@misc{10481/69550,
year = {2021},
month = {6},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10481/69550},
abstract = {Recent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the
abstract/concrete paradox (ACP): the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions
(and generate inconsistent judgment) depending on whether a problem to be analyzed
is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study
supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including
decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitutional
principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing literature
in legal theory, we argue that the susceptibility to such an effect might depend
on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist
or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less
susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experimental
studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture:
Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results (also for
professional legal decision-makers) suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal
context.},
organization = {European Research Council (ERC)

European Commission

805498},
organization = {Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Poland

0068/NPRH4/H2b/83/2016},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Experimental jurisprudence},
keywords = {Abstract/concrete paradox},
keywords = {Identifiability effect},
keywords = {Judicialdecision-making},
keywords = {Formalism},
title = {Do Formalist Judges Abide By Their Abstract Principles? A Two‑Country Study in Adjudication},
doi = {10.1007/s11196-021-09846-6},
author = {Bystranowski, Piotr and Rodríguez Hannikainen, Ivar Allan},
}