@misc{10481/112618,
year = {2025},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/112618},
abstract = {It is widely acknowledged that new rights emerge when the existing legal framework
fails to adequately protect the political and moral values of a society. Several
factors can contribute to this inadequacy (Serna 2024: 19). Among these is the
belief that current rights are insufficient to address new challenges (such as the
digital ones); additionally, technological and scientific advancements, such as
the use of “black boxes” in decision- making processes, further require the establishment
of new rights. However, sometimes the best answer to deal with these
defies are not new rights but a reinforced interpretation of existing rights (Serna
2024: 21).1 In this sense, the right not to use Internet can be conceptualized as an
specific interpretation of the fundamental right of privacy (data protection); likewise,
the right to be free from automated decisions may be considered a concretization
of the right to judicial protection (and, ultimately, the Rule of Law).
In particular, automated decision- making (ADM) systems are artificial intelligence
technologies designed to assist or even replace human judgments. Applied
in the legal domain, this technology is used by legal operators. The idea of a robot
judge or machine judge is unsettling, though it has ceased to be a science fiction
image, and national legislations, such as in Spain, already regulate AI- assisted judicial
decisions.2 On the other hand, the use of ADM systems by the public authorities
and governmental bodies is a well- established and widespread practice in all
public services areas: health, education, contracting, transportation, etc. What is
challenging is the use of ADM systems by public bodies to take decisions that have
legal effects on citizens, so that it will be an algorithm that, via assistance or substitution,
determines the sphere of rights and interests of those affected by the activity
of governmental bodies.
ADM systems present formidable challenges for the legal framework: transparency,
accessibility, accountability, fairness, biases, and the delegation of legal
powers to machines, among others. To confront these challenges and safeguard the
rationality of legal systems, some scholars advocate for establishing a human right
to not be subject to automated decisions. I will explore the necessity of this new
right from both a functional perspective (do we require a new right?) and a normative
standpoint (why is the creation of a new right imperative?). These functional
right not to use the Internet, which is the main theme of this book. In addressing these inquiries, I will focus on the utilization of ADM by legal practitioners, particularly by public bodies whose decisions, whether partially or fully automated, directly impact individual rights. Do we truly need a new right not to be subjected to automated legal decisions? Are the “classic” rights providing us with sufficient protection?},
publisher = {Routledge},
keywords = {Internet},
title = {Right not to use the Internet: Lessons to be learned from the right not to be subject to automated decisions},
doi = {10.4324/9781003528401},
author = {Moral Soriano, Leonor},
}