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Deinstitutionalization of the State and Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Contribution to the Critique of the Neoinstitutionalist Analysis of Development

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Abstract

In recent years, a euphoric shift has taken place, typified by the narrative of "Africa rising," which attempts to promote the idea of an economically emerging continent. In the Afro-optimist discourse, the idea is implicit that the neoliberal narrative has triumphed. However, critical voices argue that the discourse ignores the political environment under which African growth has been produced. This article critically reflects on the explanations of the neoinstitutionalist approach to development, the historical process of state formation and colonization in Africa. Following the proposal of postcolonial theory, sovereignty, tax, and violence are analyzed. Finally, the contradictory policies of the neoliberal experiment are demonstrated, which are leading to the deinstitutionalization of the State and to violence.

1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a euphoric shift has taken place, typified by the narrative of "Africa rising," which attempts to promote the idea of an economically emerging continent (Akolgo 2017). The origin of this optimistic scenario is found in the conference of the same title, "Africa Rising," organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Maputo in May 2014, and in the description of Africa as a "hopeful continent" by the influential magazine, *The Economist*, three years ago. The discourse quickly spread to the media, institutions, and academia.

However, critical voices are numerous. Among others, Obeng-Odoom (2015a) argues that the discourse ignores the political environment under which African growth has been produced, and the serious problems of inequality, poverty, unemployment, and destruction of the environment caused by the extraction of natural resources that affect many African countries. Nega and Schneider (2016) allude to the methodological problems in the collection of data on the supposed growth, which Jerven denounced as "Statistical Tragedy," and the deliberate manipulation of such data on the part of authoritarian governments to improve their image and secure the support of International Financial Institutions. At the World Economic Forum held in Kigali in May 2016, the myth of the supposed African economic growth was described, and referred as the protests of the social movements against the deterioration of economic and social conditions in many African countries as a reflection of the falsehood of the euphoric discourse (Kabunda Badi 2017).

In the background lies the interest of international financial institutions to demonstrate that adjustment and stabilization policies imposed on Africa in the last decades of the twentieth century are finally bearing fruit (Mkandawire 2014b), or to show that the great experiment of institutional change carried out in more recent times is evidence of the truth of the arguments of the New Institutional Economy (Bates et al. 2013).

In the Afro-optimist discourse, the idea is implicit that the neoliberal narrative has triumphed, despite the reality offering another image: the neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation, and establishment of more regressive tax systems contribute to deindustrialization and bring about high levels of inequality (Olamosu and Wynne 2015). Dependency on the exportation of primary resources is being manifested in an ever more notable underdevelopment (Taylor 2016). The case of Ghana allows us to understand fully the paradox of African growth, given its role as an exemplary student of the World Bank and IMF, which attribute its supposedly great economic performance to its following the Structural Adjustment Program and the implementation of a political order close to the rational-legal Weberian ideal. Whereas before, the liberal program considered that the extraction of natural resources was the surest way to boost economic growth, now its political leaders take refuge in democratic government and in the GDP as indicators of the economic "miracle" (Phillips, Hailwood, and Brooks 2016).

The Africa rising optimistic discourse masks the implicit dynamics in the supposed macroeconomic miracle, and its generic vision of the continent hides the fact that the economic growth is concentrated in a small group of countries that produce raw materials, without taking into account the extensive economic reality of the rest. To refer to sub-Saharan Africa as a category is to forget its huge extent and its structure made up of multiple countries with very disparate postcolonial experiences, and to run the risk of reducing a great historical, political, social, cultural, or linguistic diversity to one single unit (Musamba 2010; Olamosu and Wynne 2015).

The optimistic narrative is inspired by the paradigm of modernization, which is continually being formulated and re-formulated, and proposing capitalism as the only way, which must also contribute to democratization (Amin 1998; Beresford 2016). It should not be forgotten that the African economic trajectory follows the course of the evolution of the economic discipline (Obeng-Odoom 2017). Thus, Mkandawire (2014b) has traced the route of the economy in Africa, linking the paths of the formulation of postcolonial African economic policies and thought, from the division into three periods of the postcolonial period: structural developmentalism and neoMarxist perspectives in the 1960s and 1970s, neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, neoinstitutionalism today.

From the idea that institutions matter, there has been a remarkable shift in the research on development in sub-Saharan Africa from standard neoclassical analysis to the New Institutional Economy (Schneider and Nega 2016). The change of view took place at the beginning of the 1990s when the World Bank attributed the majority of crises in developing countries to problems of governance, emphasizing issues such as transparency, accountability, participation, and judicial reform (Gbensuglo 2015). As Mkandawire (2014a, 2014b, 2015) emphasizes, the identification of the crisis with bad government led to a search for good institutions, based on the work of Douglass North and other neoinstitutionalists (López Castellano and García-Quero 2012).

The neoinstitutional approach positively relates conflict and violence to the configuration of the State and its organizational structure, and the process of the formation of the modern State and the foundations of capitalist development are established to look for patterns to help understand why countries fail. The neoinstitutionalist narrative maintains that the miracle of Western growth occurred thanks to the creation of an institutional matrix that protected property rights and guaranteed fulfilment of contracts, a matrix that is transferable to other countries. The international organizations, nourished by this literature, support processes of state building ignoring the significant relationships between mode of production and institutions, and the process of the configuration of the State on the continent.

Postcolonial thinking is proposed to question this approach and to debate on the experiences of development in Africa, since it highlights colonialism and capitalism and how it has been molded by colonial and neocolonial structures (Obeng-Odoom 2016). Postcolonial literature holds that African states were shaped by colonists' interests and that the colonial logic that accompanied the European colonial capitalist expansion and development still remains, despite formal independence.

Today, in a context of global deregulation of markets and movement of capital, and in the midst of the privatization process, the more developed economies reduce the size of the State, privatizing state companies and the provision of public services, and many states of underdeveloped countries are incapable of collecting taxes and maintaining the monopoly of violence.

This paper critically reflects on the explanations of the neoinstitutionalist approach to development, the historical process of state formation and colonization in Africa. Following the proposal of postcolonial theory, the key elements of the process of the institutionalization of the State are analyzed: sovereignty, tax, and violence. Finally, the contradictory policies of the neoliberal experiment are demonstrated, which are leading to the deinstitutionalization of the State and to violence.

2. THE NEOINSTITUTIONALIST EXPLANATION OF DEVELOPMENT, STATE FORMATION, AND COLONIZATION

Current literature on development in Africa places the emphasis on the nature and role of the State, focusing the analysis on endogenous factors such as clientelism, the high level of incomeseeking existing in the economy, or violence, and blaming the African societies and their cultures for not following the path of western modernity (Cox and Negi 2010; Mkandawire 2001). With the idea of a neopatrimonial State, a political structure guided by sumptuary consumption and scorn for productive investment is identified (Médart 1990, 2006), whose key element is the predatory character of the elite Africans, the "politics of the belly" in the words of Bayart (1989). Violence is associated with the process of state collapse, with the crisis of the neopatrimonial state (Allen 1999), and with factors as diverse as identity (Cocodia 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Van Hoyweghen and Smis 2002), culture (Jacoby 2005), or inequality (Nathan 2004). Much of the research on new wars relates them to the profound changes of capitalism associated with globalization and to natural resources (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). In this sense, the theory of greed emphasizes the financing of revolt as a cause of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

However, the idea of the "failed State," identified as an institution that does not perform its basic functions of security and development, nor controls its territory and borders, monopolizes the debate on conflict, after its irruption into the academic field at the beginning of the 1990s (Bates 2008; Doornbos 2002; Helman and Ratner 1992). According to this interpretation, the State becomes a predatory instrument, and the indicator of state collapse is the militarization of the civil society, because the citizens react to the predatory attitude of the governments through de-politicization or private provision of security (Azam 2001; Bates 2005, 2007; Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002). However, the problem of the failed states and their institutional breakdown is not independent of the type of economic activity predominant in these countries, nor from the process of state formation.

Neoinstitutionalism links the economic development of Western Europe with the presence or absence of good institutions. Conversely, the failure of countries is attributed to the existence of exclusionary institutions. These favor certain social groups and concentrate power on an elite that seeks its own benefit, and do not create the incentives necessary for savings, investment, and innovation. The recipe for escaping underdevelopment is to create inclusive political institutions, that is, which protect private ownership and generate a system of incentives, which encourages innovation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

The narrative on the political and economic development of Western societies begins at the moment when business and industry went beyond the borders of the feudal estate and the city, and the creators of this wealth saw that the private costs of protection could be reduced if a collective authority assumed them. The issue is established in terms of balance, in which the institutions are the result of the negotiation between the authority and the population by the means necessary for state activity, and the type of state is the reflection of the bargaining power of the monarch to exchange with the representative bodies' rights and privileges in return for revenue. Thus, the subjects will try to obtain the constitutional power to fix the price of protection (taxes), and the sovereign the monopoly of power to achieve higher revenues (North 1990, 2005).

The "political economy of development," linked to the neoinstitutionalism of "rational choice," assumes this analytical proposal and investigates the role of violence as a source of prosperity, according to its public or private provision, and the influence of predatory governments on development (Bates 2001; Olson 1993). The trend is indebted to Hobbes, it connects with the Weberian concept of the State, and adopts the Schumpeterian concept of the State as a community of defense and finance (López Castellano 2010, 2012; López Castellano and Lizárraga 2006). The key argument is that the political basis of development is to control the violence, to transform it from a means of depredation into a productive resource. The important thing is to analyze the process of the creation of governmental institutions and structures that use violence to foment prosperity.

The initial hypothesis to investigate the configuration and evolution of the "modern States" is that military conflicts between states, and their preparation affected the formation of the State and its organizational structure. The military insecurity toward the exterior and the need for resources to finance the defense permit the creation of liberal political institutions. The state organizations—treasuries, courts, administration, and bureaucracies—emerge as secondary products of the securing of resources to finance it (Tilly 1992). To fund the wars, the Crown, monopolist of violence, and impelled by the imperative of income, was forced to extend the taxable base of real estate to movable property, which made its control more difficult, and payment evasion easier. The cooperation of the owners of wealth was indispensable and was achieved through the creation of institutional channels to reach agreements.

Mercantilism, following this line of methodology, would be a sort of strategy of seduction to access the new sources of wealth as a more effective formula than depredation, and institutions the ideal channel to carry it out. Measures were adopted that were designed to foment the urban economy. The import of finished goods was limited, imposing tariffs and duties, the export of raw materials was reduced, and urban manufacturers were treated favorably. From this perspective, the transfer to governments of the right to govern themselves in exchange for the payment of taxes is understood as a profitable political investment for the sovereign, power is ceded to the citizen to form economic organizations capable of promoting economic growth, and thereby, the basis of revenue of the kingdom. Eventually, the economic imperative—the need for resources and their acquisition within the kingdom—became a political imperative and shaped the parliamentary institutions of government. These forms of government provided incentives for wealth creation, as power was used to guarantee to the owners of capital that the fruit of their investment would not be subject to depredation by the controllers of the instruments of coercion (Bates 2001).

Assuming the existence of differences, but also of similarities between seventeenth-century England and many contemporary countries of the third world immersed in Hobbesian anarchy (Levi 2006), it explains why the latter did not follow the model of development of modern states. The economic imperative from the experiences of the developed capitalist countries indicate that the nature of the conditions under which the private market and the state combine in capitalist societies, sometimes antagonistically, but often in a complementary manner, can be identified in a general way as the coincidence of periods of capital accumulation (as measured by national economic growth and growing personal wealth) with a sustained process of socialization (urbanization and proletarianization) in the West.

The reasoning is that modern underdevelopment is not due to economic policy, similar to the mercantilist policy of the first European States, but to the differences of the international system they faced, which fashioned a different use of violence. That is, the two conditions were missing, which had enabled a political order favoring growth and which shaped the modern States: the military imperative—their proclamation as sovereign nations reduced the possibilities of military conflict—and the economic imperative—the abundant source of finance that external aid entailed reduced the incentives to create wealth. This double reason derived from a different relationship between the political elite and the citizenry, reduced the incentives to create "liberal" institutions, distanced them from democratic political means, and led them to macroeconomic instability (Bates 2001).

Given that development is closely linked to the mode of regulating violence, a recent study proposes to resolve the Hobbesian problem of endemic violence and political disorder through orders of limited access, that reduce the activity of revenue seeking (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Recently, new conceptual frameworks have been established that incorporate political and distributive aspects to explain the influences of institutions on long-term growth. Thus, North, Wallis, and Weingast

(2009) demonstrate a close relationship between the control of violence and development; they argue that the problem common to all societies is in regulating violence, and development depends on the means of doing it. In turn, institutions, organizations, and beliefs determine the mode of regulation of violence. A society in a natural state confronts a society of open entry, and the conditions are studied that allow it to pass from one type of society to another as a road to prosperity and development. In the first, the elite, who use violence to maintain privileges, controls the power and wealth; the second is characterized by the existence of impartial rules, markets, and competition. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) propose an analytical framework based on the dichotomy between economic and political, inclusive and extractive institutions; they associate development and economic prosperity with the creation of inclusive institutions and poverty and stagnation with the existence of extractive institutions. Inclusive political institutions are understood to be those that allow the distribution of political power in society, that is, centralized and pluralistic, typical of Western democracy, and inclusive economic institutions are understood as those that guarantee ownership, freedom, and the fulfillment of contracts and, consequently, the functioning of the market.

The institutionalist explanation has been extended to colonization with two approaches, that Coatsworth (2008) has called "political economy of conquest" and "political economy of economic failure." The first maintains that the kinds of colonization determined different political, economic, and social institutions, and these would explain the divergent rates of growth. The second holds that the abundance of the indigenous population and of precious metals explains the appearance of a high level of economic and political inequality, which would have created a decisive obstacle to economic development.

The political economy of conquest links the feasibility of settlement with the strategy of colonization, and argues that the various types of policies of colonization created different groups of institutions (from extractive states, which transferred resources from the colony to the colonizer, to new Europes, or settlement colonies, which introduced democratic institutions and markets), and that the institutions persisted after independence. Europeans introduced institutions of an extractive type where they could not establish themselves because of the unhealthy conditions and where there was an abundant population susceptible to exploitation, recruitment, or imposition.

After independence, in the extractive colonies, the old institutions were occupied by the local social strata, which profited most from the colonial phase. Such reasoning would explain the idea of the reversal of fortune: in the richer areas, extractive institutions were introduced that put a brake on their later development; in the poorer areas, market institutions were created that encouraged it (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002). The political economy of failure links the initial endowment of factors with the distribution of income and the institutions consistent with the aforementioned distributive pattern. The type of land and social heterogeneity are established as determining factors of the origins of inequality and institutional deficit. Inequality of distribution was greater where plantation agriculture was developed, with high rates of slave labor, or an abundant indigenous workforce that enabled the use of coercive means of recruitment and exploitation. The institutions were put to the service of a small elite. Where the indigenous population was scarce and the conditions were more suitable for family agricultural use, more democratic institutions were created, guarantors of the rights of ownership (Engerman and Sokoloff 2005). The legacy with regard to the legal and institutional system received by the colonies has also been referred to, connecting the law and economic development, and stressing the superiority of the English common law over the Roman civil law and its derivations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2007).

3. DISCUSSIONS ON THE POSTCOLONIAL THEORY ON FORMATION OF THE STATE, VIOLENCE, AND THE COLONY

The Weberian model and the approach of Rational Choice are dominant in the latest research on the State, development, violence, and military conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (Bakonyi and Stuvoy 2005; Cramer 2002), which must be overcome. The definition of state fragility and failure and the implementation of state-building policies adopt the Weberian concept of State as a reference, based on an interpretation of modernity refuted by reality (Milliken and Krause 2002; Fisher 2008), and ignore the specific historical experiences and the social and political realities of the African continent (Bøås and Jennings 2005; Hameiri 2007; Wai 2012). On the contrary, there is no historical evidence that the good policies and the good governance demanded by international agencies have contributed to long-term economic development (Chang 2002). A more realistic approach to political order in the regions classified as fragile must be based on the presence of orders very different from the western state model. The European nation-state was the exception and not the rule, and the history of the advent of the modern Weberian state is, in general, a history of Europe.

However, despite the fact that the European nation-state has become the axis of the possible forms of political organization, in the 1940s and 1950s, both the leaders of the European French and the African French debated the opportunity to create a French Union with different levels of sovereignty (Cooper 2002, 2014). But, in the end, after a complex process, the nation-state, which was not the preferred option, became the most accepted form of political organization in African countries (Obeng-Odoom 2015b, 2016). Cooper has studied the debates on the possibility to create a broad francophone federation in West Africa in the last years of French colonial government, which was frustrated by the French concerns on the concession of full rights of citizenship for the Africans and on the disagreement of the nationalist African leaders regarding sovereignty. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor established two lines of action: federalism at the level of West Africa and confederalism at the level of the Union, seeking political emancipation through a form of sovereignty that would simultaneously recognize the particularity and the complementarity of the different people and cultures. Divergences between the African politicians frustrated the project and after the brief failed attempt of the Federation of Mali through the union of Senegal and the French Sudan, in 1959, the rejection of the nation-state diminished, and in 1960, the eight ex-French colonies separately became independent (Cooper 2014). However, despite their circumscription to French Africa, and that it did not get beyond the sphere of debate on a form of political organization between political leaders, the attempt of French Union allows the consideration, if only in the theoretical realm, of alternative paths to the nation-state (Ginio 2015).

In the practice of state building, processes of institutional transference, which impose the same model on all countries, must be avoided (Khan 1995; Przeworski 2004), and traditional institutions rooted in local social structures must also be considered (Ottaway 2002; Posner and Young 2007).

The political economy of development analyzes the historical origin of the State and its evolution starting from a rational model of individual behavior and presenting an erroneous picture of the pre-modern states, because it projects onto the past the conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Epstein 2000). The political economy of conquest does not consider the underlying cultural aspects of institutions and defends development as an inevitable sequence of phases, with the West as reference. The asymmetric relationships of power are ignored, the exploitation of the African continent, the English systems of domination in

India and the Middle East, the European relationships with China and Japan, the European colonial and postcolonial system in America, and the permanent state of war which was the colonial expansion of Europe. On the other hand, as Rogers (2016) maintains, the administration of these colonies through indirect rule was mainly transactional—using already pre-existing structures to make governance cheaper and smoother. Studies on British indirect rule in West Africa (for instance, places like Sierra Leone and Nigeria— and perhaps to a lesser extent Uganda—among others) suggest that the inhabitants were actually very intransigent (not necessarily susceptible) to foreign rule, and therefore, the use of local paramount chiefs as intermediaries became strategic to obtain legitimacy.

Colonization is presented as the history of pacification, of the enhancement of empty territories and of the creation of institutions, and their social costs are perceived as the corruption of a great idea without allusion to the brutality of the methods of predation (Mbembe 2006a). However, the colonizing dynamism had its origin in the political fragmentation and the constant military conflicts within the system of national states, and violence is inherent in the rise of capitalism. Mercantilism sought economic prosperity and the increase of state power, and regarded war as a means to control an economic enclave and ensure taxation dependency (Anderson 1984). A political means, absolute monarchy, was combined with military and naval protection of commercial monopolies, the conquest and the traffic of slaves. Trade increased and commercial circulation was guaranteed with a constant flow of precious metals (Amin 2001).

Capitalism, with a different level of depredation, aborted the endogenous evolution of the colonies, determining or impeding growth, and interrupting processes, which led to the birth of states (Prunier 1991). No African country was permitted nor given the opportunity to opt for capitalism as a productive system.

The New Institutional Economy proposes a development model based on an institutional change based on an idealized view of western institutions, and defends a conception of the capitalist process of development that ignores the African role in this process. However, the contribution of Africa to the configuration of capitalism as a world system has been crucial (Cooper 2014; Obeng-Odoom 2015b, 2016). Sub-Saharan Africa contributed to the original accumulation of wealth of Europe and America, and their production relations were affected negatively by the slave trade, and continued in the colonial stage to benefit European capital, preventing a capitalist formation and relegating it to a secondary role at a world level (Ake 2004; Gareth 2010).

The majority of African collapsed states are a reflection of the complex and contradictory processes of formation of the State in the continent, and the root of the conflict is found in the very nature of the State (Arrighi 2002; Chrétien 2005; Musah 2002). This paper emphasizes the legacy in the field of State formation in Africa to resolve a disquieting dilemma. The neoinstitutionalist explanation regarding the continent brandishes violence as a brake on development and links conflict with state collapse. However, when referring to the formation of the modern European States, it interprets violence as historically functional, it emphasizes the positive role of conflict in the configuration of the State and its organizational structure, and it assumes that the institutionalization of power implies the gradual acquisition of the monopoly of the means of coercion. In other words, while the consolidation of the Nation State involved the creation of institutions that converted violence into an episodic event, in Africa, violence engenders no other logic than its reproduction.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the colonial state responded to the socioeconomic and political interests of the metropolis and was established as a formula of foreign power and, by force, not as a result of the process of internal historic development, nor as a response to the demands of the sociocultural and class context of the African continent. The colonial state established an arbitrary and repressive legislation, resorting periodically to torture, rape, and mass murder, which did not leave room for either the development of civil society or for democracy (Conklin 2005). Based on the importance of colonialism in the European modernity and the development of capitalism, the core idea of the postcolonial approach is that colonial logic, which was in the hands of European capitalist development, is still valid, because the colonial practices persisted despite formal independence. The conquest led to the hierarchical society of the colony, and when this disappeared, many of its structures of domination, such as bureaucracy, the army, and the economy were maintained.

Assuming that the configuration of power represented by the modern nation state was a determining factor of the development of Western capitalism, the question to answer is why some regions became nation states and others did not. The interpretations on the institutionalization of power based on the Weberian idea of the formation of the modern State in terms of the gradual acquisition of the monopoly of violence do not conclusively explain the role and the nature of the State in Africa. Nor applicable is the political concept of useful violence, which defends the neoinstitutionalist approach and which refers to Hobbes' optimistic approaches of the State (Abega 2006; Bayart 2004; Le Roy 1996).

Nevertheless, some scholars (Appiah 2012; Buur and Kyed 2007) argue that state formation in Africa had occurred prior to colonialism, and that colonial structures only replaced those states. This argument explains, in part, why the system of indirect rule was very successful in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The process of State formation in the West was violent and took centuries, and the shaping of the citizenry also took a violent form, through state institutions and legal discourse, which created obedient and law-abiding subjects (Schlichte 2007).

However, modern African States were formed for European interests, they were imposed through imperialism and colonialism, and were integrated in the international political economic system as suppliers of raw materials and as potential markets for the products of the colonizing States. As Reinert (2007) has highlighted, the colonies were countries specializing in bad commerce.

Violence is a reflection of the fragility of the process of nationalization in African countries and not a product of greed, as the trend of rational choice maintains (Chabal 2007; Di John 2003). In this sense, the postcolonial approach has followed a story very different to the orthodox account on the origin of violence and state collapse. To this end, it reconstructs the colonial prose and emphasizes its fabled power; it questions European humanism and universalism, and criticizes the colonial relationship, which swings between the desire to exploit the other and that to exterminate it (Mbembe 2006b, 2006c). An alternative reading of modernity is proposed, and the violence inherent in European ethical thought is investigated, which tries to harmonize the faith in Western man with the contempt for the life, work, and world of meanings of the colonized people. Referring to the American conquest, the Colombian explorer Estanislao Zuleta (2004) writes, with dramatic prose, that there had never been such distance between the principles and the deeds: "the most sordid interests and the most inhuman massacres are covered in the garments of the most elaborate theology."

Postcolonial literature tells of the colonial arbitrariness and the postcolonial power to focus the analysis on the emerging societies of the canonical violence that was colonization (Mbembe 2000a). To explain the violence as a fruit of the rise of militarism or of the warlords, it is argued, involves separating three inseparable processes: power, violence, and accumulation. An alternative and comprehensive approach of these three processes involves conceiving politics as a relationship of domination, along the Foucaultian lines of relationships of power or governmentality in a broad sense (Foucault 1979). These relationships extend to all fields and social institutions that permit the exercise of a power whose object is the population, its instruments the mechanisms of security, and its discourse political economy. In this sense, the instruments of killing (weapons, law, courts, police, prison) are inseparable from the tactics of governmentality. The use of coercion in the colonial and postcolonial periods is linked to the exercise of power, it is a condition of political domination to confiscate the result of accumulation of wealth. Thus, if violence is related to the attempt of the postcolonial state to accumulate power, far from being dysfunctional from this logic of the formation of the State, it would be a resource and a mode of political action simultaneously (Mbembe 2007). The colonial state operated by coercion and coopting through local groups who collaborated in the colonial management using violence, and the post-colonial State substituted the social pact for violence (Aguirre 2006).

Despite that the imagination of modernity develops a discourse on progress without violence, the colonial process was very violent and affected negatively on productive forces, demographics, cultural manifestations, and growth. Mbembe (2000b) refers to the colonial pretension to expel the colonized people from their human condition, and to transform, through violence and looting, the "savage" lands in the territories. As opposed to the metropole, in the colony, there were no laws, nor the interest to create a stable political organization, decree, and a bureaucracy that separated the citizen of the metropole from the colonial violence that governed it. The colony exemplifies the notion of sovereignty as a state of emergency, and a place where power exerts its authority through the use of violence, and inserts the economy of death, that is to say, the right to decide on the life of the governed people, in the relationships of production (Agamben 1998). In the colony, power is exercised at the margin of the law, because it is not organized as a state, and "savages" inhabit it. The sovereign right to kill is not subject to any legal and institutional rule, and colonial war is not considered as a legally codified activity. From Foucault's idea of biopower and Arendt's idea of alterity (Arendt 1987), Mbembe (2006a) focuses his analysis on biopolitics and racism as instances of legitimization of the power to kill and to exercise a policy of terror on the population.

He highlights that the origin of the biopolitical experimentation lies in the plantation system and the slave trade in America, ambits where dominion was exercised under a state of emergency. Such a perception obliges us to reconceptualize the idea of sovereignty linked to the political imagination of modernity, which situates it in the frontiers of the Nation State, at the heart of the institutions under state authority. In this sense, it is defined as "the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations." In Africa, he emphasizes, the necropolitical exercise of power responds to an economy of violence, inseparable from the emergence of a culture of terror, a form of government that seeks to control violence to obtain more productivity from the management of conflict.

In short, the European presence in sub-Saharan Africa before, during, and after colonial occupation was based on imposition by force and on the constant friction between the colonizer and the colonized. The colonial method of production incorporated an unusual degree of coercion, both to recruit African labor and to maintain production. To make the colonies self-sufficient, policies of forced labor were introduced and the colonial state developed the communication infrastructure with roads, railways, and ports, to guarantee natural and human resources (Lugalla 2005).

By way of criticism, it can be added that in postcolonial thinking, a rigorous and systematic analysis of neoliberalism is absent; hence, Obeng-Odoom (2016) claims a Postcolonial Political Economy that supplements this absence and studies in depth a project that, in his opinion, emerged to destroy the collective life and to extend the market and capitalism. Mbembe (2013) perceives this on studying the process of expansion of markets, privatization of the world under the aegis of neoliberalism, and the increasing interweaving of the financial economy, the post imperial military complex and the electronic and digital technologies that have occurred since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Mbembe defines neoliberalism as a "becoming black of the world," a moment in which the distinction between being human, an object, and merchandise tends to disappear and be erased, without anyone being able to escape it. He also argues that one of the functions of capitalism nowadays is to produce on a large scale a superfluous population, which it no longer needs to exploit but must manage.

4. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE "NEOLIBERAL EXPERIMENT" IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE STATE AND VIOLENCE

The current problem of development in Africa is multicausal and calls for deeper study into the effects of the Structural Adjustment Plans of the late twentieth century and investigation into the international relations of African countries, foreign control of natural resources, and the influence of institutions such as the IMF of the World Bank on the economic policy of these countries (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).

In the mid-twentieth century, theorists of development projected their model of industrialization and modernization on the newly emerging countries after the process of de-colonization in Africa, without taking into account the weakness of their state structures. They were assigned with the enormous task of becoming developed, via accelerated industrial modernization, in terms that no nation-state had previously faced. In the colony, a weak bureaucracy and a poor apparatus of management characterized the government, and the absence of an administrative structure obligated the delegation of political and fiscal responsibilities to private intermediaries (Diouf 1999). With decolonization, political power passed to an elite shaped by colonial interests. This elite maintained the colonial apparatus and clientelist structure, and used state power and the awarding of contracts to foreign companies to accumulate wealth (Akude 2007).

Except for the experiences of African socialism, singularly those led by Nkrumah in Ghana, or Nyerere in Tanzania that did not lead to significant structural changes (Nugent 2004), and the failed attempt of confederation in French Africa (Cooper 2014; Obeng-Odoom 2015a, 2015b), in general the western model of ideal State was replicated, confusing the formal declaration of Independence with the creation of the State (Badie 1992). No account was taken of the time required for the construction and consolidation of a State, nor was there any warning that accelerating the above process could lead to a crisis of legitimacy (Ayoob 1996; Edigheji 2004). In the end, the rapid de-colonization and the persistence of an indirect colonial control generated policies based on clientelism and neopatrimonialism. The failure of developmentalism in the 1980s and the disappearance of neopatrimonial systems created a climate of confusion, uncertainty, and chaos in the African societies, that led to the political instrumentalization of disorder (Chabal and Daloz 1999).

Ignoring historical experience, the structural adjustments of the late twentieth century, undertaken at the request of international organizations, increased the difficulty in collecting taxes, the fragility of state regulatory functions, and the inability to manage resources and provide basic public benefits, adversely affecting its legitimacy and increasing its fragility. They also affected the reduction of state spending, especially social spending, currency devaluations to attract foreign investment, and the liberalization of the market (Clapham 2003).

The structural adjustment programs imposed by international organizations on African states contributed to a large extent to state collapse (Meyns and Musamba 2010a, 2010b; Raeymaekers 2005). State capacity during the 1980s was weakened because the policy recommendations of the International Financial Institutions were contradictory (Nega and Schneider 2016). Fiscal stabilization programs reduced public employment and bureaucracy (Mkandawire 2015); deregulation and the opening of economies to the global market favored deindustrialization, as in the case of the Nigerian textile industry (Olamosu and Wynne 2015). The expression private indirect government reflects on the political plane a situation characterized by the huge debt, the sometimes nondemocratic delegation of sovereign power, and an intense privatization process (Bennell 1997; Cangabo Kagabo 1992; Mbembe 1999).

The paradox of adjustment plans is that the state was expected to lead the process of economic reforms, but its capacity to carry out reformist measures effectively was reduced. The state budget was constrained, and liberalization and deregulation impeded any commercial or financial strategy. The IMF disturbances arrived to topple governments in Liberia, the Sudan, and Zambia and threatened many others between 1990 and 1994. Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, or Uganda started privatization programs at the end of the 1980s under pressure from the World Bank and the IMF. In Tanzania, as Manzanera-Ruiz and Lizárraga (2015) point out, the 1980s represented a radical break with the previous socialist period, and structural adjustment measures were negotiated and applied by the IMF, leading to the imposition of austerity measures. The role of the state was reduced, increasing the production and provision of social services by the private sector and introducing greater taxes and charges on such services (Chachage and Mbilinyi 2003). Although some social indicators improved between 1984 and 1990, in the 1990s, unemployment increased, urban incomes decreased, and disparity in income increased (Chachage and Mbilinyi 2003). Ellis and Mdoe (2002) quoted official data that indicate the loss of a quarter of public sector jobs between 1993 and 1999. The high levels of literacy that characterized the country (85 percent in the 1970s and 1980s) reflected the country's investment in education and human capital (Shao 1985); however, these figures fell dramatically to 68 percent in 1990 (Whitehead 2009).

From the 1990s, aid would be made conditional on the creation of the institutional framework necessary for development. High standards of good government were called for, which required a strong State, at a time when restructuring and deregulation programs were being imposed, which debilitated state structures. Measures of structural adjustment return to the present time under the guise of New Institutional Economics (Nega and Schneider 2016), and with them, the contradictions reappear, because behind the idea of good government, there lies a discourse that disseminates liberal norms of economic governance that imply reducing the role of the State (Nega and Schneider 2016).

The neoinstitutionalist argument on State formation maintains that the monopoly of legitimate violence was one of the keys of the nationalization process and links the shaping of modern States with the ability of the governors to collect taxes. In its most extreme version, the maximizer of revenue model of State of Public Choice (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) conceives taxation as the reflection of its coercive power, and maintains that the fiscal crises in developing countries derive from wastefulness. However, fiscal capacity, rather than an indicator of the power of state coercion, is a variable key in the successful cases of development. The fiscal system guarantees the funds necessary to promote economic growth and development, linked to the governors and the governed, and finances public benefits that legitimize state intervention (Di John 2007, 2009; Toye 2000). The root of the fiscal problems in underdeveloped countries lies, precisely, in their inability to collect taxes, a reflection of the difficulty to establish political legitimacy and their institutional weakness as regards tributary administration and management (Chang 2002). As historians of development have pointed out, the inability of the State to join together a unified fiscal and legal system, which is not discriminatory, was the principal brake on economic pre-modern growth (Epstein 2000; O'Brien 2003).

In the West, the process of the institutionalization of taxation was very arduous and required profound transformations in social structures, trade, the means of conducting war and the technologies of the law, the ways of conceiving the public good and general benefit, and in the relationships between State, society, and market. The institution of taxation was inseparable from the creation of the necessary organizational structure, and favored the emergence and development of two closely linked concepts: that of public authority and that of common good.

The fiscal crises suffered by various sub-Saharan African states have warned of the need to establish tax systems that increase the State's ability to carry out growth and redistribution policies. However, the fiscal reforms fostered by international agencies in the late twentieth century ignored the redistributive impacts of the tax system and its positive effects on the legitimacy of the State (Bird 2012). The policy of low direct taxes, tariff-dismantling, and the tragedy of having to create fiscal incentives for foreign investment reduced the tax collecting capacity of states, preventing them from pursuing policies of development (Brauner 2013).

The new institutional economy emphasizes the market creating institutions and the governance conditions that strengthen it (Khan 2008; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). An important facet of development is ignored: if the State does not have the institutional capacity to increase fiscal revenues, it cannot provide public welfare for development (Di John 2010). The inability to collect taxes reflects the difficulty of raising political legitimacy and institutional weakness in matters of taxation administration and management. (Chang 2002; Toye 2000). In Uganda, for example, tax evasion is associated not only with bureaucratic bribery, and the quality and efficiency of the legal systems, but also to the inadequate provision of public capital (Mawejje and Okumu 2016).

The idea of the failed State has served to justify security policies (Fukuyama 2004; Krasner and Pascual 2005) and to endorse an intense privatization process. In sub-Saharan Africa, the State adapts to national and international transformations through privatization and by delegating its regulatory functions to private intermediaries. We are witness to a new type of station formation, a redistribution of state power through these processes of the "discharging" of state functions (Hibou 1999). Power is divided, and the borders between the public and the private are blurred. It is not about Hobbesian anarchy, but a political model in which the State is not the sole provider of security, welfare, and representation of the national population in a territory. The State share authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other agencies, and its functioning depends on its anchorage to the practices, the social and cultural norms. Authors such as Migdal (2001) maintain that state collapse represents the decisive moment in the struggle to control these state functions.

Currently, in a context of global deregulation of markets and capital movements and in the midst of the privatization process, we are witnessing the deinstitutionalization of some states that are unable to collect taxes and to maintain the monopoly of violence. The means of coercive power are converted into commodities and provoke the emergence of machines of war, that is, new institutions responsible for the management of violence (Escudero 2011).

The approach to conflict sustained on underdevelopment emphasizes factors such as the legacy of colonialism, or the impact of structural adjustment plans; for its part, the political economy of war" influences the crisis of the legitimacy of the postcolonial African state at the end of the 1980s, and maintains that war is an end in itself and that the perpetuation of violence becomes an economic and political objective (Duffield 2004). Other studies link armed conflicts to natural resources: diamonds (Sierra

Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire or Angola), wood (Liberia), oil (Angola, Nigeria, or the Sudan). The complicity of the transnational oil companies in the dynamics of war is evident in the case of Nigeria, where the Chevron-Texaco, TotalFina-Elf, and Royal-Dutch-Shell companies are involved, through their private security services, in hostilities with Nigerian armed groups who are demanding greater control and transparency in oil profits (Kabunda Badi 2017).

Practices of privatization and globalization have led to the emergence of private military and security companies, which have military capabilities superior to those of the national armies, such as the South African Executive Outcomes or the British Sandline International Defense Systems Ltd., Ghurkha Security Guards with the result that they are contracted by sovereign Governments (Angola or Sierra Leone), or by mining or oil transnationals (Shell in Nigeria or Talisman Energy in the Sudan) (Gómez del Prado 2006).

A recent study funded by the Danish government on five of its priority countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda) shows that Kenya's tax loss from trade misinvoicing by multinational corporations and other parties could be as high as 8.3 percent of government revenue, hampering economic growth and resulting in billions in lost tax revenue (Baker et al. 2014).

The case of the Cote d'Ivoire is an example of the erosion of the monopoly of legitimate violence. The loss of control of the army, ethnic turmoil, and the struggle for power led the country into a situation of civil war. Even in centralized states such as in the case of Angola, the privatization of violence plays a fundamental role in the organization of power, as Christine Messiant (1999) has shown. Although the Angolan elite is pervaded with corruption, plundering, and control of oil revenues, Angola ranks third in the world for direct foreign investment, especially in offshore oil exploration, and ranks first in the receipt of external humanitarian aid in southern Africa (Marques 2003).

5. FINAL REFLECTIONS

The objective of this paper is threefold: to reflect critically on the explanations of the neoinstitutionalist approach to development, the historical process of state formation and colonization in Africa; to analyze, based on postcolonial theory, the key elements of the process of the institutionalization of the State (sovereignty, tax and violence); and to highlight the contradictory policies of the neoliberal experiment in sub-Saharan Africa, which are leading to the deinstitutionalization of the State and to violence.

Thus, the current debate on Africa rising has been started, which suggests the image of an economically emerging continent. With the support of critical texts, it has been established that behind the Afro-optimist literature lies the interest of the international financial institutions to demonstrate that the adjustment and stabilization policies imposed on Africa in the last decades of the twentieth century are finally bearing fruit, or to show that the great experiment of institutional change carried out in more recent times is a proof of the truth of the arguments of the New Institutional Economy.

A more detailed analysis confirms that the neoliberal policies of privatization, de-regulation, and implementation of more regressive tax systems contributed to deindustrialization and caused higher levels of inequality, and that the dependence on exports of primary resources manifests in a more significant underdevelopment. It also shows that the generic view of the continent reduces in great diversity and complexity to one single unit. The change in the vision and development strategies also becomes evident, since the World Bank, at the beginning of the 1990s, attributed the majority of the crises in developing countries to problems of governance, and proposed the establishment of good institutions, based on the works of the New Institutional Economy.

The neoinstitutionalist approach establishes the process of modern State formation and the foundations of capitalist development to seek patterns to help understand why the countries fail. The political economy of development maintains that the key policy of development consists in controlling violence to convert it into a productive resource, and the political economy of colonization relates the methods of colonization with the goodness or badness of the institutions. Both the political economy of development and the political economy of colonization share a model of institutions linked to the protection of rights of ownership and to the guarantee of contracts, which is transferable to other countries.

Throughout the whole neoinstitutionalist account, an idea of progress without violence is implicit, without social costs; colonization assimilates itself to the creation of institutions, without alluding to the methods of predation. The management of violence shaped the modern European State, but the African States were formed in the interest of the colonizers.

Postcolonial literature argues that the colonial logic that accompanied European capitalist expansion and development continues to apply. Despite formal independence, the colonial practices persisted with decolonization. After independence, African populations had been subject to structural violence, which emphasizes force and neglects human security as the cornerstone of governance. Privatization of security impedes good governance and favors the culture of violence. Understanding the problem of violence in Africa starts with a concept of the politics as a relationship of domination, which includes all social spheres and institutions, which allow the exercise of a power whose object is the population, its instruments the mechanisms of security, and its discourse the political economy. In postcolonial times, the use of violence is a condition of the political domination to confiscate the results of accumulation of wealth.

The structural adjustment programs imposed by international organizations on African states contributed to a large extent to state collapse, because their recommendations on policies were contradictory. State capability during the 1980s was weakened because the fiscal stabilization programs reduced public employment and bureaucracy, and de-regulation and the opening of economies to the global market favored deindustrialization. The paradox of the adjustment plans is that the state was expected to lead the process of economic reforms, but its ability to carry out reformist measures effectively was reduced.

From the 1990s, aid would be made conditional on the creation of the institutional framework necessary for development. High standards of good government were called for, which required a strong State, at a time when restructuring and deregulation programs were being imposed, which debilitated state structures. Structural adjustment measures reappear under the guise of the New Institutional Economics, and with them, the contradictions are reproduced, because behind the idea of good government lies a discourse that disseminates liberal norms of economic government that imply a reduced role of the State. Today, the most developed economies have been driven to reduce the size of the State and to privatize the provision of public services. However, in Africa, we are witnessing a process of deinstitutionalization of the State, and of privatization of the means of coercive power, which is fuelling the emergence of new agents of violence and a new form of social structuring, with new mechanisms of regulation of individuals and property. To depart "the long night of the post-colonial African world" as Mbembe exclaimed, the African states must escape from the recolonization implemented by means of the international financial institutions, and retrieve legitimacy and sovereignty. In Europe, the process of the development of the State and of the capitalist economy were in tandem; in Africa, economic development requires political order and stability, which involves a State structure supported by a fiscal system, which guarantees the funds necessary to promote growth and finance the public benefits that legitimize its intervention, and by a broad regulatory capability. To overcome underdevelopment in Africa, it is essential to establish state and social institutions capable of bringing about an economic and social transformation.

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