@misc{10481/110926,
year = {2026},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/110926},
abstract = {Collective risk dilemmas are evolutionary games in which every player can contribute
some amount to avoid a certain risk of failure. The main goal of this study is to integrate,
within a collective dilemma, the influence, evolution, and formation of the perceived risk
by individuals of the population. In order to understand the effects of subjective evolving
opinions about risk perception in the evolutionary game, we pair a traditional collective
game model of homogeneous groups with a network of players evolving their opinions or
perceptions about the risk of common failure. We study the evolution of the players’ perception about the risk and how different network topologies and opinion models, with and
without considering the outcome of the game, affect the output of the evolutionary game.
We show that cooperation generally increases when the evolution of opinions leads to consensus under unimodal and polarized initial opinions, for all the evaluated scenarios. Even
when the population has similar mean final opinions, the transition of the opinions affects
the final cooperation of the game. These findings highlight the practical relevance of peer
opinion exchange between agents in real dilemmas as a mechanism to increase cooperation
and avoid collective failures.},
organization = {Andalusian Government (EMERGIA21_00139)},
organization = {MCIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 CNS2024-154265 and PID2024-156434NB-I00 (CONFIA2)},
organization = {”ESF Investing in your future”},
organization = {”European Union NextGenerationEU/PRTR”},
publisher = {Elsevier},
keywords = {Evolutionary game theory},
keywords = {Opinion dynamics},
keywords = {Collective risk dilemma},
title = {Cooperation in collective dilemmas under opinion-based risk perceptions},
doi = {10.1016/j.apm.2026.116833},
author = {Chica Serrano, Manuel and Vargas Pérez, Víctor and Hernandez, Juan M.},
}