When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
Identificadores
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912ISSN: 0495-4548
ISSN: 2171-679X
ISSN: doi: 10.1387/theoria.480
Metadatos
Afficher la notice complèteEditorial
Universidad del País Vasco
Materia
Moran, Richard Moore's paradox Self-knowledge
Date
2007Referencia bibliográfica
Bensusan, H.; Pinedo, M. When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough. Theoria, 22 (1): 35-41 (2007). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912]
Patrocinador
This paper has been partially funded by the MEC research project HUM2004-02330.Résumé
Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.