quhilk doing, ze not onely essay not zour awin ingyne of Inuentioun*, bot be the same meanes, ze are bound, as to astaik, to follow that buikis phrasis, quhilk ze translate.[98]

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[95] In French: "La plus vraie espèce d'Imitation, c'est de traduire: Car imiter n'est autre chose que vouloir faire ce que fait un Autre: Ainsi que fait *le Traducteur qui s'asservit non seulement á l'Invention d'autrui*, mais aussi à la Disposition: et encoré à l'Élocution tant qu'il peut, et tant que lui permet le naturel de la Langue translative" (Peletier 1990, 262).
[96] (James I 1584, C4ᵛ)
[97] (Peterson 1576, ¶3ᵛ)
[98] (James I 1584, M3ᵛ)

For James I, however, not everybody can become a poet because not everyone has been endowed with the gift of invention: "ze can not haue the *Inuentioun* except it come of Nature"[99]. This agrees with the common saying that orators were made whereas poets were born; as Thomas Lodge briefly put it in *A defence of poetry, music and stage plays* (1579): "*Poeta nascitur, Orator fit*; as who should say, Poetrye commeth from aboue, from a heauenly seate of a glorious God, unto an excellent creature man: an Orator is but made by exercise"[100]. In the French context, Ronsard also believed that "invention depends on a fair nature of the soul"[101]. From this perspective, thus, nature becomes the source of poetic talent.

George Gascoigne also drastically differentiates the work of an author from that of a translator by means of the idea of invention. Indeed, the subtitle of his *A Hundreth sundrie Flowres bounde vp in one small Poesie* (1573) could not be clearer: "*Gathered partely (by translation) in the fyne outlandish Gardins of Euripides, Ouid, Petrarke, Ariosto, and others: and partly by inuention, out of our owne fruitefull Orchardes in Englande*". In this manner, he builds up an entire discourse upon the discrepancy between what we would nowadays call creative writing and translating making the concept of invention a focal point. In "The letter of G. T. to his very friend H. W. concerning this worke" we find numerous occurrences of the term 'invention' understood in opposition to translation or imitation, and invariably employed with more positive connotations. For instance, when talking about two different works, "The one called, the *Sundry lots of loue*", "The other of his owne inuencion entituled. *The clyming of an Eagles neast*", he says that "especially the later (…) doth seeme by the name to be a work worthy the reading"[102]. Then, he speculates whether the author of a sonnet beginning "Loue, hope, and death, do stirre in me such strife" "borowed th'inuentiun of an Jtalian". Although the speaker says that "were it a translation or inuention (…) it is

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[99] (James I 1584, M3$^{\mathrm{r}}$)
[100] (Lodge 1853, 10)
[101] In French: "l'invention dépend d'une gentille nature d'esprit" (Ronsard 1990, 473).
[102] (Gascoigne 1573, A3$^{\mathrm{v}}$)

both prety and pithy"[103], he ends up affirming being "sure that he wrote it, for he is no borrower of inuentios"[104], which the speaker then sets to prove as if he were the writer's defence counsel. Nevertheless, when the time comes to judge another sonnet (beginning with the line "The stately Dames of Rome, their Pearles did weare") the speaker is compelled to recognize that in that case it was "but a translation": "I am assured that it is but a translation, for I my selfe haue seene the inuention of an Italian"[105].

Likewise, William Webbe in *A discourse of English poetrie* (1586), after discussing the most renowned poets in English and their best-known works, agrees that translating is easier, or at least less troublesome, than writing something new:

> I for my part, so farre as those examples would leade me, and mine owne small skyll affoorde me, have blundered uppon these fewe, whereinto I have translated the two first Aeglogues of Virgill: because *I thought no matter of mine owne invention, nor any other of antiquitye more fitte for tryal of thys thing, before there were some more speciall direction, which might leade to a lesse troublesome manner of wryting*.[106]

John Harington in *Orlando furioso in English heroical verse* (1591) also admits that he can claim no praise for the invention of the subject matter of his translation "having but borrowed it"[107]. The superiority of poetic creation over translation is also crystal clear from the first page of George Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589), where we find the following sentence:

> the very Poet makes and contriues out of his owne braine both the verse and matter of his poeme, and not by any foreine copie or example, as doth the translator, who therefore may well be sayd a versifier, but not a Poet.[108]

Hence, the poet belongs to a superior category to the translator/versifier. Later on, when Puttenham is about to make an inventory of some of the best known English writers, he begins by asserting that "It appeareth by sundry records of bookes both

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[103] (Gascoigne 1573, C2^v)
[104] (Gascoigne 1573, F3^r)
[105] (Gascoigne 1573, F4^v)
[106] (Webbe 1586, H2^v)
[107] (Harington 1591, ¶8^r)
[108] (Puttenham 1970, 3)

printed & written, that many of our countreymen haue painfully trauelled in this part: of whose works some appeare to be but *bare translatiōs*, other some *matters of their owne inuention and very commendable*"[109]. Unquestionably, "bare translations" greatly contrast with the "very commendable" matters drawn from the author's "owne invention". At the same time, however, Puttenham acknowledges that translation is one of the most important means of enriching the English language, and that it is an activity that deserves praise when carried out successfully. Translating is certainly not a shameful activity for Puttenham, and he believes that good translations need to be recognized: "as I would with euery inuētour which is the very Poet to receaue the prayses of his inuention, so would I not haue a trāslatour be ashamed to be acknowen of this translation"[110]. Still, Puttenham associates praise with invention and the poet, and shame to the translator and his work. John Harington's *Orlando Furioso* (1591) also posits that translation is regarded as an inferior activity to writing one's own invention. The following quote summarizes the connection Harington establishes between invention and translation:

> It is possible that if I would haue employed that time that I haue done vpon this, vpon some invention of mine owne, I could haue by this made it haue risen to a iust volume, and if I would haue done as many spare not to do, flowne verie high with stolen fethers. *But I had rather men should see and know that I borrow all, then that I steale any: and I would wish to be called rather one of the not worst translators, then one of the meaner makers.*[111]

The last sentence of the extract by Harington closely follows the assertion by Jacques Peletier in his *Art Poétique*, published thirty six years before, that "a good translation is worthier than a bad invention"[112]. The quotation by Harington seems to indicate his need to justify his translation and to put on the table the reasons why he had not written something of his own. Harington furthermore claims some dignity by recognizing that his work was an actual translation instead of a high flight "with stolen

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[109] (Puttenham 1970, 59)
[110] (Puttenham 1970, 253)
[111] (Harington 1591, ¶8ʳ)
[112] In French: "une bonne Traduction vaut trop mieux qu'une mauvaise invention" (Peletier 1990, 263).

fethers", that is, a pretension that his work was purely the outcome of his own invention when it was not. Once more, this shows that the practice of appropriating works from other authors when translating them was shameful and reprehensible though, unfortunately, not unusual.

In the French context, the poet Agrippa d'Aubigné (1552-1630) discussed in his Ode XIII the moral obligation to publicly recognize that a text is a translation and not the invention of an author: "It is much to translate well, but it is a petty theft not to write 'translation' above, and then we do not only convince women and the common people that it is invention"[113]. For Thomas Sébillet, not only is inventive writing more demanding than translating, but it moreover entails the risk of attracting "thieves of honor" (*voleurs de l'honneur*): "every famous and wise poet prefers, by translating, to follow the path approved long ago and by great minds rather than to undertake a work of his own invention, that will open a new path to the thieves of honor as is the fate of every virtuous hard work"[114]. Despite the recognition that translating is more comfortable than inventive writing, Sébillet staunchly defends versions and translations of other works, since he thinks translation is a great means of rendering intelligible to the great public the "argentine invention" of the classics:

> However, I warn you that the version or translation is currently the poem more frequent and better received by great poets and learned readers, given that each of them deems it a great work and of great value, to make the pure and silvery invention of poets golden and richer with our language.[115]

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[113] In French:
    C'est beaucoup de bien traduire,
    Mais c'est larcin de n'escrire
    Au dessus : traduction,
    Et puis on ne fait pas croire
    Qu'aux femmes et au vulgaire
    Que ce soit invention. (D'Aubigné 1952, 103; lines 181-186)

[114] In French: "chacun des Poètes famés et savants aime mieux en traduisant suivre la trace approuvée de tant d'âges et de bons esprits, qu'en *entreprenant œuvre de son invention, ouvrir chemin aux voleurs de l'honneur dû á tout labeur vertueux*" (Sébillet 1990, 145-146).

[115] In French: "Pourtant t'avertis-je que la Version ou Traduction est aujourd'hui le Poème plus fréquent et mieux reçu des estimés Poètes et des doctes lecteurs, à cause que chacun d'eux estime grand œuvre et de grand prix, *rendre la pure et argentine invention des Poètes* dorée et enrichie de notre langue" (Sébillet 1990, 146).

Alexander Neville's preface to his *The lamentable tragedie of Oedipus the sonne of Laius Kyng of Thebes* (1563) distinguishes between a translator and the author of an original work precisely by calling the latter "inventor"; that is, the capacity to invent is what first and foremost differentiates a translator from an inventive writer:

> Behold here before thy face (good Reader) the ryght lamentable Tragedie of that most Infortunate Prynce OEDIPVS, for thy profit rudely translated.
> Wondre not at the grosenes of the Style: *neither yet account the Inuentours dylygence disgraced by the Translators negligence:* who, thoughe that he hath sometymes boldly presumed to erre frō his Author, rouynge at Randon where he lyst:adding and subtracting at pleasure: yet let not that engendre disdainful suspicion with in thy learned brest.[116]

Hence, Neville apologetically opposes "the inventor's diligence" to his own disgracing "negligence" as a translator. Interestingly, as if in an attempt to gain some recognition from his work, Neville states that his own translation exhibits a margin of variation from the author's original work. Hence, if in the above fragment Neville says to have been "adding and subtracting at pleasure", later on he recognizes more openly that he indeed carried out considerable changes by employing his "own simple invention":

> I suffred this my base trāslated Tragedie to be published: from his Author in worde and Verse far transformed, though in Sense lytell altred: and yet oftentymes rudely encreased with *myne owne symple Invētion more rashly I cōfes than wysely*, wyshynge to please all: to offende none.[117]

In this manner, Neville admits that his own invention is also put to work when translating, quite a bold assertion considering that translating is in the sixteenth century an activity that allegedly does not require the application of the inventive faculties of the translator.

5.4. Invention in Sixteenth-Century English Emblem Books

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[116] (Neville 1563, A5ʳ)
[117] (Neville 1563, A8ᵛ)

Emblem books consisted of collections of emblematic pictures, each accompanied by a motto and an explanatory moral exposition typically written in verse. It was during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I that emblem books from the Continent were first introduced into England, where they achieved a meteoric popularity that triggered translations of some of them into the vernacular, as well as compositions of new works in English by national authors. Emblem books continued to flourish in England until the end of the seventeenth century. Rosemary Freeman asserts that, compared to Continental production, though equally allegorical, "The work of the English emblem writers is not in itself of any great bulk or merit", apart from being much smaller and, "if judged by absolute standards, rarely of any permanent value"[118]. Furthermore, she asserts that "emblem writers in England did not create the taste which they satisfied; they imported the fashion from abroad"[119]. Peter M. Daly counts six emblematic works in English during the sixteenth century: Jan van der Noot's *Theatre for worldings* (London, 1569); Samuel Daniel's translation of *The Worth Tract of Paulus Jovius* (London, 1585); Geffrey Whitney's *A Choice of Emblemes and other Devises* (Leyden, 1586); P. S.'s translation of *The Heroicall Devises of M. Claudius Paradin* (London, 1591); Andrew Willet's *Sacrorum emblematum centuria una* (London, 1592?); and Thomas Combe's *Theater of Fine Devices* (London, 1593?)[120].

When it came to poetic matters, the relevance of emblem books cannot be dismissed, for as Robert J. Clements observes, in the humanistic period "the emblemata served up the rich iconography of poetry and poetic inspiration more abundantly than did the paintings or sculptures of the time"[121]. For instance, Horace's ideas exerted noteworthy influence upon writers of emblem literature, for very often it was Horace's

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[118] (Freeman 1948, 1)
[119] (Freeman 1948, 37)
[120] (Daly 1988, 52). Peter M. Daly clarifies, nonetheless, that "since Daniel's volume contains an unacknowledged selection from the imprese of Ludovico Domenichi, and P. S's translation includes imprese by Gabriel Simeoni, a total of eight separate works are represented by these six English titles" (Daly 1988, 52). It should be also said that Daly's understanding of a book of emblems is wider than Freeman's. As a result, while the latter lists twenty-four books published in English in a total of forty-six printings, Peter M. Daly recognizes fifty books in at least 130 editions and printings up to the year 1700.
[121] (Clements 1955, 781)

words that were reproduced *verbatim* as mottoes in emblem books[122]. Furthermore, because emblem book writers felt disappointed by the general treatment of poets during the Renaissance[123], they abundantly praised poets for making use of four specific arguments:

> 1. Poets and authors achieve immortal fame; they are wards of the Muses and are, indeed, touched with divinity.
> 2. Poets and authors create monuments more lasting than bronze which are destined to endure forever.
> 3. The pen and sword are the two chief instruments for winning glory; authors deserve as much if not more glory than warriors.
> 4. Poetry is often represented by symbols of glory in the conventional iconography of emblem literature.[124]

Bearing all this in mind, it is unsurprising that emblem books, closely allied with poetic works, offer interesting insights into the concept of poetic invention[125].

Henry Peacham's *Minerva Britanna* (1612) dwells in an emblem with the motto *Tutissima comes* on the relation between Pallas and Ulysses in the latter's return trip to Ithaca (see Image 1 in Appendix II). The emblem represents both characters hand in hand, and is accompanied by a poem that contains the stanza below, which illustrates that the author effectively understands 'to invent' as the devising of stories and the writing of poetry; that is, he uses 'invention' with the meaning of invention of fables:

> Though Homer did *invent* it long agoe,
> And we esteeme it as *a fable vaine*:
> While heere we wander, it doth wisely show,
> With all our actions, Wisedome should remaine;
> And where we goe, take Pallas still along
> To guide our feete, our eares, and lavish tongue.[126]

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[122] (Clements 1955, 804)

[123] Clements remarks that emblem writers stressed three main ideas in this respect –none of which, curiously enough, had religious or ethical overtones. Firstly, that "All the great poets of antiquity were outraged by fortune or suffered ignominious deaths"; secondly, that "Poetry, like wisdom and as a form of wisdom, passes the understanding of the obtuse and malevolent present-day society"; and thirdly, that "Poetry affords a wretched livelihood and Maecenases are wanting" (Clements 1946, 214).

[124] (Clements 1944, 672)

[125] For more on the connection between Emblem books and literature in the Renaissance, see Robert J. Clements, *Picta Poesis: Literary and Humanistic Theory in Renaissance Emblem Books* (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1960).

[126] (Peacham 1612, L3ᵛ)

In this manner, Peacham associates invention and fables with wisdom, for they ultimately appear to have a didactic purpose. Unfortunately, not all emblem book authors are as positive about invention as Peacham, and some of their emblem books also illustrate a distrust of the powerful human invention that was widespread in the sixteenth century. Indeed, Geffrey Whitney, in a stanza without an emblem included in his *A choice of emblemes and other devises* (1586), puts forward the idea that, since man is a fallen being living in sin, he necessarily needs God by his side to compose something morally good, otherwise, nothing of value can be expected to come from his human invention:

> Since man is fraile, and all his thoughtes are sinne,
> *And of him selfe he can no good inuent*,
> Then euerie one, before they oughte beginne,
> Should call on God , from whome all grace is sent:
> So, I beseeche, that he the same will sende,
> That, to his praise J maie beginne, and ende.[127]

Despite his distrust of human invention when left unsupervised by God, Whitney admits that invention is a necessary requirement for good poets to have. He in fact views good poetic invention as a gift sent by the gods. Whitney accompanies the lines below praising the poetry of Sir Philip Sidney with an emblem and the Latin motto *Pennæ gloria perennis*, depicting a cherub or cupid with what seems to be a trumpet flying over a mythical landscape among clouds and distant pyramids (see Image 2 of Appendix II):

> For, when that barren verse made Muses voide of mirthe:
> Behoulde, Lvsina sweetelie sounge, of Sidneys ioyfull birthe.
> Whome *mightie Iove did blesse, with graces from aboue*:
> On whome, did fortune frendlie smile, and nature most did loue.
> And then, behoulde, the pen, was by Mercvrivs sente,
> Wherewith, hee also gaue to him, *the gifte for to inuente*.
> That, when hee first began, his vayne in verse to showe.
> More sweete then honie, was the stile, that from his penne did flowe.
> Wherewith, in youthe hee vs'd to bannishe idle fittes;
> That nowe, his workes of endlesse fame, delighte the worthie wittes.[128]

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[127] (Whitney 1586, A1ᵛ)
[128] (Whitney 1586, b3ᵛ)

Nevertheless, even if invention is a heavenly gift that makes a poet an outstanding poet, Peacham stresses the idea that we have to exercise our wit (intimately related to invention, as has been discussed) if we want to keep it active and fit; otherwise, if this mental power remains unused it eventually gets rusty, breaks down and loses its "heavenly grace". For Peacham, exercising invention is the most commendable manner to keep wit awake and alert. Wit is in fact compared to a well in the following stanzas that accompany an emblem entitled *Fit purior haustu*, precisely showing a well (Image 3 of Appendix II):

> If that the Well we draw, and emptie oft:
> The water there remaineth sweete and good:
> But standing long, it growes corrupt and naught,
> And serues no more, by reason of the mudde,
> In Summer hot, to coole our inward heate,
> To wash, to water, or to dresse our meate.
>
> So, *if we doe not excercise our wit*,
> By dayly labour, and *invention* still:
> In little time, our sloth corrupteth it,
> With in bred vices, foule and stincking ill:
> That both the glories of our life deface,
> And stoppe the source, and head of heavenly grace.[129]

In addition to this, Peacham relates invention to wits, wine, pleasure and delight, thus linking it to Classical Bacchoist views on poetry. Indeed, the emblem that goes with the lines below is entitled *Vini natura* and shows a plump naked Bacchus sitting under a tree and on a cask, and holding a bunch of grapes in one hand with Pegasus in the background ready to take off (Image 4, Appendix II). Wine is thus presented as a catalyst for invention and wit:

> Best BACCHVS Ivie thy faire brow befits,
> Thy winges ithal, that proud Gorgonean horse:
> *Because thou addest vigor to our wits*,
> Heate to our blood, vnto our bodie force:
> Mirth to our heartes, vnto the dullard spright
> *A quick Invention*, to the Sence delight.[130]

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[129] (Peacham 1612, L2^r)

Peacham moreover highlights that the rarity and singularity of inventions is an indicator of good wit and art, and something to feel proud of. In other words, the further away invention is from what is common, already known and expected, the more extraordinary the artist is. The emblem entitled *Presidium et dulce deciis* (Image 5, Appendix II), which shows an arm in an armor appearing from the clouds and placing a flag with a coat of arms on top of a mountain, is followed by the lines below:

> I consecrate in gentle Muses name
> This Monument, and to your memorie,
> Which shall outweare the vtmost date of Fame,
> And wrestle with the worldes Eternitie:
> *For as Artes glorie* is your GERMANIE ,
> *For rar'st invention, and designe of wit*,
> So ye braue Maurice are the pride of it.[131]

Years later, George Wither, author of *A Collection of Emblemes* (1635) turns the power of invention into Pegasus, described as "the Poets-horse" that elevates human minds over the sensible realm to another unknown. Invention is hence linked to fancy, imaginary realms, and feigned ideas, and seen as a means of knowledge not only of earthly things, but also of sacred ones. The emblem, preceded by the lines "No passage can divert the Course, / Of Pegasus, the Muses Horse", shows a winged horse (Image 6, Appendix II) against what seems a natural background (unfortunately, due to the bad printing of the emblem, the background is too dark to clearly distinguish anything). The accompanying lines are the following:

> This is the *Poets-horse*; a Palfray, Sirs ,
>
> (That may be ridden, without rod or spurres)
>
> (…)
>
> Yet, this old Emblem (worthy veneration)
> Doth figure out, that winged-contemplation ,
> On which *the Learned mount their best Invention ,*
> And, climbe the Hills of highest Apprehension.

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[130] (Peacham 1612, Dd2ᵛ)
[131] (Peacham 1612, Q1ᵛ)

> This is the nimble Gennet, which doth carry,
> Their *Fancie* , thorow *Worlds imaginary*;
> And, by *Idæas feigned*, shewes them there,
> The nature of those *Truths, that reall are*.
> *By meanes of this, our Soules doe come to know*
> *A thousand secrets, in the Deeps below;*
> *Things, here on Earth , and, things above the Skyes ,*
> *On which, we never fixed, yet, our eyes.*[132]

Finally, on another occasion, George Wither implicitly refers to the notion of invention (even if not explicitly in this case) in the context of some lines that accompany an emblem entitled with the couplet "A Vertue hidden, or not us'd, / Is either Sloth , or Grace abus'd". The emblem in question shows a candle light on the floor in the middle of a room where we also find an open book and a quill; in the background, it is possible to discern a man on his knees, his hands clasped, and his head looking heavenwards praying to God (Image 7, Appendix II). The idea in the lines that follow the image and that I quote below is that it is important to contribute something of one's own to this world, in whichever manner or through whichever art, and not simply to copy and repeat what others have said or done:

> The World hath shamelesse Boasters, who pretend,
> In sundry matters, to be skill'd so well,
> That, were they pleased, so their houres to spend,
> They say, they could in many things excell.
> (…)
> *If these men say, that they can Poetize ,*
> *But, will not; they are false in saying so*:
> *For, he, whose Wit a little that way lies,*
> *Will doing bee, though hee himselfe undoe .*
> If they, in other Faculties are learned,
> And, still, forbeare their Talents to imploy;
> The truest Knowledge, yet, is undiscerned,
> And, that, they merit not, which they injoy.
> Yea, such as hide the Gifts they have received,
> (Or use them not, as well as they are able)
> Are like fayre Eyes, of usefull sight bereaved;
> Or, lighted-Candles , underneath a Table .
> (…)
> Their hidden Vertues , are apparant Sloth ;
> And, all their life, is to the publike wrong:
> *For, they doe reape the Fruits , by many sowne,*
> *And, leave to others, nothing of their owne.*[133]

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[132] (Wither 1635, Q2[r])
[133] (Wither 1635, Bb4[r])

It is once again emphasized that it is essential for man to exploit his natural talents and abilities in order to produce something of his own and therefore contribute to the advancement of society. Instead, the mere enjoyment of other people's contributions (in whichever aspect, including the literary one) without adding something of one's own is disgraceful, ungrateful and a waste of talent.

5.5. Definitions of 'Invention' in Sixteenth-Century English Dictionaries

During the sixteenth century, a number of monolingual English dictionaries and others that translated Classical or foreign languages into English came into print in England[134]. These dictionaries constitute an invaluable source of information for scholars, since they are windows through which to discern the understanding of key concepts. Many of these sixteenth-century dictionaries do not mention invention at all, or if they do, they simply provide a one-word translation into other languages without accompanying it with a short definition. Nevertheless, there are a number of dictionaries that do offer brief definitions of invention, which shall be explored in the following pages. They offer a fantastic synthesis of the complexities and variations of the meaning of invention in the sixteenth century, synthesizing many of the views contained in the books on rhetoric and poetics previously discussed.

The reason why many sixteenth-century dictionaries include an entry for invention is the importance of both logic and rhetoric within the educational system. Indeed, had it not been for the fact that invention was the first of the five-fold traditional division of rhetoric, as well as a fundamental part of logic, fewer sixteenth-century dictionaries would have bothered to include the term. Certainly, many of the definitions of invention provided by these dictionaries rely on the traditional understanding of invention as

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[134] For more on the history and particularities of Renaissance English dictionaries, see DeWitt Talmage Starnes's *Renaissance Dictionaries: English-Latin and Latin-English* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1954), and his *Classical Myth and Legend in Renaissance Dictionaries: A Study of Renaissance Dictionaries in their Relation to the Classical Learning of Contemporary English Writers* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955).

finding. In Thomas Thomas's *Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae* (1587), for example, we find that *Tŏpĭcē* is defined as "*Invention or finding out of arguments*: the arte of Inuention: a part of Logicke noting the places of inuention"[135], and *Inventio* as "An inventing, a finding"[136]. Similarly, John Florio in *A World of Words* (1598) defines *Tópica* in the following terms:

> topikes, books that speake and entreat of places of inuention in & touching logike. Also *inuention or finding out of arguments*, the arte of inuention, a part of logike noting the places of inuention. Also pertaining to the places of inuenting arguments.[137]

Likewise, Richard Perceval's *A Dictionary in Spanish and English* (1599) defines the Spanish verb *Inventár* as "to inuent, to finde out"[138], and John Florio's *Queen Anna's New World of Words* (1611) talks of *Inuentíua* as "an inuention, a finding"[139]. Concurrently, nevertheless, dictionaries also show how invention in the sixteenth century went beyond 'finding' and entered the sphere of devising something new, thus mixing two different understandings of the term. For instance, John Baret in his *An Alveary or Triple Dictionary, in English, Latin, and French* (1574) explains the meaning of "An inuetour" in the following way: "*a deuisour*, a worker: an author a maker of engins. (…) *He that inuenteth or deuiseth some new thing*. (…) Logitions inueted many crabbed and hard things"[140]. Thomas Thomas also puts invention on a level with devising when talking about "An inuention or deuise"[141]. Even John Florio's *A World of Words*, which, as has been seen above, equaled invention to the "finding out of arguments", displays this hybrid understanding of invention, as it defines the words *Inuénia* as "*a deuice*, an inuention, a *newe found out* thing, a surmise"[142], *Inuentione* as "an inuention, *a deuise*, a *forgerie*, a surmise, a *finding*"[143], *Ritrouamento* as "*a finding*

[135] (Thomas 1587, Nnn viii^v)
[136] (Thomas 1587, Hhvii^v)
[137] (Florio 1598, Nn3^v)
[138] (Perceval 1599, O1^r)
[139] (Florio 1611, Z2^v)
[140] (Baret 1574, Lli^r)
[141] (Thomas 1587, Hhvii^v)
[142] (Florio 1598, Q6^v)
[143] (Florio 1598, Q6^v)

out, an inuention, *a deuise*"[144], and *Parto* as "a birth or deliuerance of a childe, *the fruite of any mans inuention*, *whatsoeuer any man or woman brings forth*, a laying, a whelping, a litter, a layrie, a farrowing, a caluing, a hatching, a kitling, a filling,&c"[145].

The connection between invention and poetry is of course not obviated or neglected by sixteenth-century lexicographers, who also confirm that invention was regarded at the time as a defining feature of quality poetry and an essential characteristic of poets themselves. For instance, Thomas Thomas defines *Pŏēma* as "*A poets invention*, or worke: a poeme: a worke made in verse or rime: verses"[146], John Florio explains *Poéma* as "a poeme, a composition or Poets worke or *inuention*, a worke in verse or rime"[147], and *Trouatore* as "a finder, an *inuentor*, a deuiser. Also vsed for a *poet* or auctor"[148]. In addition to this, invention is frequently juxtaposed to terms such as 'wit', 'fancy', and 'imagination'. For example, Thomas Thomas defines *Ingĕnĭum* as "The nature, inclination, or disposition of a thing: also *wit*, wisdome, will, or propertie, *fansie*, *inuention*, cunning"[149]; John Florio explains *Ingegnóso* as "*wittie*, wilie, *ingenious*, subtile, wise, *cunning*, craftie, *full of inuention*"[150], and *Ingégno* as "an engine, a toole, *a deuise*, an artifice, *an inuention*, an implement. Also *wit*, *arte*, skill, knowledge,

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[144] (Florio 1598, Ee4ʳ). In his *Queen Anna's New World of Words*, published thirteen years after his *A World of Words*, Florio defines this last term by deleting "a deuise" from the definition: *Ritrouaménto*, "a finding out, an inuention" (Florio 1611, Pp3v).

[145] (Florio 1598, Y5ᵛ). Again, there is a slight variation in the definition of the same word in *Queen Anna's New World of Words*, where *párto* is defined as "the fruite of any mans inuention, what[s]oeuer any man, woman, or bea[s]t brings foorth, a birth, or deliuerance of a child, a laying, a whe[*]ping, a litter, a layrie, a farrowing, a hatching, a kitling, a caluing, an ewing, a fillying, a foling, &c." (Florio 1611, Gg6ʳ).

[146] (Thomas 1587, Yy5ʳ)

[147] (Florio 1598, Aa4ᵛ). In *Queen Anna's New World of Words*, this definition is slightly altered: "Poema a Poeme, a worke in ver[s]e, a Poets worke, compo[s]ition, or inuention" (Florio 1611, Kk2ʳ).

[148] (Florio 1598, Oo2ᵛ). Again, in *Queen Anna's New World of Words* the definition varies in some points and becomes the following: "a finding, an inuention, a deui[s]e. Al[s]o a fained [s]hift, or excu[s]e. a finder. Al[s]o a [s]aeker out, or inuentor. Al[s]o v[s]ed for a Poet" (Florio 1611, Ccc4ᵛ). At this point, it should be clarified that when the authors of these dictionaries talk about 'poets', they include playwrights within this category, and so, poetry for them encompasses drama too. In this way, Thomas Thomas defines *Trăgoedia* as "A tragedie, beeing a loftie *kind of poetrie*, and representing personages of great estate, and matter of much trouble, a great broyle or stirre" (Thomas 1587, Ooo2ᵛ); *Cōmœdĭogrăphus* as "A comicall *Poet*" (Thomas 1587, M7ᵛ), and *Dramaticum* as "A base *kinde of poetrie* which endeth troublesom matters merilie" (Thomas 1587, T5ᵛ). Similarly, John Florio, clearly drawing on Thomas Thomas's definition, defines *Tragédia* as "a tragedie or moornefull play being a loftie *kinde of poetrie*, and representing personages of great state and matter of much trouble, a great broile or stirre" (Florio 1598, Nn4ʳ).

[149] (Thomas 1587, Gg2ʳ)

[150] (Florio 1598, Q1ʳ)

discretion, foresight, *fancie*, cunning. Also the nature, inclination or disposition of a thing"[151]. Randle Cotgrave in *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues* (1611) similarly translates *Ingenieusement* as "Ingeniously, *wittily*, with *good inuention*"[152], and *Ingeniosité* as "Ingeniositie, ingeniousnesse, *quicknesse of inuention*, *dexteritie of wit*"[153]. Even in definitions of terms that in principle are not related to rhetoric, logic, or poetry, we find 'invention' used as a synonym of wit. For instance, Florio's explanation of *Sale* includes not only "salt or seasoning" but "Also mirth, pleasant wittines in wordes, merie conceites or *wittie grace in speaking wit*, conceit, *inuention*, pleasantnes"[154]. Likewise, his entry for *Secco* reads as follows: "also importunate, tedious, foolish in talke, barren, *voide or poore of wit*, *inuention, or conceite*, *shallowe witted*"[155]. Finally, Randle Cotgrave understands the adjective *Engourdi* as "Benummed, nummed, astonied, stupified, sencelesse, asleepe. Esprit engourdi. A dull, and blockish wit; *a wit thats deuoid of inuention*"[156]. In this last case, it seems as if Cotgrave thought of invention as a quality or a faculty of wit or its contents.

Precisely because invention is an active faculty of the mind, it is a risk that this power can be applied to reprehensible purposes such as making up lies and false stories and deceiving. Certainly, sixteenth-century English dictionaries also record these negative views and thus debunk the virtuous and unproblematic image that, according to Grahame Castor (1964), invention still had at the time in France. Richard Huloet's *Abcedarium Anglico Latinum* (1552) for instance defines *Sycophantia* as "*Inuention* of crafty accusations, & lies", and *Sophisma* as "*Inuention*, or sophisticall oration, seamynge to be trewe, when it is false"[157]. Then, John Baret talks about "A lye or leasing, *a false inuention*"[158]; Thomas Cooper defines *Calumnia* as "A false or craftie

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[151] (Florio 1598, Q1[r])
[152] (Cotgrave 1611, Zz6[r])
[153] (Cotgrave 1611, Zz6[r])
[154] (Florio 1598, Ff3[v]). In *Queen Anna's New World of Words* again there is a slight variation in the definition: "Sále any kind of [s]alt or [s]ea[s]oning. Al[s]o the maine Sea or Ocean. Al[s]o wit, conceite, [s]harpne[ss]e or inuention in words or [s]peaking" (Florio 1611, Qq2[r]).
[155] (Florio 1598, Hh1[r])
[156] (Cotgrave 1611, Hh3[v])
[157] (Huloet 1552, R2[r])
[158] (Baret 1574, Nn3v-r)

accusation: a forged crime: a *malicions inuention* or surmise to trouble a man: a malicious detraction"[159], and *Mendacium* as "A lie: a leasing: a *false inuention*: a false tale"[160]. Copying Cooper, Thomas Thomas writes in his entry for *Mendācium* "A lie, a leasing, a *false inuention*, a false tale"[161], and in that of *Călumnĭa* the following definition: "A false or crafty accusation, a forged crime: a *malitious inuention* or surmise to trouble a man: a malitious detraction, a cauill"[162]. Later, he expresses the meaning of *Commentum* as "A comment or exposition, a sodaine deuise, a fained matter, a lie, a false taile, *an inuention*"[163]. On his part, John Florio understands *Machinatione* as "a complot, a conspiracie, a contriuing, a framing, a *subtile inuention or deuising*"[164], and Randle Cotgrave precisely defines the same term as "A machination, frame, contriuement; a subtill plot, or conspiracie; a *craftie inuention*, shifting stratageme, circumuenting tricke"[165], and that of *Calomnie* as "A calumnie; false accusation, forged imputation, spightfull detraction; *malicious inuention*, or surmise deuised for the trouble, or disgrace of another"[166]. Finally, Cotgrave also provides another illustrative entry, that for *Contreuve*, defined as "A fib, leasing; *tale of inuention; or matter inuented*"[167].

Caught in between the understanding of invention as an essential part of poetry-writing and as making fabricating lies and deceiving stories, we find sixteenth-century definitions of other terms that signal the capacity to invent fables and fictions. In this respect, Thomas Cooper and Thomas Thomas define, respectively, *Fabulósitas* and *Fābŭlōsĭtas* as "The *inuention* of fables and lies"[168]; Florio and Cotgrave follow this definition very closely when defining, respectively, *Fabulosità* and *Fabulosité* as

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[159] (Cooper 1578, P6ᵛ)
[160] (Cooper 1578, Gggg5ʳ)
[161] (Thomas 1587, Nn3ᵛ)
[162] (Thomas 1587, H7ᵛ)
[163] (Thomas 1587, M5ʳ)
[164] (Florio 1598, S4ᵛ)
[165] (Cotgrave 1611, Ddd4ʳ)
[166] (Cotgrave 1611, N6ᵛ)
[167] (Cotgrave 1611, V5v)
[168] (Cooper 1578, Bbb6ᵛ) and (Thomas 1587, Z1ʳ)

"fabulousnes, *inuention* of sables and lies"[169], and as "Fabulousnesse; *th'inuention* of lyes, tales, fables, or fained reports"[170]. Similarly, Florio defines *Fittione* as "a fiction, a dissembling, faining or *inuention*"[171], and Cotgrave as "A fiction, *inuention*, lie, fib, cog; a thing imagined, fained, or foisted in"[172].

Invention was moreover understood by sixteenth-century English lexicographers as closely related to the notion of imagination, an equally creative and potentially disturbing mental faculty. John Baret treats them almost as synonyms when explaining imagination in terms of invention, and vice versa. Thus, he elaborates lists of synonymous terms by comparing "To deuise" to "To imagine: to inuent craftily: to go about deceitfully"[173], and "To inuent" to "to imagine: to deuise: to feyne"[174]. In his turn, Thomas Thomas defines *Invenio* as "finde that one seeketh for, to deuise, invent, or *imagine*: to get, to obteyne, to procure, to spie out and know, to seeke or inquire out"[175], thus including on the same list both the more rhetorical-logical idea of finding and a more imagination-oriented understanding of invention, which again shows the complexity of the notion of invention at a time of blending traditions. Likewise, John Florio puts invention and imagination close in meaning by defining the term *Trouato* as "found, deuised, *inuented*, *imagined*, gotten, obtained, procured, sought out. Also a deuice, an *inuention*, a conceit, an *imagination*, an excuse"[176]. Similarly, Richard Perceval in his *A Dictionarie in Spanish and English* (1599) defines *Invención* as "an *inuention*, a deuise, *a plot imagined*"[177]; Robert Cawdry talks of "inuention" as a "deuise, or *imagination*"[178], and Randle Cotgrave, like Thomas Thomas, as "a finding-out, or thing found out; a deuise, forgerie, conceit; also, a tricke, shift; surmise,

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[169] (Florio 1598, L2r). In *Queen Anna's New World of Words* the definition runs as follows: "Fabulo[s]ità inuention of fables" (Florio 1611, P5^r).
[170] (Cotgrave 1611, Nn2v)
[171] (Florio 1598, M1^r)
[172] (Cotgrave 1611, Oo6v)
[173] (Baret 1574, Tiir)
[174] (Baret 1574, Lli^r)
[175] (Thomas 1587, Hhvii^v)
[176] (Florio 1598, Oo2v)
[177] (Perceval 1599, O1r)
[178] (Cawdry 1604, F2r)

imagination"[179]. Finally, Cotgrave defined *Fantasier* as "To *imagine*, deuise, conceiue, *inuent*", and *Fantastiquer* as "To conceiue, imagine, deuise, cast about, represent in the imagination"[180], again drawing 'to invent' and 'to imagine' closer.

5.6. Invention in Sixteenth-Century English Literature

When looking at the works of literature produced in the sixteenth century, the term 'invention' very frequently appears in poems, plays, and literary prefaces. In most of these cases, invention is seen as a necessary requirement for the poet to write something of interest, an ingredient that adds quality and taste to his writings, and makes it worth reading. Invention for instance appears as a term of praise in Anthony Munday's epistle to Edward de Vere, prefaced to his *Zelavto* (1580), where Munday talks about "such expert heads, such pregnaunt inuentions, and such commendable writers"[181]. George Chapman in *The proper difficulty of poetry* (1595) also views invention as a fundamental mental power for a poet to construct a high quality composition, for which reason, when he discusses the central idea of "*Enargia*, or cleernes of representation, required in absolute Poems", he says it "is not the perspicuous delivery of a lowe inuention; but *high, and harty inuention* exprest in most significant, and unaffected phrase"[182]. That same year, in "The author to his loving cousin" prefixed to his *Saint Peters Complaint* (1595), Robert Southwell shows that he considers invention as the element that gives credit to any literary composition: "Blame me not (good Cosen) though I send you a blame-woorthy present, in which the most that can commend it, is the good will of the writer, *neither Arte nor inuention, giving it any credite*"[183]. John Davies in his turn talks about "maruellous *Inuentions*, / Which doe produce all *Artes*

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[179] (Cotgrave 1611, Aaaiiii^v)
[180] (Cotgrave 1611, Nn6^v)
[181] (Munday 1580, 3^v)
[182] (Chapman 1595, A2^r)
[183] (Southwell 1595, A3^v)

and *Sciences*"[184], thus locating the faculty of invention at the roots not only of poetry

but of all arts as well as sciences.

The relation between invention and the written word is so close that it is

unsurprising to find instances in which the verb 'to invent' is taken as a synonym with

'to write a book'. For example, in a dialogue between the characters Ralph and Robin in

Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus*, Ralph asks Robin "Why *Robin* what booke is that?" to

which Robin answers "why the most intollerable booke for conjuring that ere was

invented by any brimstone divel"[185]. John Lyly in the prologue to his *Mydas* (1632) also

makes invention the defining element of plays, as proven in the set of correlations that

appear in the following extract: "Gentlemen, so nice is the World, that for apparell there

is no fashion, for Musique no Instrument, for Diet no Delicate, for Playes no *Inuention*

but breedeth satietie before no one, and contempt before night"[186]. For George

Gascoigne, invention appears as a necessary component to write literature, as he

expresses in the following lines from *The Reporter* (1587):

> To tell a tale without authoritye,
> Or *fayne a Fable by invencion*,
> That one proceedes of quicke capacitye,
> That other proves but small discretion,
> Yet have both one and other oft bene done.
> And if I were a Poet as some be,
> You might perhappes here some such tale of me.[187]

Gasgoigne moreover recognizes the importance of invention for a poet by stating in

a letter to a friend prefaced to his *A Hundreth sundrie Flowres bounde vp in one small*

Poesie (1573) that "quicknes of inuencion, proper vocables, apt Epythetes, and store of

monasillables may help a pleasant brayne to be crowned with Lawrell"[188]. Invention is

so central for Gascoigne that in *In prayse of a Countesse* (1587) he even beseaches the

gods help to pursue the composition of a poem with proper and fine invention:

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[184] (Davies 1602, B1^v)
[185] (Marlowe 1990, 26)
[186] (Lyly 1632, T1^r)
[187] (Gascoigne 1587, E1^r)
[188] (Gascoigne 1573, A3^v)

> And when I call the mighty Gods in ayd
> *To further forth some fine invention*:
> My bashefull spirits be full ill afrayd
> To purchase payne by my presumption.[189]

With the same assumption in mind, John Davies addresses his "busie inuention" in his epigram 26 entitled "Of wise fooles, or foolish wise men", and asks for assistance with his invention in order to write a witty epigram that moves readers to laughter:

> O! for an Epigram to make the wise
> (Like Fooles) laugh at it, till their hearts do breake,
> VVhy then haue at it; *O Inuention rise*,
> And tickle wisest Heart-strings till they ake.[190]

The above quoted extract is not the only instance where John Davies's works address invention in such a direct way; in his ingenious poem "Inuentions Life, Death, and Funerall" the poetic persona complains about the ill functioning of his invention, which seems unable to operate correctly before the sight of the poetic voice's beloved one, who manages to confuse, paralyze, and eventually kill the poetic voice's invention. Due to the peculiarity of both the subject and the way it is approached, it seems worthwhile to quote at length:

> *Busie Inuention, whie art thou so dull*
> *And yet still doing*?
> Are no Conceits ensconst within thy Scull
> To helpe my woing?
> Canst not, with Iudgments aide, once sally out
> with Words of power
> My Ladies dreaded Forces to disrout
> and make way to her?
> *Or, can'st thou vse no Stratagem of Witt*
> *That may entrappe her*?
> To yeeld vnto Conditions faire, as fitt
> els loue enwrappe her?
> Fy, fy, thou lin'st my hedd-peece to no end
> Sith by thy Lyninge
> I cannot, in Loues warres, my Witt defend
> from foule declyning.

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[189] (Gascoigne 1587, N1ʳ)
[190] (Davies 1611, B6ʳ)

> *Doth Loue confound thee, that thy Founder is,*
>   *(Bewitcht Inuention?)*
> *Can she which can but make thee pregnant, misse*
>   *of hir intention?*
> *The powers of Witt cannot defend thee then*
>   *from Shames confusion;*
> But thou must die, with shame, and liue agen
>   By Hopes infusion.
> *Hope, hold my Hart, and Head; for, they are sick*
>   *Inuention dyeth:*
> Loue-sicke they are and neede an Emperick
>   which Loue denieth.
> Inuention, now doth draw his latest breath
>   for comfort crying,
> *Hee dies, and yet, in dying, striues with Death*
>   *(To liue still dying!*
> Ring out his Knell, for now he quite is dead
>   Ding, dong, bell, well ronge!
> Sing out a Dirge for now hee's buried
>   Farewell Hee, well songe!
> *This Epitath fix on his senslesse Head,*
>   *Here lies Inuention*
> *That stood his louing Master in no steade*
>   *In Loues contention.*[191]

In the same way that invention was the first of the parts of rhetoric, invention seems to be what triggers the process of poetic composition. No invention (rather, no good invention) means no chance of coming up with anything worth writing about, hence the poets' desperate cries for help from the gods or Muses to quicken, illuminate, or brighten up their inventiveness, or the generous and unsolicited advice of Muses who intervene before the poet experiences anxiety when facing the blank page, as in the case of Sir Philip Sidney's opening lines of *Astrophel and Stella*:

> I sought fit wordes, to paint the blackest face of woe,
> *Studying inuentions* fine, her wittes to entertaine,
> Oft turning others leaues, to see if thence would flowe,
> Some fresh and fruitfull showre, upon my Sunne-burnt braine.
> But wordes came halting out, *wanting inuentions stay*,
> *Inuention Natures childe*, fledde Stepdames studies blowes:
> And others feete, still seem'de but straungers in my way,
> Thus great with Childe to speake, and helplesse in my throwes,
>   Byting my tongue and penne, beating my selfe for spite:
>   *Foole saide My muse to mee, looke in thy heart and write*.[192]

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[191] (Davies 1605, H4ᵛ-H4ʳ)
[192] (Sidney 1591, B1ʳ)

As in the *Defence*, it seems that Sidney's poet simply needs to look within himself, turn his eyes to the "fore-idea or conceit" and rely on "the zodiac of his own wit" to find quality raw material for his compositions. Another well-known literary English Renaissance masterpiece, Shakespeare's *King Henry V*, opens with the powerful address to "a muse of fire" able to share with the poet the delights of "the brightest heaven of Invention":

> O for a muse of fire, that would ascend
> The brightest heaven of Invention,
> A kingdom for a stage, princes to act,
> And monarchs to behold the swelling scene.[193]

On other occasions in Shakespeare, however, the poet does not require the aid of the Muses to invent if he has a flesh and bone inspirational figure, namely, a lover. In sonnet 38 in fact the inspiring beloved one is called "the tenth muse":

> *How can my muse want subject to invent,*
> *While thou dost breathe, that pour'st into my verse*
> *Thine own sweet argument, too excellent*
> *For every vulgar paper to rehearse?*
> O give thyself the thanks, if aught in me
> Worthy perusal stand against thy sight;
> *For who's so dumb that cannot write to thee,*
> *When thou thyself dost give invention light?*
> *Be thou the tenth muse, ten times more in worth*
> *Than those old nine which rhymers invocate;*
> And he that calls on thee, let him bring forth
> Eternal numbers to outlive long date.
>   If my slight muse do please these curious days,
>   The pain be mine, but thine shall be the praise.[194]

Other sonnets by Shakespeare talk further about the activity of the poet as one that, first and foremost, begets invention. Thus, sonnet 79 includes the following lines: "I grant, sweet love, thy lovely argument / Deserves the travail of a worthier pen, / *Yet*

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[193] (Shakespeare 1992, 70)
[194] (Shakespeare 2000, 35-36)

what of thee thy poet doth invent / He robs thee of and pays it thee again"[195]. Then, sonnet 103 includes the following lines:

> Alack what poverty my muse brings forth,
> That, having such a scope to show her pride,
> The argument all bare is of more worth
> Than when it hath my added praise beside.
> O blame me not if I no more can write!
> *Look in your glass, and there appears a face*
> *That overgoes my blunt invention quite,*
> *Dulling my lines, and doing me disgrace.*[196]

In Shakespeare, invention is certainly an inescapable part of poetry and a criterion to assess a literary creation, as *Love's Labour's Lost* illustrates when Holofernes informs Nathaniel that he is going to show some verses by a young pupil of his to the boy's father:

> I do dine today at the father's of a certain pupil of mine, where, if before repast it shall please you to gratify the table with a grace, I will, on my privilege I have with the parents of the foresaid child or pupil, undertake your *ben venuto, where I will prove those verses to be very unlearned, neither savouring of poetry, wit, nor invention.*[197]

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[195] The full sonnet runs as follows (Shakespeare 2000, 68, 71):

> Whilst I alone did call upon thy aid,
> My verse alone had all thy gentle grace,
> But now my gracious numbers are decayed,
> And my sick Muse doth give another place.
> I grant, sweet love, thy lovely argument
> Deserves the travail of a worthier pen,
> Yet what of thee thy poet doth invent
> He robs thee of and pays it thee again.
> He lends thee virtue, and he stole that word
> From thy behaviour; beauty doth he give
> And found it in thy cheek; he can afford
> No praise to thee but what in thee doth live.
>   Then thank him not for that which he doth say,
>   Since what he owes thee thou thyself dost pay.

[196] The sonnet continues as follows (Shakespeare 2000, 88, 91):

> Were it not sinful then, striving to mend,
> To mar the subject that before was well?
> For to no other pass my verses tend,
> Than of your graces and your gifts to tell;
>   And more, much more than in my verse can sit,
>   Your own glass shows you, when you look in it.

[197] (Shakespeare 1990, 160-161). Crane observes that *Love's Labour's Lost* "contains more direct references to rhetoric and more burlesque of its affected use than any other work of Shakespeare. 'Wit' and 'invention' are among the words mentioned frequently in the context" (Crane 1937, 204). In addition to this, Crane states that "Many other passages in Shakespeare's plays, particularly the earlier ones, in

In other words, "unlearned" verses are the ones that lack wit and invention, the two features that bring poetry to life and the two criteria that distinguish learned from unlearned poetry. Likewise, in *Ferdinando Ieronomi and Leonora de Valasco* (1575) Gascoigne makes invention a criterion to distinguish between different kinds of poems, more specifically, between "three sundrie sortes of Posies: *Floures, Hearbes,* and *VVeedes*":

> I terme some Floures, bycause being *indeed inuented vpon a verie light occasion*, they haue yet in them (in my iudgement) *some rare inuention* and Methode before not commonly vsed. And therefore (beeing more pleasant than profitable) I haue named them Floures.
> The seconde (being indeede morall discourses, and *reformed inuentions*, and therefore more profitable than pleasant) I haue named Hearbes.[198]

Once more it can be seen how the adjective "rare" is given positive connotations when applied to describing invention; certainly, it is that lovely rareness that precisely makes Gascoigne categorize a poem under the praising label of "flower". A similar understanding of invention (again premodified by "rare") appears in a poem by a G. W. Senior prefaced to Edmund Spenser's *Amoretti and Epithalamion* (1595):

> So while this Muse in forraine landes doth stay,
> *inuention weepes*, and pens are cast aside,
> the time like night, depriud of chearefull day,
> and few do write, but (ah) too soone may slide.
> (…)
> thy muse hath got such grace, and power to please,
> with *rare inuention* bewtified by skill.[199]

The praising expression "rare invention" unmistakably indicates a quest for a spark of innovation in literary composition, an awareness that difference in terms of subject matter is needed for a literary work to stand out. For the same reason, invention very often appears within the vicinity of the adjective 'new'. For instance, John Lyly in

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which such terms as 'comparisons', 'circumstances', 'causes', 'contraries', 'distinctions', 'examples', 'laces', and 'invention' occur, indicate that his training in rhetoric had been much the same as that of other writers of the time" (Crane 1937, 205). For more on Shakespeare and rhetoric, see Marion Trousdale, *Shakespeare and the Rhetoricians* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
[198] (Gascoigne 1587, **3ʳ)
[199] (Spenser 1595, *3ʳ-*4ʳ)

Euphues and his England (1580) talks about the "inuention of *new* fables" as opposed to "the reciting of old"[200]; then Thomas Nash in *Pierce Penilesse* (1592) says that "Poets and Philosophers that take a pride in inuenting *new* opinions, haue sought to renoume their wits, by hunting after strange conceits of heauen and hell"[201], and finally, in his *Summers last will and testament* (1600) Nash states: "Giue a scholler wine, going to his booke, or being about to inuent, it sets a *new* poynt on his wit, it glazeth it, it scowres it, it giues him *acumen*"[202]. Shakespeare also links invention and novelty in his sonnets, and gets concerned with not writing anything new or, at least, with the appearance of new. Sonnet 59, for instance, begins with the uncertainty that "If there be nothing new, but that which is / Hath been before, how are our brains beguiled, / Which, lab'ring for invention, bear amiss / The second burthen of a former child!"[203]. Not achieving novelty but remaning stuck in mere repetition worries the poetic voice of sonnet 76 as well:

> Why is my verse so barren of new pride,
> So far from variation or quick change?
> Why with the time do I not glance aside
> To new-found methods, and to compounds strange?
> Why write I still all one, ever the same,
> *And keep invention in a noted weed,*
> *That every word doth almost tell my name,*
> *Showing their birth, and where they did proceed?*[204]

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[200] (Lyly 1580, Z3ᵛ)
[201] (Nash 1592, I1ʳ)
[202] (Nash 1600, F1ʳ)
[203] (Shakespeare 2000, 52). The sonnet continues as follows:

> O that recórd could with a backward look,
> Ev'n of five hundred courses of the sun,
> Show me your image in some ántique book,
> Since mind at first in character was done,
> That I might see what the old world could say
> To this composèd wonder of your frame;
> Whether we are mended, or whether better they,
> Or whether revolution be the same.
> O, sure I am the wits of former days
> To subjects worse have giv'n admiring praise.

[204] (Shakespeare 2000, 67). The sonnet finishes as follows:

> O know, sweet love, I always write of you,
> And you and love are still my argument.
> So all my best is dressing old words new,
> Spending again what is already spent:

These are certainly the thoughts of a poet who fears stagnation in the same writing procedures. "New pride", "variation", "quick change", "new-found methods", "compounds strange" and a new "invention" constitute all the capacities and skills the poetic voice believes a good poet should have, once again stressing the importance of novelty in literary composition. Invention and renovation are therefore opposed to imitation and the immutable continuation of literary tradition. In Shakespeare's *Love's Labour's Lost*, for instance, the character of Holofernes praises Ovidius Naso "for the elegancy, facility, and golden cadence of poesy": "And why indeed Naso but for smelling out the odoriferous flowers of fancy, the jerks of invention? *Imitari* is nothing. So doth the hound his master, the ape his keeper, the tired horse his rider"[205].

John Lyly also contrasts invention to imitation, suggesting that what one imitates is an invention devised by someone else. In *Euphves* (1578) invention is presented as that which is followed and imitated by others: "I my selfe haue thought that in diuinitie there coulde bee *no eloquence, which I myght imitate, no pleasaunt inuention whiche I might followe*, no delicate phrase, that myght delyght mee"[206]. Likewise, in *Euphues and his England* (1580), talking about different aspects of English nobility, the following comment is made about their attire: "The attire they vse, is rather *led by the imitation of others, then their owne inuention*, so that ther is nothing in England more constant, than ye inconstancie of attire"[207]. Then, Edward Blount, the editor of John Lyly's *Six Court Comedies*, in a prefixed letter to the volume praises Lyly's works by calling them a group of "six ingots of *refined inuention*"[208] exclusively derived from Lyly's own invention, as "The Lyre he played on, *had no borrowed strings*"[209]. That invention is a more valuable literary quality than imitation appears most clearly in Chapman's preface to his *Achilles Shield, Translated as the other seuen Bookes of Homer out of his*

       For as the sun is daily new and old,
        So is my love, still telling what is told.
[205] (Shakespeare 1990, 159)
[206] (Lyly 1578, O2^v)
[207] (Lyly 1580, Ff3^r)
[208] (Lyly 1632, A4^r)
[209] (Lyly 1632, A4^v)

eighteenth booke of Iliades, an installment of his translation of Homer published in 1598[210]. Under the heading "In a defence of Homer", Chapman opposes the value of Homer's works to Virgil's, confronting the unique invention of the Greek master to the mere imitation of the Roman:

> *for Homers Poems were writ from a free furie, an absolute & full soule, Virgils out of a courtly, laborious, and altogether imitatorie spirit: not a Simile hee hath but is Homers: not an inuention, person, or disposition, but is wholly or originally built vpon Homericall foundations,* and in many places hath the verie wordes Homer vseth: (…) all Homers bookes are such as haue beene presidents euer since of all sortes of Poems; *imitating none, nor euer worthily imitated of any.*[211]

Indeed, this was not the first time Virgil was called an imitator of Homer, for, as has been seen, both Castelvetro as well as Speroni had leveled similar criticisms at him. Similarly, in "To the Gentlemen Students of both Uniuersities", Robert Greene differentiates those who pass "Ouids and Plutarchs plumes as their owne" from the talented men who need not "borow inuention of Ariosto, and his Countreymen":

> Let other men (as they please) praise the mountaine that in seauen yeares brings foorth a mouse, or the Italionate pen, that of a packet of pilfries, affoordeth the presse a pamphlet or two in an age, *and then in disguised arraie, vaunts Ouids and Plutarchs plumes as their owne; but giue me the man, whose extemporall vaine in anie humor, will excell our greatest Art-masters deliberate thoughts; whose inuention quicker than his eye*, will challenge the proudest Rethoritian (…) Indeede I must needes say, the descending yeares from the Philosophers Athens, haue not been supplied with such present Orators, as were able in anie English vaine to be eloquent of their owne, *but either they must borow inuention of Ariosto*, and his Countreymen, take vp choyce of words by exchange in Tullies Tusculane, and the Latine Historiographers store-houses; similitudes, nay whole sheetes and tractacts verbatim, from the plentie of Plutarch and Plinie; and to conclude, their whole methode of writing, from the libertie of Comical fictions, that haue succeeded to our Rethoritians, by a second imitation: so that, well may the Adage, *Nil dictum quod non dictum prius*, bee the most iudiciall estimate, of our latter Writers.[212]

In this manner, Greene laments the situation regarding national literary production, in which he identifies too many imitators of the Classical or of Italian authors and very few worthy inventors able to set a precedent. Furthermore, Greene's words show that

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[210] The extracts of the preface here quoted were not reprinted in the later issues of 1609 and 1611.
[211] (Smith 1904, vol. 2, 298)
[212] (Greene 1589, **2ᵛ -**2ʳ)

imitation can either occur at the level of invention or at that of elocution, and that he is disappointed by both. Clearly, imitation is criticized while invention is encouraged, and the fact that imitation is a widespread practice does not legitimize it; on the contrary, it saddens Green even more. For Greene, imitation is playing safe, finding shelter and protection in words that have already been said before or in stories already told. What he instead wishes for is a courageous and talented author with an "inuention quicker than his eye". Invention reappears as a term of praise when Green points out remarkable contemporary poets:

> there are extant about London, many most able men, to reuiue Poetrie, though it were executed ten thousand times, as in Platos, so in Puritanes common wealth; as for example Mathew Roydon, Thomas Atchelow and George Peele, the first of whome, as *hee hath shewed himselfe singular*, in the immortall Epitaph of his beloued Astrophel, besides *many other most absolute comicke inuentions* (…) & for the last (…) I dare commend him to all that know him, as the chiefe supporter of pleasance nowe liuing, (…) whose first encrease, the Arraignment of Paris, might plead to your opinions, *his pregnant dexteritie of wit, and manifold varietie of inuention*; wherein (me iudice) *hee goeth a step beyond* all that write.[213]

Although more subtly, George Peele repeats this same idea in his story "How George read a play booke to a Gentleman", included in the posthumously published *Merrie Conceited Iests* (1627). One of the characters of the tale is a gentleman "that tooke great delight to haue the first hearing of any worke that George had done, himselfe being a writer, and had *a Poeticall inuention of his owne*"[214]. The fact that Peele bothers to inform readers that the gentleman "had a Poeticall inuention of his owne" works as a powerful characterization strategy that encourages readers to respect the gentleman as an author, and thus Peele distinguishes him from a mere scribbler and a borrower of other men's inventions.

5.6.1. Invention's Negative Side

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[213] (Greene 1589, A3$^{\mathrm{v}}$)
[214] (Peele 1627, D3$^{\mathrm{v}}$)

As the survey on sixteenth-century English dictionaries advanced, when invention was employed in contexts different from rhetorical, logical or pro-poetry ones, it sometimes took on negative connotations through its association with lies, falsehoods and feigning. This supports the assertion that invention was seen as an active capacity of the mind that could be turned to a variety of purposes, including non-advisable ones. For instance, in Shakespeare's play *All's Well That Ends Well* we find evidence of this when the Second Lord states "None in the world, but returne with an invention, and clap upon you two or three probable lies"[215], or when the character of Parolles asks himself: "What shall I say I have done? It must be a very plausive invention that carries it"[216]. Then, in Robert Greene's *Gwydonius* (1584), after Castania hears the surmised dream of Gwydonius, she affirms having found it so "straunge and wonderfull" that if it had not been her the one waking him up, she would "either haue thought it a fained vision, or a fantasticall inuention"[217], meaning, of course, something made up by Gwydonius. On other occasions, invention is not so much associated with lies as with nonsensical and superstitious thoughts devised by ignorant or idle men. In John Lyly's *Euphues and his England* (1580) we find the following two fragments illustrating this shade of meaning:

> Doe you thinke Gentleman, that the minde being created of God, can be ruled by man, or that anye one canne moue the hart but he that made the hart? But such hath bene the superstition of olde women, & such the folly of young men, *that there could be nothing so vayne, but the one woulde inuent*, nor anye thing so sencelesse but the other would beleeue:[218]
> (…)
> But for bicause ther haue ben many without doubt, that haue giuen credite to the vayne illusions of Witches or the *fonde inuentions of idle persons*, I will sette downe such reasons as I haue heard and you wil laugh at, so I hope I shall both satisfie your minde, and make you a lyttle merry, for me thinketh there is nothing that can more delyght, then to heare the thinges which haue no wayghte, to bee thought to haue wroughte wonders.[219]

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[215] (Shakespeare 2003, 113)
[216] (Shakespeare 2003, 117)
[217] (Greene 1584, H2^v)
[218] (Lyly 1580, R3^r)
[219] (Lyly 1580, R3r-R4v)

Related to invention's implications of superstition, Marlowe uses the term in *Doctor Faustus* to signal the evil workings of the minds of the up-to-no-good "servile spirits" commanded by Faustus:

> How am I glutted with conceit of this?
> Shall I make spirits fetch me what I please,
> Resolve me of all ambiguities,
> Performe what desperate enterprise I will?
> (…)
> Yea, stranger engines for the brunt of warre,
> Then was the fiery keel at Antwarpes bridge,
> *Ile make my servile spirits to invent*:[220]

On other occasions, as in Anthony Munday's preface to *Zelavto* (1580), invention is employed to talk about shrewd and cunning schemes devised to trick people in and gain some kind of unfair profit. The idea of falsehood thus appears again on stage:

> Likewise Gentlemen, ambicious heads, are apt to send foorth spitefull speeches, and if they can possyble catche a hole in a mans coate: the same wyll they lay euerie day in his dishe: But such secrete Serpentes in bewraying their behauiour, can not hurt him whome they wyllingly would: *but confound them in their craftyest inuentions*.[221]

Furthermore, there are instances of poets distrusting invention on the grounds of its opposition to reason. These authors see invention as a dangerous power when its creative side is unmediated by the rational mind, thus bringing to surface thoughts well-worth taking with caution. John Davies in his "T'insult vpon the wretched, is a Crime", included in his *A Select Second Husband* (1616), equals "idle Poets" to those who put "small Ryme" before "great Reason", thus taking "vnwaigh'd" that which comes from invention:

> His Mindes cleare Eye pry'd narrowly, to spie
> What well would grace her, yet it come to Eye.
> Not like *some idle Poets of our Time*,
> *That ouersee great Reason, for small Ryme :*
> *And from Inuention, take what comes vnwaigh'd*
> *(By Iudgement , with the Understandings ayde)*

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[220] (Marlowe 1990, 6)
[221] (Munday 1580, N2^r – N3^v)

> To farse great Bookes , with Ignorance farre greater :
> Which neretheless, oft better sell than better.[222]

Another problematic side of invention is that it is often employed by Protestant authors to refer to Catholicism, idolatry, or man-made ideas about religion with no foundation on the Scriptures. In this respect, invention is opposed to true religion, faith, the teachings of the Bible and, ultimately, salvation. Thus, in Marlowe's *Massacre at Paris* we find the following intervention by the character of the King of Navarre:

> My Lords, sith in a quarrell iust and right,
> We vndertake to mannage these our warres:
> Against the proud disturbers of the faith,
> I meane the Guise, the Pope, and King of Spaine,
> Who set themselves to tread us vnder foot,
> And rent our true religion from this land.
> *But for you know our quarrell is no more,*
> *But to defend their strange inuentions,*
> *Which they will put vs to with sword and fire:*
> We must with resolute mindes resolue to fight,
> In honor of our God and countries good.[223]

In religious discourse, invention certainly appears with these negative connotations, and frequently accompanied by words such as 'fancy'. Overall, invention represents man-made ideas that oppose and wish to compete with and establish themselves over God's dictates. In this Protestant discourse, invention indicates a force that separates man from salvation and draws him closer to idolatry and heresy. For instance, many sermons by Hugh Latimer contain references to invention understood in the manner explained above. In the following excerpt Latimer puts "mans invention" against "goddis preceptis" on the same level as "fansies":

> while they preched, these wylworkes, that comme but of our owne devotion, although they be not so necessarye, as the workes of mercy, and the preceptes of god, yet they sayd, & in the pulpet, that wilworkes were more principall, more excellent, & (playnly to utter what they meane) more acceptable to god than workes of mercy: *as thoughe now mans inuētions and fansies, coude plese god better than goddis preceptis, or straunge thinges better than his owne*:[224]

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[222] (Davies 1616, E1ᵛ)
[223] (Marlowe 1971, C2v)
[224] (Latimer 1537, A7v-A7r)

For Latimer, man's inventions are so powerful and, therefore, so fearful, because they are able to "sette up an other fayth" different from the true one (*i.e.*, Protestantism), and impose false rituals and traditions:

> These worldlynges pull downe the lyuely fayth, and full confidence that men haue in Christe, and sette up an other fayth, an other confidence of theyr owne makynge: the chyldren of lyght contrary. These worldelynges sette lyttell by suche workes, as god hath prepared for our saluation, *but they extoll traditions and workes of theyr owne inuention*: the chylderne of lyghte contrary.[225]

Of course, Protestant Latimer identifies this false religion based on men's inventions with Catholicism and its rituals, an identification that he expresses in passages such as the following:

> Where the Deuyll is residente, that he maye preuayle, up with all supersticion and Idolatrie, sensing, paintynge of ymages, candels, palmes, ashes, holie water, *and new seruice of mennes inuentyng, as though man could inuente a better waye to honoure God with, then god hymselfe hath apoynted*.[226]

Other Protestant preachers of the sixteenth century made similar observations putting forward Latimer's same arguments. For instance, John Foxe's *Fox's Book of Martyrs* (1563) deals in similar terms with the relation between "human inventions", idolatry and Catholicism:

> In the reign of Edward III. the church of England was extremely corrupted with errors and superstition; and the light of the gospel of Christ was *greatly eclipsed and darkened with human inventions*, burthensome ceremonies, and gross idolatry.[227]

Later on, in the chapter "Persecutions in England during the reign of Queen Mary" and within a diatribe against Catholic practices, Foxe poses the following rhetorical question in which 'invention' and 'imagination' go hand in hand: "Do you not promise them trentals and dirges, and Masses for souls, and sell your prayers for money, and

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[225] (Latimer 1537, C7r-D1v)
[226] (Latimer 1548, C4v-C4r)
[227] (Foxe 2007, 241)

make them buy pardons, and trust to *such foolish inventions of your imaginations*?"[228].

Likewise, the deeply pessimistic sermon John Knox preaches on the dangers and

potential risks of the advancement of atheism upon England makes "lies" and "men's

inventions" synonyms:

> if at any time we see the face of the church within this realm so defaced, as I think it
> shall be sooner than we look for—when we shall see, I say, virtue to be despised, vice
> to be maintained, the verity of God to be impugned, *lies and men's inventions holden in
> authority*—and finally, when we see the true religion of our God, and the zealous
> observers of the same, trodden under the feet of such as in their heart say, that "There is
> no God" (Psal. xiv.)[229]

In his study of the French meta-literary scene in the sixteenth century, Grahame

Castor points out that the term 'invention', unlike that of 'fiction', was loaded with few

pejorative associations, and even if he recognizes that "The semantic respectability of

the word was later to be quite seriously compromised", at the time 'invention' was a

fairly neutral word "much nearer to *trouver* than it was to *controuver*", and therefore

"very useful to the defenders of poetry"[230]. Thus, Castor states that in the French

context "there was nothing *fantastique*, or *monstrueux*, or *fiévreux* about invention,

nothing irrational; it was a perfectly normal process of the mind, over which the reason

and the judgement could ideally exercise full control"[231]. Castor explains this generally

positive, rational, orderly, systematized and controlled view of invention as a result of

its coming from a long and considerably respected rhetorical tradition. At the same

time, however, he cannot stop noticing that during the sixteenth century *invention* was

beginning to gradually shift in meaning, "from that of finding something which is

already in existence and merely requires discovery (in the sense of uncovering, or

bringing into human awareness for the first time), to that of making something

completely new, creating something which has never existed before"[232]. Castor

moreover explains that as a result of the association with imagination that invention was

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[228] (Foxe 2007, 346)
[229] (Knox 1832, 480)
[230] (Castor 1964, 124)
[231] (Castor 1964, 125)
[232] (Castor 1964, 126)

undergoing at the time, invention took up some of the "unfavourable connotations" (associations with lying, irrationality, passions, the body, etc.) dragged by imagination[233].

Comparing Castor's conclusions for the French context with what we have read from the English side, the negative side to invention appears much more acute in England. Definitely, invention was not a neutral term in England, as the dictionaries of the time have demonstrated, and it was certainly (as in France) associated with imagination, which did not have very good press either. In fact, one may wonder whether a reason for invention's seemingly less neutral connotations in the English context has to do with an earlier linkage of invention with imagination, or a faster transmission of negative connotations due to the serious attacks against imagination led by Protestant reformers.

In addition to Castor, Suzanne Kooij has more recently noted that in French poetics imagination does not play a dominant role, and that, in fact, the term is hardly ever used by poets when talking about poetry so "to avoid associations with madness and frenzy"[234]; Kooij moreover confirms that 'invention' or 'enargeia' were more frequently used than the dangerous 'imagination', this being a "strategy used by French poets to emphasize their image-making powers without having to use the term 'imagination'"[235]. In this respect, I would like to remark that Kooij's wording seems to suggest that there was a conscious effort on the part of French authors to avoid using the term imagination in their writings due to the prejudices it raised. As a result, it seems that the use of invention was favored in this context because of its more neutral overtones. Nonetheless, one has to take into account that invention was the term typically used, the one that had existed for a longer time in literary comments, and hence, the standard. The inclusion of imagination in literary discourse was a fairly recent phenomenon –as it was completely absent from literary discourse in Antiquity and in the medieval tradition. In

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[233] (Castor 1964, 181)
[234] (Kooij 2004, 77)
[235] (Kooij 2004, 79)

other words, it is not that imagination was avoided: its lesser frequency is instead explained by its non-traditional usage. Certainly, for a post-Romantic mentality, the term 'imagination' is the familiar one while 'invention' is the alien; as a result, it is easier for us to think that in the sixteenth century theorists tried to avoid 'imagination' when writing about literary discourse and forget to consider that 'imagination' was still far from being common in such contexts. Thus, the appearance of 'imagination' in sixteenth-century literature is in a way a novelty, which is what truly explains its less numerous occurrences. In contrast, invention unquestionably was one of the brightest stars within the literary terminological galaxy of the sixteenth century.

6

Inspiration and Imagination in the Sixteenth Century

The rise of the concept of invention within the literary discourse of the sixteenth century runs parallel to its association with imagination, which up until the Renaissance had been a household notion of theories of the human soul and the workings of the mind if completely absent from reflections upon poetry. The association of invention with imagination suggests that the concept of invention had surpassed the rhetorical meaning of 'finding' and that poets and men of letters began conceiving of their work as a mentally demanding activity that was not necessarily related to the theories of inspiration but was based instead upon the complex mechanisms of the human brain. This chapter, after considering the presence in the Renaissance literary sphere of the renewed theories of inspiration by Italian Neoplatonists, will fully focus on tracing the concept of imagination from Antiquity through the sixteenth century, paying attention as well to theories of the tripartite human soul, the distinction between internal and external senses, the theory of the four elements and the four humours, and the belief in the division of the brain into ventricles containing separate mental powers. Additionally, the negative press that accompanied the concept of 'imagination' during the sixteenth century will be discussed in detail, along with its repercussions upon the poetic scene and the English defences of poetry. Finally, as with imitation, the works of Sir Philip Sidney together with those of William Shakespeare will prove highly useful in gaining deeper insight into this concept and its relations with the much praised notion of invention.

6.1. Poetry and Inspiration: From Antiquity to the Sixteenth Century

The notion of poetic inspiration raised questions as to how the divine breath or divine spirit entered in contact with men, and how one should assess, from an aesthetic and epistemological point of view, the literary production of the inspired poet. Democritus does not categorically deny the parenthood of the poet's best works, for in order to compose them, he has to exploit certain faculties to their highest level. Nevertheless, Democritus subjects the operativity of such faculties to the powerful stimulus of a supernatural and external agent who embraces the poet with a special frenzy by which the poet enters a trance similar to that of the *furor divinantium*[1]. From Democritus's perspective, the poet is not one hundred percent responsible for his works because he is dependent on the inspiring divine breath. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato presented poetry as a god-given madness or divine frenzy (*mania*), and classified it, along with prophecy, mystery and love, as one of the four divine *deliriums* which make the soul aspire to return to the realm of Ideas:

> And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.[2]

Also, the following extract from Plato's *Laws* characterizes poetry as a divine frenzy:

> … the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows to flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another.[3]

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[1] (Gil 1966, 36)
[2] (Plato 1999, 469; 245A)
[3] (Plato 2006, 84; 719C)

Then, Plato asserts in the *Ion* that "God takes away the mind of these men [poets], and uses them as his ministers, just as he does soothsayers and godly seers, in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who utter these words of great price, when they are out of their wits, but that it is God himself who speaks and addresses us through them"[4]. Therefore, the inspired poet is not conscious of what happens to him, for inspiration escapes the poet's control. This is not to say, however, that the poem is the poet's mechanical rendering of some divinely inspired words; indeed, the poet becomes an intermediary who modifies and shapes the original message. Should any faults or imperfections be found in the poem, they ought to be attributed to the poet and not to the Muse or to the lack of inspiration, for if poetry is not written under this type of temporary madness, it will be logically bad, for *techné* is no guarantee of good poetic creation[5].

Aristotle scarcely deals with poetic inspiration in his *Poetics*, partly because he had treated the subject in his now lost *On poets* and partly because he rejected the mysterious collaboration of superior entities with the poet; for Aristotle, a poet is rather a craftsman with a teachable skill, a *tekhné*. He describes poetry as an activity of a man with natural talent perfected through exercise. Only once in the *Poetics* does Aristotle allude to a form of poetic madness, and he then advises the playwright to write with emotion so to move the audience more easily and naturally. Aristotle ends up stating the following: "Hence poetry is the work of a gifted person, or of a manic: of these types, the former have versatile imaginations, the latter get carried away"[6].

The theory of divine inspiration becomes a commonplace among Latin poets, and invocations to the Muses put on a formulaic character particularly visible in epic

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[4] (Plato 1962, 423; 534CD)

[5] Of course, within Plato's scheme what is surprising is that, if poets are inspired by the gods, poems themselves can be immoral and deceitful, and that official governmental censorship is required. As E. N. Tigerstedt puts it, "if the poet's inspiration really is divine, the fruits of it must be good, it being a fundamental principle of Plato's philosophy, that God and all his works are good" (Tigerstedt 1969, 65).

[6] (Aristotle 1999, 89; 1455A). According to D. A. Russell, "We should conclude that those critics who think-like the sixteenth-century Castelvetro – that Aristotle must have meant 'the naturally talented *rather than* the manic' are essentially right" (Russell 2001, 78).

poems[7]. The Muses seem not only to transmit knowledge of past events to the poet, but also solve his doubts when he hesitates between two possible versions or explanations of a given fact. In Latin poetry, invocations to the Muses very often appear together with the recognition of the poet's ignorance and his dependence on the Muses' omniscence. Sometimes, we also find Apollo, Love, Venus, Bacchus, or gods in general invocated by the poets at the beginning of their works. This inspiration is not received as the awakening of occult forces, but as a kind of *docere* on the part of the inspiring entity. Didactic poets, and even elegiac poets, consider themselves disciples of the Muses in a way, and their task appears limited to writing down what the deity (the true *auctor* or *repertor carminis*) dictates them[8].

In *De oratore*, Cicero discusses the theory of inspiration in the following terms: "For I have often heard that –as they say Democritus and Plato have left on record– no man can be a good poet who is not on fire with passion, and inspired by something very like frenzy"[9]. Cicero's description of the mental state of the poet as *inflamatio animi et quidam adflatus quasi furore* (a state of quasi madness or delirium) shows that he understands that *furor* is connected with inspiration or possession of divinity rather than madness. Later, in the poetry of the Imperial Age, the Muses lose ground, and are gradually devalued or replaced until they are finally rejected by early Christian poetry.

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[7] Indeed, it has even been argued that, from Hesiod onwards, invocations of the poets to the Muses begin to trivialize, and that even Homer himself uses on many occasions the invocation to the Muses as a mere poetic formula, as a poetic resource –see (Gil 1966, 27). In Antiquity, the Muses were vital forces not only linked to poetry but to all other higher forms of intellectual life. Muses have been considered deities of springs connected with the cult of Zeus. Homer's Muses are Olympians whose function in epic is to infuse into the poet what he is to say. The Muses had no well-marked personalities, and, even in ancient Greece, their image was fairly vague. They rather "incarnate a purely intellectual principle, which could be dissociated from the Greco-Roman pantheon" (Curtius 1979, 229); in fact, Apollo was the only god with whom they were regularly associated. Hesiodus assigns to Zeus and Memory the parenthood of the Muses, who exercise the power of remembrance to the poets, as all invocations to the Muses entail a specific question for which the poet requires an answer. The Muses possess an ocular knowledge of events, but their help limits itself to giving information or refreshing the poet's memory, and does not exclude the personal task of the poet, who is responsible for arranging his story poetically.
[8] (Gil 1966, 84)
[9] (Cicero 1979, 337, 339; II.46.194). In Latin: "Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem –id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt– sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse, et sine quodam afflatus quasi furoris". Even though Democritus and Plato were coupled together from Classical Antiquity regarding their theories on inspiration, nowhere was Democritus mentioned in Plato's writings, which has made some authors doubt Plato's acquaintance with Democritus's theories (Tigerstedt 1969, 72).

During the Renaissance, Neoplatonists took up the subject of poetic inspiration and gave true and renovated credit to it[10]. The term *furor* appears in Italy in the late fourteenth century in the writings of L. Bruni, who opposes the high divine poetry of Orpheus and Hesiod to that of Dante. Boccaccio's definition of poetry in *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium* Book 14 chapter 7 refers, not to a furor, but to an inspiring fervor not far removed from furor: "For poetry, which negligent and ignorant people degrade, is some vigor to thoughtfully invent, and tell or write what one has invented. (...) In fact, this vigor has great consequences, like encouraging the mind to recite, or imagine strange and unprecedented inventions"[11]. In other words, for Boccaccio it seems as if the poet's fervor triggered invention[12]. Then, Marsilio Ficino supported the theory of divine *furor* in poetry and believed that poetry was the result of inspiration and not of imitation.

Francesco Patrizzi in his *Della Poetica* (1586), also from the thesis of the divine *furor*, referred to the poet as a creator of new and marvelous fictions, and attempted to remove imitation as the distinctive quality that differentiated poetry from the rest of the discursive arts. Patrizi honestly believed in the theory of divine *furor* or inspiration, and considered it the chief element for the writing of good poetry, and in Book III of the *Deca ammirabile* pointed at the *mirabile* (*i.e.*, that which makes us wonder and marvel) as the essence of poetry. The *mirabile* is a quality of the poem, a result of the divine *furor*, its intrinsic end, and the origin of *la maraviglia*, its extrinsic end, its effect upon the audience. Furthermore, for Patrizi the marvellous stands in opposition to imitation and to theories of credibility, verisimilitude, possibility, necessity, or truth. In fact, he

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[10] As Henri Weber puts it, Neoplatonic theories on inspiration show the almost mystic element within the Humanist movement: "l'inspiration reflète à la fois un désir de communication avec les forces cosmiques qui président aux destinées de l'univers et un besoin d'échapper aux contraintes de la vie sociale. Le caractère sacré reconnu à l'inspiration est une défense de la liberté du poète contre l'esclavage de la vie de cour et la poésie officielle, à laquelle il se trouve contraint par les exigences de sa situation matérielle" (Weber 1981, 108).

[11] In Latin: "Poesis enim, quam negligentes abiciunt et ignari, est fervor quidam exquisite inveniendi atque dicendi, seu scribendi, quod inveneris. (...) Huius enim fervoris sunt sublimes effectus, ut puta mentem in desiderium dicendi compellere, peregrinas et inauditas inventiones excogitare" (Boccaccio 1951, 699). The translation into English of these sentences is my own.

[12] While William O. Scott (1981, 274) does not consider this an instance of Neoplatonism, Abrams (1976) does view it as an earlier Neoplatonic notion of poetic invention.

identifies the twelve sources of the marvellous in "ignorance, fable, novelty, paradox, augmentation, change from what is usual, the extranatural, the divine, great utility, the very exact, the unexpected, the sudden"[13]. The process works as follows: first the Muses or the gods inspire the poet (divine *furor*); second, the poet receives that enthusiasm and from it he creates the marvellous in verse; and third, the poem, created to achieve the *mirabile*, moves and inspires awe in the audience.

Having been Plato's translator and commentator, Marsilio Ficino was highly acquainted with Platonic theories. Ficino discussed divine *furor* in the letter *De divino furore*, the commentary to the *Phaedrus*, the *Theologia platonica* (XIII, 2), and *De Amore*, VII, 14, the *Ion argumentum*. Nevertheless, as Michael Allen points out, "Ficino wrote no formal treatise on poetry, and was not a poet himself nor an arbiter for his time of poetic taste"[14], and as Raphael Falco observes, none of the above mentioned works "reveals a systematic *ars* by which poetry might be analyzed or taught"[15]. Ficino was instead more concerned with associating the *furor* of poetry to the manifestation of God in the production of verse and song[16]. Ficino notes that Plato distinguished four kinds of divine madnesses or frenzies: the poetic, the hieratic, the prophetic, and the amatory passion (*i.e.*, poetry, mystery, prophecy, and love). Ficino saw poetry as the initial step in theology, since the poetic frenzy, through musical notes and harmony, would

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[13] (Weinberg 1961, vol. II, 774)

[14] (Allen 1998, 213)

[15] (Falco 2007, 108). Tigerstedt claims that "there is no aesthetics in the modern sense in Ficino's philosophy", for what Ficino calls *Ars* means "human activity, productivity in general, whether the fine arts, or techniques, mechanics, agriculture, or the taming of animals". Thus, "Ficino sees no fundamental difference between an 'artist' and an 'artisan;' he calls both of them *artifex* and their products *artificial*. When Ficino, as so many before him, calls God *naturae artifex*, he does not intend to call Him an artist in the modern sense of this word, though he stresses the beauty of the creation. And when he says that the 'Arts' imitate God, 'Nature's Artificer,' he does not mean only the fine arts" (Tigerstedt 1970, 474).

[16] "Often the source was retrospectively identified as the Christian god, notwithstanding the various earlier names given by Orpheus, Linus, Homer, and Hesiod to what Ficino liked to refer to as the notion of One Being" (Falco 2007, 103). Falco furthermore asserts the following: "Ficino might not have been an arbiter of poetic taste precisely, his commitment to the revival of Plato guided his judgment in regard to the acceptance of particular genres and the banishment of poets who failed to fulfill the criteria laid out by Plato in the *Republic*. Insisting that such poems as the divine hymns of Orpheus and Musaeus be understood monotheistically, Ficino manages neither to banish the *prisci poetae* nor to accept them uncritically. Further following Plato, he also condones certain forms of narrative poetry (…). Unlike later theorists, Ficino did not seek to glorify the poet as the uncontested founder of civilization, nor did he credit human ingenuity with poetry's most enduring monuments (…). Rather, his remythicization of the *furor poeticus* was undertaken chiefly to connect the poetic madnesses described by Plato to the extant myth of the *vates* or *poeta theologus*" (Falco 2007, 109).

moderate and order the different parts of the soul. In this manner, Ficino related poetic inspiration to the natural and harmonic movements of the heavens by likening it to an imitation of the celestial music of the movements of the spheres –since each sphere is inhabited by its own soul, a Muse or Siren, whose influence accounts for the variety of poetic inspiration. Plato's discussion in the *Phaedrus* of the four furors that contribute to the ascension of the soul towards divinity and in the soul's liberation from the body influenced Ficino's *De divino furore* and his commentary to the *Phaedrus*, where poetic *furor* is associated to the delirium of love. In *De amore* and the *Ion argumentum*, inspiration is nonetheless dissociated from that precise type of *furor*, and rather seen as the first and fundamental stage in the process of divine revelation. Ficino agreed with Plato in that the poet is but a passive element and that the composition of poetry lies in the active role played by the inspirational divinity. Hence, Ficino explains in his *Platonic Theology* that poets are not necessarily highly intelligent men, and that Homer's great literary achievements were the result of divine inspiration:

> Consider moreover the poets whom Democritus and Plato both say are seized by a kind of divine frenzy. Two of Plato's dialogues show us this especially, the *Phaedrus* and the *Ion*. He adduces three pertinent signs. First, *without God individual men, even after a long time, can scarcely acquire the individual arts*, yet the legitimate poets, such as Plato held Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod and Pindar to be, inserted into their works the particular signs and subject matters of all the arts. Second, *poets in a frenzy sing of many things, and marvellous ones at that, which a little later, when their frenzy has abated, they themselves do not sufficiently understand*: it is as if they had not pronounced the words but rather God had spoken loudly through them as through trumpets. Third, men of great prudence and those most learned from their youth have not turned out to be the best poets. Rather, some of the poets were mad, as was said of Homer and Lucretius; but others were uneducated as Hesiod himself bore witness, and so too, according to Plato, were Ion and Tynnicus of Chalcis, both of whom suddenly beyond all art stepped forward as wonderfully gifted in poetic matters. He adds that *certain wholly unskilled men are enraptured by the Muses precisely because divine providence wishes to declare to mankind that splendid poems are not men's inventions but the gifts of heaven*.[17]

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[17] (Ficino 2004, 127). In Latin: "Praeterea, poetas considera quos Democritus et Plato divino quodam furore correptos affirmant. Hoc ostendunt prae ceteris duo Platonis dialogi, *Phaedrus* et *Ion*. Cuius quidem rei affert signa. Primum, quod artes singulas singuli homines sine deo longo vix tempore assequuntur, legitimi vero poetae, quales fuisse vult Orpheum, Homerum, Hesiodum, Pindarum, omnium artium suis operibus certa quaedam indicia et argumenta inseruerunt. Secundum, quod multa furentes canunt et illa quidem mirabilia, quae paulo post defervescente furore ipsimet non satis intellegunt, quasi non ipsi pronuntiaverint, sed deus per eos ceu tubas clamaverit. Tertium quod non prudentissimi quique et ab ineunte aetate eruditissimi optimi evasere poetae, verum insani potius aliqui, qualem se fuisse testatur

The terms *furor* and *delirium* can be understood in both positive and negative ways: on the one hand, *furor* makes the human soul encounter divinity; on the other, *furor* and *delirium*'s outward manifestations are very similar to physical disease and madness, and therefore it becomes difficult to identify which agent is acting on a person. Renaissance Neoplatonics explained this resemblance by associating both inspiration and folly to black humour, the melancholic sort of temperament[18]. Hence, just as melancholy may produce hallucinations and hopelessness, it may also account for exceptional genius and make a person likely to receive divine inspiration. Through this reasoning, Renaissance Neoplatonists managed to provide a physical/physiological/psychological explanation to divine inspiration.

According to Vida, the poet is the recipient of the divine furor, and he can prepare to receive this inspiration by reading other poets' inspired words. Still, it is surprising that Vida relied so much on poetic inspiration and at the same time devoted such a large part of his work to discussing the poet's education, abilities and skills as dependent on his own efforts, and the techniques of invention, disposition and elocution[19]. Despite the divine inspiration, what Vida actually advises is that the poet should rely on his own capacities to write the final version of the composition, in which process the poet's reason and skills should ponder over the graciously received inspiration:

> But young bard, trust not, ah, trust not too much to poetic ardor. *We cannot allow you always to adopt the suggestions of fortune and the bursts of inspiration which come to you while the raging god dwells in your breast. Rather let reason and care oppose their*

Hesiodus et quales extitisse Ionem et Tynnichum Chalcidaeum scribit Plato, qui praeter artem subito in rebus poeticis mirandi prodierint. Addit ineptissimos quosdam homines a Musis ideo corripi, quia divina providentia declarare vult hominum generi non hominum inventa esse praeclara poemata, sed caelestia munera" (Ficino 2004, 126).

[18] Perrine Galand-Hallyn and Fernand Hallyn explain the effects of the prevalence of the melancholic temper in an individual and its effects on Ficino's overall explanation: "La mélancolie rend le corps plus lourd et l'âme plus légère. Elle contribue à leur distinction et favorise ainsi l'action du délire, dont l'effet consiste justement à dissocier l'âme du corps et à provoquer ce que Ficin appelle une 'vacance de l'âme', une ouverture aux influences célestes" (Galand-Hallyn and Hallyn 2001, 127).

[19] As Ralf G. Williams points out, "Vida makes no definitive statement on the relationship between the poet's own quite learnable activity in the matter of invention, and the uncontrollable, in fact capricious, gusts of inspiration imparted by 'the gods'" (Williams 1976, xxxiv). Nevertheless, this is far from infrequent in the Renaissance, for, as John M. Steadman asserts, "The majority of Renaissance theorists saw little or no contradiction between assertions of divine inspiration and the importance of formal rules and classical models" (Steadman 1974, 156).

power. Bridle in your frenzied soul, and recall it to [reason's] colors; be cautious and learn when to restrain your mind and when to give it free rein. Hence we insist that you must invariably pause at this point until your spirits are calmed and every impulse is curbed. Then return and, with your emotions well under control, revise everything that blind frenzy cast up in your mind.[20]

As for the presence of theories of inspiration among the poets of the Pléiade, there is no unanimity, and if some poets such as Ronsard or Du Bartas did assign inspiration a key role, others like Du Bellay or Sébillet dealt with it briefly[21]. For instance, Sébillet in his *Art poétique français* (1548) calls poetry the art "that more properly I would call divine inspiration" ("que plus proprement j'appellerai divine inspiration"), defending his statement in the following terms:

> And certainly like in all arts, this spark of divine fire, when approaching the mind, its kindred, flares and thus is of course known; furthermore, it shines more vividly and with more apparent splendor in the art of poetry (allow me to name art what most properly I would call divine inspiration). The true poet only sings his verses and songs when excited by the vigor of his mind, and inspired by some divine afflatus. Yet Plato called poets the sons of the gods; father Ennius called them saints, and sages have always called them divines like those commended by some divine gift and heavenly prerogative as is clearly shown by the numbers by which the poets measure their songs, the perfection and divinity of which support and maintain the admirable machine of this universe, and everything it encloses and contains.[22]

Of course, the fact that poetry is a consequence of inspiration makes it more difficult to teach, because it locates the poetic capacities of the poet in his natural abilities. As Sébillet questions, "who can reasonably affirm that poetry was by nature

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[20] (Vida 1976, 73). In Latin: "Ne tamen ah nimium, puer o, ne fide calori. / Non te fortuna semper permittimus uti, / Praesentique aura, saevum dum pectore numen / Insidet : at potius ratioque, & cura resistat ; / Freno siste furentem animum, & sub signa vocato, / Et premere, & laxas scito dare cautus habenas. / Atque ideo semper tune exspectare jubemus, / Dum fuerint placati animi, compressus, & omnis / Impetus. hic recolens sedato corde revise / Omnia, quae caecus menti subjecerint ardor" (Vida 1976, 72).

[21] See Prescott (1978).

[22] In French: "Et certes comme en tous les arts cette étincelle du feu divin à l'approcher de l'esprit son semblable rend lumière, par laquelle elle est évidemment connue ; aussi en l'art Poétique (me soit permis de nommer art ce que plus proprement j'appellerai divine inspiration) reluit-elle en plus vive et plus apparente splendeur. Car le Poète de vraie marque, *ne chante ses vers et carmes autrement que excité de la vigueur de son esprit, et inspiré de quelque divine afflation*. Pourtant appelait Platon les Poètes enfants des dieux: le père Ennius les nommait saints, et tous les savants les ont toujours appelés divins comme ceux qui nous doivent être singulièrement recommandés à cause de *quelque don divin, et céleste prérogative, laquelle est clairement montrée par les nombres dont les Poètes mesurent leurs carmes, la perfection et divinité desquels soutient et entretient l'admirable machine de cet univers*, et tout ce qu'elle clôt et contient" (Sébillet 1990, 52).

and birth, without study, doctrine or precept, anything other than heavenly given?"[23].

He goes on to say that despite Horace's stress on exercise, poetic invention largely

depends on the poet's natural abilities:

> *the first point of invention comes from the subtlety and wisdom of the mind:* which if God has denied man, no work nor doing will avail, in spite of Minerva. *Curiously, in the art of poetry, it is usually considered good to perfect oneself more from nature than art,* which agrees with the common maxim that says, the poet is born, the orator is made. Though Horace seems to give equal faculty to nature and art, and deems them as necessary and friendly conspirators to the perfection of the poet, he has nonetheless previously sufficiently shown that *it is necessary to be advised by nature as first and chief teacher.*[24]

In contrast with Sébillet and the idea of poetry as a divine gift, Du Bellay in his

Deffence strongly insists on the effort and the work of the poet:

> *Do not tell me either that poets are born*, because that refers to this fire and keenness of spirit that naturally excites poets, without which all study would be flawed and useless. Certainly, *it would be too easy a thing, and therefore contemptible, to immortalize oneself through fame, if the sort of natural talent given even to the least educated were sufficient to produce a work worthy of immortality*. Whoever wishes to fly through men's hands and lips must remain in his study a long time. And *he who wishes to live on in the memory of posterity must sweat and tremble often, as if dead to himself*. As often as our Court poets drink, eat, and sleep at their leissure, he must endure hunger, thirst, and long vigils. These are the wings by which men's writings fly to heaven.[25]

In *Art Poétique* (1555), Jacques Peletier revises the Ancients' ideas on inspiration

before broadly discussing the concept of nature, which he takes as absolute: from

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[23] In French: "qui pourrait raisonnablement affirmer que la Poésie fût de nature et de première naissance, sans étude, doctrine ou précepte, autrement que divinement donnée?" (Sébillet 1990, 52).

[24] In French: "*le premier point de l'invention se prend de la subtilité et sagacité de l'esprit*: laquelle si Dieu a déniée à l'homme, pour néant se travaillera-t-il de dire ou faire en dépit de Minerve: *singulièrement en l'art de poésie, que l'on tient communément et bien, se parfaire plus de nature que d'art*, jouxte la vulgaire sentence qui dit, Le Poète naît, l'Orateur se fait. Et encore que Horace semble donner faculté égale à la nature et à l'art, et les requière amiables conjurateurs à la perfection du poète, si a-t-il pardevant assez évidemment montré qu'*il se faut conseiller à sa nature comme première et principale maîtresse*" (Sébillet 1990, 58).

[25] (Du Bellay 2004b, 69-70). In French: "Qu'on ne m'allegue point aussi que les Poëtes naissent, car cela s'entend de ceste ardeur, et allegresse d'Esprit, qui naturellement excite les Poëtes, et sans la quele toute Doctrine leur seroit manque, et inutile. Certainement ce seroit chose trop facile, et pourtant contemptible, se faire eternel par Renommée, si la félicité de nature donnée mesmes aux plus Indoctes, etoit suffisante pour faire chose digne de l'Immortalité. Qui veut voler par les Mains, et Bouches des Hommes, doit longuement demeurer en sa chambre: et qui desire vivre en la memoire de la Posterité, doit comme mort en soymesmes suer, et trembler maintesfois : et autant que notz Poëtes Courtizans boyvent, mangent, et dorment à leur oyse, endurer de faim, de soif, et de longues vigiles. Ce sont les Esles, dont les Ecriz des Hommes volent au Ciel" (Du Bellay 2001, 128-129).

Peletier's perspective, nature is the sole origin and explanation of poetic creation, and what could be called "supernatural" has no place in poetry:

> But who would take here Nature in a wide sense, as a great worker that deals universally with everything that exists in the world, and with everything that falls within human cogitation and that encompasses even what we name against nature, and furthermore the supernatural, *when there is nothing but Nature in the poet, where there is nothing but Nature in the world*.[26]

The factor of divine inspiration in poetry was developed further by Pontus de Tyard in his *Solitaire Premier ou Prose des Muses et de la fureur poetique, plus quelques vers lyriques* (1552) and by Ronsard in "Ode a Michel de l'Hôpital" (1552). Ronsard goes against Fabri's idea that the poet was an orator writing in verse, and sees instead a poet inspired by the Muses and connected to a divine source. In the opening of *Abbregé de l'art poëtique françois* (1565) Ronsard states that "the art of poetry cannot be understood or taught by rules, for being more mental than based on tradition"[27]. Ronsard moreover highlights the poet's cult to the Muses, who should be revered due to their connection with the grace of God, the ultimate source from which all poetry derives:

> Over all things you will hold the Muses in reverence, even in singular veneration, and you will never make them serve dishonest purposes, ridicule, or offensive lampoons, but you will have them dear and sacred, like the daughters of Jupiter, that is of God, who in His holy grace, has first through them discovered the excellencies of His majesty to the ignorant people. Because poetry was not in the old times but an allegorical theology…[28]

Ronsard in fact distinguishes different generations of poets according to their relationship with divinity. The first generation is that of the divine poets (*Poètes divins*),

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[26] In French: "Mais certes qui voudrait prendre ici Nature amplement, pour cette grande ouvrière, qui agit universellement sur tout ce qui est au monde, et sur tout ce qui tombe en la cogitation des hommes: et qui comprend même les choses que nous appelons contre nature, et encore que les supernaturelles: lors *il n'y aurait que la Nature au Poète, quand il n'y aurait que la Nature au Monde*" (Peletier 1990, 244).

[27] In French: "l'art de poésie ne se puisse par préceptes comprendre ni enseigner, pour être plus mental que traditif" (Ronsard 1990, 467).

[28] In French: "Sur toutes choses tu auras les Muses en révérence, voire en singulière vénération, et ne les feras jamais servir à choses déshonnêtes, à risées, ni à libelles injurieux, mais les tiendras chères et sacrées, comme les filles de Jupiter, c'est-á-dire de Dieu, qui de sa sainte grâce a premièrement par elles fait connaître aux peuples ignorants les excellences de sa majesté. Car la Poésie n'était au premier âge qu'une Théologie allégorique..." (Ronsard 1990, 467).

and among them we find Orpheus, Homer, or Hesiod: "they are called divine poets, not so much due to the divine mind that makes them admirable and excellent over the rest, but for the conversation that they have with oracles, prophets, soothsayers, sibyls, dream interpreters, from whom they have learned the best part of what they know"[29].

Then, a second generation encompasses what for Ronsard are the human poets (*poètes humains*), whose poetry has more to do with exercise than with their contacts with the divine forces: "the second poets I call human poets, for being fuller of artifice and hard work than of divinity"[30]. Within this group, Ronsard places the *poètes Romains*, and remarks that "the main point is invention, which comes from both good nature, as well as the lesson of good and ancient authors"[31]. Ronsard then describes a gradual disappearance of the participation of the Muses in the creation of poetry, art and technique slowly gaining ground. After the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire, and the plunge into the 'Dark Ages', Ronsard believed that the poetical/inspirational situation reached rock bottom. In "Ode a Michel de l'Hôpital" (1552), he nevertheless assures readers that the Muses returned after the birth of the French statesman Michel de l'Hospital (1507–1573). The latter work by Ronsard, in which he describes how Jupiter granted the Muses the power to inspire men, distinguishes authentic poetry (poetry inspired by the Muses) from human art (poetry that can be learned):

> Vostre mestier, race gentille,
> Les autres mestiers passera,
> D'autant qu'esclave il ne sera
> De l'art, aux Muses inutile.
> Par art le navigateur
> Dans la mer manie et vire
> La bride de son navire :
> Par art plaide l'Orateur,
> Par art les Rois sont guerriers,
> Par art se font les ouvriers :

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[29] In French: "ils sont appelés Poètes divins, non tant pour leur divin esprit qui les rendait sur tous admirables et excellents, que pour la conversation qu'ils avaient avec les Oracles, Prophètes, Devins, Sibylles, Interprètes de songes, desquels ils avaient appris la meilleure part de ce qu'ils savaient" (Ronsard 1990, 467-468).

[30] In French: "les seconds poètes que j'appelle humains, pour être plus enflés d'artifice et labeur que de divinité".

[31] In French: "le principal point est l'invention, laquelle vient tant de la bonne nature, que par la lecon des bons et anciens auteurs" (Ronsard 1990, 468).

> Mais si vaine experience
> Vous n'aurez de tel erreur,
> Sans plus *ma sainte fureur*
> Polira vostre science.[32]

Du Bartas in lines 21-24 of "L'Uranie" (1574) shares Ronsard's perspective:

> Tout art s'aprend par art, *la seule poesie*
> *Est un pur don celeste* ; et nul ne peut gouter
> Le miel que nous faisons de Pinde desgouter,
> S'il n'a d'un *sacré feu* la poitrine saisie.[33]

Ronsard enumerates ways to favour *furor*, such as going frequently to solitary places, using pagan myths, or entering in contact with wild nature. In addition to the isolation and introspection of the poet, inspiration is also related to the willingness for a social life, as poetry cannot forget society, for ultimately the poet has to reveal truth and science to his fellowmen. On other occasions, divine *furor* may follow the enthusiasm of the poet after reading classical authors awakens his inner desire to emulate them; this means that imitation and emulation of the classics does not radically enter in conflict with the theory of inspiration[34]. Later on in his literary career, and in contrast with what has been explained above, in *Response auz injures et calomnies* (1563) Ronsard seems to deprive poetry of the divine status he had previously claimed for it by affirming (like Castelvetro) that pleasure is the sole aim of poetry, and that poetry is the product of human art[35].

The idea of inspiration is far more present in the French literary tradition than in the English one. Indeed, Sir Philip Sidney's *Deffence* is virtually the only poetics of

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[32] (Ronsard 1978, 396). (Quint 1983, 26) translates these lines into English in the following manner: "Your profession, noble race (of poets), will surpass all other professions, because it will not be the slave of art, art that is useless to Muses. By art the navigator handles and turns the bridle of his boat. By art the Orator pleads; by art Kings become warriors, by art craftsmen do their work. But if you do not vainly pursue that erroneous course (of art), my sacred furor will by itself polish your poetic skills".

[33] (Du Bartas 1938, 174-175). In English: "All art is learned through art, only poetry is purely a heavenly gift; and no man can taste the honey dripping from Pindus, whose chest is not by a sacred fire seized".

[34] As Weber explains, "Dans la reconnaissance simultanée de la valeur de l'inspiration et du principe de l'imitation, se manifeste la double exigence d'une authenticité individuelle et d'un recours à la tradition littéraire" (Weber 1981, 159-160).

[35] As David Quint points out, Ronsard reduces poetry to "little more than an aesthetic toy" (Quint 1983, 30). For more on this change, see (Quint 1983)

sixteenth-century England to refer to inspiration, and even then, inspiration appears as a fossilized poetic strategy: "He [the poet] citeth not authorities of other histories, *but even for his entry calleth the sweet Muses to inspire into him a good invention*", says Sidney[36]. Sidney's poetics is entirely grounded on the human mind, and so, Sidney rejects the possibility of divine inspiration, for, according to him, it is not a deity that elevates the poet's wit, but "the vigour of his own invention"[37]. The formulaic nature of theories of inspiration in the English Renaissance appears in, for instance, Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queene*. In the *invocatio*, Spenser addressed a Muse who he referred to as "holy Virgin chiefe of nine"[38]; later, he implored the aid of Venus, Cupid, and Mars, invoked Clio, and made Book VI begin with a second *invocatio* of the Muses, as the poet felt his powers failing. Then, Robert Coplande, the translator of Peter of Ravenna's *Foenix domini Petri Raven[n]atis memoriae magistri* (1491) as *The art of memory that otherwyse is called the phenix* (1545), suggests in the preface to his translation that Peter of Ravenna's invention did not emanate from his mind but from God, who inspired his spirit:

> For it semeth more to be inuented by dyuyne inspyracion than by arte or scyence of mankynde. I have also founde by wrytynge that whan the authour of this presēt worke experymented his knowledge through al the Itallies that many affirmed to have leyne this worke *more dyuyne than humayne*, so that some dyd blysse thē by great admiracion. The authour reported that he had no teacher of this art, but that *it came to hym by inuencion throughe the socour and help of god that lyghtned and inspired his spyrite*.[39]

One cannot help but read this claim of divine inspiration as a kind of marketing strategy; as a way to give extra importance to the book in order to sell more copies. Indeed, divine inspiration seems a fantastic means of legitimizing any work, or at least of advertising it for commercial purposes.

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[36] (Sidney 2002, 103)

[37] (Sidney 2002, 85). As Ronald Levao remarks, inspiration can be taken in a metaphorical way, and consequently, it would not be "the cause of the poet's conceit but the effect that the conceit has on the reader" (Levao 1987, 129). In other words, it would be "the faculty that creates fictions, the faculty that creates another nature and so reveals our divinity to ourselves" (Levao 1987, 131).

[38] (Spenser 1596, A2ʳ)

[39] (Copland 1545, A2ʳ-A3ᵛ)

6.2. Imagination

Imagination affects the way we apprehend, interpret, and respond to reality, and is a key term in current critical discourse[40]. The complexity of this concept has led Lodi Nauta and Detlev Pätzold to state that "there is no such thing as *the* history of *the* imagination", only "many conceptions and uses of the imagination" throughout history[41]. The Latin *imaginatio,* from which the current word 'imagination' is derived, has roughly been equated to the Greek word *φαντασία*, which firstly appeared in Greek literature in Plato's dialogues *Theaeletus*, *Sophist* and in his *Republic*, the earliest of the three. In Aristotle's works, 'phantasia' appears much more frequently, particularly in *De Anima*, where it is described as a movement in beings that perceive. For Aristotle, all phantasia is connected either with reasoning (confined to man) or perception (common to all animals including man).

In the case of the Neoplatonics, they show two attitudes towards phantasia: firstly, they are suspicious towards it because they regard it as deceitful due to its connection to the body, and secondly, they accept it as an intermediary between sense and intellect, and hence, between the sensual world and the higher realm of forms of thought. The following pages deal with the reinterpretation and understanding of the concept of imagination in the Renaissance, focusing on sixteenth-century England and advancing some of the attitudes towards imagination that would become widespread during Romanticism. Indeed, one of the chief features that distinguish English Romantic poets from previous poets is the importance that the former attributed to imagination. Though with different shades of meaning, Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats all take imagination as the pillar of their poetic theory, for they believed poetry was

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[40] I. A. Richards distinguishes six different senses in the present use of the term 'imagination': (i) "The production of vivid images, usually visual images", (ii) "The use of figurative language", (iii) "sympathetic reproducing of other people's states of mind, particularly their emotional states", (iv) "Inventiveness, the bringing together of elements which are not ordinarily connected", (v) "relevant connection of things ordinarily thought of as disparate", and (vi) the type of discourse on imagination developed from Coleridge during the Romantic period (Richards 2001, 212-214).

[41] (Nauta and Patzold 2004, xiii)

impossible without it. The roots to their approach extend into the sixteenth century, when imagination began to acquire importance within the literary discourse.

6.2.1. Imagination in Antiquity

The idea of man creating something from nothing was alien to Ancient Greek thought[42], and consequently, the idea of the writer as a creator is generally absent from Greek and Roman thought[43]. Murray Bundy explains that the nearest Greek equivalent to imagination was εἰκασία, "derived from εἴκω, 'to be like,' or 'capable of being compared'"[44]. The translation of the Greek *fantasia* as Latin *imaginatio* is problematic according to Bundy, who believes that the term *imaginatio* should have been reserved to render the concept of *eikasia* instead. The mediaeval translation into Latin of this set of concepts resulted in the following correspondences:

> φαντασία became *imaginatio*, and φάντασμα became *phantasia*. This, of course, tended to substantiate the distinction between the faithfully imaginative and the fanciful, or, as mediaeval usage had it, the phantastical (...). When thinkers like Avicenna and Albertus Magnus, adhering to this usage, distinguished between *phantasia* and *imaginatio*, it was to denote the free play of the power, the combinatory functions, by the former, and simpler presentative and reproductive powers by the latter[45].

In other words, *phantasia* was linked to greater freedom, and for this reason was seen as potentially dangerous. Even if *imaginatio* was occasionally used as a synonym of *phantasia* –in which case it carried the same negative connotations–, *imaginatio* was

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[42] (Mack 2005, 17)
[43] (Russell 2001, 100)
[44] Then, "From εἴκω comes the noun εἰκών, indicating the state of being like, an image, or copy, or likeness. This is synonymous with εἴδωλον, often used as a philosophical term, but later coming to have the more restricted meaning of 'statue' or 'idol.' From the basic verb, εἴκω, came another verb, εἰκάζω, with the conventional ending giving the active force, 'to make like,' 'to copy,' 'to imitate,' 'to portray'" (Bundy 1927, 11).
[45] (Bundy 1927, 278). In contrast, M. Schofield reflects on whether Aristotle's φαντασία should be translated as 'imagination', as it often has, and this critic affirms that the lack of complete synonymy between both terms "should not lead us to abandon altogether a direct equivalence between φαντασία and imagination", arguing that "in a passage from the opening section of his discussion of φαντασία in *De An.* III 3 (427b16-24), Aristotle offers two criteria to distinguish from belief (…) which fit the concept of imagination so perfectly, and are so fundamental to it, that it would be perverse to take the topic to be anything other than imagination" (Schofield 1978, 102).

otherwise employed to denote a higher creative activity than *phantasia*, and, in aesthetic terms, able to move beyond mere representation. The term φαντασία derives from φαίνω, 'to appear', 'to be apparent', 'to come to light', and τὸ φαινόμενον is thus that which appears. The noun φάντασμα "came to indicate not only the appearance, the result of the activity implied in the verb, but also a mental state as opposed to a reality"[46]. Then, "φαντάζω, the verb from which φάντασμα derives, means 'make apparent', 'make show', 'present'", and in pre-Hellenistic literature only occurs in passive and middle forms, consquently, "not only φάντασμα and φαντάζω, then, but φαντασία too has a natural passive tendency in the language as we find it, at odds with the active force of 'imagination'"[47]. Finally, Murray W. Bundy states that little is known about pre-Platonic and popular notions of φαντασία, and that it was from the fifth century BC onwards that these terms began to be loaded with complex philosophical connotations[48]. Indeed, it was thanks to Plato and Aristotle that the understanding of φαντασία as a mental disposition gives the term philosophical connotations and fills it with a more active sense[49].

Since Plato linked *fantasia* to the copying of the ideal world, he related it to falsehood and deceitful images. As a result, phantasy and phantastic imitation became the lower forms of imagination while the faculty of imagination was thought to have a more positive aspect related to the good sort of imitation (that is, direct imitation of Ideas and not of their sensible and unfaithful representations). In contrast with the Platonic view, Aristotle sees *phantasia* as the mediator between thoughts and the

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[46] (Bundy 1927, 279). Schofield defines Aristotle's understanding of φάντασμα as "'appearance', 'apparition', 'guise', 'presentation', often with the strong implication of unreality", and it often refers to ghosts or apparitions in dreams; "Plato, however, more often employs φάντασμα to talk of unreal appearances more generally; he treats it as the abstract noun corresponding to φαίνεσθαι, 'appear'" (Schofield 1978, 117).

[47] (Schofield 1978, 116). Schofield explains the following: "We have noted the absence of active forms of the verb φαντάζω in pre-Hellenistic texts. What this means in practice is that we read not of persons *making* things appear thus and so, but of sights, dreams, etc. *being presented* or *presenting themselves* to persons. This fact no doubt explains both the relative rarity of φαντασία compared with φάντασμα (…) and the near absence of an active force in φαντασία when it does occur in writers before Aristotle. (…) When φαντασία does gain what one might call a natural toehold in the language, it does so in a secondary sense, 'presentation' as corresponding not to the active but the passive of the verb – a frequent use in Aristotle" (Schofield 1978, 131).

[48] (Bundy 1927, 12-13)

[49] (Schofield 1978, 132)

senses, and imagination as a mental capacity that links the soul to the external world by providing the mind with raw material to think. *Phantasia* becomes, thus, a necessary feature of perception and cognition, even if it is second to other mental capacities[50]. Phantasy is never mentioned in Aristotle's *Poetics*, for Aristotle did not connect his psychological theory of *phantasia* with the activity of the poet or artist. However, the term is considerably discussed in his *De anima* because it has such a key role in the passage from perception to conception.

In *De anima* III.3 Aristotle describes how phantasy mediates between sense-experience and thought, and differentiates between *fantasia aiszetiké*, *fantasia bouleutiké*, and reproductive imagination. *Fantasia aiszetiké* is the simple impression, a function of the lower soul, common to all animals, and connected with appetite and passion. Then, there is the deliberative (*bouleutiké*) type of phantasy, which works with reason, operates in the higher soul, and is the image produced by common sense. Without it there is no thought, and it holds the function of regulating the phantasms of the lower soul[51]. Indeed, common sense played an essential part in the system of cognition, for it was in charge of joining the impressions coming from the outer senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch), and imagination could not function without it. In sum, for Aristotle *phantasia aisthetiké* refers to the imagination that cooperates only with perception, whereas the superior type of imagination, *phantasia bouleutiké* or *logistiké*, participates in reasoning and deliberating, and in rational animals controls the *phantasia aisthetiké*. The deliberative imagination along with the will (*boulesis*) directs the mind when taking decisions.

In Aristotle's hierarchical psychology, imagination appears in the intermediary layer between sensation and intellect, as the imagination houses images that are points

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[50] As Murray Bundy discusses: "Each phenomenon has its own proper effect or phantasy. The 'phantasy' is merely the impression upon the mind; the effect may or may not correspond to the cause. For Aristotle the phantasy may be true or false. One color, for instance, may have the phantasy of another" (Bundy 1927, 66). Its role is central because the soul never thinks without a phantasm.

[51] This dualism between *fantasia aiszetiké* and *fantasia bouleutiké* "led to a conception of two kinds of memory, one of sensations and their phantasms or concrete representations, the other of thoughts and their phantasms, a notion upon which Neoplatonism was to seize" (Bundy 1927, 259).

of transition between the lower soul and the higher soul or reason. Images are thus the fuel of thought and, hence, although imagination appears below conceptual thought, it is essential to it. Imagination ultimately depends on the recollection of sensory images, particularly those coming from the sense of sight[52]. The sensory image that imagination presents to the reasonable part of the mind is attached to a label and is transformed into a concept. In the construction of the mental picture, the *sensus communis* plays an important role, for it compares the information brought by each sense and then combines it into the mental picture resulting from sensual perception, which can then be preserved in the memory in the form of images. Furthermore, the different perceptions of the senses can be broken up and combined in various ways to form new, different, and strange images.

When Longinus employs the term *phantasia* and distinguishes between a rhetorical type or use from a poetical one, he does so with the meaning of "image productions":

> 15. Weight, grandeur, and urgency in writing are very largely produced, dear young friend, by the use of "visualizations" (*phantasiai*). That at least is what I call them; others call them "image productions." For the term *phantasia* is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind from any source and engenders speech, but the word has now come to be used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your audience. *That phatasia means one thing in oratory and another in poetry you will yourself detect, and also that the object of the poetical form of it is to enthral, and that of the prose form to present things vividly, though both indeed aim at the emotional and the excited.*[53]

According to Longinus, if the writer's mind is excited with a genuine emotion, the reader's mind participates in that excitement too. Longinus explains that the term

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[52] For Aristotle, the heart was the organ of thought while the brain was chiefly an organ in charge of cooling down the warm bodily spirits. Instead, Galen argued that thought occurred in brain matter –brain cavities having already been explored and described by Herophilos and Erasistratos. However, early Christians were apparently reluctant to identify the soul with matter, and rather dematerialized psychic functions. Due to this fact, Poseidonios and Nemesios assigned to brain cavities rather than to brain substance the different functions of thought, a view which lasted for centuries until it began to be seriously questioned in the middle of the sixteenth century. As Milton Kirchman shows, "by the early seventeenth century, the belief that thought took place in brain hollows was commonly disregarded" (Kirchman 1979, 85). For more on Aristotelian rhetorical and 'scientific' ideas, see William A. Wallace, "Aristotelian Science and Rhetoric in Transition: The Middle Ages and the Renaissance." *Rhetorica* VII.1 (1989): 7-21.

[53] (Longinus 1999, 215-217; 15.1-15.2)

phantasia "has now come to be used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your audience"[54]. Nonetheless, Longinus differentiates poetical from rhetorical *phantasia*, for the latter is based on fact, and does not include elements of the supernatural.

In Antiquity, the Stoics developed another remarkable treatment of *phantasia*, this time chiefly related to rhetoric[55]. Stoicism, as formulated by Zeno and Cleanthes at the end of the fourth century BC, was for centuries highly influential and eventually became one of the most popular philosophical movements of the Hellenistic and early imperial periods. The Stoics, somewhat influenced by Aristotle's third book of *De anima* and Plato's *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, described *phantasia* as "the 'presentation' of images to the mind of a thinker or writer and through a text to a reader"[56]. From the Stoical/rhetorical perspective, *phantasia* is a creative capacity and the originator of art, actively operating in the process of cognition[57]. The Stoics also saw an intimate connection between *phantasia* or mental images and language[58], and made a distinction between 'true' and 'false' mental images: while the first (termed *phantasiai kataleptikai*) were based on 'real' perception and consequently were the foundation of both knowledge and right conduct, 'false' mental images were the ones present in, for instance, dreams and hallucinations (*phantasmata*)[59]. These were stigmatized as

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[54] (Longinus 1999, 215-217; 15.1)

[55] According to Dan Flory (1996), it is the Stoic's theory of imagination the closest to our modern understanding.

[56] (Kennedy 1989a, 210)

[57] The definition of *fantasia kataleptiké* was particularly one of the main contributions of Stoicism: "The 'acataleptic' phantasy was called a phantasm, and upon this opposition of *fantasia* and *fantasma* was built a tetralogy of terms, including *fantastón* to denote the source of the real image, the phantasy, and *fantastikón* to correspond to the phantasm" (Bundy 1927, 260).

[58] So much so that for them "*phantasia* was thought to be at the root of language through the functioning of thought (*dianoia*)" (Webb 2009, 114).

[59] (Webb 2009, 116). Ruth Webb explains the differences between rhetorical and Stoic *phantasia* in the following terms: "Stoic kataleptic *phantasiai*, like Aristotle's *phantasmata*, derive from sense perception and are thus a kind of memory. It is this close connection to memory that helps to explain both the nature of the mental images that the speaker draws upon and the predictability of the audience's visual response. If we draw the analogy with rhetorical *phantasia*, the speaker's visualization of the scene he wants to place before his audience's eyes draws on elements already residing in his memory and, unless it is a scene he has witnessed himself, is a composite of existing images. The fact that memory images do not remain inert but are subject to manipulation means *phantasiai* or *phantasmata* are not to be understood as

dangerous and sometimes associated with poetry. This differentiation between a true and an illusory type of phantasy was at the roots of a great ethical problem for the Stoics, who claimed the supremacy of reason over phantasy, and stated that phantasies had to be used reasonably. This radical opposition of fantasy and reason would later have great impact upon medieval thought.

In Neoplatonism, *phantasia* was also regarded as a dual capacity: on the one hand, it belonged to the lower soul, and thus was connected with the passions and the body; on the other, it reflected higher mental-states. Plotinus, attempting to combine Aristotle with Plato, deduced two kinds of phantasy (based on *De anima*'s distinction) and two corresponding sorts of memory, one belonging to the rational soul, the other to the irrational[60]. Like the Stoics, Plotinus moved this distinction of phantasy to the ethical domain, and so, recognized that the first type was related to voluntary acts and the other to the untrustworthy instincts.

While phantasy was certainly part of the language of Greek rhetoric, where it referred to the emotional states of the orator, the vivid mental pictures within his mind, and his ability to arouse emotions in his hearers, according to Bundy there is little evidence that back then it equally signified "an aesthetic concept of phantasy"[61]. In fact, according to Watson, "the transformation of phantasia into a term for creative art was due to Platonic-Stoic syncretism" in the first century BC[62]. *Phantasia* was a familiar term in Latin rhetorical tradition alluding to the power of the mind to envision the

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limited to the quasi-photographic reproduction of things seen. By various processes, images that derive from experience can form the raw material of new composites. Stoic linguistic theory certainly allowed for abstract thought to be derived from perception by a number of procedures including resemblance, analogy, synthesis and transposition. If we apply this idea to rhetorical *phantasia* we find that it is possible to visualize things that one has never seen by applying the same procedures to existing mental images. Mythical and fantastic beasts can be imagined through a process of synthesis, putting together man and horse…" (Webb 2009, 119).

[60] For Plotinus, since both higher and lower souls have memory, there must be a double faculty of phantasia, although "when the two phantasiai are in agreement and the two faculties of phantasia united, with that of the higher soul in control, there is only one *phantasma* or mental picture" (Watson 1988, 102). Nevertheless, if there is discord between the two *phantasiai*, the duplication will not be obvious. In any case, we should avoid such discord and make the lower soul reach memory of the activities of the higher one, and the higher soul forget what it receives from the lower.

[61] (Bundy 1927, 261)

[62] (Watson 1988, 91)

unsensed and convey it to an audience[63]. It was a capacity that could be cultivated by everyone through exercise (therefore it was not a heavenly gift) and that became central in the development of both oratory as well as poetry.

Neither Quintilian or Longinus described *phantasia* at length, nor did they offer many examples of it, but rather discussed *phantasia* in passing as if it were a familiar concept for their readers. Quintilian stated that for the orator or the poet to move the audience, they first had to feel the emotion they wanted to transmit. Since emotions are not under our conscious control, it is possible to achieve this end by "forming in our minds clear *phantasiai* −'visions'− of absent things; this means putting to practical use the faculty of day-dreaming and fantasy which we often employ in an idle moment"[64]. Hence both oratory and poetry benefit from this vividness of vision, which then shows in the orator's or poet's expression. Of course, this makes manifest the linkage between phantasy and emotion −in fact, it has been traditionally thought that imagination enters the rhetorical discourse through investigation of the emotions (*pathos*), and the orator's capacities to put in words vivid visual images pertinent to his subject matter that may aid his discourse. Finally, within classical rhetoric, imagination was also closely related to memory and to the mnemonic techniques for the orator to remember his discourse based on visual images stored in the memory[65].

6.2.2. Imagination in the Middle Ages

Medieval thought on imagination was affected by Platonic views, Aristotelian ideas on human psychology, the Neoplatonic synthesis of both currents, Stoicism, Gnosticism, and Christian theology. In medieval and Renaissance thought, imagination was the intermediary faculty of the soul by which man reshapes the images of sense perception, which can be then stored in memory. This intermediary position between the senses and

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[63] (Flory 1996, 156)
[64] (Russell 2001, 109)
[65] As Ruth Webb's puts it, "the orator uses his own visual resources to call up images which already exist in the audience's mind" (Webb 2009, 110).

the intellect made various authors reflect on the interrelation of body and soul and the role that the faculty of imagination played in it. The Renaissance discussion on the imagination largely relied on the medieval notion that the brain was divided into different chambers (*cellulae*) or ventricles (*ventriculae*) hosting different mental faculties[66].

According to Avicenna, Albert the Great and Roger Bacon, there were five: common sense and imagination (in the foremost ventricle), fantasy and judgment (in the middle cell), and memory (at the rear ventricle). Olaf Pluta explains that in late-medieval times this five-fold distinction advocated by the representatives of the "old school of thought" or *via antiqua* was reduced to three following the "principle of Parsimony" of the late-medieval "new school of thought" (or *via moderna*), based on the idea that "one should not multiply entities unnecessarily, or make more assumptions than one needs"[67]. These three remaining faculties were common sense, imagination and memory. Within this tradition, each mental power is located in a specific part of the head. Just like there were recognized five senses, there were also distinguished three internal powers located in separate cavities of the head. Imagination (Greek φαντασία or τὸ φανταστικόν; Latin *imaginatio* or *phantasia*) was thought to reside in the front of the head, holding a place for common sense and another for the formation of the mental images used when thinking. The process is the following: the first cell produces an image, which then passes to the cell in the central cavity, called *logistikon* or *rationalis*, where reason (*vis cogitativa*, *intellectus*) is located. Opinion and reason in the second cell managed then the images fashioned in the first cell to form opinions and ideas. Later, the idea formed here moves to the back of the head, to the domain of the power of memory (*vis memorativa*), for memory stores ideas rather than images[68].

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[66] Some authors such as Galen and other Greek doctors criticized the rigid departmentalization in separate ventricles, and instead believed that in all ventricles each mental power could be found in approximate equal proportions.

[67] (Pluta 2004, 24)

[68] Of course, "This was the simple formula; but in this scheme there was also a place for a power capable of recombining the images fashioned by the simple imagination, associating, for example, the head of a human being with the body of a goat. This was often called *phantasia* as distinguished from *imaginatio*,

Augustine, who treated the topic of imagination at length in *De Trinitate* (400-416), regarded imagination as an active faculty of the soul working with memory-images and mediating not between sense and memory, but between memory and understanding. Indeed, if for Platonism the images within the imagination could not be granted any truth, for Aristotle there is a degree of truth in materiality itself, in the physical world, and therefore, also in the images. Consequently, for Scholasticism the contemplation of particulars constitutes the starting point of our understanding of universals; from this follows that particular images have a kind of reality which the Platonic and Augustine tradition would deny. For the latter, the idea comes before the particular, and so, an image of a particular in the mind is just a way of illustrating a universal that the mind already has and that only exists in the mind of God[69].

In contrast with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic view, memory for Augustine is independent from phantasy or imagination, and consequently, imagination no longer has an intimate contact with ideas. In addition to this, separating imagination and phantasy so radically from the rest of the powers of the mind seems to make medieval theorists ignore their participation in the higher processes of cognition. As a result, the opposition between imagination and reason, or phantasy and intellect, becomes more acute[70]. In Augustine's synthesis and interpretation of already extant materials, he distrusted and condemned the imagination for being a source of deceit, sin and error due to its creative abilities and its contact with the sensible world. Indeed, this would be a constant in Christian thought as, for instance, Boethius also put forward the distinction between

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although the latter term was also used. Sometimes this was located in the first cell as an aspect of imagination; but sometimes it was thought of as a kind of rational power, *cogitatio*, and therefore placed in the second cell" (Bundy 1930a, 249-250). In any case, as Bundy has pointed out "There is no consistent mediaeval theory of imagination", but rather "conflicting attitudes towards imagination" (Bundy 1927, 177), for medieval writers distinguished sometimes three internal senses (imagination or fancy, common sense, and memory), sometimes five (as in the case of Alfarabi), seven (like Avicenna), or even four (like Averroes).

[69] Thus, "from an Augustinian point of view particular images make universal truths more concrete, vivid, and easy to articulate" (Montgomery 1979, 39).

[70] (Bundy 1927, 179-180)

sense, imagination, and reason, again placing the latter over the other two and leaving imagination in the background[71].

Following the Christian belief that all things had been created by God and that, therefore, everything is derived from Him, Augustine postulates that the human imagination does not take on creative powers but merely limits itself to reflect that which already exists. From this perspective, the human mind's job is not to create but to imitate and discover[72]. Since God manifests through appearances, the stress falls upon external reality, not upon what is made up by the human mind –certainly, without a reliability of sensible perception, there can be no guarantee regarding the accuracy of human reception. In contrast with this medieval view, during the Renaissance, a number of shifts took place that ultimately modified ideas on imagination and the perception of the human mind; namely, the mind was no longer perceived as a passive receptacle of perception, tradition or dogma[73].

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[71] Jan R. Veenstra, however, sustains a radically different view on Augustine's position towards imagination. According to him, Saint Augustine got highly interested in the role of mental images, to the point that Veenstra credits him being "the first to record the term *imaginatio* in Latin literature" (Veenstra 2004, 1). By 'imagination' Augustine not only referred to sense images but instead denoted a greater inner mental world not necessarily dependent upon the senses, for even if imagination had a role in human thinking, true knowledge was rooted in a superior world of forms to which divine illumination gave access. Hence, Jan R. Veenstra gives Augustine credit for liberating *imagination* (or *phantasia*) from the negative connotations attributed to it by the Platonists due to imagination's association with sense perception (Veenstra 2004, 2).

[72] (Berger 1988, 50-52). Berger also singles out three crucial points about the world for the medieval imagination: "first, an esthetic belief in the harmony and shapeliness of Creation, which was approach as a work of art"; "second, a belief in the unity of the world which –since there is but one Creator– is inflected toward the idea of uniqueness: one God, one Creation, one Incarnation, one cosmos, one space-time" – which is "why the medieval imagination can only be reflective, why human creation is easily construed as vanity and illusion"; and thirdly, "that appearances, phenomena, are objective, meaningful, symbolic, and real" (Berger 1988, 53).

[73] According to Berger, whereas "the medieval imagination would rank realities above appearances and appearances above interpretations, the Renaissance imagination ranks interpretations above appearances and usually, but not always, below realities" (Berger 1988, 54). Berger explains that "The shift from medieval to Renaissance imagination may be detailed by a number of epitomes: from the mind as speculum to the mind as stage; from *imago Dei* to Vitruvian Man; from the criterion of dogmatic certainty based on authority and communal tradition to the criterion of probability based on hypothesis, experiment, internal and individual experience; from the emphasis on correspondence to the emphasis on coherence; from a metaphysics in which substance and essence have both logical and temporal priority over function and operation to a metaphysics in which they emerge as symbolic forms which are consequent on thought; from temporal process as the unfolding of a spatially conceived eternity and Form to visual images as the forms of temporal process and force; from attention to exemplary causes in the mind of God to attention to hypothetical causes in the mind of a particular scientific or philosophical investigator" (Berger 1988, 54). For more on medieval notions of the workings of the mind, the imagination, and the role of images in human mental processes, see Walter S. Melion, "Introduction: Meditative Images and the Psychology of Soul" in *Image and Imagination of the Religious Self in Late*

6.2.3. Imagination in the Renaissance

In the Renaissance, theories on the workings of the mind (what we would nowadays call 'psychology'), physiology and medicine were inseparable, since mental conditions tended to be explained in terms of physical causes and vice versa[74]. Thus, in the Renaissance, philosophical reflections upon the soul fell under the study of natural philosophy and were first and foremost influenced by Aristotle's *De anima* and then by his *Parva naturalia*[75]. In order to fully grasp the way in which during the Renaissance the human mind was thought to work, we have to consider, first, the tripartite division of the soul (or the recognition of three types of soul); second, the notion that there were both internal as well as external senses; third, the theory of the four elements and the four humours; and finally, the belief in the division of the human brain into ventricles, each containing a separate mental power.

During the Renaissance it was generally believed in the existence of three different types of souls: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational. The vegetative soul is seated in the liver and found in plants, animals and men; its chief faculties are growth, reproduction and nourishment. The sensitive soul, seated in the brain and the heart of both animals and men, has the faculties of motion and feeling. Finally, only man possesses a rational soul in the brain capable of knowing God. The rational soul is divided in two: reason (capable of judgment and thus able to distinguish good from evil)

Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Reindert Falkenburg, Walter S. Melion and Todd M. Richardson, eds. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2007. 1-36).

[74] Edward Dowden adds other elements to the Elizabethan study of human nature and mind: "The study of mind, thus involving the study of earth and its constituents, must needs be extended to a research into the influences of the heavens, of the astrological influences which affect the body and the soul of man, the powers of the stars that govern our conditions, and the play of each sign of the Zodiac upon the part of our frame specially related to it (…). With the macrocosm of the universe the microcosm of man had a correspondence. (…) And, finally, over and above all these stood the science of sciences – theology – for man was not only a microcosm corresponding to the macrocosm; he proceeded, in his noblest part, immediately from God, and was made in His image" (Dowden 1910, 308-309).

[75] In fact, "the term *psychologia* itself was coined – apparently by the German humanist Joannes Thomas Freigius in 1575 – to refer to the traditional complex of problems originating from these two works" (Park and Kessler 1988, 455). The importance of Aristotle's *De anima* in Early Modern Europe was so great that "virtually all universities required it to be read for the degree of bachelor of arts, an honour it shared only with the *Physics* among Aristotle's non-logical works" (Park and Kessler 1988, 456). See (Park and Kessler 1988) for more on the history of Aristotle's *De anima* in Early Modern Europe and for an account of the most influential works on 'psychology' from Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

and the will (which desires the good). In addition to this, it was generally accepted that there was a distinction between external senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) and the internal ones located in the brain (common sense, imagination, sometimes called *phantasy* or *fancy*, reason, and memory).

The external senses pass their information to the common sense, which then assembles it to form composite images, then sent to the imagination, which retains them for some time, evaluates them as pleasant or painful, and even combines them to form new synthetic images of nonexistent realities. This process is perfectly explained in the *Margarita philosophica* (*Philosophic Pearl*), written by the German Carthusian Gregor Reisch in the 1490s. The book was one of the most influential university textbooks for the teaching of philosophy, and it relied on Aristotle, Greek Neoplatonism, Galenic medicine, early Christian writers (like St Augustine and Nemesius), and medieval Arabic writers influenced by Aristotelian philosophy (chiefly Avicenna and Averroes). Reisch distinguished three kinds of soul: the vegetative, the lowest; the sensitive, the one in the middle; and the intellective, the higher type of soul, including both the organic faculties as well as the three rational powers: intellect, intellective memory (*i.e.*, memory of concepts), and will. Furthermore, Reisch recognized five internal senses: common sense and imagination in the front cell, fantasy and estimation in the middle one, and memory at the back[76]. Man was thus made up by body, soul and spirits, the soul being the only immortal part of the three. The reasonable soul had two faculties: on the one hand, wit/understanding/intellect, able to comprehend general, universal and divine truths, and, on the other, will, which receives information from the understanding

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[76] Katharine Park summarizes the functions and interrelations of each of them: "Common sense compared the individual data – described as similitudes or images – gathered by the various external senses, and perceived qualities such as size, shape, number and motion that fell under more than one sense. Imagination stored these data before passing them on to fantasy, which acted to combine and divide them, yielding new images, called *phantasmata*, with no counterparts in external reality. Estimation accounted for instinctive reactions of avoidance or trust, while memory, finally, stored not only the images derived from the external sense but also the *phantasmata* and the reactions of estimation; unlike imagination, however, it acted *cum differentia temporis*, recognising its contents as part of past experience. Because the internal senses were less bound to the actual experience, they acted to bridge the gap between external sensation, limited to the knowledge of particulars, and the highest cognitive operation of intellection, which dealt with universals" (Park 1988, 471).

about what is good, and is crucial in making the right choice and silencing the capricious demands of the appetites. Sometimes the word 'intellect' groups both the understanding and the will, though in that case a distinction is made between "the intellect speculative" and "the intellect practical"[77]. The movement from external to internal sense and from sensation to intellection was seen *in crescendo*, rendering the soul closer to God in each step.

The two key doctrines that support Renaissance medicine are the theory of the four elements elaborated by philosophers before Hippocrates of Cos (5th century BC), and the idea of the existence of bodily spirits. According to the theory of the four elements (earth, water, air and fire), these along with their properties (heat, cold, moisture and dryness) compose all material things in different proportions. Heat and moisture are the fundamental qualities for life, whereas cold and dryness are hostile to it[78]. Later on, four bodily fluids were distinguished (blood, phlegm, red bile and black bile) and then associated to the four elements: blood was linked to heat and moisture, and the element of air; red bile was hot and dry, and related to fire; phlegm was cold and moist, and likened to water, and black bile was thought to be cold and dry and related to earth. A balance among the four fluids or humours guaranteed a healthy organism, otherwise, disease was on its way.

Finally, some authors believed in the distribution of mental faculties in separate ventricles that has already been discussed and, according to which, imagination found its residence in the front of the brain; reason in the middle ventricle, and memory in the rearmost. Reason judged the mental images produced by the imagination as true or false, desirable or undesirable, good or evil, and were then transmitted to the will to treat them correspondingly. Thus, imagination was for the sixteenth century the image-making faculty that worked with what had already been experienced or perceived but was no longer present to the senses, and the faculty to picture new things never actually

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[77] (Dowden 1910, 311)

[78] For this reason, aging means that the body gradually becomes drier and colder. The ideal was that the human body in a state of health would keep all these elements balanced.

perceived through the combination of images. This means that, following Aristotelian belief, imagination's picturing capacity ultimately depended on previously experienced sensations. This close link between imagination and the senses explains imagination's connection to irrationality, deceitfulness and the sins of the flesh.

6.2.3.1. Imagination in Renaissance Italy and France

If in the closing pages of Chapter 6 it was asserted that imagination played a comparatively small role in French Renaissance poetics, this was not the case in the Italian context, where the influential Marsilio Ficino and Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola discussed imagination at length against the background of Neoplatonic philosophy. Neoplatonic theology of emanation located the intelligible over the sensible, regarded *phantasia* as the intermediary between the divine mind and the sensible substance, and consequently, developed an interest in the possibility of transmitting transcendental knowledge through images in divination, prophecy and dreams. Plotinus saw imagination "mainly as an impediment to intellectual knowledge, a 'concession' to simple folk at best, but far too bodily and beneath the intellectual's station to be of any use for the soul's ascent, or rather, escape from the body"[79].

Marsilio Ficino is the greatest exponent of Renaissance Neoplatonism, and although he did not expressly write about an aesthetic system, in Book XIII chapter three of his *Platonic Theology*, Ficino regards the invention and exercise of arts as conclusive proof of the superiority of man over animals, and a means for man to elevate himself over bodily dependence and shorten the distance between humanity and divinity[80]. For Ficino, imagination is, on the one hand, subordinated to perception, but on the other it can become a pathway for the superior world to contact humans through images (although reason can also elevate over fantasy and contemplate that superior

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[79] (Veenstra 2004, 1). Jan R. Veenstra argues, nonetheless, that Plotinus's neoplatonic views on imagination did not affect on the whole medieval and Renaissance authors.

[80] Ficino "made it easy for poets and painters to see themselves as exercising through imagination a creative potential reflecting the creativity of God" (Cocking 1991, 172).

realm without any dependence on images). Furthermore, Ficino also believes in the existence of a third world different from the sensible and the intelligible where all individual souls are immersed and in which imagination allows communication between human souls and the world-soul[81].

Then, in 1500 Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola wrote *De imaginatione* at the moment when Platonism experienced a rebirth. Pico located truth in Scritpture and in the Christian faith, and drew on Plato and the Pythagoreans, the Neoplatonists, Arabic and Stoic theorists, Saint Augustine, and both Girolamo Savonarola (who argued how divine illumination and Christianity constituted the only source of truth and how secular learning was insignificant compared to them[82]) and, of course, Ficino. Aristotle's *De anima* is Pico's main source text, even if he often disagrees with it. Pico defines imagination in the following manner:

> Now this power of the mind, which the Greeks term φαντασία, in Latin is called *imaginatio.* And this name it received from its function; from the images, that is, which it conceives and forms in itself. To it there are carried through the instruments of the five exterior senses, of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, the likenesses and impressions of things which are from without – a very rich harvest of phantasies; for whatever the object of sensation, and that means everything corporeal which can be perceived or felt by any sense, the object produces, in so far as it can, a likeness and image of itself, in imitation of incorporeal and spiritual nature.[83]

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[81] John Martin Cocking discusses Ficino's understanding of imagination and fantasy in the following terms: "Ficino's use of the terms 'fantasy' and 'imagination' is not entirely consistent, but he tends to use 'fantasy' when he is setting out his more orthodox theory of knowledge, in which both reason as conceptual thought, or reasoning, and reason as the direct intellectual apprehension of the forms are placed above it; and to use 'imagination' when he moves away from Plato, Aristotle and Scholasticism into the more exotic realms of Neoplatonism and alchemy" (Cocking 1991, 180).

[82] For more on Savonarola see, for instance, W.H. Crawford, *Girolamo Savonarola: A Prophet of Righteousness* (Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2006).

[83] (Pico 1930, 25). In Latin: "Ea igitur animae vis, quam Graeci φαντασία nuncupant, Latine imaginatio dicitur, idque nomen de officio sortita est, ex imaginibus scilicet, quas concipit et effingit in sese. In eam namque advehuntur per quinque exteriorum sensuum instrumenta – visum, auditum, olfactum, gustum, tactum – rerum quae forinsecus sunt similitudines speciesve, imaginationum seges uberrima. Quicquid enim sub sensum cadit, hoc est, corporeum omne quod cerni, quodve ullo sensu sentiri potest, similitudinem atque imaginem sui quantum potest effundit ad imitationem incorporeae spiritalisque naturae" (Pico 1930, 24). Harry Caplan states that Pico identifies phantasy with imagination; for this reason, Caplan's translation of *On the Imagination* uses the terms phantasy and imagination interchangeably (Pico 1930).

Pico grants imagination an intermediary place between sense and the intellect, since he thinks it is generated by sensation but able to produce images *ex sese*. On the relation between imagination and sense, Pico says the following:

> imagination is placed on the border between intellect and sense, and holds the intermediate ground. It follows *sense*, by an act of which it is born; *intellection* it precedes. It coincides with sense in that, like sense, it perceives the particular, corporeal, and present; it is superior to sense in that, with no external stimulus, it yet produces images, not only present, but also past and future, and even such as cannot be brought to light by nature. It accords with sense in that it employs sensible forms as objects; but it surpasses sense in that at will it separates and in turn combines those forms which sense upon ceasing to function has abandoned. This activity can in no way be performed by sense.[84]

Then, about imagination and intellect he affirms the following:

> Imagination conforms with intellect, in being free, unfixed, and devoted to no special object. But it is surpassed by intellect, since it conceives and fashions the sensible and particular only, while intellect, in addition, conceives and fashions the universal and intelligible, and such things as are purified from all contact with matter.
>
>   Further, imagination enters into alliance with all the superior powers, inasmuch as they would fail in that function which nature has bestowed upon each of them unless imagination support and assist them. Nor could the soul, fettered as it is to the body, opine, know, or comprehend at all, if phantasy were not constantly to supply it with the images themselves.[85]

He goes on to describe the way imagination interacts with the intellect in these terms:

> For when the imagination has received the impressions of objects from the senses, it retains them within itself, and, having rendered them more pure, furnishes them to the active intellect. This intellect in turn brightens these impressions by its own light, and

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[84] (Pico 1930, 31). In Latin: "In confinio namque intellectus et sensus posita est et médium inter utrumque locum tenet, et sequitur quidem sensum, cuius actu paritur; intellectionem autem antecedit. Cum sensu coit quia et particularia, quemadmodum ille, et corporea et praesentia percipit; praestat illi quia, nullo etiam movente, prodit imagines, nec praesentes modo, verum et praeteritas et futures, et quae etiam promi a natura in lucem nequeunt. Consentit ei quia sensilibus speciebus pro objectis utitur. Eum vero praecellit, quoniam eas quae a sensu derelictae sunt, ipso etiam cessante, et sequestrat invicem pro arbitrio et copulat; quod fiery a sensu nullo pacto potest" (Pico 1930, 30).

[85] (Pico 1930, 33). In Latin: "Intellectui convenit utpote quae libera, vaga, nullique rei peculiariter addicta. Praecellitur autem quoniam sensilia particulariaque tantum concipit et effingit; ille praeter haec universalia et intelligibilia, abque omni materiae contagio defaecata.

   In foedus praeterea superiorum omnium virium venit, quandoquidem officio eo quod sibi natura impertiit frustrarentur, imagination non suffragante adminiculanteque. Neque enim aut opinari, aut scire, aut intellegere anima corpori alligata quicquam posset, nisi ei phantasia species ipsas identidem ministraret" (Pico 1930, 32).

draws off from them the intelligible ones, which it then places in the potential intellect. And the potential intellect later is informed and perfected by means of these intelligible images.[86]

Pico also says that "imagination is for the most part vain and wandering"[87], though it is a faculty men cannot do without, for "The soul employs the imaginative faculty for conceiving likenesses of sensible objects only, and for placing them before the intellect", which "employs reason for investigating these likenesses, and also for examining those things which are removed from bodily existence"[88]. Pico thus regards imagination as a faculty capable of deceit, because it can produce images of non-extant objects. The imagination is devoid of correct judgment, and therefore needs the guidance of a superior force (reason) to lead man towards good; otherwise, man is pulled towards bestiality and doomed. Pico identifies four factors that can affect imagination: first, the temperament of the body; second, sensual objects; third, man's judgment (*arbitrium*); and finally, good and bad angels. He spends a large part of his treatise exploring each of them and putting forward remedies for them. In sum, Pico regards imagination as a great power that can be moved to good and evil purposes, one that can corrupt reason and deceive the intellect, and one that is associated with passions, mental afflictions, and the defects of judgment and opinion:

> *Nor is it hard to prove that universal errors which occur as much in civil life as in the philosophic and Christian life, take their beginnings from the defect of the imagination.* The peace of the State is disturbed by ambition, cruelty, wrath, avarice, and lust. But then the depraved *imagination is the mother and nurse of ambition*, and thinks it a fine thing to outstrip all others, albeit without regard for the virtue or nobility whereby those may shine whom the man fired by ruinous ambition busies himself to surpass in honors. *Cruelty, wrath, and passion are born from and nourished by the imagination of an ostensible but deceptive good*, which one who is carried away by perfervid sense and rash imagination to insults, wounds, and murders, thinks inherent in retaliation. What else excites the insatiable thirst for gold? What else kindles the ardor of lust? *And what else, if not the deceitful imagination, brings to the fore the other vices which for want of*

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[86] (Pico 1930, 41). In Latin: "Ubi namque imaginatio rerum species recepit a sensibus, retinet in se, purioresque effectas offert agenti intellectui, qui suo lumine collustrans ab eis intellegibiles species abstrahit, quas in intellectum potentiae reponit, qui eis postea informatur atque perficitur" (Pico 1930, 40).

[87] (Pico 1930, 29). In Latin: "Imaginatio vero vana plurimum et oberrans" (Pico 1930, 28).

[88] (Pico 1930, 29). In Latin: "Utitur anima virtute phantastica ad concipiendum proponendumque intellectui sensibilium tantummodo rerum similitudines. Urtitur ratione ad inquirendum de eis arbitrandumque quae a corporeis etiam sequestrantur" (Pico 1930, 28).

> *time I omit to mention*? Neglecting reason, she gives precedence to injustice rather than
> to justice, to lust rather than to continence, to savagery rather than to clemency, to
> avarice rather than to generosity, to discord rather than to peace.[89]

Pico summarizes his views on the dangers of imagination by affirming that "the faults of all monstrous opinions, and the defects of all judgment, are to be ascribed beyond all peradventure to the vices of phantasy", and that "the Christian life, which consists in both belief and action, is ruined by a false imagination"[90].

Although in the French literary context reflections upon the imagination appear less extensive than in the Italian or, as will be seen, the English one, sixteenth-century French authors did reflect on imagination, and not always in negative ways. For instance, in 1555 Jacques Peletier asserted in *Art Poétique* that invention originated in the faculty of imagination: "invention is a design born from the imagination of the understanding and conceived to achieve our ends"[91]. Ten years later, Ronsard would subscribe to Peletier's views also making invention derive from imagination: "invention is nothing but the natural capacity of an imagination that conceives of ideas and forms of all things that can be imagined both heavenly as well as earthly, animated or inanimated, to represent them afterwards"[92]. However, Ronsard's thoughts on imagination are not exempt from prejudices and negative connotations, and if he unconditionally praises poetical invention, his views on imagination are not equally

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[89] (Pico 1930, 45-47). In Latin: "Jam neque difficile probate est errata universa, quae tam in civili quam philosophica et Christiana vita contingunt, ex imaginationis vitio principia sumere. Civitatis pacem turbat ambitio, crudelitas, iracundia, avaritia, libido. Porro, ambitionis parens et alumna est imaginatio prava, quae praestare ceteris pulchrum ducit, nulla alioquin aut virtutis aut stemmatis habita ratione, quibus ii praefulgeant, quos praeire honoribus satagit qui pernicioso ambitu fervet. Crudelitatem, iram, atque iracundiam et parit et alit imaginatio ementiti boni atque fallacis, quod inesse vindicate arbitratur is qui fervid sensu et imaginatione praecipiti fertur in contumelias et vulnera et caedes. Et quid aliud inexstinguibilem auri sitim excitat? Quid libidinis ardorem incendit, et quae ob temporis brevitatem vitia reliqua mittimus in medium profert, quam deceptrix imaginatio? Quae, ratione posthabita, et injuriam justitiae, et libidinem continentiae, et mansuetudini feritatem, et liberalitati avaritiam, paci et discordiam anteponit" (Pico 1930, 44-46).

[90] (Pico 1930, 49). In Latin: "fateri opus est monstrosarum opinionum omnium culpas et judicii defectus omnis phantasiae vitiis extra omnem aleam ascribendas", and "Subinde quoque colligemus Christianam vitam, quae et in credendo et in operando consistit, ab imaginatione falsa labefactari" (Pico 1930, 48).

[91] In French: "Invention est un dessein provenant de l'imagination de l'entendement, pour parvenir à notre fin" (Peletier 1990, 251-252).

[92] In French: "L'invention n'est autre chose que le bon naturel d'une imagination concevant les Idées et formes de toutes choses qui se peuvent imaginer tant célestes que terrestres, animées ou inanimées, pour après les représenter" (Ronsard 1990, 472).

stable. In the following quotation, for instance, Ronsard contrasts invention and imagination, assigning the latter the capacity to represent fearful monsters while the former invents "inventions…ordonnées et disposées":

> When I tell you to invent beautiful and great things, I do not mean those fantastic and melancholic inventions that have no more sense than the broken dreams of a frenzied man, or of a patient extremely tormented by the fever, whose ailing imagination sees a thousand monstrous forms without order or connection. Your inventions, for which I cannot give you any rule for being spiritual, will be well-ordered and arranged: and although they seem superior to those of the common people, they will always be such as to be easily conceivable and understood by everyone.[93]

Michel de Montaigne discusses imagination at greater length, proves a deep distrust of imagination, and goes on the defensive when talking about it for Pico's same reasons. In his essay "De la force de l'imagination", Montaigne admits being greatly influenced by it:

> I am one of those by whom the powerful blows of the imagination are felt most strongly. Everyone is hit by it, but some are bowled over. It cuts a deep impression into me: my skill consists in avoiding it not resisting it.[94]

Montaigne attributes great powers to the imagination and speaks of it as connected to irrationality, superstition and all sorts of psycho-somatic diseases, which is ultimately why Montaigne tries to resist the influence of imagination: "It is likely that the credit given to miracles, visions, enchantments and such extraordinary events chiefly derives from the power of the imagination acting mainly on the more impressionable souls of the common people"[95]. Certainly, for Montaigne "When imaginary thoughts trouble us

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[93] In French: "Quand je te dis que tu inventes choses belles et grandes, je n'entends toutefois ces inventions fantastiques et mélancoliques, qui ne se rapportent non plus l'une à l'autre que les songes entrecoupés d'un frénétique, ou de quelque patient extrêmement tour-menté de la fièvre, *à l'imagination duquel, pour être blessée, se représentent mille formes monstrueuses sans ordre ni liaison: mais tes inventions, desquelles je ne te puis donner règle pour être spirituelles, seront bien ordonnées et disposées* : et bien qu'elles semblent passer celles du vulgaire, elles seront toutefois telles qu'elles pourront être facilement conçues et entendues d'un chacun" (Ronsard 1990, 472-473).

[94] (Montaigne 1993, 109). In French: "Je suis de ceux qui sentent très-grand effort de l'imagination. /// Chacun en est heurté, mais aucuns en sont renversez. Son impression me perse. Et mon art est de luy eschapper, non pas de luy resister" (Montaigne 1969, 143).

[95] (Montaigne 1993, 111-112). In French: "Il est vray semblable que le principal credit des miracles, des visions, des enchantemens et de tels effects extraordinaires, vienne de la puissance de l'imagination agissant principalement contre les ames du vulgaire, plus molles. On leur a si fort saisi la creance qu'ils pensent voir ce qu'ils ne voyent pas" (Montaigne 1969, 145).

we break into sweats, start trembling, grow pale or flush crimson; we lie struck supine on our feather-beds and feel our bodies agitated by such emotions; such even die from them"[96]. Montaigne even states that he is not surprised that imagination can lead people to death: "I do not find it strange that imagination should bring fevers and death to those who let it act freely and who give it encouragement"[97].

6.2.4. Imagination in the English Renaissance

According to the *OED*, the earliest written record of the term 'imagination' in English dates from *c*. 1340, and means "The action of imagining, or forming a mental concept of what is not actually present to the senses (...); the result of this process, a mental image or idea". The *OED* adds to this definition that imagination is often used "with implication that the conception does not correspond to the reality of things, hence freq. *vain* (*false,* etc.)". Thus, imagination can also mean "Scheming or devising; a device, contrivance, plan, scheme, plot; a fanciful project". Moreover, imagination is defined as "That faculty of the mind by which are formed images or concepts of external objects not present to the senses" or "beyond those derived from external objects". As early as 1509, imagination also stood for "The creative faculty of the mind in its highest aspect; the power of framing new and striking intellectual conceptions; poetic genius". In the same way, 'to imagine' has been used since the fourteenth century as synonymous with "To form a mental image of, to represent to oneself in imagination, to picture to oneself (something not present to the senses)".

Imagination was often associated with 'phantasy', a term that came into English via Old French (*fantasie*)[98]. According to the *OED*, in fourteenth-century England in the

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[96] (Montaigne 1993, 110). In French: "Nous tressuons, nous tremblons, nous pallissons et rougissons aux secousses de nos imaginations, et renversez dans la plume sentons nostre corps agité à leur bransle, quelques-fois jusques à en expirer" (Montaigne 1969, 143-144).
[97] (Montaigne 1993, 109). In French: "Je ne trouve pas estrange qu'elle donne et les fievres et la mort à ceux qui la laissent faire et qui luy applaudissent" (Montaigne 1969, 143).
[98] The *OED* affirms the following: "The senses of *fantasía* from which the senses of the word in the mod. langs. are developed are: 1. appearance, in late Gr. esp. spectral apparition, phantom (so L. *phantasia* in

context of scholastic psychology, phantasy meant "Mental apprehension of an object of perception; the faculty by which this is performed". In other contexts it meant "The image impressed on the mind by an object of sense", or it could refer to a "Delusive imagination, hallucination". Then, in the fifteenth century it furthermore denoted "A supposition resting on no solid grounds; a whimsical or visionary notion or speculation", and in the late sixteenth century it took on the meaning of "Imagination; the process or the faculty of forming mental representations of things not actually present".

Sixteenth-century dictionaries often viewed imagination and fancy or phantasy as synonymous. For instance, Thomas Thomas defines *Phantăsia* as "The image of things conceiued in the minde: a vision, *phantasie*, appearance, representation or imagination"[99]; Edmund Coote translates *phantasie* simply by "imagination"[100]; John Florio defines *fantasia* as "a fansie, a conceit, *fantasie*, humor, *imagination* or intent"[101]; Richard Perceval regards *fantasia* as "*fantasie*, *light imagination*, fond conceipt"[102]; Robert Cawdry then translates both *fantacie* and *phantasie* as "imagination"[103]; and finally, Cotgrave includes "fancie" within his definition of imagination ("*Imagination*, *fancie*, conceit, thought; a surmise, or surmising"[104]), and "imagination" within those of "Fantasie" ("The *fancie*, or *fantasie*; opinion, humor, *imagination*, conceit, affection, iudgement; the mind of a bodie; also, a vision, representation, or image of things conceiued in the mind"[105]), and "Phantasie" ("A *fancie*, or *fantasie*, a conceit, an *imagination*"[106]).

Vulg.); 2. the mental process or faculty of sensuous perception; 3. the faculty of imagination. These senses passed through OF. into Eng., together with others (as delusive fancy, false or unfounded notion, caprice, etc.) which had been developed in late L., Romanic, or Fr.".

[99] (Thomas 1587, Xx6ᵛ)
[100] (Coote 1596, N1v)
[101] (Florio 1598, L3r)
[102] (Perceval 1599, L5r)
[103] (Cawdry 1604, E1ʳ) and (Cawdry 1604, G4ʳ)
[104] (Cotgrave 1611, Zz2r)
[105] (Cotgrave 1611, Nn5r)
[106] (Cotgrave 1611, Ppp1v)

In the early modern period, images were considered "mediating *vincula* par excellence" equally appealing to man's sensitive soul, his motive and perceptual faculties, as well as to his intellective soul and rational faculties. English Renaissance writers inherited the theory of the existence of three inner senses (common sense, imagination or fantasy, and memory), and continued assigning to each a different compartment or cell within the brain[107]. Nevertheless, there was no consistent and unanimously agreed theory about the workings of the mind or about the human psyche in Elizabethan England. Instead, numerous psychological trends coexisted and merged forming a mixed popular knowledge that unrigurously and asystematically blended various traditions such as the Aristotelian, the Neoplatonic, the Galenic, and the Hermetic[108]. This generalized lack of clarity regarding what could be called "key

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[107] M.W. Bundy in fact remarks that during the Renaissance there was still a love inherited from the Middle Ages (particularly from authors such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas) towards the idea of finding trilogies in the conceptualization of the workings of the mind: a specific desire to identify three souls (vegetative, animal, and rational), three brain ventricles (one for imagination in the front, one for reason in the middle, and one for memory at the back), three seats of mental processes (liver, heart, and brain), and to distinguish between body, soul, and spirit(s) (Bundy 1924, 519). For instance, in Edmund Spenser's the *Faerie Queene*, the three counselors that advise Alma (*phantasia, cogitation*, and *memoria*) are the inward wits, those powers that mediate between the body and the soul, sense and intellect. Additionally, John Davies's perception of the human soul replicates the image of the Trinity, as it appears in his "To the Most Noble, Iudicious, and my Best Beloued Lorde, William Earle of Pembrooke", prefaced to his *Mirum in Modum*:

> To subdiuide Soules indiuisible,
> (Being wholy in the whole, and in each part)
> For me were more then most impossible,
> Though I were Arte it selfe, or more then Arte.
> *Yet must I make my Soule a Trinitie,*
> *So to diuide the same, betweene you three;*
> *For Vnderstanding, Will, and Memorie,*
> *Makes but one Soule, yet they three Virtues be.* (Davies 1602, A2r)

Dennis R. Klinck argues that the Trinitarian analogy can become "an instrument of interpretation", and indicates four areas to which this analogy was applied during the Renaissance: "(1) to psychology, the structure of the mind or soul of man; (2) to the analysis of sin; (3) to the creations or compositions of the human mind, indeed, to 'knowledge'; and (4) as a reconciliatory principle, to the problem of opposites or division". From his analysis he concludes that "what might be called 'applied trinitarianism' was a serious concern of many Christian writers of the English Renaissance and was frequently invoked to explain aspects of their experience" (Klinck 1981, 27).

[108] As Louise C. Turner Forest affirms, Elizabethan psychology was far from being "a clear, precise, unified, concrete system so universally known and accepted that its concepts were thoroughly engrained in the Elizabethan mind" (Forest 1946, 652). Instead, this critic sees it as "a hodge-podge of utterly contradictory 'facts,' conflicting theories, hopelessly inter-mixed, overlapping terms, and extremely variable and ill-kept distinctions" (Forest 1946, 656). Thus, Forest remarks that different treatises of the time regard man's soul as a unity, ultimately undivided, whereas others recognize the existence of three souls (vegetal, sensible, and rational), and others even take this division to refer to three separate faculties

psychological concepts" appears in sixteenth-century dictionary entries such as Richard Huloet's definition of fantasy. Huloet tries to gather various traditions in his explanation simply because he is unsure of which of them is actually correct and should prevail over the rest:

> Phantasiæ be certaine fantasies whych be thus defined. Some saye they be affections which is none other but the memory wrapt, or corruption of vnderstanding. Other affirme the same to be an operation of the power fantastical, that is to say: a mouing from the carnall sence. Certayne other also take them to be of the substaunce or power animal, keper of the primatiue figures or formes in their naturall sence.[109]

We find another instance of uncertainty in John Florio's attempts to provide a definition of *Ménte*. Florio defines the word through a long and confusing enumeration of terms related to the mind but unclear in their shades of meaning, so he makes all of them roughly synonymous: "the highe[s]t and chiefe[s]t part of the [s]oule, the mind, vnderstanding, memorie, iudgement, intent, thought, imagination, conceit, or

within just one soul. What is more, even though mind and soul are distinguished in some treatises, Forest affirms that very often they are used as synonyms in the same works, and, similarly, there is no agreement either when it comes to pin down the elements that make up man: "There is no agreement about whether man is basically compounded of four elements of which only one, the watery, comprehends the four humors; or whether these humors themselves are made of varying proportions of these four elements" (Forest 1946, 661). From this perspective, "a clear, unified theory of the humors capable of being consistently and accurately applied in the interpretation of Elizabethan literature can only be achieved, therefore, by a process of accepting all concords and rejecting all differences", for every Elizabethan scholar employed "each individual authority to his own satisfaction, and in his own particular way. There are accordingly almost as many Elizabethan psychologies as there are treatises" (Forest 1946, 666). Likewise, there was no general agreement as to allocating a portion of the brain for each faculty of the mind. What is more, "There is no consent about the names, nature, or dwelling place of the internal senses, or even about the five wits or the nature and powers of the rational soul" (Forest 1946, 667). Similarly, Lawrence Babb argues that "The physiological psychology of the Renaissance is a body of theory containing so many contradictions, semicontradictions, and disharmonies that any exposition of it is likely to misrepresent by introducing into it an orderliness which it does not really have" (Babb 1948, 510). Babb locates the roots of this confusion in the Renaissance student of medicine's attempt to bring to an agreement the highly diverse and often contradictory works written by tremendously different authorities from dissimilar traditions.

Francis R. Johnson also affirms that the audience that went to the theatre had a confused mixture of psychological concepts, which worked for the advantage of playwrights, since they could loosely invoke the contemporary terminology of 'psychology' to describe a character without having to worry too much about being extremely precise (Johnson 1951, 111). A remarkable number of studies have approached the Elizabethan understanding of the workings of the human mind drawing on, or alluding to, the poetry or the drama of the period. Among these studies it is worth mentioning the following: Hardin Craig's *The Enchanted Glass: The Elizabethan Mind in Literature* (Oxford: Basis Blackwell, 1950); Lawrence Babb's *The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580 to 1642* (East Lansing, Mich: Michigan State College Press, 1951); E. Ruth Harvey's *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: Warburg Institute, 1975); and (Eden 1986).

[109] (Huloet 1552, L4ᵛ⁻ʳ)

foreknowledge"[110]. Similarly, John Davies states the following when explaining the workings of the mind:

> *Imagination, Fancie, Common-sence*,
> In nature brooketh oddes or vnion,
> Some makes them one, and some makes difference,
> But wee will vse them with distinction.
> With sence to shunne the *Sence* confusion.[111]

In the English context, one of the earliest occurrences of the term 'imagination' referring to rhetorical/poetical activities can be found in Stephen Hawes's *The historie of Graunde Amoure and La Bell Pucel, called The passetyme of pleasure* (1509), which surprisingly includes imagination as one of the five parts of rhetoric: invention, imagination, fansy, good estimation (that is, judgment), and "retentise memory". The extract below revolves around three main ideas: first, that invention and imagination are distinct and separate forces, and that one is not part of the other; second, that imagination and fansy are seen in a positive light; and third, that imagination applied to discourse is fairly close to our current understanding of literary creation.

> *The first of them, is called Invention*
> Which surdeth, of the most noble warke
> Of v. Inwarde wittes, on whole affection
> As wryteth ryght many a noble clarke,
> Myth misty coloure, of clowdes darke
> Nowe commen wytte, dothe full well elect
> What it shoulde take, and what it shall abiecte
>
> *And secondlye, by imagination*
> To drawe a matter, ful facundious
> Full marveylous, is the operation
> To make of nought, reason sentencious
> Clokyng a trouthe, wyth coloure tenebrous
> For often under, a fayre fayned fable
> A trouthe appeareth, greatly profitable
>
> It was the guyse, in olde antiquitye
> Of famous poetes, ryght ymaginatise
> Fables to fayne, by good aucthoritye
> They were so wyse, and so inventyfe
> Theyr obscure reason, fayre and sugratyse

---

[110] (Florio 1611, Cc5r)
[111] (Davies 1602, B3ʳ)

> Pronounced trouthe, under clowdy fygures
> By the invention, of theyr fatall scriptures
>
> *And thirdly, they had suche a fansy*
> In thys hye art, to be intelligible
> Their fame encreasyng, evermore truely
> To flouthe ever, they were invyncible
> To their wofull hartes, was nought impossible
> Myth brennyng love, of insaciate fyre
> Newe thynges to fynde, they set their desyre
>
> For thoughe a man, of hys propre mynde
> Be inventyse, and he do not applye
> His fantasye, unto the busye kynde
> Of hys cunnynge, it may not ratifye
> For fantasye, must nedes exemplifye
> His new invention, & cause hym to entende
> Myth whole desyre, to bryng it to an ende[112]

In the extract above Stephen Hawes blends in a unique way classical rhetorical notions with rhetoricized poetical ones, along with traditional ideas on the workings of the mind. According to Jane Griffiths, who deals with these lines in detail, "Hawes' description of the part played by invention within the art of rhetoric is wholly his own"[113]. Indeed, Murray W. Bundy deems Gregory Reisch's *Margarita Philosophica* (1496) Hawes's main source, for Hawes follows Reisch in his enumeration of the five inward wits, even though Hawes does not follow Reisch as far as invention is concerned[114].

One of the sixteenth-century authors that more consistently and systematically employed this terminology was Huarte de San Juan. For example, Huarte assigns to imagination the origin of a number of faculties as well as all "Arts and Sciences". That is, for Huarte imagination is the source of "*Poetrie* [note its first position in the

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[112] (Hawes 1554, D1^v-D1^r)

[113] (Griffiths 2003, 102)

[114] From the analysis of Hawes's work and the tradition preceding him, Bundy asserts that "*invention* was first explained in terms of mental powers not earlier than the beginning of the sixteenth century" (Bundy 1930b, 541). As Bundy reads *The Pastime of Pleasure*, he believes that Hawes "made poetic invention synonymous with imagination and fantasy" (Bundy 1930b, 541), even if he distinguishes imagination and fantasy following Reisch and thus mediaeval psychology: "imagination is the simple, reproductive function; fantasy is the function of recombining the images of past experiences, of making new syntheses" (Bundy 1930b, 541). However, Bundy goes beyond by asserting that from Hawes's commentary on both fantasy and imagination, he does not seem to have a clear idea of what fantasy is, even if he borrows the definition from Reisch, whereas he does seem to have a clear picture of the meaning and significance of imagination, which for him is "the poet's capacity for fiction, resulting in the 'fair feigned fable'" and synonymous with invention (Bundy 1930b, 541).

enumeration], Eloquence, Musicke, and the skill of preaching: the practise of Phisicke, the Mathematicals, Astrologie, and the gouerning of a Common-wealth, the art of Warfare, Paynting, drawing, writing, reading"[115]. Huarte opposes imagination to understanding and since he believes that someone with good imagination is able to read and write well, he concludes that "few men of good vnderstanding, doe write a faire hand"[116]. To explain the physiological source of poetry, which lies in the imaginative, Huarte gives the example of a man hopeless at writing poetry who suddenly started writing verses in praise of his loved one very easily. According to Huarte, the reason for this is that "loue heateth and drieth his braine, and these are qualities which quicken the imagination: the like (as *Iuuenal* noteth) anger doth effect, which passion heateth also the braine"[117] –indeed, for Huarte heat and dryness strengthen imagination while coldness and dryness are associated to the reasoning faculty. In English literature, John Davies's poem "To the high and mighty, Henry by the grace of God Prince of Wales", included in his *Microcosmos* (1603), expresses a similar thought although in this case with regards to invention. In this poem, Davies discusses how the Muse's heat melts his "old, cold, rude, and raw" invention, freeing his previously frozen thoughts and allowing him to write:

> As when a yongling lieth by the syde
> Of some old Sire, his age doth vertue draw
> From his deere youth, that makes Age longer bide:
> *So mine invention old, cold, rude, and raw,*
> *(Not able to disgest ought in hir maw)*
> *May by the quicke hereditary heate*
> *Of thy yong Muse (that yeiest thoughts can thaw)*
> In VVales , my Countries name, performe this feate,
> And welcome thee to thy long empty Seate.
> (…)

---

[115] (Carew 1594, H4ʳ). In Spanish: "De la buena imaginativa nacen todas las artes y ciencias que consisten en figura, correspondencia, armonía y proporción. Éstas son: poesía, elocuencia, música, saber predicar; la práctica de la medicina, matemáticas, astrología; gobernar una república, el arte militar; pintar, trazar, escrebir, leer" (Huarte 1991, 150).

[116] (Carew 1594, H8ᵛ-H8ʳ)

[117] (Carew 1594, I1ʳ). In Spanish: "el amor calienta y deseca el celebro (que son las calidades que avivan la imaginativa). Lo mesmo nota Juvenal que hace la indignación, que es pasión también que calienta el celebro" (Huarte 1991, 158).

> But ô! I feele, but with the thought of thee,
> *My frozen thoughts to melt, as with a Sunne,*
> *Whose comfort Brutes Remayne doth long to see:*
> *And through my Nerues I feele the warme bloud runne*
> *Fro hart, to braines, to heat invention.*[118]

Huarte, nonetheless, cannot avoid prejudices against the products of the imagination, and at one point he distinguishes between two types of knowledge: one resulting from understanding, to which he associates honesty, rectitude and simplicity; and another coming from the imagination, which he finds suspicious: "the sciences which appertaine to the imaginatiue, are those, which such vtter as dote in their sicknesse, and not of those which appertaine to the vnderstanding, or to the memorie"[119]. Hence, the circumstances producing a fertile imagination, when taken to the extreme, end up in madness –which again more closely connects poetry to madness and the poet to the madman[120].

There were a considerable number of works on the nature of humankind written in the Renaissance with clear ethical overtones, and indeed many intended to inform readers about the workings of the mind in order to foster moral behaviour, encourage self-control and virtue, and reject vice. Unsurprisingly, many of them were written by divines and therefore display preacher-like styles. Among these sixteenth-century titles we find *The Castle of Helth* (1534 and many editions); *The Touchstone of Complesions*, translated by Thomas Newton (1565 and later editions); *Theatrum Mundi*, translated by John Alday (1566? and later editions); Thomas Rogers's *Anatomie of the Minde* (1576); Timothy Bright, *Of Melancholy* (1586); *The French Academie* (1586); Huarte de San Juan, *Examen de Ingenios*, translated by R. Carew (1594), and Sir Richard Barckley, *The Felicitie of Man* (1598). Then, in the seventeenth century, Thomas Wright's *The Passions of the Minde in Generall* (1601), Pierre Charron's *De la Sagesse* (1601, early

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[118] (Davies 1603, F3^r-F4^v)

[119] (Carew 1594, E8^r). In Spanish: "Las ciencias que pertenecen a la imaginativa son las que dicen los delirantes en la enfermedad, y no de las que pertenecen al entendimiento ni memoria" (Huarte 1991, 437).

[120] Huarte's "extreme physiological determinism" leads Don Abbott to assert that Huarte represented "the *Siglo de Oro*'s most emphatic statement of the subjugation of rhetoric to the imagination and the most explicit declaration of the division between eloquence and understanding" (Abbott 1983, 100).

translation by Samson Lennard), Robert Allott's *Wits Theater of the Little World* (1602), Thomas Walkington's *Optick Glasse of Humors* (1607), Pierre Charron's *Of Wisdome* (translated *c*. 1607), F. N. Coeffeteau's *Table of Humane Passions* (translated in 1621), Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), or Edward Reynolds's *Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man* (1640). Finally, to these have to be added poems such as Sir John Davies's *Nosce Teipsum* (1599), John Davies of Hereford's *Mirum in Modum* (1602) and *Microcosmos* (1603)[121], Phineas Fletcher's *The Purple Island* (1633), or plays such as Tomkis's *Lingua* (1607) or Nabbes's *Microcosmus* (1621), which deal with the nature of man and human psychology[122].

6.2.4.1. Negative Views on Imagination in English Works of the Sixteenth Century

The disrepute of imagination as a falsifying and misguiding faculty that we have already seen in Pico della Mirandola's discourse or in Montaigne's essay was also present in England. As in Italy, English attacks against imagination ultimately depended upon imagination's association with the highly suspicious and fallible senses (also related to the body and immorality), which inevitably supply the imagination with raw material. Hence, imagination was contaminated from its very roots and it was hard for Elizabethans to believe that imagination could produce anything other than false representations, monsters, and lies. That imagination was loaded with negative connotations in English is apparent in definitions of the term in sixteenth-century English dictionaries, which very often equate it with fancy. In the following quotations, imagination appears at its best as a toy and a trifle, while at its worst it is linked to falsehood, deceit, and lies.

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[121] By contrasting numerous parallel passages, Ruth L. Anderson demonstrates that John Davies of Hereford's theory of the soul as it appears in his poems *Mirum in Modum* and *Microcosmos* was drawn directly from the translation of La Primaudaye's *The French Academie* (Anderson 1927).

[122] For more on the connection between ideas on imagination in Renaissance England and the literature of the period, see William Rossky, "Imagination in the English Renaissance: Psychology and Poetic." *Studies in the Renaissance* 5 (1958): 49-73.

John Baret defines 'To imagine' as to "deuize or finde out some *false tale or subtiltie*: to inuent, *to counterfaite* some body, to thinke, to muse some thing in himselfe, to dispute & intreate or deuize togither of something"[123]. Also highly illustrative is Thomas Thomas's definition of *Imāgo* as "An image: a similitude, an appearance, a representation of a thing: a likenes, *a counterfaite*, a vision, *an idle toy*, *a fansie*, *an imagination*"[124], and of *Opīnātio* as "Opinion, hope, iudgement, fame, estimation or reputation: *suspicion*, fantasie, imagination"[125]. Randle Cotgrave explains the meaning of *Resverie* as "A rauing, *idle talking*, dotage, *trifling*, *follie*, *vaine fancie*, *fond imagination*", and consequently, the expression "C'est resverie" as "Tis a dreame, *fable*, *mockerie*, *ieast*, *idle tale*, which you deliuer"[126]. Imagination furthermore appears in both Florio's definition of *Phantasina* as "a dreame, a vision, an image of things conceiued in the minde, an appearance, a *vaine vision* or *false imagination*, a *fairie*, a *hobgoblin*"[127], and Richard Perceval's description of a *Chiméra* as "a monster with a head like a lyon, a belly like a goate, and taile of a serpent. Also a *fansie* or imagination"[128].

Fulke Greville, Baron Brooke, in his posthumously published *A Treatie of Humane Learning* (1633) elaborates on the workings of the mind and traces the problems with the imagination to its connection with the fallen senses and its capacity to negatively distort that already problematic raw material thus confusing human understanding[129]. Imagination therefore is ultimately responsible for "sleeping visions", "idle phantasmes waking", and "dreames", and dooms the rest of man's mental powers (memory

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[123] (Baret 1574, Kk2r)
[124] (Thomas 1587, Ee2r)
[125] (Thomas 1587, Rr6r)
[126] (Cotgrave 1611, Zzz3r)
[127] (Florio 1598, Z5r)
[128] (Perceval 1599, F5^{r})
[129] Fulke Greville had been friends with Sir Philip Sidney since 1564, when both entered Shrewsbury School at the age of ten. From then onwards they were intimate friends and political colleagues until Sidney's death in 1586. Fulke Greville extensively talks about Sidney in *The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney*, first published in 1652 (over twenty years after Greville's death in 1628). Although Greville's work was taken for centuries as the authoritative biography of Philip Sidney, as Adriana McCrea argues, the work is less "a biography of 'an other' than something of a displaced *auto*biography" (McCrea 1995, 299-300); furthermore, it is "neither quite biography nor history – that is, not quite a 'life' of Sidney, much less a 'life and times' of either Sidney or the Elizabethan age" (McCrea 1995, 302).

included) to be untrustworthy. In order to understand Fulke Greville's negative notion

of imagination and its perverse repercussion upon human understanding, it is expedient

to consider this quotation:

6

Which Sense, Mans first instructor, while it showes
To free him from deceipt, deceiues him most;
And from this false root that mistaking growes,
Which truth in humane knowledges hath lost:
So that by iudging Sense herein perfection,
Man must deny his Natures imperfection.

10

Knowledges next organ is *Imagination* ;
A glasse, wherein the obiect of our Sense
Ought to reflect true height, or declination,
For vnderstandings cleare intelligence:
But this power also hath her variation,
Fixed in some, in some with difference;
In all, so shadowed with selfe-application
As makes her pictures still too foule, or faire;
Not like the life in lineament, or ayre.

11

This power besides, always cannot receiue
What sense reports, but what th' affections please
To admit; and as those Princes that doe leaue
Their State in trust to men corrupt with ease,
      "False in their faith, or but to faction friend,
      "The truth of things can scarcely comprehend:

12

So must th'Imagination from the sense
Be misinformed, while our affections cast
False shapes, and formes on their intelligence,
And to keepe out true intromissions thence,
Abstracts the imagination, or distasts,
With images preoccupately plac'd.

13

Hence our desires, feares, hopes, loue, hate, and sorrow,
In fancy make us heare, feele, see impressions,
Such as out of our sense they doe not borrow;
And are the efficient cause, the true progression
Of sleeping visions, idle phantasmes waking,
 Life, dreames; and knowledge, apparitions making.

14

Againe, our *Memory, Register of Sense* ,
And mould of Arts, *as Mother of Induction*,
Corrupted with disguis'd intelligence,
Can yeeld no Images for mans instruction:
But *as from stained wombes, abortiue birth*
Of strange opinions, to confound the earth.

15

The last chiefe oracle of what man knowes
Is *Vnderstanding*; which though it containe
Some ruinous notions, which our Nature showes,
Of generall truths, *yet haue they such a staine*
From our corruption, as all light they lose;
Saue to conuince of ignorance, and sinne,
Which where they raigne let no perfection in.

16

Hence weake, and few those dazled notions be,
Which *our fraile Vnderstanding* doth retaine;
So as mans bankrupt Nature is not free,
By any Arts to raise it selfe againe;
Or to those notions which doe in vs liue
Confus'd, a well-fram'd Art-like state to giue.

17

Nor in a right line can her eyes ascend,
To view the things that immateriall are;
For as the Sunne doth, while his beames descend,
Lighten the earth, but shaddow euery starre:
So Reason stooping to attend the Sense,
Darkens the spirits cleare intelligence.[130]

Of course, Fulke Greville is not the only author of the English Renaissance to blame the senses for bringing to the mind faulty material that eventually confuses the understanding. John Davies expresses the same complaint in the following terms:

Then if the Senses bee affected ill,
Or apprehend their Obiects with offence,
They wrong the Vnderstanding and the Will:
With false reporte of their experience.
But first they misse-informe th' Intelligence ,
It giuing credit to their information,
Misse-leads the Will (that wayward is by kinde)
Which moues the Members with all festination:

---

[130] (Greville 1633, d2^v- d3^v)

> (Beeing instrumentall agents of the Minde)
> To doe what ere the Senses pleasant finde.[131]

Additionally, John Davies explains in the form of a poem his distrust of imagination, which is ultimately based upon his distrust of the information gathered by the senses:

> The *Accademicks* held it better farre
> Quite to distrust th' *Imagination* ,
> Then to beleeue all which it doth auerre,
> *Which breeds more false, then true opinion*:[132]

It is undeniable that despite the disrepute, English Renaissance thinkers often perceived imagination as a building power even if producer of images sometimes lacking correspondence to reality. Unsurprisingly, then, terms such as 'feign', 'forge', 'frame', and 'coyn' are associated with the active and creative workings of imagination, as well as metaphors such as a fertile womb that, if stimulated or impregnated, can form shapes or fantasies, or a mirror capable of both distorting appearances and reflecting them[133]. For instance, the metaphor of the glass or mirror is used on several occasions by Puttenham to refer to phantasy and to illustrate how this faculty can be turned to produce marvellous achievements as well as dreadful "monsters in mans imaginations":

> *And this phantasie may be resembled to a glasse as hath bene sayd, whereof there be many tempers and manner of makinges, as the perspectiues doe acknowledge, for some be false glasses and shew thinges otherwise than they be in deede, and others right as they be in deede*, neither fairer nor fouler, nor greater nor smaller. There be againe of these/glasses that shew thinges exceeding faire and comely, others that shew figures very monstruous & illfauored.
> *Euen so is the phantasticall part of man (if it be not disordered) a representer of the best, most comely and bewtifull images or apparances of things to the soule and according to their very truth*. If otherwise, then doth it breede *Chimeres* & monsters in mans imaginations, & not onely in his imaginations, but also in all his ordinarie actions and life which ensues.[134]

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[131] (Davies 1602, A4[r])
[132] (Davies 1605, K4[r])
[133] For more on these Renaissance metaphors, see Jay L. Halio, "The Metaphor of Conception and Elizabethan Theories of the Imagination." *Neophilologus* 50 (1966): 454-61.
[134] (Puttenham 1970, 19)

Finally, it should be noted that, when defining the rhetorical figure of the Sidenote or Hypotiposis, Puttenham states that "to faine a thing that neuer was nor is like to be, proceedeth of a *greater wit and sharper inuention* than to describe things that be true"[135]. In other words, the phantasy that goes beyond the mere mirror and moves beyond the simple reflection of things is of greater value for Puttenham. Again, wit and invention go together, and the underlying idea is that while everyone can describe what can be seen, only a superior mind can describe the unseen.

6.2.4.2. The Defence of Imaginative Writings in Sixteenth-Century England

Only on few occasions was imagination regarded as a purely positive faculty, and Davies of Hereford's understanding of "fancie" as the origin of "all maruellous *Inuentions*, / Which doe produce all *Artes* and *Sciences*"[136], or George Gascoigne's rhetorical question "For who doubteth but that Poets in their most feyned fables and imaginations, haue metaphorically set forth vnto vs the right rewardes of vertues, and the due punnishments for vices?"[137] are unfortunately rare exceptions. Another instance of a positive view of imagination appears in John Heywood's *Dialogue on Wit and Folly*, where he describes imagination as a defining and essential human quality that distinguishes us from mere beasts. Imagination is furthermore related to pleasure and, of course, subordinated to reason:

> Plesewr dyscussybyll in thes thus doth fall
> The beast in effect hathe none the man hathe all
> *The resonabyll manns imagynashyon*
> Joynd w[ith] resonabyll consyderatyon
> Bryngth man muche plesewr in consyderyg
> The plesant proporte of eche plesaunt thyng[138]

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[135] (Puttenham 1970, 238)
[136] (Davies 1602, B1^v)
[137] (Gascoigne 1573, A2^r)
[138] (Heywood 1846, 20)

Indeed, there exists a legitimate and reputable side of active imagination as long as the faculty operates towards a specific purpose and cooperates with the higher understanding; in other words, imagination is positive provided that it is under the control of reason. Despite the above quotations, the material against imagination greatly outnumbers the one defending it, and imagination was often considered an uncontrolled, distorting, irrational and immoral faculty. The adherents of poetry in the Renaissance obviously had to deal with the association of poetry with imagination, since feigning is the very essence of poetry. Significantly enough, in Shakespeare's play *As you like it*, the character of Audrey at one point inquires about the meaning of "poetical": "Is it honest in deed and word? Is it a true thing?". "No, truly; for the truest poetry is the most feigning" is Touchstone's answer[139]. In this state of things, one possible solution to defend poetry was defending imagination in general; another, stressing that the faculty was not totally harmful, and that there was a good side to it. The latter became the general choice and, as a result, notions of good and bad imagination emerged. It was argued that poetic imagination was good because in it feigning was controlled and disciplined, for the poet deliberately feigns and distorts reality with a specific moral and rational purpose in mind. From this perspective, good imagination does not lie, but creates revealing and verisimilar imitations of life that unmask the truth underneath appearances.

This distinction between two different kinds of imagination appears to be related to Plato's discussion in *The Sophist* of two kinds of art: icastic and fantastic. On the one hand, icastic or "likeness-making" art occurs when "someone produces an imitation that agrees with the proportions of its original in length, breadth, and depth, and also gives the appropriate colors to each [of its parts]"[140]. In this case, the artist limits himself to accurately copying the model without using his imagination. On the contrary, fantastic art is synonymous with "semblance-making" art by not representing the model

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[139] (Shakespeare 2009, 163)
[140] (Plato 2005, 101; 235D)

faithfully[141]. In this case, the artist does not follow the actual proportions of the model but makes his own choices irrespective of the features of the model. Cinquecento critics such as Patrizi, Castelvetro, and Mazzoni employ Plato's distinction, and whereas the first two show a preference for icastic art, as they consider it more truthful, reliable and verisimilar than fantastic art, Mazzoni's *Della difesa della Commedia di Dante* argues instead that since icastic art is too close to history, the "marvelous-credible" of fantastic art is preferable[142]. The two representatives par excellence of icastic and fantastic art in humanist Italy were, respectively, Tasso's *Gerusalemme liberata*, and Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*. Tudor apologists for poetry generally continue to support icastic before fantastic art due to the former's reliability and lifelike properties. For instance, Puttenham distinguishes in *The Arte of English Poesie* between what he calls the "eufantastic" and the "fantastic", that is, between ordered and disordered art:

> Wherefore such persons as be illuminated with the *brightest irradiations of knowledge and of the veritie and due proportion of things, they are called by the learned men not phantastici but euphantasiote and of this sorte of phantasie are all good Poets*, notable Captaines stratagematique, all cunning artificers and engineers, all Legislators Polititiens & Counsellours of estate, *in whose exercises the inuentiue part is most employed and is to the sound & true iudgement of man most needful*.[143]

Thus, "euphantastic" art is associated with knowledge and truth and appears proper to the best poets as well as to noble, respectable and high members of the military, the body politic and the legal power. On his part, Sidney uses almost the same terms as Plato to refer to the dichotomy, linking the infected will with fantastic art, and icastic art with the erected wit. From his perspective, icastic art draws the poet's activity closer to God's creation: "For I will not deny but that man's wit may make Poesy, which should be *eikastike*, which some learned have defined, 'figuring forth good things', to be *phantastike* which doth contrariwise infect the fancy with unworthy objects"[144].

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[141] (Plato 2005, 102; 236C)
[142] (Kinney 1986, 29)
[143] (Puttenham 1970, 19-20)
[144] (Sidney 2002, 104). This passage has been interpreted as a reduction of "the icastic-fantastic dichotomy from a metaphysical to an ethical distinction" (Levao 1987, 136-137), which means that the adjectives "good" and "unworthy" are strictly used in an ethical way.

6.2.4.3. Sidney's Understanding of Imagination

As in the case of Peletier, Ronsard, Huarte and many other authors previously discussed, Sir Philip Sidney typically relates and understands imagination and invention hand in hand, to the point that, for example, we find in his *Defence* assertions such as the following: "in Poesy, looking but for fiction, they shall use the narration but as an imaginative ground-plot of a profitable invention"[145]. This close link between both concepts does not prevent them from having different connotations: indeed, while Sidney honestly lauds invention, he typically regards imagination problematically.

Sidney is generally careful with the manner in which he employs 'imagination', and if he affirms that the poet should deliver his ideas "in such excellency as he had imagined them", he quickly adds that his "delivering forth also *is not wholly imaginative, as we are wont to say by them that build castles in the air*"[146]. In other words, delivering an idea in a "wholly imaginative" way becomes synonymous with building "castles in the air". Then, when Sidney discusses the arguments of the 'poet-whippers', he states that what the latter basically did was to oppose action and imagination and therefore poetry: "They allege herewith, that before poets began to be in price our nation hath set their hearts' delight upon action, and not upon imagination, rather doing things worthy to be written, than writing things fit to be done"[147]. Of course, this extract makes evident that for Sidney imagination is at the core of poetry, and, certainly, if we bear in mind that the meaning of imagination is, ultimately, the capacity to create images, this poetic image-building skill is stressed time and again in Sidney's *Defence* even if indirectly. Even John Hoskins in his *Sidney's Arcadia and the Rhetoric of English Prose* (*c*. 1599) cannot avoid mentioning images, pictures, when discussing Sidney's *Defence*: "The conceits of the mind are pictures of things and the

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[145] (Sidney 2002, 103)
[146] (Sidney 2002, 85)
[147] (Sidney 2002, 105)

tongue is interpreter of those pictures"[148]. In this pictorical context, the sense of sight undoubtedly acquires special relevance, and so, shortly after, Hoskins formulates the following rhetorical question: "How shall you look for wit from him whose leisure and whose head, assisted with the examination of his eyes, could yield you no life and sharpness in his writing?"[149]. Nevertheless, Sidney does not very frequently use the term 'imagination' in his *Defence*, but rather prefers to paraphrase its literal meaning, as in the following extract:

> *it is not rhyming and versing that maketh a poet* – no more than a long gown maketh an advocate, who though he pleaded in armour should be an advocate and no soldier. *But it is that feigning notable images of virtues, vices, or what else, with that delightful teaching, which must be the right describing note to know a poet by.*[150]

In other words, rhyme and verse are not the essence of poetry, but imagination put to the service of *docere* and *delectare*: "that *feigning notable images* of virtues, vices, or what else, with that delightful teaching". Furthermore, in contrast with philosophers, a poet produces "a perfect picture" of things "*for he yieldeth to the powers of the mind an image* of that whereof the philosopher bestoweth but a wordish description, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess the sight of the soul, so much as that other doth"[151]. Having said this, it is then unsurprising that before the question of "whether the *feigned image of poesy* or the regular instruction of philosophy hath the more force in teaching"[152] Sidney states that the philosopher's outcomes "lie dark before the *imaginative and judging power*" of "the *speaking picture* of poesy"[153]. Even when Sidney describes "the best and most accomplished kind of Poetry", which for him is the heroical, he does so in terms of images: "as the *image* of each action stirreth and instructeth the mind, so the *lofty image* of such worthies most inflameth the mind with

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[148] (Hoskins 2003, 399)
[149] (Hoskins 2003, 400)
[150] (Sidney 2002, 87)
[151] (Sidney 2002, 90)
[152] (Sidney 2002, 91)
[153] (Sidney 2002, 90)

desire to be worthy, and informs with counsel how to be worthy"[154]. Again, we find the

imagination working through images for the achievement of virtue[155].

Certainly, in Sidney there is not an explicit defence of imagination or an overt

vindication of the centrality of the imagination for the production of poetry; instead,

Sidney tries (consciously or unconsciously) to convey the implications of imagination

without overusing the term, either because it was a word that was still uncommon in

poetry (in contrast with invention) or because he wishes to avoid unnecessary

controversy without giving up his convictions about poetry[156]. It seems to me that

Sidney's *Defence* is the product of a moment of terminological transition reflective of a

deeper conceptual shift: leaving behind the concept of imitation, Sidney shows how

ideas of imagination were gradually gaining force at a time when invention was

generally the key concept when describing poetry[157]. Sidney transforms the classical

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[154] (Sidney 2002, 99)

[155] Walter R. Davis also remarks the importance of the image within Sidney's theory of poetry, and notes the frequency with which Sidney repeats and makes variations of Plutarch's notion of the poem as an image or picture (Davis 1969, 37). Davis explains this predominance because of the transcendent nature of images and their role in leading the mind from the concrete to the Idea. On his part, Lawrence C. Wolfley explores this visualist model of Sidney's theory and affirms that "The poetic image is a sort of projectile which has the power to *strike*, *pierce*, and *possess* the reader's more or less passive soul, itself conceived as a visually receptive organ" (Wolfley 1976, 233). Then, Kathy Eden (1986) observes Sidney's indebtedness to Aristotle when it comes to his treatment of the image, as well as to scholastic interpretations of the Greek philosopher's views. Furthermore, Eden affirms that "it is precisely because Sidney's poet uses his art to transform the psychological image into a poetic image designed to promote virtue and prevent vice that he deserves the highest commendation in contributing to the highest aim of human activity" (Eden 1986, 174). Peter Mack also remarks the importance that image and imagination acquire from the last two decades of the sixteenth century onwards, and signals how Sidney's *Defence* takes as the defining characteristic of the poet "the capacity to make images which will inspire readers to action" and move them to virtue (Mack 2004, 69). Moreover, Mack notes that even though Sidney relies much on Scaliger's *Poetices* (1561), his discussion on poetry as related to imagination is his own, for Scaliger does not mention it at all. Instead, Sidney's principal sources in this regard are rhetoric and the mid sixteenth-century discussions on Aristotle's *Poetics* (Mack 2004, 71-72). Finally, Michael Mack remarks that imagination is virtually present in the sixteenth-century notion of 'wit' that Sidney employs, and that "only with Bacon does 'wit' begin to be associated with reason *against* imagination" (Mack 2005, 15).

[156] In this manner, I do not completely agree with Peter Mack's statement that "While Sidney acknowledges a societal prejudice against the imagination, he also attempts to undo it, insisting on the truth and value of the effects of the poetic imagination" (Mack 2004, 71). Sidney's *Apology* is not vindicative of imagination; otherwise, the term would be far more frequent in his text.

[157] Michael Mack in fact considers that Sidney developed a "transitional theory" and that the *Apology* was "a landmark along the path from poetry understood as imitation to poetry understood as creation" (Mack 2005, ix). Mack views the idea of the imitation of God as essential within this shift: "In Sidney's transitional poetics, art is at once the mirror of nature and a mirror of the divine art of creation. When poetic creativity receives a fuller treatment in the romantic period, this double mirroring remains at the heart of creativity. As is the case with Sidney, for Wordsworth and Coleridge art still imitates nature, and the mind, though creative, is still a mirror. The difference is that the mind not only mirrors the world, but

ideal of poetry when stating that poetry has the power to reform the world, and that it originates in the poet's idea[158].

If medieval thinkers repeatedly presented God as an author and the world as his book that could be read and interpreted by man, they never called God a poet, nor poets or artists creators, for the latter statement would be blasphemous because *creatio ex nihilo* was considered a privilege exclusive to God[159]. Hence, in the Middle Ages the poet was not seen as a parallel figure to God the creator, nor were poems seen as creations[160]. In the fourteenth century, the term 'maker' was used by poets almost exclusively to refer to God, but the situation changed a century later, when 'maker' began to designate the poet as craftsman as well [161]. Cristoforo Landino pushed this change further by asserting in his *Commentary on Dante* (1481) that the poet's work

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the world also mirrors the mind" (Mack 2005, 32). William Bouwsma (1993) argues that there is in fact a connection between creativity and modernity based on the shift from attributing creativity to God, to recognizing it in human beings. According to Bouwsma, there are three stages in this process: firstly, it is denied that human beings can create; secondly, it is admitted but hyperbolically; finally, the use of the term is extended and becomes vaguer, and it is generally accepted that human beings actually create and that creativity is proper to human beings, eventually forgetting that in the past creativity was a faculty borrowed from God.

[158] M. H. Abrams (1976), who recognizes no actual theory of poetic creativity until the eighteenth century, views Sidney's *Apology*, though not creative by romantic standards, indeed occupying a position that goes beyond imitation of nature.

[159] Tigerstedt points out that in the Middle Ages "it seems that the world is never explicitly called a poem (*poema*), though the word *carmen*, as in Augustine, hovers between 'poem' and 'song'" (Tigerstedt 1970, 467). Furthermore, "in the Middle Ages, educated people knew that *poeta* was in Greek ποιητής and that it came from ποιέω or, as they wrote, *poio*, but this verb they translated by *fingo* or *facio*, never by *creo*" (Tigerstedt 1970, 468).

[160] Michael Mack notes that there were only few isolated exceptions to this, the earliest found in the commentaries of the medieval canonists and in the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa: "Working out the consequences of the doctrine of man as a microcosm, Cusa found that the human being is 'another god,' who rules over the earth as God rules over the universe. Whereas the Scholastics accepted the Aristotelian understanding of art as an imitation of nature, Cusa believed in the autonomy of art, an autonomy mirroring the absolute power and freedom of God the creator" (Mack 2005, 18). More will be said about Cusa in later pages.

[161] (Ebin 1988, 198). Discussing the use of the term 'maker' by Chaucer, Glending Olson notes that "Chaucer employs 'makere' and 'makyng' to describe himself, his contemporaries, and their activity, and 'poete' and 'poetrie' to designate the ancients, the most revered moderns, and their work" (Olson 1979, 274-275). Hence, in Chaucer, 'poet' invariably denotes ancient authorities or Dante and Petrarch, but never Chaucer's contemporaries, whom he qualifies as 'makers'. 'Making' is indeed inferior to 'poetry', and "the emphasis in the vernacular lyric treatises on technique rather than on inspiration or learning reinforces the impression that making is perceived primarily as craftsmanship" (Olson 1979, 276). Consequently, while poets are learned men, versifiers are closer to artisans, and although both poets and makers "can produce works which combine pleasure and profit, yet there seems to be the implication that obtaining profit is an expected consequence of reading poets but a somewhat more infrequent result when reading or hearing makers" (Olson 1979, 285).

"departs from making and comes very near to creating", since it is composed almost though "not entirely out of nothing":

> And the Greeks say "poet" from the verb "piin" [*sic*], which is half-way between "creating," which is peculiar to God when out of nothing he brings forth anything into being, and "making," which applies to men when they compose with matter and form in any art. It is for this reason that, *although the feigning of the poet is not entirely out of nothing, it nevertheless departs from making and comes very near to creating.*[162]

Indeed, Christophoro Landino, a friend of Marsilio Ficino, is considered the first author to compare the poet to God as creator[163]. However, Landino recognizes that the poet does not create *ex nihilo*, as God, although the poet is seen over all other men as a kind of semi-divinity. This drastically contrasts with Ficino's view, as Ficino's doctrine of the *furor poeticus* far from converting the poet into a creator makes him dependent on some divine inspiration.

If Landino called God "the supreme poet", Scaliger calls the poet "almost . . . a second deity". For Scaliger, the poet "depicts quite another sort of nature [*naturam alteram*] and a variety of fortunes; in fact, by so doing, he transforms himself almost into a second deity [*Deum alterum*]"[164]. Scaliger reached radical conclusions from a critical Aristotelianism[165], and so asserted the absolute opposition between nature and art, the former representing chaos, irregularity, and arbitrariness, and the latter, armony, elegance, order, and intellectual discipline. Hence, for Scaliger, the writer is able to

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[162] Quoted in (Mack 2005, 18).

[163] (Tigerstedt 1970, 456). E. N. Tigerstedt says that "Landino was fond of this argument, for he repeated it at least twice. First, the following year, in 1482, he published a richly commented edition of Horace's poems. Then, in his Virgil edition, published in 1487, Landino returns to this idea" (Tigerstedt 1970, 458-459). To the claim of some scholars that the architect, painter, and writer Leone Battista Alberti had also affirmed the artist to be a creator like God, Tigerstedt responds that these scholars "have failed to quote any statement by Alberti in which he compares the artist to the Creator. Nor does any exist, except, seemingly, a passage in the *Della pittura*, where Alberti, speaking of the great fame of a master painter, says that he 'shall see his works adored and feel himself regarded as another god.' But this is only a hyperbolic way of describing the painter's fame, not any real comparison of him to God. There is no reason for regarding Alberti's words as having had any influence on Landino. (…) Nor does there seem to be any other fifteenth-century Italian – or, for that matter, non-Italian – artist who calls himself, or another artist, 'creator'" (Tigerstedt 1970, 475).

[164] Quoted in (Mack 2005, 22)

[165] Spingarn discusses Scaliger's admiration towards Aristotle in the following terms: "[Scaliger] was the first to regard Aristotle as the perpetual lawgiver of poetry. He was the first to assume that the duty of the poet is first to find out what Aristotle says, and then to obey these precepts without question. He distinctively calls Aristotle the perpetual dictator of all the arts" (Spingarn 1976, 141).

create a much better reality than the natural one, which renders the poet a kind of semi-god able to perfect nature in the realm of art. This of course relates to the golden world of art that Sidney presents in his *Defence*: "Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers poets have done; neither with pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smelling flowers, nor whatsoever else may make the too much loved earth more lovely. *Her world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden*"[166]. For Sidney "There is no art delivered to mankind that hath not the works of Nature for his principal object, without which they could not consist, and on which they so depend, as they become actors and players, as it were, of what Nature will have set forth"[167]. The astronomer, the geometrician and arithmetician, the musician, the natural and the moral philosopher, the lawyer, the historian, the grammarian, even the rhetorician, the logician, the physician, or the metaphysic have nature as their object of study. Only the poet goes beyond nature, rivalling with it, for nature is not a mere model for the poet but a force that works in parallel with him:

> *Only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature, in making things either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in Nature*, as the Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like: so as he goeth hand in hand with Nature, *not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit*.[168]

With the statement that nature's "world is brazen" and the poets' golden, Sir Philip Sidney compares the works of nature and of the poet making the latter surpass the former, since the poet's imitative qualities and invention enable him to re-shape nature by turning it into a far more pleasant reality: "as Aristotle saith, those things which in themselves are horrible, as cruel battles, unnatural monsters, are made in poetical imitation delightful"[169]. Sidney additionally discusses the effects of imagination in the common man, who is also able to elevate over sensual perception and towards a

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[166] (Sidney 2002, 85)
[167] (Sidney 2002, 84-85)
[168] (Sidney 2002, 85)
[169] (Sidney 2002, 95)

supernatural realm at the high cost of forgetting earthly matters, which may put in risk his own happiness. In *The Covntesse of Pembrokes Arcadia*, Sidney writes what follows:

> Yesterday was but as to day, and to morrow will tread the same footsteps of his foregoers: so as it is manifest inough, that all thinges follow but the course of their owne nature, sauing only Man, who while *by the pregnancie of his imagination he striues to things supernaturall*, meane-while hee looseth his owne naturall felicitie.[170]

Similarly, George Puttenham, when describing the relation of the poet with nature and comparing the poet's work with the activities of craftsmen, he states that "it is not altogether with him as with the crafts man, nor altogither otherwise then with the crafts man"[171]. Thus, the poet seems to share certain qualities with other artisans, at the same time that his activity is not equal to any of them. The poet, like the carpenter or the gardener, takes his raw material from nature and then works with it, transforms it and turns it into something artificial, different from nature. Like the painter, the poet's activity has an element of imitation, but unlike the gardener, the carpenter and the painter, the poet "restes onely in deuise and issues from an excellent sharpe and quick inuention, holpen by a cleare and bright phantasie and imagination". The poet

> is not as the painter to counterfaite the naturall by the like effects and not the same, nor as the gardiner aiding nature to worke both the same and the like, nor as the Carpenter to worke effects vtterly vnlike, *but euen as nature her selfe working by her owne peculiar vertue and proper instinct and not by example or meditation or exercise as all other artificers do*, is then most admired when he is most naturall and least artificiall.[172]

In this manner, George Puttenham also recognizes the poet's activity as parallel to that of nature. Poetry is, thus, like nature itself, and the more natural and less artificial, the better. Of course, this defence of naturality has much to do with the education of courtiers (whom *The Arte* primarily addresses), for whom dissimulation and concealment of artificiality constitute a priority in their courtly code.

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[170] (Sidney 1590, Oo1r)
[171] (Puttenham 1970, 306)
[172] (Puttenham 1970, 307)

Like Sidney, Alberico Gentili in his *Commentatio* (1593) also expressed his convincement that art could effectively surpass nature:

> *For although art is the imitator of nature, yet it often excels nature.* As Plato himself observed happens in painting – that the painter paints an image of such excellence as universal nature could never display. And indeed our poet thus represents men even of such virtue as human nature is not capable of.[173]

Other authors of the time opposed this view and, for instance, John Eliot in his *Ortho-epia Gallica: Eliots fruits for the French* (1593) puts forward the idea that imitation of nature can never reach the perfection of nature itself, as he illustrates in the following extract dealing with music:

> Where art thou Linus most harmonious musition with thine yvorie lute? vvhere art thou Amphiō the finest fingrer of an harpe in all Greece? where art thou Orpheus with thy silver sitterne? where art thou Arion with thy melody that made the fishes danse in the sea? come hether, learne new lessons. *Truly these foure who haue bene so famous by report of all Latine and Greeke authours, for that they were most excellent musitions, haue neuer bene able to counterfait this little bird singing hir note.*[174]

The elevation of the artist to godlike status has its roots in the Neo-Platonic theory and not in the Aristotelian tradition, which in contrast tended to subordinate art to nature[175]. Nonetheless, sixteenth-century poets were still far from completely detaching the poet's golden worlds from the divine Creation, since grounding poetic fiction in an ideal realm ensured poetry's validity in a context in which the idea of feigning was too powerfully connected to deception. The analogy God-poet is also employed in *The true order and methode of wryting and reading hystories, according to the precepts of F. Patricio and Accontio Tridentio* (1574), translated by Thomas Blundeville. The work

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[173] (Binns 1999, 97). In Latin: "Etsi enim ars est naturae imitatrix, vincit tamen illam saepe : quemadmodum in pictoria ipsemet observavit Plato fieri, ut tantae imaginem excellentiae pingat pictor, quantae nunquam ostendere natura universa possit. Et vero sic poeta noster vel viros repraesentat tantae virtutis, quantae capax humana natura non est" (Binns 1999, 96).

[174] (Eliot 1593, T3ʳ)

[175] In this regard, C. S. Lewis affirmed that in Neo-Platonic theory "Art and Nature thus become rival copies of the same supersensous original, and there is no reason why Art should not sometimes be the better of the two. Such a theory leaves the artist free to exceed the limits of Nature. Of these two conceptions it is the neo-Platnoic, not the Aristotelian, which is really demanded by most Golden poetry; by the *Furioso*, the *Liberata*, the *Arcadia*, the *Faerie Queene*, and by many elements in Shakespearean 'comedy'" (Lewis 1966, 320).

states that poets "in some respect" stand close to God's work, and provides a gradient of

other arts and sciences that also "make anyethyng":

> Of those that make anyethyng, *some doe make much of nothing, as God dyd in creating the Worlde of naught, and as Poets in some respect also doe, whilest they faine fables and make thereof theyr poesies, and poeticall Hystories*: some agayne of more doe make lesse, as keruers & grauers of Images, and other such like artificers, some of little doe make much, & of much little, as the Oratours vvhylest sometyme they extoll small things, & sometime abase great thinges. And some doe make of so much as much, as true Philosophers, and Hystoriographers, whose office is to tell things as they were done without either augmenting or diminishing them, or swaruing one iote from the truth.[176]

Furthermore, George Puttenham employs the analogy of God and the poet to stress

the importance of the latter's work. The analogy is used in the context of an explanation

of the nature of the activity of the poet, whom Puttenham considers both a maker and an

imitator:

> *A Poet is as much to say as a maker. And our English name well conformes with the Greeke word: for of ποιεῖν to make, they call a maker Poeta. Such as (by way of resemblance and reuerently) we may say of God: who without any trauell to his diuine imagination, made all the world of nought, nor also by any paterne or mould as the Platonicks with their Idees do phantastically suppose.* (...) And neuerthelesse without any repugnancie at all, *a Poet may in some sort be said a follower or imitator*, because he can express the true and liuely of euery thing is set before him, and which he taketh in hand to describe: *and so in that respect is both a maker and a counterfaitor: and Poesie an art not only of making, but also of imitation.* And this science in his perfection, can not grow, but by some diuine instinct, the Platonicks call it *furor*: or by excellencie of nature and complexion: or by great subtiltie of the spirits & wit or by much experience and obseruation of the world, and course of kinde, or/peradventure by all or most part of them. Otherwise how was it possible that *Homer* being but a poore priuate man, and as some say, in his later age blind, should so exactly set foorth and describe, as if he had bene a most excellent Captaine or Generall, the order and array of battels, the conduct of whole armies, the sieges and assaults of cities and townes? or as some great Princes maiordome and perfect Surueyour in Court, the order, sumptuousnesse and magnificence of royal bankers, feasts, weddings, and enteruewes? (...) *It is therefore of Poets thus to be conceiued, that if they be able to deuise and make all these things of them selues, without any subiect of veritie, that they be (by maner of speech) as creating gods.* If they do it by instinct diuine or naturall, then surely much fauoured from aboue. If by their experience, then no doubt very wise men.[177]

Remarkably, in the previous paragraph Putthenham affirms that God has

imagination as well: "God: who without any trauell to his diuine imagination, made all

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[176] (Blundeville 1574, E4ʳ-F1ᵛ)
[177] (Puttenham 1970, 3-4)

the world of nought". Additionally, since God created out of nothing, He should be given more credit than the one the Platonics usually attribute to Him (for God did not have Ideas to follow). This of course also means that God could not possibly imitate, and that, therefore, invention or creation without imitation should be praised as well in the case of human poets. Nevertheless, unlike God the creator and imitator of none or nothing, the human poet is, at the same time, a maker who does not employ "any foreine copie or example" but "makes and contrives out of his own braine"[178] (in this regard being a parallel figure to God "by manner of speech") and is not a counterfaitor or imitator.

In the English tradition, Puttenham was the first to establish an incipient comparison between God (the Maker) and the human poet, although his words did not imply a complete identification thanks to the expression "by maner of speech". Due to the poets' almost divine status –after all, poets were, even if "by maner of speech", "creating gods"–, they could create in their poems a second nature more perfect than the sensory world, in contrast with the limitations of logic and rhetoric, which, although going beyond mere imitation, are still unable to surpass nature:

> there be artes and methodes both to speake and to perswade and also to dispute, and by which the naturall is in some sorte relieued, as th'eye by his spectacle, *I say relieued in his imperfection, but not made more perfit then the naturall*, in which respect I call those *artes of Grammer, Logicke, and Rhetorick not bare imitations*, as the painter or keruers craft and worke in a forraine subiect viz. a liuely purtraite in his table of wood, but by long and studious obseruation rather a repetitiō or reminiscens naturall, reduced into perfection, and made prompt by vse and exercise.[179]

Sir Philip Sidney also draws on the originality of the Landinian comparison between God and the poet in his *Defence*[180]. However, Sidney seems to be less vague or dubious than George Puttenham when asserting the following:

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[178] (Puttenham 1970, 3)
[179] (Puttenham 1970, 306)
[180] Dorothy Connell additionally stresses Pico della Mirandola's un-acknowledged influence upon Sidney's recognition of man's creative powers, as well as the influence of other Renaissance humanists following Pico's *Oratio* (Connell 1977, 2).

> Neither let it be deemed too saucy a comparison to balance the highest point of man's wit with the efficacy of Nature; but rather *give right honour to the heavenly Maker of that maker, who having made man to His own likeness, set him beyond and over all the works of that second nature*: which in nothing he showeth so much as *in Poetry, when, with the force of a divine breath he bringeth things forth surpassing her doings...*[181]

In contrast with Puttenham, Sidney does not allude to God's imaginative faculty, and he more emphatically affirms that poetry goes well beyond nature. Nature is the product of God, but man is the product of God in "His own likeness". Consequently, the position of human beings is over that of nature and its creative powers, poets in particular occupy the highest status, and poetry, the top position within the hierarchy of the arts and sciences: "of all sciences (I speak still of human, and according to the human conceits) is our poet the monarch"[182]. Furthermore, Sidney takes this analogy between God and the poet a step further than Puttenham by attributing to the poet the power to transform the audience just like God has the power to redeem humanity. Sidney's interest in the effect of poetry upon the audience follows the line of Boccaccio, Petrarch, and the humanist poetic tradition, which emphasized the good moral effects of poetry. For them, poetry, just like theology, could lead audiences to God[183]. Fulke Greville, who, as has been seen, accused imagination of being at the roots of man's faulty understanding of the world, and who obviously knew in detail Sidney's life and works, begins his *A Treatie of Humane Learning* (1633) with an affirmation of the powers of the human mind and its capacity to go beyond nature:

> The Mind of Man is this worlds true dimension;
> And *Knowledge* is the measure of the minde:
> And as *the minde, in her vaste comprehension,*
> *Containes more worlds than all the world can finde*:
> So Knowledge doth it selfe farre more extend,
> Than all the minds of Men can comprehend.[184]

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[181] (Sidney 2002, 85-86)
[182] (Sidney 2002, 95)
[183] Michael Mack argues that Sidney's is neither a secularist nor a Protestant poetics, but a Christian one designed to move poets and their readers to embrace the transforming power of grace (Mack 2005, 162).
[184] (Greville 1633, d1ʳ)

Not only that, but Greville, like Sidney, discusses the idea that man has the potential to become like God through the exercise of sciences and arts:

> But all these naturall Defects perchance
> May be supplied by *Sciences, and Arts*;
> Which wee thirst after, study, admire, aduance,
> As if restore our fall, recure our smarts
> *They could, bring in perfection, burne our rods;*
> *With Demades to make us like our Gods.*[185]

Sidney's understanding of artistic imitation within the context of the relation between art and nature implies that imitation of nature also includes imitating her creative powers[186]. The poet's invention is precisely what enables his imitation of nature turn into a golden world[187]. Indeed, Sidney's theory regarding the relation between nature and imitation and the creation of a golden world by the poet through his own inventive powers is the result of a blending and personal interpretation of highly different and often contradictory traditions which numerous authors have attempted to explain in various ways[188]. I believe that Sidney goes beyond a mere recapitulation of

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[185] (Greville 1633, d1ʳ)

[186] Erwin Panofsky argues that already in Ancient Greece, classical thought on μίμησις "was thoroughly familiar with the notion that the artist's relation to nature is not only that of an obedient copyist but also that of an independent rival, who by his creative ability freely improves on her necessary imperfections" (Panofsky 1968, 15). On the relationship between the first world made by God and perceived through the senses, and the second nature constructed by the human mind, Harry Berger (1988) affirms that up until the fourteenth century and within the Christian framework of thought, the second nature fell behind the first world made by God, which was perceived as being better. In other words, visible beauty would always remain a shadow of the invisible one. However, Berger argues that from the fourteenth to the late seventeenth century this conception changes: "A simplified synoptic view of these centuries reveals that as nature loses its Aristotelian substantiality, as the lines between subjective and objective forms of phenomena become more sharply drawn, as physical reality becomes more closely identified with atoms, force, and mathematics – as, in general, man by retracting his projected self-images confers new otherness on both God and nature, the mind-made orders increase in dignity and importance. (…) by the time of Galileo, Descartes, Bernini, Milton, Leibniz, and Newton, the second world tends to be thought of as improving, superseding, or even replacing the first world. Actuality becomes a chaos or blueprint offered by God as raw material to the mind" (Berger 1988, 11).

[187] According to Weiner, while Sidney offers invention "as the source from which the poet's golden world originates", for him imitation becomes "the deliberate and deliberative process by which the poet reworks both the 'facts' of the visible world and the materials inherited from his predecessors" (Weiner 1991, 248).

[188] For example, O. B. Hardison (1972) recognizes two different sets of voices and views in Sidney's *Apology*: that of humanistic poetics (which would insert Sidney's discourse within the traditions stemming from Plato, the Neoplatonists, and Horace, and continuing with Boccaccio, Politian, and Tasso), and that of an incipient neo-classicism with prescriptive overtones (following Scaliger, Castelvetro, and Ben Jonson). Because of this, Hardison speculates that the *Defence* may have been written in two phases and that since Sidney died before it was printed, it was published without a

the beliefs of past and contemporary authors and adds something new to the mix: the

poet's idea or fore-conceit.

Clearly, the notion that the poet can create a new nature is in origin Neoplatonic,

and Neoplatonism saw the poet as imitating Ideas directly. Nonetheless, that Sidney was

not a fully convinced Neoplatonic can be seen when comparing his writings with

Cristoforo Landino's Neoplatonic *Comento di Christophoro Landino fiorentino Sopra*

La Comedia di Dante Alighieri (1481)[189], whose chapters "Che cosa sia poesia e poeta e

delle origine sua divina e antichissima" and "Furore divino" place the theory of divine

furor in a central position, whereas Sidney rejects it by saying that Plato "attributeth

unto Poesy more than myself do, namely, to be a very inspiring of a divine force, far

above man's wit"[190]. Hence, although influenced by Neoplatonism, Sidney does not

embrace its theories on poetic inspiration because he believes that the poet does not

need divine inspiration to discover the divine truth of things. Instead, the poet simply

has to look within himself to find what he needs to write. Also unlike the Neoplatonists,

Sidney believed that the poet's composition is more than the blurred reflection of an

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thorough revision by Sidney himself. Then, D. H. Craig stresses that Sidney's drawing on different traditions produces the resulting "hybrid quality" of the *Defence* which explains its "striking originality" (Craig 1980, 183). Craig discusses Sidney's lack of a total compromise with the theories of both Plato and Aristotle in the following terms: "The Aristotelian theory of imitation, on the other hand, gave the fictional image a substantial ontology, yet rules out the possibility that it could represent Ideas which were separate from reality. Sidney's praise of the poet as 'feigning notable images of virtue [and] vices' is incompatible with Platonic doctrine, and Aristotelians could not approve of the poet who exempts himself from the rule that 'There is no art delivered to mankind that hath not the works of Nature for his principal object.' Sidney's concept is a thoroughly hybrid growth" (Craig 1980, 197). Finally, Nandra Perry views the *Defence* as a distant relative of Seneca's epistle "On Imitation", which synthesizes the Platonic and Aristotelian mimetic theories (Perry 2005, 391).

[189] Similarly, Robert Stillman claims that Sidney cannot be considered either a pure Aristotelian or a perfect representative of Neoplatonism despite employing some typically Neoplatonic notions such as the conception of the literary work as a microcosm: "Clearly, Sidney was no Aristotelian. For all of *The Defence*'s attention to the vocabulary of *mimesis*, its deep and consistent diminishment of the truths to be derived from a slippery world makes small sense out of possible claims to induction or empiricism, and hence to the value of that Aristotelian project of locating forms (or ideas) embodied in the material realm. Clearly, too, Sidney was no neoplatonist. He does not conceive of Ideas as deriving from or participating in some transcendent realm of meaning and value, and he specifically disclaims any source for the poet's Ideas in divine inspiration. By contrast, what Sidney insists upon is the poet's *possession* of the Idea" (Stillman 2002, 373). Ronal Levao believes that "The *Apology* does entertain echoes of Neoplatonism, or at least the claims Neoplatonism had made possible" (Levao 1985, 136), although unlike the Neoplatonists, for Sidney the poet is not inspired, "his heavenly and divine nature is at best metaphorical", and "Where Sidney does mention poets who were truly inspired by God (David, Solomon, et al.), he is careful to set them apart from 'right poets,' his subject" (Levao 1985, 137). In conclusion, "Sidney is interested in a poetic grounded in the human mind, and inspiration would compromise its autonomy" (Levao 1985, 137).

[190] (Sidney 2002, 107)

Idea, for even if Neoplatonics admitted that artists could imitate the Ideas directly, they thought that, due to the material side of art, the work of art necessarily remains inferior to the transcendent Idea.

In fact, some scholars have seen Sidney's discussion of the fore-conceit closer to Nicholas of Cusa's art of conjecture than to Neoplatonic art theory and Ficino's postulates[191]. In *De coniecturis*, Nicholas of Cusa writes that "Man is God", clarifying that "He is not absolutely God because he is man; he is therefore a human god"[192]. Nicholas of Cusa's *De idiota* gathers his thought regarding human inventiveness. *De idiota* is made up of four dialogues: the two books of *De sapientia* on human relation to divine wisdom; the last book of *De staticis experimentis*, on empirical investigation of phenomena; and the central dialogue *De mente*, on the human mind and human knowledge. Cusa agrees with other Renaissance thinkers on the idea of *Genesis* that man is made in God's image and likeness. Wilhelm Dupré explains that for Nicholas of Cusa "it is up to the free spirit to create its own worlds by bringing things together in its own ways and, what is even more important, by joining the world of the divine as it

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[191] Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall (1948) talk of Nicholas of Cusa as, in a sense, "the first Western Platonist of the Renaissance", even if they remark that "his influence during the Renaissance, especially during the early period, while suggested by similarities of thought, is very difficult to establish" (Cassirer, Kristeller and Randall 1948, 7). Levao warns about the importance of distinguishing Nicholas of Cusa's poetics from the Neoplatonic one, for although in his work we find the implication "that the discursive hunt for truth approaches the condition of poetry" (Levao 1985, 86), "Neoplatonism generally operates within a more clearly defined arena: its Ideas and hierarchies are treated as an objective, symbolic field from which to draw poetic material and against which to trace human progress. For Cusanus, that field of reference is *already* a metaphor. Objective reality exists, of course, but our perception of it *as* a symbolic arena forces us to recognize that the work of conjecture has already begun. Cusanus's poetics is therefore more problematic than the Neoplatonists': conjecture proceeds from prior conjecture and leads to subsequent conjecture, a process that relies on an ultimate reality, yet at the same time threatens to cut the mind loose without a point of departure or arrival" (Levao 1985, 87-88).

[192] (Quoted in Levao 1985, 67). Ronald Levao explains Nicholas of Cusa's point on this matter in the following terms: "Cusanus's notion of a 'human god' seeks to resolve the pronounced antithesis of Aquinas's argument that 'to create can be the proper action of God alone,' which in turn was a rejection of Peter Lombard's view that God can 'communicate to a creature the power of creating' (*ST* I.45.5). Cusanus does distinguish between human and divine power, nowhere more explicitly than in *De idiota*: God's knowledge creates real beings, whereas man's is only assimilative (3.7). But this distinction between the *vis entificativa* of the former and the *vis assimilativa* of the latter is not as rigid as one might suppose: man's assimilation of the external objects that organize his thought is no mere conformity to a given, but is characterized by originality and self-movement" (Levao 1985, 67-68). Levao asserts that "The mind's highest capacity, like Cusanus's *intellectus*, may suggest an intuitive leap to a higher unity, but it always return us to the mind's active fashioning. The metaphysical terms of the *Apology*, like the elaborate schemata of *De coniecturis*, must be pictured as lying within, rather than outside of, the sphere of human mankind" (Levao 1985, 139-140).

appears in the light of God's Holy Spirit"[193]. As Cusa himself states, freedom and thought go along with nature and grace:

> No other nature can become better by itself, but is what it is under the rule of necessity which keeps it like that. Only intellectual nature has the principles within it, through which it can become better, and therefore more like God and more susceptible to God.[194]

The "Idea or fore-conceit" is for Sidney a central device for poetry-making, and it encapsulates two different traditions: that contained in 'idea', and that represented by 'fore-conceit'. Certainly, the two terms are only roughly synonymous, and since 'idea' usually refers in the sixteenth century to philosophy, truth, universals, transcendent values, 'fore-conceit' is impregnated with rhetorical and logical connotations, and therefore "suggests a realm of contingent relationships"[195]. Furthermore, while the notion of 'idea' still carries connotations of being inherent in the human mind, the fore-conceit seems to be created by the mind and capable of being transferred from the mind of the poet to that of the reader. From this perspective, the poet's fore-conceit is what bridges the epistemological gap between 'idea' and the poetic composition that addresses a readership. Sidney's prefix 'fore-' may imply that the poet's conceit pre-dates invention, the first part of rhetoric –this could point at the previously discussed operation of *intellectio*. According to Sidney, it is through the poet's "freely ranging

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[193] (Dupré 2002, 9)

[194] Quoted in (Dupré 2002, 9). William J. Hoye explores the place of Nominalism and Neoplatonism in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, concluding that his Nominalistic standpoint – according to which "our concepts of God do not convey real knowledge of God in himself, but rather serve as representatives in God's place in propositions formulated by the theologian about God" (Hoye 1986, 16) – worked at a deeper level in his thinking structure, while Neoplatonism was, from Hoye's point of view, "subsumed by Cusanus into a position that appeals to supernatural faith for its ultimate principle of verification" (Hoye 1986, 17). For more on Nicholas of Cusa, see F. Edward Cranz's *Nicholas of Cusa and the Renaissance*, Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald Christianson, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). For more on Neoplatonism in Nicholas of Cusa's and Marsilio Ficino's thought, see Maurice DeGandillac's "Neoplatonism and Christian Thought in the Fifteenth Century (Nicholas of Cusa and Marsilio Ficino)", in Dominic J. O'Meara, ed., *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought* (Norfolk: Internat. Soc. for Neoplatonic Studies, 1981, 143-165). Specifically dealing with Ficino we find Paul Oskar Kristeller's book *The philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, translated into English by Virginia Conant (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1964; Rpt. of 1943 Columbia UP).

[195] (Wolfley 1976, 230). Furthermore, according to Wolfley, the 'fore-conceite' is "entirely mental and 'pre-linguistic'" (Wolfley 1976, 231).

only within the zodiac of his own wit" that he finds his 'idea'[196]. Indeed, it does not seem that for Sidney ideas pre-existed in the human mind; on the contrary, they are the product of human mental activity, of man's wit, invention and imagination.

The sixteenth-century thought that ideas have an *a posteriori* nature seems to be confirmed by an analysis of the definitions of 'idea' by sixteenth-century English dictionaries, which reveal that ideas were connected in some way to the power of human imagination. Thus, Thomas Cooper defines 'idea' as "The figure *couceiued in Imagination*, as it were a substance perpetuall, being as parerne of all other sorte or kinde, as of one seale proceedeth many priutes, so of one Idea of man proceede many thousands of men"[197], a definition that Thomas Thomas copies for his own dictionary[198]. John Florio defines 'idea' as "the idea, figure or forme of anything *conceiued in imagination*"[199], and John Perceval as "a forme or fashion, *conceiued in imagination*, as it were a during substance, being a patterne of all other like kindes"[200].

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[196] (Sidney 2002, 85). When tracing the source of the Sidneyan 'Idea', Erwin Panofsky's study of the concept of 'idea' appears highly valuable. Panofsky (1968) demonstrates a change in the conception of ideas from Plato to Bellori (mid-seventeenth century). In that span of time, the origins of Ideas change from being located in the metaphysical realm to being placed in the realm of the sensible world. In the Renaissance, there was no agreement on this point and different authors identified different sources for them. Unlike the Middle Ages, which had placed the artistic object within the artist's imagination, the Renaissance took it out to the sensible world, thus distancing subject and object. Panofsky distinguishes in sixteenth-century Italy two chief and essentially different meanings of the term 'idea' when applied to the artistic field. On the one hand, authors like Alberti and Raphael employed it to refer to "the mental image of a beauty that surpasses nature", what we would now call 'ideal'; on the other, as used by Vasari and others, "any image conceived in the artist's mind" (Panofsky 1968, 66). Panofsky elaborates on the importance of the development of this second meaning: "Since an idea is no longer present *a priori* in the mind of the artist (i.e., it does not precede experience) but is brought forth by him *a posteriori* (i.e., it is engendered on the basis of experience), its role is no longer that of a competitor with, much less that of an archetype for, the reality perceived by the senses, but rather that of a derivative of reality. For the same reasons an idea functions no longer as the given content or even as the transcendent object of human cognition, but as its product. This change is clearly recognizable even in purely semantic terms. From now on an idea no longer 'dwells' or 'pre-exists' in the soul of the artist, as Cicero and Thomas Aquinas had put it, and still less is it 'innate' to him, as genuine Neoplatonism had expressed, it rather 'it comes into his mind,' 'arises,' is 'derived' from reality,' 'acquired,' nay, 'formed and sculpted'" (Panofsky 1968, 62). According to Mack, in the Renaissance, the concept of 'idea' was still moving from the divine (*i.e.* the mind of God), to the human realm (*i.e.* the human mind) (Mack 2005, 56).

[197] (Cooper 1578, Nnn4ʳ)

[198] "Idĕa, æ, f.g. p.l. The figure *conceiued in imagination*, as it were a substance per petuall, beeing as a patterne of all other sort or kinde: as of one seale proceedeth many printes, so of one Idea of man proceedeth many thousands of men" (Thomas 1587, Dd8v).

[199] (Florio 1598, O5v). Fundamentally the same definition appears in Florio's 1611 dictionary: "Idea the Idea, figure or forme of any thing *conceiued in the imagination*" (Florio 1611, V3ᵛ).

[200] (Perceval 1599, X6v)

Neither for Sir Philip Sidney were ideas innate and pre-existent in the poet and his readers' minds, but it was the mind of the poet the one creating ideas[201].

6.2.4.4. Imagination in Shakespeare's Plays

As with imitation and invention, the occurrences of the term 'imagination' in Shakespeare's works constitute exceptional summaries of sixteenth-century understandings of this concept. In Shakespeare's plays, imagination is often inevitably connected with those negative ideas previously discussed and referring to false assumptions and misleading and untrustworthy thoughts with no counterpart in reality. In Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, for instance, when Prince Hamlet is giving instructions to the actors who will perform "The Mousetrap" (the play with a scene reproducing Claudius's murder of Hamlet's father), Hamlet tells them the following:

> I prithee when thou seest that act afoot,

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[201] Of course, not all critics would agree with my position: Stillman (2002) states that Sidney never acknowledged the poet as a maker of Ideas, but rather sees the Idea in close relationship with the poet's erected wit, very likely as something innate, and which would explain the connection between the poet and the divine Maker, and the special features of "the mind's own divine essence" (Stillman 2002, 380). On his part, DeNeef argues that Sidney's conception of the Idea is closer to Ficino than to any other of the Italian thinkers – "even though, we must insist, no direct Ficinian influence need be assumed" (DeNeef 1980, 172). DeNeef bases his argument partly on Sidney's analogy between the poet (maker) and God (Maker), the fact that "teaching can remind us of those Ideas which are natural to, innate in, the memory" (DeNeef 1980, 172), and Sidney's statement that Ideas can be "benumbed by lack of use" (DeNeef 1980, 172). Sidney's agreement with Ficino's thoughts would also imply that Sidney viewed the Idea in the human mind as less perfect than the "original" idea given the "fall" or degradation from its divine source by its contact with the body. Furthermore, in a way, it would be an imitation from the divine original. Likewise, the wording in a text of the fore-conceit also implies some kind of distortion, and consequently, the Ideas that form or awaken in the audience's mind would not completely coincide with those of the poet. In other words, "the reader can never discover the poet's Idea, or even his own innate Idea, *in* the text", and so, "Truth is always behind and beyond the text" (DeNeef 1980, 172-173). Lawrence C. Wolfley has elaborated a list of all the various influences different scholars have identified when explaining Sidney's understanding of "Idea":
The Platonic form of the Good;
Truths of Christian revelation;
Mystical insights into the beauty of divine being;
Images of Man's perfection in Eden, and similarly in the pagan Golden Age;
Universal Aristotelian ethical conceptions, of magnanimity and of the various psychological and behavioral types;
Stoic conceptions of the virtues and vices;
The Four Cardinal Virtues and the Seven Deadly Sins;
Theophrastian "characters";
Ciceronian models of political and oratorical virtue. (Wolfley 1976, 230)

> Even with the very comment of thy soul
> Observe my uncle. If his occulted guilt
> Do not itself unkennel in one speech
> It is a damned ghost that we have seen
> And *my imaginations are as foul*
> As Vulcan's stithy.[202]

Hamlet's "imaginations" would ultimately refer in this case to his visions of the ghost of his deceased father. Indeed, the reason why Hamlet devices "The Mousetrap" is to make sure that the ghost of his father, who accuses Claudius of his murder and of usurping the throne, and who vehemently asks Hamlet to avenge him, is telling the truth. If "The Mousetrap" proves the honesty of the ghost and the veracity of his story, then, it is also confimed that the ghost is trustworthy and not a mere imagination of Hamlet's mind. On the contrary, if Claudius's semblance gives no sign of guilt, it may follow that the ghost's story is false, and that the ghost himself is nothing but an envoy from the devil who wishes to make Hamlet commit a mortal sin in order to condemn his soul and drag it to hell. In this context, "imaginations" are tremendously loaded with negative and even devilish connotations. Likewise, in a passage in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, Page asks the character of Mister Ford "What spirit, what devil suggests this imagination?"[203], again calling 'imagination' to a senseless and shocking thought inspired by a devil or an evil spirit. Later on in the same play, the word 'imaginations' refers to both irrational dictates of a heart driven by jealousy, and ideas not at all based on reality but solely located in the brain of, again, the character of Mister Ford:

> Mrs. Ford: If you find a man there, he shall die a flea's death.
> Page: Here's no man.
> Shallow: By my fidelity, this is not well, Master Ford. This wrongs you.
> Evans: Master Ford, you must pray, and *not follow the imaginations of your own heart*. This is jealousies.
> Ford: Well, he's not here I seek for.
> Page: No, *nor nowhere else but in your brain.*[204]

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[202] (Shakespeare 2006, 301-302)
[203] (Shakespeare 1997, 103)
[204] (Shakespeare 1997, 121-122)

In *The Second Part of King Henry IV*, Shakespeare furthermore establishes another link between imagination and irrationality by affirming in the context of the discussion of the pitiful "yong Hotspurres case, at Shrewsbury" that "great imagination" is "proper to madmen":

> [yong Hotspurres] who lined himself with hope,
> Eating the air, and promise of supply,
> Flatt'ring himself in project of a power
> Much smaller than the smallest of his thoughts,
> *And so with great imagination,*
> *Proper to madmen*, led his powers to death,
> And, winking, leaped into destruction[205]

In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, this connection between imagination and madness, devils, spirits and poets is explored in detail in the following conversation between Hippolyta and Theseus, which seems to draw upon Huarte's thoughts on the workings of the human mind:

> Hippolyta: 'Tis strange, my Theseus, that these lovers speak of.
> Theseus: More strange than true. I never may believe
> These antique fables, nor these fairy toys.
> *Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,*
> *Such shaping fantasies*, that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> *The lunatic, the lover, and the poet*
> *Are of imagination all compact:*
> One sees more devils than vast hell can hold;
> That is the madman: the lover, all as frantic,
> Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt:
> The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
> *And as imagination bodies forth*
> *The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen*
> *Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing*
> *A local habitation and a name.*
> *Such tricks hath strong imagination,*
> That if it would but apprehend some joy,
> It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
> Or, *in the night, imagining some fear*,
> How easy is a bush suppos'd a bear![206]

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[205] (Shakespeare 1989, 80)
[206] (Shakespeare 1983, 103-104)

Lastly, imagination for Shakespeare seems to become a necessary requirement on the part of the audience in order for it to be gripped by the story and consequently enjoy the play. For instance, the famous opening speech of *King Henry V* demands spectators to use their imagination to maximize the suspension of disbelief and travel in time and space to the circumstances surrounding the action of the play:

> …Can this cockpit hold
> The vasty fields of France? Or may we cram
> Within this wooden O the very casques
> That did affright the air at Agincourt?
> Oh, pardon: since a crooked figure may
> Attest in little place a million,
> And let us, ciphers to this great account,
> *On your imaginary forces work*.
> Suppose within the girdle of these walls
> Are now confined two mighty monarchies,
> Whose high uprearèd and abutting fronts
> The perilous narrow ocean parts asunder.
> Piece out our imperfections with your thoughts.
> Into a thousand parts divide one man,
> *And make imaginary puissance*.
> Think when we talk of horses that you see them
> Printing their proud Hooves I'th' receiving earth,
> *For 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings,*
> *Carry them here and there; jumping over times,*
> *Turning th' accomplishment of many years*
> *Into an Hour-glass*. For the which supply
> Admit me Chorus to this history,
> Who, Prologue-like, your humble patience pray,
> Gently to hear, kindly to judge our play.[207]

Otherwise, the refusal of the audience to actively collaborate by employing their imaginations when watching a play, or the company's inability and lack of skill to facilitate the audience in that imaginative effort to momentarily immerse into the play's storyline, results in dramatic catastrophe. The following extract from *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in which Hippolyta and Theseus attend the terrible performance by a low-standard company illustrates how a bad representation can disconnect the spectator's imaginations and, therefore, how these are utterly unable to enjoy the play:

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[207] (Shakespeare 1992, 71-72)

> Hippolyta: This is the silliest stuff that ever I heard.
> Theseus: The best in this kind are but shadows; and *the worst are no worse, if imagination amend them*.
> Hippolyta: *It must be your imagination then*, and not theirs.
> Theseus: *If we imagine no worse of them than they of themselves, they may pass for excellent men…*[208]

Comparing the occurrences and use of both 'invention' and 'imagination' in Shakespeare, we can extract an interesting conclusion: the word to refer to the activity and labour of the poet or playwright is 'to invent', while the action required by the audience when watching a play is 'to imagine'; hence, Shakespeare thought that the poet chiefly invented rather than imagined. From this, it can be furthermore deduced that while everyone possesses the mental power of imagination and can imagine, only poets have invention and, thus, it is just them that can invent works of literature.

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[208] (Shakespeare 1983, 116)

Conclusions

It has been my claim throughout the previous pages that poetical invention occupies a transitional step between the classical concept of literary *mimesis* and the powerful Romantic notions of literary imagination and originality. The conceptual richness of 'invention' no doubt lies in its intermediary position and on the fact that it condenses many of the complexities of Renaissance poetics. But now that the history of the concept of invention in the sixteenth century has been explored, the question of what happens with it and with the concept of imagination in the following century emerges. Although I do not intend in this final heading to carry out a thorough analysis of the occurrences of these terms in seventeenth-century literary texts, I believe it is worthwhile to discuss how both invention and imagination were employed by some of the major authors and thinkers of the seventeenth century, namely, Francis Bacon, Ben Jonson, Thomas Hobbes, John Dryden, and John Locke[1].

In Ben Jonson's posthumously published *Timber; or, Discoveries Made upon Men and Matter*, Jonson affirms that "In writing there is to be regarded the invention and the fashion", and that invention "ariseth upon your business whereof there can be no rules of more certainty, or precepts of better direction given, than conjecture can lay down,

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[1] The scholar Ullrich Langer comments on the changes suffered by the concept of invention during the seventeenth century by drawing on sources different from mine (he focuses on, among others, Baltasar Gracián and Emanuele Tesauro). Langer remarks on two different phenomena. On the one hand, he notes "an increased emphasis on the faculty of the *ingenium*, as the capacity to manipulate language in such a way that novel relationships are created between things of the world" (Langer 2000, 141). As a result, "This emphasis displaces the focus of invention from the finding of things, or subject-matter, to the finding of words, especially metaphors" (Langer 2000, 141). On the other hand, Langer believes that poetic invention is gradually "severed from its roots, sometimes associated in the seventeenth century with the production of poetic tricks, conceits, and 'marvels', and finally transformed into something entirely unrelated, poetic 'creativity'", while at the same time rhetoric becomes "mainly the art of embellishment, of tropes and figures", thus losing "the epistemological-mnemonic import that invention had always guaranteed to the orator and the poet" (Langer 2000, 143).

from the several occasions of men's particular lives and vocations"[2]. In other words, Ben Jonson understands that invention, coming up with the subject matter or topic of one's writings, obeys no rules: that is, the precepts and teachings of the rhetoricians are of no use for the literary author, who is left alone with his own "conjecture" when it comes to devising the matter of his works. John Dryden, already at the end of the seventeenth century, continues highlighting the central role of invention in the process of literary composition in *A Parallel between Painting and Poetry* (1695):

> The principal parts of Painting and Poetry next follow. *Invention is the first part, and absolutely necessary to them both*; yet no Rule ever was or ever can be given how to compass it. A happy Genius is the gift of Nature: it depends on the influence of the Stars, say the Astrologers; on the Organs of the Body, say the Naturalists; 'tis the particular gift of Heaven, say the Divines, both Christians and Heathens. *How to improve it, many Books can teach us; how to obtain it, none; that nothing can be done without it, all agree:*
> *Tu nihil invitâ dices faciesve Minervâ.*
>   *Without Invention a Painter is but a Copier, and a Poet but a Plagiary of others. Both are allow'd sometimes to copy and translate; but as our author tells you, that is not the best part of their Reputation. Imitatours are but a servile kind of Cattle*, says the Poet; or at best the Keepers of Cattle for other men: they have nothing which is properly their own; that is a sufficient mortification for me while I am translating Virgil. *But to copy the best Author is a kind of praise*, if I perform it as I ought; as a Copy after Raphael is more to be commended, than an Original of any indifferent Painter.
>   *Under this head of Invention is plac'd the Disposition of the Work, (to put all things in a beautifull order and harmony, that the whole may be of a piece).* The Compositions of the Painter shou'd be conformable to the Text of Ancient Authors, to the Customs, and the Times. And this is exactly the same in Poetry; Homer, and Virgil are to be our guides in the Epique; Sophocles, and Euripides, in Tragedy: in all things we are to imitate the Customs, and the Times of those Persons and Things which we represent: Not to make new Rules of the Drama, as Lopez de Vega has attempted unsuccessfully to do; but to be content to follow our Masters, who understood Nature better than we. But if the Story which we treat be modern, we are to vary the Customs, according to the Time and the Country where the Scene of Action lies: *for this is still to imitate Nature, which is always the same, though in a different dress.*[3]

It becomes apparent in Dryden's words that invention takes precedent over any other quality of the good painter and poet. Without invention, Dryden believes, no one

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[2] (Jonson 1860, 760). Note the similarity of this quotation with John Hoskins's definition of invention in *Directions for Speech and Style*: "In writing of letters there is to be regarded the invention and the fashion. For the invention, that ariseth upon your business, whereof there can be no rules of more certainty or precepts of better direction given you than conjecture can lay down of all the several occasions of all particular men's lives and vocations" (Hoskins 1935, 4).

[3] (Dryden 1989, 61-62)

can expect to achieve great things, as painters and poets will reach the peak by copying previous artists –and, of course, imitators necessarily remain below the level of perfection of their models. Invention is for Dryden a natural quality that a man either possesses or completely lacks from his birth, and even if invention can be learned through manuals written by experts and through the imitation of renowned models, without natural inventiveness the doors to fame will always remain shut. Just as Ben Jonson, Dryden places the emphasis upon the natural skills of the poet, upon his genius, while he deems limited the value and usefulness of preceptive works. Copiers, plagiarizers, and imitators lay far behind the true poet, that is, the one that trusts his own inventive genius and not any other man's. Nevertheless, Dryden's praise of invention is far from undervaluing the worth of imitation, as he still considers it necessary to follow the example of the great models of the past and to respect the literary rules fixed by tradition; thus, Dryden rejects daring proposals such as Lope de Vega's *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias* (1609). In short, for Dryden imitation of nature is the final aim of both literature and painting, and this imitation is best achieved through the poet and painter's invention, which, instead of running loose, should operate within certain formal precepts set by tradition. *Annus Mirabilis* (1667) contains the passage most illustrative of Dryden's views on the role of imagination in poetry writing:

> *The composition of all Poems is or ought to be of Wit, and wit in the Poet, or wit writing,* (if you will give me leave to use a School distinction) *is no other then the faculty of imagination in the writer*, which, like a nimble Spaniel, beats over and ranges through the field of Memory, till it springs the Quarry it hunted after; or, without metaphor, which searches over all the memory for the species or Ideas of those things which it designs to represent. *Wit written, is that which is well defin'd, the happy result of thought, or product of imagination*. But to proceed from wit in the general notion of it, to the proper wit of an Heroick or Historical Poem, I judge it chiefly to consist in the delightful imaging of persons, actions, passions, or things. (…) So then, *the first happiness of the Poet's imagination is properly Invention, or finding of the thought*; the second is Fancy, or the variation, deriving or moulding of that thought, as the judgment represents it proper to the subject; the third is Elocution, or the Art of clothing and adorning that thought so found and varied, in apt, significant and sounding words: *the quickness of the Imagination is seen in the Invention, the fertility in the Fancy, and the accuracy in the Expression.*[4]

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[4] (Dryden 1956, 53)

If Dryden believed that "The composition of all Poems is or ought to be of Wit" and that "wit in the Poet (…) is no other then the faculty of imagination in the writer", then it appears that it is the mental faculty of imagination that is ultimately responsible for the production of poetry; in other words, imagination enables poetry. Curiously, Dryden employs the image of the hunting dog combing memory to explain the workings of the imagination, an image that had already been used in the sixteenth century by authors such as Thomas Wilson to explain the functioning of rhetorical invention understood as a process of finding. However, Dryden does more than adapt old rhetorical images to new poetic categories, for he actually devises a new poetical system built upon, or constructed parallel to, the traditional non-Ramist rhetorical structure. In this manner, if traditional rhetoric was divided into *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria* and *pronuntiatio* or *actio*, Dryden takes imagination as the most general category in poetics and divides it into three parts: invention, "or finding of the thought" –again drawing on, while simultaneously differing from, the traditional understanding of rhetorical invention; fancy, "or the variation, deriving or moulding of that thought, as the judgment represents it proper to the subject"; and elocution, "or the Art of clothing and adorning that thought so found and varied". This definition of imagination highlights the tremendous influence and impact of the discipline of rhetoric upon the understanding and conceptualization of poetry even in the second half of the seventeenth century, while concurrently signaling a transition that would hatch with Romanticism and its extensive praise of imagination.

John M. Aden (1959) has carried out a detailed study of Dryden's use of the terms invention, imagination, fancy, wit, and humour, effectively tracing and discussing the occurrences of these words in Dryden's production up to and through his *Essay of Heroic Plays* (1672). Aden suggests that between 1664 and 1672 Dryden's concept of literary creation changed and developed towards more pre-Romantic positions. A later study by Robert D. Hume (1970) focuses on the same topic but in Dryden's subsequent

production, thus continuing Aden's conceptual research. Hume demonstrates that the development Aden identified as taking place at the beginning of Dryden's career eventually stopped, and instead of asserting "the autonomy of the fictive imagination", Dryden finally "moves back toward a scheme which emphasizes 'judgement' and correction more than it does free creativity" (Hume 1970, 295). For instance, Hume remarks that the *Dedication of the Aeneis* (1697) contains Dryden's last significant comment on 'imagination' as such:

> And whereas *Poems which are produc'd by the vigour of Imagination only, have a gloss upon them at the first, which Time wears off*; the Works of Judgment, are like the Diamond, the more they are polish'd, the more lustre they receive. Such is the difference betwixt Virgil's *Aeneis*, and Marini's *Adone*.[5]

According to Hume, this passage "should not be taken as meaning that Dryden has turned against imagination and proposes to create with judgement alone. The passage comes at the end of a denunciation of bad taste and showy 'wit': Dryden objects to production by imagination alone, and insists that its products must be subjected to severe scrutiny and correction by judgement"[6]. Furthermore, Hume observes that with time the term 'invention' becomes more frequent and important for Dryden, and "as Dryden moves away from his more psychological discussions of creation, 'invention' tends to replace imagination or fancy as the first term in the creative process"; interestingly, such a change parallels Dryden's "shift in subject from his own writings to the work of others"[7]. For instance, in *The Preface to Fables* (1700), Dryden discusses a tripartite poetic scheme based on invention/manners/expression. In the quotation below discussing Ovid and Chaucer, Dryden contrasts these two authors in terms of their invention, stressing once more that invention is an individual activity that cannot be delegated to anybody else, and that, if one does not possess it, he is forced to use another man's:

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[5] (Dryden 1697, Hh2ʳ)
[6] (Hume 1970, 307)
[7] (Hume 1970, 308)

> Both writ with wonderful Facility and Clearness; *neither were great Inventors*: For Ovid only copied the Grecian Fables, and most of Chaucer's Stories were taken from his Italian Contemporaries, or their Predecessors. (...) *Both of them built on the Inventions of other Men*; yet since Chaucer had something of his own, (...) I may justly give our Countryman the Precedence in that Part...[8]

James Engell in fact considers it remarkable that Dryden assigns imagination this "larger and richer sense" already by the 1660s, as from Engell's perspective, it was the Enlightenment that created the current idea of the imagination, which eventually occupied the centre of an expanding network of concepts such as genius, poetic power, originality, and individuality[9]. Still, as Michael Mack notes, "Although the idea of human creativity reaches its full flourishing in the romantic period, it is the Renaissance that bears witness to its birth"[10]. In this respect, David Quint claims that a tension exists between two contrary movements in Renaissance literature: on the one hand, a feeling of "epistemological anxiety, heightened by nostalgia, in the task of depicting a source which sanctioned what were otherwise 'counterfeit,' purely man-made fictions"[11]; and, on the other, the Renaissance incipient recognition of human creativity as a value, which means the definition of "the individuality of the creator in historical terms"[12]. Quint affirms that by the end of the Renaissance there occurred a shift in literary values that both demonstrated and contributed "to a general secularization of culture"[13], which in its turn led to "the appreciation of a purely literary originality" in which the writer

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[8] (Dryden 1700, B1^r-B2^v)

[9] (Engell 1981, 173). Engell effectively claims that "the imagination, as understood in the Romantic period and as we still understand it today, was actually the creation of the eighteenth century" (Engell 1981, vii). James Engell localizes the phrase "the creative imagination" in the 1730s, and says that by 1780 it had become "an ideal to believe in wholeheartedly, a goal, a state of mind or being toward which to aspire" (Engell 1981, vii-viii). Furthermore, this critic views it as an umbrella term gathering previously employed words for literary criticism or referring to literary creation: fervor, divine inspiration, enthusiasm –while at the same time efforts were made to draw a line between imagination and "fancy" (Engell 1981, viii).

[10] (Mack 2005, 157)

[11] (Quint 1983, x)

[12] (Quint 1983, x). In contrast, in the Middle Ages fictional texts were taken as extensions of the sole source of truth: the Holy Scripture, and even during the Renaissance Erasmus's *The Praise of Folly* (1511) still relied on the authorizing source of Christian values and doctrine. Indeed, *The Praise of Folly* views "counterfeit meaning" as "a form of idolatry" in which "man worships his own creations rather than his Creator" (Quint 1983, 8), and the book's satire concentrates "upon a creativity that is not grounded in the Word of God" (Quint 1983, 20).

[13] (Quint 1983, 22)

valorises his own individuality and novel contributions[14]. As Quint explains, the image of the river and the source or fountainhead in Virgil's *Fourth Georgic* can illustrate this debate over the authoritative origins of a text and ideas of originality. The source, which is prior to the river, is the place from which the river emanates. Concurrently, the river inevitably distances itself from its source, is in permanent flux, and becomes something different from the source[15].

Francis Bacon has been considered the first spokesman of modern science and philosophy and the father of the inductive method, with his popularity peaking during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries[16]. Bacon believed that a new historical era was

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[14] (Quint 1983, 213-214). Similarly, François Rigolot argues that "Renaissance literature has gradually relinquished its claims to an allegorical source of authorized or revealed truth, and moved steadily away from models of exemplarity toward legitimizing an independent system of historically grounded analogies" (Rigolot 1998, 562). Ullrich Langer, however, understands the Renaissance drive towards originality and individuality within the theological sphere, deeply grounded in scholasticism. Langer in this manner states that "the cultural paradigm for individual 'creation' in medieval and Renaissance society" was "God's creation and conservation of the world" (Langer 1990, 86).

[15] David Quint identifies a two-directional movement in this: "away from the source to the original self-expression and historical identity of its author, back to the source and its authorized truth" (Quint 1983, 24).

[16] For example, Carson S. Duncan, whose work explores the satire that appears in English literature of the 17th and 18th century against the new science, believes that the so-called "new science" was the result of an impulse coming "from the influence of four men, two foreigners and two Englishmen, Galileo and Descartes, Bacon and Harvey. When Galileo made his telescope and saw the proof of the Copernican theory, there was introduced the fundamental new principle, –namely, the application of mechanical apparatus to the solution of the problems of natural philosophy. (…) To Bacon is attributed the inductive method for scientific research (…).To him is due, then, the working hypothesis –the inductive method–, wherein a long and careful process of experimentation and observation must precede the drawing of conclusions.

The third element was furnished by Descartes. He was a mathematician as well as a philosopher, and hence could bring mathematical accuracy and precision to the aid of philosophical thinking. His great service, therefore, lay in his reducing to formulae the facts gleaned from experiment and observation. (…) He also joined forces with Bacon against the power of ancient authority. (…)

Harvey's chief influence was due to his achievements. Trained in the new scientific methods under Fabricius at Padua and filled with an enthusiasm for discovery, he returned to England to apply with clear-sightedness and commonsense the new principles to physiological research. The result was that he startled the learned world and stimulated intellectual curiosity with his discovery of the circulation of the blood" (Duncan 1972, 1-3).

However, in contrast with this view, "For some present-day epistemologists, Bacon was a spokesman for a hopelessly naïve induction by enumeration, and had thus nothing to do with the development of modern science. In striking contrast, the Frankfurt School criticized Bacon for being the very epitome of the modern scientific domination of nature and humankind" (Peltonen 1996, 1). Indeed, "According to Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and other representatives of the Frankfurt School, Francis Bacon was precisely the opposite – the symbol of what science has been up until now and should no longer be: the impious will to dominate nature and tyrannize mankind" (Rossi 1996, 43). Paolo Rossi also reminds us that "that which we call science (in the form in which *we* know it) did not exist in the first half of the seventeenth century. The two great historic processes which gave life to *our* science, and which the

ahead, that traditional philosophy had to be refuted, and that contemplative science had to be replaced by an active science. For this, a new classification of knowledge was imperative, as well as new methods of acquiring knowledge. Bacon indeed "wanted to replace the Aristotelian image of science as a contemplation and organization of eternal truths long since discovered with a conception of science as a discovery of the unknown. More importantly, he wanted to unite the rational and empirical faculties, theory and practice, and to create a truly active or operative science"[17]. Unlike Aristotle, Bacon opposed jumping from empirical particulars to the first principles (axioms) that formed the premises of deductive reasoning. Instead, Bacon thought that the most general axioms should be the end and not the beginning of scientific inference, and that knowledge rises from lower propositions to general ones, so that it gradually becomes less empirical and more theoretical.

Francis Bacon discusses at length both invention and imagination in several of his works. In "Of the Proficience and Advancement of learning, divine and moral", Francis Bacon carries out a strict classification of the "Arts Intellectual" in four groups: "ARTE of ENQVIRIE or INUENTION: ART of EXAMINATION or IVDGEMENT: ART of CVSTODIE or MEMORIE: and ART of ELOCVTION or TRADITION", for, as Bacon explains, they are "diuided according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for mans labour is to *inuent* that which is *sought* or *propounded*: or to *iudge* that which is *inuented*; or to *retaine* that which is *iudged*: or to *deliuer* ouer that which is *retained*"[18]. It is when discussing the "arte of enqvirie or inuention" that Bacon distinguishes between two types of invention, "much differing": the invention of Arts and Sciences, on the one hand, and that of Speech and Arguments, on the other. The invention of Arts and Sciences Bacon reports "deficient": "which seemeth to me to be such a deficience, as if in the making of an Inuentorie, touching the State of a defunct, it should be set downe, *That there is no*

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sociologists have called *institutionalization* and *professionalization* of science, took place between the middle of the seventeenth and the middle of the nineteenth centuries" (Rossi 1996, 25).
[17] (Rossi 1996, 14-15)
[18] (Bacon 2000, 107)

readie money"[19]. As for the invention of Speech and Arguments, Bacon says that it "is

not properly an *Inuention*":

> *for to Inuent is to discouer that, we know not, & not to recouer or resummon that which wee alreadie knowe*; and the vse of this Inuention, is no other; But out of the Knowledge, whereof our minde is alreadie possest, to drawe foorth or call before us that which may bee pertinent to the purpose, which wee take into our consideration. *So as to speake truely, it is no Inuention; but a Remembrance or Suggestion, with a Application*: Which is the cause why the Schooles doe place it after Iudgement, as subsequent and not precedent. Neuerthelesse, because wee doe account it a Chase, aswell of Deere in an inclosed Parke, as in a Forrest at large: and that it hath alreadie obtayned the name: *Let it bee called Inuention; so as it be perceyued and discerned, that the Scope and end of this Inuention, is readynesse and present vse of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.*[20]

Thus, from Bacon's perspective, invention proper is the first type he recognizes,

that which applies to Arts and Sciences, which he opposes to the one "of Speech and

Arguments". For Bacon, invention strictly means to discover or to find out what is not

yet known, as, for instance, a law of nature. In any case, Bacon is aware that rhetorical

invention has been traditionally used to denote the retrieval of matter from our general

store of knowledge and the finding of arguments[21]. In fact, within rhetorical invention,

Bacon distinguishes two different types of aids for the orator when finding arguments

for his case: common-places and topics, which in their turn are divided into General

Topics and Special Topics[22]. In addition to extensively talking about rhetoric, Bacon

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[19] (Bacon 2000, 107)

[20] (Bacon 2000, 111-112)

[21] Karl Wallace aptly summarizes Bacon's notion of invention in the following manner: "Bacon's conception of the inventive process is a broad one; it embraces not merely the finding of thoughts and ideas, pure and simple, but also includes the invention of striking analogies and sentences which may be dropped into a speech *in toto*. Invention means also a system of gathering and cataloguing material that it may be easier recovered upon any given occasion. It means, furthermore, a series of questions or topics, the answers to which uncover new knowledge pertinent to the question in hand. In brief, invention denotes, in Bacon's system of rhetorical address, discovering and recovering, the emphasis being placed on the second process" (Wallace 1943, 85).

[22] Karl Wallace narrows down Bacon's understanding of the general Topics to three points: "first, it is a line of investigation applicable to any subject; second, it serves to suggest material which has already been discovered, but which does not immediately fly to present to use; and lastly, it prompts an interrogation of wise men and of books, whereby we may derive from without us facts that have heretofore escaped our observation" (Wallace 1943, 60-61). Moreover, in "so far as the general topic comprises a method whereby the speaker may find facts and ideas that he has otherwise not known, a functional similarity is perceived between Bacon's scientific method of discovery and rhetorical topics. Both seek to invent new knowledge, and consequently the technique of discovery useful in science may, within certain limits, prove advantageous to the practical art of rhetoric. (...) It should be observed again,

also discusses poetry, which he relates and compares to philosophy and rhetoric in positive terms:

> In this third part of Learning which is Poesie, I can report no deficience. For being as a plant that commeth of the lust of the earth, without a formall seede, it hath sprung vp, and spread abroad, more then any other kinde: *But to ascribe vnto it that which is due for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions and customes, we are beholding to Poets more then to the Philosophers workes, and for wit and eloquence not much lesse then to Orators harangues*.[23]

Furthermore, Bacon extensively discusses poetry understood as feigning when talking about the possibility of poetry being, on some occasions, a form of "fained history":

> because the Acts or Euents of true Historie, haue not that Magnitude, which satisfieth the minde of Man, *Poesie faineth Acts and Euents Greater and more Heroicall; because true Historie propoundeth the successes and issues of actions, not so agreable to the merits of Vertue and Vice, therefore Poesie faines them more iust in Retribution, and more according to Reuealed Prouidence, because true Historie representeth Actions and Events, more ordinarie and lesse interchanged, therefore Poesie endueth them with more Rarenesse, and more vnexpected, and alternatiue Variations*. So as it appeareth that *Poesie* serueth and conferreth to Magnanimitie, Moralitie, and to Delectation. And therefore it was euer thought to haue some participation of diuinenesse, because it doth raise and erect the Minde, by submitting the shewes of things to the desires of the Mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bowe the Mind vnto the Nature of things.[24]

Thus, in a Sidney-like manner, Francis Bacon ponders the superiority of poetry over history in explaining past events: while "true Historie propoundeth the successes and issues of actions, not so agreable to the merits of Vertue and Vice", "Poesie faines them more iust in Retribution, and more according to Reuealed Prouidence". Furthermore, poetry adds "more Rarenesse, and more vnexpected, and alternatiue Variations" to plain historical events giving them "Magnanimitie, Moralitie, and (...)

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however, that whereas the new instrument yields knowledge new to mankind, its application to rhetorical invention gives knowledge new only to the speaker" (Wallace 1943, 61). As for the Particular Topic, "like the General Topic, aids the investigator or searcher by recalling to mind ideas and arguments which he had previously unearthed, and by prompting lines of inquiry which will bring forth new material appropriate to the purpose at hand. The Particular Topic, however, differs from the General Topic in that each substantive science, as distinct from the methodological sciences like logic and rhetoric, has a line of inquiry appropriate to it and to no other science" (Wallace 1943, 61).

[23] (Bacon 2000, 75)

[24] (Bacon 2000, 73-74)

Delectation". Francis Bacon in fact divides poetry into three groups: narrative poetry, which he understands as a "meere imitation of History"; representative poetry, or "a visible History", and "an Image of Actions as if they were present"; and allusive or parabolical poetry, "a NARRATION applied onely to expresse some speciall purpose or conceit" that "tendeth to demonstrate, and illustrate that which is taught or deliuered, and this other to retire and obscure it: That is, when the Secretes and Misteries of Religion, Pollicy, or Philosophy, are inuolued in Fables or Parables"[25]. In other words, in *The Advancement of Learning* Bacon classifies poetry into epic, drama, and allegory, a treatment that is extensively discussed in the Latin translation of the book, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, and additionally repeated in *Descriptio Globi Intellectualis*.

If Bacon pays considerable attention to the concept of invention, his views on imagination are even more succulent and elaborated. In the *Advancement of Learning* and the *De augmentis*, Bacon divides all knowledge in three parts: History, Poesy, and Philosophy. Each one is, in its turn, matched with a different mental faculty: History with memory, Poesy with imagination, and Philosophy with reason[26]. Bacon defines poetry and explains its connection to imagination in the following terms:

> POESIE is a part of Learning in measure of words for the most part restrained: but in all other points extremely licensed: *and doth truly referre to the Imagination: which, beeing not tyed to the Lawes of Matter; may at pleasure ioyne that which Nature hath seuered: & seuer that which Nature hath ioyned, and so make vnlawfull Matches & diuorses of things: Pictoribus atque Poetis &c*. It is taken in two senses in respect of Wordes or Matter; In the first sense it is but a Character of stile, and belongeth to Arts of speeche, and is not pertinent for the present. In the latter, it is (as hath beene saide) one of the principall Portions of learning: and is nothing else but FAINED HISTORY, which may be stiled as well in Prose as in Verse.[27]

In this manner, poetry's association with imagination makes poetry freer and allows it to escape from the constrictions of "the Lawes of Matter". Francis Bacon's overt connection between imagination and poetry unquestionably perpetuates the

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[25] (Bacon 2000, 74)

[26] As explained in the *Advancement of Learning* (1605), Bacon distinguishes a total of six psychological faculties: understanding, reason, imagination, memory, will, and appetite –the chief ones being reason, imagination, and memory.

[27] (Bacon 2000, 73)

Renaissance's general view on the workings of the mind, partly inherited from the medieval trilogy of imagination, reason, and memory. Thus, Bacon's ideas on this matter are not very distant from, for example, Stephen Hawes's, who in the *Pastime of Pleasure* (1509) had already associated poetry and imagination in a similar way:

> *It was the guyse, in olde antiquitye*
> *Of famous poetes, ryght ymaginatise*
> *Fables to fayne,* by good aucthoritye
> They were so wyse, and so inventyse
> Theyr obscure reason, fayre and sugratyse
> Pronounced trouthe, under clowdy fygures
> By the invention, of theyr fatall scriptures[28]

The similarity is such that Murray Bunday sees no original contribution on the part of Francis Bacon to the Renaissance theory of poetry. In this critic's own words, "Bacon not only made no original contribution to the theory of poetry, but it is doubtful whether he had any sympathy with the Renaissance views which he repeated"[29]. Furthermore, Bundy states:

> Bacon conceives of himself as the apostle of a civilization achieved by human reason. His view of the poetic imagination, far from anticipating the views of the nineteenth century, is, in reality, the antithesis of those views; and Blake was right when he numbered Bacon among the apostles of reason who had strenuously resisted the claims of the imagination.[30]

Bundy moreover argues that Bacon "turned, with a sigh of relief, [from poetry] to philosophy, from the realm of imagination to that of reason, because he was essentially a rationalist, thinking in terms of prose rather than poetry, consistently glorifying reason, often at the expense of imagination"[31]. To support this thought, Bundy carefully studies Bacon's general attitude towards imagination, and in doing so, finds "with one notable exception, a consistent distrust of the power –the kind of distrust which Sidney

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[28] (Hawes 1554, D1ʳ)
[29] (Bundy 1930a, 254)
[30] (Bundy 1930a, 256)
[31] (Bundy 1930a, 254)

and Puttenham, true defenders of poetry, had been at pains to combat"[32]. From Bundy's perspective, it was only "parabolical poetry" that Bacon was truly interested in "because it was an aspect in which imagination had become truly a handmaid of reason"[33]. Bundy for instance claims that in Book I of the *Advancement of Learning* Bacon associated imagination specifically with natural magic, alchemy, witchcraft, and the pseudo-science of astrology[34]. As a result of Bacon's views on imagination, Bundy concludes that it was in oratory, and not in poetry, that Bacon's interest laid.

The critic John L. Harrison, maintaining more moderate positions, affirms that there is no "reason to think that Bacon commonly expected of Imagination either a vicious inflammation of the passions or the setting of reason at naught"[35], even if Bacon's sympathies may have fallen on the side of rhetoric rather than on poetry's: "for the single reason that poetry was not a science, was not bound to the nature of things, Bacon, although fully appreciating its value, was prepared to leave it pretty much alone even though its face might be turned heavenward"[36] –as in the case of parabolical poetry. Certainly, Bacon assigned rhetoric an important psychological duty: that of applying "Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will": "Rhetorick is sub-servient to the imagination, as Logick is to the Understanding. And the office and duty of Rhetorick (if a man well weigh the matter) is no other, than to apply and command the Dictates of Reason to Imagination, for the better moving of the Appetite and Will"[37]. In other words, if in poetry imagination could work along with reason to produce inventions (even if imagination could sometimes escape the strictest rules of

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[32] (Bundy 1930a, 254)
[33] (Bundy 1930a, 257)
[34] (Bundy 1930a, 255)
[35] (Harrison 1957, 115)
[36] (Harrison 1957, 119)
[37] (Bacon 1674, Z3ʳ). Karl R. Wallace explains more in detail Bacon's understanding of imagination: "notably where he [Bacon] discusses poetry and rhetoric, he speaks of two principal functions of imagination, that of reproducing images made originally by the senses or held in memory and that of creating images either in cooperation with reason or in its own right. These functions are in turn revealed in what Bacon called the 'three kinds' of imagination, 'the first joined with belief of that which is to come; the second joined with memory of that which is past; and the third is of things present, or as if they were present'" (Wallace 1967, 69).

reason), in rhetoric, imagination inseparably worked with reason. Hence, in contrast with the way rhetoric makes use of the imagination (*i.e.*, to implement the dictates of reason), in poetry imagination obeys no law; still, as Bacon anchored the imaginative activity in experience, it did not have absolute freedom, for its raw material was ultimately drawn from sense images. In any case, Bacon did not demonize the imagination, for he admitted that it not only served reason but could moreover function as an instrument of faith and a means for God to communicate directly with men:

> *in matters of faith and religion our imagination raises itself above reason*; not that divine illumination resides in the imagination; its seat being rather in the very citadel of the mind and understanding; but that *the divine grace uses the motions of the imagination as an instrument of illumination*, just as it uses the motions of the will as an instrument of virtue; which is the reason why religion ever sought access to the mind by similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams.[38]

Other critics such as O. B. Hardison side with Bundy and adopt rougher views towards Bacon's notion of poetry and imagination. From Hardison's viewpoint, to Bacon "poetry was a product of imagination, and imagination was, in turn, a fantasy-producing organ unless rigidly controlled by reason. Pure poetry is thus deceptive or, at best, trivial amusement"[39]. Hardison explains his opinion further in the following terms:

> When controlled by reason, poetry can usefully make clear the lessons of the moral philosopher, but in such a case the work is a mixture of 'philosophy,' which gives it validity, and 'poetry,' which is merely pleasing decoration. The result of the Baconian view was to deprive poetry of much of the prestige which it enjoyed during the sixteenth century. Not until the imagination itself was redefined by Kant and Coleridge was the Baconian thesis effectively challenged. In the meanwhile, the genres of epic and tragedy became all but extinct, while such 'reasonable' poetic forms as verse essay, satire, and comedy flourished.[40]

In contrast with Bundy and Hardison's criticism of Francis Bacon's understanding of imagination, Brian Vickers laments that "we are still told that Bacon hated the

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[38] Quoted in (Wallace 1967, 84).
[39] (Hardison 1967, 10)
[40] (Hardison 1967, 10-11)

imagination, distrusted drama, or fiction, or poetry"[41]. Indeed, despite any possible distrust of imagination, evidence shows that in the *Advancement of Learning* (1605) Bacon considered imagination as one of the main psychological faculties along with reason and memory. Certainly, I believe that it is not by chance that the spread and rise of the concept of imagination in the field of poetics coincides with the establishment and strengthening of the pillars of empiricism and modern science with the thought of fundamental figures such as Francis Bacon. Even if Murray Bundy and other scholars are right in their assertions of Bacon's preference of reason over imagination, his limitation in compiling the already extant medieval and Renaissance thoughts on imagination (even preserving the prejudices of his time against this faculty of the human mind), we should bear in mind that imagination was nonetheless very present throughout Bacon's works and given a degree of importance equal to memory and almost on a par with reason. One cannot deny that, even if Bacon preferred reason, did not add anything new to the concept of imagination, and replicated prejudices and extant widespread distrust, he did acknowledge imagination as an unavoidable and essential mental faculty that could not only serve as a means of divine illumination and heavenly communication with man, but that was also indispensable for human thought and understanding. As such, imagination unquestionably deserved a prominent position in Bacon's groundbreaking explanation of the sciences.

Finally, other relevant studies on Bacon and his idea of the imagination include the discussion around imagination and Bacon's political views. Todd Wayne Butler connects the conceptual study of imagination with English seventeenth-century politics, stating that "As a precursor to belief and action, the imagination could do more than generate paintings and poetry. It could build and unmake governments"[42]. Butler asserts that in the seventeenth century "matters of image and power were marked by the

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[41] (Vickers 1992, 498). Brian Vickers has additionally studied Bacon's idea of rhetoric in "Bacon and Rhetoric", *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon*. Markku Peltonen, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 200-231). Moreover, Vickers is the author of the very complete *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
[42] (Butler 2008, 3)

recognition that while the acceptability of partisan images or texts might depend on one's political or confessional stance, the common process by which all human beings formed and pursued political agendas was necessarily born not only of reason but also of the imagination"[43]. In fact, Butler's first chapter is entirely dedicated to treating Bacon's idea of imagination and its impact upon political theory. According to Butler, imagination appears in Bacon's writings

> not as a static mental faculty but as a powerful mechanism that might both enhance and subvert authority. Wariness and fascination exist side-by-side in Bacon's readings of the imagination, as the faculty's mediatory role between reason and the passions grants it a profound yet often ill-directed influence over the course of human action. In Bacon's works, the imagination becomes intimately associated with human desires, which act not only as potentially destabilizing forces in an individual or society but also as the very means by which regulative authority may be enforced and maintained.[44]

However, "When properly functioning, Bacon contends, the imagination presents to reason images of the truth and to action images of goodness, thus matching the receiving faculty's capacity with the most appropriate object. Imagination thereby becomes a crucial mechanism for the transmission of authority; it is the pathway by which human desires are brought to heel"[45].

The scholar Donald F. Bond discerns two distinct groups of authors of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that have opposing ideas regarding the faculty of the imagination: on the one hand, "Those who set up an ideal of abstraction as the highest kind of knowing, whether in mathematics or metaphysics, tend to disparage imagination"; on the other, empiricists, "who view knowledge as dealing with aggregates, as beginning with individuals and ending in universals, accord it a much higher position"[46]. Hence, for Bond,

> From the Cartesian standpoint, then, imagination, while of aid in visualizing certain material things, is of little value in the understanding of spiritual natures. Those who attempt to use it in knowing God or the essence of the soul are predestined to failure in

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[43] (Butler 2008, 15)
[44] (Butler 2008, 19)
[45] (Butler 2008, 20-21)
[46] (Bond 1937, 248)

trying to imagine the unimaginable. Descartes' theory of innate ideas was in part an attempt to account for the presence in our minds of these ideas which could not have entered by means of sense or imagination.[47]

Likewise, in England the Cambridge Platonists and various seventeenth-century moralists and divines often disparaged imagination as a part of man's lower soul dependent on the senses. Additionally, rationalists discredited imagining as part of the material realm, while claiming that true ideas were not dependent upon sensory images. In this manner, to rationalist thinkers the imagination appeared as an inadequate means to attain the highest kind of knowledge, and rather considered it as a weight that draws human thought towards a materialistic view of life. In contrast, seventeenth-century empiricists (led by Hobbes) did not disregard the imagination, but saw it instead as a necessary element in the cognitive process. Hobbes abandoned the distinction between the rational and sensitive soul, and hence did not perceive imagination as able to incite the lower soul to revolt against the rational soul. Similarly, in literary terms, in the preface to his translation of the *Odyssey* (1675), Hobbes affirmed that "Elevation of Fancy" "is generally taken for the greatest praise of Heroick Poetry"[48]. Moreover, in his *Leviathan* (1651) and *Elements of Philosophy* (1655-1658), Hobbes recognized the imagination as a profoundly constructive power, and his ideas influenced Locke, Hume, and Burke's empirical approach to imagination. For instance, in the second chapter of *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines the Latin *imaginatio* and the Greek *phantasia* stating that while *imaginatio* refers to the representation of an object no longer present, *phantasia* encompasses all sense impressions and is able to rearrange them:

> For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. *IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping as waking.* (…)

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[47] (Bond 1937, 250)
[48] (Hobbes 1677, A6ᵛ)

> This decaying sense, when we would express the thing it self, (I mean fancy itself,) we call Imagination, as I said before: But when we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that *Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names*.
> *Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experience*. Again, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaur. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of another man; as when a man imagines himself a Hercules, or an Alexander, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Romants), it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind.[49]

Nevertheless, as Engell notes, despite this initial distinction between imagination and fancy, Hobbes ends up using both terms interchangeably. For Hobbes, then, the imagination gives meaning to the information gathered by the senses (chiefly, the sense of sight). In the extract above, Hobbes also closely links imagination and memory (and, consequently, imagination and experience) and additionally distinguishes between simple and compound imagination, the latter being a "fiction of the mind". In his "Answer to Davenant's *Preface before* Gondibert" (1650) Hobbes also talks in positive terms of the imagination (called 'fancy' in the extract) and relates it to the arts, technology, science and philosophy:

> Time and education begets experience; Experience begets memory; Memory begets Iudgement, and Fancy; Iudgement begets the strength and structure; and *Fancy begets the ornaments of a Poeme*. The Ancients therefore fabled not absurdly, in making memory the mother of the Muses. (…) *so farre forth as the Fancy of man, has traced the ways of true Philosophy, so farre it hath produced very maruelous effects to the benefit of mankind*. All that is bewtiful or defensible in building; or meruaylous in Engines and Instruments of motion; Whatsoever commodity men receaue from the obseruation of the Heauens, from the description of the Earth, from the account of Time (…) and *whatsoeuer distinguisheth the ciuility of Europe, from the Barbarity of the American sauuages, is the workemanship of Fancy, but guided by the Precepts of true Philosophy*.[50]

Other critics are more skeptic in attributing imagination a significant role in these three thinkers' philosophical postulates. For instance, Eva T. H. Brann affirms that, for

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[49] (Hobbes 1651, B2^{r}-B3^{v})
[50] (Hobbes 1650, I7^{r}-I8^{r})

Hobbes, Locke and Leibniz "the imagination plays a small role, since they posit cognitive processes that are in no need of a mediating power"[51]. Regarding Hobbes, Brann states that his "account of the imagination in the *Leviathan* (I 2) is as reductionist in theory as it is supple in style"[52]. As for Locke's notion of imagination, Brann affirms that for the British philosopher "sense-impression and image need not be distinguished, because all mental representations are on the same level of interiority"; thus, "image and idea need not be distinguished because all representations are equally perceptual"[53]. Consequently, "the primary source of knowledge, sensation, and the secondary source, reflection, both supply their respective representations in the form of 'ideas'"[54].

In contrast, Donald F. Bond affirms that even if "Locke has little to say directly about the imagination", and despite the fact that the "rather dry, rationalistic temper of his mind inclines him to disparage poetry, romances, and other works of fancy" and that he is "largely concerned with the way in which we receive our ideas and our manner of attaining to truth"[55], "his recognition of imagination as the prime factor in wit and invention entitle him to a position with Hobbes of great influence upon the thinkers of the following century"[56]. Then, according to Engell, Locke

> does not stress the creative and artistic side of the mind's productive power. He does not use the words 'original' or, what was then more common, 'inventive.' He does not talk about genius, nor does he pause to ask how the productive power operates, to give examples, or to delve into psychological particulars. For him, it is enough to state that 'the mind has a power'"[57].

Still, Engell states that "No matter how much Locke denigrates 'imagination' as something largely illusory, fit for little more than recreative 'entertainment,' his stress on the mind's active and free manipulation of simple ideas encouraged other thinkers to develop interest and confidence in the imagination. Like Donald F. Bond, Engell

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[51] (Brann 1991, 78)
[52] (Brann 1991, 78)
[53] (Brann 1991, 79)
[54] (Brann 1991, 79)
[55] (Bond 1937, 261)
[56] (Bond 1937, 264)
[57] (Engell 1981, 19)

highlights the relevant role that British empiricists assigned to imagination in contrast to the French Cartesian school:

> Because of a stress on the five senses and on concrete reality, the empirical school might seem the natural enemy of imagination. But British empiricism escapes the prevailing rationalistic method of Continental thought in the late seventeenth century. This rationalism, found to varying degrees in Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, identifies reason as the highest faculty in the mind and generally discredits the imagination. The empiricists, on the contrary, view the imagination as a power that might replace or compliment 'reason.'[58]

In other words, English neo-classicism occurred at a time of confrontation between, on the one hand, Platonic idealism and the Cartesian rationalist faction proper of French neo-classicism that advocated a dualistic type of psychology which marginalized and undervalued imagination, and, on the other, the empiricist psychology, which took imagination seriously:

> Phantasms were no longer evaluated by an ideal truth, but by the truth or falsehood of the sensations which brought them into existence. To the creative writer imagination meant not only the reproducing of images, but the making of comparisons and the combining of materials into new and hitherto undreamed of situations and characters. Thanks to Hobbes and his followers, the imagination was no longer to be associated merely with error or passion; thanks to both Hobbes and Locke its associative powers were to be studied more intently and more sympathetically. (…) from the beginning English neo-classical critics set a higher value upon imagination as a factor in the production of literature; they were impressed by its spontaneity, its vividness, its range; and they were inclined to accord it an increasingly prominent role in literary creation.[59]

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[58] (Engell 1981, 20). Engell elaborates on this idea in the following terms: "In English thought the imagination becomes less diametrically opposed to reason and more the working partner of reason, the act of reasoning itself, a process so complex that it cannot be broken down into the logical or 'rational' steps of 'method'" (Engell 1981, 20). Descartes's views on the imagination chiefly appear in Rules XII and XIV of the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (1628) and in Meditations II and VI of the *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641). Eva T. H. Brann explains that "the imagination is ordained as the guarantor of the extension/space/body identity. What the mind, and only the mind, can intuit is not space or body, but spatiality and corporeality, that is to say, the essence of body" (Brann 1991, 73). Brann continues explaining Descartes's views on the imagination in the following terms: "The imagination in which the extended substance is to be represented has its seat in a corporeal organ –according to Descartes, the pineal gland. (…) This corporeal imagination has to be conceived as a genuine part of the body, of sufficient magnitude to allow its different parts to assume shapes distinct from one another (Rule XII). The images imprinted on the imagination-organ are 'corporeal ideas,' a notion that goes back to the early Stoics. Descartes's understanding of the term 'idea' is not consistent in this context, since he sometimes denies that ideas are corporeal (…). This organ (…) can receive imprints from the inside, from the mind. (…) Naturally, it can receive external impressions from the outside, from other bodies" (Brann 1991, 73). In this way, imagination for Descartes appears as "the interface between mind and corporeal world" (Brann 1991, 74).

[59] (Bond 1937, 264). W. Jackson Bate discusses the impact of the Cartesian principles of French neo-classicims upon seventeenth-century England: "To the England of the Restoration and the early

In fact, the scholar G. S. Rousseau, who has studied the concept of imagination in the period that goes from 1660 to 1800, ascertains that "Late in the seventeenth century man discovered his imagination"[60]:

> The discovery of the imagination does not imply that man suddenly realized he had one (…) What he did discover – with the help of scientists and philosophers – was that the imagination was a real essence, as material in substance as any other part of the body, and that it therefore could be medically described. An important consequence of this development in physiology is that leading thinkers of the next century deified the new "organ," endowing it alone with the means of salvaging the soul of man while on earth.[61]

Rousseau continues explaining that "Descartes, Hobbes, Malebranche, and, more significantly, Locke toppled an aged empire of thought when, in their various ways, they introduced for the first time in European thought the possibility of a real imagination: substantive, existential, working physiologically through the mechanical notions of the blood, nerves, and animal spirits"[62]. In the field of art and literature, this discovery of the imagination resulted in the rise of non-realistic art and, eventually, of symbolic art, and therefore, in the decline of mimetic art:

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eighteenth century, the mature and sophisticated neoclassicism of France had an irresistible appeal. It gave the English poet a chance to be different from his immediate predecessors while at the same time it offered a counter-ideal that was impressively, almost monolithically, systematized. French neoclassicism appeared to have answers ready for almost any kind of objection to it. And most of the answers had this further support: they inevitably referred – or pulled the conscience back – to the premises of 'reason' and of ordered nature that the English themselves were already sharing, though not perhaps in the same spirit as the French. To dismiss an argument that led directly back to 'reason' was something they were not at all prepared to do. It was like attacking virtue itself" (Bate 1971, 17).

For more on the idea of imagination in seventeenth-century France, see (Maguire 2006), who explores the notion of imagination in French thought from Pascal to Tocqueville. As a sample of the reflections upon imagination gathered in the book, it is illustrative to quote from Pascal's posthumously published *Pensées*, where he affirms the following regarding imagination: "*Imagination*. This is the dominant part of man, this mistress of error and of falsity, and still more treacherous since it is not always so; for it would be an infallible rule of truth if it were an infallible rule of lies. But, being most often false, it gives no mark of its quality, marking the true and the false with the same character" (Quoted in Maguire 2006, 17). Pascal continues in the following terms: "This proud power, enemy of reason, pleases itself in controlling and dominating it, to show how it can in all things establish a second nature in Man. It has its happy persons and its miserable persons; its healthy, its sick, its rich, and its poor. It makes reason believe, doubt and deny; it suspends the senses and it makes them sense [*sentir*]; it has its madmen and its sages; and nothing makes us more vexed than to see that it fills its adherents with another satisfaction entirely more full and complete than reason" (Quoted in Maguire 2006, 18).

[60] (Rousseau 1995, 19)
[61] (Rousseau 1995, 20)
[62] (Rousseau 1995, 21)

as soon as the imagination is acknowledged as real substance containing matter, it may then transform the perceiver's sense of trees and rocks and permit him to represent these materially tangible objects in artistic shapes that are not immediately recognizable. A belief in the physical existence of the imagination implies a belief in psychology –the science of the psyche– and belief in psychology substantially alters the number of possibilities for imitation. If the imagination contains substance and is material, then, like trees, rocks, or drops of water, it may be imitated in art.[63]

In conceiving imagination as a physiological process, Rousseau states that we have to thank "Medical theories of physicians like Sydenham, Willis, Charleton, Hooke, and Boyle", "for without their bold ideas the imagination must have lingered for a longer time in an inchoate state of universal darkness"[64]. In this respect, Rousseau also remarks on the importance of Locke's thought, as "his deepest questions are ultimately physiological": "The imagination, he argued, must exist; observation and induction teach that no two men behold and describe a tree similarly; they cannot and indeed are not capable of expressing it alike or suggesting an identical connotation; therefore, while the tree exists, it is not existential in the sense the imagination is; in fact, the tree can exist only in the eye and imaginative faculty of the beholder"[65].

In this brief study of the evolution of the concepts of invention and imagination in sixteenth and seventeenth-century thought, some essential questions remain to be answered: Why did imagination flourish in the literary discourse from the sixteenth century onwards? What was missing in the sixteenth century concept of poetical invention that favoured the introduction of the concept of imagination when talking about literature? And, what is more, what caused invention to be almost completely superseded by imagination in subsequent centuries? Grahame Castor's answer to the first question is that there was an important element missing in the concept of invention, one which was central to poetry, namely, "the capacity for picture-making and image-forming":

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[63] (Rousseau 1995, 22)
[64] (Rousseau 1995, 23)
[65] (Rousseau 1995, 23)

> During the sixteenth century the Horatian tag 'ut pictura poesis' was very commonly taken to mean that poetry should be a speaking picture. This fitted in with another Renaissance requirement for poetry, that it should be a vivid representation which made the readers (or the audience) feel that they were actually present at the scene described.[66]

For Castor, this would be one of the reasons for imagination to enter the scene despite its association to lies, sin, the passions and the senses: imagination was precisely the faculty able to produce poetic images. Castor thus believes that the solution for including within literary discourse the highly distrusted (though needed) notion of imagination was drawing it closer to the favorably seen concept of invention, and therefore attempting an amalgamation of both[67].

To Castor's argument regarding the importance of the image element in poetry, I would like to add that the introduction of imagination into literary discourse and its expansion in this area signals the rising relevance that studies in the natural sciences and physiology acquired in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was them that anticipated and constituted the breeding ground of modern science and the modern scientific discourse of which Francis Bacon is often regarded as the initiator. The incipient empirical science took experimentation and direct observation of nature as the starting point of all knowledge and understood itself in opposition to the old-fashioned Scholasticism, which asserted that scientific truths ought to be founded upon deductive knowledge, the opinions of consolidated authorities such as Aristotle, and the dictates of divine providence or religious doctrine. This empirical trend gradually gained importance and resulted in the establishment of The Royal Society of London for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge, chartered by Charles II in November 1662, and to which authors such as Dryden were connected[68].

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[66] (Castor 1964, 180)

[67] (Castor 1964, 180)

[68] As Antonio Pérez-Ramos remarks, "The founding of the Royal Society represents both Bacon's deification as a philosopher and the final victory of the Baconian project of collaboration, utility, and progress in natural inquiries" (Pérez-Ramos 1996, 316). As for Dryden's relation to the Royal Society and the new science, both Bredvold (1928) and Claude Lloyd (1930) have studied this matter. As Lloyd remarks, "Dryden entered the university in 1650, and during his sojourn there the Cambridge Platonists

My hypothesis is, then, that the gradual growth of the concept of imagination within literary discourse is, at least partially, the result of this concept's widespread presence in other fields such as the study of the human body and mind following the principles of the new science –as the proliferation of books on the study of the mind such as the ones enumerated in Chapter 6 illustrates. Certainly, the notion of imagination had been present in these domains ever since Classical Antiquity, and was especially relevant in Aristotle's highly influential *De anima*, whose teachings remained a constant throughout the educational system of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The transfer of the concept of imagination from moral philosophy and the study of the human mind to the conceptualization of the process of poetry-writing responds to a growing interest in understanding the manner in which the mind of the poet operates. Leaving the theory of inspiration behind as unsatisfactory and insufficient, many Renaissance authors attempted to apply the inherited views from Antiquity and the Middle Ages regarding the workings of the human mind to the understanding of poetic activity. In this manner, the old question of mimesis and how a work of art relates to the real world began to compete with a rising curiosity towards the mental process of invention and the active, rebellious and potentially dangerous mental faculty of imagination and their role in the first stages of artistic and literary production. In other words, sixteenth-century authors were not only concerned with how the potentially golden realm of art relates to the brazen one of nature, but also with how the poet's

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were developing what was felt to be the philosophical equivalent of the scientific activities at Oxford; but there seems to have been no encouragement of 'natural' philosophy and little interest in it" (Lloyd 1930, 970). Dryden was proposed for membership in the Royal Society on November 12, 1662; on November 19 he was elected, and, on November 26, admitted. Furthermore, Dryden became a member of the committee for improving the English language. From November 1662 and for three years, until December 1665, his name was on the roster of the society, however, since he did not pay weekly dues or the admission fee, his name was eventually removed and does not appear in Sprat's *History* (1667) (Lloyd 1930, 975). According to Bredvold, Dryden's "ideas are closely related to the important movements of his age. He was interested in the Royal Society, understood its spirit, and recognized that he was like minded with it; he understood the new philosophy of motion, vaguely perhaps in its scientific aspects, but with an acute interest in its deterministic implications regarding human nature; and he rejected the dogmatic materialism of Hobbes and Lucretius" (Bredvold 1928, 438). In contrast, Lloyd concludes that in the end "Dryden, it is clear, did not associate himself with the Society; and few, if any, outside the Society itself knew that he had ever had any connection with it. There is little need, therefore, to attempt to reconcile Dryden's 'scientific' beliefs with those of the scientists of his day" (Lloyd 1930, 976).

invention, imagination, fancy, and the zodiac of the poet's wit function in such a way that they are capable of producing a golden world superior to nature's brazen one.

As has been seen, two outstanding terminological transitions in the field of poetics occurred in a relatively short span of time. First, a transition in meaning within the concept of invention by which, in the Middle Ages, invention got immersed in conceptualizations of poetry, and gradually left behind its purely logical and rhetorical implications and its definition as an activity of 'finding' to draw closer to the notion of imagination in the sixteenth-century poetical context. Second, a subsequent shift in approximately the mid-seventeenth century (precisely when modern science began to consolidate) by which the category of invention gradually lost importance before that of imagination, and by which, from the last decades of the eighteenth century onwards, invention was neglected in favor of the all-important Romantic imagination.

Appendices

Appendix 1: *εὑρίσκω* and *εὑρήσεις*

The tables below show the occurrences of the noun *εὑρήσεις* and the verb *εὑρίσκω* (and its compound verbal forms) in the major Ancient Greek works on poetry, namely, Plato's *Phaedrus*, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Aristotle's *Poetics*, Longinus's *On the Sublime*, Demetrius's *On style*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus's *On literary composition*, and Aristophanes's *The Clouds*. As will be seen, neither *εὑρήσεις* nor *εὑρίσκω* are part of the common way of conceptualizing the process of poetry-writing in Ancient Greece. Indeed, none of the two terms is employed systematically by any of the authors to refer to what in the Renaissance became 'poetical invention', even if they have been commonly rendered into English as derivatives of 'invention', 'to invent', 'discovery', 'to discover', or 'to find'. Still, among the more general uses of both words, we find the seeds of the subsequent Latin *inventio* and English 'invention' referred to poetry; these instances are marked with ****** in the first column[1].

1. In *Phaedrus* (Plato 1999)

Nouns:		
**	καὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν **εὕρεσιν** ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων	*And in these the arrangement, not the **invention**, is to be praised; but in the case of arguments which are not*

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p. 438; 236A	τε καὶ χαλεπῶν **εὑρεῖν** πρὸς τῆ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν **εὕρεσιν**	*inevitable and are hard **to discover**, the **invention** deserves praise as well as the arrangement.*
Verbal forms:		
p. 424; 230E	σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον **εὑρηκέναι**	*But you seem to **have found** the charm to bring me out.*
p. 466; 244E	ἡ μανία ἐγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδει απαλλαγὴν **εὕρετο**	*Madness has entered in and by oracular power **has found** a way of release for those in need.*
p. 466, 468; 245A	λύσιν τῷ ὀρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν **εὑρομένη**	*And for him who is rightly possessed of madness a release from present ills **is found**.*
p. 488; 252B	πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα ἰατρὸν **ηὕρηκε** μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων	*For it not only reveres him who possesses beauty, but **finds** in him the only healer of its greatest woes.*
p. 490; 252E	σκοποῦσιν οὖν, εἰ φιλόσοφός τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν **εὑρόντες** ἐρασθῶσι, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὅπως τοιοῦτος ἔσται	*So they seek for one of philosophical and lordly nature, and when they **find** him and love him, they do all they can to give him such a character.*
p. 492; 253A	ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ'ἑαυτῶν **ἀνευρίσκειν** τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν	*And when they search eagerly within themselves to **find** the nature of their god, because they have been compeled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god.*
p. 492; 253B	καὶ **εὑρόντες** περὶ τοῦτον πάντα δρῶσιν τὰ αὐτά	*And when they have **found** such a one, they act in a corresponding manner toward him in all respects.*

p. 528; 264D	καὶ **εὑρήσεις** τοῦ ἐπιπράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, ὃ Μίδᾳ τῷ Φρυγί φασί τινες ἐπιγεγράφθαι	*You will **find** that it is very like the inscription that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.*
p. 534; 266A	ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκεν πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς **ἐφευρὼν** ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησεν μάλ' ἐν δίκη	*And one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it **found** among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled.*
p. 534; 266B	ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δ' αὖ τινα ἔρωτα **ἐφευρὼν** καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπήνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν	*But the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, **found** a love having the same name as the first, but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.*
p. 536; 267A	τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐηνὸν εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος **εὗρε** καὶ παρεπαίνους;	*Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion, who **invented** covert allusion and indirect praises?*
** p. 538; 267B	ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς **ηὑρηκέναι** ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην	*And once when Prodicus heard these inventions, he laughed, and said that he alone **had discovered** the art of proper speech.*
** p. 544; 269B	ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν ᾠήθησαν **ηὑρηκέναι**	*And on this account have thought, when they possessed the knowledge that is a necessary preliminary to rhetoric, that they **had discovered** rhetoric.*
p. 556; 273B	τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφὸν **εὑρὼν** ἅμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἔγραψεν	*Apparently after he had **invented** this clever scientific definition.*

p. 558; 273D	φεῦ, δεινῶς γ'ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην **ἀνευρεῖν** ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δέ ποτ'ὢν τυγχάνει καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὀνομαζόμενος	*Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias **has brought to light**, or some other, whoever he may be and whatever country he is proud to call his own*
p. 558; 273D	τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπίσταται **εὑρίσκειν**	*And we just stated that he who knows the truth is always best able to **discover** likenesses.*
p. 560; 274C	εἰ δὲ τοῦτο **εὕροιμεν** αὐτοί, ἆρα γ'ἂν ἔθ'ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;	*But if we ourselves should **find** it **out**, should we care any longer for human opinions?*
p. 560; 274D	τοῦτον δὲ πρῶτον ἀριθμόν τε καὶ λογισμὸν **εὑρεῖν** καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν	*He it was who **invented** numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy.*
p. 562; 274E	μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον **ηὑρέθη**	*For it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have **discovered**.*
p. 562; 275A	οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλ'ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον **ηὗρες**	*You have **invented** an elixir not of memory, but of reminding.*
p. 570; 277C	περί τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διιδὼν καὰ ταὐτά, τὸ προσαρμόττον ἑκάστη φύσει εἶδος **ἀνευρίσκων**	*And in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must **find out** the class of speech adapted to each nature.*
p. 572, 574; 278A-B	δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον υἱεῖς γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐὰν **εὑρεθεὶς** ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα εἴ τινες τούτου ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν	*That such words should be considered the speaker's own legitímate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be **found** there, and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of*

		others.

2. In *Art of Rhetoric* (Aristotle 2000)

Verbal forms:		
I.2.2, p. 14	ὥστε δεῖ τουτῶν τοῖς μὲν χρησάσθαι τὰ δὲ **εὑρεῖν**	*Thus we have only to make use of the former, whereas we must **invent** the latter.*
I.4.3, p. 38	μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἕως ἂν **εὕρωμεν** εἰ ἡμῖν δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι	*For our examination is limited to **finding out** whether such things are possible or impossible for us to perform.*
I.4.8, p. 42	ἀλλ'ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοι **εὑρημένων** ἱστορικὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν	*But in view of advising concerning them it is further necessary to be well informed about what has been **discovered** among others.*
I.5.17, p. 58	ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν πάρα λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὁ δ'**εὗρεν**, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχε τὸ βέλος	*Fortune is also a cause of those goods which are beyond calculation; for instance, a man's brothers are all ugly, while he is handsome; they did not see the treasure, while he **found** it.*
I.9.38, p. 102	καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον **εὕρηται** καὶ κατεσκευάσθη	*And if it is for his sake that distinctions which are an encouragement or honour have been **invented** and established.*
I.13.19, p.	καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς	*And the reason why arbitrators **were***

148	**εὑρέθη**, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύῃ	*appointed* was that equity might *prevail*.
I.14.4, p. 148	καὶ δι'ὃ ζητηθῇ καὶ **εὑρεθῇ** τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα	*Or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have been sought and* ***found***.
II.19.14, p. 268	ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται **εὑρεῖν**	*As Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were unable by himself to* ***find out*** *what Euthynus had learnt [with the help of others].*
** II.20.7, p. 276	εἰσὶ δ'οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν **εὑρεῖν** ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾷον	*Fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage that, while it is difficult to* ***find*** *similar things that have really happened in the past, it is easier to invent fables.*
III.17.10, p. 456	ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥᾷον **εὑρεῖν** ἀπόδειξιν	*And when one has a starting-point, it is easier to* ***find*** *a demonstrative proof.*

3. In *Poetics* (Aristotle 1999)

Verbal forms:		
** p. 74; 1453b	λέγω δὲ οἷον τὴν Κλυταιμήστραν ἀποθανοῦσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τὴν Ἐριφύλην ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος, αὐτὸν δὲ **εὑρίσκειν** δεῖ καὶ τοῖς παραδεδομένοις	*I mean, e.g., Clytemnestra's death at Orestes' hands, and Eriphyle's at Alcmaeon's, but the poet should be* ***inventive*** *as well as making good use of traditional stories.*

	χρῆσθαι καλῶς	
** p. 78; 1454a	ζητοῦντες γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τέχνης ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τύχης **εὗρον** τὸ τοιοῦτον παρασκευάζειν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις	*In their experiments, it was not art but chance that made the poets **discover** how to produce such effects in their plots.*
p. 86; 1455a	καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεοδέκτου Τυδεῖ, ὅτι ἐλθὼν ὡς **εὑρήσων** τὸν υἱὸν αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται	*Also in Theodectes' Tydeus, the reflection that having come to **find** his son he was doomed himself.*
p. 86; 1455a	οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ᾽αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις **εὑρίσκοι** τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι τὰ ὑπεναντία	*In this way, by seeing things most vividly, as if present at the actual events, one will **discover** what is opposite and not miss contradictions.*

4. In *On the sublime* (Longinus 1999)

Nouns:		
1.4, p. 162	καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς **εὑρέσεως** καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὐδ᾽ἐκ δυεῖν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τῶν λόγων ὕφους μόλις ἐκφαινομένην ὁρῶμεν	*Again, experience in **invention** and the due disposal and marshalling of facts do not show themselves in one or two touches but emerge gradually from the whole tissue of the composition*
Verbal forms:		
8.2, p. 182	καὶ γὰρ πάθη τινὰ διεστῶτα ὕψους καὶ ταπεινὰ **εὑρίσκεται**, καθάπερ οἶκτοι λῦπαι φόβοι	*For one can **find** emotions that are mean and devoid of sublimity, for instance feelings of pity, grief, and*

		fear.
9.5, p. 186	τίς οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ μεγέθους ἐπιφθέγξαιτο, ὅτι ἂν δὶς ἐξῆς ὀφορμήσωσιν οἱ τῶν θεῶν ἵπποι, οὐκέθ᾽**εὑρήσουσιν** ἐν κόσμῳ τόπον;	*So supreme is the grandeur of this, one might well say that if the horses of heaven take two consecutive strides there will then be no place **found** for them in the world.*
9.10, p. 192	ὡς πάντως τῆς ἀρετῆς **εὑρήσων** ἐντάφιον ἄξιον, κἂν αὐτῷ Ζεὺς ἀντιτάττηται	*Hoping thus at the worst to **find** a burial worthy of his courage, even though Zeus be ranged against him.*
16.3, p. 226	καίτοι παρὰ τῷ Εὐπόλιδι τοῦ ὅρκου τὸ σπέρμα φασὶν **εὑρῆσθαι**	*True, the germ of the oath is said to **have been found** in Eupolis.*
18.1, p. 232	**εὑρήσει** τὰ σαθρὰ τῶν Φιλίππου πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος	*Why, the mere course of the war will **found out** the weak spots in Philip's situation*
23.2, p. 242	φημὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς οὐ μόνα ταῦτα κοσμεῖν, ὁπόσα τοῖς τύποις ἑνικὰ ὄντα τῇ δυνάμει κατὰ τὴν ἀναθεώρησιν πληθυντικὰ **εὑρίσκεται**	*In the category of number, for example, not only are those uses ornamental where the singular in form is **found** on consideration to signify a plural-take the lines.*
27.3, p. 250	καὶ οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν χολὴν οὐδ᾽ὀργὴν ἔχων **εὑρεθήσεται** ἐφ᾽οἷς ὁ βδελυρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀναιδὴς βιάζεται	*And will none of you **be found** to feel anger and indignation at the violence of this shameless rascal*
36.2, p. 278	μᾶλλον δ᾽οὐδὲ πολλοστημόριον ἂν **εὑρεθείη** τῶν ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἥρωσι πάντη κατορθουμένων	*Of the true successes **to be found** everywhere in the work of these heroes.*
44.7, p. 302	οὐ δὴ ἔχω λογιζόμενος **εὑρεῖν**, ὡς οἷόν τε πλοῦτον ἀόριστον	*Indeed, I cannot **discover** on consideration how, if we value*

	ἐκτιμήσαντας	*boundless wealth.*

5. In *On style* (Demetrius 1999)

Verbal forms:		
11, p. 354	οὐ γὰρ ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἡ περίοδος **εὑρίσκεται**	*No longer is there any **trace** of the period.*
** 130, p. 428	χρῆται δὲ αὐταῖς Ὅμηρος καὶ πρὸς δείνωσιν ἐνίοτε καὶ ἔμφασιν, καὶ παίζων φοβερώτερός ἐστι, πρῶτός τε **εὑρηκέναι** δοκεῖ φοβεράς χάριτας	*Charm is also used by Homer sometimes to make a scene more forceful and intense. His very jesting adds to the terror, and he seems to have been the first **to invent** the grim joke.*
134, p. 432	τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ Ξενοφῶντι δοκεῖ πρώτῳ **εὑρῆσθαι**	*This secret seems to have been **discovered** first by Xenophon.*
134, p. 432	Λαβὼν γὰρ ἀγέλαστον πρόσωπον καὶ στυγνόν, τὸν Ἀγλαϊτάδαν, τὸν Πέρσην, γέλωτα **εὗρεν** ἐξ αὐτοῦ χαρίεντα	*Who took the gloomy and sombre figure of the Persian Aglaitadas and **exploited** him for a charming joke.*
** 140, p. 436	καίτοι ἡ ἀναδίπλωσις πρὸς δεινότητας μᾶλλον δοκεῖ **εὑρῆσθαι**, ἡ δὲ καὶ τοῖς δεινοτάτοις καταχρῆται ἐπιχαρίτως	*Repetition, it is true, is thought to have been **invented** more particularly to add forcé but Sappho exploits even the most forceful features for charm.*
162, p. 448	πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦται χάριτες ἐκ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν **εὕρηνται**	*The charm in all of these **comes from** hyperbole.*
275, p.	καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ῥήτορσι δὲ πολλὰ	*Many similar examples may be **found***

506	ἄν τις **εὕροι** τοιαῦτα	*in the orators.*
** 298, p. 520	εὐημέρησαν δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τότε **ἐξευρεθέντες** τὸ πρῶτον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐξέπληξαν τῷ τε μιμητικῷ καὶ τῷ ἐναργεῖ καὶ τῷ μετὰ μεγαλοφροσύνης νουθετικῷ	*This type of speech was very successful at the time it was first **invented**, or rather it stunned everyone by the verisimilitude, the vividness, and the nobility of the ethical advice.*

6. In *On literary composition* (Dionysius of Halicarnassus 1985)

Verbal forms:		
** 3, p. 24	οὕτω κἀνταῦθα οὐδέν ἐστι προὔργου λέξιν **εὑρεῖν** καθαρὰν καὶ καλλιρήμονα, εἰ μὴ καὶ κόσμον αὐτῇ τις ἁρμονίας τὸν προσήκοντα περιθήσει	*So here too it is pointless to **devise** pure and elegant expression unless one adorns it with the proper arrangement.*
3, p. 30	πάλαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποις **ἐξεύρηται**, ἐξ ὧν μανθάνειν δεῖ	*Long ago men **established** good principles, from which we should learn.*
** 4, p. 46	ταύτης μὲν τῆς πραγματείας ἀπέστην, ἐσκόπουν δ'αὐτὸς ἐπ'ἐμαυτοῦ γενόμενος, εἴ τινα δυναίμην **εὑρεῖν** φυσικὴν ἀφορμήν, ἐπειδὴ παντὸς πράγματος καὶ πάσης ζητήσεως αὕτη δοκεῖ κρατίστη εἶναι ἀρχή	*I therefore abandoned this enquiry and, asserting my Independence, proceeded to consider whether I could **find** some natural starting-point, since nature is believed to be the best basis of every operation and every enquiry.*
5, p. 54	τίνα δ'ἦν τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι διδάσκειν, ὡς ἂν	*What these principles were I shall try to explain to the best of my ability,*

	οἷός τε ὦ, ὅσα μοι δύναμις ἐγένετο **συνεξευρεῖν**, οὐχ ἅπαντα λέγων ἀλλ'αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα	*stating not all, but only the most essential which I, along with others, **have found** it possible to discover.*
10, p. 70	καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη πλάσματα καὶ γραφὰς καὶ γλυφὰς καὶ ὅσα δημιουργήματα χειρῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρωπίνων ὁρῶσα ὅταν **εὑρίσκῃ** τό τε ἡδὺ ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλόν, ἀρκεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι ποθεῖ	*For the latter, when it views moulded figures, pictures, carvings, or any other human artefacts, and **finds** both attractiveness and beauty in them, is satisfied and desires nothing more.*
12, p. 86	ταύτην δ' οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ πολλάκις γυμνάσαντες ἄμεινον τῶν ἄλλων **εὑρίσκουσιν** αὐτόν, οἱ δ' ἀγύμναστον ἀφέντες σπανιώτερον καὶ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης	*Those who have trained this faculty by applying it frequently to many cases are more successful **in their quest** for good taste tan others, while those who leave the faculty unexercised succeed comparatively seldom, and as it were by good luck.*
15, p. 110	μυρία ἔστιν **εὑρεῖν** παρ'αὐτ τοιαῦτα χρόνου μῆκος ἢ σώματος μέγεθος ἢ πάθους ὑπερβολήν ἢ στάσεως ἠρεμίαν ἢ τῶν παραπλησίων τι δηλοῦντα παρ'οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ἢ τὰς τῶν συλλαβῶν κατασκευάς	*Countless such lines are **to be found** in Homer, representing length of time, bodily size, extremity of emotion, immobility of position, or some similar effect, by nothing more than the artistic arrangement of the syllables.*
16, p. 116	τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὄντα ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ συμβαλλόμενος **εὑρήσεις**	*You will **find** others, of which there are many, when you come to collect material on your own.*
18, p. 136	μυρία τοιαῦτ'ἔστιν **εὑρεῖν** καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι	*And there are countless such passages **to be found** in Plato.*
19, p. 152	ἀμήχανον γὰρ **εὑρεῖν** τούτων	*It is imposible **to find** other writers*

	ἑτέρους ἐπεισοδίοις τε πλείοσι καὶ ποικιλίαις εὐκαιροτέραις καὶ σχήμασι πολυειδεστέροις χρησαμένους	*who have used more digressions, more timely variations, or more figures of different kinds.*
22, p. 182	πολλὰ τις ἂν **εὕροι** τοιαῦτα ὅλην τὴν ᾠδὴν σκοπῶν	*Anyone who examined the ode as a whole **would find** many examples of this kind.*
22, p. 184	τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαιότερα σαφῶς μὲν **εὑρεῖν** διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἀδύνατα ἦν	*Events before this time, and those even more remote, could not be clearly **ascertained** owing to the passage of time.*
22, p. 190	κώλων δὲ περιλαμβανομένων ἐν ταύταις οὐκ ἐλαττόνων ἢ τριάκοντα τὰ μὲν εὐεπῶς συγκείμενα καὶ συνεξεσμένα ταῖς ἁρμονίαις οὐκ ἂν **εὕροι** τις ἓξ ἢ ἑπτὰ τὰ πάντα κῶλα	*And these comprise no fewer than thirty clauses, yet of these not as many as six or seven **will be found to have been composed** in an euphonius or structurally polished manner.*
23, p. 198	καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας ἐπὶ πολὺ τραχυνούσας τὴν εὐέπειαν **εὑρίσκω**	*As for the juxtapositions of vowels, I **find** those ocurring within clauses to be even fewer.*
23, p. 202	φωνηέντων μὲν γὰρ ἀντιτυπίαν οὐκ ἂν **εὕροι** τις οὐδεμίαν ἐν γοῦν οἷς παρεθέμην ἀριθμοῖς	*For no dissonance of vowels can be **found**, at least in the rhythmic clauses I have quoted, not any.*
24, p. 206	τούτων γὰρ ἑτέρους **εὑρεῖν** ἀμήχανον ἄμεινον κεράσαντας τοὺς λόγους	*It is impossible to **find** authors who have been more successful than these in blending the style of their writings.*
25, p. 220	καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐξῆς τούτοις ὅμοια **εὑρεῖν** ἔστι πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνάμεστα μέτρων τε	*For it is possible to **find** similar instances in the clauses that follow these, replete as they are with many*

	καὶ ῥυθμῶν	*varieties of metres and rhythms.*
25, p. 226	ἣν τελευτήσαντος αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν **εὑρεθῆναι** ποικίλως μετακειμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς Πολιτείας ἔχουσαν τήνδε ᾽Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος᾽	*Which they say **was found** after his death, whith the opening words of the Republic arranged in vaious orders ("I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston")*
26, p. 232	ὃ τι μὲν ἂν τῶν ποιημάτων ὅμοιον **εὑρίσκω** τῷ φλυάρῳ καὶ ἀδολέσχῃ, γέλωτος ἄξιον τίθεμαι	*Whatever poetry I **find** resembling this garrulous nonsense, I regard as worthy only of ridicule.*
26, p. 236	ἔπειτ' αὖθις τὸν δ' ἄρ' ἐνὶ προδόμῳ **εὖρ'** ἥμενον οὐ συνεκτρέχον οὐδὲ τοῦτο τῷ στίχῳ	*He **found** him seated at his doorway, where once more the words do no trun out the full coruser of the line.*

7. In *The Clouds* (Aristophanes 1967)

line 561	ἣν δ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖσιν ἐμοῖς εὐφραίνησθ' **εὑρήμασιν**, εἰς τὰς ὥρας τὰς ἑτέρας εὖ φρονεῖν δοκήσετε.	*But for you who praise my genius, you who think my writings clever, ye shall gain a name for wisdom, yea! For ever and forever.*
** line 896	τί σοφὸν ποιῶν; γνώμας καινὰς **ἐξευρίσκων**.	*By what artifice taught? By **original thought**.*

Appendix 2: Emblems

Image 1: *Tutissima comes* **(Peacham 1612, L3ᵛ)**

Image 2: *Pennæ gloria perennis* **(Whitney 1586, b3ᵛ)**

Image 3: *Fit purior haustu* **(Peacham 1612, L2ʳ)**

Fit purior haustu.   68

Image 4: *Vini natura* **(Peacham 1612, Dd2ᵛ)**

Vini natura.

**Image 5:** *Presidium et dulce deciis* **(Peacham 1612, Q1ᵛ)**

Image 6: No passage can divert the Course, of Pegasus, the Muses Horse
(Wither 1635, Q2ʳ)

Image 7: A Vertue hidden, or not us'd, Is either Sloth, or Grace abus'd (Wither 1635, Bb4ʳ)

Appendix 3: Glossary

This final appendix offers a glossary of thirty key terms whose meanings are worth bearing in mind when reading this work. The remarkable absence in the glossary of the term 'invention' is due to the fact that the entire thesis revolves around the investigation of this concept, and, therefore, a definition of it in a single paragraph appears insufficient for my purposes. The brief definitions of the chosen thirty terms are meant to help non-specialists possessing some basic knowledge in rhetoric (and therefore already used to essential rhetorical concepts) through their reading of this work[1]. Below the list of the thirty terms arranged alphabetically, the same appear organized in clusters according to their related meanings, so that their connections are clarified more easily.

aemulatio

art de première rhétorique

art de seconde rhétorique

art poétique

artes poetriae

commonplace books

creation

creativity

eikasia (εἴκασία)

emblem books

enarratio poetarum

eurísko (εὑρίσκω)

fabula

fainomenon (τὸ φαινόμενον)

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[1] For those in need of a general introduction to rhetoric, see, for instance, Albaladejo Mayordomo (1991), Martínez-Dueñas Espejo (2002), and Gunderson (2009).

fantasia aiszetiké

fantasia bouleutiké

fantasma (φάντασμα)

furor poeticus

heuresis (εὑρήσεις)

idea

imaginatio

mimesis

originality

phantasia

plagiary

poétrie

progymnasmata

similis

topoi (τόποι)

wit

***

enarratio poetarum was the analysis and interpretation of renowned authors in Roman schools, where teachers of grammar were in charge of teaching dissemination, interpretation, imitation, and analysis of what we currently understand as literature, which was seen as a preparatory stage to learning of rhetoric. The end of *enarratio* was an overall judgment from an aesthetic viewpoint. It encompassed a commentary of the form, *verborum interpretatio*, and another of the content, *historiarum cognitio*. Latin grammarians' explanation consisted of a quick introduction followed by a detailed commentary of each word and line. It essentially aimed to explain the rhythm of the

verses, difficult terms, and poetical constructions. The exercises employed in *enarratio poetarum* often went beyond the limits of the grammatical concept of correctness, and usually entered a field reserved to the rhetorician.

artes poetriae. The medieval *artes poetriae* were preceptive grammars or rhetorics of versification that advise authors on how to compose poems through rules derived from experience in teaching and analysis. Consequently, the *artes poetriae* primarily taught composition using examples not only to illustrate the theory, but also to propose these examples as models for new texts. Indeed, they were more practical than theoretical in nature, since they did not really offer a disquisition on theoretical principles even if, of course, they were built upon them. Given that teachers of the medieval *artes poetriae* were not rhetoricians but experts on grammar, composition fundamentally consisted in *enarratio* or textual exposition, and textual exegesis, and was studied through the traditional *progymnasmata*.

progymnasmata. Progymnastic exercises were exercises in composition, preparatory to the writing and delivery of declamations, and aimed at training students in *inventio*.

art de première rhétorique. An *art de première rhétorique* focused on prose and not verse, although some of its principles applied to both. It heavily relied upon classical erudition and appeared fundamentally appropriate for the orator.

art de seconde rhétorique. For an *art de seconde rhétorique* poetry could not be taught but versification could instead be learned. These arts were in reality handy manuals full of precepts for the would-be poet.

poétrie. In sixteenth-century France, *poétrie* was a compendium of stories ready for the poet to versify.

art poétique. An *art poétique* in sixteenth-century France was concerned with poetic inspiration, questions about the essence of poetry, its proper subjects, the genres, issues of vocabulary, versification, translations and versions, etc.

fabula. According to W. S. Howell, English literary critics in the Renaissance identified poetry with fable, that is, with the Latin *fabula*, "a narrative of imagined characters taking part in imagined events" which "could be mythical, or legendary, or fictitious, or quasi-historical, or historical", and which could be narrated in "realistic terms, or in terms of romance, or allegory" (Howell 1980, 87).

eurisko (εὑρίσκω). The Greek verb *εὑρίσκω* means 'to discover' or 'to find'.

heuresis (εὑρήσεις) is the Greek noun that corresponds to the Latin *inventio*, which, according to the *Ad Herennium,* was the "devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing" (Cicero 1968, 7; I.2.3.).

topoi (τόποι) corresponds to the Latin *loci*. They are not arguments in themselves but heuristic devices that help supply the orator with material for his speech. Aristotle distinguished two sets of *topoi*: a group of dialectical *topoi* for discussions of philosophical nature, and another of rhetorical *topoi*.

commonplace books were intended to promote copious style, varied diction, and training in amplification of a theme. Commonplace books supplied young students of rhetoric with both ideas and words by collecting excerpts from the classics. They chiefly resulted from "the humanist desire to expedite *inventio* by having at hand massive stores of material for 'imitation', both in content and style"; from "the habit of collecting commonplace material inherited from the middle ages, when *florilegia* and conflated commentaries multiplied beyond anything dreamed of in antiquity"; and

finally, from the humanist doctrine of imitation, which encouraged taking as models expressions or passages written by renowned authors of Antiquity (Ong 1968, 58).

imaginatio has roughly been equated to the Greek word *φαντασία*, which firstly appeared in Greek literature in Plato's dialogues *Theaeletus*, *Sophist* and in his *Republic*. In Aristotle's works, *φαντασία* appears much more frequently, particularly in *De anima*, where it is described as a movement in beings that perceive. For Aristotle, all *phantasia* is connected either with reasoning (confined to man) or perception (common to all animals including man). Later, with Neoplatonism, *phantasia* was, on the one hand, suspicious because, due to its connection to the body, it was thought able to deceive; on the other, it was made an intermediary between sense and intellect, and hence, between the sensual world and the higher realm of forms of thought.

eikasia (εἴκασία). The translation of the Greek *phantasia* as Latin *imaginatio* is problematic according to Bundy, who believes that the term *imaginatio* should have been reserved to render the concept of *εἴκασία* instead. Indeed, for M. Bundy *εἴκασία* is the nearest Greek equivalent to imagination. The term is derived from the verb *εἴκω*, meaning 'to be like' or 'capable of being compared'. Then, "From *εἴκω* comes the noun *εἰκών*, indicating the state of being like, an image, or copy, or likeness. This is synonymous with *εἴδωλον*, often used as a philosophical term, but later coming to have the more restricted meaning of 'statue' or 'idol.' From the basic verb, *εἴκω*, came another verb, *εἰκάζω*, with the conventional ending giving the active force, 'to make like,' 'to copy,' 'to imitate,' 'to portray'" (Bundy 1927, 11).

phantasia was the term used to render the Greek word *φαντασία*, which derives from *φαίνω*, 'to appear', 'to be apparent', 'to come to light'. In pre-Hellenistic literature it typically occurred in passive and middle forms, which has made scholars such as

Schofield assert that "φαντασία has a natural passive tendency in the language as we find it, at odds with the active force of 'imagination'" (Schofield 1978, 116).

fainomenon (τὸ φαινόμενον) is that which appears.

fantasma (φάντασμα) derives from the verb φαντάζω, meaning 'make apparent', 'make show', 'present'. Schofield defines Aristotle's understanding of φάντασμα as "'appearance', 'apparition', 'guise', 'presentation', often with the strong implication of unreality", and often related to ghosts or apparitions in dreams; "Plato, however, more often employs φάντασμα to talk of unreal appearances more generally; he treats it as the abstract noun corresponding to φαίνεσθαι, 'appear'" (Schofield 1978, 117).

fantasia aiszetiké refers to the imagination that cooperates only with perception. Aristotle defined it as the simple impression, a function of the lower soul, common to all animals, and connected with appetite and passion. It

fantasia bouleutiké. It is the deliberative type of phantasy that works with reason, operates in the higher soul, and is the image produced by common sense. Without it there is no thought, and it holds the function of regulating the phantasms of the lower soul. It is a superior type of imagination, for it participates in reasoning and deliberating, and in rational animals it controls the *phantasia aisthetiké*. The deliberative imagination along with the will (*boulesis*) directs the mind when making decisions.

furor poeticus. According to the ancient Greeks, *furor poeticus* is the poetic frenzy and quasi-temporary madness that the poet experiences as a result of the divine inspiration or afflatus that allows him to compose pieces of outstanding literary worth.

wit. In Old English 'wit' referred to the mind, and in the plural alluded to the five senses or mental faculties in general. In the sixteenth century, translators typically rendered into English the Latin voice *ingenium* as 'wit'. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, wit "was particularly associated with rhetorical devices, such as proverbs, maxims, similes, examples, apophthegms, definitions, and set descriptions", which school rhetoricians used for the amplification and embellishment of topics (Crane 1937, 8). As a result, 'wit' became "often almost synonymous with 'mental acumen'", and at times connoted "a flow of ideas and words ample for the development of any topic at length, along with quick comprehension of thought and readiness in answering" (Crane 1937, 9).

idea usually referred in the sixteenth century to philosophy, truth, universals, transcendent values. In the Renaissance there was no agreement on the source of ideas: sometimes they carried connotations of being inherent in the human mind, but others they were connected to the power of human imagination and seen as having an *a posteriori* nature. According to Mack (2005, 56), in the Renaissance the concept of 'idea' was still moving from the divine (*i.e.* the mind of God), to the human realm (*i.e.* the human mind).

emblem books consisted in collections of emblematic pictures, each accompanied by a motto and an explanatory moral exposition typically written in verse. It was during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I that emblem books from the Continent were first introduced into England, where they achieved meteoric popularity.

mimesis. Within the Platonic doctrine of imitation *mimesis* was understood as an image-making faculty that copied an ideal and true realm in the sensible world; within the Aristotelian framework it could be conceived as the copying of human actions in its more general sense, and within the rhetorical context as copying or emulating models.

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There are moreover different classes of imitation according to the imitative model or to the type of relation of likeness established between the model and the copy; that is, the dynamics between the imitated object and the product that results from the process of imitation. *Mimesis* has turned into a synonym of the Latin *imitatio*, despite recent attempts trying to separate the meanings of both terms: maintaining *mimesis* to refer to variation rather than plain imitation, and imitation to refer to mechanical repetition and to a "reproductive movement of repetition-of-the-same" (Muckelbauer 2003, 74).

similis alludes to the willingness to make something or someone similar to a model.

aemulatio denotes an attempt to rival or surpass the model. *Aemulatio* differs from *imitatio* in that the former can show a negative and envious side leading to malice which imitation does not necessarily possess.

creation. According to the *OED*, the term 'creation' appeared in English in the fourteenth century with the primary meaning of "The action or process of creating; the action of bringing into existence by divine power or its equivalent; the fact of being so created". Nevertheless, it would not be until the beginning of the seventeenth century that 'creation' would stand for "An original production of human intelligence or power; *esp.* of imagination or imaginative art". In other words, in its primeval meaning it was a term related to divinity, and it did not allude to an artistic creation by human beings until much later. In this respect, Ullrich Langer states that "The divine analogy both defines the act of human creation and relegates it to a certain status within Creation, emphasizing that, whereas God could create something out of nothing, man, in the medieval view, could only fashion pre-existent material" (Langer 1990, 86).

creativity. According to the *OED*, 'creativity' with the meaning of "The faculty of being creative; ability or power to create" is first recorded in written form in 1659. As

Grahame Castor states, the terms 'creativity' and 'originality' were not used at all in the sixteenth century; originality "did not become the antonym of imitation until the seventeenth century at the earliest, and creativity was not regularly attributed to poets or to poetry until the eighteenth century" (Castor 1964, 5). William Bouwsma (1993) argues that there is in fact a connection between creativity and modernity based on the shift of attributing creativity only to God, to recognizing creative potential in human beings. There are three stages in this transition: firstly, it is denied that human beings can create; secondly, it is admitted but hyperbolically; finally, the use of the term is extended, becomes more vague and, eventually, it is generally accepted that human beings actually create, forgetting that creativity was once a faculty only attributed to God.

originality. The *OED* records the first written occurrences of 'originality' in English as dating from the mid 18th century with the meanings of "fact or quality of being primary, or produced at first hand; authenticity, genuineness", and "an attribute of persons: original thought or action; independent exercise of one's creative faculties; the power of originating new or fresh ideas or methods; inventiveness". Finally, the connotation of "quality of being independent of and different from anything that has gone before; novelty or freshness of style or character, esp. in a work of art or literature" would date from the 1780s.

plagiary. Although it was not until 1709 that the first copyright legislation appeared in England, Joseph Hall is credited with the first recorded use of the English term 'plagiary' in his *Virgidemiarum* (1598), and there were in fact references to 'plagiaries' (*i.e.*, "people who misappropriate texts") already in early seventeenth-century works. The word *plagiarius*, literally 'kidnaper', had been used for the first time by the Latin poet Martial to refer to a literary thief in the epigram *Ad Fidentinum Plagiarium*.

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