university of groningen

UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA

No arguer is an island

An interactional approach to speech acts of arguing

PhD thesis

to obtain the joint degree of PhD of the
University of Groningen and the University of Granada

on the authority of the
Rector Magnificus of the University of Groningen
Prof. J.M.A. Scherpen
Rector Magnificus of the University of Granada
Prof. P. Mercado Pacheco

and in accordance with
the decision by the College of Deans of the University of Groningen.

This thesis will be defended in public on

Tuesday 14 January 2025 at 9.00 hours

by

Amalia Haro Marchal

born on 2 January 1995

Supervisor(s)
Prof. J.A. van Laar
Prof. L. Bermejo Luque

Assessment Committee
Prof. E. Maier
Prof. E. Romero González
Prof. F. Paglieri
Prof. S. Oswald

Editor: Universidad de Granada. Tesis Doctorales
Autor: Amalia Haro Marchal
ISBN: 978-84-1195-737-3
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10481/102883

A Miguel

Contents

Preface

My interest in argumentation theory goes beyond the last three years during which I have worked on this dissertation. My interest in speech act theory quickly led me, thanks to the work of Lilian Bermejo, to explore its application in argumentation theory. This is partly because it seems that there is something unique about the practice of giving and asking for reasons that sets it apart from any other communicative act. And, as someone interested in understanding what we do with our words, delving into a practice as widespread as argumentation is especially interesting.

One of the motivations for this dissertation is the need to account for how the world changes when we argue: what obligations and commitments we acquire, what argumentative moves are legitimized, and how the changes brought about by the practice of arguing differ from those introduced by any other communicative act, while emphasizing the fundamental role the interlocutor plays in the argumentative exchanges. This thesis, therefore, aims to be a modest contribution to the task of examining and exploring these aspects of the practice of argumentation.

Although I have been fortunate to finally work and pursue my doctoral dissertation in such a fertile and kind field as argumentation theory, each step towards this point has had its challenges. As we know, at least in Spain, finding funding to pursue a doctoral thesis is not easy. In my case, after several attempts, I had to seek funding abroad. To do so, I went to Bratislava, where I got a predoctoral grant and was finally able to start my PhD with funding. Nine months later, Lilian offered me

the opportunity to work on a doctoral thesis under her supervision, allowing me to resume and develop my work in the field of argumentation theory. Thanks to this, I have been able to enjoy a predoctoral contract under the program "Ayudas para Contratos Predoctorales para la Formación de Doctores" of the Ministry of Science and Innovation, in the framework of the project *The Justification of Normative Models for Constitutively Normative Practices: Proposals and Applications*, with Lilian Bermejo-Luque and Javier Rodríguez Alcázar as principal investigators.

During the third year of my PhD, I had the opportunity to carry out a research stay at the University of Groningen, under the supervision of Jan Albert van Laar, who, from the very beginning, offered me the possibility of co-supervising my dissertation. This allowed me to pursue my dissertation under a cotutelle arrangement, which has been an enormous enrichment for both my research and my doctoral training.

Doing a PhD, as anyone who has taken this path knows, is not easy. From the constant struggle with your own ideas and those of others, the imposter syndrome lurking at almost every moment, to the days when you would like to shut your computer and never open it again because not a single word comes out. All of these, at least in my case, were challenges that did not stop me from enjoying this journey. I owe this to all the people who have been present throughout this process, but above all to my thesis supervisors, who have always listened to my ideas and encouraged me to develop and defend them, and who, moreover, have always made me feel supported and backed every step of the way.

Prefacio

Mi interés por la teoría de la argumentación no se limita a estos últimos tres años en los que he llevado a cabo esta tesis doctoral. Mi interés en la teoría de los actos de habla rápidamente me llevó, gracias al trabajo de Lilian Bermejo, a interesarme por su aplicación en la teoría de la argumentación. Esto se debe, en parte, a que parece que hay algo en la práctica de dar y pedir razones que es distinto de cualquier otro acto comunicativo. Como alguien interesada en saber qué hacemos con nuestras palabras, profundizar en una práctica tan extendida como argumentar resulta especialmente interesante.

Una de las motivaciones de esta tesis doctoral es la necesidad de dar cuenta de la forma en la que cambia el mundo cuando argumentamos: qué obligaciones y compromisos adquirimos, qué movimientos argumentativos están legitimados, y cómo los cambios que se introducen mediante la práctica de argumentar son distintos a los que se introducen por medio de cualquier otro acto comunicativo; todo ello, además, recalcando la importancia de tener en cuenta el papel fundamental que juega el interlocutor en el intercambio argumentativo. Esta tesis, por tanto, pretende ser una modesta contribución a la tarea de examinar y explorar estos aspectos de la práctica de argumentar.

Aunque he tenido la suerte de, finalmente, trabajar y hacer mi tesis doctoral en un ámbito tan fértil y amable como el de la teoría de la argumentación, cada paso hasta llegar aquí ha tenido sus dificultades. Como ya sabemos, al menos en España, conseguir financiación para hacer una tesis doctoral no es fácil. En mi caso, después

de intentarlo varias veces, tuve que buscar financiación fuera. Para ello, me fui a Bratislava, donde conseguí una beca predoctoral que me permitió empezar por fin el doctorado con financiación. Nueve meses después, Lilian me ofreció la posibilidad de hacer una tesis doctoral bajo su dirección, permitiéndome retomar y desarrollar mi trabajo en teoría de la argumentación. Para ello, he podido disfrutar de un contrato predoctoral en el marco del programa de Ayudas para Contratos Predoctorales para la Formación de Doctores del Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, en el marco del proyecto *La justificación de los modelos normativos para prácticas constitutivamente normativas. Propuestas y aplicaciones*, siendo Lilian Bermejo-Luque y Javier Rodríguez Alcázar los investigadores principales.

Durante el tercer año de doctorado, tuve la suerte de poder realizar una estancia de investigación en la Universidad de Groningen bajo la supervisión de Jan Albert van Laar, quien, desde un principio, me ofreció la posibilidad de co-dirigir mi tesis. Esto me ha permitido hacer mi tesis en régimen de cotutela, lo que ha supuesto un enriquecimiento enorme para mi investigación y también para mi formación doctoral.

Hacer un doctorado, como todo el mundo que haya recorrido este camino sabe, no es nada fácil. Desde la lucha constante contra tus propias ideas y las de los demás, el síndrome de la impostora acechando en casi todo momento, hasta los días en los que a una le gustaría cerrar el ordenador y no volverlo a abrir nunca más porque no le sale ni una palabra. Todo eso, al menos en mi caso, han sido problemas que no me han impedido disfrutar de este camino. Esto se lo debo a todas las personas que han estado presentes a lo largo de este proceso, pero sobre todo a mis directores de tesis, quienes han escuchado mis ideas y me han animado siempre a desarrollarlas y defenderlas, y quienes, además, me han hecho sentir apoyada y respaldada en todo momento.

Agradecimientos / Acknowledgments

Cuando pienso en todas las personas a las que tengo algo que agradecer, la lista empieza a hacerse más y más larga. Recopilar, por tanto, lo más importante de estos años no es tarea fácil, pero eso lo único que refleja es lo afortunada que soy de haber tenido tanto apoyo a lo largo de estos años. Esta tesis es el resultado del gran apoyo, en todos los sentidos, de muchas personas, que me ha permitido trabajar en lo que más me apasiona. A todas las personas que habéis estado conmigo a lo largo de este camino, gracias de corazón.

Me gustaría empezar dándole las gracias a mi directora, Lilian Bermejo, a quien debo, entre otras muchas cosas, el haber tenido la posibilidad de realizar mi tesis doctoral en un ámbito como el de la teoría de la argumentación; un ámbito donde he tenido la oportunidad de desarrollar y presentar mis ideas en contextos que han sido siempre tan productivos como amables. Cuando estaba todavía un poco perdida, Lilian decidió confiar en mí y dirigir mi tesis doctoral, permitiéndome volver a Granada para trabajar en el tema de investigación que realmente me apasionaba y que despertaba mi interés en empezar una carrera académica. Una de las cosas que debo agradecerle es la generosidad que siempre ha demostrado, animándome a confiar y a defender mis propias ideas, ayudándome también a deshacer los enredos conceptuales en los que me he visto inmersa tantas veces, y haciéndome ver siempre que tenían una solución. También me ha permitido ver la profundidad de los problemas filosóficos a los que me he ido enfrentando, y la importancia de ser rigurosa al abordarlos. En los momentos del doctorado en los que la cosa se ponía un poco más

difícil y se apagaban el entusiasmo y las ganas de seguir, Lilian siempre ha conseguido traerlos de vuelta y hacerme ver lo mucho que me gusta trabajar en esto. Su cercanía y su apoyo en todo momento han sido fundamentales para hacer de un proceso como este algo de lo que he podido disfrutar enormemente. Contar con ella como directora ha sido un privilegio. Me siento muy afortunada, y no puedo estar más agradecida.

I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Jan Albert van Laar. Since I decided to do my research stay at the University of Groningen under his supervision, he has always been willing to help me and to collaborate in the supervision of my thesis, and I could not be more grateful for that. During my stay in Groningen, I was lucky to be able to do what I love most, which is to talk and discuss about philosophy; an activity I enjoyed immensely, not only because of the stimulating discussions with Jan Albert, but also because he was able to create a space where I always felt confident to express and defend my ideas, something that can be particularly challenging during the pre-doctoral stage. He has been incredibly generous, offering to work with me and supervise my work even before we knew whether he would officially become my co-supervisor. His genuine interest in my work and the discussions about the ideas I've been developing throughout these years have greatly enriched my research, and I can only express my deepest gratitude for that.

I would also like to express my gratitude to my supervisor during my research stay at the Nova University of Lisbon, Marcin Lewiński. His work has always been a source of inspiration for me. Having the opportunity to discuss with him, as I had the chance to do during my stay and also at conferences over the years, has always been enlightening. He has always been willing to help me, and for that, I am deeply grateful. Furthermore, his research has sparked several ideas that, while not explored in detail in this dissertation, have laid the groundwork for the directions I would like to pursue in future work.

Me gustaría también dar las gracias a Esther Romero, la persona que despertó mi interés en la filosofía del lenguaje durante el grado, y con quien me inicié en el camino de la investigación. Su manera de entender y ejercer la filosofía han sido una referencia constante para mí en estos años. Tuve la suerte de que aceptase dirigir mi Trabajo Fin de Grado y mi Trabajo Fin de Máster, donde pude empezar a trabajar en los temas que luego formarían parte de esta tesis doctoral. Desde entonces, Esther

ha estado siempre acompañándome en este recorrido, ofreciéndome su ayuda y siendo siempre un apoyo, tanto personal como intelectual. Sus comentarios sobre mi trabajo siempre han sido muy enriquecedores y me han ayudado a mejorarlo y a progresar enormemente a lo largo de esta etapa. Pero sobre todo le agradezco de corazón todas sus palabras de ánimo y su apoyo durante estos años.

También quiero dar las gracias a mis compañeros y compañeras del área de filosofía moral, Alberto Molina, Daniel Martin, David Rodríguez Arias, Ester Massó, Gonzalo Díaz, Ivar Hannikainen, Javier Rodríguez, Joan Llorca, Jon Rueda, Jorge Suárez, José Luis Moreno, Lilian Bermejo, Luis Espericueta, María Victoria Martínez, Pablo Neira, Paco Lara, Paloma García, Pedro Francés y Violeta Garrido. Especial mención a Javier Rodríguez, con quien me inicié en la docencia durante del doctorado y quien siempre ha estado dispuesto a ayudarme. Empezar a dar clase no es fácil, pero desde el principio Javier me hizo de guía y confió en mí, no solo para impartir la asignatura que compartimos, sino también para echarle una mano en la dirección de dos Trabajos de Fin de Grado. Muchas gracias, Javier.

No quiero dejar de mencionar y de dar las gracias, en este sentido, a mis alumnas. Vosotras habéis hecho que la etapa doctoral sea más especial y también que se haga más amena. He disfrutado y he aprendido muchísimo en las clases, y eso ha sido gracias a vosotras. Vuestra comprensión y vuestra dedicación me han servido para no dejar de pensar nunca cómo podría hacerlo un poco mejor. Mención especial a Resurrección y Blanca, cuyos TFGs he ayudado a dirigir. Gracias por vuestra paciencia y por permitirme conocer un poco más lo que es el trabajo docente.

Tengo mucho que agradecer también a mis compañeras y compañeros del seminario *ActArg*: Lilian, Carmela, Juan, Enrique, Miguel Ángel y José, con quienes he tenido la oportunidad de leer y discutir sobre argumentación y actos de habla, lo cual he disfrutado enormemente y además ha sido crucial para la elaboración de esta tesis.

Quiero dar las gracias también al resto de personas que me hicieron un hueco cuando todavía estaba en el máster y que me han acompañado durante estos años: Manolo, Neftalí, María José Frápolli y Juan José Acero. Especial mención a Manolo y Neftalí, por quienes me he sentido cuidada en todo momento, y quienes siempre han hecho que sienta que tengo un apoyo si lo necesito. Vuestros comentarios sobre

mi trabajo en estos años me han servido no solo para mejorarlo, sino también para darme cuenta de lo importantes que son las palabras que elegimos para expresar las ideas.

Gracias también a las amigas y amigos con los que inicié mis andaduras como doctoranda y que han sido un apoyo fundamental estos años, Alba, Edu, Llanos, Manu y Xavi. Gracias por todos los momentos que recuerdo con tanto cariño, como los cumpleaños, los congresos, los conciertos de Soto Asa, las noches en el Bar de Nino y en el Rhin Barril o los momentos de risas en el despacho. Especial mención a Manu, que fue la primera persona con la que hablé cuando estaba pensando en hacer un doctorado, y que desde entonces me ha seguido guiando y ayudando en todo, como compañero y también como amigo. Haber podido, además, trabajar contigo ha sido un privilegio. No puedo estar más agradecida. Gracias también a Ana Muros, quien ha estado presente en todas las alegrías de estos años, y quien también ha sido un apoyo en los momentos no tan buenos. Los ratos de cervezas, la ruta fallida por los Cahorros, la visita en Valencia o hablar hasta las tantas mientras tomamos una copa han sido momentos que han hecho de esta etapa algo muy especial. Vuestra amistad es una de las cosas más valiosas que me ha dado el doctorado y el trabajo académico.

Gracias también a mis compañeras y compañeros de despacho, Ana, Andrea, Dani, Enrique, Guti, Gonzalo, Joan, Jorge, Luis, Pablo, Pedro, Victoria, Violeta y Sergio. Especial mención a Enrique, Guti, Violeta, Sergio, Ana y Andrea, con quien he tenido la suerte de compartir buenos momentos también fuera del despacho. Enrique, a ti tengo que agradecerte todas las palabras de ánimo y apoyo a lo largo de estos años. Contigo comparto un camino académico que me ha servido para enriquecer mi propio trabajo y para encontrar siempre a alguien con quien poder hablar de actos de habla. Guti, a ti te debo muchos momentos de humor absurdo y de consejos tecnológicos que me han hecho la vida más fácil. Pero sobre todo tengo que agradecerte tu apoyo y tu comprensión en todo momento. Violeta, en estos años, has sido y eres la amiga que toda persona que está pasando por un proceso como este necesita. Además, compartir contigo la docencia ha sido una de las cosas más enriquecedoras y bonitas de estos años. No quiero dejar de mencionar a Laura Delgado, quien ha sido un apoyo importante durante estos últimos meses. Gracias por tus palabras de ánimo y por ser la persona que da los mejores consejos del mundo.

También quiero dar las gracias a Alba y a Sara, por haberme regalado tantos momentos de risas y por haberme ayudado a retomar el hábito de la lectura. Y gracias también a mi compañero Guillermo Tomás, con quien he tenido la suerte de trabajar en un proyecto que me ha permitido acercarme al trabajo empírico en psicología y adquirir habilidades que han enriquecido enormemente mi propio trabajo.

Gracias también a todas las personas del Granada Gang: Alba, Ana, Andrea, Andrés, Dani, David, Edu, Francesco, José, José Luis, Llanos, Manolo Heras, Manu, Mirco, Nemesio, Palma, Pedro, Tori, Víctor y Xavi, y también a Sara, Lorena y Cris.

También quiero dar las gracias a la comunidad de teoría de la argumentación en España: Cristina Corredor, Hubert Marraud, José Ángel Gascón y Paula Olmos. Especial mención a Cristina Corredor, cuyo trabajo conocí mientras estaba cursando el máster de Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, y de quien aprendí y he seguido aprendiendo tanto desde entonces. Beyond the Spanish community, I would also like to thank Fabio Paglieri and Steve Oswald, who have kindly agreed to write the reports of my thesis necessary for the International Doctorate Mention. Finally, I would also like to thank Katarzyna Budzynska and Marcin Koszowy for giving me the opportunity to collaborate with them in the Laboratory of The New Ethos during these years.

Gracias también a mis compañeras de la SWIP, Llanos Navarro, Alba Moreno, Marina Ortega, María José Frápolli, María José Alcaraz, Marta Jorba y Marga Vázquez, por el trabajo y el esfuerzo incansable en la reivindicación del trabajo y el papel de la mujer en la filosofía.

I would also like to thank the people that gave me an opportunity to start my PhD in Bratislava, Milos Kosterec, Daniela Vacek, Martin Vacek and Mirco Sambrotta. Especial mención a Mirco, quien no dudó en ayudarme desde que llegué allí. Gracias también a las personas que conocí en Bratislava y que rápidamente se convirtieron en amigos, Elia y Lango. Gracias por ser un refugio durante los meses de pandemia donde compartir momentos de alegría, de risas y mucho Tatratea.

También quiero dar las gracias a otras personas con las que he tenido la suerte de coincidir durante mis estancias. Durante mi estancia doctoral en Lisboa, coincidí con Álvaro Domínguez, Manuel Sanchís, Marcia Martínez, Inés Corbalán y Giulia Terzian. Manuel, Marcia, a vosotros os debo muchos momentos de risas y la

maravillosa expresión "melón y al cargo". Inés, Giulia, a vosotras tengo que agradeceros el haber contado conmigo para escribir un artículo, lo que me ha permitido no solo aprender y enriquecer mi trabajo enormemente, sino también disfrutar mucho del proceso. También quiero dar las gracias a José Alhambra, quien me hizo de guía cuando decidí hacer la estancia en Lisboa para después convertirse en un amigo, un compañero de penurias y un apoyo durante estos años. Gracias por acompañarme en los momentos de histeria antes de una charla y un vuelo larguísimo, y en las cervezas de celebración. Sin ti los congresos durante estos años no habrían sido lo mismo. I would also like to thank Bita Heshmati, with whom I have shared great moments during my doctoral stay in Groningen, as well as at the conferences where we've had the chance to meet again.

I would also like to thank my friend Lucija, whom I met during a Summer School in Lisbon in 2022 and since then she has become one of my dearest friends. Lucija, you are one of the best things that academia has given me. I feel incredibly fortunate to have had the opportunity to work with you, which has allowed me to learn and enrich my own work. Also, I've always felt deeply supported and understood by you, and I will never forget the support you've given me during some of the toughest moments of these past years. I've always been able to rely on you, and I am deeply grateful for that.

Mi familia ha sido un apoyo fundamental durante estos años. Quiero dar las gracias especialmente a mis padres, Lola y Manuel, quienes han sido un apoyo fundamental en todos los sentidos durante estos años. Cuando decidí estudiar filosofía, me apoyaron desde el primer momento y sin condiciones. Y hasta ahora han seguido haciéndolo en cada una de las etapas que me han llevado hasta aquí. Tengo que agradecerles su generosidad, que nunca ha tenido límites, y el haberme apoyado y animado a seguir cuando las cosas se han puesto difíciles. Mi madre ha sido siempre para mí un ejemplo de coraje y de fortaleza. Su cariño, su amor por los demás y sus palabras de aliento han sido siempre un consuelo en los momentos más complicados, en los que nunca he dejado de sentirme apoyada. Mi padre ha sido siempre un ejemplo de benevolencia y generosidad. Su comprensión y su capacidad para transmitir calma cuando las cosas se vuelven caóticas y cuesta pensar con claridad me han ayudado a encontrar el camino en los momentos en los que me he sentido perdida.

Nunca voy a poder agradeceros lo suficiente todo lo que habéis hecho y seguís haciendo por mí.

También quiero dar las gracias a mi hermano, Juan, de quien he aprendido mucho durante estos años, y a quien agradezco sobre todo el haber traído a este mundo a mis sobrinos, Mario y Paulo. Siempre os tengo en mente, y ocupáis un espacio muy especial en mi corazón. Gracias por haber llenado mi vida de alegría y de amor incondicional estos años.

Gracias también a mi tío Chico, quien siempre ha estado dispuesto a escuchar mis divagaciones y a ser un apoyo en los momentos complicados. También quiero darle las gracias a mi segunda familia, Maite, Miguel, Jorge y Juan, de quienes siempre recibo tanto cariño. Me siento muy afortunada de teneros en mi vida y, aunque no podamos vernos muy a menudo, siempre os tengo presentes. Gracias por vuestro apoyo durante estos años.

Y gracias a otro miembro de mi familia, mi gato Sócrates, quien no se ha separado de mí ni un segundo en las largas jornadas de trabajo durante los años de doctorado.

Quiero dar las gracias también a mis mejores amigos, Cristina, Javi y Melisa. A todos os debo muchos momentos de alegría, pero sobre todo un apoyo incondicional durante toda mi vida. Cristina, tu energía, tu decisión y tu lealtad son un ejemplo para mí. Nunca has dejado de estar ahí para mí, y siempre has estado dispuesta a sacar un rato si había posibilidad de vernos después de un tiempo. Gracias por tu apoyo y tu cariño durante estos años. Javi, tú me has sabido entender en todo momento durante este proceso, que estás recorriendo también, y contar con tu comprensión y tus palabras de aliento me han hecho mucho más fácil llegar hasta aquí. Melisa, tu cariño y el apoyo que me has dado desde que un día cualquiera nos dio por hacernos amigas han sido una de las cosas más bonitas con las que he podido contar estos años. Gracias por acompañarme en los momentos más complicados. Por vuestros ánimos, vuestro apoyo y vuestros consejos, gracias de corazón.

Miguel, no sé ni siquiera por dónde empezar a darte las gracias. Me has dado tanto durante estos años que es casi imposible ponerlo en palabras. Si he llegado hasta aquí, ha sido gracias a ti. Tú me has animado a seguir y has peleado conmigo cuando parecía imposible ni siquiera empezar este camino. Me has apoyado

incondicionalmente, incluso en los momentos más difíciles para ti. No ha sido nada fácil, pero no has soltado mi mano ni un segundo. Tu constancia, tu capacidad de trabajo, tu forma de pensar y tu pasión por la filosofía han sido un ejemplo para mí todos estos años. Y tu capacidad para ver siempre lo bueno y lo valioso en los demás y donde otras personas no lo vemos es lo que me ha ayudado a no derrumbarme y a sentirme más segura en un entorno en el que constantemente se encuentra una luchando contra el síndrome de la impostora. Tenerte al lado, para mí y para cualquier persona, es un regalo. Esta tesis tiene mucho de ti y de nosotros. Esta tesis son los meses de encierro durante la pandemia (siempre en pisos de 15 metros cuadrados) que, para ser sincera, me supieron a gloria. Son discusiones filosóficas en el balcón o en cualquier bar de Bratislava. Son los sábados yendo a pasear y los domingos yendo a comer al mejor bar de Lisboa. Son los paseos en bici por Utrecht y un viaje más que necesario a Efteling. Pero sobre todo son todos los días en Granada, en nuestra casa. Esta tesis son todos los días levantándonos juntos, subiendo a la facultad, días en los que te ha tocado a ti estar encerrado escribiendo tu tesis, o viendo Aquí No Hay Quien Viva en bucle, jugando a videojuegos, o haciendo algo rico de cenar después de un día difícil, o trabajando en agosto a 40 grados. Esta tesis son estos cuatro años que hemos compartido y en los que has estado ayudándome y apoyándome en todo momento. Si hay algo realmente malo de este trabajo y de este camino es la incertidumbre. No sabemos muy bien cómo acaba esto, ni dónde, ni cuántas mudanzas quedan. Pero tú has sido capaz de hacer que toda esa incertidumbre pase a un segundo plano. Tú eres mi hogar, y haces de cada lugar que compartimos un hogar. Esta tesis nos ha visto comprometernos y organizarlo todo en medio de todo el caos, lo cual, lejos de ser una carga, en los momentos más difíciles me ha servido para recordar lo afortunada que soy y para pensar en las cosas buenas que vienen después, como lo es una vida entera contigo. Gracias por ver siempre tanto en mí. Una vida contigo se me queda corta. Te quiero.

Publications

Corbalán, M. I., Haro Marchal, A., & Terzian, G. (2024). Los abogados del diablo hacen varias cosas con palabras. *Revista Iberoamericana De Argumentación*, (Monográfico 1), 37–51.

Haro Marchal, A. (2023). Argumentation as a speech: Two levels of analysis. *Topoi, 42*(2), 481-494.

Haro Marchal, A. (2022). The Speech Act of Naming in Fictional Discourse. *Studia Semiotyczne*, *36*(1), 119-133.

Summary

Since the second half of the 20th century, argumentation theory has been shaped by a growing interest in natural language argumentation. This focus has enabled the field to benefit from conceptual tools drawn from the philosophy of language, particularly from the realm of pragmatics. Among these, speech act theory has had a particularly significant influence on the development of argumentation theory, reflected in two main approaches where this theory plays a central role. In the first approach, speech act theory is used as an analytical tool, where argumentation takes place through the performance of speech acts with argumentative functions, but where these acts do not constitute a specific type of speech act. On the other hand, the second approach holds that speech acts do not merely have an argumentative function, but rather that argumentation should be characterized precisely as a specific speech act. The first approach includes proposals developed within the framework of normative pragmatics and the conversational approach to argumentation, while the second comprises two theories that offer models for the analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of argumentation: the pragma-dialectical model, developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation, proposed by Lilian Bermejo-Luque. Both models agree on the need to define argumentation as a type of speech act, formulating the conditions under which an utterance (or set of utterances) counts as an act of arguing. To this end, both Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model adopt a modified version of the Searlean approach to speech acts. However, this approach presents certain problems pointed out by other

proposals in speech act theory, especially those framed within an interactional or normative approach, which emphasize the importance of the social nature of communication and the active role of the interlocutor in the communicative process. These proposals highlight the importance of considering the way in which speech acts modify the normative space of those participating in a communicative exchange.

The aim of this dissertation is to offer a characterization of argumentation as a speech act from an interactional perspective. This approach allows for maintaining the advantages of defining argumentation as a specific type of speech act while simultaneously overcoming the limitations of the Searlean approach. By adopting an interactional perspective, crucial aspects of any communicative exchange, including argumentative ones, are addressed, such as the active role of the interlocutor and not just the speaker in the performance of speech acts of arguing, and the illocutionary effects of these acts, understood as changes in the set of dialectical obligations, entitlements and commitments of those participating in an argumentative exchange. These illocutionary effects function as a standard for evaluating the argumentative process and the subsequent dialectical moves. Adopting an interactional approach to characterizing argumentation also allows for addressing certain types of injustices that occur in argumentative exchanges, such as discursive injustice, and offers a more precise characterization of fallacies involving the attribution of commitments, such as the straw man fallacy.

This dissertation is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the topic of this dissertation, outlining the main ideas that will be presented in the following chapters. Chapter 2 presents a state of the art addressing the relationship between speech act theory and argumentation theory, introducing the main proposals that demonstrate the influence of the former on the latter. Key concepts and the most relevant connections between both disciplines are introduced, distinguishing between approaches that focus on the argumentative function of speech acts and those that characterize argumentation as a specific speech act. Chapter 3 presents a second state of the art focused on speech act theory, where both the classical theories of John L. Austin and John Searle, as well as the most relevant interactionist proposals, developed by authors such as Herbert H. Clark, Marina Sbisà, Antonella Carassa and Marco Colombetti, and Maciej Witek, are discussed. Finally, the reasons for adopting an

interactional approach in the characterization of argumentation are presented. Chapter 4 offers a solution to the problems of the Searlean approach adopted by Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation, proposing a distinction between two levels of analysis of the speech act of arguing. This allows for explaining both the active role of the interlocutor in the argumentative exchange and the illocutionary effects produced by the speech acts of arguing. Chapter 5 analyzes the differences in the meaning of the speech act of arguing at each of the two levels of analysis, distinguishing between speaker meaning and the joint meaning of speech acts of arguing. Furthermore, some of the consequences of this distinction for the characterization and analysis of cases of discursive injustice that occur in argumentative contexts are explored. Chapter 6 explores the implications of this distinction for the evaluation of argumentation, especially in cases where there is a gap between what the speaker intends to say and the interpretation by the interlocutor, such as in the case of the straw man fallacy. This will allow for the identification of three scenarios in which this type of fallacy is committed, but where the implications for the evaluation of the argumentation differ. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the main conclusions of this dissertation, along with some lines of future research derived from the proposal developed throughout this work.

Resumen

Las propuestas desarrolladas en la teoría de la argumentación desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX han estado marcadas por un interés creciente en la argumentación en el lenguaje natural. Este interés ha permitido que la teoría de la argumentación se beneficie de herramientas conceptuales provenientes de la filosofía del lenguaje, y en particular, del ámbito de la pragmática. Entre estas, la teoría de los actos de habla ha tenido una influencia especialmente significativa en el desarrollo de la teoría de la argumentación, reflejándose en dos enfoques principales donde dicha teoría desempeña un papel central. En el primer enfoque, la teoría de los actos de habla se utiliza como una herramienta analítica, donde la argumentación tiene lugar por medio de la realización de actos de habla con funciones argumentativas, pero donde no constituyen un tipo específico de acto de habla. Por otro lado, para el segundo enfoque los actos de habla no tienen meramente una función argumentativa, sino que sostiene que la argumentación debe caracterizarse precisamente como un acto de habla concreto: un acto de argumentar. La primera aproximación incluye propuestas desarrolladas en el marco de la pragmática normativa y el enfoque conversacional de la argumentación, mientras que la segunda comprende dos teorías que ofrecen modelos para el análisis, la interpretación y la evaluación de la argumentación: el modelo de la Pragma-dialéctica, desarrollado por Frans van Eemeren y Rob Grootendorst, y el Modelo Normativo Lingüístico de la Argumentación, propuesto por Lilian Bermejo-Luque. Ambos modelos coinciden en la necesidad de definir la argumentación como un tipo de acto de habla, formulando las condiciones bajo las cuales una proferencia (o conjunto de proferencias) cuenta como un acto de

argumentar. Para ello, tanto la Pragma-dialéctica como el Modelo Normativo Lingüístico adoptan una versión modificada del enfoque searleano de los actos de habla. Sin embargo, este enfoque presenta ciertos problemas señalados por otras propuestas en la teoría de los actos de habla, especialmente aquellas de corte interaccional o normativo, que subrayan la importancia de la naturaleza social de la comunicación y el rol activo del interlocutor. Estas propuestas enfatizan la importancia de tomar en consideración la manera en la que los actos de habla modifican el espacio normativo de quienes participan en un intercambio comunicativo.

El objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es ofrecer una caracterización de la argumentación como un acto de habla desde una perspectiva interaccional. Esta aproximación permite mantener las ventajas de definir la argumentación como un acto de habla específico, superando al mismo tiempo las limitaciones del enfoque searleano. Al adoptar una perspectiva interaccional, se abordan aspectos cruciales de cualquier intercambio comunicativo, incluidos los argumentativos, como el papel activo del interlocutor y no solo del hablante en la realización de los actos de argumentar, y los efectos ilocucionarios de estos actos, entendidos como cambios en el conjunto de derechos, obligaciones y compromisos dialécticos de quienes participan en un intercambio argumentativo. Estos efectos ilocucionarios funcionan como un estándar que permite evaluar tanto el proceso argumentativo como los movimientos dialécticos subsiguientes. Adoptar un enfoque interaccional para caracterizar la argumentación también permite abordar ciertos tipos de injusticias que ocurren en intercambios argumentativos, como la injusticia discursiva, y ofrecer una caracterización más precisa de falacias que involucran atribuciones de compromiso, como la falacia del hombre de paja.

Este trabajo se estructura en siete capítulos. El capítulo 1 introduce el tema de esta tesis doctoral, presentando las ideas principales que se desarrollarán a lo largo de los siguientes capítulos. En el capítulo 2 se presenta un estado de la cuestión que aborda la relación entre la teoría de los actos de habla y la teoría de la argumentación, presentando las principales propuestas que demuestran la influencia de la primera sobre la segunda. Se introducen los conceptos clave y las conexiones más relevantes entre ambas disciplinas, distinguiendo entre las aproximaciones que se centran en la

función argumentativa de los actos de habla y aquellas que caracterizan la argumentación como un acto de habla concreto. En el capítulo 3 se presenta un segundo estado de la cuestión centrado en la teoría de los actos de habla, donde se presentan tanto las teorías clásicas de John L. Austin y John Searle como las propuestas interaccionistas más relevantes, desarrolladas por autores como Herbert H. Clark, Marina Sbisà, Antonella Carassa y Marco Colombetti, y Maciej Witek. Para concluir, se presentan las razones para adoptar un enfoque interaccional en la caracterización de la argumentación. En el capítulo 4 se ofrece una solución a los problemas del enfoque searleano adoptado por la Pragma-Dialéctica y el Modelo Normativo Lingüístico de la Argumentación, proponiendo una distinción de dos niveles de análisis del acto de habla de argumentar. Esto permite explicar tanto el papel activo del interlocutor en el intercambio argumentativo, como los efectos ilocucionarios producidos por los actos de habla de argumentar. El capítulo 5 analiza las diferencias en el significado del acto de habla de argumentar en cada uno de los dos niveles de análisis, distinguiendo entre el significado del hablante y el significado conjunto de los actos de habla de argumentar. Asimismo, se exploran algunas de las consecuencias de esta distinción para la caracterización y el análisis de casos de injusticia discursiva que ocurren en contextos argumentativos. En el capítulo 6 se exploran las implicaciones de esta distinción para la evaluación de la argumentación, especialmente en casos donde existe una brecha entre lo que el hablante quiere decir y la interpretación por parte del interlocutor, como en el caso de la falacia del hombre de paja. Esto permitirá identificar tres escenarios en los que se comete este tipo de falacia, pero donde las implicaciones para la evaluación de la argumentación difieren. Finalmente, en el capítulo 7, se expondrán las principales conclusiones de esta tesis doctoral, junto con algunas líneas de investigación futura derivadas de la propuesta elaborada a lo largo de esta tesis doctoral.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In using language, we do many different things: give orders, make promises, ask questions, express gratitude, warning, and so on. The many uses of language also include arguing, that is, giving reasons to justify a claim . Imagine a couple planning their wedding and trying to decide on a date. They are choosing between late June and early September. After weighing the pros and cons, one of them says, "Well, late June is too hot, so maybe we should go with early September". In saying this, the speaker is not merely making assertions; they are also giving their partner a reason to choose the early September date. Ideally, if it is true that in late June is too hot, the speaker is giving their partner a *good* reason for the choice. In other words, they are attempting to show that the claim "we should go with the early September date" is correct; that is, they are attempting to *justify* that claim. Additionally, in the best-case scenario, they will persuade their partner to choose the early September date.

Argumentation is a pervasive form of communication. As such, it can take place in in many different forms and across a variety of contexts: everyday life, political debates, academic and scientific contexts, online discussions, ethical discussions, healthcare decision-making, etc. It plays a crucial role not only in casual conversations, but also in more formal settings, like political discourses, courts of justice, or scientific conferences. Its pervasive character contributes to make it a complex phenomenon, which can be used to legitimate, but also illegitimate purposes. Consider, for example, the following case. Recently, during a rally in Erie, Pennsylvania, on September 29th,

former President Donald Trump once again made his racism and hostility towards immigrants blatantly clear. In his discourse, he explicitly blamed immigrants for the alleged rise in crime rates, as well as Kamala Harris for, according to him, implementing a policy in California during her time as attorney general that allowed thieves to avoid prosecution for stealing items valued under $950. In a particularly outrageous moment of the rally, he said the following:

> […] You see these guys walking out with air conditioners, with refrigerators on their backs. The craziest thing. And the police aren't allowed to do their jobs. […] Now, if you had one really violent day […], one rough hour, and I mean real rough, the word will get out and it will end immediately (The Guardian, 2024).

Here, we find several assertions (e.g., that immigrants "walk out with air conditioners or with refrigerators on their backs"). However, that's not all. Trump is also pointing this out as a reason to justify the use of violence against immigrants. More specifically, he is trying to justify the implementation of a day on which violence can be legitimately used because, according to him, this will put an end to the violence and the robberies committed by immigrants. What we see here is not merely someone uttering what may seem like nonsense; that could suggest that we should not hold him accountable for what he says and does. Rather, his words and discourse show that a reasonable interpretation is that he is arguing for something very significant and dangerous, seeking to justify that extreme measures should be taken against immigrants, using reasons that appeal to fear and prejudice. His claims, of course, are blatantly false; however, when assessing his accountability, it is essential to recognize that he is not merely responsible for putting forward false claims, but also for actively attempting to justify the use of extreme violence against vulnerable sectors of the population.

The study of argumentation, since Aristotle, has been carried out from numerous approaches, including logic, rhetoric, epistemology, and dialectics. While traditionally studied within the domains of logic, in recent decades, scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of studying argumentation as a phenomenon

of natural language[1]. The example above underscores the importance of adopting this sort of approach. From this perspective, argumentation can be seen as a communicative activity through which we present reasons to justify a conclusion, often with different objectives in mind. It enables us to resolve differences of opinion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984), invite the audience to infer the conclusion (Pinto, 2001), increase the audience's adherence to the conclusion (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958) or rationally persuade an audience of the conclusion (Johnson, 2000). These features make it necessary to move beyond the formal structures and consider how arguments are constructed, understood, and evaluated in real-world discourse.

Contemporary approaches to argumentation theory also align with this shift to the analysis of argumentation as a communicative activity. Argumentation theory, as we know it today, emerged in the mid-20th century, largely driven by the work of Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca (1958), Toulmin (1958), and Hamblin (1970). Building on these foundational works, later scholars extended and refined argumentation theory, leading to significant advancements in the field. Among the most outstanding works derived from these are the works of authors such as Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair (1977), Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984) or Christopher W. Tindale (1999). Their work marked a shift in argumentation studies which brought into focus the communicative and pragmatic dimensions of argumentation, situating it as a socially embedded activity that goes beyond formal structures and abstract reasoning, and whose characterization and evaluation involves taking into account the interaction between the speakers and the audience, the contextual aspects in which it takes place, and the normative constraints governing those contexts.

The increasing interest in studying natural language argumentation has brought the field closer to the tools and concepts developed and used in the domain of philosophy of language and, more specifically, of pragmatics. This approach has enriched the study of argumentation, allowing for more nuanced analyses that go beyond formal logic to consider the real-world dynamics of communication. As Bermejo-Luque (2011) points out, everyday argumentation is frequently full of

[1] For a full-fledged outline of the historical development of argumentation theory, see Lewiński and Mohammed (2016) and Bermejo-Luque (2014).

ambiguity, vagueness, non-literal meaning, etc. In other words, it needs to be interpreted. Interpretation, therefore, becomes a crucial task for argumentation theorists, as it allows them "to understand the meaning of the claims involved in argumentative discourses and texts" (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p. 12).

In this sense, as we will explore further, adopting a pragmatic perspective provides a valuable theoretical framework that allows us to explain how argumentation functions as a communicative activity rooted in a social context. This dissertation situates itself within this perspective and aims to contribute to this research tradition.

1.1. The pragmatic approach to argumentation

The intersection of pragmatics and argumentation theory has been extensively explored, as demonstrated by the works of Snoeck-Henkemans (2014) and Oswald (2023). Various pragmatic approaches have proven useful and of great interest to argumentation theorists. These include Grice's theory of implicature and Principle of Cooperation (Grice, 1957, 1975), the relevance-theoretic approach (Carston, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 1986), and the speech act theory. It is the latter that primarily constitutes the conceptual framework of this dissertation. Originally developed by John L. Austin in his seminal work *How to do things with* words (1962), speech act theory focuses on how language is used to perform actions, rather than merely conveying information. This focus on the performative aspects of language (i.e., what speakers do when they use words), provides argumentation scholars with a rich theoretical toolkit for characterizing argumentation from a pragmatic perspective as a communicative social activity.

As we will see in more detail in Chapter 2, the contributions of speech act theory to the study of argumentation can be differentiated depending on the approach taken by argumentation theorists. Broadly, these contributions can be classified into two main types. On the one hand, some argumentation theorists have used speech act theory as a tool to account for the specific argumentative functions that certain speech acts fulfill within particular contexts. For those who adopt this perspective, argumentation is not necessarily viewed as a distinctive speech act. Instead, speech act theory works primarily as an analytical tool that allows argumentation theorists to

provide an explanation of the argumentative function played by several types of speech acts. Noteworthy examples of this approach include the work developed within the framework of normative pragmatics (Jacobs, 1998, 2000; Kauffeld, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001; Kauffeld and Innocenti, 2018; Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022) and the conversational argument approach (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, 1992; Jacobs, 1989). Recent approaches within this tradition have also emphasized the need to address the complexities of natural language argumentative exchanges in real-life contexts, characterized by their polylogical and multi-party nature (Lewiński (2021a, 2021b); Lewiński and Aakhus (2014, 2023). These approaches also highlight the richness and diversity of argumentation in practice, contrasting this to what they refer to as *functionalist* theories of argumentation, which assume that argumentation has an intrinsic goal (Goodwin and Innocenti, 2018).

On the other hand, there are other theorists who have contended that the practice of argumentation exhibits specific characteristics that make it possible (and preferable) characterizing it as a specific type of speech act. Within this framework, two prominent approaches have emerged that offer a systematic model for accounting for both the descriptive and the normative dimensions of argumentation as a specific type of speech act. These approaches are the pragma-dialectical model developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 2004) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation proposed by Bermejo-Luque (2011). These models provide the conditions that must be met for an utterance or set of utterances to *count* as argumentation. Furthermore, they provide the conditions and rules for evaluating argumentation, making it possible to distinguish between good and bad argumentation. Drawing from Pragma-dialectics and LNMA, other contemporary analyses of argumentation as a distinctive speech act have also emphasized the intersubjective and deontic aspects of speech acts of arguing (Corredor, 2021; Labinaz, 2021).

In this dissertation, I will align with those views that characterize argumentation as a specific type of speech act. In my view, this has important advantages. As Bermejo-Luque points out, characterizing argumentation as a speech act in its own rights "allows us to pin down the distinction between argumentation and other types of communicative activities" (2011, p. 54). It allows us to offer a characterization of the

constitutive goal of argumentation that distinguishes it from other forms of communication. The definition of argumentation as a specific speech act emphasizes its primary function as an attempt at justifying a claim. This underscores that argumentation has a distinctive role within communicative exchanges—different from merely asserting, for instance. In treating argumentation as a specific type of speech act, we can formulate specific norms and conditions for evaluating its success regarding its constitutive goal; conditions and norms that are different from those formulated for any other type of speech act. This allows for the development of criteria that focus on whether the act of arguing has been successfully performed, or whether the argumentation put forward is a good means to show the correctness of the claim (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p. 40). In relation to these considerations, the specific view that I will develop throughout this dissertation will focus on the distinct way in which argumentation changes the social context of the participants. More specifically, it will attempt to provide a way to understand acts of arguing as producing effects (in this case, illocutionary effects) that are different from those produced by any other type of speech act.

1.2. The argument

This dissertation aims to contribute to the theory of argumentation by emphasizing the advantages of characterizing argumentation through the philosophy of language, specifically through the field of pragmatics. As previously mentioned, the characterization of argumentation presented throughout this dissertation follows the path initiated by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, and further developed by Bermejo-Luque, where argumentation is conceived as a speech act, distinguishable from other types of acts, and which has a clear-cut communicative goal.

Despite the explanatory virtues of both models, my proposal diverges from theirs in the approach to speech act theory endorsed to characterize argumentation. This is so because the approach they adopt, namely, Searle's (1969) speech act theory, presents important issues that have been highlighted by other perspectives in speech act theory. These problems have to do with the role that Searle's theory assigns to the hearer in communication and the performance of the speech act, as well as its neglect of an illocutionary effect identified by Austin, which Sbisà (2007, 2009a) refers to as

the conventional effect of speech acts. These effects involve the production of changes in the normative positions of the participants, i.e., what Sbisà (2006) calls *Deontic Modal Competence*, which includes the rights, obligations, and entitlements of the agents. The shortcomings of Searle's theory have been pointed out by scholars working within the so-called *interactional* (or *normative*) approach to speech acts (Corredor, 2021). Building on this interactional approach, my main goal in this dissertation will be to elaborate a characterization of argumentation as a speech act that overcomes the issues in Searle's conception. This will allow me to provide an account of speech acts of arguing that takes into account both the active role of the interlocutor in the performance of such acts and the distinctive normative effects that set them apart from other types of speech acts.

The conception of argumentation that I will defend throughout this dissertation is more closely aligned with Bermejo-Luque's Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation. As we will see, the pragma-dialectical model presents several problems, as pointed out by Bermejo-Luque. Unlike van Eemeren and Grootendorst, who offer an ideal model for critical discussion, Bermejo-Luque offers a model capable of handling everyday argumentation, which can occur in any communicative context, including different types of dialogues –not only critical discussions—, and may be guided by various perlocutionary objectives. Given that my interest lies in the interactive nature of argumentation and in natural language argumentation that can take place in any context, I consider that an approach like the one offered by the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation has advantages over the pragma-dialectical model.

The approach developed throughout this dissertation seeks to fulfill both the descriptive and normative tasks associated with the study of argumentation. Regarding the first task, one of the main assumptions of this dissertation is that argumentation is a communicative activity that brings about changes in the set of dialectical obligations, entitlements, and commitments of the participants in the argumentative exchange. It occurs in contexts where there is doubt or a matter of controversy, either for the participants themselves or for an external or potential audience. As a communicative activity, it takes place through the performance of speech acts of arguing. Following Bermejo-Luque's proposal, I will understand these

speech acts as complex second-order speech acts whose constitutive goal is justification.

Although my proposal mainly builds on the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation, it also differs in important ways from it regarding the question of what constitutes argumentation and the conditions for performing the illocutionary act of arguing. In my view, addressing this question requires distinguishing between two levels of analysis. At the first level, in order to determine whether the act of arguing has been successfully carried out, it is necessary to consider only the speaker's utterance and the fulfillment of certain conditions. However, at a second level of analysis, it is also necessary to consider the interlocutor's response. This allows us to determine how the speaker's utterance was interpreted and whether certain illocutionary effects have been produced, (i.e., the production of changes in the set of obligations, entitlements, and dialectical commitments of both parties). As I seek to show, it is the production of these illocutionary effects that distinguishes arguing from any other type of communicative act. In this framework, the conceptualization of the meaning of speech acts used to characterize argumentation is also important. This is so because, as we will see, establishing the meaning of the utterance(s) is what leads to the production of normative effects. In this regard, and to emphasize the interactive and dialectical nature of argumentation, I will distinguish between the speaker's meaning and the meaning jointly constructed by the speaker and the interlocutor within the argumentative exchange.

Regarding the second task, the approach to argumentation as a speech act elaborated along this dissertation also provides criteria for evaluating argumentation; specifically, I will focus on its evaluation from a dialectical perspective. As we will see, the normative effects of the speech act of arguing, once in place, bind both the speaker and the interlocutor to a standard of evaluation, allowing us to determine which dialectical moves are permissible (or what would count as good or bad dialectical moves). In this sense, once the speech act of arguing has been performed and its effects are in place, they function as a regulative device that allows for the evaluation of subsequent dialectical moves carried out by both the speaker and the interlocutor. Good argumentation, as a dialectical process (Johnson, 1996) involving both the speaker and the interlocutor, will be characterized by how the participants fulfill their

respective obligations and entitlements in accordance with the argumentation put forward by the speaker and recognized as such by the interlocutor. Hence, any dialectical move that does not align with the effects produced by the performance of a specific speech act of arguing, with a specific meaning, including additional argumentation, will be evaluated negatively. As we will see in Chapter 6, the interactional approach offered in this dissertation can be effectively applied to the explanation of specific fallacies, such as the straw man fallacy, offering a finer-grained analysis of its pernicious consequences in different scenarios. It also has important consequences for the analysis of injustices that occur in argumentative exchanges, often in the context of power imbalances; a topic that has received extensive attention in argumentation theory (Bondy, 2010; Hundleby, 2013, 2023; Stevens, 2021, 2022; Yap, 2020). As we will see, an interactional approach to argumentation can shed light on the phenomenon of discursive injustice (Kukla, 2014) arising in argumentative contexts, as well as on the analysis of fallacies that, due to the unjust norms in place in power imbalance situations (Hundleby 2013; Stevens, 2021), systematically undermine the ability of members from oppressed collectives to equally partake in argumentative exchanges.

1.3. Structure of the dissertation

The structure of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I explore the intersection between speech act theory and argumentation theory, tracing how insights from pragmatics, especially the work of John L. Austin and John Searle, have shaped contemporary approaches to argumentation. In addition to these, I also discuss recent contributions to argumentation theory. Firstly, I introduce several valuable tools that speech act theory provides argumentation scholars with for analyzing argumentation in real-world discourse (section 2.1.). Secondly, I provide an overview of various approaches to argumentation that draw on speech act theory, distinguishing between approaches that define argumentation as occurring through speech acts with argumentative functions and those that conceptualize argumentation itself as a specific type of speech act. Section 2.2.1. delves into normative pragmatics and other proposals that apply speech act theory to analyze the argumentative function of certain speech acts. Section 2.2.2. outlines the two models that conceptualize argumentation as a

specific type of speech act: Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation. After that, I identify several limitations of these different approaches (section 2.3.). Specifically, I argue that what we need is an account of argumentation as a distinct type of speech act that accounts for the illocutionary effects that argumentative speech acts have on the normative commitments of the participants involved in argumentative exchanges. The chapter closes by introducing the idea that argumentation should thus be understood as a communicative activity that changes the obligations, entitlements, and responsibilities of its participants.

Chapter 3 provides a deeper examination of speech act theory, exploring its theoretical landscape and the various conceptual resources that different accounts provide for the analysis of argumentation. I begin by outlining the foundational theories of speech acts, mainly focusing on the contributions of J.L. Austin and John Searle (section 3.1.). After delving into Austin's theory of speech acts (section 3.1.1.), I outline some of the main criticisms raised against it, such as that offered by Strawson, whose reinterpretation of Austin's account along Gricean lines significantly influenced subsequent approaches (section 3.1.2.). Among these, I will pay special attention to Searle's account, which has significantly influenced speech act theoretic approaches to argumentation (section 3.1.3.). Section 3.2. introduces the interactional approaches to speech acts. I discuss how these approaches address the limitations of Searle's theory, emphasizing the role of the interlocutor and the changes in the normative positions of communicative participants produced by means of speech acts. Specifically, I focus on the accounts elaborated by Herbert H. Clark (3.2.1.), Marina Sbisà (3.2.2.), Carassa and Colombetti (3.2.3.), and Maciej Witek (3.2.4.). Finally, I summarize the central aspects of the interactional approach—namely, its emphasis on the importance of considering the social and context-changing nature of speech acts—and I briefly outline its implications for the study of argumentation, thereby setting the stage for the following chapters (section 3.2.5.).

In Chapter 4, I apply the interactional framework to the analysis of the illocutionary speech act of arguing. The chapter begins by examining the two main approaches that characterize argumentation as a distinctive speech act: the pragma-dialectical approach and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation; specifically, I focus on their shared reliance on the Searlean account of speech acts

(section 4.1.). I then draw from interactional views to point out two main problems with this Searlean account, concerning its neglection of the active role of the interlocutor in the performance of illocutionary acts of arguing and of the normative effects produced by them (section 4.2.). After that, I outline my own solution to these problems (section 4.3.). This consists in the distinction between two levels of analysis of the speech act of arguing; while the first level focuses on the speaker's utterances, the second level considers the communicative exchange between speaker and interlocutor, where both parties play active roles. I will argue for the need to consider both levels of analysis to fully understand the communicative and normative aspects of argumentation, focusing specifically on how this can contribute to extend and complement the characterization of argumentation offered by the Linguistic Normative Model.

Building on this two-level framework, Chapter 5 provides a characterization of the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing at each of these levels. I begin by revisiting the difference between Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation regarding the bearers of the speech act of arguing, as well as the distinction between the two levels of analysis (section 5.1.). I then introduce Carassa and Colombetti's notion of *joint meaning* and discuss how it can be applied to the analysis of speech acts of arguing (section 5.2.). After explaining the details of Carassa and Colombetti's account (section 5.2.1.) and highlighting some controversial aspects of it (section 5.2.2.), I apply it to account for the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing at the two levels of analysis (section 5.2.3.); specifically, I argue that, while the notion of speaker's meaning can account for the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing at the first level (i.e., the level of the speaker's utterances), the notion of joint meaning captures its meaning at the level of the communicative exchange (section 5.2.3). Finally, I consider situations of discursive injustice occurring in argumentative exchanges, showing that the notion of joint meaning helps explaining how such injustices occur and impact argumentative communication (section 5.3.).

Chapter 6 examines the consequences that the gap between what a speaker means and the interlocutor's interpretation poses for the evaluation of argumentation. Specifically, I focus on cases involving commitment attributions, such as the case of the straw man fallacy. In section 6.1., I re-examine some of the key concepts

introduced in Chapter 2 regarding the evaluation of argumentation. Here I emphasize the importance of considering the normative effects produced by illocutionary acts of arguing for the appraisal of argumentation from a dialectical perspective; specifically, I argue that these normative effects function as a regulative device. Section 6.2. then begins by recalling the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation, highlighting how the joint construction of meaning is necessary for these normative effects to come into being. In this sense, the production of the normative effects is not always straightforward; gaps between what a speaker means and their interlocutor's interpretation can affect the production of these normative effects, and consequently the evaluation of argumentation (section 6.2.1.). I then propose that the notion of joint meaning allows us to carry out a finer-grained analysis of the consequences of this sort of gap, taking the straw man fallacy as a case of study. After providing a definition of the straw man fallacy and sketching the different approaches to it (section 6.2.2.), I present three different scenarios in which a straw man fallacy may occur, each illustrating different consequences for the evaluation of argumentation from a dialectical perspective (6.2.3.). The analysis reveals how the creating (section 6.2.3.1.), retaining (section 6.2.3.2.), or taking up (section 6.2.3.3.) of a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation differently affects the construction of joint meaning and the evaluation of subsequent dialectical moves based on the normative effects introduced by it. Throughout this discussion, I comment on how these different scenarios relate to different sorts of injustices often faced by members from oppressed collectives in argumentative exchanges.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I outline the main conclusions of the dissertation. After providing a summary of the dissertation and highlighting its main contributions (section 7.1.), I tentatively explore some possible lines for future research that this work opens (section 7.2.). Here I sketch some further reflections on how an interactional approach to speech acts of arguing can be extended to account for argumentative exchanges in which there are involved more than two parties, and how it can delve into the particular features of injustices occurring in argumentative practices.

Chapter 2

Speech act theory and argumentation theory

As it is well known, the study of argumentation has been approached from various perspectives: from logic to rhetoric, to epistemology or dialectics. The research tradition that this dissertation builds on and aims to contribute to sets aside (at least for some purposes) the formal aspects related to logic, shifting its focus to the analysis of argumentation as a phenomenon belonging to the study of natural language. From this perspective, argumentation is primarily understood as a communicative activity. As such, multiple authors have found in pragmatic perspectives and, more specifically, in the theoretical framework of speech act theory, a useful conceptual toolkit for undertaking the analysis of argumentation.

Speech act theory has its origin in the work of John L. Austin. In his collection of lectures *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), Austin conducts a detailed analysis of the types of things we do with words, as the title suggests. His proposal begins by pointing out that language has traditionally been conceived as a way of transmitting information, of describing facts about the world. This would mean that all our statements are limited to description and, therefore, should be able to be evaluated as true or false. This is what Austin calls the *descriptive fallacy* (1962, p. 3). Contrary to this conception, Austin invites us to think of linguistic communication not only as a means for describing the world, but as a way of *performing* actions—describing being only one possible action among them. In this regard, the most important contribution of Austin's work as received in the literature is the distinction between three aspects of

the "total speech act in the total speech situation" (1962, p. 52), involving the performances of three types of acts: the locutionary act (the act *of* saying something), the illocutionary act (the act performed *in* saying something) and the perlocutionary act (the act performed *by* saying something). For example, if a speaker utters (1)

(1) I promise that tomorrow I will arrive at work early,

they are not only saying something (namely, that they will arrive at work early tomorrow), but they are also performing the act of promising, which will produce certain conventional effects (Austin, 1962, p. 116), such as the obligation to do what they promised to do (Austin, 1962, p. 116). Additionally, it is possible to attribute to the speaker of (1) the perlocutionary act of reassuring the listener through their utterance.

As we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, Austin's proposal has greatly influenced the development of speech act theory. One of the most significant examples is Searle's (1969) account, for whom speech acts are "the basic unit of communication" (1969, p. 16). Searle's proposal, although generally considered as a development of Austin's, introduces important distinctions with respect to his theory. These include, among others, the distinction between *propositional content* and *illocutionary force* of the act, and the consideration of the first illocutionary effect pointed out by Austin (i.e., the securing of uptake; see section 3.1.1) as the essential effect for the successful performance of the act. In addition, based on an intentionalist conception of communication (Grice, 1957), Searle proposes an alternative taxonomy of illocutionary acts (Searle, 1975) and a new list of conditions that must be fulfilled for an illocutionary act to be identified as such and correctly realized.

Speech act theory has significantly influenced the study of argumentation. This influence is particularly strong in approaches that aim to explain and interpret natural language argumentation. This connection between speech act theory and argumentation studies has been thoroughly explored by Snoeck-Henkemans (2014) and Oswald (2023). Snoek Henkemans carries out an in-depth analysis of the intersection between speech act theory and argumentation theory, with a particular focus on insights from speech act theory that have been integrated into the study of

argumentation. She particularly focuses on the contributions of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), as well as on the Gricean theory of conversational implicature. She explores the pivotal role speech act theory has played in shaping the pragma-dialectical approach and other significant frameworks, such as Jacobs and Jackson's conversational approach. In a nutshell, she examines how speech act theory contributes to the analysis of the structure and function of argumentative discourse, emphasizing the relevance and applicability of speech act theory in contemporary argumentation studies.

A more recent and finer-grained analysis of the connection between argumentation theory and speech act theory is the one offered by Oswald (2023). Oswald presents a historical overview on the relationship between pragmatics and argumentation theory (2023, p. 144). Unlike Snoeck-Henkemans, who focuses primarily on the interplay between argumentation theory and speech act theory, Oswald takes a broader approach, highlighting the significant contributions that pragmatic insights (particularly those from speech act theory and inferential pragmatics) have made to the field of argumentation. His work systematically explores how these insights have informed the understanding of the type of contributions that pragmatics made to argumentation theory. Specifically, he focuses on the three key research questions within argumentation theory to which pragmatics has crucially contributed: a) the nature and scope of argumentation, b) normative issues related to the question of when argumentation is good, and c) explanatory issues related to the effects of the argumentation on the audience (2023, p. 145). This broader perspective allows for a more nuanced analysis of how linguistic pragmatic insights have enriched the conceptual and methodological frameworks within argumentation studies.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of this inter-theoretical relationship between argumentation studies and speech act theory, so as to situate the present dissertation and its main intended contributions. The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.1., I will briefly outline some key concepts and aspects at the intersection of pragmatics and argumentation theory, such as the meaning of utterances, the role of commitments and presumptions, and the effects produced by speech acts. These elements are crucial to understanding the proposals discussed throughout this chapter and along this dissertation. In section 2.2., I will present the

main approaches to argumentation that have been strongly influenced by speech act theory. I will firstly introduce the proposals that focus on the argumentative function of speech acts; specifically, I will mainly focus on normative pragmatics (Jacobs, 1998, 2000; Kauffeld, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001; Kauffeld and Innocenti, 2018; Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022), as well as on other approaches such as the conversational argument approach (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, 1992; Jacobs, 1989), and some recent proposals (Lewiński, 2021a, 2021b). Following this, I will present the two models in which argumentation is conceptualized as a specific type of speech act, namely, Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque, 2011). In section 2.3., I will identify some problems in the approaches presented in section 2.2. and provide a rough outline of the solution that I will develop throughout this dissertation. Specifically, I will propose to address these issues by adopting a normative approach to speech acts for the characterization of argumentation as a particular type of speech act. Finally, in section 2.4., I will outline the main conclusions of this chapter.

2.1. The connection between pragmatics and argumentation theory: some intersecting points

As I have previously pointed out, conceiving argumentation as a form of communication or, more precisely, as a communicative activity, is a fruitful starting point for understanding argumentation. This requires considering several aspects intrinsic to any communicative exchange.

As Oswald (2023, p. 145) claims, argumentation, as a form of communication, occurs between at least two parties. This interaction involves an exchange of meaning among its participants. As in any communicative exchange, the production and the recognition of meaning is especially important for argumentative exchanges to be effective. In the case of argumentative communication, establishing the meaning of the communicative acts carried out within the argumentative exchange is part of the interpretation of argumentation. As Bermejo-Luque (2011, p. 12) observes,

> Argumentative communication, as it appears in everyday life, is frequently packed with non-literal meanings, ambiguity, ellipses, vagueness, etc. This

> is why we need to interpret it: we need to know the real meaning of each communicative move. […] Thus, our models for argumentation interpretation should come from special branches of Linguistics or Communication Studies (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p. 12).

In this regard, determining the meaning conveyed by speech acts, whether understood as speech acts with argumentative functions or speech acts of arguing, is crucial for the production and interpretation, but also the analysis and evaluation of the argumentation put forward.

A crucial notion in both speech act theory and argumentation studies is the notion of *illocutionary act.* As previously mentioned, Austin defined this notion as the performance of an act *in* saying something. This type of act involves the production of some effects, which, according to him, must be brought about for an illocutionary act to be considered successful. He distinguishes three illocutionary effects: (i) the securing of uptake, (ii) effects that change the normative facts (i.e., changes in the speaker's and interlocutor's entitlements, expectations, and obligations), and (iii) the inviting of a response (1962, pp. 115-116). This notion has greatly influenced some approaches to argumentation, especially those in which it is defined as a concrete type of speech act, such as Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque, 2011). As we will see in more detail below, according to them, argumentation can be defined as an illocutionary act with a particular illocutionary force, namely, as an attempt to justify.

In connection to this, the notion of *perlocutionary effect* also plays a key role in speech act theory and argumentation theory. Austin introduces this concept to denote the causal effects of speech acts in the audience's feelings, actions, beliefs, etc. Examples of perlocutionary acts are persuading and convincing. These perlocutionary acts have been of special interest for argumentation theorists because they "are also the outcomes arguers want to achieve through their argumentative discussions" (Oswald, 2023, p. 147), as it is the case in Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984), where convincing is defined as the inherent perlocutionary effect associated with the illocutionary act of arguing (1984, p. 24). However, as Bermejo-

Luque (2011, p. 59) and also Aikin and Talisse (2018) observe, convincing is just one of the possible perlocutionary effects argumentation can produce.

Finally, another communicative aspect that, although differently understood, plays a role in both speech act theory and argumentation theory is the notion of *commitmen*t. As Oswald points out, the notion of *commitment* is commonly defined in pragmatics as "a propositional attitude that is central in the recognition of communicative intentions" (2023, p. 149). In argumentation theory, however, this notion is particularly significant due to its dialectical properties. As Hamblin (1970) and Walton and Krabbe (1995) have argued, when interpreting and evaluating argumentation, it is crucial to track the commitments that can be attributed to participants in an argumentative exchange and for which they can be held accountable. An important feature of these commitments is that they are "publicly expressed" (Oswald, 2023, p. 149) and determine the dialectical obligations and entitlements that participants acquire along the dialogue.

2.2. From speech act theory to argumentation: main approaches

The previous section has shown how linguistic pragmatics, particularly speech act theory, offers a valuable conceptual framework for defining and characterizing the practice of argumentation. In this section, we will delve into this connection and present the proposals in argumentation theory where the theoretical framework of speech act theory plays a central role. Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 2004), the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque, 2011), the conversational argument approach (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, 1992; Jacobs, 1989), the normative pragmatics approach (Jacobs, 1998, 2000; Kauffeld, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001; Kauffeld and Innocenti, 2018; Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022) and some more recent proposals (Lewiński, 2021a, 2021b; Lewiński and Aakhus, 2014, 2023), to name a few, are prominent instances of the influence of speech act theory in argumentation studies. While these advances share a common theoretical framework, they also exhibit significant differences in how they apply and interpret speech act theory within the study of argumentation. Therefore, to provide a more nuanced characterization of these proposals, I will distinguish between two approaches in argumentation theory where speech act theory plays a fundamental

role. Both characterize argumentation from a communicative perspective which occurs through the performance of speech acts. However, a more detailed analysis reveals important differences between them. A first group of approaches take it that argumentation, although a communicative phenomenon, does not necessarily constitute a particular type of speech act. Rather, they understand it as occurring through the performance of speech acts that have argumentative functions. By contrast, a second group of approaches conceptualize argumentation as a specific type of speech act, namely, the speech act of arguing.

Regarding the first approach, in the characterization of argumentative practices offered by some argumentation theorists, speech act theory works as an analytical tool (Snoeck-Henkemans, 2014, p. 41). As mentioned above, the conversational argument approach is a good example of the application of speech act theory to the study of argumentation. Additionally, approaches developed within the framework of normative pragmatics have also made significant use of speech act theory. Within these approaches, Gricean insights have also greatly influenced the study of argumentation, especially the notion of Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975). All of these proposals share the common belief that, while speech act theory provides a valuable framework for analyzing argumentation, this does not imply that argumentation itself must be strictly defined as a particular type of speech act (see section 2.2.1.1.).

In the second approach, the definition of argumentation as a specific type of speech act requires addressing several aspects inherent to any speech act. This includes providing a definition of its specific illocutionary force, i.e., the type of illocutionary act that is performed *in* saying something. Furthermore, it is important to outline the conditions under which an utterance or set of utterances *counts* as an illocutionary act of arguing. It is also necessary to determine the characteristic effects (illocutionary and perlocutionary) of the act. Additionally, the role (if any) that the communicative intentions play in the performance of the act should be clarified. Within this approach, Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque, 2011) are the two approaches to argumentation which characterize it in these terms, that is, as a specific type of illocutionary act.

2.2.1. Argumentative functions of speech acts

Among the proposals in which argumentation theory works as an analytical tool, those framed within normative pragmatics (Jacobs, 1998, 2000; Kauffeld, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001; Kauffeld and Innocenti, 2018; Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022) and the conversational argument approach (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, 1992; Jacobs, 1989), together with more recent proposals such as those offered by Lewiński (2021a, 2021b) or Goodwin and Innocenti (2018) are especially relevant. They emphasize the utility of speech act theory in understanding and analyzing argumentation within real-life communication. In this section, we will delve into the details of each of them. Due to the importance of normative pragmatics–and especially the work of Kauffeld (1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001), one of its most prominent figures–for the purposes of this dissertation, I will first and foremost focus on this specific approach. After discussing the main elements within normative pragmatics, I will discuss other approaches that apply the conceptual toolkit of speech act theory to the analysis of argumentation.

2.2.1.1. Normative pragmatics

The concept of *normative pragmatics* refers to an approach within argumentation theory concerned with the norms that language users apply when engaging in argumentative discourse (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 454). Proposals within this approach include those by Jacobs (1998, 2000), Kauffeld (1998a, 1999, 2001), or Goodwin (2005, 2007, 2001). As Jacobs (1998) notes, normative pragmatics emphasizes the communicative aspects of actual argumentative messages and its functional properties. He argues that normative pragmatics provides a corrective to traditional models by stressing the importance of analyzing arguments as they are actually used in communicative exchanges (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 454).

Jacobs (1998) identifies two key aspects essential to the normative pragmatics approach: the expressive design and the functional design of arguments. Expressive design refers to the communicative elements of messages and their interpretation, taking into account not only the literal content but also the contextual factors and inferences that shape the actual message (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 455). Functional design, on the other hand, emphasizes the analysis and appraisal of the functional properties of argumentative messages (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 454), i.e., the way in which argumentative messages "enhance or diminish the conditions for their own

reception" (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 455). According to Jacobs, argumentative messages can be designed "either to encourage or to discourage critical scrutiny of the justification for alternative positions" (1998, p. 400). In other words, they are designed to promote critical scrutiny of the justification of particular and alternative stances (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 455). Thus, understanding the functional design, according to him, "is key to seeing what makes something a useful or obstructive contribution to the decision-making process" (Jacobs, 1998, p. 400).

A key aspect of normative pragmatics is its interest in the complexities and ambiguities inherent in communication. Instead of perceiving vagueness or interpretative difficulties as issues to be resolved, normative pragmatics views these elements as essential parts of the communicative process, providing important insights into how messages are both formed and understood (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 455; Jacobs, 1998, p. 398).

Alongside speech act theory, Kauffeld and Innocenti (2018) also highlight the importance of the Gricean approach endorsed by normative pragmatics. They claim that normative pragmatics theory accounts for the reasons why "speakers can reasonably expect their messages to secure intended responses from addressees" (2018, p. 465). This theory, as they point out, "is based on a Gricean analysis of utterance-meaning, or what it means to seriously say and mean something" (2018, p. 465). According to them, in the Gricean view, the utterance-meaning is accounted for in terms of speaker's reflexive intentions (Grice, 1957, 383-385). An addressee's recognition of the speaker's reflexive intentions provides them with reasons "to respond in accord with the speaker's primary intention" (2018, p. 466)[2]. In the normative pragmatics theory, they note, these reasons can be described as presumptions, such as the presumption of veracity or the presumption of fairness (2018, p. 467). An important aspect of the normative pragmatic theory they observe is that when a speaker makes an utterance, they openly and deliberately manifest their intention to get addressees to respond and incur responsibilities (2018, p. 467). In Kauffeld and Innocenti's view, the normative pragmatics approach allows us to

[2] This primary intention is formulated by Kauffeld as the speaker's intentions "that some addressee (A) respond (r) that p" (2001, p. 7).

account for these responsibilities and obligations incurred by the participants of an argumentative exchange.

In this sense, according to Kauffeld and Goodwin (2022, p. 1) "argumentation theorists need to command a clear view of the sources of the responsibilities and obligations arguers incur". This is so because, in their view, the probative or dialectical obligations which arguers incur determine the quality of the argumentative exchange (2022, p. 1). But how do these responsibilities and obligations arise? Kauffeld was interested in exactly this question, namely, determining how probative obligations, such as burdens of proof, arise in argumentative discourse. Some of these obligations are linked to the speech acts carried out in argumentative exchanges (Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022, p. 1). Here, the notion of presumption plays a crucial role. Drawing from a Gricean approach to speech acts (and from a rhetorical and dialectical perspective), Kauffeld analyses and compares the pragmatic features of certain illocutionary acts, such as acts of accusing and proposing, where, paradigmatically, speakers and addressees incur probative obligations. He claims that the Gricean account of utterance-meaning offers a useful theoretical framework to account for how participants of argumentative practices incur those obligations and responsibilities (2001, p. 15). He also explores how these obligations are distributed in argumentative exchanges (1998a). Kauffeld's focus on illocutionary acts, specifically those of proposing and accusing, illustrates how these acts are not just communicative moves, but also carry with them inherent probative responsibilities. Speakers cannot simply make statements without being prepared to back them up with reasons and evidence.

As he claims, the performance of any type of speech act makes the speaker incur responsibilities and burdens. For instance, in seriously asserting that P, a speaker would be responsible for the veracity of their utterance. Or, in other words, they are expected to have made an effort to establish the truth of P (1998a, p. 248). What makes proposing and accusing especially interesting for argumentation theorists and different from other speech acts is that they impose obligations to the speaker and the addressee to provide "reasons and evidence in support of the proposition put forward for the addressee's consideration, acceptance, belief or other response" (1998a, p. 248). In other words, Kauffeld is here focusing on speech acts in which participants

characteristically incur in probative obligations. And his purpose is to determine how these obligations arise.

Regarding the illocutionary act of proposing, according to Kauffeld (1998b), it is carried out when speakers state propositions and openly commit themselves to respond to the objections and doubts raised by their addressees. One of the main features of illocutionary acts of proposing is that they are designed to "induce participation in a dialectical exchange wherein the speaker has the burden of proof" (1998b, § 3, para. 8). A proposal is put forward with the aim to induce preliminary considerations of a proposition (or set of propositions) that the addressee might be inclined to disregard (2000). He claims that in order for a speaker to perform the act, it is necessary that the speaker (1998a, p. 248):

> (i) Says that p.
> (ii) Openly gives it to be believed that she is speaking with the intention of answering doubts and objections regarding p.
> (iii) Overtly intends that her statement and commitment to advocacy provide her addressee with reason to raise questions, doubts and objections regarding p.

Here, the commitment of the speaker to advocacy is crucial. The speaker's statement and their commitment to advocacy "are linked by the proposer's manifest intention that the statement and corresponding commitment to speak on its behalf are to provide the addressee with reason to raise questions, doubts, and objections" (1998a, p. 249). In this regard, Kauffeld claims that in performing an illocutionary act of proposing, the speaker openly commits (i.e., incur responsibility) to answer to the objections and doubts put forward by the addressee. Kauffeld points out that the proposer openly incurs a burden of proof which provides the addressee with reasons for presuming that the proposer has thoroughly considered the issue (1999). And this is so because if they fail in providing the addressee with appropriate answers to their objections and doubts, the proposer risks being criticized for wasting the addressee's time (1999, p. 13).

However, in speech acts of proposing, a proposer does not incur a responsibility to answer *all* of the addressee's objections and doubts. The kind of doubts and objections they would be committed to respond are those worth considering (1998b, § 3, para. 7). If these possible objections have been put forward by other participants during the exchange, presumably the speaker would be obliged to answer them. However, if, for instance, they can produce potential harms or danger, or cannot be substantiated, then the proposer would not have the responsibility to answer them (1998b, § 3, para. 12).

Turning to the illocutionary act of accusing, which according to Kauffeld is also of particular interest to argumentation scholars, we can say that a speaker has carried out an illocutionary act of accusing if she (1998a, p. 252):

(i) States her charges by saying that some party (the accused) did x, implying that the speaker believes it may be wrong for the accused to do x.
(ii) Demands that the accused or their representatives answer the charge by way of a denial, admission of guilt, justification, excuse, etc.
(iii) Acts as if she intends that the charge and her demands provide her addressee with reason to answer to her charges.

In accusing, the intention with which the speaker makes the accusation is crucial. In these types of illocutionary acts, an accuser speaks with the intention to secure an answering response from the accused (1998a, p. 252). This response could consist in defending themselves, admit what they did, deny the allegation, etc. (Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022, p. 6). In other words, accusations are calculated to impose an obligation on the accused to explain, justify, or excuse their behavior (Kauffeld, 1998a, p. 254). Generally, one incurs this obligation because they have caused some kind of harm or offense (Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022, p. 8). In addition, by means of their utterances, the accuser generates a presumption of veracity, i.e., the presumption that they have made an effort to ascertain the truth about the accused's conduct (1998a, p. 255). This is calculated to counteract the (presumed) veracity of the accused's denial

(Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022, p. 9). As Kauffeld claims, the accuser's burden of proof arises as a "practical consequence of the commitments to veracity and fairness initially undertaken in making her accusations", and it generates "by challenges and protests from the accused […] which obligate her to substantiate her charge" (1998a, p. 257). In addition, because in any accusation there is a risk of embarrassing the accused and causing them harm, the accuser "temper[s] their charges by engaging in an auxiliary presumption of fairness" (1998a, p. 256). In this sense, the obligation imposed to the accused to explain his conduct holds because it is presumed that the accuser is being fair, and they have made an effort to ascertain the truth of the accusation. This is why an accused may still be obliged to explain his conduct even if they did not do what they are accused to have done (Kauffeld, 1998a, p. 255; Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022, p. 9).

Regarding the role that these obligations and responsibilities play in the evaluation of argumentation, Kauffeld, following Johnson (1996) and Govier (1997), highlights the role of the probative obligations in the dialectical evaluation of argumentation. Johnson distinguishes two levels of argument appraisal: the appraisal at the level of premise-support, and the dialectical tier in which argumentation is assessed "in terms of the arguer's obligation to answer questions and objections regarding her standpoint" (Kauffeld, 1999, p. 1). According to Johnson, the premise-conclusion structure that is at the core of arguments is the result of the process of argumentation, which has a second tier or level, called the *dialectical tier*. At this level, the possible objections, doubts or criticisms raised by an addressee should be answered (1996). In this regard, the evaluation of argumentation at the dialectical tier involves considering not only the premise-conclusion structure, but also how well the arguer responds to the criticisms and objections (Kauffeld, 1999, pp. 3-4). As we will see in the upcoming chapters, this dialectical dimension will be of particular importance to this dissertation.

An important point raised by Govier (1997), also noted by Kauffeld, is the question of whether the range of doubts and criticisms that an arguer must respond is limited. She asks this because, according to her, one of the implications of Johnson's approach is that the speaker might be subject to respond to all objections put forward by an addressee, which is, of course, unrealistic (Kauffeld, 1999, p. 7). In order to solve

this problem, she proposes to supplement Johnson's approach with the idea that, in putting forward their main argument and responding to objections with supplementary arguments, the arguer is building a case for a position (Govier, 1997, p. 10), whose adequacy can be both evaluated from the premise-conclusion structure and in terms of the adequacy of the dialectical activity. In this sense, she distinguishes between Exhaustive Cases and Good Cases. Whereas in the former the arguer is obliged to respond to all objections and criticisms with supplementary arguments, in a Good Case the arguer is merely obliged to respond to the most significant ones. However, such supplementary arguments can also be subject to doubts and objections, so the solution to the problem identified in Johnson's account, as Kauffeld puts it, would consist in establishing "*ad hoc* restrictions on the doubts and objections which might be raised" (1999, p. 9).

Kauffeld, departing from his examination of the acts of proposing and advising, explores whether the obligations incurred in these acts can establish non-arbitrary limits to the possible objections and criticisms to which the speaker is committed and obliged to answer (1999, p. 12). He claims that the burden of proof incurred by a proposer is related to the responsibility of an arguer in what Govier calls a Good Case, where, as previously noted, not all the doubts and objections should be answered by the arguer. In this regard, Kauffeld points out that the objections and doubts that an arguer is obliged to answer are those worth considering. According to him, there is not an exhaustive answer to the question of which objections are not worth considering (1999, p. 14). However, as we have said, in cases in which an objection can, for instance, pose potential harms or is entirely at odds with common sense, or if it cannot be substantiated, then the arguer can consider themselves allowed to limit and dismiss the objection as unworthy. As he points out, "when we examine good argumentative practice, we find exemplary cases in which the proposer does claim to be able to rest her case because she has answered all doubts and objections which merit consideration" (2000, p. 15). At this point, we would say that the proposer has discharged their dialectical obligations, and that the opponents should undertake the burden of proof if the argumentative exchange goes on.

2.2.1.2. Other proposals

Other than normative pragmatics, some recent significant contributions to argumentation theory that apply the speech act theory toolkit include those of the conversational argument approach (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, 1992; Jacobs, 1989), and Lewiński (2021a) and Goodwin and Innocenti (2019).

The conversational argument approach is one of the most prominent instances of the great influence of speech act theory in argumentation studies. As Jacobs points out, it is a promising approach to the analysis of the functional organization of argumentation (1989, p. 345). However, according to him, its application cannot serve, as Pragma-dialectics intends (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984), for characterizing argumentation as a specific type of speech act. This is so because this characterization "overlooks the way in which the context of activity and the form of expression organize the argumentative functions performed in using language" (Jacobs, 1989, p. 345). He thus proposes to carry out a pragmatic analysis which takes into account the variety of argumentative functions present in natural language use. Within this framework, Jacobs and Jackson (1982, 1992), drawing from pragmatics and conversation analysis, conceptualize argumentation as a public practice primarily aimed at managing disagreement rather than as an individual reasoning exercise (Oswald, 2023, p. 151; Snoeck-Henkemans, 2014, p. 49). Argumentation, according to them, is "a procedure whereby two or more individuals publicly arrive at agreement" (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, p. 215). In this approach, arguments are seen as "interactionally emergent structures organized around the function of managing disagreement" (Jacobs and Jackson, 1992, p. 161). As they observe, "argument regulates in important ways the shape and occurrence of other conversational events", i.e., "it can be used to obtain and avoid agreement, acceptance, or affiliation for a wide range of conversational acts" (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, p. 206). Within this framework, according to him, "arguments are subordinate speech acts issued in support or in objection to some main, superordinate act" (Jacobs, 1989, p. 348).

In their analysis, due to the general preference for agreement, arguments are structured as "disagreement-relevant expansions" (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, p. 224) serving the participants as a resource to manage the disagreement. In a nutshell,

Jacobs and Jackson provide a nuanced understanding of how arguments unfold naturally in everyday communication.

Among the most recent approaches, Lewiński (2021a, 2021b) argues that one of the problems of traditional approaches to speech act theory is that they assume illocutionary monism and a dyadic reduction. The former refers to the idea that each utterance has only one primary illocutionary force (2021a, p. 421). The latter is the assumption that the interaction only involves two agents, namely, a speaker and a hearer. Drawing from the concept of illocutionary pluralism, Lewiński proposes a more nuanced approach that reflects the complexity of real-life, multi-party argumentative situations that these assumptions fail to capture. Lewiński refers to these multi-party situations as polylogues. A polylogue, according to him, is a conversation involving more than two people (2021a, p. 435). In these polylogical interactions, speakers often convey multiple, simultaneously relevant illocutionary forces through a single utterance, a phenomenon Lewiński refers to as illocutionary pluralism. For instance, in a multi-party debate, a speaker can perform a variety of speech acts with a single utterance, such as expressing a standpoint while simultaneously challenging an opponent, etc. This pluralistic approach allows for a more accurate representation of the complex dynamics present in real-world argumentative discourse.

In a different vein, Goodwin and Innocenti (2019), departing from the critics raised against what Goodwin (2007) calls *functionalist* theories of argumentation, have recently argued that, in making arguments, people make reasons apparent. According to the functionalist theories, argumentation has an intrinsic goal: invite the audience to infer the conclusion (Pinto, 2001), increase the audience's adherence to the conclusion (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958) or rationally persuade an audience of the conclusion (Johnson, 2000). According to Goodwin and Innocenti, all these theories have in common the fact that they focus on the effects that argumentation has on the audience (2019, p. 669). They reconstruct the arguments to fit ideal models, such as the critical discussion or negotiation dialogues, and then "evaluate them by deducing from the ideal model norms, rules, guidelines, codes of conduct, and the like for good argumentation" (2019, p. 670).

However, as Goodwin and Innocenti observe, these approaches are too narrow, because they do not capture the richness and diversity of the actual uses of

argumentation. They carry out the analysis of two cases on the suffragette movement in the United States in order to show that, in making arguments, speakers achieve something different from changing the audience's relationship to a conclusion (2019, pp. 670-671). They also make reasons apparent, which generates a pragmatic force understood as the "pressure generated just by making utterances and the commitments, obligations, responsibilities, and the like undertaken in the course of making the utterances" (2019, p. 671). The examination of the two cases allows them to contend that argumentation theories should focus on accounting for how acts of arguing generate pragmatic force, rather than focusing solely on how arguments change the audience's relationship to the conclusion.

2.2.2. Argumentation as a speech act

In this section, I will present the two proposals where argumentation is conceptualized as a specific type of speech act, namely, Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque, 2011).

2.2.2.1. Pragma-dialectics

According to the pragma-dialectical model developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), the primary goal of argumentation is to resolve a difference of opinion in a critical discussion. The concept of critical discussion refers to the debate between a protagonist and an antagonist concerning a specific standpoint on an expressed opinion with "the purpose of the discussion being to establish whether the protagonist's standpoint is defensible against the critical reactions of the antagonist" (1984, p. 17). This critical discussion is governed by a set of rules[3]. Argumentation, in this case, is characterized as one of the stages of the discussion, also encompassing the confrontation, opening, and concluding stages[4].

[3] The pragma-dialectical approach offers a detailed account of the rules that govern critical discussion. See (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, 2004).

[4] It is important to note that this is one of concepts of "argumentation" that they endorse. Additionally, argumentation is also understood as the illocutionary act through which the speaker attempts to justify or refute an expressed opinion, that is, to convince the listener of the acceptability or unacceptability of that opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 43).

In the confrontation stage, the participants establish that there is a difference of opinion. In the opening stage, the roles of the participants, namely protagonist and antagonist, are defined, and the initial commitments of each participant are set. Here, the protagonist commits to defending the standpoints, while the antagonist commits to questioning them, critically responding to the protagonist and their defense (van Eemeren et al., 2014). In the next stage, argumentation, the protagonist, and antagonist begin to resolve the difference of opinion identified in the first stage (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 86) by advancing either a pro-argumentation (to justify the expressed opinion) or a contra-argumentation (if the goal is to refute the expressed opinion). The antagonist's role at this stage is to cast doubts on the constellation of statements that constitute the protagonist's pro-argumentation or contra-argumentation (1984, p. 86). Finally, in the concluding stage, the protagonist and antagonist decide whether the difference of opinion has been resolved. If the protagonist must retract their standpoints, the discussion is won by the antagonist. Conversely, if the antagonist must retract the doubts previously raised, the discussion is resolved in favor of the protagonist (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 530).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst argue that, in argumentative discussions, participants attempt to persuade each other of the acceptability (in the case of pro-argumentation) or unacceptability (in the case of contra-argumentation) of the expressed opinion. They do so through argumentative statements, by which they justify or refute the opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 2).

To characterize argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst employ speech act theory, as they believe it provides the most suitable framework for characterizing the stage of critical discussion that bears the same name (1984, p. 19). They introduce several modifications to Searle's theory to apply it to the analysis of argumentation (Snoeck-Henkemans, 2014). Unlike Searle, they argue that a speech act (in this case, a speech act of arguing) can consist of more than one sentence. They claim that any instance of argumentation consists of at least two statements, corresponding to Toulmin's datum and warrant (1984, p. 32). Secondly, unlike Searle's proposal, they assert that each of the statements that constitute the argumentation also performs a different illocutionary act. This means that the sentences uttered in the argumentation can have more than one illocutionary force simultaneously (1984, p. 32). The final

distinction they establish between their proposals and Searle's lies in their view that advancing a set of statements constitutes argumentation as long as the sentences uttered are in a specific relationship with another sentence that, when uttered, counts as the advancement of what they call the "expressed opinion" (1984, p. 33). They define argumentation as a complex speech act composed of elementary illocutions. These elementary illocutions, at the sentence level, have the force of assertive speech acts (i.e., the type of acts Searle calls "representatives"). It is the combination of these elementary illocutions that constitutes the complex illocutionary act of arguing at the textual level.

Although, as noted, they take Searle's theory as a starting point for their analysis of argumentation, they identify certain problems that need to be addressed to make its application to the characterization of argumentation satisfactory. One of the main difficulties they identify is that Searle's theory only considers what van Eemeren and Grootendorst call the "communicative aspects" of language (1984, p. 23). This means that other aspects are excluded. In this case, it seems that Searle overlooks the interactional aspects, which van Eemeren and Grootendorst define as those related to the attempt to "produce perlocutionary effects" (1984, p. 23). This is particularly relevant to argumentation because, according to the authors, performing a speech act of arguing always includes the intention to produce two types of effects. The first one (produced by any type of illocutionary act) is the illocutionary effect consisting in achieving an understanding of the act (1984, p. 25). The second is the perlocutionary effect, which involves gaining acceptance of our act by our listener (1984, p. 26). This effect is tied to the essential purpose of the act of arguing, which is to convince our interlocutor of the acceptability (in the case of pro-argumentation) or unacceptability (in the case of contra-argumentation) of the expressed opinion. In their own words:

> Our hypothesis is that in the *communicative* sense argumentation is a form of language use corresponding to the forms of language use characterized in the speech act theory as *illocutionary* acts and that as regards its *interactional* aspects argumentation is linked with the *perlocutionary* act of convincing. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, p. 29).

Following this idea, and after establishing the necessary modifications to Searle's theory for the case of argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst formulate a set of constitutive conditions that must be met for a speaker's utterance (or set of utterances) to count as a speech act of arguing (1984, p. 40). Within this set of constitutive conditions, they distinguish between recognition conditions and correctness conditions of the act (1984, p. 42). This distinction is important because, for them, it is possible for an illocutionary act to be recognized as such without being performed correctly. For example, if I say, "I promise to come tomorrow" without any intention of fulfilling the promise, my act would be an insincere act of promising, but it could still be recognized as an act of promising. This distinction is what the authors have in mind when making the distinction between types of conditions. Let's examine these conditions for the illocutionary act of arguing. Here, we will only present the conditions for pro-argumentation. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, for an illocutionary act of arguing to be performed, the speaker must fulfill the recognition conditions, namely, the propositional content condition and the essential condition (1984, p. 43):

ii. Propositional Content Condition: The constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,…,S_n) consists of assertive statements in which propositions are expressed.
ii. Essential Condition: Advancing the constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,…,S_n) counts as an attempt by S [the speaker] to justify O [the expressed opinion] to L's [the listener] satisfaction, i.e. to convince L of the acceptability of O.

As we have noted, if these recognition conditions are met, then the illocutionary act of arguing has been performed. Now let's consider the conditions that must be met for the act to be performed correctly (1984, p. 44):

iii. Preparatory Conditions:
a) S believes that L does not (in advance, completely, automatically) accept the expressed opinion O.
b) S believes that L will accept the propositions expressed in the statements S_1, S_2 (,…,S_n)

c) S believes that L will accept the constellation of statements S_1 S_2, (,…, S_n) as a justification of O.

iv. Sincerity Conditions:

a) S believes that O is acceptable.

b) S believes that the propositions expressed in the statements S_1, S_2 (,…,S_n) are acceptable.

c) S believes that the constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,…,S_n) constitutes an acceptable justification of O.

If these correctness conditions are met, the illocutionary act of arguing has not only been performed but has also been performed correctly[5].

In the next section, we will present the other model in which argumentation is characterized as a specific type of speech act: the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation.

2.2.2.2. The Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation

In her book *Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory*, Bermejo-Luque (2011) develops the "Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation", which will henceforth be referred to as LNMA. This model is grounded in a linguistic-pragmatic approach to argumentation. For Bermejo-Luque, argumentation is a type of communicative activity whose constitutive goal is justifying a target-claim, in the sense of showing that this claim is correct. More specifically, she conceives it as an activity governed by both constitutive and regulatory constraints:

[5] The pragma-dialectical approach also incorporates the Gricean approach to address both normative aspects of argumentation. For instance, Grice's Cooperative Principle has been adapted into a communicative principle that arguers must observe (Oswald, 2023, p. 151). The theory modifies Grice's conversational maxims principles like avoiding ambiguity and providing relevant information into felicity conditions that determine when speech acts of arguing are successfully performed. According to this communicative principle, arguers should avoid making statements that are unclear, insincere, or irrelevant (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004, p. 77).

> Regulative constraints determine the achievement of certain properties that we value; in other words, they provide rules for evaluating argumentation from one or another point of view. In turn, constitutive constraints determine the identification of certain objects of the world as argumentation (2011, p. 53).

According to her, it is possible to distinguish between good and bad argumentation, where good argumentation is one that successfully achieves its constitutive goal of showing that a target-claim is correct (2011, p. 14).

Bermejo-Luque offers a model for the interpretation, analysis, and evaluation of argumentation. Since argumentation, like any other form of communication, involves ambiguities, non-literal meanings, and ellipses, it requires interpretation. It is also necessary to determine the function that each communicative move serves within the argumentation. The difference between these tasks lies in the fact that while interpreting argumentation allows us to determine the meaning of the statements that constitute argumentative discourse, analysis enables us to determine the function of each move within the argumentation (2011, pp. 12-13). Furthermore, Bermejo-Luque argues that to evaluate argumentation (that is, to determine whether a speech act of arguing has succeeded in showing that a target-claim is correct), we must consider both the semantic and the pragmatic aspects of argumentation. While the former allows us to determine whether the target-claim is correct, the latter helps us assess whether the act of arguing was an effective means of showing its correctness (2011, p. 15).

Bermejo-Luque points out that, from her perspective, normative models of argumentation must account for two distinct senses of normativity: constitutive normativity (related to the characterization of the concept of argumentation) and regulative normativity (related to the distinction between good and bad argumentation) (2011, pp. 50-51). For Bermejo-Luque, argumentation is a communicative activity whose main goal is to show that what she calls the target-claim (or conclusion) is correct (2011, p. 53). Moreover, it is an activity that is both constitutively and regulatively normative. While regulative rules allow us to evaluate

argumentation, constitutive rules enable us to identify certain objects in the world as instances of argumentation (2011, p. 53).

As van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Bermejo-Luque characterizes argumentation a specific illocutionary act. In her view, argumentation can be characterized as a second-order speech act complex that conventionally counts as an attempt to show that a target-claim is correct. In connection with the concept of argumentation, we also find the concept of argument. For Bermejo-Luque, arguments are an abstract representation of the syntactic and semantic properties of acts of arguing and acts of reasoning (2011, p. 56). She defines them as "representations of the inferences that supervene on acts of arguing and on acts of reasoning" (Bermejo-Luque, 2017, p. 22). In this sense, the way we obtain arguments is by laying down the content of the acts of arguing (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p. 57).

Bermejo-Luque notes that, as Pragma-dialectics, her model characterizes argumentation from a pragmatic perspective. This approach allows us to consider not only the illocutionary aspects of argumentation but also the perlocutionary objectives, such as persuading the listener or resolving a difference of opinion, as in the case of Pragma-dialectics (2011, p. 58). Although Bermejo-Luque acknowledges the merits of Pragma-dialectics, she also points out a series of difficulties it faces. The first difficulty is related to the consideration of convincing as the intrinsic perlocutionary effect of the speech act of arguing (2011, p. 59). As noted, Bermejo-Luque considers that convincing is one of the multiple perlocutionary goals a speaker may have when engaging in an act of arguing, but it is not the only one. Moreover, it is a perlocutionary effect that can be achieved not only through argumentation but also through a threat or a mere assertion, for example (2011, p. 59). In this sense, one of the advantages of the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (LNMA) compared to other models is that it does not restrict the perlocutionary objective of argumentation to just one goal, such as the adherence of a universal audience (Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca 1958; Tindale 1999) resolving a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984), or rationally persuading an addressee (Johnson, 2000). Instead, all of these (and others) can be considered perlocutionary goals of the illocutionary act of arguing (Bermejo-Luque, 2017, p. 15). The second problem Bermejo-Luque identifies in the proposal by van Eemeren and Grootendorst is that

they exclude the claim that the speaker is attempting to justify (i.e., the conclusion) from the illocutionary act of arguing. According to Bermejo-Luque, this suggests that for them, the act of arguing would be equivalent to what she characterizes as the act of adducing, that is, the act of adducing a reason to justify the conclusion, which would be one of the acts that compose the act of arguing (2011, p. 59). This exclusion of the assertion that one seeks to justify, Bermejo-Luque argues, presents a problem for the formulation of constitutive conditions that would make a set of utterances count as an act of arguing. The final difficulty Bermejo-Luque points out regarding the pragma-dialectical model is that, although both characterize argumentation as a complex speech act, van Eemeren and Grootendorst do so because they include the warrant as part of the speech act of adducing, while Bermejo-Luque views the act of arguing as complex because she includes the act of concluding as one of the constitutive parts of the act of arguing (2011, pp. 59-60).

For Bermejo-Luque, illocutionary acts of arguing are second-order speech acts complexes because they consist of two acts: the act of adducing (i.e., the reason reason) and the act of concluding (i.e., the target-claim). She asserts that these are second-order acts because they can only be performed through first-order acts, which in this case would be constative acts which can be performed directly or indirectly, and both literally and non-literally (2011, p. 60). In LNMA, the acts of adducing and concluding are performed through two constative speech acts (R and C), which become acts of adducing a reason and concluding a target-claim because there is what Bermejo-Luque calls an implicit inference-claim that establishes a relationship between the content of the two constative acts (2011, p. 60). The propositional content of this implicit inference assertion is "if r [the content of R and its pragmatic force], then c [the content of C and its pragmatic force]" (2011, p. 60).

Bermejo-Luque characterizes the speech act of arguing in conventionalist and intentionalist terms. She provides an intentionalist characterization of the act because she uses the Speech Act Schema (SAS) proposed by Bach and Harnish (1979). She uses the SAS to characterize the illocutionary act of arguing because, according to her, it is a model "that can be used to deal with indirect and non-literal argumentation" (2011, p. 61) and has "the virtue of integrating insights from inferentialist approaches to linguistic meaning within speech-act theory" (2011, p. 61). More specifically,

Bermejo-Luque argues that to interpret a speech act as an act of adducing or concluding, it is necessary "to make a presumption concerning the relationship between R and C" (2011, p. 61), which amounts to "attributing to the speaker an implicit assertion I, whose content is 'if r (the content of R), then C (the content of c)'" (2011, p. 61). This presumption is what Bermejo-Luque calls the Argumentative Presumption (2011, p. 61):

> Argumentative Presumption (AP): The mutual belief for H and S that S has implicitly asserted I.

This implicit assertion, according to Bermejo-Luque, corresponds to the implicit inference-claim mentioned earlier, which is one of the constitutive parts of any illocutionary act of arguing (2011, p. 62). The SAS, therefore, serves as an interpretative tool for Bermejo-Luque, enabling the hearer to attribute the performance of the speech act of arguing to the speaker.

As mentioned earlier, conventions also play an essential role in Bermejo-Luque's characterization of the illocutionary act of arguing. She adopts Bach and Harnish's definition of conventions as "actions that, if performed in certain situations, count as doing something else" (1979, p. 121). Bermejo-Luque claims that "conventionally, acts of arguing are attempts at showing a target-claim to be correct" (2011, p. 70). It is important to stress here that, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, this attempt at justifying should not be understood, as in Pragma-dialectics, as an attempt at convincing. As Bermejo-Luque observes, convincing is just one of the possible effects we may aim to achieve by arguing, but not a constitutive one. Additionally, she notes that we must be able to "interpret [the speaker's act] as an attempt at justifying a claim" (2011, p. 55). This would mean that, for a speaker's utterance to conventionally count as an act of arguing, the speaker must be seen as fulfilling certain conditions. Following Searle's (1969) proposal, Bermejo-Luque claims that there are certain conditions that make a speech act count as an illocutionary act of arguing (2011, p. 70). These conditions are the following (2011, pp. 71-72):

i. Preparatory Conditions:

(i) S believes that a claim R, having such and such pragmatic force, may be taken to be correct by L [the listener].
(ii) It makes sense to attribute to S a conditional claim, with a certain pragmatic force, whose antecedent is "R is correct," and whose consequent is "C is correct".
(iii) S takes the correctness of a claim C to be in question within the context of the speech-act.
(iv) S takes a claim R to be a means to show a target- claim C to be correct.

ii. Propositional Content Conditions:

(v) The content of the reason is that a claim R' is correct.
(vi) The content of the target-claim is that a claim C' is correct[6].

iii. Sincerity Conditions:

(vii) S believes the propositional content of R in a certain way and to a certain extent, namely, the way and extent that correspond to the pragmatic force of the claim R'.
(viii) S believes that R being correct is a means to show that a target-claim C is correct.
(ix) S believes the propositional content of C in a certain way and to a certain extent, namely, the way and extent that correspond to the epistemic pragmatic force of the target-claim C.

iv. Essential Conditions:

(x) Adducing R with such and such pragmatic force is a means to show that a target-claim C is correct.
(xi) S aims to show that a target-claim C is correct.

[6] According to Bermejo-Luque, "[...] R' and C' correspond to the propositional contents of the claims constituting the basis of the act of adducing and the act of concluding in conjunction with the ontological qualifiers that correspond to the pragmatic force with which these contents have been put forward in the corresponding indirect claims." (2011, p. 66).

As we have noted, in LNMA, a speech act of arguing is an act that consists of an attempt by the speaker at showing that a target-claim is correct, that is, at justifying a target-claim (2011, p. 53). However, this definition only pertains to the illocutionary aspect of the speech act of arguing. There is another aspect, the perlocutionary aspect, which is related to the types of effects that the act of arguing can have, such as inducing beliefs or persuading our interlocutor or audience. As Bermejo-Luque points out, LNMA "aims to be a good tool for dealing with both aspects of the activity of arguing, that is, its justificatory power and its persuasive power, and for dealing with its interpretation and evaluation" (2011, p. 54).

2.3. Speech acts and argumentation: towards an integrative account

As we have seen, the application of speech act theory to the study of argumentation has given rise to a large number of proposals and approaches that have enriched our understanding of argumentative practices. However, as I will try to argue here, these approaches are not without issues. In this last section I will present what I take to be the main issues in order to briefly outline the key points of my own solution, which I will develop throughout the upcoming chapters. As we will see, this will be based on a combination of the main insights from normative pragmatics, on one hand, and Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (LNMA), on the other.

Firstly, in line with the pragma-dialectical model and the LNMA, I think that a full-fledged account of argumentation from speech act theory requires going beyond the mere identification of argumentative functions of speech acts; a characterization of argumentation itself as a speech act is needed. In this sense, I think that normative pragmatics and related views discussed in section 2.2.1. fall short in their application of the speech act theory toolkit. As demonstrated by the pragma-dialectical model and LNMA, I also think that it is possible to identify certain features of argumentation that set it apart from other types of speech acts. These include specific conditions that allow us to define it, and therefore analyze it, as a distinctive speech act. Unlike the view held by normative pragmatics theorists, which focuses on the argumentative role of some speech acts, the pragma-dialectical model and the LNMA emphasize that argumentation is an act with particular conditions of performance and specific effects

(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984, pp. 43-44; Bermejo-Luque, 2011, pp. 71-72). These distinctive characteristics will also allow us to evaluate it as a specific type of move in communicative exchanges, with specific implications for such exchanges that can be distinguished from those of other speech acts. Therefore, I will follow Pragma-dialectics, and especially the LNMA, in the conceptualization of argumentation as a specific type of speech act. This is so because, in my view, the LNMA model has significant advantages over the pragma-dialectical one. In addition to avoiding the problems Bermejo-Luque identifies in the pragma-dialectical model, such as establishing a specific perlocutionary goal for argumentation, the LNMA, unlike van Eemeren and Grootendorst's, does not constitute an ideal model. Instead, it accounts for argumentation as occurring in many different contexts and with different purposes. This approach aligns with my interest in the social nature of argumentation and the real-world argumentative exchanges.

On the other hand, however, I will also argue that both of these approaches present certain limitations. Specifically, as I will develop in the upcoming chapters, I think that, due to the Searlean framework they adopt, they do not take into account one of the illocutionary effects produced by any speech act of arguing, consisting in the introduction of changes in the normative position of the participants of the argumentative exchange[7]. This illocutionary effect formulated by Austin consists in bringing about changes in the set of obligations, entitlements, and responsibilities of the participants of the communicative process, i.e., in what Marina Sbisà calls their *Deontic Modal Competence*. I will argue that, in the case of argumentation, these effects consist in the production of changes in the participants' dialectical entitlements, obligations, responsibilities and commitments. I will understand these effects as constitutive of acts of arguing, distinguishing them from any other type of speech act.

As I see it, these effects are similar to the features that Kauffeld associates with specific speech acts that have an argumentative function, such as proposing or accusing. As pointed out in section 2.2.1., he argues that, in performing these types of speech acts, an arguer incurs certain responsibilities and obligations to answer the addressee's objections and doubts. However, Kauffeld does not conceive of

[7] Similar criticisms regarding the lack of consideration of the normative effects of illocutionary acts in both the pragma-dialectical model and LNMA have been made by Corredor (2021) and Labinaz (2021).

argumentation as a specific type of speech act. He simply elaborates, from a Gricean perspective, on the conditions that must be met for speech acts like proposing, accusing, or advising to play an argumentative function and to be evaluated from a dialectical perspective. This poses several issues. In my view, the account he proposes does not account for how the communicative activity of arguing changes the norms in a specific way. One can make a proposal or accuse someone, and in a very broad sense, we could say, as Kauffeld, that they have engaged in an argumentative exchange and now, the accused has an obligation to explain what he did, to offer an excuse, to deny the allegation, etc. However, the type of changes introduced through argumentation go beyond this. Following Bermejo-Luque, I believe these changes are connected to the intention to justify. Specifically, they are connected to the attempt to establish a justificatory relationship between a reason and a claim. It is this attempt to establish a justificatory connection that, once recognized and taken up, alters the normative landscape by changing the *dialectical* obligations and rights of the participants. This particular way of introducing changes in the world and norms is what makes certain moves argumentation.

As we will see, this is particularly important for the evaluation of argumentation. In my proposal, these normative effects will allow us to offer a criterion for the dialectical evaluation of argumentation. The production of these effects will work as an evaluative device, thus constituting a standard of evaluation. I will elaborate on this by adopting what in speech act theory is known as a *normative or interactional approach* to speech acts. In this normative approach, to be introduced in the next chapter, both an interlocutor's response to the speaker's utterance(s) and the normative effects produced by speech acts are crucial for the characterization of communicative processes. As I hope to show in the following chapters, this normative approach can be particularly fruitful when applied to the characterization of argumentation from a descriptive and a normative point of view.

2.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have presented an overview of the connection between speech act theory and argumentation theory. Following the accounts of Snoeck-Henkemans and Oswald, I have highlighted the great influence that speech act theory has on

argumentation studies. Besides, I have distinguished two approaches: one in which speech acts play an argumentative function, and another one in which argumentation is characterized as a specific type of speech act. Within the first approach, I have mainly focused on the proposals developed within normative pragmatics, as well as the conversational argument approach and other recent approaches to argumentation where speech act theory plays a key role. In addition, I have introduced the pragma-dialectical model and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation, which are the two models within argumentation theory where argumentation is conceptualized as a specific type of speech act.

I have argued that the characterization of argumentation as a speech act is a more appropriate account than those presented in section 2.2.1., because, as I have pointed out, they account for specific aspects of the argumentative practices that are not taken into consideration in other approaches. However, they are not exempt from problems. One of them has to do with the fact that they do not take into account how the successful performance of illocutionary acts of arguing is linked to the production of certain illocutionary effects. Although these kinds of effects are seemingly considered by proposals such as Kauffeld's, his is not a satisfactory solution, as I will argue in Chapter 6. Characterizing argumentation as a speech act allows us to account for the particular features of argumentative practices that distinguish them from others. In this regard, an account where argumentation is defined as the performance of a particular speech act seems to be more fruitful. As I will develop in the following chapters, I think that adopting a normative approach to speech acts in characterizing argumentation allows us to keep all the virtues of models like the LNMA, while also providing a finer-grained account that takes into consideration other aspects of the speech act of arguing, such as the normative effects associated with it.

Chapter 3

Speech act theory: classical and recent approaches

In the previous chapter, we have seen the great impact speech act theory has had on the field of argumentation studies. For many scholars in this domain, speech act theory has proven to be a valuable framework, providing them with conceptual tools to account for both the descriptive and normative aspects of argumentative practices. In a nutshell, it provides a sound basis for understanding how language functions within argumentative interactions. However, despite these contributions, the application of speech act theory in argumentation has not been without its challenges. In particular, as I already mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the Searlean framework adopted by approaches such as Pragma-dialectics and LNMA has important limitations. These limitations have raised critical questions about the ability of a Searlean approach to fully explain the complexities of argumentative exchanges.

Recent developments in speech act theory have pointed to important shortcomings within classical approaches, particularly in Searle's account. Specifically, the proposals developed within the so-called *interactional* or *normative* approach to speech act theory have played a crucial role in identifying and addressing these problems. In this approach, speech acts are conceived as social actions that change the normative status of participants of communicative exchanges. These proposals emphasize the inherently social nature of speech acts and the crucial role that the audience plays in their performance. According to them, speech acts change

the expectations, entitlements, and obligations of the participants of the communicative process. In addition, by emphasizing the social and interactive dimensions of speech acts, these approaches have provided a more comprehensive understanding of how meaning is constructed and negotiated in real-world discourse.

In this chapter, I will delve into the theoretical landscape of speech act theory. I will first outline some of the main classical approaches, paying special attention to those that have been used in the characterization of argumentation, such as the Searlean view. I will then introduce the more recent interactional proposals, which offer an alternative and a more nuanced perspective to the challenges identified in some of the classical approaches. The central question guiding this chapter is whether these alternative perspectives on speech acts can promise to provide a more robust framework for characterizing argumentative practices. If the normative approach can successfully address the shortcomings of the Searlean account, it may also offer a valuable framework for characterizing argumentation by taking into account its inherently social nature. As we will see along the next chapters, this approach can provide us with effective tools for the interpretation, analysis, and evaluation of argumentation.

The structure of this chapter is the following. In section 3.1., I will outline some of the classical approaches to speech acts. Specifically, I will mainly focus on those that have played a key role in the development of the interactional accounts, namely, the speech act accounts proposed by John L. Austin (1962) and John R. Searle (1969). In section 3.2., I will present the interactional approach to speech acts. I will focus on the accounts proposed by Herbert H. Clark (1996), Marina Sbisà (2006, 2009a, 2019), Antonella Carassa and Marco Colombetti (2009) and Maciej Witek (2013, 2015). I will also briefly outline the key reasons for adopting a normative approach to characterizing argumentation as an alternative to the Searlean framework. Finally, in section 3.3., I will outline the main conclusions of this chapter.

3.1. Classical approaches to speech acts

As Sbisà points out, the background of speech act theory "is to be found in the work of philosophers such as Frege, Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and H.P. Grice" (2009b, p. 229). Specifically, Austin's *How to do things with words* (1962) played a major role in

putting the study of speech acts at the centre of research in the philosophy of language, providing insights into how language functions as more than just a means of conveying information. What I will refer to here as *classical* approaches laid the groundwork for understanding the performative character of language. Specifically, this section delves into the foundational contributions of key speech act theorists such as J.L. Austin and John R. Searle, whose work significantly influenced the subsequent development of speech act theory. In this section, I will firstly present Austin's speech act theory. Then, I will briefly outline the main criticisms that were raised by Strawson (1964) regarding Austin's proposal. This will allow us to show how some of Strawson's insights have influenced further developments in speech ac theory, as the accounts proposed by Bach and Harnish (1979) and Searle (1969) show. After that, I will delve into Searle's account. As we will see, his account in turn gave rise to further criticism, which eventually led to the development of alternative interactional perspectives, which will be covered in the next section.

3.1.1. How we do things with words

As I previously pointed out, John L. Austin's *How to do things with words* (1962) constitutes the foundational work of speech act theory. According to Austin, in using language, we do not merely describe the world or convey information. Instead, we *perform actions*, such as promising, apologizing, ordering, marrying, etc. By means of the performance of these acts, we also change the world in a certain way: we can make certain actions permissible or forbidden, create expectations in our interlocutor, or acquire commitments. Moreover, these actions can have different effects on our audience, such as inducing beliefs, persuading them, or even affecting them emotionally. For instance, if a speaker utters (1)

(1) Close the window

she is not merely describing what she wants her interlocutor to do; rather, she is performing a certain action, namely, an order. According to Austin, it is possible to distinguish three parts of the "total speech act in the total speech situation" (1962, p. 148): the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. He

distinguishes these aspects in order to account for the senses in which "to say something may be to do something" (1962, p. 12). To begin with, Austin characterizes the *locutionary act* as the act *of* saying something. However, the act *of* saying something may also have different senses. Thus, according to Austin, to say something is (1962, pp. 92-93):

a) To perform a phonetic act, i.e., the act of uttering certain noises, which is called a *phone*.
b) To perform a phatic act of uttering a *pheme*, i.e., the act of uttering certain noises (which are vocables or words that belong to a vocabulary) and according to a certain grammar.
c) To perform a rhetic act of uttering a *rheme*, i.e., the act of using the pheme with a certain sense, reference or both and which, together, amount to meaning.

The second aspect of the total speech act is what Austin calls the *illocutionary* act. The illocutionary act is the act performed *in* saying something. Austin claims that performing a locutionary act is "*eo ipso* to perform an illocutionary act" (1962, p. 98). In uttering (1) above, the speaker is not only saying something. She is also carrying out an illocutionary act with the illocutionary force of an order, i.e., she is performing an act of ordering her interlocutor to do something. However, saying something with an illocutionary force is not enough to perform an illocutionary act. According to Austin, some conditions must be met (1962, p. 14). In order to account for these conditions, he presents what he calls the *doctrine of infelicities* in which he outlines the types of conditions which, if not satisfied, would make the utterance unhappy. According to Austin (1962, pp. 14-15), these include the following:

> (A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure[8] having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and

[8] Here, Austin refers to rule-governed activities, like the performance of illocutionary acts, including marrying or pronouncing a sentence, which involve extra-linguistic conventions, but also any other type of action that

> further,
>
> (A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
>
> (B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
>
> (B. 2) completely.
>
> (Γ. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
>
> (Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (Austin, 1962, pp. 14-15).

Austin contends that if any of these conditions is not met, then the act would qualify as unhappy (1962, p. 15). However, there are significant differences in the ways an act can be rendered unhappy. In this regard, he distinguishes between *misfires* and *abuses*. If any of the A or B conditions is violated, then the act would be null or void. In other words, we would say that the act is merely purported, and thus constitutes a misfire (1962, p. 16). By contrast, if one of the Γ conditions is not met, then the act is not void (i.e., it has been actually performed), but it constitutes an abuse.

Another key aspect of illocutionary acts, as observed by Austin, is their association with the production of specific effects, which he calls *illocutionary effects*. Austin identifies and distinguishes three types of illocutionary effects (1962, pp. 115-116):

> (i) The securing of uptake, which amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution.

---

produces conventional effects, such as promising, betting or commanding. As Sbisà points out, for Austin, these procedures envisage "circumstances of execution, competence, position or capacity of the participants, conventional effects, and linguistic forms suitable to making it clear what procedure is invoked" (2013, p. 34).

(ii) The production of conventional effects, i.e., effects "distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the 'normal' way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events […]" (1962, p. 116).

(iii) The inviting of a response by convention which, if accepted, requires a second act by the speaker or another person.

For Austin, the successful performance of an illocutionary act involves the production of these illocutionary effects[9]. These effects are different from what he calls *perlocutionary effects*, which are characterized as the (intended or unintended) consequences in the interlocutors' thoughts, feelings, or actions. Examples of perlocutionary acts are convincing, persuading, alerting, etc[10]. For instance, in uttering (2),

(2) I'll be here tomorrow at 10

the speaker can be taken (depending on the features of the particular context in which (2) is uttered) as carrying out an illocutionary act of promising, whose illocutionary effects would consist in securing the uptake and in producing changes in the normative status of the parties, that is, in the rights, entitlements, and obligations of the speaker and their audience (Sbisà, 2006, 2009a; Witek, 2015). In this case, these changes would consist in the speaker acquiring the obligation to do what they promised to do, or the hearer's legitimate expectation that the speaker will keep their promise. Adding to these illocutionary effects, their act can also produce perlocutionary effects, such as causing the hearer to feel pleased that the speaker will be there tomorrow.

---

[9] However, as Sbisà points out, according to Austin, the third type of effect does not play an essential role in the characterization of all illocutionary acts, as "Austin himself says that it belongs only to certain kinds of illocutionary acts" (2009a, p. 44).

[10] Here it is important to stress that, as far as a perlocutionary effect is produced due to a particular feature of the speaker's act, the speaker can be held responsible for the perlocutionary effect produced even if its production was unintended (Sbisà, 2007, 2013).

3.1.2. Some challenges to the Austinian account

As previously noted, the speech act theory formulated by Austin has significantly influenced further developments in speech act theory. For instance, adopting a Gricean perspective, Strawson (1964) reinterpreted Austin's approach to make it compatible with the theory of non-natural meaning proposed by Grice (1957).

According to Austin, the successful performance of an illocutionary act hinges on the production of the illocutionary effect (i), namely, the securing of uptake. More specifically, Austin claimed that "unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed" (1962, p. 115). Strawson interpreted this to mean that uptake is the effect essentially connected to the performance of illocutionary acts. In other words, for these acts to be successful, the *only* effect that must be brough about is the securing of uptake, i.e., the (securing of) understanding by the audience of the meaning and force of the speaker's utterance. Moreover, in his effort to reinterpret the Austinian notion of *illocutionary act* as intention-based, he argues that (the securing of) uptake requires the audience to recognize a complex and overt intention expressed by the speaker, which corresponds to Grice's (1957) concept of *speaker meaning*.

Strawson criticizes Austin's characterization of illocutionary acts as inherently conventional. Strawson argues that only some illocutionary acts are essentially conventional. The existence of these acts depends on the practices governed by certain conventions (1964, p. 457). Examples of these types of acts would be marrying, pronouncing a sentence, or bringing in a verdict. By contrast, Strawson observes that there are illocutionary acts which do not require extra-linguistic conventions but are instead intention-based. These acts are successfully performed when the effect of securing uptake is produced.

Strawson's reinterpretation of Austin's account along Gricean lines has greatly influenced subsequent developments in speech act theory, as Searle's (1969) and Bach and Harnish's (1979) approaches show. Bach and Harnish's proposal (1979), which is also based on Grice's theory, differs considerably from those of their predecessors. In their inferential theory, communicative intentions determine the illocutionary force of the act. Following Strawson, they distinguish between conventional and communicative acts. Within their framework, communicative illocutionary acts are

those where the speaker, through their utterance, attempts to communicate something to the hearer. These acts consist of expressing a specific attitude through the utterance: the speaker intends for the hearer to take the utterance as a reason to believe that the speaker holds that attitude. In addition, they also consider the achievement of uptake (i.e., the recognition of the speaker's communicative intention) as the effect that is essentially connected to the successful performance of an illocutionary (communicative) act. One of the most important aspects of their proposal is the introduction of what they call the "Speech Act Schema" (SAS), which serves as a model for interpreting a speaker's utterance.

Although Bach and Harnish's contributions are noteworthy, for the purposes of this chapter (as well as this dissertation), the most significant development of Austin's theory is the one elaborated by Searle (1969). In the next section, I will present it in more detail, highlighting the main aspects in which his proposal differs from Austin's.

3.1.3. The Searlean approach to speech acts

In Searle's (1969) approach to speech acts, speaking is understood as a rule-governed form of behavior (1969, p. 12). It has been often seen as a re-elaboration of Austin's original framework. However, they differ significantly in some important respects. Firstly, Searle introduces a distinction between the propositional content and the illocutionary force of the speech act. Moreover, Searle provides an alternative taxonomy of illocutionary acts (Searle, 1975) and introduces a new set of conditions that must be met for an illocutionary act to be correctly identified and successfully performed. Finally, and most importantly for our purposes here, he aligns with Strawson in conceiving the first illocutionary effect identified by Austin (i.e., the securing of uptake) as the essential effect for the successful performance of the act. In his account, this effect is based on an intentionalist conception of communication, following Grice (1957) again.

In his characterization of speech acts, Searle modifies several aspects of the theory originally proposed by Austin. Unlike Austin, who distinguishes force from the meaning of the utterance, Searle integrates force as a component of meaning. He argues that, in performing an illocutionary act, the speaker characteristically also performs an utterance act (act of uttering certain words) and a propositional act (act

of referring and predication, i.e., of expressing a proposition). This allows him to distinguish between the propositional content and the illocutionary force of an utterance. He claims that both illocutionary and propositional acts consist in "uttering words in sentences in certain context, under certain conditions and with certain intentions" (1969, p. 25). Importantly, these acts are not carried out independently; a propositional act cannot be performed without simultaneously performing an illocutionary act. As he points out, "one cannot just express a proposition while doing nothing else and have thereby performed a complete speech act" (1969, p. 29). He proposes to represent the distinction he establishes between the propositional content and the illocutionary force by means of the form *F(p)*, where *F* refers to the illocutionary force indicating devices (i.e., what indicates the type of illocutionary act perform, e.g., assertion, promise, order, etc.) and *p* refers to the proposition expressed (1969, p. 31). Unlike Austin's taxonomy of speech acts, based on the type of verb used, Searle (1975) proposes an alternative taxonomy that is grounded in the illocutionary force of each type of act, that is, in the type of action performed by uttering a sentence. Specifically, Searle (1975, pp. 354-361) identifies five types of illocutionary acts: representational (or assertive), directive, commissive, expressive, and declarative. Another important aspect in Searle's account is the intentionalist view he adopts for the characterization of illocutionary acts. He reformulates Grice's (1957) notion of speaker meaning to account for the conventional aspects of meaning, not just the intentional ones (i.e., those related to the communicative intentions a speaker might have when uttering certain words). Searle argues that performing an illocutionary act involves the speaker's intention to produce a certain effect through the hearer's recognition of that intention; it also involves the intention that this recognition is achieved because the rules for using the expression with which we perform the action are conventionally associated with the production of that effect.

Searle formulates the necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a specific type of illocutionary act, namely, the act of promising (1969, pp. 57-61). These include *propositional content conditions*, *preparatory conditions*, *essential conditions*, and *sincerity conditions*. From these conditions, he derives a set of semantic rules for the use of illocutionary force indicating devices (1969, pp. 62-63), where the essential rules adopt the form "X counts as Y". For instance, in the case of the illocutionary act of

promising, the utterance of a sentence counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do what the speaker is promising to do (1969, p. 63). He also adds a condition that reflects the reformulation of the Gricean analysis of the speaker's meaning (1969, pp. 60-61):

> The speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect, and he also intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the meaning of the item he utters conventionally associates it with producing that effect (Searle, 1969, pp. 60-61).

Here, the intended effect produced by illocutionary acts, as Searle describes it, is the hearer's understanding of the meaning and the force of the utterance, that is, the securing of uptake (1969, p. 47):

> In the case of illocutionary acts, we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do. […] It consists simply in the hearer understanding the utterance of the speaker (Searle, 1969, p. 47).

Unlike Austin, but in line with Strawson, Searle limits the illocutionary effects of an act to the securing of uptake. As we will see, this limitation raises important challenges in accurately characterizing communication that takes place through the performance of speech acts.

In the next section, I will present some of the most relevant proposals framed within the normative approach to speech acts, which attempt to address these limitations.

3.2. The interactional approach to speech acts

As previously pointed out, the Searlean account has significantly influenced further developments in speech act theory. However, it is not exempt from problems. In particular, they can be summarized in two: that it does not take into account the active

role played by the hearer in the performance of the speech act, and that it does not take into account the second illocutionary effect distinguished by Austin, consisting in the production of changes in the normative position of the participants by means of the performance of speech acts. These problems have been raised by some theorists whose proposal can be framed within the so-called *normative* or *interactional* approach to speech acts (Carassa and Colombetti 2009; Clark 1996, 2006; Sbisà 2006, 2009a; 2019; Witek, 2013, 2015). In my view, a suitable definition of this approach is the one offered by Corredor (2021):

> What makes an approach to speech acts interactional is that it seeks to explain the illocutionary meaning of utterances by taking into account not only (nor primarily) the speaker's communicative aims and intentions in issuing an utterance, but also the hearer's recognition and interpretation in response to it (Corredor, 2021, p. 464).

This approach emphasizes the inherently social nature of communication. In this context, speech acts are conceived as social actions that change the normative position of the participants of communicative exchanges (Sbisà 2007; Caponetto and Labinaz 2023, p. 10). As we shall see, some of the proposals are classified as neo-Austinian due to the consideration of speech acts as context-changing actions (Sbisà 2007; Caponetto and Labinaz 2023, p. 10). As Corredor points out, in characterizing speech acts within this framework, we must consider the way "they change the normative stances of interlocutors" (Corredor 2023). This approach challenges the conception of communication as merely the transmission of information and emphasizes the importance of the social context in which the participants engage in communicative exchanges. In addition, they provide a characterization of meaning that goes beyond the speaker's intentions and the hearer's recognition of those intentions.

In the next sections, I will explore the normative approach in greater depth, providing a detailed examination of some of the most significant proposals that have been developed within this framework.

3.2.1. Communication as a social joint action

Herbert H. Clark has put forward a proposal that, in contrast to Searle's view, highlights the active roles of both the speaker and the hearer in communicative interactions. Building on this perspective, Clark and Carlson (1982) have argued that the hearer plays an essential role in the performance of speech acts. However, they claim that this role has not been properly accounted for in the classical approaches to speech acts. According to them, speakers carry out speech acts that are directed to the addressees, but also to other hearers (1982, p. 333). For instance, when a speaker addresses one person in a group, they are often simultaneously informing the others about the content and purpose of their utterance. They argue that these acts are not considered in standard theories such as Searle's (1969). What they propose is that, in conversations where there are more than two participants, speakers perform two types of illocutionary acts with each utterance: one act that can be classified within the traditional types (e.g., assertions, orders, promises, etc.), and a second act they call *informative*. They introduce this new category to account for those acts "directed to all the participants in the conversation–the addressees and third parties alike" (1982, p. 332). This type of act is performed with the intention to inform the parties of the promise, assertion, order, etc. that is directed to the addressee.

Following this line of thought, in "Using Language" (1996), Clark characterizes communication as a joint action. He argues that when people engage in a communicative process, they are participating in a coordinated effort that involves shared commitments and goals. Clark contends that communication is not simply about the transmission of information from a speaker to a hearer; rather, it must be understood as a joint activity where both parties actively contribute. This interactive and cooperative model emphasizes the essential role of both the speaker and the hearer in construing what the speaker is to be taken to mean (1996, p. 212).

Specifically, Clark describes communicative acts as "the joint act of one person signaling another and the second recognizing what the first meant" (1996, p. 130). He also argues that this joint construal of an utterance (conceived as the mutual understanding by the speaker and the hearer of the speaker's utterance) is established through an interactive process (1996, p. 192). According to Clark, the joint construal

of an utterance is not necessarily the speaker's original intention, but what both participants accept as a valid interpretation of the message.

As previously pointed out, Clark found important issues in Searle's account of communication. In particular, he criticizes Searle's view that it is irrelevant whether the speaker's act is actually understood by a hearer; all that matters is that the speaker fulfills the conditions that make uptake possible (i.e., secures the uptake), regardless of how the hearer actually understands the speaker's utterance. According to Clark (1996, p. 137), this overlooks the essential role of the hearer in the communicative process. He argues that communication cannot occur without the hearer taking action too and understanding the speaker's intended meaning (Clark, 1996, p. 138). This flaw in Searle's approach, according to Clark, ignores the interactive and social nature of communication, where the hearer's recognition and response are crucial to the success of communicative acts.

According to Clark, joint actions are managed through joint commitments (2006, p. 126). He illustrates this by pointing out that while an individual can privately commit to an action, such as deciding to have a beer after getting home, joint actions require more than just private commitments:

> I can commit myself privately to doing something and then act on that commitment. I may tell myself, "I'll have a beer when I get home," and when I get home, I have a beer. But for you and me to do something together—say, shake hands—it is not enough for me to commit privately to grasping your hand, or for you to commit privately to grasping mine. We must act on a joint commitment to shake hands (Clark, 2006, p. 126).

Joint commitments are essential for the success of joint activities because they bind the participants to a shared goal and coordinate their actions to achieve that goal. For example, in a cooperative task like assembling a TV stand, participants continuously establish joint commitments through communicative acts such as offering suggestions and agreeing to specific tasks (2006, pp. 127-129). These joint commitments that coordinate joint activities are made up of the sum of the participatory commitments of the parties involved in the communicative exchange. In this regard, two activities

can be distinguished in joint activities: a basic joint activity (assembling the table) and joint coordination actions. The latter are necessary to carry out the former, and they consist of communicative acts. According to Clark, joint commitments emerge from projective pairs, described as sequences of actions where one person proposes a course of action, and the other responds by accepting, modifying, or rejecting the proposal. It is these different possible responses that determine the joint commitments established to carry out the course of joint action. This process allows participants of the communicative exchange to negotiate and establish joint commitments throughout the activity.

Importantly, Clark points out that joint commitments are not only about actions, but they can also be about propositions. If the joint commitment is about a proposition, what is established through it is a joint position of the participants. By contrast, if the joint commitment is for a course of action, what is established is a joint course of action. Following Searle's classification of types of speech acts, Clark argues that assertive, directive, and expressive acts serve to establish joint positions, while directives and commissives serve to establish joint courses of action (2006, p. 134).

Clark also argues that despite the advantages and importance of joint commitments for social relationships, they also carry certain risks. In joint commitments, each individual's autonomy is given up in order to reach an agreement that allows for coordination (2006, p. 139). This does not necessarily have to be negative, and in fact, in most cases, it is not. The problem arises when these commitments entail certain risks, such as exploitation. In this case, one of the participants exploits the partial control they have over the other, causing harm in order to make the other cooperate more than they are obligated to, and thus benefiting the one who exploits. For instance, while I am driving on the highway, a driver could pull out in front of me and force me to brake suddenly, just as I could injure other drivers if I do not cooperate (2006, pp. 139-140). Additionally, another risk associated with joint commitments is overcommitment. The main idea is that, once joint commitments have been negotiated, it is difficult to renegotiate them, as it implies that participants are bound to their initial commitments. In upcoming chapters, and especially in Chapter 5, we will see the importance of this type of risk for the analysis of argumentative exchanges.

3.2.2. Speech acts and illocutionary effects

In her work on speech act theory, Marina Sbisà advocates for a reorientation of speech act theory towards an Austinian perspective, suggesting that speech acts should be understood as social actions that produce changes in the context (2002, p. 421). By adopting the Austinian perspective, she emphasizes the importance of taking into account the conventional effects in the characterization of communication, and how we can introduce changes in the social and normative space by means of the performance of speech acts.

In "Communicating Citizenship in Verbal Interaction: principles of a speech act-oriented analysis" (2006) Sbisà proposes a set of conceptual tools for discourse analysis that include aspects of the social context in which communication through speech acts occurs. According to her, it is possible to distinguish at least two versions of speech act theory, which she attributes to Austin and Searle, respectively. She argues that each of these versions endorse a different conception of language and action (2006, p. 152). On the one hand, in Austin's approach, the total speech act is studied within the total speech situation. The total speech act can be described as a locutionary act, an illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary act. As noted in section 3.1., for Austin, the performance of an illocutionary act is associated with the production of conventional effects, i.e., with the production of a conventional state of affairs. On the other hand, according to Searle, the speech act and the illocutionary act coincide. The illocutionary act is conceived as a gesture carried out conforming to a convention. The total speech act, in this case, consists of the utterance of a sentence that expresses a proposition and has illocutionary force (Sbisà, 2006, pp. 152-153).

In a nutshell, one of the main differences between Austin's and Searle's views is that, according to Austin, an illocutionary act is performed if conventional effects are produced, and it is carried out through conventional procedures; by contrast, for Searle, an illocutionary act is performed if it is carried out according to a conventional procedure. Despite this distinction, what both theorists emphasize is the importance of conventions for the characterization of the illocutionary act.

Following Austin, Sbisà argues that illocutionary acts produce conventional effects. These correspond to the second illocutionary effect that Austin associated with the successful performance of illocutionary acts, namely, the production of changes in

the normative facts. Sbisà characterizes these effects as the production of changes in what she calls the *deontic modal competence* of the participants of the communicative exchange, which she defines as the set of rights, obligations, and entitlements (2006, p. 158). Both the deontic modal competence and the changes in it are determined by the type of illocutionary act that is performed together with the context in which it takes place.

In this line, and in contrast to Searle, Sbisà argues that illocutionary acts are conventional not (or not only) because of the means used to perform the acts, but because of the conventional effects they produce (2009a, p. 33). As she points out, "when an effect is conventional, the state of affairs it brings about cannot exist without some kind of human intervention or decision" (2009a, p. 45). For instance, the illocutionary effect of naming a ship does not consist in a change in the natural course of events; it consists in a change in the norms, which belong to a social dimension (2007, p. 464). According to her, the production of these illocutionary effects "depends on the agreement about their coming into being among the members of the relevant social group" (Sbisà 2009a, p. 48). This agreement may be "held to play a role with respect to what is to count as being (objectively) the case when matters of right, entitlement, obligation, authority, etc. are at issue" (2002, p. 430). Importantly, the conventional effects are not only produced by those illocutionary acts whose performance depends on the existence of extra-linguistic conventions, such as naming a ship or marrying. Rather, as Sbisà (2009a, p. 45) argues, any kind of illocutionary act produces this type of effect.

An additional feature of conventional effects pointed out by Sbisà is that they are cancellable and defeasible (2007, p. 466). Sometimes their defeasibility will depend on the violation of some felicity conditions. As Sbisà points out (2002, p. 423), in Austin's view, the felicity conditions work as rules by which the speech act is assessed. They "single out those aspects of the situation against which the felicity of the speech act is to be evaluated" (2002, p. 426). In this context, a positive evaluation means that the illocutionary act has been successfully performed, whereas a negative evaluation can have different consequences. For instance, if a speaker issues an order, but we later find out that they did not have the authority required to carry out an act of ordering, then the act would be "null and void and […] its conventional effect never occurred"

(2006, p. 153). In Austin's words, it would constitute a *misfire*. By contrast, if someone makes a promise without any intention to keep it, then it would constitute an *abuse*; the promise would be defective, but not void (2002, p. 423). Other conventional effects can be cancelled by another illocutionary act, e.g., permission can cancel prohibitions.

Importantly for our purposes here, Sbisà also contends that the notion of *uptake* plays an essential role for the characterization of the conventionality of illocutionary acts. As previously pointed out, Searle and Strawson consider the securing of uptake as the only illocutionary effect essentially connected to the successful performance of illocutionary acts. They conceive the securing of uptake as an effect that the speaker overtly intends to produce. Although Sbisà recognizes the indispensability of uptake, she does not take it as the only effect necessary for the successful performance of speech acts (2009a, p. 33). She argues that for conventional effects to be produced, what is essential is the participants' agreement on their production, which is achieved by the securing of uptake (2009a, p. 49). However, here the securing of uptake is not understood, as Searle and Strawson do, as the overt intention to produce it, but as the *actual* uptake, which does not need to be explicit. Thus, in line with Clark's proposal above, Sbisà also highlights the fundamental role of the hearer in the performance of illocutionary acts.

Another important aspect of Sbisà's approach to speech acts is her exploration of the variety of speech act norms and the role they play in communicative processes (Sbisà, 2019). Specifically, she distinguishes between constitutive rules, maxims, and objective requirements. Regarding the constitutive rules, Sbisà points out that they are rules "without which a certain type would not exist and performances of acts of that type could not occur" (2019, p. 25). They specify the necessary conditions that must be met for a speech act to count as the performance of a concrete illocutionary act. As we have seen, both Searle (1969) and Austin (1962) offer an account of the constitutive rules of speech acts, but their accounts differ in some crucial respects. Searle (1969, p. 33) distinguishes between regulative and constitutive rules; while the former regulate existing forms of behavior, the latter bring about new ones. On the other hand, according to Sbisà, Austin (1962, pp. 14-15) formulates the set of rules that are not constitutive rules themselves, but templates for constitutive rules. These are "cast in a generic form, with variables to be filled in to yield the rules for specific illocutionary

acts" (Sbisà, 2019, p. 26). In discussing the rule requiring the existence of an accepted conventional procedure, Sbisà emphasizes that the specific constitutive rules of a given illocutionary act must specify that procedure (2019, p. 26). In Searle's framework, these constitutive rules encompass all the conditions he outlines, except for the sincerity rule, whereas in Austin's model, they include the A and B rules, but exclude those of the Γ type (2019, p. 24). Despite these differences, both Searle and Austin agree that if these constitutive conditions are not fulfilled, the speech act would be rendered null or void (2019, p. 26).

Regarding the maxims, Sbisà points out that they "encode advice for optimal communicative behavior from the point of view of the subjects involved" (2019, p. 29). Maxims such as Grice's conversational maxims that arise from the Cooperative Principle, along with the Cooperative Principle itself (1989, pp. 26-27) serve the optimization of communicative behavior (Sbisà, 2019, p. 29). Both the sincerity condition as formulated by Searle and Austin's formulation of the Γ conditions would work, according to Sbisà, not as constitutive rules, but as maxims. These function not as constitutive, but as regulative rules. This means that, if they are not met, the act would be defective and liable to criticism, but not null or void. Thus, as Sbisà observes, "sincerity therefore seems to be a requirement for perfection, which the sincerity norm advises the speaker to achieve" (2019, p. 31).

Finally, the third kind of norms discussed by Sbisà are the objective requirements. In characterizing these norms, Sbisà carries out a reassessment of what Austin referred to as "the correspondence of facts" (2019, p. 32). This should not be understood literally, because he does not believe in a simple one-to-one correspondence between propositions and facts. Instead, Sbisà claims that his theory of truth involves linking statements to historical situations "with regard to which the assertion is to be assessed" (2019, p. 32). Sbisà explains that "correspondence to facts", in the case of assertions such as "It is true that p", implies that the relevant situation in the world "is as the assertion says it is" (2019, p. 32). Here, the context, including the speaker's aim in making that assertion, should be taken into account. However, Austin observes that not only assertions can be evaluated regarding the correspondence to facts. He also extends this kind of assessment to other types of speech acts, such as verdictives, expositives, behabitives, or exercitives. These types of

speech acts, instead of being true or false, might be judged as right, fair, justified, or appropriate, depending on the context and the goals of the speaker (2019, p. 33). Sbisà claims that what is at issue in these acts is "whether the speaker was right in performing that speech act for those aims in that context, given how things are in the world" (2019, pp. 33-34). According to her, these requirements are objective because they have to be complied with objectively (2019, p. 34):

> In order for an assertion to be true, it does not matter what the speaker or the receiver believe, it does not matter even what its evaluator believes: it matters how the assertion, as made in a certain speech situation with a certain descriptive content, actually relates to the historical situation to which it refers.

Sbisà emphasizes that these objective requirements are mind-transcendent, meaning that they exist independently of what any of the participants might believe. An assertion's truth, for example, is not determined by the beliefs of the speaker, the receiver, or even an external evaluator, but by how accurately the assertion relates to the situation it is meant to describe (2019, p. 34).

3.2.3. Joint meaning of speech acts

Another proposal developed within the interactional approach that has also highlighted the social nature of meaning is Antonella Carassa and Marco Colombetti's *joint meaning account*. In "Joint meaning" (2009) Carassa and Colombetti's main goal is to reconcile two intuitions that seem to be in conflict: 1) what a speaker means is a function of their communicative intentions and 2) the resulting meaning of successful communication is jointly construed by the speaker and the hearer (2009, p. 1838). To reconcile them, they establish a distinction between the *speaker's meaning* and the *joint meaning* of speech acts. While the former is defined as a personal communicative intention, the latter is understood as a type of propositional joint commitment. More specifically, they define the joint meaning as the propositional joint commitment of the speaker and the hearer "to the extent that a specific communicative act has been performed" (2009, p. 1851). It is also described as a deontic concept, i.e., it entails

rights, obligations, and entitlements, and cannot be reduced to volitional or epistemic mental states, such as beliefs or intentions.

To achieve their goal of reconciling the apparently conflicting intuitions, they use speech act theory as their theoretical framework, integrating Clark's view of communication (1996), and Gilbert's theory of joint commitment (1996). According to them, it is possible to distinguish two main approaches in speech act theory: one proposed by Austin and Searle, and another one developed by Strawson and Bach and Harnish. According to Austin and Searle, the performance of illocutionary acts depends on the existence of conventions. By contrast, as we pointed out above, Strawson and Bach and Harnish distinguish between conventional acts and communicative acts. For conventional acts to be successfully performed, specific conventions are required. However, communicative acts do not depend on conventions, but on the speaker having a specific communicative intention that the hearer must recognize.

In their characterization of the notion of *joint meaning*, they build on some of Clark's concepts, such as the concepts of *joint projects* or *joint commitments*. However, Carassa and Colombetti identify a problem in Clark's idea of commitment to a joint project. They argue that this commitment cannot be adequately defined in terms of epistemic or volitional mental states, as Clark suggests. Instead, they argue that the definition of joint commitment must include a clause concerning the obligations of the participants in the communicative exchange (2009, p. 1842). Moreover, they emphasize the need for a more precise characterization of the structure of joint commitments. To address these shortcomings, they turn to Gilbert's theory of joint commitment. According to Gilbert (1996), a joint commitment is a commitment between two or more individuals that establishes deontic relationships among them. Each party to the commitment is obligated to fulfill their part and has the right to expect that the other parties will do the same. Gilbert characterizes social commitments as desire-independent reasons for action, intentionally created by the involved parties. These commitments form a set of deontic relationships between the parties. They are related to intentions in that the commitment to perform an action logically entails certain obligations, which serve as practical reasons for forming the

intention to carry out that action. In line with Clark, these social commitments can be commitments to perform an action or propositional commitments.

Carassa and Colombetti also argue that the production of effects on the hearer by means of the performance of speech acts requires the securing of uptake, which also requires the recognition of reflexive communicative intentions (2009, p. 1844). According to them, having a reflexive intention recognized is a means to create social commitments (2009, p. 1846). They argue that the function of the reflexivity of intentions that determine the speaker's meaning is to achieve the level of overtness necessary to propose, accept, reject, or handle a social commitment between the speaker and the hearer (2009, p. 1847).

The notion of joint meaning they propose should be applied to conversational settings, i.e., joint activities of at least two subjects that involve certain joint commitments (2009, p. 1849). The function of the joint meaning, according to Carassa and Colombetti, is to "maintain a shared view of what is said" (2009, p. 1849). It is formed when the speaker and the hearer jointly commit to the fact that a specific communicative act has been performed by the speaker. It must be understood as a participatory act, where the speaker performs a communicative act, and the hearer takes it up. In this account, uptake does not merely consist in understanding the speaker's utterance or establishing a common belief. Rather, it must be understood as a deontic concept involving a commitment to the fact that the speaker has performed a concrete communicative act (2009, p. 1849). Joint meaning is, therefore, a joint commitment between two or more individuals.

Despite the importance of joint meaning, Carassa and Colombetti continue to emphasize the role of the speaker's meaning, noting that meaning cannot be fully explained in terms of a collective construction. Nonetheless, they stress the need to analyze both in conversational exchanges, and the extent to which they might or not coincide. According to them, the speaker's meaning, and the joint meaning will often coincide, but this need not be the case. However, the fact that they do not always coincide does not imply a logical contradiction or a violation of the joint commitment. In order to illustrate this, let's consider the following example provided by them in which a speaker, Alex, utters (2a):

(2a) Alex: I think I'm going for a walk.

In this case, Alex's communicative intention was, by means of his utterance, to inform his interlocutor, Barbara, about his plans, but without any intention to invite her to join. After this, the dialogue continues as follows:

(2b) Barbara: Sorry Albert, I'm too busy.
(2c) Alex: Pity. Well, I'll be back soon.

By means of (2b), Barbara shows that she interpreted Alex as not merely informing her about what he is going to do, but as inviting her to join. As Carassa and Colombetti observe, by means of (2c), Alex shows that the meaning jointly construed of his first utterance was an invitation. Hence, if Barbara changes her mind and responds to Alex's utterance by saying "Oh, well, I think my work can wait. But only a short walk, ok?", Alex cannot now, without consequences, say that his intention was not to invite her, but to just go alone for a walk. And this is so because in jointly construing the meaning of the utterance as an invitation, he acquires certain obligations, such as acting in a coherent way with regard to his previous invitation (2009, p. 1851).

3.2.4. Illocutionary acts and interaction

Maciej Witek (2019) has also proposed a new approach to meaning and communication that represents a significant contribution to the interactional approach. In the Austinian approach he proposes, using language "is a social practice that consists of performing conventional speech acts" (2019, p. 71). Here, by 'conventional' he refers to acts which are performed conforming to a convention, understood as a "socially controlled process that involves interactional negotiation" (2019, p. 71).

In his paper "An interactional account of illocutionary practice" Witek (2015) proposes an account which follows the Austinian view in considering that speech acts must be understood as context-changing social actions, in line with Sbisà (2009a). Specifically, he elaborates his own account following both Austin's (1962) speech act theory and Millikan's (2005) biological model of language.

In line with Austin, Witek draws on the distinction between the three types of effects associated with the performance of illocutionary acts: (i) securing of uptake, (ii) effects that change the normative facts, and (iii) the inviting of a response. The distinction between these three types of effects allows Witek to distinguish three approaches to the nature and structure of illocutionary acts (2013, 2015, p. 44). Each of them is associated with each illocutionary effect. He thus distinguishes between intentionalist, institutionalist and interactional approaches to speech acts. In the intentionalist approach, the performance of a speech act depends on "uttering a sentence with the intention to produce effect (i)" (2015, p. 44). It amounts to get the hearer to "recognize the force and the meaning of one's utterance (2015, p. 44). The institutionalist account takes the production of the illocutionary effect (ii) as the main function of illocutionary acts. Finally, in the interactional approach he proposes, the force of an illocutionary act is defined "in terms of the effect of the (iii) type" (2015, p. 45), that is, in terms of the "response that the act conventionally invites or attempts to elicit" (2015, p. 45). Here, it is important to stress that the notion of *convention* he is assuming has to do with patters of interaction to which the speaker appeals to when uttering a sentence, which involves two elements: the speaker's act and the hearer's response. To illustrate this, he offers the following example in which a boy goes to the kitchen and utters (3) (2015, p. 49):

(3) I'm hungry!

In this case, we can imagine that his father stands up and start making the boy a sandwich. Witek observes that, from an intentionalist perspective, this example would be explained by saying that the kid is performing two illocutionary acts: namely, he directly states that he is hungry, and indirectly he requests for food, where the second act "is conversationally implicated by the former and evokes the father's cooperative response" (2015, p. 49). From an interactional perspective, however, the boy can be taken to be performing a direct and conventional act. He is initiating the reproduction of a speaker-hearer pattern that involves the hearer doing what the speaker has requested (2015, p. 49). Here, it is important to distinguish between what Witek calls the primary and secondary interactive effects. The primary effect is related to the

"cooperative proper function of the act" (2015, p. 50). For instance, in (3), if it is understood, as Witek does, as a direct request, the primary interactive effect would be the boy's father making him a sandwich (2015, p. 50). The secondary effect occurs when one of the interlocutors wants to maintain conversational cooperation with the other but, for some reason, cannot respond by producing a primary interactive effect. An example of secondary interactive effect would be the father responding to the boy by uttering something like "There is a piece of pizza in the fridge" (2015, pp. 49-50).

In a nutshell, then, the interactional account proposed by Witek emphasizes the role that the third type of effect outlined by Austin, consisting in the inviting of a response. In this regard, in characterizing illocutionary effects, Witek also contends that "the force of an illocutionary act depends on its interactive effect construed as the hearer's conventional response to the act" (2015, p. 54).

3.2.5. Interaction in argumentation

To sum up, the interactional approach to speech acts offers a re-conceptualization of communication that takes place through the performance of speech acts and their meaning, emphasizing their social nature. This re-conceptualization aligns with the Austinian account, where speech acts are conceived as social actions and, more specifically, as context-changing actions.

In addition, normative proposals also highlight the role that the hearer plays in the performance of speech acts. Intentionalist or conventionalist approaches, such as those proposed by Searle or Bach and Harnish, only pay limited attention to the role of the hearer in communication. Specifically, from these perspectives, the hearer's role in communicative exchanges and, in particular, in the performance of the speech act, is a mere passive one, limited to the recognition of intentions and the understanding of the speaker's utterance. By contrast, within the interactional approach, the hearer plays an active role in the communicative process. Their interpretation of the speaker's utterance, as well as their own response, play a crucial role in determining the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance and in the successful performance of the act.

Another central aspect remarked by theorists whose proposal can be framed within the normative approach has to do with the illocutionary effects produced by

means of the performance of speech acts. As noted above, they are characterized as the production of changes in the normative position of the participants of the communicative exchange. These effects, as Sbisà argues, modify the set of rights, obligations, and entitlements of the participants, thereby showing the ability of speech acts to enact norms. In other words, they introduce changes in the normative landscape and the normative positions of the speaker and their audience. For this reason, along this dissertation, as we will see, I will refer to them as *normative* effects.

In my view, taking into account these elements is crucial because, as the advocates of the interactional approach contend, without considering them, it is difficult to provide a nuanced account of the complexities inherent to communication that occurs through speech acts. As I will show along the next chapters, this can be applied to the study of argumentation. In accounting for argumentation as a communicative activity and, more specifically, as a specific type of speech act, it is important to take into account its social dimension and how it changes the context and the normative position of arguers. In particular, it is important to understand how the social context changes *as a result of* the performance of speech acts of arguing, and how these changes differ from those produced by other types of speech acts. To address this, I will characterize the normative effects that are produced by means of acts of arguing as changes in the dialectical obligations and entitlements of the participants of argumentative exchanges. This requires a close examination of argumentative interactions focusing not only on the role of the speaker in performing the speech act, but also on the role of the interlocutor and the audience. The interlocutor's interpretation of the speaker's act of arguing is essential in determining the meaning of the speech act of arguing and its successful performance.

As I will argue, adopting a normative approach to speech acts enables us to provide a finer-grained characterization of argumentation as a speech act. This approach not only allows us to address the limitations of the Searlean framework (discussed in section 3.2) adopted by Pragma-dialectics and LNMA. It also allows us to account for the normative and context-changing dimension of communication that is also inherent in argumentative practices.

3.3. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical landscape of speech act theory, in order to have a clearer picture of the conceptual resources it offers for the analysis of argumentation. I have firstly presented some of the classical approaches to speech acts, starting with Austin's foundational approach to speech act theory. Then, I have presented some of the main challenges to the Austinian account proposed by Strawson, who reinterprets it from a Gricean perspective, highlighting the role of the securing of uptake in the successful performance of illocutionary acts, and criticizing the conventionality attributed by Austin to illocutionary acts. Along these lines, I have also outlined the main features of Searle's approach. Although it has been commonly conceived as a re-elaboration of the theory proposed by Austin, it significantly differs from it. Among other differences, Searle reformulates the Gricean concept of speaker's meaning in a way that it can account for the conventional features of speech acts. In line with Strawson, he also conceives the securing of uptake as the effect essentially connected to the performance of speech acts.

Due to several problems with these reinterpretations of Austin's work, the so-called *interactional* or *normative* approach to speech acts define them as social actions that produce changes in the normative positions of the participants of the communicative exchange. I have firstly presented Clark's account, where communication is understood as a joint action. I have also outlined the account developed by Sbisà, who adopts an Austinian perspective that emphasizes the role of conventional illocutionary effects, which confer the acts their conventional character. In addition, I have introduced the joint meaning account proposed by Carassa and Colombetti, which, building partially on Clark's account, defines joint meaning as propositional joint commitment to the extent that a certain communicative act has been performed. Finally, I have outlined the neo-Austinian interactional account proposed by Witek, where the third type of illocutionary effect distinguished by Austin defines, according to him, the interactional dimension of speech acts.

In the next chapters, I will offer a characterization of argumentation by adopting a normative approach to speech acts. This will allow me to account for the role played by the interlocutor in argumentative exchanges, as well as the specific normative effects produced by illocutionary acts of arguing. As I will argue, these consist in

bringing about changes in the dialectical obligations and entitlements of the participants of the argumentative exchanges. I will also argue that, by adopting this approach, we can account for the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing in a way that all these previous elements are considered, with important implications for the analysis of argumentative exchanges. After laying out the characterization of argumentation from a normative perspective in Chapters 3-4, in Chapter 5 we will see how this approach allows us to carry out a finer-grained analysis of certain dialectical fallacies, such as the straw man fallacy, where there is a gap between what a speaker means and how they are interpreted by the interlocutor, as well as the implications of this gap for the evaluation of argumentation.

Chapter 4[11]

Argumentation as a speech act: two levels of analysis

As we have been pointing out along previous chapters, the development of argumentation theory has been greatly influenced by speech act theory. Several proposals in argumentation theory make use of it as a general theoretical framework where it works as an analytical tool (Snoeck-Henkemans, 2014, p. 41). The conversational argument approach (Jacobs and Jackson, 1982, 1992; Jacobs, 1989) the normative pragmatics (Jacobs, 1998, 2000; Kauffeld, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001; Kauffeld and Innocenti, 2018; Kauffeld and Goodwin, 2022), or more recently, the account proposed by Lewiński (2021a, 2021c) are good examples of the use of speech act theory for analyzing argumentation.

However, in these kinds of theories, no specific type of speech act characterizes an illocutionary act of arguing. In this respect, there are two theories that deserve to be highlighted. As previously noted, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) proposed the pragma-dialectical approach in which the main goal of argumentation is to resolve a difference of opinion, and in which the act of arguing is conceived as an illocutionary

[11] This chapter revisits some of the key aspects and elements already presented in chapters 2 and 3. This is so because the content of this chapter is a version of a published article in *Topoi* (Haro Marchal, 2023), restructured and expanded to fit the format and requirements of a thesis chapter, and an effort has been made to preserve its integrity without significantly altering the original structure. This ensures that the chapter can be read in a relatively standalone manner, while also combining important aspects that were previously addressed separately.

act complex. According to them, "even the simplest argumentation for or against an expressed opinion contains […] at least two statements (cf. the datum and the warrant in Toulmin's model)" (1984, p. 32). Likewise, Bermejo-Luque (2011) proposes a linguistic-pragmatic model of argumentation in which she provides a characterization of the speech act of arguing as a second-order speech act complex which consists of adducing a reason (or reasons) and concluding a target-claim or conclusion. The speech act of arguing, from an illocutionary point of view, counts as an attempt by the speaker at showing that a target-claim is correct. Regardless of their differences, these proposals of arguing as an illocutionary act are of great interest because both make it much clearer that being a reason or being a target-claim depends on an illocutionary act which has its proper conditions. In other words, they make clear that a mere sequence of utterances does not become a case of argumentation.

Both theories follow Searle's (1969) account in considering that some conditions must be fulfilled for the speaker's utterance (or set of utterances) to count as a speech act of arguing. Applying the Searlean account to the analysis and characterization of argumentation allows Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation to provide a suitable definition of what it means for a speaker's utterance to constitute a speech act of arguing. However, the Searlean framework poses some challenges. In this regard, I will argue that it involves two interrelated issues, namely, that is leaves out (i) the active role played by the interlocutor in communication, and (ii) the normative effects that any speech act, including the act of arguing, brings about. These normative effects consist in the production of changes in what Sbisà (2006), following Austin's (1962) speech act theory, calls *Deontic Modal Competence*, i.e., the set of rights, obligations and entitlements that can be attributed to the participants of a communicative exchange and that can be modified and affected by the performance of speech acts. These effects concern not only the speaker's but also the interlocutor's obligations and entitlements.

Along this chapter, I will argue that to account for the active role played by the interlocutor in the performance of illocutionary acts of arguing and the specific normative effects produced by those acts, we must distinguish between two different levels in the analysis of the speech act of arguing: one related to the speaker's utterance, and another one related to the communicative exchange in which both the speaker

and the interlocutor are involved. At the first level, the successful performance of the illocutionary act of arguing is associated with the fulfilment of the condition of the securing of uptake by the speaker, understood as the speaker making her utterance graspable for a potential interlocutor[12]. By contrast. At the second level of analysis, in order to determine whether the illocutionary act of arguing has been successfully carried out, it is necessary to take into account the interlocutor's response. At this level, the illocutionary act of arguing refers to the speaker's act which involves and affects the interlocutor in a certain way, i.e., it brings about changes in both the speaker's and the interlocutor's set of rights, obligations, and entitlements. In this regard, at the second level of analysis, the successful performance of the illocutionary act of arguing would be associated with the production of changes in the deontic modal competence. In this chapter, for the characterization of the distinction between the two levels of analysis, I will draw from what in previous chapter we referred to as the interactional approach to speech acts (Corredor 2021; Witek 2015).

The structure of this chapter is the following. In section 4.1., I will briefly present the main features of the pragma-dialectical approach and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation. This will allow us to, in section 4.2., introduce the two interrelated problems associated with Searle's speech act theory adopted by both Pragma-Dialectis and the Linguistic Normative Model that are relevant to our discussion in this chapter. I will also present the main aspects of the interactional approach that will allow me to adopt it as an alternative to the Searlean one. Finally, I will argue that, despite the modifications that the pragma-dialectical approach introduces in the Searlean account, they are not enough to overcome the shortcomings associated with it. In section 4.3., I will present the two levels of analysis that must be distinguished to account for the illocutionary effects consisting in the production of changes in the deontic modal competence of arguers. As we will see, accounting for

[12] It is necessary to stress that this is one conception of the securing of uptake, but not the only one. The securing of uptake can be conceived, as Sluys (2018) as well as Bermejo-Luque (2011) do, as a necessary condition for the successful performance of the speech act. On the other hand, the securing of uptake can be characterized, as Strawson (1964) and Searle (1969) do, as an effect that the speaker overtly intends to produce. In the first case, to secure the uptake by the speaker would consist in making their words graspable for a potential hearer. By contrast, according to the second conception, the securing of uptake involves having the overt aim to get the hearer to understand the speaker's utterance.

these illocutionary effects is crucial to provide a characterization of argumentation that does not entail the issues associated with the Searlean view. My own solution will be contrasted with the Linguistic Normative Model. This will allow me to extend and complement this model in a way that it includes the aspects that are not taken into consideration by the Searlean framework. Finally, in section 4.4., I will draw the main conclusions of this chapter.

4.1. Two accounts of the illocutionary act of arguing

As we have seen, speech act theory has significantly influenced the development of argumentation theory. Notably, Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque 2011) (henceforth referred to as LNMA) are two proposals that develop a systematic and full-fledged model in which they provide different characterizations of the speech act of arguing. In this section, I will re-examine the key aspects of each model that will help me outline the main points of discussion within the Searlean framework they endorse.

4.1.1. The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation

The pragma-dialectical model of argumentation put forward by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) submits that the main goal of argumentation is resolving a difference of opinion in a critical discussion. As pointed out before, they adopt speech act theory and, more specifically, Searle's (1969) account, as their theoretical framework because, according to them, it constitutes the most appropriate framework for characterizing the speech act of arguing (1984, p. 23).

In their model, argumentation is conceived as a complex illocutionary act which is formed by elementary illocutions that have the illocutionary force of assertions which constitute an illocutionary set that stands in a relationship of justification (or refutation) of an expressed opinion (which is not part of the speech act of arguing) (1984, pp. 34-35). Although they draw from Searle's account of speech acts, they consider that it presents some problems that must be solved for his account to be applied to the analysis and characterization of argumentation. For instance, the Searlean approach only takes into account what van Eemeren and Grootendorst

consider the *communicative* aspects of language, leaving out what they consider as their interactional aspects, which are expressed "in attempts to bring about perlocutionary effects" (1984, p. 23). In the case of argumentation, they contend that the speech act of arguing is always performed with the intention to produce two types of effects, namely, the illocutionary effect of *understanding* and the perlocutionary effect of *acceptance*[13].

As already mentioned, van Eemeren and Grootendorst identify several problems in the Searlean view of speech acts that need to be addressed before its application to the characterization of argumentation as a specific type of speech act. As Snoeck-Henkemans (2014, p. 43) points out, the speech act of argumentation, as it is characterized in Pragma-dialectics, can be distinguished from the standard Searlean approach in three aspects. First, in Pragma-dialectics, argumentation consists of (at least) two statements which can be expressed in more than one sentence (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, p. 32; Snoeck-Henkemans 2014, p. 43). Second, "argumentative utterances always have a dual illocutionary force: taken individually they are assertives, but together they form an argumentation" (Snoeck-Henkemans 2014, p. 43). Finally, a speech act "can only be regarded as argumentation if it is linked to another speech act which expresses a standpoint" (2014, p. 43).

The solution offered by van Eemeren and Grootendorst to these problems is based on the distinction between the illocutionary forces at the sentence level and at the textual level (1984, p. 34). Argumentation is understood as an illocutionary act complex which consists of elementary illocutions. The set of these elementary illocutions (which have the illocutionary force of assertions) is what constitutes the illocutionary act complex of arguing.

In order to characterize the speech act of arguing based on the (modified) Searlean account, van Eemeren and Grootendorst formulate the constitutive conditions that must be fulfilled for the illocutionary act of arguing to be happily performed, i.e., for it to count as a speech act of arguing (1984, p. 40). Among the conditions for the performance of the speech act, they distinguish between the

[13] They also distinguish between inherent and consecutive perlocutionary effects. The former would consist in the acceptance by the hearer of the speaker's act, while the latter would encompass the rest of possible consequences of their act (1984, p. 24).

recognition conditions and the correctness conditions (1984, p. 42). They establish this distinction because they consider that "[...] although an illocution may be recognized (e.g., the listener knows that the speaker intends to perform a particular illocution), it need not necessarily have to be entirely correct [...]." (1984, p. 41). In this regard, they claim that for the illocutionary act of arguing to be actually performed, the conditions that must be fulfilled by the speaker are the propositional content condition and the essential condition, which are formulated as follows (1984, p. 43)[14]:

> 1. Propositional content condition: the constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,...,S_n) consists of assertives in which propositions are expressed.
>
> 2. Essential condition: advancing a constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,...,S_n) counts as an attempt by S [the speaker] to justify O [the expressed opinion] to L's satisfaction, i.e. to convince L [the listener] of the acceptability of O.

In addition, for the illocutionary act of arguing to be considered as correctly performed, the following correctness conditions must be fulfilled by the speaker, which are the preparatory and the sincerity conditions (1984, p. 44):

> 3. Preparatory conditions:
> i. S believes that L does not (in advance, completely, automatically) accept the expressed opinion O.
> ii. S believes that L will accept the propositions expressed in the statements S_1, S_2 (,...,S_n).
> iii. S believes that L will accept the constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,...,S_n) as a justification of O.
>
> 4. Sincerity conditions:
> i. S believes that O is acceptable.
> ii. S believes that the propositions expressed in the statements S_1, S_2 (,...,S_n) are acceptable.

[14] Here, I will focus on the conditions for pro-argumentation.

iii. S believes that the constellation of statements S_1, S_2 (,...,S_n) constitutes an acceptable justification of O.

An important point here is that according to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, if the recognition conditions are not fulfilled by the speaker, then the speech act of arguing has not been performed. Regarding the correctness conditions, if they have not been fulfilled, the illocutionary act of arguing would have been performed, but it would not constitute a correct illocutionary act complex of arguing. The consequences produced by the non-fulfillment of each of these conditions is different. However, for our purposes in this chapter, the failures of interest are limited to the failure in the essential condition and the second and third preparatory conditions, which will be addressed in section 4.2.

4.1.2. The Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation

LNMA, developed by Bermejo-Luque (2011), is framed within a pragmatic-linguistic approach to argumentation that incorporates a critical re-elaboration of Toulmin's (1958) material conception of inference. As previously pointed out, in this model, argumentation is understood as a communicative activity consisting in an attempt by the speaker at showing that a target-claim is correct, that is, at justifying a target-claim, and it is characterized as a specific type of speech act.

As we have seen, Bermejo-Luque also identifies a set of problems in Pragma-dialectics that she addresses in her proposal. The first one has to do with van Eemeren and Grootendorst's consideration of convincing as the intrinsic perlocutionary goal of argumentation (2011, p. 59). According to Bermejo–Luque, convincing would be one of the multiple goals that we could have when we argue, but not the only one. The second problem involves the way Pragma-dialectics excludes the claim the speaker is trying to justify from the speech act of arguing. Bermejo-Luque argues that by doing this, in the pragma-dialectical model the speech act of arguing would be equivalent to the speech act of adducing. The reason why Bermejo–Luque considers this a problem for Pragma-dialectics is because, according to her, it poses serious consequences

regarding the formulation of the constitutive conditions that would make a set of utterances count as an act of arguing (2011, p. 59). Finally, the third problem she notices in Pragma-dialectics is that, although they characterize argumentation as an illocutionary act complex, they do so because they consider that the warrant is part of the act of adducing, whereas for Bermejo-Luque the speech act of arguing is a complex one because she takes the act of concluding as one of its constitutive parts (2011, pp. 59–60).

As already mentioned, Bermejo–Luque follows Searle (1969) in considering that there are certain conditions that must be fulfilled for the speaker's utterance to count as a speech act of arguing. She characterizes the speech act of arguing as a second-order speech act complex formed by two speech acts, namely, the speech act of adducing (a reason) and the speech act of concluding (a target-claim)[15]. These are second-order speech acts because they can only be carried out by means of performing first-order speech acts; in particular, in LNMA the act of adducing and the act of concluding are carried out by means of performing two constative speech acts (R and C), which can be performed either directly or indirectly, or literally or non-literally (2011, p. 60). The constative speech acts R and C become speech acts of adducing a reason and concluding a target-claim because there is an implicit inference-claim which establishes a relationship between the content of both constative speech acts (2011, p. 60).

According to the conventional approach to speech acts she endorses, for the speaker's utterance to conventionally count as a speech act of arguing, the speaker must count as fulfilling certain conditions. Following Searle, she claims that these are "constitutive conditions that make certain performances acts of arguing" (2011, p. 70). The conditions she formulates for the illocutionary act of arguing are the following (2011, pp. 71-72):

---

[15] Hitchcock (2007) also conceives adducing and concluding as speech acts. However, while for Bermejo-Luque both acts are characterized as constative speech acts, for Hitchcock the act of concluding can be a constative, but also any other type of speech act. Lewiński (2021c) holds a similar view regarding the conclusions of practical arguments.

Preparatory conditions:

(i) *S* believes that a claim *R*, having such and such pragmatic force, may be taken to be correct by *L* [the listener].

(ii) It makes sense to attribute to *S* a conditional claim, with a certain pragmatic force, whose antecedent is "*R is correct*," and whose consequent is "*C is correct*".

(iii) *S* takes the correctness of a claim C to be in question within the context of the speech-act.

(iv) *S* takes a claim *R* to be a means to show a target-claim *C* to be correct.

Propositional content conditions:

(v) The content of the reason is that a claim *R'* is correct.

(vi) The content of the target-claim is that a claim *C'* is correct.

Sincerity conditions:

(vii) *S* believes the propositional content of *R* in a certain way and to a certain extent, namely, the way and extent that correspond to the pragmatic force of the claim *R'*.

(viii) *S* believes that *R* being correct is a means to show that a target-claim *C* is correct.

(ix) *S* believes the propositional content of *C* in a certain way and to a certain extent, namely, the way and extent that correspond to the epistemic pragmatic force of the target-claim *C*.

Essential conditions:

(x) Adducing *R* with such and such pragmatic force is a means to show that a target-claim *C* is correct.

(xi) *S* aims to show that a target-claim *C* is correct.

Let's illustrate this with the following example offered by Bermejo-Luque (2019, p. 664):

(1) I promise I'll take care, so don't worry

Bermejo–Luque characterizes this utterance as a speech act of arguing in which two other acts are carried out: a speech act of adducing (a reason) and a speech act of concluding (a target-claim). According to her, two first-order speech acts (a promise and an advice) are reconstructed "as two indirect speech-acts of claiming connected to each other by the corresponding inference-claim" (2011, p. 60). In her account, the utterance of "I promise I will take care" constitutes a speech act of adducing in (1). This is so because, by uttering it, the speaker does not only promise that she will take care but, since she has also implicitly made the claim that, if (it is true that) she commits herself to take care, then (it is true that) the hearer does not have to worry, she is also adducing as a reason that she commits herself to take care (2011, p. 65). The utterance of "don't worry" constitutes an act of concluding in (1) because in uttering it, the speaker is suggesting the hearer not to worry; given that she has implicitly claimed that if (it is true that) she commits herself to take care, then (it is true that) the hearer should not worry, she indirectly claims that the hearer should not worry, thus turning this act into an act of concluding (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p. 66).

In the following section, I will outline the main problems within the Searlean approach that are relevant to the aims of this chapter and the broader scope of this dissertation. Additionally, I will summarize the key ideas of the interactional approach that will guide the solution I propose in this chapter to address the issues related to the Searlean framework.

4.2. An alternative to the Searlean account: the interactional approach to speech acts

The Searlean characterization of the speech act of arguing provided by Pragma-dialectics and LNMA gives raise to some important questions. Firstly, it poses the question of whether it is appropriate to say that a speech act of arguing has been successfully carried out if the interlocutor's response is irrelevant for the performance of the speech act. In addition, if one only takes into account what a speaker does, it seems difficult to account for the changes in the set of rights, obligations, and entitlements of the participants of the communicative process that are produced by a speech act of arguing. Finally, we can also ask whether what we want to do when we

argue is limited to trying to make our utterances understandable or getting our interlocutor to understand our utterances.

These questions, which were firstly formulated in relation to speech acts in general, have been considered by many authors whose proposals are framed within the interactional approach to speech acts presented in the previous chapter (Carassa and Colombetti, 2009; Clark, 1996; Sbisà, 2006, 2009a; Witek, 2015, 2019). We will see how these considerations are also applicable to the characterization of the speech act of arguing.

4.2.1. Two problems in the Searlean account

Although Searle's (1969) approach to speech acts has greatly influenced the development of speech act theory in general, as well as the study of argumentation, it has also given rise to important criticisms, such as the one pointed out by Clark (1996). According to Clark (1996, p. 137), in Searle's view it is irrelevant whether the speaker's act is received, read, or understood by a hearer[16]. Clark points out that "this view is, of course, absurd. There can be no communication without listeners taking actions too—without them understanding what speakers mean" (1996, p. 138). As we have previously mentioned, Clark's criticisms have been subsequently taken up by other interactional approaches (Carassa and Colombetti, 2009, p. 1840; Sbisà, 2009a, p. 37). Among the various issues raised by interactional accounts in relation to the Searlean view discussed in the previous chapter, I will focus on two interrelated problems within the Searlean perspective that these approaches have pointed out. The first one is related to the mere passive role that such perspective attributes to the interlocutor, while the second one consists in that it leaves out the normative effects brought about by speech acts. Let's now see these criticisms in more detail.

As Sbisà (2009a, p. 35) indicates, Strawson (1964), motivated by his intention to make Austin's proposal compatible with the Gricean theoretical framework, played a fundamental role in advancing and promoting the subsequent consideration of the

[16] Clark's remark needs to be clarified. In formulating the first condition for the performance of an illocutionary act, Searle (1969, p. 57) claims that they include "such things as that the speaker and the hearer both know how to speak the language [...].", among other things. What is irrelevant in Searle's account is the need of the hearer's response for the performance of the speech act.

securing of uptake as the central illocutionary effect associated with the successful performance of a speech act. Searle agrees with Strawson in considering the securing of uptake as the only illocutionary effect that is essentially connected with the performance of an illocutionary act. In their view, this effect is conceived as the only illocutionary effect that must be overtly intended by the speaker in order to carry out a certain illocutionary act. Here is where the two interrelated problems that I mentioned above arise. The first issue, illustrated by Clark's remarks, is that this perspective assigns a mere passive role to the hearer: if the only thing needed for the successful performance of an illocutionary act is that the speaker overtly intends to secure the uptake, then the interlocutor's response seems to play no role in the performance of the illocutionary act. Clark's (1996, p. 139) own view, elaborated along Austinian terms, differs from Searle's (1969) in two respects. Firstly, Clark (1996) can be attributed a characterization of the securing of uptake that differs from the one offered by Searle and Strawson (as well as the one offered by Sluys (2018) and adopted by Bermejo-Luque). Contrary to Searle's view of the uptake, for Clark this notion refers to the hearer's response which shows the hearer's recognition (i.e., understanding) of the speaker's act. Secondly, Clark assumes that the securing of uptake thus conceived (i.e., as the hearer's response which shows their recognition of the speaker's act), and not only the speaker's overt intention to achieve it, is needed for the successful performance of an illocutionary act[17].

Relatedly, the second problem has to do with the fact that the Searlean perspective leaves out the second type of illocutionary effect formulated by Austin (1962, p. 116), i.e., the effect consisting in the production of changes in the normative facts (that is, in the set of rights, obligations and entitlements of the participants of the communicative process). As already mentioned, this set of obligations, rights and entitlements is what Sbisà calls the *Deontic Modal Competence* (2006, p. 158). The fact that the Searlean approach disregards the illocutionary effect (ii) in the characterization of speech acts entails an important consequence, namely, that we would not be able to explain how it is possible that, when we carry out certain speech acts, the interpersonal relationship between speakers and interlocutors changes.

[17] For a detailed discussion about the different conceptions of the securing of uptake, see McDonald (2021).

Let's illustrate this with a very common example. When someone utters (2):

(2) I promise I will be there at 8:00 pm

given the fulfillment of the conditions put forward by Searle (1969, pp. 57–61) (i.e., the propositional content condition, preparatory conditions, sincerity condition and the essential condition), we can say that the speaker has carried out an illocutionary act of promising, which is successfully performed when the speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect (understood as the hearer's understanding of the speaker's utterance) by means of getting the hearer to recognize the speaker's intention to produce that effect (1969, p. 60).

The characterization of the actual and successful performance of a speech act as dependent on these conditions allows Pragma-dialectics and LNMA to account for argumentation in terms of what the speaker does, i.e., in terms of the sentence (or sentences) uttered by the speaker which (given the fulfillment of these conditions) would constitute a speech act of arguing. The interlocutor's response would not be necessary for the successful performance of the speaker's act. The interlocutor's role in communication and, more specifically, in the performance of the illocutionary act, is here reduced to just hearing (and understanding) the speaker's utterance. In my view, this approach neglects how actual communicative processes work, where normally the speaker and interlocutor participate in the conversation actively, responding in a certain way[18], and exchanging their role along the process.

Secondly, Searle's characterization does not take into account how the performance of the illocutionary act (in this case, the illocutionary act of promising) changes the deontic modal competence of both the speaker and the interlocutor. In uttering (2), if the speaker gets the interlocutor to listen and understand their utterance, the speaker is acquiring a certain commitment, namely, that of delivering what has been promised. In this sense, the speaker's deontic modal competence would have

[18] I do not mean here that the interlocutor is always obliged to say something as a response explicitly. We can imagine a lot of situations where the response that we expect from out interlocutor is merely implicit, as when I order my kid to set the table or when my doctor informs me of my next appointment time.

changed, but also the interlocutor's. When a speaker promises something, in addition to the commitment they acquire, they also change the normative facts for their interlocutor: if the interlocutor responds (either explicitly or implicitly) by displaying how the speaker's act has been received, then we would be able to say whether the speech act of promising has been successfully performed, i.e., whether the changes in the deontic modal competence have been produced, and thus, whether the interlocutor has acquired the legitimate expectation that the speaker will keep their promise. In the case of (2), for instance, if they have agreed to go to the movies, then the interlocutor will be entitled to expect the speaker to fulfill the promise to not be late.

Thus, we can see how both speaker's and interlocutor's interpersonal relationship has changed: by means of the speaker's utterance and the interlocutor's response they have introduced changes in the set of their rights, obligations, and entitlements, that is, in their deontic modal competence. And this is not an effect only associated with promises. It is an effect associated with the performance of any type of speech act (Sbisà, 2007, 2009a), and which must be taken into account in order to offer a plausible explanation of how communication actually works. Also, the consideration of this second type of illocutionary effect involves taking into account the role of the interlocutor as not limited to merely hearing and understanding, but also as an active actor in the communicative process. The production of the normative effects associated with a speech act is not up to the speaker; the interlocutor's response is what determines if the illocutionary act has been successfully performed, i.e., if the normative effects have been brought about.

4.2.2. The interactional approach to Speech Acts

In this section, I will outline the solution to these challenges proposed by the interactional approach. As we have previously pointed out, an interactional approach to speech acts can be defined, as Corredor (2021, p. 464) does, as one that explains the illocutionary meaning of utterances by considering not only the speaker's communicative intentions, but also the hearer's recognition and interpretation in response to the speaker's utterances.

Since I have already detailed the different proposals within this approach in the previous chapter, here I will focus on the key insights from Witek's (2015) and Sbisà's (2006, 2009a) interactional proposals regarding the two specific problems addressed in this chapter.

As previously pointed out, Witek (2015) elaborates an interactional account following both Austin's speech act theory (1962) and Millikan's (2005) biological model of language. To do so, he draws on the distinction between the three effects that Austin (1962, pp. 115–116) associates with the performance of every speech act, i.e., (i) securing of uptake, (ii) producing effects that change the normative facts, and (iii) the inviting of a response. In his interactional account, the force of an illocutionary act is defined "in terms of the effect of the (iii) type" (2015, p. 45), that is, in terms of "the response that the act conventionally invites or attempts to elicit" (2015, p. 45), thus emphasizing the role played by the hearer in the performance of the act and, more specifically, by the hearer's response. As previously observed, the notion of convention he endorses is related to patterns of interaction that involves two elements, namely, the speaker's act and the hearer's response: "the act's interactive effect is the response it invites under the conventional pattern of interaction invoked by the speaker or, more appropriately, negotiated by the participants in speech situation", where this pattern "consists of two complementary parts: the speaker's act and the hearer's cooperative response to it" (2015, p. 45).

On the other hand, Sbisà also offers a criticism of the Searlean approach to the role of the hearer. In her normative account, outlined in the previous chapter, the interlocutor plays an essential role in communication. Specifically, Sbisà contends that "since the successful performance of the illocutionary act [...] depends on intersubjective agreement as manifested in the hearer's response, in order to determine whether some effect has actually been achieved [...], the hearer's response has to be examined too" (2006, p. 161).

In addition, Sbisà also addresses the second problem associated with the Searlean approach, i.e., that it leaves out what Austin refers to as the second type of illocutionary effect. To do so, she delves into Austin's characterization of this second type of effect. According to Sbisà (2006, p. 154), in Austin's account the intersubjective relationship of the interlocutors is affected by the performance of the illocutionary act.

This act is associated with the production of conventional effects, which are brought about only if there is intersubjective agreement on its production. The production of these conventional effects amounts to the production of changes in what Sbisà (2006, p. 158–159) refers to as the deontic modal competence. In this regard, it is communication through the performance of illocutionary acts what produces changes in the deontic modal competence of the agents.

She stands against the view of uptake offered by Strawson (1964) and Searle (1969). As both Strawson and Searle do, Sbisà assumes "the indispensability (already stated by Austin) of uptake as a condition for the successful performance of illocutionary acts" (2009a, p. 34). However, what she finds problematic is their consideration of the securing of uptake as the only effect that must be overtly intended.

Sbisà (2009a, p. 44), delving into the characterization of Austin's second type of illocutionary effect, claims that, in order to illustrate this effect, Austin (1962, p. 117) uses as an example the case of naming a ship. In this case, the effect of the act consists in that the ship acquires a specific name, and furthermore, that other acts like, for example, referring to the ship by using a different name, would be out of order (Sbisà, 2009a, p. 44). She claims that this effect is associated with the performance not only of conventional acts, as previously characterized, but with every illocutionary act. This interpretation, in her view, fits well with Austin's account.

This example allows her to offer her own characterization of this illocutionary effect. Sbisà claims that, in the case of the effect of naming a ship, this effect consists in introducing changes in the norms. In particular, it consists in the enactment of a norm which manifests itself in the performance of subsequent acts related to the particular illocutionary act of naming a ship, and in how these subsequent acts are assessed. She claims that the effect consisting in the creation of a norm depends on what the speaker does being "socially accepted as having that effect" (2009a, p. 46). Sbisà concludes that "what is revealing of the conventionality of the illocutionary act (understood as the conventionality of its effects) is the need to secure uptake" (2009a, p. 49), where the effect is conventional because it depends on the agreement between the members of the social community. This agreement, in turn, depends on the securing of uptake, not on its interpretation as an intention to secure it, but as an actual uptake.

4.2.3. Is Pragma-dialectics a solution?

As previously pointed out, the pragma-dialectical approach introduces a set of modifications in the Searlean account of speech acts in order to apply it to the analysis of argumentation. These changes allow van Eemeren and Grootendorst to account for what, according to them, are the interactional aspects of the language use. In the case of argumentation, these interactional aspects have to do with the perlocutionary act of convincing. Because of the changes they introduce in Searle's theory, which allow them to introduce into their analysis of argumentation what they consider to be the interactional aspects of language, one might think that the problems attributed to the Searlean approach do not apply to their model, or even that their model poses a solution to them. After all, they explicitly introduce these interactional aspects as a constitutive part of argumentation. The question we should ask at this point is whether their sense of "interaction" is the same as the one embodied in the interactionist theories discussed before. As we will see, the type of interactional aspects that Pragma-dialectics takes into account not only differ from those presented in Chapter 3 and the previous section, but also do not allow us to solve the two interrelated problems that have been exposed, which can be summarized as follows:

1. The listener is attributed a mere passive role in the performance of speech acts.
2. The normative effects that are produced through the performance of speech acts of argumentation are left out.

Taken these previous considerations into account, let's see the reasons why Pragma-dialectics would not solve the first problem. In characterizing the speech act of arguing, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 23, 25) claim that, when we perform speech acts, we do so with the intention not only to get the listener to understand our speech act, but also to produce the perlocutionary effect of getting the listener to accept our speech act. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst distinguish between the recognition and the correctness conditions that must be fulfilled for a happy performance of a speech act of arguing. These are the conditions that "the speaker must fulfill if by uttering a complex of utterances he wishes to perform the compound

illocution of argumentation [...]." (1984, p. 40), and furthermore "that the listener may regard as having been fulfilled when he decides to treat a complex of utterances as argumentation." (1984, p. 40). According to them (1984, pp. 43–44), if the recognition conditions are not fulfilled by the speaker, the illocutionary act complex of argumentation has not been performed. By contrast, if the correctness conditions have not been fulfilled, the illocutionary act of arguing would have been performed, but not correctly.

In the formulation of both the recognition and the correctness conditions for the speech act of arguing, they introduce the listener in different ways. In the case of the recognition conditions, they formulate the essential condition of the act of arguing as an attempt by the speaker to convince the listener of the acceptability of the expressed opinion. On the other hand, in the case of the correctness conditions, they formulate the preparatory conditions in terms of the beliefs that the speaker attributes to the listener regarding the acceptability of the expressed opinion (first preparatory condition), the acceptability of the propositions expressed in the statements (second preparatory condition), or the acceptability of the constellation of statements as a justification of the expressed opinion (third preparatory condition).

What seems to be here an attempt to account for the listener as an active part of the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing does not actually solve the problem formulated in section 4.2.2. The crucial point here is that the active participation of the listener is not necessary to carry out the speech act of arguing. As they put it, what is necessary for the speaker's utterance to count as a speech act of arguing (not necessarily as a correct one) is that the speaker fulfills the propositional content condition and the essential condition. They explicitly contend that the speech act of arguing, to be performed, does not necessarily need to be correctly performed: "the consequences [of an incorrect performance of the act] for both S and L may therefore be precisely the same as if it had been." (1984, p. 44). If the recognition conditions (i.e., the propositional content condition and the essential condition) are fulfilled, then the listener is able to consider that the illocutionary act of arguing has been performed (either correctly or incorrectly) (1984, p. 44). Whether the illocutionary act of arguing has been correctly performed depends on factors that go beyond the conditions of its actual performance, in which the listener would still play a purely passive role.

Now that we have outlined a response to the question of why Pragma-dialectics does not solve the first of the problems, let's see why the theory also entails the second problem. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst argue that "argumentation may succeed while the attempt to convince fails." (1984, p. 50). This is the reason why they make a distinction between the happiness conditions of the illocutionary acts of arguing and the perlocutionary act of convincing (1984, p. 50). According to them, the speech act of arguing has been happily performed if the speaker has performed it correctly and if they have achieved the illocutionary effect consisting in that the listener has understood the speaker's act as an attempt to convince them of the acceptability of an expressed opinion (1984, p. 50). On the other hand, the perlocutionary act of convincing can be considered as happily performed if the speaker gets the listener to accept the expressed opinion (1984, p. 50). The difference between the conditions for each type of act, as they contend, can be found in the formulation of the second and third preparatory conditions they set for the act of arguing (1984, p. 50). These conditions, as they point out, are formulated from the speaker's perspective regarding the listener's attitude towards "the acceptability of the propositions expressed in statements S_1 S_2 (,...,S_n) or of the justificatory or refutatory potentiality of that constellation in respect of the expressed opinion O" (1984, p. 50). Regarding these conditions, they claim that, in the case of the perlocutionary act of convincing, it would be successfully carried out if the listener "actually subscribes to the attitude attributed to him by the speaker or at least if he wishes to tie himself down to that attitude." (1984, p. 50).

Here it is necessary to stress that the kind of interaction that they have in mind and that they consider in order to characterize the speech act of arguing differs from the one endorsed by the interactional approaches presented above, and that I also adopt in order to offer a solution to the interrelated problems. Following Corredor (2021), I consider that the characterization of the perlocutionary act of the speech act of arguing as convincing is legitimate. However, as Corredor points out, for van Eemeren and Grootendorst:

> [...] a complex speech act is an act of arguing provided that, and to the extent that, the listener grasps the attempt by the speaker to convince them

> [...]. I do not share the underlying intuition that the communicative (illocutionary) dimension of argumentation consists of the listener's understanding the speaker's attempt, and that the interactional aspect is constrained to the perlocutionary effects. [...] Instead, an alternative concept of interaction can be taken into account. (2021, p. 461).

In the interactional approaches to speech acts presented before, the interactional aspects of language concern the illocutionary acts, i.e., what in Pragma-dialectics belongs to the communicative aspects. Furthermore, in contrast to the interactional approaches to speech acts, in Pragma-dialectics the illocutionary effects associated with the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing are limited to the understanding by the listener of the speaker's act, leaving out the normative effects associated with the performance of any speech act[19].

4.3. Two levels in the analysis of the illocutionary act of arguing

In analyzing argumentation, we might have two different interests: on the one hand, we can be interested in accounting for what the speaker does, the speaker's utterance; on the other hand, we can be interested in accounting for the communicative exchange that takes place between a speaker and an interlocutor in argumentation, which is associated with the production of certain normative effects. In my view, LNMA provides a more adequate approach to the former because it avoids the issues that Bermejo-Luque points out in the pragma-dialectical model (see section 1.2.), allowing for a better explanation of why a speaker's utterance may count as a speech act of arguing. By contrast, the main virtue of the interactional account presented above is that it enables us to account for speech acts as communicative exchanges involving a speaker and an interlocutor, as well as for the normative effects that they bring about.

---

[19] Here it must be pointed out that van Eemeren and Grootendorst consider the obligations that the speaker and the listener acquire when the perlocutionary act of convincing has been happily performed. For instance, once the perlocutionary act has been performed, the listener can regard the speaker as committed to the expressed opinion, and the listener would be considered by the speaker as committed to the expressed opinion (1984, pp. 50, 69). However, once again these obligations are characterized in terms of the perlocutionary consequences of the speech act of arguing, i.e., the perlocutionary effect of convincing.

In this section, I will offer a solution to the two interrelated problems outlined along section 4.2, which will allow us to retain the main virtues of LNMA and Pragma-dialectics, while at the same time incorporating the insights of interactional approaches. To exemplify my solution, I will contrast it with LNMA, focusing on the discussion of Bermejo-Luque's example (1).

Specifically, I will argue that, to avoid the problems of the Searlean perspective, we must distinguish two different levels in the analysis of the speech act of arguing. This distinction will allow us to account for what constitutes a successful performance of an illocutionary act of arguing within each level. The first level of analysis is associated with the speaker's utterance, whereas the second level is associated with the communicative exchange, where both speaker and interlocutor play an essential role in the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing. At the first level, in order to know if the illocutionary act of arguing has been successfully performed, we only need to take into account the speaker's utterance. Furthermore, at this level, the happy performance of the illocutionary act of arguing just requires the fulfillment of the condition of the securing of uptake (as it is conceived by Bermejo-Luque) by the speaker. By contrast, when we situate ourselves at the second level (i.e., the level of the communicative exchange), in order to determine whether the speech act of arguing has been successfully carried out, we need to take into account not only the speaker's utterance, but also the interlocutor's response. The interlocutor's response is what shows how they have received the speaker's act and thus, if the normative effects (i.e., the changes in the deontic modal competence) have been produced. If this is the case, then we can say that, from this level of analysis, the speech act of arguing has been successfully performed.

As we will see, the distinction between these two levels allows us to show how the evaluation of the same act of arguing varies depending on the level which we pay attention to.

Let's consider again example (1):

(1) I promise I'll take care, so don't worry

Here, as already pointed out, if the speaker fulfills certain conditions, then their utterance would count as an attempt at showing that a target-claim is correct, i.e., as an act of arguing. At the first level, the level of the speaker's utterance, the only thing that is needed for the speaker's act of arguing to be considered as successfully performed is that they count as trying to justify a target-claim. In order to count as trying to justify a target-claim, they must count as fulfilling certain conditions (2011, p. 72), which in LNMA would also involve the securing of uptake (that is, they must make their utterance graspable for a potential interlocutor).

This example shows that, if we situate ourselves at the first level of analysis, a Searlean approach, such as the one adopted by Bermejo-Luque, can account for speech acts of arguing whose performance depends solely on what the speaker does, namely, the speaker's utterances. However, as I have argued, this Searlean characterization of the speech act of arguing only in terms of what the speaker does entails the two interrelated problems presented along the previous sections. In order to overcome these problems, my proposal consists in distinguishing a second level of analysis, where not only the speaker, but also the interlocutor play a fundamental role. In this second level, the successful performance of a speech act of arguing is associated with the production of normative effects (i.e., changes in the deontic modal competence). The normative effects of illocutionary acts of arguing can be conceptualized as *prima facie* obligations, entitlements, and commitments of both the speaker and the interlocutor. As we will see along the next chapters, these effects establish a mutual binding of the speaker and interlocutor to a standard of evaluation, working as a regulative device that allows us to evaluate the quality of subsequent dialectical moves carried out by both the speaker and the interlocutor. These normative effects include the following:

- The interlocutor's legitimate expectation that the speaker can provide more reasons to justify the target-claim if requested to do so by the interlocutor.
- The interlocutor's entitlement to ask for reasons to show why the reasons already provided justify the target-claim.
- The speaker's commitment to the truth of the implicit inference-claim.

- The speaker's obligation to provide more reasons (reasons to show why the reasons already provided justify the target-claim) if requested to do so by the interlocutor.
- The interlocutor's entitlement to challenge the reasons adduced and the implicit inference-claim as a means to justify the target-claim.
- The interlocutor's conditional commitment to accept the correctness of the target-claim unless they can produce reasons to the contrary.
- The interlocutor's acceptance of the burden of criticism in challenging the speaker's argument[20].
- The speaker's commitment to addressing potential counterarguments and objections.

Now let's consider this re-elaboration of example (1):

(3) a. I promise I will take care, so don't worry.
b. Ok. Don't forget to take lots of pictures!
c. Sure!

In this case, in order to know whether the speech act performed by the utterance of (3a) constitutes a successful illocutionary act of arguing, we need to pay attention to the second level, which means that we need to take into account the interlocutor's response (3b). It is this response what shows how the interlocutor has received the speaker's utterance, and hence whether the speaker's utterance counts as a speech act of arguing in this second sense. In this case, the interlocutor's response (3b) shows that they have received the act performed by the speaker as an act of arguing. When this is the case, it can be said that the normative effects have been produced and, therefore, that the speech act of arguing has been successfully carried out. The set of rights, obligations, and entitlements of both the speaker and the interlocutor has changed; now we can say that the interlocutor has a legitimate expectation that the speaker is able to provide more reasons to show the correctness of the target-claim, that the

[20] The concept of *burden of criticism*, introduced by van Laar and Krabbe, corresponds to "the dialectical obligation of an opponent to adequately react to the criticisms of her criticisms" (2013, p. 202).

speaker is thus obliged to provide more reasons if requested to do so by the interlocutor, and so on.

As I have argued, the distinction between the two levels of analysis is relevant because the interlocutor's response is what shows us how the speaker's act has been interpreted and, thus, whether the normative effects associated with the performance of the illocutionary act have been produced. To see more clearly the importance of distinguishing between the two levels of analysis, consider the consequences of the following variation in the interlocutor's response:

(4) a. I promise I will take care, so don't worry.
b. Every time I've been in the car with you, I've seen you using the cell phone and exceeding the speed limit. So, please, don't make promises that you won't keep.
c. Okay. Well, goodbye then.

Once again, if we situate ourselves at the first level of analysis, taking into account only (4a), it is correct to claim that (given that some conditions have been fulfilled) the illocutionary act of arguing has been successfully performed: the speaker has secured the uptake of their utterance, so it counts as an attempt at showing that a target-claim is correct. However, if we pay attention to the second level (the level of the communicative exchange) and consider the interlocutor's response (4b) as well, can we still say that the speech act of arguing has been successfully performed? In this case, by means of (4b), the interlocutor is raising doubts about the commitments that the speaker is trying to acquire when they say "I promise I'll take care". The speaker has secured the uptake, which can be seen in the interlocutor's response (4b), but what the interlocutor's response shows is that they do not consider the speaker as a reliable one to perform the speech act of promising.

At the second level of analysis, for the illocutionary act of arguing to be hold as successfully performed, it must be considered that the illocutionary effect consisting in producing changes in the deontic modal competence has been produced. In this example, the interlocutor's response shows that they recognize that the speaker is intending to carry out a promise, and that it would have been successfully performed

if the speaker were reliable. However, since this is not the case, the normative effects associated with the speech act of promising have not been produced. The lack of production of the relevant normative effects would make the speaker's act of arguing unsuccessful, at least at this second level of analysis[21]. This would mean that, for instance, the interlocutor no longer has the legitimate expectation that the speaker will provide more reasons to show the correctness of the target-claim, nor the speaker is obliged to do so if requested by the interlocutor, etc.

As I view it, my proposal has two main derived implications. The first one has to do with the possible interpretations of the evaluation of argumentation in LNMA and the interactional approach that I have presented. The second consequence is related to the different roles that can be attributed to the interlocutor in an argumentative exchange. Let's first delve into the first implication, taking (4) again as an example. For Bermejo-Luque, by uttering (4b), the interlocutor would be recognizing the speaker's utterance (4a) as an act of promising that has been successfully carried out; however, the interlocutor questions the truth of the implicit inference-claim, i.e., "if (it is true that) I commit myself to take care, then (it is true that) you should not worry". In this case, a promise has been successfully performed, but what the speaker is promising is not a sufficient reason for the interlocutor not to worry; in a nutshell, (4b) would amount to something like "your promises are blown away by the wind". By contrast, in the interactional approach that I have outlined, by uttering (4b) the interlocutor shows that the (alleged) promise the speaker intended to do by means of (4a) is an unsuccessful one. Consequently, the normative effects (e.g., the acquisition of certain commitments or legitimate expectations) have not been brought about. What (4b) shows is that, although the interlocutor does not consider the utterance of "I promise I will take care" as a happy promise, they do recognize that the speaker wants their utterance to count as a reason for the interlocutor to not worry. In short, (4b) would amount to something like "You can't promise that; you are simply blabbering, so I can't just stay calm. What you're doing is trying to make a fool of me".

[21] This kind of failure in the performance of the speech act can be accounted for as a *misfire* (Austin, 1962, p. 16).

The difference between the interpretation of the evaluation of argumentation from both LNMA and the interactional approach leads to the second derived implication of my proposal. Specifically, the distinction just made has consequences regarding the different roles that can be attributed to the interlocutor in communication and, in this case, in argumentative communication. On the one hand, the analysis of the example carried out from LNMA shows that the interlocutor must be characterized as an interpreter of what the speaker says. From this view, the interlocutor's only task would be to interpret the speaker's utterance. On the other hand, from the interactionist perspective, the interlocutor is not understood as a mere interpreter of the speaker's utterance. Rather, the interlocutor's role would be that of being one of the parts of a process that involves (at least) two parts. In this sense, we can characterize the interlocutor as an active part of the communicative exchange, who contributes to put certain normative changes in place together with the speaker. This distinction allows us to contend that we, as interlocutors, have two different ways in which we can present ourselves to what we are said: it seems that, in one sense, interlocutors function simply as interpreters of what the speaker says or does (that is, interpreters of the speaker's intentions); in another sense, by contrast, they function as one of the parts of a process that involves more than one part. This plurality in the consideration of the interlocutor's function is possible because of the plurality of levels of analysis. While at the first level the interlocutor's role would be that of being an interpreter of the speaker's act, at the second level the interlocutor would be conceived as one of the (at least) two parts of the communicative process.

4.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have presented van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical model and Bermejo-Luque's LNMA in order to show that both models provide a suitable characterization of the speech act of arguing from the point of view of what a speaker does. However, as far as they assume a Searlean perspective in the characterization of the speech act of arguing, they leave out the role of the interlocutor in the performance of the illocutionary act, and the normative effects produced by an illocutionary act of arguing. In this regard, I have contended that these problems have

been raised by different authors whose proposals can be framed within the interactional approach to speech acts.

By applying some insights of the interactional approaches to the study of argumentation, I have argued that, in order to account for the role of the interlocutor and the normative effects that speech acts of arguing introduce in the set of rights, obligations and entitlements of the participants of the communicative exchange, it is necessary to distinguish between two different levels of analysis: the level that only involves the speaker utterance, and the level that involves both the speaker and the interlocutor.

In the following chapters, I will further develop my proposal, adopting the normative approach for the characterization of argumentation as a specific type of speech act. I will further explore how these normative effects are produced through the interaction between the speaker and the interlocutor in argumentative exchanges. In particular, I take the analysis presented here one step further by exploring whether there is any difference in the meaning that can be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing at each of these levels. It is clear that argumentation theorists place significant emphasis on the speaker's meaning, which is tied to the speaker's utterance. However, it is worth considering whether focusing on the speaker's meaning is enough to account for the full scope of the argumentative exchange that takes place between the speaker and the interlocutor. Drawing on Carassa and Colombetti (2009), I will contend that it is crucial to differentiate between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing. The speaker's meaning is to be attributed to the act of arguing at the first level of analysis. By contrast, at the second level of analysis, the joint meaning is jointly constructed by both the speaker and the interlocutor during the argumentative exchange. Moreover, I will argue that this approach will enable us to understand how the normative effects linked to the performance of illocutionary acts of arguing are brought about at the level of the communicative exchange. This will allow us to provide a framework for the evaluation of the dialectical dimension of argumentation. In addition, I will explore the implications of potential gaps between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing. Specifically, I will explore the consequences of these

gaps in cases involving commitment attributions, such as the case of the straw man fallacy.

Chapter 5

The joint meaning of speech acts of arguing

On December 10, 2023, Santiago Abascal, leader of the Spanish far-right party Vox, said the following about Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, whose Spanish acronym is PSOE) in an interview for the Argentinian newspaper *Clarín*:

> Pedro Sánchez is not as clever and skillful as people think. A politician who has no scruples, who has no principles, has a competitive advantage over honest politicians who have scruples because we set limits for ourselves. I have moral limits. I have principles. I cannot sell them. Sánchez has none. He can step on the laws, he can do anything, he can put national unity at risk. That gives him a competitive advantage. **There will be a time when the people will want to hang him by his feet [emphasis added]** (Abascal, 2023) [Author's translation].

A few days later, on December 13, 2023, the PSOE filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor's Office for hate crime against the President of the Government in which they claim that Abascal "does not limit himself to identify the President, democratically elected, with a dictator, but comes to ***justify*** [emphasis added] through the simile that, as happened with Benito Mussolini, there will come a time

when the people will want to use violence against him" (RTVE, 2023) [Author's translation]. In short, what it comes to say is that Santiago Abascal, through his words, has justified the use of violence against Pedro Sánchez.

After this, Abascal, in an official event of the Brothers of Italy (party of Prime Minister Georgia Meloni) held in Rome on December 17, 2023, responded to the accusations claiming that the left "has manipulated and twisted my words to make a violent caricature and to lynch me in the public square. [...] I want to say that no, I do not desire anyone, not even a corrupt and a traitor, to be hanged by the feet. No one, absolutely no one" (Abascal 2023) [Author's translation].

In my view, this case exemplifies the importance of the interlocutor's interpretation of the speaker's utterance. Here, the speaker, Santiago Abascal, has been interpreted as justifying, i.e., as arguing in favor of the use of violence against the Spanish Prime Minister (although he denies this interpretation of his words). As we can see, the weight of interpretation in determining the type of speech act that someone carries out can be so great as to constitute grounds for a complaint to the public prosecutor's office for a crime as serious as the crime of incitement to hatred. As we will see, this is so because communication, including argumentative communication, changes our normative landscape.

In the previous chapters, we have characterized argumentation as a communicative activity, emphasizing its social dimension. As such, one of the crucial tasks for argumentation theorists is the interpretation of argumentation, which is directly connected to determining the meaning conveyed by speech acts of arguing. As Bermejo-Luque (2011, p. 12) points out, "argumentative communication, as it appears in everyday life, is frequently packed with non-literal meanings, ambiguity, ellipses, vagueness, etc. […] The specific goal of interpreting argumentation is to understand the meaning of the claims involved in argumentative discourses and texts". Similarly, Oswald notes that, given that argumentation is a communicative activity, argumentation theorists are interest in the production and identification of speaker meaning because "just like they do in any communicative event, in argumentative discussions speakers exchange meanings" (2023, p. 145).

The main goal of this chapter is to delve into the study of the meaning of speech acts of arguing. The characterization of the meaning of speech acts offered in this

chapter will align with the distinction between the two levels of analysis introduced in the previous chapter. This will allow me to explain how the normative effects associated with the successful performance of these acts are produced. Here, the notion of *commitment* will be particularly relevant to carry out the characterization of the meaning of speech acts of arguing. As we will see, cases like the one presented above trigger certain questions, such as whether it is so easy to get rid of the commitments that one acquires through one's utterances, those that can be reasonably attributed to us through the interpretation of our words, what effects our utterances have on the normative space we share with others, and what are our obligations and entitlements in relation to the commitments we acquire and those attributed to us. As Oswald suggests, commitment "allows conversational participants to keep track of each other's arguments, positions, standpoints – i.e., of each other's performance of relevant speech acts." (2016, p. 18). He argues that commitments are closely related to the speaker's meaning and that successful communication occurs when the interlocutor understands the speaker's meaning (2016, p. 18). There is no doubt, then, that argumentation theorists are interested in the speaker's meaning, linked to the speaker's utterance. However, we should ask whether focusing on the speaker's meaning is enough to account for what happens in the argumentative exchange involving both the speaker and the audience.

For argumentation theorists, establishing the meaning of speech acts of arguing is important, as this is what allows for the evaluation of the argumentation. Although I agree with Oswald's view, I would like to go beyond this idea by arguing that commitments are not solely related to the speaker's meaning, but they are also inherently connected with the meaning jointly constructed by both the speaker and the interlocutor in argumentative exchanges. In order to do this, I will argue that it is necessary to distinguish between what a speaker means, understood in Gricean lines as dependent on the speaker's communicative intentions, and its interpretation by the interlocutor.

In the previous chapter, I have proposed to solve the problems associated with the Searlean view of speech acts adopted by LNMA and Pragma-dialectics by distinguishing between two levels in the analysis of the illocutionary act of arguing: one related to the speaker's utterance, and the other related to the communicative

exchange involving the speaker and the interlocutor in the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing. In this chapter, I will go a step further and explore whether there is any difference in the meaning that can be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing at each of these levels. Following Carassa and Colombetti (2009), I will argue that it is necessary to distinguish between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing. The former is to be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing at the first level of analysis (i.e., the level of the speaker's utterance). The latter represents the meaning jointly constructed by the speaker and the interlocutor at the level of the communicative exchange, where the speaker but also the interlocutor play a role in the performance of the act of arguing, and which may not coincide with the speaker's meaning.

Accounting for the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing in terms of speaker's meaning and as a joint construction will provide us with insights into the existing connection between the speaker's utterance and their communicative intentions, and the interlocutor's interpretation and response to it. Furthermore, this proposal will allow us to determine how the normative effects associated with the performance of illocutionary acts of arguing are produced at the level of the communicative exchange. It provides a theoretical basis for understanding how the dialectical rights, obligations and entitlements are introduced and changed by and among the participants of argumentative exchanges. In other words, it allows us to account for how their dialectical normative landscape changes by means of the illocutionary acts of arguing.

In addition, I will delve into the consequences that the distinction between the speaker's and the joint meaning poses for the analysis of argumentative exchanges. I will argue that this distinction results particularly relevant for analyzing cases in which commitment attributions are at stake, such as cases of discursive injustice.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 5.1., I will re-examine the main points of the distinction between the two levels of analysis. In section 5.2., I will explore the difference between the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing at each level of analysis, introducing first the main insights of Carassa and Colombetti's account, along with some problems associated with it. In section 5.3., I will apply the previous characterization of the meaning of speech acts of arguing to the analysis of

cases of discursive injustice occurring during argumentative exchanges. Finally, I will draw the main conclusions of this chapter.

5.1. The speech act of arguing: two levels of analysis

As discussed before, the Searlean framework presents certain issues that have been raised by the interactional approach to speech acts. In addressing these challenges in the context of characterizing the speech act of arguing, my proposed solution lies in distinguishing between two distinct levels of analysis. In this section, I will re-examine the main aspects of the problems and the solution. By doing so, I aim to provide a clearer conceptualization of the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing at each level of analysis.

5.1.1. What counts as a speech act of arguing?

As previously noted, both Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (henceforth referred to as LNMA) (Bermejo-Luque, 2011) provide a characterization of argumentation as a specific type of speech act. Although there are noteworthy differences between their respective proposals, for the purposes of this chapter only one is relevant. This difference has to do with the bearers of the act of arguing. While van Eemeren and Grootendorst exclude the claim the speaker is attempting to justify from the illocutionary act of arguing, LNMA does include this target-claim as part of it.

According to Pragma-dialectics, the simplest speech act of arguing consists of at least "[…] two statements (cf. the datum and the warrant in Toulmin's model)" (1894, p. 32). They claim that the utterance of these sentences has two simultaneous illocutionary forces: each sentence has an illocutionary force of one of the members of the assertive class (statement, assumption, or assertion) and is also part of a whole which, at a higher textual level, has an argumentative illocutionary force. As noted before, for the utterance of these sentences to count as an illocutionary act of arguing, they must be in a relationship of justification or refutation with an expressed opinion (1984, p. 43). Accordingly, it is correct to claim that, in this model, the bearers of the illocutionary act of arguing are at least two sentences.

To illustrate this, consider the following example in which a couple is deciding whether to walk or take the bus to the restaurant where they're meeting some friends:

(1a) Michael: We should take the bus.
(1b) Anna: Is it really necessary? I don't think it would take that long to walk.
(1c) Michael: Well, it looks like it will start raining soon.

In this example, (1a) constitutes the expressed opinion to which Michael's argumentation is in a relationship of justification. By means of (1c) together with the unexpressed premise (which works as the warrant in this model) "if it looks like it will start raining soon, then we should take the bus", Michael performs an illocutionary act of arguing. (1c) together with the unexpressed premise count as an illocutionary act of arguing, i.e., as an attempt by the speaker to justify (convince) his interlocutor of the acceptability of the expressed opinion[22].

Unlike Pragma-dialectics, in LNMA illocutionary acts of arguing are composed of a speech act of adducing (a reason), a speech act of concluding (a target-claim) and "the implicit inference-claim that turns a mere claim into a reason for another" (Bermejo-Luque 2011, p. 57). In this model, and in contrast to Pragma-dialectics, for Michael to be considered as carrying out an illocutionary act of arguing, uttering (1c) together with the implicit inference-claim is not enough. In LNMA, the illocutionary act of arguing would be performed by means of the utterance of (1a) and (1c). In this case, two first-order speech acts (a suggestion and an assertion, respectively) turn into a speech act of concluding and a speech act of adducing by virtue of their relation to the implicit inference-claim, namely, "if (it is true that) it looks like it will start raining soon, then (it is true that) we should take the bus". Hence, in this case, the bearers of the illocutionary act of arguing are the utterance of two sentences, corresponding to the speech act of adducing and the speech act of concluding, together with the implicit inference-claim.

[22] Here it is necessary to stress that the "Premise-Conclusion" structure inherent in arguments does not necessarily follow a temporal sequence. In the given example, the conclusion is expressed before the premise, but it still constitutes an act of arguing.

In a nutshell, in the Pragma-dialectics model, the illocutionary act of arguing is carried out by means of the utterance of sentences like (1c), together with the unexpressed premise, whereas in LNMA it is performed by the utterance of (1a) and (1c), and the implicit inference-claim. This divergence in the characterization of the bearers of the act of arguing has implications for what constitutes argumentation in each model, and how it functions as a communicative act.

As we will see, the difference between these models regarding the bearers of the speech act of arguing has further implications for the task of interpreting argumentation, allowing us to carry out a more nuanced analysis of the meaning of the speech acts of arguing according to each model.

5.1.2. Two levels of analysis

As previously pointed out, both Pragma-dialectics and LNMA characterize the speech act of arguing in terms of a modified version of Searle's (1969) speech act account[23]. This encompasses specific preparatory conditions, propositional content conditions, essential conditions, and sincerity conditions (though articulated in a different way in each model) that must be fulfilled for an illocutionary act to count as an act of arguing (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, pp. 43-44; Bermejo-Luque 2011, pp. 71-22). However, as I have argued in the previous chapter[24], the Searlean approach they endorse poses two interrelated problems raised by those proposals framed within the interactional or normative approaches to speech acts (Clark 1996; Sbisà 2006, 2009a; Carassa and Colombetti 2009; Witek 2015). The first problem lies in Searle's attribution of a mere passive role to the interlocutor in the communicative process, where, as Clark points out (1996, p. 137), their response does not seem to play an active role in the performance of the illocutionary act. The second problem arises from the fact that Searle's account overlooks one of the illocutionary effects outlined by Austin (1962) as the one consisting in the production of changes in the set of rights,

[23] In the case of LNMA, the account of speech acts offered by Bach and Harnish (1979) also plays an important role. More specifically, Bermejo-Luque adopts their Speech Act Schema as an interpretative tool because, according to her, it "can be used to deal with indirect and non-literal argumentation" (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, p. 61).

[24] See also (Haro Marchal, 2023).

obligations, and entitlements of the participants of the communicative exchange, which Sbisà (2006, p. 158) calls *deontic modal competence*. For instance, if I utter "I promise you I won't smoke anymore", the normative effects associated with a successful performance of this illocutionary act of promising consist in the setting of a commitment on my part to refrain from smoking again.

My proposal to address these issues consists in adopting an interactional approach according to which they should be characterized as social actions (Sbisà 2007; Caponetto and Labinaz 2023, p. 10). This entails that, in characterizing the illocutionary act of arguing, we must consider the active role played by the interlocutor in the performance of the speech act, together with the way "they change the normative stances [rights, obligations, entitlements] of interlocutors" (Corredor 2023). In other words, we must consider how they change the deontic modal competence of the participants of the communicative exchange. As we have seen in the Chapter 4, my solution to the problems associated with the Searlean account consists in distinguishing two levels in the analysis of the illocutionary act of arguing. At the first level, in order to determine whether the illocutionary act has been successfully carried out, we need to take into account the speaker's utterance, and what the speaker means by means of their utterance (i.e., what are the communicative intentions that can be reasonably attributed to the speaker[25]). In addition, at this level, the successful performance of the act requires the fulfillment of the condition of securing of uptake by the speaker, i.e., the speaker making their utterance graspable for a potential interlocutor. By contrast, at the second level of analysis, the level of the communicative exchange, determining whether the illocutionary act of arguing is successful or not involves taking into account not only the speaker's utterance, but also the interlocutor's response. This response shows how the interlocutor has interpreted the speaker's utterance (Sbisà, 1992, p. 101), and whether the normative effects (i.e., changes in the rights, obligations, and entitlements of the speaker and their interlocutor) associated with the act of arguing have been produced.

[25] What can be reasonably attributed to the speaker depends on what the speaker utters, but also on the contextual information. Although, as rule of thumb, the interlocutor's interpretation should coincide with the speaker's intended meaning, this is not always the case, as Abascal's example shows.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the normative effects of illocutionary acts of arguing can be defined as bringing about changes in the speaker's and interlocutor's set of dialectical obligations, entitlements, commitments, and expectations. They include the interlocutor's legitimate expectation that the speaker can provide more reasons to justify the target-claim[26] if requested to do so by the interlocutor, the speaker's commitment to the truth of the implicit inference-claim (or warrant), or the speaker's commitment to addressing potential counterarguments and objections. In addition, as I mentioned in the previous chapter and as we will see in more detail in Chapter 6, they work as a standard of evaluation.

In the following section, I will show how the notion of *joint meaning* can be applied to the analysis of argumentation. I will illustrate how it works within the distinction between the two levels of analysis and I will argue that it provides a suitable framework for explaining how the normative effects of acts of arguing are produced. To show the implications of adopting this framework, I will apply the joint meaning account to Pragma-dialectics and LNMA.

5.2. The joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing

In this section, I will explore how the meaning of the illocutionary acts of arguing differs at the two different levels of analysis. As already pointed out, at the first level, in order to know whether the act of arguing has been performed, we need to take into account the speaker's utterance and the fulfillment of some conditions. At the second level, we also need to consider the interlocutor's response. As already pointed out, from the point of view of the second level of analysis (i.e., the level of the communicative exchange), for an illocutionary act of arguing to be successfully performed, the normative effects associated with it must be produced. Hence, offering an account of how these effects are brought about is crucial. To do this, we firstly need to determine whether the meaning that can be attributed to the act of arguing is different at each level of analysis. To account for the distinction between the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing at each level, I build on Carassa and Colombetti's (2009) joint meaning account. Applying this proposal to the pragma-dialectical model

[26] Or the expressed opinion in the case of Pragma-dialectics.

and the LNMA will allow us to show what constitutes a speech act of arguing at the first level of analysis, as well as when the interlocutor's responses are taken into account.

5.2.1. Carassa and Colombetti's joint meaning account

As we saw along Chapter 3, in their paper "Joint meaning" (2009), Carassa and Colombetti propose a distinction between the speaker's meaning (conceived along Gricean lines) and the joint meaning of speech acts. While the former must be understood as a personal communicative intention, the latter is conceived as a joint construal of the speaker and the interlocutor (2009, pp. 1837-1838). They characterize the joint meaning as a propositional joint commitment of both parties to the extent that a specific communicative act has been performed by the speaker (2009, p 1851). The joint meaning is also a deontic concept, i.e., it entails rights, obligations, and entitlements. In characterizing the concept of joint meaning as a propositional joint commitment, they draw on Walton and Krabbe's (1995) dialogue theory. They distinguish between action commitments and propositional commitments. The former is conceived as someone's commitment to a course of action, while the latter is defined as "a kind of action commitment whose partial strategies assign dialogical actions that center on one proposition" (1995, p. 28). One of the examples they offer to illustrate the concept of propositional commitment is the following:

> John is about to take the garbage out. He asks Mary: "Where did you put the garbage?" Mary answers: "Behind the door, as usual." In this case Mary has not committed herself to do anything about the garbage, but she has incurred a propositional commitment with respect to the proposition that she has put the garbage behind the door. She cannot (without more ado) deny this proposition, and perhaps it wouldn't be entirely out of place to ask for evidence ("Are you sure?") (1995, p. 22).

Carassa and Colombetti also emphasize that the meaning jointly construed may not coincide with the speaker's meaning. In order to illustrate their proposal, they offer

the following example of a dialogue between Barry (the boss) and Evelyn (an employee):

(2a) Barry: Are you free tonight?
(2b) Evelyn: Yes, I am, Barry. I think it would be a good idea to spend a couple of hours on the draft of the project.
(2c) Barry: Oh, well ... yeah. Back here at half past eight?
(2d) Evelyn: Perfect, I'll be here.
(2e) Barry: See you at eight thirty, then.

In this example, Barry's original intention, so it is supposed, was to invite Evelyn to have dinner at a restaurant. However, what Evelyn's response shows is that by means of her utterance (2b), she has "redefined Barry's original intention as an indirect proposal to spend the evening working […]" (2009, p. 1841). In addition, what Barry's response (2c) shows is that Evelyn's interpretation is finally accepted by him. According to Carassa and Colombetti, "the proposal to spend the evening working on a draft must be regarded as a joint construal by Barry and Evelyn" (2009, p. 1841).

In what follows, I will show how Carassa and Colombetti's joint meaning proposal can be applied to the analysis of argumentation and how it works within the distinction between the two levels of analysis. As we will see, at the first level of analysis, the meaning attributed to the illocutionary act is the speaker's meaning, whereas at the second level the meaning of the illocutionary act must be conceptualized as a joint meaning, i.e., as the meaning jointly constructed[27] by the speaker and the interlocutor, which may not coincide with the speaker's meaning. However, before delving into this, I will first highlight some key points where my proposal diverges from theirs. This will provide a clearer understanding of how this notion can be applied to the analysis of argumentation.

[27] Carassa and Colombetti seem to use the verbs "construe" and "construct" interchangeably in their characterization of the notion of joint meaning. Although they generally refer to "joint construal" and "jointly construed," they also mention "joint construction" (see 2009, p. 1852). In characterizing the meaning of the speech acts of arguing, I prefer to use the terms "joint construction" and "jointly constructed meaning." In my view, this emphasizes the active, ongoing process of jointly negotiating and establishing meaning within dialogue.

5.2.2. Some issues in Carassa and Colombetti's joint meaning account

Although Carassa and Colombetti's notion of joint meaning sheds light on a crucial aspect of communication, namely, that the meaning of a speech act depends not only on the speaker but also on the interlocutor, several issues need to be addressed before it can be effectively applied to the characterization of the meaning of speech acts of arguing.

One issue in their proposal can be observed in their analysis of Example 2. Carassa and Colombetti explain this case as one in which Barry's intentions are redefined by Evelyn, and this redefinition is accepted by him. In my view, this explanation is not entirely correct. This is an example where the speaker's utterance is ambiguous enough for the interlocutor to choose among the possible interpretations available in the existing room linguistically indicated. In other words, Barry's utterance was (deliberately) ambiguous enough to allow for different plausible interpretations. The interlocutor's choice of one interpretation over another may be influenced by various factors. On the one hand, the interlocutor may choose the most salient option based on the context in which the dialogue takes place. However, in this particular example, the context has certain features. It is a dialogue in which Carassa and Colombetti explicitly highlight the roles of the participants, Barry being the boss and Evelyn the employee. Therefore, it is a communicative situation marked by a power imbalance that influences the interlocutor's interpretation. We can imagine that Evelyn has recognized Barry's communicative intentions when he asks "Are you free tonight?", but she chooses not to explicitly express her discomfort with her boss's implicit proposal for dinner. It is conceivable that Barry has used a vague expression so that, if faced with a response like "I think this is an inappropriate invitation," he can deny that those were his communicative intentions.

Another controversial aspect of Carassa and Colombetti's proposal is the possible reading of joint meaning as a necessarily collaborative process. This is also illustrated in their analysis of Example 2. In my view, this idealizes how meaning construction actually works, particularly in cases where power imbalances influence how the speaker is interpreted, how meaning is negotiated, and how the speaker's commitments are established and introduced in the commitment store. As we will see in Section 5.3, sometimes the social position of the speaker makes it difficult (if not

impossible) for them to perform certain types of speech acts, including speech acts of arguing. In such situations, the construction of the meaning of the speaker's utterance is not a collaborative process; rather, it is the interlocutor interpreting the speaker as performing a completely different illocutionary act, and the speaker being forced to accept this interpretation.

As we will see in the next chapter, these considerations regarding the characterization of illocutionary acts of arguing are crucial in accounting for certain fallacies, such as the straw man fallacy**.**

5.2.3. Joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing

In my view, as I have previously argued, in order to determine the successful performance of an illocutionary act of arguing at the level of the communicative exchange we need to take into account not only the speaker's utterance. It is also necessary the recognition by the speaker and the interlocutor of the production of illocutionary, normative effects. These effects are conceived as changes in the dialectical set of obligations, entitlements, and commitments of the participants engaged in the argumentative exchange. At the first level of analysis, it is crucial to consider whether the illocutionary act of arguing has been successfully carried out by examining the speaker's utterance together with the fulfillment of certain conditions. These conditions include the securing of uptake, which consists in the speaker making their utterance graspable for a potential hearer. If the speaker has met the conditions and has made their utterance graspable, then the illocutionary act can be deemed to have been successfully performed at the first level. By contrast, at the second level of analysis, determining whether the illocutionary act has been successfully performed considering the speaker's utterance is not enough. It involves taking into account the interlocutor's response to the speaker's utterance. This response is crucial because it shows how the interlocutor has interpreted the speaker's act and, thus, whether the normative effects associated with the illocutionary act have been produced (Caponetto and Labinaz 2023, p. 14; Sbisà 1992, p. 101). The mutual recognition by the speaker and the interlocutor of the production of these normative effects renders the illocutionary act successful.

In light of this, the question we should ask now is how exactly these effects are brought about. I will argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to offer a characterization of the meaning of the illocutionary act at the second level of analysis as depending not only on the speaker's communicative intentions, but as a joint construction by the speaker and the interlocutor. The production of the normative effects hinges upon the interlocutor's interpretation of the speaker's meaning together with the speaker's acceptance of this interpretation. In this regard, for the normative effects to come into being, speaker and interlocutor must be jointly committed to some interpretation of the speaker's utterance.

For our purposes, the notion of *commitment store*, originally introduced by Hamblin (1970) and further developed by Walton and Krabbe (1995), proves to be particularly useful. Walton and Krabbe point out that this notion has been used by Hamblin "as a technical device to keep track of arguers' commitments in dialogue, as part of a method of evaluating argumentation" (1995, p. 123). According to Walton and Krabbe, the rules governing the dialogues dictate which statements are either introduced into or removed from the commitment store (1995, p. 116). The notion of commitment store plays a central role in their dialogue theory. They build upon Hamblin's idea, conceptualizing the commitment store as a form of idealization:

> In all types of dialogue, both parties ideally have a recorded log of their individual commitments to any given point to which the dialogue has progressed, called the participant's "commitment store." This, of course, is a normative ideal which is often not met in ordinary conversation in "real life," where arguers often forget their commitments, or even deny they ever made them, and no record of what really happened may be available for scrutiny (1995, p. 118).

The concept of the commitment store is particularly useful for our analysis. Specifically, this concept can be instrumental in accounting for the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing and how the normative effects associated with these acts are produced along the argumentative exchange. However, there are some differences between their approach to the concept of commitment store and mine. A key

difference between Walton and Krabbe's approach and my perspective lies in their consideration that the commitment store exclusively contains propositions. In contrast, for the purposes of the present discussion, I will assume that it encompasses both propositions and the illocutionary forces of speech acts, i.e., the type of speech act performed by the participants of the argumentative exchange. This distinction is important, as we will see in section 5.3., in accounting for certain cases where commitment attributions are at stake, such as cases of discursive injustice. In such cases, for some speakers (due to their status, for example) it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish what their commitments are, and it is difficult to introduce them into the commitment store, which is crucial for the evaluation of the argumentation. In addition, in my view, what commitments enter in the commitment store shared by the speaker and the interlocutor results from the joint construction of the meaning. The commitment store also allows us to keep a record of what the speaker can be considered committed to. These commitments entering in the commitment store will determine what normative effects are produced or, in other words, what dialectical moves are permitted and what are restricted.

I have pointed out that the construction of joint meaning is necessary for the production of normative effects. Along the lines of Carassa and Colombetti, the joint meaning of acts of arguing is conceptualized as the joint commitment on the part of the speaker and the interlocutor that the speaker has carried out a certain speech act[28]. This joint commitment by the speaker and the interlocutor is what enters in the commitment store shared by them. To illustrate this, let's consider again example (1). When the speaker utters (1c) "Well, it looks like it will start raining soon", he shows that he takes up the interlocutor's interpretation of his utterances as an act of arguing. Once they are jointly committed to the extent that the speaker has carried out a particular speech act of arguing, the normative effects are produced. So now we can consider the interlocutor (in this case, Anna) as entitled to, for instance, ask for reasons to show why the reasons already provided by Michael do justify the target-claim.

Another crucial aspect concerning the construction of the joint meaning at the level of the communicative exchange relates to the constraints regarding the dialectical

[28] By 'meaning' I mean here both the illocutionary force and the propositional content of the speaker's utterance.

moves derived from it. These constraints result from the specific commitments inserted in the commitment store, which determines what moves would be allowed. For example, the speaker would not be allowed to ignore or refuse to address the interlocutor's challenges to the reasons already given, for this would be incompatible with the interlocutor's right to seek additional justification. In the case of the interlocutor, they would not be allowed to disregard or ignore the reasons already given by the speaker without providing a challenge or seek for clarification, neither to deny the speaker's commitment to the truth of the implicit inference-claim without a proper clarification.

In order to illustrate the idea that the meaning that can be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing is different at each level of analysis, let's consider the following example in which two friends, Jack, and Emily, are discussing about a party to which Emily is invited[29]. This analysis will be conducted using both the Pragma-dialectics and LNMA. It will allow us to show that the analysis of the argumentation changes in Pragma-dialectics and LNMA once we consider the different meaning that can be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing at each level.

(3a) Jack: If the party is going to be so great, why aren't you going?

(3b) Emily: I told you, I just have too much going on right now.

(3c) Jack: So you're saying the party won't be that fun.

(3d) Emily: No, I'm sure it'll be fun.

(3e) Jack: But you also said it's mostly people from work .

(3f) Emily: Yeah, it's mostly people from work.

(3g) Jack: [Pauses, lifts eyebrows with a look of sudden realization]

(3h) Emily: What?

(3i) Jack: When someone says about a party "it's mostly people from work," they usually mean that the party won't be really fun.

(3j) Emily: Look, if you asked me if it will be fun and I only said "it's mostly people from work that go", that might imply it's not going to be fun. But just because I mentioned it's mostly work people doesn't

[29] This a version of an example used by Horn (2004, p. 5) concerning the difference between conversational and generalized implicatures. In his analysis, he uses a dialogue from the movie "When Harry Met Sally".

mean it can't be fun. It could be either. It could be mostly work people and still be a great time, or it could be mostly work people and a boring party.

(3k) Jack: So, you think it will be fun?

(3l) Emily: Yes, for sure.

First of all, is should be stressed that this example could be analyzed from different perspectives and taking into account different elements that compose it. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will focus on Jack's utterances that could count as acts of arguing. In order to analyze this example, we will firstly focus on the first level of analysis, taking into account only the speaker's utterances.

From the pragma-dialectical model, the analysis of the example would be as follows. By means of the utterance of (3c), "So you're saying the party won't be that fun", Jack carried out a speech act of concluding that is not part of the argumentation. The content of (3c) is the expressed opinion to which the argumentation is related. At the sentence level, the argumentation is formed by an assertive speech act that Jack carries out by means of (3e), "But you also said it's mostly people from work", and by means of the unexpressed premise that turns (3e) into an argumentation at the textual level. The unexpressed premise is made explicit later in the dialogue by means of (3i), namely, "When someone says about a party "it's mostly people from work," they usually mean that the party won't be really fun". The elementary illocution (2e) together with the unexpressed premise constitute the speech act of arguing because they are in a relationship of justification with the expressed opinion in (3c).

By contrast, from LNMA, the analysis of the example would be the following. By means of (3c), Jack asserts that Emily meant that the party won't be that fun. By means of (3e), Jack asserts that Emily told him that the party would be mostly people from work. Jack implicitly asserts that, if (it is true that) Emily told him that the party would be mostly people from work, then (it is true that) Emily meant that the party would not be that fun. Jack adduces that Emily said that the party would be mostly people from work as a reason to conclude that the party won't be that fun. The argumentation, according to LNMA, would be constituted by (3c) and (3e) together with the implicit inference-claim.

We can see that, at the first level of analysis, in order to determine what constitutes argumentation within a particular dialogue, i.e., to determine which are the bearers of the illocutionary acts of arguing, we must consider only the speaker's utterances. In the case of Pragma-dialectics, the bearers of the speech act would be Jack's utterances of (3e) and the unexpressed premise, whereas in the case of LNMA, these would be the utterances of (3c), (3e) and the implicit inference-claim.

As it has been observed, at the first level of analysis, in order to determine whether the illocutionary act of arguing has been successfully performed, it is only necessary to consider the speaker's utterance and the fulfillment of certain conditions. This would apply for both Pragma-dialectics and LNMA. This is so because, as explained above, in both models the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing depends on the speaker, thus assigning the interlocutor a mere passive role. In addition, the illocutionary effects necessary for the successful performance of the act are reduced to the interlocutor's understanding of the speaker's utterance. However, in order to account for how argumentation, as a communicative activity, changes the dialectical and normative landscape for both the speaker and the interlocutor. Taking into consideration the speaker's utterance and what a speaker means is not enough.

From the perspective of the communicative exchange, the interlocutor's response becomes crucial, for it shows how the speaker's utterances were interpreted by the interlocutor. In this example, we need to take into consideration Emily's responses. They allow us to determine whether the meaning of the illocutionary act has been jointly constructed. In other words, they allow us to determine whether the commitments that have been introduced in the commitment store include Jack's commitment to (3e), (3c) and the unexpressed premise, and thereby whether the normative effects associated with the illocutionary act of arguing have been brought about. Considering this, let's examine how the analysis of the example changes when it is carried out from the second level of analysis.

In the case of Pragma-dialectics, the analysis of the example is the following. By means of (3f) ("Yeah, it's mostly people from work"), Emily shows that she does not accept that Jack's utterance (3e) ("But you also said it's mostly people from work") is in a relationship of justification with the opinion expressed by means of (3c) ("So you're saying the party won't be that fun"). Insofar as it functions as what makes explicit the

unexpressed premise, Jack's utterance (3i) ("When someone says about a party "it's mostly people from work," they usually mean that the party won't be really fun") is needed for his speech act to constitute argumentation. However, by means of (3i), Jack shows that he does not accept Emily's interpretation of (3e) as a mere assertion. In other words, Jack does not accept that the commitment to the speech act performed by the speaker should be introduced into the commitment store merely as the performance of an assertion, as it would have occurred if he would accept Emily's interpretation of his utterance. By means of (3j) ("Look, if you asked me if it will be fun and I only said "it's mostly people from work that go", that might imply it's not going to be fun. But just because I mentioned it's mostly work people doesn't mean it can't be fun. It could be either. It could be mostly work people and still be a great time, or it could be mostly work people and a boring party"), Emily shows that she accepts Jack's speech act as an argumentation. However, she questions the warrant. By the end of the dialogue, the commitment introduced in the commitment store shared by them would finally be the commitment to the extent that the speaker has performed an act of arguing.

By contrast, according to LNMA, Emily's response (3f), "Yeah, it's mostly people from work", shows that, in the first place, she was interpreting Jack's utterances as mere assertions. This interpretation of what Jack meant, whose intention was to perform an illocutionary act of arguing, is not taken up by him. If that would have been the case, then the speech act of arguing that Jack had attempted to perform would have been unsuccessful. In this case, the commitment to the speech act performed by the speaker introduced in the commitment store would have been the commitment to the extent that the speaker performed an assertion, and the normative effects produced would correspond to it. By means of (3i), "When someone says about a party "it's mostly people from work," they usually mean that the party won't be really fun", Jack makes explicit the implicit inference-claim, what supports his implicit assertion, rejecting Emily's interpretation of his speech acts as mere assertion. And by means of (3j), Emily shows that she takes up Jack's utterances as an illocutionary act of arguing, although she questions the implicit inference-claim. Hence, the commitment added to the commitment store would be that the speaker has performed an act of arguing.

As we can see, the analysis of the example differs when we take into account the interlocutor's response, which will allow us to determine what constitutes the argumentation within the argumentative exchange, i.e., which are the bearers of the speech act of arguing. While at the first levels of analysis the meaning of the illocutionary act is accounted for as dependent solely on the speaker's communicative intentions, at the second level it is characterized as jointly constructed by the speaker and the interlocutor and determines what has been *actually* communicated, i.e., what joint commitments have been introduced in the commitment store.

As mentioned earlier, by means of illocutionary acts of arguing, individuals engage in mutual recognition and change of their normative positions. In this regard, I have argued that the only way in which an illocutionary act can take effect (and thus be rendered successful) at the level of the communicative exchange is by means of the production of the illocutionary, normative effects associated with it. In example (3), the normative effects associated with the act of arguing are triggered only when Emily and Jack *jointly* commit to the extent that, by means of the utterance of (3e) and (3c) (together with the warrant and the implicit inference-claim), Jack was carrying out an illocutionary act of arguing. As I argued above, in the case of argumentation, these normative effects can be characterized as changes in the dialectical obligations and entitlements of the speaker and the interlocutor. Following Sbisà, I consider that these effects are produced by means of their recognition by both the speaker and the interlocutor. In her words, the production of these effects "depends on the agreement about their coming into being among the members of the relevant social group" (Sbisà, 2009a, p. 48). In my view, this agreement does not need to be conceived as a strong agreement. It must be understood as the joint construction of the joint meaning, i.e., as the acquisition by the speaker and the interlocutor of the commitment to the extent that the speaker has performed a certain speech act of arguing. It is the creation of the joint commitment, which enters in the commitment store shared by both the speaker and the interlocutor, what results in the production of normative effects. This amounts to saying that it is the communicative exchange, and not only the speaker's utterance, what makes possible the production of normative, illocutionary effects (and their recognition) that results in a successful illocutionary act of any type, including the act of arguing. As it was already pointed out, within the interactional framework of

speech acts, illocutionary acts of arguing are conceptualized as social actions whose performance introduce changes in the rights, obligations, and entitlements of the participants of any communicative exchange, including argumentative ones. Thus, in order to consider an individual responsible for what they have done, and in order to know the kind of obligations or rights acquired by them and their interlocutor by means of their act, it is important to reconstruct the meaning of the illocutionary act. This is what the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning within the two levels of analysis allows us to do.

In the following section, I will illustrate how this distinction can shed light on the analysis in which commitment attributions are at stake in argumentative exchanges, such as in cases of discursive injustice.

5.3. Joint meaning and discursive injustice in argumentative exchanges

The example provided at the beginning of the chapter regarding Abascal's words shows how important the interlocutors' interpretation of the speaker's utterance is in determining the type of speech act performed, and also the extent of the consequences of this interpretation. In this section (as well in the next chapter), I will show why the distinction between the speaker's and the joint meaning of acts of arguing is especially important in cases involving commitment attributions. Here, I will focus on cases of discursive injustice.

The notion of *discursive injustice*, introduced by Kukla (2014), refers to the situation in which someone's speech ability is undermined because of his or her unprivileged social position. An example of this kind of injustice, offered by Kukla (2014, p. 445), is one in which a female manager at a factory is trying to give orders to her male employees, but they don't recognize her as a person authorized to give orders due to the social position she occupies (i.e., being a woman). For this reason, the employees interpret her as requesting instead of ordering something, which means that they would not be obliged to do what they are ordered to do. As Kukla points out regarding requests, "acknowledging its legitimacy leaves the one requested free to grant or refuse the request" (2014, p. 446). This occurs when the illocutionary force associated with a speaker's utterance is distorted by the hearer due to the speaker's social position. The phenomenon of discursive injustice thus takes place in communicative contexts. As far

as argumentation can be understood as a communicative activity, cases of discursive injustice might also occur in argumentative exchanges. We thus need an approach that accounts for the occurrence of this phenomenon in argumentative practices.

As we will see, accounting for the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing within the distinction between the two levels of analysis and using the notion of joint meaning can be particularly useful to account for cases of discursive injustice taking place during argumentative exchanges. This is so because it allows us to keep two intuitions. The first one consists in that, in some important sense, we can say that the speaker has in fact successfully *performed* the illocutionary act she intended to perform. The second one is the intuition that, unless certain changes are produced by means of speech acts, the act cannot be considered successful. In addition, these changes have to be recognized to come into being and, as we have seen, this occurs when the meaning is jointly constructed, and specific commitments are introduced in the commitment store. Here, I will present the analysis of a case of discursive injustice from the LNMA perspective.

To illustrate the importance of distinguishing between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of the illocutionary acts of arguing for the analysis of discursive injustice, let's consider the following example. Three PhD students in Psychology, Emma, Fred, and Albert, are discussing about which therapy is better for the treatment of anxiety: cognitive-behavioral therapy or behavioral therapy alone. Every participant in the conversation knows that Emma's husband is a clinical psychologist with a strong behaviorist background. In this scenario, the following exchange takes place:

> (4a) Fred: Albert, you must admit that behavioral therapy has produced the greatest advances in the history of clinical psychology, especially for the treatment of anxiety.
> (4b) Albert: I don't deny that, Fred. I'm just saying that cognitive-behavioral therapy incorporates all the benefits of traditional behavioral therapy with the added impact of the cognitive techniques.
> (4c) Emma: Well, several papers show that the efficacy of cognitive-behavioral therapy is fully explained by its behavioral components.

If the exchange would have finished at this point, the analysis of this example from the point of view of the speaker's utterance (the first level of analysis) would be as follows. In uttering (4c), Emma's communicative intention was to perform an illocutionary act of arguing. By means of her utterance, she was carrying out a speech act of adducing that several papers show the efficacy attributed to cognitive behavioral therapy is fully explained by its behavioral components as a reason to conclude that behavioral therapy alone is a better form of therapy for anxiety. This is so because we attribute to her the implicit claim that if (it is true that) several papers show that the efficacy attributed to cognitive-behavioral therapy is fully explained by its behavioral components, then (it is true that) behavioral therapy alone is a better form of therapy for anxiety.

However, let's imagine that the conversation continues as follows:

(4d) Albert: Look at you! How well your husband has trained you! I can see your husband's reinforcement program is working perfectly.

At the second level of analysis, the hearer's response (4d) is crucial in determining whether Emma's intended speech act of arguing has been successfully carried out. It allows us to determine how her act has been received and interpreted by her interlocutor, which in turn helps us to determine if the normative effects associated with the illocutionary act of arguing have been produced. In this case, Albert's response (4d) indicates that Emma's utterance was not received as the act she was intending to carry out, that is, as an act of arguing. At best, he seems to be interpreting her as an entreaty to participate in the conversation. Now we can imagine that Emma, overwhelmed by the situation and in an effort to avoid conflict, responds to Albert by uttering (4e):

(4e) Yeah, well… I guess.

By means of (4e), Emma shows that she takes up Albert's interpretation of her utterance[30]. Thus, the normative effects associated with the act she intended to perform in the first place would have not been brought about: Albert does not have the legitimate expectation that the speaker, Emma, will provide more reasons to show the correctness of the target-claim, nor Emma is obliged to do so if requested by the interlocutor, etc. This example can be considered as a case in which the speaker's meaning does not coincide with the meaning jointly constructed. In addition, it constitutes a case of discursive injustice within an argumentative context, where the illocutionary force of Emma's act is distorted by Albert, who has interpreted the act as, for instance, an entreaty to participate in the conversation rather than an attempt at justifying a target-claim, i.e., as an act of arguing[31].

In this example, as in all cases of discursive injustice, the distortion might well be due to the speaker's social position, which in this case corresponds to the fact that she is a woman. As it is exemplified by Zenker et al. (2023, § 4.2, para. 9), "speakers from underprivileged social groups (e.g., in terms of their ethnicity, gender, or education) may be invited to join a debate, with no overt exclusion taking place". However, if it is the case that "the group's demands are treated as mere suggestions, […] their speech acts' illocutionary force can nevertheless be blocked or downgraded" (Zenker et al. 2023, § 4.2, para. 9).

This example illustrates how, at each level of analysis, the meaning of the illocutionary act performed by the speaker differs. While at the first level the meaning of the illocutionary act is accounted for as dependent on the speaker's communicative intentions, constituting the speaker's meaning of the act, when the interlocutor's

[30] An important point here is that we can imagine that she actually thinks that she has given an argument (and also a *good* argument taking into account her expertise). However, given the hostile context, Emma could not feel confident enough to give a different answer to Albert. She might think that, if she keeps responding, Albert will again respond to her in a rude way, so it would not be worth it to intervene again. As we will see in the next chapter, this can be due to a variety of reasons, such as her social position or the norms governing argumentative exchanges.

[31] This example can be accounted for as an example of an *ad hominem* attack: it is possible to interpret that Albert is actually recognizing Emma as arguing, but he is just not taking her seriously. Albert could believe that it is Emma's husband who is arguing, not her. So, in his view, there would be no point in trying to engage in an argumentative exchange with her.

response is taken into consideration the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing is characterized as jointly constructed by the speaker and the interlocutor. This joint construction constitutes what is communicated and not merely intended to be communicated, that is, what has been introduced in the commitment store.

In addition, I consider that the account presented along contributes significantly to account for the intuition mentioned before that the woman has, to some important extent, performed the act she intended to perform. This is why, from a third-person perspective, it would not be a problem to claim that her interlocutor is doing something wrong. From the point of view of the first level of analysis, as far as the woman has fulfilled certain conditions (and thus her utterance is graspable for potential hearers), her interlocutor should have been able to understand the meaning of her utterance, that is, to grasp the speaker's meaning. He should have recognized that Emma's communicative intention was for her utterance to be interpreted as an act of arguing. This would be the case, for instance, regarding the possible interpretation made by her other interlocutor, Fred. We can imagine that Fred has correctly interpreted Emma and that, after that conversation, he approaches her to keep discussing on the topic, responding to Emma's argument[32].

In short, the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning allows us to explain what constitutes a successful illocutionary act at each level, and how the normative effects associated with the successful illocutionary acts of arguing are produced.

5.4. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have presented an approach to the meaning of illocutionary acts in which I have distinguished between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of speech acts of arguing. Based on my two-level analysis of illocutionary acts of arguing, I have contended that, while the former can be attributed to the act of arguing at the first level, the latter can be attributed to the illocutionary act at the second level. As

[32] Although the speaker has been interpreted differently by each of her interlocutors, this would not constitute an instance of illocutionary pluralism. According to Lewiński (2021b, p. 6692), the performance of a plurality of illocutionary acts must be intentional. However, in example (4), the speaker has no intention to perform the act she has been interpreted as performing by Albert, namely, an entreaty.

we have seen, an account as the one proposed here is pertinent not only because the illocutionary act of arguing involves the speaker's intentional act of giving reasons that support a claim, but also because it changes the dialectical obligations and entitlements of both the speaker and the interlocutor. Through an analysis of the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing, we can distinguish the speaker's communicative intentions and the interlocutor's interpretation of their utterance, thus enriching our interpretation of the argumentation put forward by the speaker. As we have seen, an important result of this proposal is that it can be useful to account for cases of discursive injustice that occur in argumentative practices.

In the next chapter, I will delve into these distinctions to account for other types of cases where commitment attributions are at stake. Specifically, I will focus on instances where there is a gap between the speaker's meaning and its interpretation by the audience. To illustrate this, I will use the straw man fallacy as a case of study, examining what consequences it has for the evaluation of argumentation. In addition, I will argue that the notion of joint meaning, together with the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing, can shed light on the implications of the gap created by this fallacy for the evaluation of argumentation.

Chapter 6

Commitment attributions in argumentative exchanges

One of the key challenges in argumentative exchanges is the divergence between a speaker's intended meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation. This divergence, or 'gap,' can have significant implications for the evaluation of argumentation, particularly in the context of commitment attributions. Consider the following example:

In September 2022, during a parliamentary hearing on the reform of the abortion law in force in Spain, the former Spanish Minister of Equality, Irene Montero, defended the importance of sex education for minors:

> (1) […] all the girls, boys, and non-binary children in this country have the right to know their own bodies, to know that no adult can touch their bodies if they do not want to, and that it is a form of violence. They have the right to know that they can love or have sexual relationships with whomever they choose, based, of course, on consent. (El diario 2022) [Author's translation].

During her intervention, Irene Montero was addressing the right of 16 and 17-year-old girls to terminate pregnancies voluntarily without needing prior parental permission, along with the right to sex education for minors, and pointing out that,

once they grow up, they are free to love or engage in sexual relationships with whomever they want. However, these statements sparked a major controversy in the context of Spanish politics because the far-right Spanish party, Vox, called for the minister's resignation, manipulating her words to accuse her of "justifying pedophilia" (Vox 2022). Former Vox spokesperson in the Congress, Iván Espinosa de los Monteros, said the following regarding the minister's statements:

> The Minister of Equality literally said that minors, boys, and girls should be able to have sexual relations with whomever they want, even with adults, as long as there is consent. [...] Therefore, we demand her dismissal, immediate resignation, and the closure of the ministry. (El Confidencial 2022) [Author's translation].

He also announced that they would take legal actions against her. Other members of Vox and other far-right groups also echoed Montero's statements, twisting her words to accuse her of promoting pedophilia. However, in December 2022, all the complaints and lawsuits were dismissed and deemed inadmissible by the Supreme Court with the approval of the Public Prosecutor's Office because the judges found no trace of incitement to pedophilia in Montero's words. According to the Supreme Court, Irene Montero's words addressed the need to educate minors on the matter of consent. After this, Vox appealed the Supreme Court's decision, but again, in March 2023, the complaints and lawsuits were definitely dismissed. Moreover, the Supreme Court also condemned the party's actions in this matter, noting that all the complaints were clearly inadmissible (Público, 2023).

As with Abascal's example presented in the previous chapter, the controversy surrounding Montero's words highlights the importance of the interlocutor's interpretation of the speaker's utterance in successful communication and argumentative exchanges. When interlocutors distort the speaker's original stance, this not only undermines the illocutionary success of the speech acts, but it can also pose other types of consequences. I have argued along the previous chapters that, from a communicative point of view, speech acts of arguing are successfully carried out when the illocutionary effects associated with them are produced. These effects establish a

mutual binding of the speaker and interlocutor to a standard of evaluation. Once in place, they function as a regulative device that allows us to evaluate the quality of the argumentative process and subsequent dialectical moves carried out by both the speaker and the interlocutor. For these effects to come into being, it is necessary that the speaker and the interlocutor jointly construct the meaning of the speaker's utterance. This requires the interlocutor to respond showing their interpretation of the speaker's utterance, and the speaker to take up this interpretation. This interaction entails the recognition that the normative position of the parties has changed in a certain way.

As a rule of thumb, the interlocutor's interpretation typically coincides with the speaker's intended meaning. However, as illustrated in example (1), in some cases – and, at times, despite the speaker's best efforts— what a speaker means does not always coincide with the interlocutor's interpretation. This divergence between the speaker's intended meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation can take the shape of a misrepresentation or distortion of the original stance, potentially undermining illocutionary success.

In this chapter, I will argue that this gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation poses important consequences for the evaluation of argumentation. To be clear, I will be focus on the evaluation of argumentation at the dialectical level[33]. Specifically, I will explore the consequences of this gap in cases involving commitment attributions. I will argue that to fully understand these pernicious consequences, it is crucial to distinguish between the speaker's meaning and what we have called the *joint* meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing. To illustrate this, I will take the straw man fallacy as a case in point, distinguishing three different scenarios in which the fallacy may be committed. These three scenarios share the interlocutor's misinterpretation of the speaker's intended meaning; what they differ on is on how exactly this misinterpretation affects the meaning of the speech act of

[33] It is necessary to stress here that dialectical evaluation is not the only type of evaluation that we can carry out. Argumentation can also be evaluated from a logical and a rhetorical point of view. From a logical (or semantic) perspective, we evaluate whether the semantic conditions determining the correctness of the target-claim have been met. Rhetorical evaluation, on the other hand, focuses on determining whether an act of arguing is a good means to show the correctness of the target-claim (Bermejo-Luque 2011, pp. 159, 165).

arguing as jointly constructed, and hence what consequences this poses for the evaluation of argumentation from a dialectical perspective.

This chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.1, I will present some key points on the evaluation of argumentation that will be of interest for the purposes of this chapter. To do so, I will revisit some ideas introduced in Chapter 2, including some insights from Kauffeld's and Bermejo-Luque's proposals, before highlighting how my approach differs from theirs. In section 6.2., I will recall some important aspects of the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation, together with the notion of joint meaning, applying it to the analysis of the straw man fallacy. Finally, in section 6.3., I will draw the main conclusions of this chapter.

6.1. Argumentation appraisal

In Chapter 1, I contended that determining the meaning of speech acts of arguing is important not only for the interpretation, but also for the evaluation of argumentation. In this section, I will present several key points regarding the evaluation of argumentation that are of particular relevance to the purposes of this chapter. To do so, I will revisit some of the ideas introduced in Chapter 2, including key elements from Kauffeld and Bermejo-Luque's proposals. After this, I will introduce my alternative proposal and explain how it diverges from theirs, particularly in relation to the role played by the normative effects produced in argumentative exchanges for the evaluation of argumentation. This will serve as a basis for applying the account offered here for the analysis of cases where there is a gap between the speaker's intended meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation.

In Chapter 2, I presented Kauffeld's analysis of specific speech acts that are especially relevant to argumentation theorists, such as proposing and accusing. He argues that the performance of these types of speech acts makes the speaker incur certain obligations and responsibilities, such as the burden of proof, that arise within the argumentative discourse. In this respect, according to Kauffeld and Goodwin (2022, p. 1), one of the most important tasks for argumentation theorists consists in determining the sources of these obligations and responsibilities. This is so because, according to Kauffeld and Goodwin, they "determine important norms related to the quality of arguments" (2022, p. 1). In other words, they are important for the

evaluation of argumentation. Specifically, drawing from Johnson (1996) and Govier (1997), Kauffeld emphasizes that these probative obligations play a central role in the dialectical evaluation of argumentation. Following Johnson (2000), argumentation, at the dialectical tier, is assessed "in terms of the arguer's obligation to answer questions and objections regarding her standpoint" (Johnson 2000, p. 1).

Kauffeld, in his examination of speech acts such as proposing and accusing, shows that adopting the theoretical framework of speech act theory is useful for characterizing the obligations and responsibilities incurred by participants in argumentative exchanges. However, as we have noted, the effects of argumentative speech acts go beyond the simple performance of argumentative functions associated with individual speech acts like accusing or proposing. Thus, a more nuanced account of argumentation requires going beyond merely identifying the argumentative functions of speech acts. In this regard, in order to account for the particular features of argumentation that distinguish it from other types of communicative acts, I adopt the view of argumentation as a specific type of speech act. The approach I propose here thus builds on Kauffeld's and Bermejo-Luque's insights, but it introduces a crucial distinction: while Kauffeld focuses on the general obligations associated with various speech acts (e.g., accusing, proposing), I argue, following Bermejo-Luque, that a full-fledged account of argumentation requires characterizing it as a specific type of speech act. This characterization provides a deeper understanding of the specific normative effects introduced through argumentation. By contrast to other types of speech acts, acts of arguing aim to establish a justificatory relationship between a reason and a target-claim, changing the normative position of both the speaker and the audience in a very specific way. In my view, this justificatory relationship, once recognized, produces normative effects, i.e., it creates and introduces specific changes in the dialectical obligations, entitlements, and responsibilities for both the speaker and the interlocutor, establishing a standard of evaluation that guides the (dialectical) appraisal of the argumentation.

As we saw in Chapter 3, the list of normative effects associated with illocutionary acts of arguing is the following:

- The interlocutor's legitimate expectation that the speaker can provide more reasons to justify the target-claim if requested to do so by the interlocutor.
- The interlocutor's entitlement to ask for reasons to show why the reasons already provided justify the target-claim.
- The speaker's commitment to the truth of the implicit inference-claim.
- The speaker's obligation to provide more reasons (reasons to show why the reasons already provided justify the target-claim) if requested to do so by the interlocutor.
- The interlocutor's entitlement to challenge the reasons adduced and the implicit inference-claim as a means to justify the target-claim.
- The interlocutor's conditional commitment to accept the correctness of the target-claim unless they can produce reasons to the contrary.
- The interlocutor's acceptance of the burden of criticism in challenging the speaker's argument.
- The speaker's commitment to addressing potential counterarguments and objections.

Let's illustrate the evaluative function of the normative effects with the following example. Imagine a parent saying (2a) to his son in the context of a family that is preparing for a trip and that needs to leave to the airport by 8 a.m.:

(2) It's 7:30 a.m.; you should start getting ready now

Now imagine that, after saying this, the son responds by saying something like "But my luggage is ready". This response shows two things: that he has interpreted his parent's utterance as an act of arguing, and that he evaluates it as bad argumentation, questioning the reason adduced as a good means to show the correctness of the target-claim. To this utterance, the parent could answer something along the lines of "But you have to eat something before we leave".

By means of this argumentative exchange, in which a speech act of arguing has been carried out and recognized (i.e., the meaning has been jointly construct by the

speaker and the interlocutor), some normative effects have been produced, including those outlined above. Once in place, these effects work as a regulative device, binding the speaker and the interlocutor to a standard of evaluation that establishes which subsequent dialectical moves are allowed (or which would count as good and bad dialectical moves). For instance, in the previous example, subsequent replies by the son disputing the correctness of the implicit inference-claim would count as permissible moves; by contrast, merely insisting on questioning the need to get ready without even attempting to justify this denial would count as an illegitimate movement, as it would contravene the normative effects in play (in this case, the one concerning the interlocutor's conditional commitment to accept the correctness of the target-claim unless they can produce reasons to the contrary).

As we will see, the production of the normative effects is not always straightforward. In this chapter, I will explore some cases where a gap arises between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation. As previously noted, evaluating argumentation involves assessing the dialectical moves carried out by both the speaker and the interlocutor on the basis of the commitments introduced in their commitment store. The gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation can potentially pose problems for the evaluation of argumentation because the commitments that each party attributes to the other may differ, thus making it difficult to determine what argumentation is being (and should be) evaluated. I will argue that, by examining the dialectical obligations and entitlements that arise from the joint construction of meaning between the speaker and the interlocutor, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes good argumentation from a dialectical point of view.

6.2. Joint meaning and the evaluation of argumentation: the case of the straw man fallacy

In the previous chapter, I have emphasized the importance of establishing the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing for argumentation theorists. As we have seen, this is crucial because it determines the commitments introduced into the commitment store, which gives rise to the production of normative effects that, in turn, set constraints on the permissible dialectical moves for both the speaker and the

interlocutor. In this section, I will show that the notion of joint meaning, alongside the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning, can shed light on the analysis of cases in which commitment attributions are at stake. More specifically, I will argue that the notion of joint meaning allows us to carry out a finer-grained analysis of the consequences for the evaluation of argumentation arising from the gap between the speaker's meaning and its interpretation by the interlocutor. I will show this by taking the straw man fallacy as a case study. Specifically, I will present three scenarios in which the fallacy may occur, which pose different consequences for the evaluation of argumentation. Before we move on, however, let me first bring back the main insights on the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation that are of interest for the purpose of this chapter.

6.2.1. Speech acts of arguing and commitment attributions

As already pointed out, argumentation, as a communicative activity, involves an exchange among its participants (Oswald, 2023); from this communicative point of view, acts of arguing are only successful when the aforementioned normative effects are brought about, whereby the production of these normative effects depends on the interactive construction by the speaker and the interlocutor of the meaning of the speaker's act. In the previous chapter, I argued that the interlocutor's interpretation of the speaker's utterance and the speaker's take up constitutes what I, drawing from Carassa and Colombetti's (2009) proposal, have referred to as the *joint meaning* of illocutionary acts of arguing.

As I pointed out, however, the concept of joint meaning that I am endorsing does not entail a strong collaboration or cooperation between a speaker and their interlocutor, as Carassa and Colombetti seem to do. This conceptualization of the notion is important because, as we will see, in cases of straw man fallacies, especially in situations of power imbalance, the speaker can take up a certain attribution of commitments due to some unfair norms that are in place, or due to the lack of hermeneutical resources (Stevens, 2021). In those cases, we would not take the speaker as actively collaborating with their interlocutor.

In the previous chapter, I contended that the joint meaning determines the commitments introduced into what, following Walton and Krabbe (1995), we referred

to as the commitment store. However, the interlocutor does not always correctly interpret the speaker's utterance, thus posing potential difficulties for the construction of the joint meaning[34]. In these cases, we would say that there is a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation.

For instance, consider the following example in which three colleagues, Anna, Henry and John, are discussing about the best marketing strategy to promote a product. However, the conversation takes a negative turn because Henry and John start making offensive comments about a female colleague's recent advancement in the company. In reaction to this, Anna decides to intervene and says "It's incredibly disrespectful to talk in such a way about your colleague; you should stop right now". In this case, by means of her utterance, Anna can be taken as carrying out a speech act of arguing in which she is adducing as a reason that talking in that way about a colleague is disrespectful to conclude that they should stop doing it. If Henry and John would have responded Anna by saying something like "You're right" and "We're sorry", and then Anna replies to them "It's fine. Please, don't do that again. Where were we?", we would say that the meaning is jointly constructed, because it coincides with her interlocutor's interpretation. And therefore, we could say that the normative effects associated with the act of arguing would have been produced, they would be in place; so her act of arguing would be successful.

However, let's imagine that the responses she receives from Henry and John are something similar to "Oh, god, calm down!" and "Yeah, you're overreacting! Don't be so aggressive!". This shows that they interpreted Anna not as attempting to justify that they should stop talking that way, but just as attacking them[35]. In this case, a gap arises between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutors' interpretation. Imagine that, after John and Henry's responses, and to avoid further uncomfortable reactions, Anna simply lowers her head, bites her tongue, and says "I'm sorry, I guess I'm a bit stressed out today". In this case, we would say that, in retrospect, the meaning of Anna's utterance has been constructed as an attack to Henry and John; a joint

[34] These difficulties may not entail major problems and can be quickly solved, as example (2) shows, by simply accepting the interlocutor's interpretation.

[35] This can be due to different reasons, some of them related to the speaker's social position or identity. See (Yap, 2020) for further elaboration.

meaning that, of course, does not coincide with what she intended to communicate, but which nonetheless enters the commitment store of the participants of the conversation. In this scenario, the normative effects in place would not be those of an act of arguing.

In the next section, I will show that the notion of joint meaning is useful for the analysis of cases in which the gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation has negative consequences for the evaluation of argumentation and subsequent dialectical moves performed in the argumentative exchange. To illustrate this, I will focus on the analysis of the straw man fallacy. I will attempt to show that introducing the notion of joint meaning allows us to distinguish three possible scenarios in which the fallacy may occur, which pose distinctive consequences for the evaluation of argumentation from a dialectical perspective.

6.2.2. The case of the straw man fallacy

The straw man fallacy has been commonly characterized as occurring when the speaker's position or argumentation is misrepresented or distorted by the interlocutor to make it easier to refute or criticize, while disregarding the speaker's original stance. The interlocutor then proceeds to criticize the distorted position as if it were the speaker's actual stance (Walton 1996; Johnson and Blair 1983; Govier 1992; Tindale 2007; van Laar 2008; Aikin and Cassey 2011; Lewiński and Oswald 2013; Stevens 2021).

The distortion of the speaker's position can take various forms. According to Tindale, the straw man fallacy involves attacking or dismissing a position that "is not the real 'man' or 'person', but a caricature of the real position held" (2007, p. 20). In some cases, the speaker's position is exaggerated by the interlocutor, with the intention of making it look more radical (Walton 1996, p. 117); or quite the opposite: sometimes it is oversimplified by "omission of his nuances of qualifications", as van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987 p. 286) claim. In addition, it can take place by means of making up a fictional standpoint to represent the speaker's view for its refutation (Walton and Krabbe 1995, p. 95) or by "fabricating an imaginary opponent with an imaginary and impossibly weak argument, and then defeating the argument" (Aikin and Cassey 2011, p. 92). Additionally, the straw man fallacy can be committed by selecting a weaker

version of another speaker's argument or perspective by the interlocutor (Talisse and Aikin 2006, p. 347).

What all these forms have in common is the interlocutor's attribution of wrong commitments to the speaker. In this respect, I will follow Walton (1996) and Lewiński and Oswald (2013) in characterizing the straw man fallacy as an issue of commitment attribution. Before we move on with the analysis of the implications of this fallacy for the evaluation of argumentative exchanges, let's look at these two accounts in more detail.

Walton (1996) presents an account of the straw man fallacy relating it with other types of fallacies, such as *ad hominem* arguments, or *secundum quid.* However, he defines it as a fallacy on its own right. According to him, the straw man fallacy does not simply consist in misrepresenting someone's position, but in using "that misrepresentation to refute or criticize that person's argument in a context of disputation" (1996, p. 124). He claims that the straw man fallacy poses problems for the critical discussion because, in order to resolve it, the argumentation used by one of the parties should be based on premises representing the actual position of the other party (1996, p. 125).

One of the issues addressed by Walton has to do with the presence or absence of the respondent at the moment in which the accusation of having committed a fallacy has to be assessed. If the person is present, Walton claims, "is in a privileged position to pronounce on what his present position is on the issue" (1996, p. 126). But even so, it might be difficult for them to make clear what commitments they've acquired, especially if there are no witnesses or any other record of the conversation. Walton points out that the commitments acquired by the participants in a dialogue, according to an ideal model, are placed in a commitment store (Hamblin 1970). However, in real conversations, disputes can arise because there would not be any registration of these commitments; or any possible registration, like memory, could be disputed. In cases in which the respondent is not present, Walton claims, evaluators should employ the principle of charity in their interpretation of the discourse (1996, p. 127).

Walton emphasizes the importance of determining the respondent's commitments when assessing accusations of straw man fallacies. The evaluation should be carried out considering the evidence that can be found along the discourse,

including what the speaker said and how it was said. He conceives of a commitment as a normative concept "appropriate for use in evaluating cases of alleged fallacies" (1996, p. 127), and related to the specific conditions of the type of dialogue in which the speaker is participating. In a nutshell, what is essential to evaluate cases constituting straw man fallacies is the evidence that allows us to track what the speaker's commitments are and thus what their actual position is.

Similarly, Lewiński and Oswald (2013) also characterize the straw man fallacy as an issue of commitment attribution. More specifically, as they note, it is an issue of commitment attribution related to the derivation of meaning; a move that is "meant to make misattributions of meaning and commitments pass for legitimate" (2013, p. 170). Drawing from Pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2010), they conceive fallacies as speech acts constituting violations of rules governing rational argumentative discussions (2013, p. 165). In particular, they define the straw man fallacy as occurring when the adversary's argument is misrepresented by the arguer "in such a way that they become easier to refute, and then attacks the misrepresented position as if it were the one actually defended by the adversary" (2013, p. 165).Their interest lies in the criteria for identifying a straw man fallacy as an unreasonable move, which requires being able to distinguish between a representation and a misrepresentation of an adversary's position. To do so, pragmatic criteria for normative interpretation, provided by the pragma-dialectical approach, are needed.

One of the aspects that can be taken into consideration in the identification of a straw man fallacy is the pragma-dialectical concept of "disagreement space" (van Eemeren et al. 1993), which relates to the commitments that a speaker can be "held accountable for on the basis of a pragmatic interpretation of what she said in a given context" (Lewiński and Oswald 2013, p. 168), including the speaker's meaning, which determines all the fair attacks to the speaker's position. However, as Lewiński and Oswald point out, the speaker's meaning includes explicit but also implicit contents, so it is not always so transparent, making it difficult to identify the actual speaker's commitments. Thus, the interpretation of a given utterance or set of utterances includes the speaker's obligation to be as clear as possible in formulating their utterances in a graspable way for them to allow their interlocutor to attribute the correct commitments to the speaker (2013, p. 169).

They formulate two criteria for the identification of a straw man fallacy: (i) the pragmatic plausibility and (ii) the interpretative charity (2013, pp. 169-170). According to the first one, if a speaker is following "the contextually relevant procedures in deriving speaker meaning […] and thus stays within the bounds of a disagreement space of a given utterance" (2013, p. 169), then they cannot be taken as committing a straw man fallacy. Regarding the interpretative charity, they think of it as a "choice of the interpretation that is most beneficial to the arguer" (2013, p. 170), which arguers and analyst are adviced to take when interpretative doubts arise. It should be understood not as a rule of reasonable argumentation, but as a rhetorical choice that can be taken by the adversary in producing their criticisms to the speaker's position[36].

I agree with Walton and Lewiński and Oswald in that the straw man fallacy is an issue of misattribution of commitments, and in that the identification and evaluation of a straw man as an unreasonable move depends on the determination of the speaker's commitments. I would nonetheless like to go a step further and argue that introducing the notion of joint meaning can be useful to fully understand what this misattribution of commitments consists in and what are its implications for the evaluation of the argumentation. Specifically, the misattribution of commitments in cases of straw man fallacy consists in a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation. As we previously observed, the interlocutor's response to the speaker's utterance shows how they have been interpreted, and thus what commitments are attributed to the speaker. If this interpretation is accepted by the speaker, then we can say that the meaning of their utterance has been jointly constructed. This interactive construction determines which commitments are introduced in the commitment store, and which normative effects, functioning as a standard of evaluation, are in place. In this regard, introducing the notion of joint meaning and accounting for the straw man fallacy in terms of a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation will allow us to provide a more thorough account of the consequences this gap can have for the evaluation of argumentation. I will illustrate this by presenting three scenarios in which a straw man fallacy is committed.

---

[36] Lewiński and Oswald also point out that the adversary can opt for an uncharitable interpretation, provided it is a pragmatically plausible interpretation (2013, p. 170).

6.2.3. Three scenarios

In the preceding section, we observed that the successful performance of an illocutionary act of arguing (from the communicative point of view) amounts to the production of certain normative effects. These normative effects, whose production depends on the joint construction by the speaker and the interlocutor of the meaning of the speaker's utterance, function as a standard of evaluation. That is, once in place, these effects allow us to assess subsequent dialectical moves by the speaker and the interlocutor. For instance, if someone carries out an illocutionary act of arguing by uttering (2a)

> (2a) I've been thinking that we should reconsider our meat consumption. It is not good for either our health or the environment.

a possible response could be (2b)

> (2b) Don't see it. Eliminating meat will lead to us not getting enough protein.

However, let's imagine that the speaker's intention was just to suggest that they should reduce and not eliminate their meat consumption. Here, although there seems to be a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation, the speaker's formulation of their utterance leaves some room for interpretation. We can imagine that, after this, the speaker responds uttering (3c)

> (2c) I didn't mean that! What I wanted to say is that we should reduce the consumption, not eliminate it.

> (2d) Oh, ok! That could work for me!

By means of (2c), the speaker is clarifying what they meant by (2a). The initial gap, which could potentially give rise to a straw man fallacy, does not pose a problem in this particular case: what the speaker meant has been finally accepted by the

interlocutor, so the meaning of (2a) has been jointly constructed, bringing about the normative effects that will regulate next dialectical moves on the basis of the commitments introduced in their commitment store. This example illustrates an argumentative exchange in which the speaker's act of arguing, (2a), has been successfully carried out, despite the initial gap.

What differentiates this from straw man cases? A possible answer lies in the intentionality of the move. In many cases, a straw man fallacy can be committed strategically, e.g., it might be meant to block or hindering the discussion. However, as Tindale (2007, p. 22) observes, a straw man fallacy can be intentionally or unintentionally committed, yet still be fallacious (Stevens, 2021). As already mentioned, a crucial feature of straw man fallacies has to do with the fact that the misrepresentation of the speaker's position is meant to be attacked by the interlocutor. As we will see, in the instances of the straw man fallacy that will be presented, the interaction aimed at jointly establishing the commitments to which the speaker can be held accountable is not fruitful. Specifically, unlike in cases like (2), this interaction fails to result in a proper attribution of commitments to the speaker.

As we will now see, the analysis of the straw man fallacy is particularly useful for analyzing the consequences that the gap poses for the evaluation of argumentation. The most obvious consequence has to do with the fact that, in cases constituting a straw man fallacy, the argumentation that is criticized or refuted by the interlocutor (i.e., evaluated as bad argumentation) does not coincide with the argumentation actually put forward by the speaker. However, other consequences can be observed if the notion of joint meaning is taken into account. In order to illustrate them, I will present three scenarios in which there is a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation; however, its consequences for the evaluation of the argumentation differ depending on how the gap affects the joint construction of the meaning of the speech act of arguing in each scenario.

6.2.3.1. Creating the gap

In the first scenario, the straw man fallacy is committed when the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing is firstly jointly constructed by the speaker and the interlocutor in a correct manner, but the interlocutor's subsequent criticisms are based

on a distorted version of the speaker's argumentation. In this scenario, where the normative effects are in place due to the initial construction of the joint meaning, the interlocutor's subsequent moves must be evaluated negatively in the light of these effects. To illustrate this, let's consider the following example. During a department meeting where the announcement of a position for an assistant professor is being discussed, the following dialogue takes place between a PhD student, Sophia, and the head of the department, Roger:

> (3a) Sophia: I believe it's important to increase the presence of philosophers from underrepresented and marginalized groups. So I think that the call for applications should state that we encourage people from these groups to apply.
>
> (3b) Roger: So what you're saying is that we should explicitly include this in the announcement? Would it work something like: "Our department is committed to diversity, and to promote the work of philosophers from underrepresented groups, we encourage these individuals to apply for this position"?
>
> (3c) Sophia: Yes, exactly.
>
> (3d) Roger: Alright. Could you take care of adding it to the call for applications?
>
> (3e) Sophia: Sure. I'll do it today.

In this example, an illocutionary act of arguing has been performed by Sophia. In this case, she has adduced that it is important to increase the presence of philosophers from underrepresented groups as a reason to conclude that they should include a statement in these lines in the call for applications. By means of his utterance (3b), Roger is seeking clarification to see if his interpretation coincides with what Sophia meant. By means of (3c), Sophia makes it clear that Roger's interpretation is

correct, i.e., it coincides with the speaker's meaning. The meaning of Sophia's utterance has thus been jointly constructed: speaker and interlocutor agree on what the speaker meant, and normative effects have been produced accordingly. The commitments that have been introduced in the commitment store are that Sophia carried out an attempt at showing that the target-claim "the call for applications should state that we encourage people from these groups to apply" is correct, adducing as a reason that it's important to increase the presence of philosophers from underrepresented and marginalized groups. This entails that, for instance, now Roger would be entitled to ask for reasons to show why the reasons already provided justify the target-claim, and Sophia would, in principle, have to provide them. In other words, the illocutionary act of arguing carried out by Sophia would be successful. But let's imagine that, after the meeting, Roger approaches Sophia in the cafeteria and utters (3f) in presence of others:

> (3f) Roger: I've been thinking about our conversation at the meeting. I think what you said before is problematic. Academic competition should be exclusively guided by considerations about a person's merits and qualifications, irrespective of their background or identity. So why should we discourage white men from applying, even if they are properly qualified?

Roger's utterance (3f) shows that there is a gap between what Sophia meant and his interpretation of her utterance. He can thus be taken as committing a straw man fallacy, because he is misrepresenting Sophia's stance as an attempt to justify that they should discourage white men for applying by adducing as a reason that considerations about a person's identity should override their merits and qualifications. Roger is here creating the gap between Sophia's intended meaning and his own interpretation; that is, he seems to assume that his interpretation coincides with what Sophia meant[37]. This creation poses consequences for the evaluation of argumentation in the sense

[37] This gap can arise from a genuine misunderstanding. However, it can also be the result of a deliberate misrepresentation of Sophia's argument. The interlocutor, Roger, could be merely pretending or making as if his interpretation coincided with Sophia's intended meaning and the meaning as jointly constructed.

that, based on this misinterpretation, Roger could consider himself entitled to engage in further dialectical moves to critically challenge an argumentation that does not actually coincide with Sophia's. However, these further dialectical moves would not be legitimate in the light of the normative effects previously brought about by their initial joint construction of Sophia's argumentation, i.e., those produced by means of Sophia's utterance (3a), Roger's utterance (3b) and Sophia's subsequent response. Such dialectical moves should be evaluated negatively. For instance, Roger would not be entitled to ask Sophia for reasons to justify why considerations about a person's identity should override an assessment of their qualifications. And, in fact, Sophia would not be obliged to provide reasons to show that, for the reasons she already provided and the target-claim she intended to justify are completely different. Thus, dialectical moves made by Roger with regard to the distorted position, such as asking Sophia "Why do you want to discourage white men from applying?", will be qualified as bad or incorrect dialectical moves; they would be bad means (Bermejo-Luque 2011, p. 191) for determining whether Sophia's argumentation is a good or bad attempt at showing that the target-claim or conclusion is correct.

6.2.3.2. Retaining the gap

In the second scenario, the interlocutor's response indicates that the speaker's meaning has been distorted, yet let us assume that the speaker does not accept this interpretation of her utterance. In this case, a straw man fallacy is committed, but, as a result, no joint meaning is constructed, and thus no normative effects are produced. This absence of normative effects prevents the evaluation of the argumentation put forward by the speaker in subsequent moves. To illustrate this, let's imagine a different version of example (3):

> (4a) Sophia: I believe it's important to increase the presence of philosophers from underrepresented and marginalized groups. So I think that the call for applications should mention that we encourage people from these groups to apply.

(4b) Roger: I think that's problematic. Academic competition should be exclusively guided by considerations about a person's merits and qualifications, irrespective of their background or identity. So why should we discourage white men from applying, even if they are properly qualified?

(4c) Sophia: No. That's not what I was saying.

In this case, we can see that there is a gap between the speaker's meaning, i.e., what Sophia meant, and Roger's interpretation of her utterance. In this example, Roger is committing a straw man fallacy because he is misrepresenting Sophia's position to make it look more radical and thus easier to criticize; he is interpreting Sophia as concluding that they should discourage white men from applying, adducing as a reason that considerations about a person's identity should override an assessment of their qualifications. In this case there is no joint meaning: Roger's interpretation is not accepted by Sophia, who explicitly denies that what she meant is what Roger interpreted. The lack of agreement regarding the speaker's meaning prevents certain commitments from entering in their commitment store[38]. And thus, the normative effects associated with the illocutionary act of arguing performed by Sophia are not produced. In this scenario, Sophia would be allowed to ignore or refuse to directly address the interlocutor's challenges to the reasons already given, because the reasons for which he would be seeking additional justification are not the ones provided by Sophia in the first place. And the same applies for other possible dialectical moves: as far as no argumentation has been introduced in the commitment store shared by Sophia and Roger, any dialectical move regarding the argumentation provided and the argumentation attributed to Sophia would be illegitimate. In other words, there is

[38] At least in the commitment store shared by Sophia and Roger. However, this could be different for the rest of the audience attending the meeting. As in the previous scenario, it is easy to imagine that other people's interpretation of Sophia's utterance coincides with her intended meaning.

no argumentation in their commitment store to be evaluated, so other dialectical moves in this direction would be illegitimate[39].

In scenarios of this sort, the straw man fallacy may not be committed by chance or randomly, but to serve some specific purposes. It can be argued that the speaker has made her utterance(s) graspable for her interlocutor and the rest of the audience; however, Roger could still insist in his misinterpretation for strategic reasons. We can imagine that Roger believes that opportunities are already equal for everyone and considers that Sophia's suggestion is just an excuse to "erase" white men from academia. He thus aims to convince the rest of the audience that Sophia is really trying to fool them. So he retains the gap between the speaker's meaning and his interpretation tactically. By doing so, he is trying to prevent Sophia's actual argumentation to enter in the commitment store, thereby avoiding discussing whether the explicit encouragement of applications by marginalized philosophers should be added to the call. In other words: he is trying to *block* the construction of the joint meaning as a strategy for preventing the discussion initiated by Sophia from moving forward.

Such deliberate manipulation is characteristic of the dynamics commonly observed in political contexts. Example (1) would be a case of the straw man fallacy in which the gap between the speaker's and the interlocutor's interpretation is retained. As we pointed out, Irene Montero's intervention generated a big controversy because, while she was justifying the importance of sex education for minors, she was taken by members of Vox as justifying pedophilia. The misrepresentation of her argumentation carried out by Vox's member Espinosa de los Monteros responds to strategic purposes, namely, to achieve Irene Montero's resignation. And this is made even more evident by the fact that, on other occasions, and for the same purpose, other members of his party have carried out similar tactics.

[39] One legitimate move would consist in asking for clarification, that is, attempting to construct the joint meaning. For instance, Roger could address Sophia at the cafeteria and utter "Sorry, Sophia. I should have been more careful. Did you mean that...?".

6.2.3.3. Taking up the gap

In the final scenario, the straw man fallacy occurs when the interlocutor distorts the meaning of the speaker's utterance in their response, and yet the speaker *accepts* this interpretation. Hence, the normative effects produced will shape the evaluation of subsequent dialectical moves based on this distorted joint construction. Let's consider a different version of example (4):

> (5a) Sophia: I believe it's important to increase the presence of philosophers from underrepresented and marginalized groups. So I think we should include in the call for applications that we encourage them to apply.
>
> (5b) Roger: I don't think that discouraging white men is beneficial for our department. After all, the university should encourage all applications from qualified people, regardless of their social background or identity.
>
> (5c) Sophia: Yeah… you're right... So should I add anything else to the call for application?
>
> (5d) Roger: No, I think it is fine. You can start distributing it.

This last scenario, in which the joint meaning doesn't coincide with the speaker's intended meaning, can be particularly pernicious for the speaker. It can be accounted for in two different ways. On the one hand, we can imagine that Sophia knows that Roger's interpretation does not coincide with what she meant, but she still accepts it and thus they jointly construct her utterance as meaning what Roger interprets that it means. But she could also genuinely believe that Roger's interpretation actually coincides with the meaning she intended to communicate. In this second case, we would say that the victim has been fooled (Stevens 2021). However, in both cases, the consequences for the evaluation of argumentation would be the same: what is introduced in the commitment store is the distorted version of

Sophia's argumentation and, thus, subsequent dialectical moves will be constrained by the normative effects brought about by this distorted version. For instance, if the speaker attempts to reintroduce aspects of her previous argument (such as additional justification for the reasons already provided) to demonstrate why the interlocutor's assessment of the argumentation as bad is incorrect, this move would be deemed inappropriate. Especially in cases where the speaker is actually fooled, she may find herself unable to adopt a critical stance or engage in the discussion. This can be due to a variety of reasons. For instance, as Stevens (2021, p. 114) points out, the speaker may suffer from a hermeneutical lacuna, hindering her ability to provide a precise formulation of her reasons, and thus being particularly susceptible to being fooled by the interlocutor's misrepresentation. This, eventually, could result in the undermining of her confidence in her faculties (2021, p. 122).

An additional cause of the speaker's inability to take a critical position can be due to the norms governing argumentative exchanges. As Hundleby (2013) observes, the norms of politeness governing argumentative discussions make it difficult for women to be correctly interpreted:

> When women defy gendered standards of feminine, polite passivity, they initially tend to be viewed as merely requesting an active, authoritative role —especially in expert discourse. If not prima facie excluded, women are denied the responses that men receive, and pro tanto, seem to be speaking out of turn or continuously entreating to argue. (2013, p. 243).

These norms may cause women to be interpreted as making a completely different illocutionary act, as in cases of discursive injustice (Kukla 2014), or as holding the wrong commitments, as in the case of the straw man fallacy. The continuous exposure of the speaker to argumentative situations in which, due to their social position, the meaning of their utterance is distorted, may produce in them the believe that the possibility of carrying out acts of arguing is not available for them anymore. In other words, it may result in the speaker ceasing to perceive the *speech affordance* (Ayala 2016) of arguing in certain situations in which they should be able to perceive it.

6.3. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that the gap between the speaker's intended meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation has significant consequences for the evaluation of argumentation. After presenting some of the key points of my proposal regarding the evaluation of argumentation from an interactional approach to speech acts of arguing, and by taking the straw man fallacy as a case in point, I have contended that the notion of joint meaning, alongside the distinction between the speaker's meaning and the meaning jointly constructed of illocutionary acts of arguing, provides valuable insight into the implications of this gap for argument evaluation.

In order to show this, I presented three scenarios where a straw man fallacy is committed, each revealing different consequences for the evaluation of argumentation. In the first scenario, the straw man fallacy is committed after the speaker and the interlocutor have jointly constructed the meaning of the illocutionary act in a way that coincides with the speaker's intended meaning. Here, the interlocutor creates the gap after the normative effects are in place, misrepresenting the speaker's argumentation. Since the normative effects have already been established through the joint construction of meaning, any subsequent dialectical moves carried by the interlocutor would be evaluated negatively.

In the second scenario, the interlocutor's initial response shows that the speaker's meaning has been distorted, and the speaker explicitly rejects this misinterpretation. The gap created by this distortion prevents the construction of joint meaning, hence blocking the production of the normative effects necessary for evaluating the speaker's argument in future interactions. This, in turn, prevents the evaluation of the argumentation put forward by the speaker in subsequent moves.

Finally, in the third scenario, the interlocutor's distortion of the meaning of the speaker's utterance is taken up by the speaker, either intentionally or unintentionally. As a result, the normative effects produced are grounded in a distorted version of the speaker's meaning. This scenario poses a particular danger, as the speaker's acceptance of the distorted interpretation biases the evaluation of their argumentation, potentially hindering their ability to reintroduce or defend aspects of their original stance. Such acceptance may further undermine the speaker's ability to engage in the discussion.

The analysis proposed along this chapter allows us to discern different pernicious consequences of the misattribution of commitments involved in the straw man fallacy, taking into account how it may differentially affect the joint construction of the speech act of arguing and its characteristic normative effects. This discussion opens the door to further investigation into strategies for mitigating the impact of fallacious argumentation, especially when it arises from the misattribution of commitments.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

In this chapter, I will outline the main contributions of this dissertation. By drawing on some of the most recent approaches to speech acts, in this dissertation I have provided a characterization of argumentation as a speech act where the normative and interactional aspects, as they have been presented along the previous chapters, play an essential role. Throughout this work, I have contended that characterizing argumentation as a specific type of speech act has important advantages over other approaches where speech act theory is considered just a tool for accounting for the argumentative function of certain speech acts. This dissertation is an attempt to make a modest contribution to better understand how argumentation can and should be characterized as a specific type of speech act. In particular, and by contrast to Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation, I have contended that a full-fledged account of argumentation as a specific type of speech act requires considering not only the role played by the speaker in performing the act; rather, it is necessary to consider the whole exchange in which the interlocutor plays a key active role in the performance of the act, and in the particular way in which argumentation changes the normative landscape for both of them. This is crucial, as I have argued, for evaluating argumentation as a dialectical process where other communicative moves are carried out, which can then be assessed as correct or incorrect moves in the light of the normative effects introduced by speech acts of arguing.

In this concluding chapter, I will provide a detailed summary of the main findings of this dissertation and highlight its primary contributions to the field of Argumentation Theory. In addition, I will outline possible paths for future research that can further develop the ideas presented here.

7.1. Summary of Findings and Main Contributions

In Chapter 2, I have explored the intersection of pragmatics and argumentation theory, focusing on the influence of speech act theory in argumentation studies. After discussing the foundational works of John L. Austin and John Searle, the chapter further explores how different approaches to argumentation have applied speech act theory. I have distinguished two main kinds of approaches: those that focus on the analysis of the argumentative functions of certain speech acts, and those that propose to characterize argumentation as a specific type of speech act. The former include various perspectives, central among them is the normative pragmatics account. Among the latter, we find Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation as the two main models that characterize argumentation as a specific type of speech act. This chapter concludes by outlining the proposal to be elaborated along the following chapters, aimed at integrating the main virtues of previous proposals, while addressing their shortcomings; specifically, one which integrates the conceptualization of argumentation as a distinct kind of speech act with the analysis of the specific normative effects that characterize it.

In Chapter 3, I have delved deeper into the speech act theoretical framework in order to map the different conceptual resources available for argumentation theorists. After introducing the main elements of Austin's foundational work, I have discussed several criticisms and revisions of his proposed framework, focusing particularly on Strawson's reinterpretation of Austin's account along Gricean lines, as well as Searle's approach to speech acts, highlighting its main differences with Austin's speech act theory. After that, I have presented the limitations of the Searlean approach as outlined by the proposals developed within the interactional approach to speech acts, which include the work of Clark, Sbisà, Carassa and Colombetti, and Witek. These approaches emphasize the social nature of speech acts, defining them as context-changing social actions. This chapter emphasizes the virtues of the interactional

approach to speech acts, concluding that adopting this framework can be fruitful for providing a full-fledged characterization of argumentation as a speech act.

In Chapter 4, I have delved into the problems associated with the Searlean view assumed by Pragma-dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation, elaborating my own solution to address these problems. After outlining some of the key points of both models, I have proposed a solution consisting in the distinction between two levels of analysis. While the first level focuses on the speaker's utterance, the second level considers the broader communicative exchange in which the interlocutor also plays an active role in the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing. This chapter concludes by contending that, in order to provide a more nuanced account of the communicative and interactional aspects of argumentation, it is necessary to take into consideration both the speaker's utterance and the interlocutor's response showing how the speaker's utterance has been interpreted and whether the illocutionary effects consisting in changes in the dialectical obligations and entitlements have been produced.

In Chapter 5, I have carried out an analysis of the meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing. Specifically, I have explored whether the meaning that can be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing at each level of analysis differs. Drawing on Carassa and Colombetti's account, I have introduced the notion of *joint meaning* and I have argued that it is necessary to distinguish between the speaker's meaning and the joint meaning of illocutionary acts of arguing. I have contended that while the speaker's meaning is to be attributed to the illocutionary act of arguing at the first level of analysis, the joint meaning represents the meaning jointly constructed by the speaker and the interlocutor at the level of the communicative exchange. In addition, I have examined how the notion of joint meaning of speech acts of arguing can be applied in accounting for cases of discursive injustice as occurring in argumentative exchanges.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I have explored the implications of the interactional approach elaborated along the previous chapters for the evaluation of argumentation. In particular, I have focused on cases involving commitment attributions. I have argued that cases in which there is a gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation can have important consequences for the evaluation of argumentation. I have re-examined the most important concepts regarding

argumentation evaluation as outlined in Chapter 2, focusing on Kauffeld's and Bermejo-Luque's approaches in order distinguish them from my own approach. In order to illustrate the consequences of the gap between the speaker's meaning and the interlocutor's interpretation, I have taken the straw man fallacy as a case of study, distinguishing three scenarios in which this fallacy is committed which pose different consequences for the appraisal of argumentation. Finally, I have pointed out that, in some cases, the gap constituting a straw man fallacy can be due to unjust norms governing certain communicative context, which contribute to perpetuate power imbalances.

7.2. Further notes on related and future work

In this dissertation, I have advocated for the adoption of a characterization of argumentation as a type of speech act. I have argued that previous proposals developed in this area left room for further exploration of this characterization due to the theoretical framework they endorsed. In contrast, I have adopted an alternative framework, which allows us to emphasize not only the social nature of argumentative communication but also the social nature of the meaning the speech acts of arguing.

I have argued that argumentation, as a socially embedded communicative activity, involves a range of elements that Argumentation Theory must account for. These include the role of the interlocutor and the audience, as well as how argumentation introduces changes in the social context; changes that are different from those produced by other types of communicative acts. However, the research path initiated in this dissertation is far from complete, and there remain many areas for further investigation.

First, it is necessary to delve deeper into the role not only of the interlocutor but also of the external audience in the performance of argumentative speech acts and the production of normative effects. Throughout the dissertation, I have primarily focused on the argumentative exchange that takes place between two parties (namely, the speaker and the interlocutor). However, this does not exhaust what constitutes an argumentative context. One of the questions for future research concerns the roles that external audiences play in the successful performance of the act, i.e., in the production of normative effects, as well as in the construction of the meaning of a set

of utterances. In Chapter 6, it is noted that in cases where a straw man fallacy is committed in front of an audience that includes individuals beyond the interlocutor, the interpretation of the interlocutor may not align with that of the audience. For instance, in a case where a victim of a straw man fallacy is fooled, or where the audience recognizes that a person has been a victim of discursive injustice, the audience may (and indeed should) hold the speaker accountable for committing a fallacy or an injustice. To explain this, the concept of *polylogue*, developed by Lewiński and Aakhus (2014, 2023), may prove useful. In this regard, a potential future line of research could investigate how an interactionist framework as the one elaborated along this dissertation can explain the characteristics of a polylogical argumentative situation.

Another open line of research relates to the injustices that occur in argumentative exchanges. We have explored the notion of discursive injustice (Kukla, 2014) and its relation to certain unjust norms that govern specific argumentative practices (Stevens, 2021; Hundleby, 2013, 2023). Although this has been explored in Chapters 5 and 6, there is still room for further development. The notion of joint meaning in argumentative speech acts seems to be a valuable resource for further exploring why these cases constitute injustices. As pointed out throughout the dissertation, this notion does not reflect or aim to reflect the cooperative or collaborative nature of communication, as this would exclude injustices such as those mentioned. Instead, it helps us understand why these cases are instances of injustice. In this case, I have argued that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the victim to introduce certain commitments into the *commitment store*. Due to unjust social norms, the victim finds it difficult to participate equally in the joint construction of meaning, which would enable the successful performance of the speech act. For this reason, we can regard the situation as unjust, and the notion of joint meaning of speech act of arguing would help clarify why this is the case.

However, this is not the end of the inquiry. In this sense, it would also be relevant to explore the consequences of other types of injustices occurring in argumentative practices. For example, as briefly mentioned at the end of Chapter 6, the continuous exposure of a speaker to certain types of injustices, such as those noted in that Chapter 5 and 6, may lead to the victim losing the ability to perform argumentative speech acts

altogether. In other words, they may cease to perceive the *speech affordance* (Ayala, 2016) of argumentation in contexts where they should indeed be able to perceive it. In my view, although this is a serious consequence for any type of speech act, argumentative speech acts have particular features that warrant further investigation. Continuing research in this area is both important and relevant, and I believe that an interactional theoretical framework, like the one adopted and proposed throughout this dissertation, could be fruitful.

In this regard, it is also worth investigating how the interactional approach developed in this dissertation can be applied to other argumentative phenomena that generate unjust situations, such as the devil advocacy. In Corbalán, Haro, and Terzian (2024), for instance, we argue that accounting for the illocutionary force from a normative (i.e., interactional) framework of speech acts is more suitable for explaining incorrect and unjust uses of such argumentative maneuvers[40]. Another line of research involves exploring the occurrence of these types of injustices in academic argumentative contexts[41].

Finally, I believe that the approach developed in this dissertation leaves room for further investigation into the evaluation of argumentation. While this work has focused on the dialectical evaluation of argumentation, further investigation is needed. In addition, exploring the semantic and rhetorical evaluation of argumentation from an interactionist approach is also desirable. Regarding the evaluation of argumentation, another line for future research would concern the study of other fallacies beyond the straw man fallacy, and examine how the framework developed in this dissertation could be applied to account for different types of fallacies.

To conclude, I hope to have provided compelling arguments in favor of adopting a theoretical framework that offers all the advantages outlined throughout this work. However, much work remains to be done. As we have seen, this study opens the door to further research in several areas of particular relevance and interest to

[40] See also Terzian and Corbalán (2024) for an in-depth analysis of the non-ideal forms of devil's advocacy.

[41] For instance, in a work-in-progress paper presented at the conference "Authority and metalinguistic speech acts" (IFILNOVA, Lisbon), we (Duda and Haro, 2024) argue that in such contexts, socially underprivileged academics carve out space for themselves in environments that normatively do not recognize them as possessing the authority to argue.

argumentation theory. In future work, I look forward to continuing to develop the proposal put forward so far.

Bibliography

Aikin, S. F., & Casey, J. (2011). Straw men, weak men, and hollow men. *Argumentation, 25*(1), 87-105.

Austin, J. L. (1962). *How to do things with words*. Oxford University Press.

Ayala, S. (2016). Speech affordances: A structural take on how much we can do with our words. *European Journal of Philosophy, 24*(4), 879-891.

Bach, K., & Harnish, R. M. (1979). *Linguistic communication and speech acts*. MIT Press.

Bermejo-Luque, L. (2011). *Giving reasons: A linguistic-pragmatic approach to argumentation theory*. Springer.

Bermejo-Luque, L. (2014). *Falacias y argumentación*. Plaza y Valdés.

Bermejo-Luque, L. (2017). El modelo normativo-lingüístico de argumentación. *Cogency, 9*(2), 7-30.

Bermejo-Luque, L. (2019). Giving reasons does not always amount to arguing. *Topoi, 38*(3), 659-668.

Bondy, P. (2010). Argumentative injustice. *Informal Logic*, *30*(3), 263-278

Caponetto, L., & Labinaz, P. (2023). Marina Sbisà's deontic approach to speech actions. In L. Caponetto & P. Labinaz (Eds.), *Sbisà on speech as action* (pp. 1-26). Springer International Publishing.

Carassa, A., & Colombetti, M. (2009). Joint meaning. *Journal of Pragmatics, 41*(9), 1837-1854.

Carston, R. (2002). *Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication*. Blackwell Publishing.

Clark, H. H. (1996). *Using language*. Cambridge University Press.

Clark, H. H. (2006). Social actions, social commitments. In S. C. Levinson & N. J. Enfield (Eds.), *Roots of human sociality: Culture, cognition, and human interaction* (pp.126-150). Berg Press.

Clark, H. H., & Carlson, T. B. (1982). Hearers and speech acts. *Language, 58*(2), 332-373.

Corbalán, M. I., Marchal, A. H., & Terzian, G. (2024). Los abogados del diablo hacen varias cosas con palabras. *Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación*, *Monográfico 1*, 37-51.

Corredor, C. (2021). Illocutionary performance and objective assessment in the speech act of arguing. *Informal Logic, 41*(3), 453-483.

Corredor, C. (2023). Agreeing on a Norm: What Sort of Speech Act? *Topoi*, *42*(2), 495-507.

Duda, L. & Haro Marchal, A. (2024, Jan 25). *Taking back the power: a metalinguistic perspective* [Oral presentation]. Authority and Metalinguistic Speech Acts. Lisbon, Portugal.

van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (1984). *Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion*. Foris Publications.

van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (1987). Fallacies in a pragma-dialectical perspective. *Argumentation, 1*, 283-301.

van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). *Reconstructing argumentative discourse*. University of Alabama Press.

van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2004). *A systematic theory of argumentation*. Cambridge University Press.

van Eemeren, F. H., Garssen, B., Krabbe, E. C. W., Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., Verheij, B., & Wagemans, J. H. M. (2014). *Handbook of argumentation theory*. Springer.

van Eemeren, F. H., Houtlosser, P., Ihnen, C., & Lewiński, M. (2010). Contextual considerations in the evaluation of argumentation. In C. Reed & C. W. Tindale (Eds.), *Dialectics, dialogue and argumentation: An examination of Douglas Walton's theories of reasoning and argument* (pp. 115-132). College Publications.

El Confidencial. 2022, September 22. *Vox and Cs call for Irene Montero's resignation over her statements on sexual education*. Retrieved from

https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2022-09-22/abascal-dimension-montero-igualdad-ninos_3494791/.

El Diario. 2022, September 2022. *The far-right manipulates Irene Montero's words about young people and pregnancy to accuse her of admitting to pedophilia*. Retrieved from https://www.eldiario.es/rastreador/ultraderecha-manipula-palabras-irene-montero-jovenes-embarazo-acusarla-admitir-pedofilia_132_9560260.html.

Gilbert, M. (1996). *Living together: Rationality, sociality, and obligation*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Goodwin, J. (2008). Argument has no function. *Informal Logic*, *27*(1), 69-90.

Goodwin, J., & Innocenti, B. (2019). The Pragmatic Force of Making an Argument. *Topoi*, *38*(4), 669-680.

Govier, T. (1992). *A practical study of argument*. Wadsworth.

Govier, T. (1997). Arguing forever? Or: Two tiers of argument appraisal. In H. V. Hansen, C. W. Tindale, & A. V. Colman (Eds.), *Conference Proceedings of the OSSA 1997, Argumentation and rhetoric.*

Grice, H. P. (1957). Meaning. *The Philosophical Review, 66*(3), 377-388.

Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. Morgan (Eds.), *Syntax and semantics* (Vol. 3, pp. 41-58). Academic Press.

Grice, H. P. (1989). *Studies in the way of words*. Harvard University Press.

Haro Marchal, A. H. (2023). Argumentation as a speech: Two levels of analysis. *Topoi, 42*(2), 481-494.

Hitchcock, D. (2007). Informal logic and the concept of argument. In D. Jacquette (Ed.), *Philosophy of logic* (pp. 101-129). Elsevier.

Hamblin, C. (1970). *Fallacies*. Methuen.

Horn, L. R. (2004). Implicature. In L. R. Horn & G. Ward (Eds.), *The handbook of pragmatics* (pp. 3-28). Blackwell Publishing.

Hundleby, C. (2013). Aggression, Politeness, and Abstract Adversaries. *Informal Logic*, *33*(2), 238-262.

Hundleby, C. (2023). Social Justice, Fallacies of Argument, and Persistent Bias. *Argumentation*, *37*(2), 281-293.

Jacobs, S. (1989). Speech acts and arguments. *Argumentation, 3*(4), 345-365.

Jacobs, S. (1998). Argumentation as normative pragmatics. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), *Proceedings of the fourth ISSA conference on argumentation* (pp. 397-403). Sic Sat.

Jacobs, S. (2000). Rhetoric and dialectic from the standpoint of normative pragmatics. *Argumentation, 14*(3), 261-286.

Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (1982). Conversational argument: A discourse analytic approach. In J. R. Cox & C. A. Willard (Eds.), *Advances in argumentation theory and research* (pp. 205-237). Southern Illinois University Press.

Jacobs, S., & Jackson, S. (1992). Relevance and digressions in argumentative discussion: A pragmatic approach. *Argumentation*, *6*(2), 161-176.

Johnson, R., & Blair, A. (1983). *Logical self-defence* (2nd ed.). McGraw-Hill Ryerson

Johnson, R. H. (1996). *The rise of informal logic: Essays on argumentation, critical thinking, reasoning, and politics*. Vale Press.

Johnson, R. H. (2000). *Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument*. Lawrence Erlbaum.

Kauffeld, F. J. (1998a). Presumption and the distribution of argumentative burdens in acts of proposing and accusing. *Argumentation, 12*, 245-266.

Kauffeld, F. J. (1998b). The good case for practical propositions: Limits of the arguer's obligation to respond to objections. *ISSA Proceedings 1998*.

Kauffeld, F. J. (1999). Dialectical tier as structured by proposing and advising. In H. V. Hansen, C. W. Tindale, & E. Sveda (Eds.), *Conference Proceedings of the OSSA 1999, Argumentation At The Century's Turn.*

Kauffeld, F. J. (2001). Grice without the Cooperative Principle. In H. V. Hansen, C. W. Tindale, J. A. Blair, & R. H. Johnson (Eds.), *Conference Proceedings of the OSSA 2001, Argumentation and its Applications.*

Kauffeld, F., & Goodwin, J. (2022). Two Views of Speech Acts: Analysis and Implications for Argumentation Theory. *Languages*, *7*(2), 93.

Kauffeld, F. J., & Innocenti, B. (2018). A Normative Pragmatic Theory of Exhorting. *Argumentation*, *32*(4), 463-483.

Kukla, R. (2012). Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice. *Hypatia*, *29*(2), 440-457.

Labinaz, P. (2021). Argumentation as a speech act: A (provisional) balance. *Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 21*(63), 357-374.

van Laar, J. A. (2008). Room for Maneuver When Raising Critical Doubt. *Philosophy And Rhetoric*, *41*(3), 195-211.

van Laar, J. A., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (2012). The Burden of Criticism: Consequences of Taking a Critical Stance. *Argumentation*, *27*(2), 201-224.

Lewiński, M. (2021a). Speech act pluralism in argumentative polylogues. *Informal Logic, 41*(3), 421-451.

Lewiński, M. (2021b). Illocutionary pluralism. *Synthese*, *199*(3-4), 6687-6714.

Lewiński, M. (2021c). Conclusions of practical argument: A speech act analysis. *Organon F, 28*(2), 420-457.

Lewiński, M., & Aakhus, M. (2014). Argumentative polylogues in a dialectical framework: A methodological inquiry. *Argumentation, 28*(2), 161-181.

Lewiński, M., Aakhus, M., & Tracy, K. (2023). *Argumentation in complex communication: Managing disagreement in a polylogue*. Cambridge University Press.

Lewiński, M., & Mohammed, D. (2016). Argumentation theory. In K. B. Jensen, R. Craig, J. Pooley, & E. Rothenbuhler (Eds.), *International encyclopedia of communication theory and philosophy* (pp. 1-15). John Wiley & Sons.

Lewiński, M., & Oswald, S. (2013). When and how do we deal with straw men? A normative and cognitive pragmatic account. *Journal Of Pragmatics*, *59*, 164-177.

McDonald, L. (2021). Your word against mine: The power of uptake. *Synthese, 199*, 3505-3526.

Millikan, R. G. (2005). *Language: A biological model*. Oxford University Press.

Niebieskikwiat, Natasha. 2023, January 20. *Santiago Abascal, leader of Vox: "The way in which Javier Milei has waged the cultural and political battle against the left has been very important."* Clarín. https://www.clarin.com/politica/santiago-abascal-lider-vox-modo-javier-milei-dado-batalla-cultural-politica-izquierda-importante_0_tNevHGQlw1.html

Oswald, S. (2023). Pragmatics for argumentation. *Journal Of Pragmatics*, *203*, 144-156.

Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). *La nouvelle rhétorique: Traité de l'argumentation*. Presses Universitaires de France.

Pinto, R. C. (2001). *Argument, inference and dialectic*. Kluwer.

Público. 2023, March. *The Supreme Court once again rejects Vox's complaint against Irene Montero for her words on sex education.* Retrieved from:

https://www.publico.es/politica/supremo-rechaza-nuevo-denuncia-vox-irene-montero-palabras-educacion-sexual.html.

RTVE. 2023, December 13. *PSOE presents complaint to the Prosecutor's Office against Abascal for justifying the use of violence.* Retrieved from https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20231213/psoe-presenta-denuncia-fiscalia-abascal-justifica-uso-violencia-presidente/2466773.shtml.

Sbisà, M. (1992). Speech acts, effects, and responses. In H. Parret & J. Verschueren (Eds.), *(On) Searle on conversation* (pp. 101-111). John Benjamins.

Sbisà, M. (2002). Speech acts in context. *Language & Communication*, *22*(4), 421-436.

Sbisà, M. (2006). Communicating citizenship in verbal interaction: Principles of a speech act oriented discourse analysis. In H. Hausendorf & A. Bora (Eds.), *Analysing citizenship talk* (pp. 151-181). John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Sbisà, M. (2007). How to read Austin. *Pragmatics: Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association, 17*(3), 461-473.

Sbisà, M. (2009a). Uptake and conventionality in illocution. *Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, 5*(1), 33-52.

Sbisà, M. (2009b). Speech act theory. In J. Verschueren & J. O. Östman (Eds.), *Key notions for pragmatics* (pp. 229–244). John Benjamins.

Sbisà, M. (2013). Locution, illocution, perlocution. In M. Sbisà & K. Turner (Eds.), *Pragmatics of speech actions* (pp. 25-75). De Gruyter Mouton.

Sbisà, M. (2019). Varieties of speech act norms. In M. Witek & I. Witczak-Plisiecka (Eds.), *Normativity and variety of speech actions* (pp. 23-50). Brill.

Searle, J. R. (1969). *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*. Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J. R. (1975). A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), *Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science* (Vol. 7, pp. 344-369). University of Minnesota Press.

Sluys, M. (2018). Getting the message and grasping it: The give-and-take of discourse. *Philosophia, 47*(1), 1-18.

Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (2014). Speech act theory and the study of argumentation. *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 36*(1), 41-58.

Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). *Relevance: Communication and cognition*. Blackwell.

Stevens, K. (2021). Fooling the Victim: Of Straw Men and Those Who Fall for Them. *Philosophy And Rhetoric*, *54*(2), 109-127.

Stevens, K. (2022). Silence at the meta-level: A story about argumentative cruelty. *Philosophy and Rhetoric, 55*(1), 76-82.

Strawson, P. F. (1964). Intention and convention in speech acts. *The Philosophical Review, 73*(4), 439-460.

Talisse, R., & Aikin, S. F. (2006). Two Forms of the Straw Man. *Argumentation*, *20*(3), 345-352.

Terzian, G., & Corbalán, M. I. (2024). Diabolical devil's advocates and the weaponization of illocutionary force. *The Philosophical Quarterly, 74*(4), 1311-1337.

The Guardian. (2024, September 30). *Trump suggests violent crime could be ended by "The Purge."* The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/sep/30/trump-crime-the-purge-speech

Tindale, C. W. (1999). *Acts of arguing: A rhetorical model of argument*. SUNY Press.

Tindale, C. W. 2007. *Fallacies and Argument Appraisal*. Cambridge University Press.

Toulmin, S. E. (1958). *The uses of argument*. Cambridge University Press.

Vox. [@vox_es]. 2022, September 22. *#URGENT Vox in response to Irene Montero's outrageous words justifying pedophilia: 1. Presents a reproach to Irene Montero. 2. Announces legal actions. 3. Demands the closure of the Ministry of Equality*. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/vox_es/status/1572889630831415297.

Walton, D. and Krabbe, E. 1995. *Commitment in dialogue. Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning*. SUNY Press.

Walton, D. (1996). The straw man fallacy. In J. van Bentham, R. Grootendorst, & F. Veltman (Eds.), *Logic and argumentation* (pp. 115-128). Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Walton, D. 2013. *Methods of Argumentation*. Cambridge University Press.

Witek, M. (2013). Three approaches to the study of speech acts. *Dialogue and Universalism, 1*, 129-142.

Witek, M. (2015). An interactional account of illocutionary practice. *Language Sciences, 47*, 43-55.

Witek, M. (2019). Coordination and norms in illocutionary interaction. In W. Maciej & I. Witczak-Plisiecka (Eds.), *Normativity and variety of speech actions* (pp. 66-98). Brill.

Yap, A. (2020). Argumentation, Adversariality, and Social Norms. *Metaphilosophy*, *51*(5), 747-765.

Zenker, F., Van Laar, J. A., Cepollaro, B., Gâţă, A., Hinton, M., King, C. G., Larson, B., Lewiński, M., Lumer, C., Oswald, S., Pichlak, M., Scott, B. D., Urbański, M., & Wagemans, J. H. M. (2023). Norms of Public Argumentation and the Ideals of Correctness and Participation. *Argumentation*, *38*(1), 7-40.