@misc{10481/107571,
year = {2025},
month = {9},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10481/107571},
abstract = {The notion of deep disagreement was originally introduced by Fogelin to describe
situations where disagreement about the truth-value of a proposition proceeds from
a clash of viewpoints (Fogelin, Informal Logic 7, 1985). Fogelin and others conceived of this notion in a Wittgensteinian fashion, i.e., as disagreements generated
by a clash of what Wittgenstein called “hinge propositions” and “forms of life”.
Thus, the notion of deep disagreement has inherited the theoretical traits that some
scholars of Wittgenstein’s work attribute to the notion of hinge propositions and
forms of life. In this paper, we take inspiration from Wittgenstein’s remarks to
explore whether genuine moral disagreements align with the inherited definition
of deep disagreements. The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible tension between the notion of deep disagreement inspired by later Wittgenstein, and
a conception of moral disagreements, conceived as not straightforwardly factual
disagreements, that can be tracked in Wittgenstein’s work from the Tractatus to
On Certainty.},
organization = {Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PID2023-150151NA-I00)},
organization = {Spanish Ministry of Science (PID2019-109764RB-I00)},
organization = {Generalitat Valenciana (CIGE/2023/008)},
organization = {Junta de Andalucía (B-HUM-459-UGR18)},
organization = {CRUE-CSIC / Springer Nature (Open Access funding)},
publisher = {Springer},
keywords = {Deep disagreement},
keywords = {Moral disagreement},
keywords = {Evaluative disagreement},
title = {A Wittgensteinian take on moral vs. deep disagreements},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-025-05265-3},
author = {Almagro Holgado, Manuel and Villanueva Fernández, Alberto Neftalí},
}