When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough Bensusan, Hilan Pinedo García, Manuel de Moran, Richard Moore's paradox Self-knowledge Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world. 2014-01-22T11:22:49Z 2014-01-22T11:22:49Z 2007 info:eu-repo/semantics/article Bensusan, H.; Pinedo, M. When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough. Theoria, 22 (1): 35-41 (2007). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912] 0495-4548 2171-679X doi: 10.1387/theoria.480 http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Universidad del País Vasco