@misc{10481/80057,
year = {2022},
month = {6},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/80057},
abstract = {We study experimentally an instrument to prevent bank runs in healthy banks. In particular, we
extend the basic bank-run game, where depositors choose between withdrawing or keeping their
money deposited, with a third option, the possibility to relocate funds to a priority account that is less
profitable, but which guarantees a payoff even in a bank run. Theoretically, the use of this instrument
dominates withdrawals for depositors without liquidity needs, and given this fact, depositors should
optimally keep their deposits in the bank, so no bank run shall happen. In our experiment, we find
evidence that the mechanism reduces not only bank runs that occur because of a coordination problem
among depositors, but also panic bank runs that occur when depositors can observe the action of
others. However, its effectiveness is limited and depositors seem not to recognize the protection it
provides.},
organization = {Spanish Government	ECO2014-58297-R	
PGC2018-097875-A-I00	
ECO2017-82449-P	
ECO2016-76178-P},
organization = {Hungarian Academy of Sciences	LP2021-2},
organization = {MCIN/AEI	ECO2017-82449-P	
ECO2016-76178-P	
B-SEJ-206-UGR20	
PID2019-107192GB-I00},
publisher = {Elsevier},
keywords = {Bank run},
keywords = {Coordination problem},
keywords = {Panic behavior},
keywords = {Experimental economics},
keywords = {Policy tools},
keywords = {Financial stability},
title = {Preventing (panic) bank runs},
doi = {10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100697},
author = {Kiss, Hubert J. and Rodríguez Lara, Ismael},
}