@misc{10481/81596,
year = {2023},
month = {3},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/81596},
abstract = {Following and extending Searle’s speech act theory, both Pragma-Dialectics and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation
characterize argumentation as an illocutionary act. In these models, the successful performance of an illocutionary
act of arguing depends on the securing of uptake, an illocutionary effect that, according to the Searlean account, characterizes
the successful performance of any illocutionary act. However, in my view, there is another kind of illocutionary effect
involved in the successful performance of an illocutionary act of arguing, which affects both the speaker’s and the hearer’s
set of rights, obligations, and entitlements. In order to give an account of this second type of effect, I will argue that it is
necessary to distinguish two levels in the analysis of the illocutionary act of arguing. The first one is related to the illocutionary
effect of securing of uptake and thus to the speech act performed by the speaker, while the second one allows us to
account for the changes produced by the performance of the illocutionary act of arguing in the deontic modal competence
of both the speaker and the hearer.},
organization = {the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Innovation (Project PID2019-107478 GB-I00, FPI Predoctoral Fellow
PRE2020- 095944).},
publisher = {Springer Nature},
keywords = {Speech Act Theory},
keywords = {Argumentation theory},
keywords = {Illocutionary act},
keywords = {Deontic modal competence},
keywords = {Illocutionary effect},
title = {Argumentation as a Speech Act: Two Levels of Analysis},
doi = {10.1007/s11245-023-09900-x},
author = {Haro Marchal, Amalio},
}