@misc{10481/111987,
year = {2026},
month = {5},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/111987},
abstract = {We present a model of two players who take turns to facilitate collusion. One of the players wins (contract, office), while the other loses by presenting a ludicrous proposal or no proposal at all. Assuming that players use grim trigger strategies, we show that it is possible to sustain agreements as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (a) for a range of discount factors below one but above zero and (b) for two disjoint intervals of the discount factor.},
organization = {MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 -  (CEX2021-001181-M) (PID2023-151783NB-I00)},
organization = {MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER, UE - (PID2022-138774NB-I00)  (PID2023-147391NB-I00)},
organization = {PAIDI Research Groups Program - (PPRO-SEJ426-G-2023)},
publisher = {Elsevier},
keywords = {Collusion},
keywords = {Folk theorem},
keywords = {Taking turns},
title = {Collusion when players take turns},
doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112918},
author = {Corchón, Luis Carlos and Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe and Moreno, Bernardo},
}