@misc{10481/83904,
year = {2022},
month = {11},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/83904},
abstract = {This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer–Richard
model of equilibrium tax rates in which individuals are either low or high skilled workers and face
a real-effort task that includes leisure at the work place. We find that a large proportion of lowskilled
workers vote for the lowest tax rate (the one that gives them the lowest payoff), especially
when the alternative tax rate is very high. However, this proportion is significantly reduced in
treatments in which the subjects are given extra information about how the tax operates in
redistributing income. This result suggests that the lack of information about the role of taxes in
income redistribution may be an important factor in explaining the counter-intuitive voting
behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. We also find some support that the
prospect of upward mobility and the belief in the negative effect of taxes on productivity make
low-income voters support low tax rates, especially when the alternative tax rate is very high},
organization = {MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033},
organization = {Project ECO2016-76789-P},
organization = {Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad},
organization = {Faculty of Economics and Business of the University of Granada},
publisher = {Elsevier},
keywords = {Income inequality},
keywords = {Income redistribution},
keywords = {Voting},
keywords = {Taxation},
keywords = {Real-effort task},
title = {Don’t shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting},
doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102325},
author = {Jiménez Jiménez, Natalia and Molís Bañales, Elena and Solano García, Ángel},
}