Versioning goods and joint purchase: substitution and complementary strategies Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco Versioning goods Joint purchase option Substitutes Complementary Price discrimination Market segmentation We analyze the monopolist’s decision about how to design different versions of a good, i.e. whether to make them substitutes or complements, when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this context, we find that versioning goods as substitutes or complements may be optimal for the monopolist, and the final result depends on the degree of concavity and convexity of the cost function. 2014-04-30T12:58:12Z 2014-04-30T12:58:12Z 2007 info:eu-repo/semantics/report Martínez-Sánchez, F. Versioning goods and joint purchase: substitution and complementary strategies. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2007). (The Papers; 07/06). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31502] http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31502 eng The Papers;07/06 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica