Peer effects in public contributions: theory and experimental evidence
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31513Metadata
Show full item recordEditorial
Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Materia
Public good game Social networks Conditional cooperation
Date
2008Referencia bibliográfica
Ballester, C.; Brañas-Garza, P.; Espinosa, M.P. Peer effects in public contributions: theory and experimental evidence. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2008). (The Papers; 08/04). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31513]
Sponsorship
María Paz Espinosa acknowledges financial aid from MEC (SEJ2006-06309/ECON) and Gobierno Vasco, DEUI (IT-313-07); Pablo Brañas-Garza from DGCYT (SEJ2007-62081/ECON).Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of social integration on cooperative behavior. We show that if the social network shows assortative mixing then conditional cooperation is an equilibrium strategy for altruistic subjects with a high degree of social integration.We provide experimental evidence on the relationship between individuals’ position in a social network and their contributions in a public good game.