

PROGRAMA DE DOCTORADO EN ESTUDIOS MIGRATORIOS

"The Collective Memory of the Catastrophe – Nakba – and Resilience among Palestinian Refugee Youth in the West Bank"

"MEMORIA COLECTIVA DE LA CATÁSTROFE – NAKBA – Y LA RESILIENCIA ENTRE LOS JOVENES PALESTINOS REFUGIADOS EN CISJORDANIA"



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Dedication

Dedication

To the holy and blessed land...

The land of fig, olive, and pomegranate trees

The land of sad orange trees...

Palestine...

To all the men and women who have rewritten history with love

To every refugee who dreams of returning to his usurped homeland...

To my cherished father, mother, and brothers...

To them all and to you,

I dedicate this dissertation.

Jawad A. Dayyeh

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Abstract

The present dissertation aims to investigate the collective memory of the Nakba (Catastrophe) as perceived by Palestinian refugee youth. The study approached the literature as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which addressed both theoretical and applied research. The significance of this study is that it is the first, to the author knowledge, which deals with this theme, in the seventy years following the Nakba. The study will be an important reference point for those concerned with the Palestinian question in general and the area of collective memory in particular.

To achieve this end, the study adopted the descriptive method using a quantitative questionnaire design approach, which is appropriate to the exploratory nature of the research, and has provided more meaningful, indepth data. The target population consisted of 15974 Palestinian refugee youth residing in the refugee camps of the West Bank in 2018. The overall sample was constituted of 1000 youth (508 males and 492 females) selected in a stratified method, according to gender and region. Collective memory of the Nakba was evaluated using an index of a 27-item scale. The researcher approached the participants at the refugee camps in the West Bank, and they were asked to complete the questionnaire; however, the interviews with young persons between 10–14 years of age were conducted in their homes. Data were analyzed using the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS), and the resulting high scores indicated a high level of collective memory.

The findings indicate that Palestinian refugee youth preserve a very strong collective memory of the Nakba. Collective memory is based on the affected individuals' shared values, norms, experiences, common destiny, and their

common history, all of which are more widespread among Palestinians, taking into consideration their extremely tragic experiences of the Israeli occupation, through the seventy years following the Nakba; these are stored in the Palestinians' collective memory and are unerasable, indicating that they know of their hometown, which their forefathers were forced to leave. Their right of return is sacred and imprescriptible, and they will not hesitate to sacrifice their lives if that helps the Palestinian people return to their homeland.

The findings reveal that the variables of gender, exposure to Israeli violence, parents' level of education, and GPA are significant predictors for the collective memory of the Nakba.

The findings confirm that the traumatic events of the Nakba have become imprinted upon the collective memory of Palestinian refugee youth. It is a fact that refugees may age and die, but the youth can never forget. Since we are Palestinians, we were Palestinians, and we are still Palestinians, we will stay like this forever; we shall return to Palestine, sooner or later. This determination means one thing; as the refugees continue to be denied the right of return, the collective memory of the Nakba continues to burgeon in the Palestinians' collective consciousness. This is the story of the Palestinians, the story of the persecution of a people, the expropriation of their land, and the reproduction of the collective memory of the Nakba.

In light of the study results and the discussion, the study recommends giving the concept of collective memory of the Nakba the utmost importance in the curriculum and in the output of different media outlets. Further research is essential to expand the understanding of the collective memory of the Nakba

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aspects among Palestinian refugee youth, within different methodological contexts. More research in the area of the traumatic experiences of the Nakba among generations of Palestinians is essential. A comparative study of the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian youth in the diaspora is also recommended.

Resumen

El presente trabajo tiene como principal objetivo el estudio del concepto de «memoria colectiva» en relación con el hecho histórico de la Nakba (catástrofe), desde la perspectiva de la generación palestina más joven. Nos consta que este es el primer estudio de este tipo en los setenta años que han transcurrido desde la Nakba, por lo que resulta incuestionable su relevancia para futuras investigaciones relacionadas con la cuestión palestina o el concepto de «memoria colectiva» en general.

El núcleo de población objeto de estudio en este trabajo está formado por jóvenes refugiados palestinos residentes en los campos de Cisjordania. La población de jóvenes que residen en dichos campos asciende a 15 974; de entre ellos, en este estudio se ha trabajado con 508 hombres y 492 mujeres, seleccionados teniendo en cuenta su género y la región de la que proceden.

La memoria colectiva de la Nakba ha sido evaluada in situ a través de un cuestionario que contenía 27 conceptos relacionados y que fue facilitado a los propios jóvenes en los campos de refugiados de Cisjordania. Los sujetos de entre diez y catorce años fueron entrevistados directamente en sus casas. Los datos recogidos fueron tratados con el SPSS (*Statistical Package for Social Sciences*).

Los resultados arrojados por la investigación demuestran que los jóvenes refugiados mantienen un alto nivel de memoria colectiva respecto a la Nakba: conocen bien la tierra que sus antepasados fueron forzados a abandonar, mantienen los valores y normas propios de su pueblo y defienden el derecho a regresar. Factores como el género, el nivel de exposición a la violencia por parte del estado israelí o el nivel educativo de los padres resultaron ser de

especial relevancia para la pervivencia y el desarrollo de esta memoria colectiva.

La situación palestina

El pueblo palestino habitaba en paz la tierra del Isra y el Miraj (el viaje nocturno y ascenso a los cielos del profeta Mahoma). Entre ellos, pequeñas comunidades de judíos convivían en ciudades como Jerusalén, Hebrón, Tiberíades o Safed.

Fue en el siglo XIX, en sintonía con el auge de los nacionalismos en toda Europa, cuando surge el movimiento sionista, cuyas bases quedan establecidas en el Congreso de Basilea de 1897. Los países colonizadores vieron en este movimiento una oportunidad única para extender su dominio sobre Oriente Medio. Los proyectos que intentaron desarrollar las bases del Sionismo fueron desde el intento de Napoleón por crear un Estado judío en Palestina a mediados del XIX hasta la Declaración de Balfour de 1917, que aseguraba la judaización de Palestina bajo la batuta de Gran Bretaña. A partir de 1920, el pueblo palestino inicia su resistencia a este proceso, en un primer momento de forma pacífica, organizando conferencias y estableciendo partidos. El tono de la protesta palestina cambia en 1929 con la conocida como «Sublevación de Buraq, o del Muro de las Lamentaciones». (Kiyali 1985; Boyasir, 1987; Natsheh et al., 1991; Rimawi, 2005).

En 1931 tiene lugar en Jerusalén la Primera Conferencia Islámica. Los partidos palestinos cumplieron sus objetivos y el pueblo palestino volvió a revelarse en 1933 para intentar parar la oleada de inmigración judía. Aparece en escena el jeque Izzedin al-Qassam, que funda el primer movimiento de resistencia popular antisionista y en contra del Mandato Británico, conocido

como «la Mano Negra», e introduce por primera vez la dimensión religiosa en el movimiento de resistencia palestina. Entre los años 1936 y 1939 tiene lugar la conocida como «Gran Revuelta Árabe». (Johnson, 1982; Sande, 1992).

La Segunda Guerra Mundial allana el camino para que Estados Unidos irrumpa con fuerza en la escena internacional. El movimiento sionista pone todo su empeño en activar el papel de Estados Unidos al servicio de sus intereses. Se crea el Comité Anglo-Americano de Investigación, encargado de examinar detenidamente la situación de Palestina. De esta investigación surge la decisión de dividir el territorio palestino en dos estados, uno árabe y otro judío. El 15 de mayo de 1948, Gran Bretaña pone fin a su Mandato, momento en el que el movimiento sionista declara la constitución del Estado de Israel (sobre el 78% del territorio palestino). Alrededor de 700 000 palestinos (aproximadamente el 66% de la población total) son expulsados de sus pueblos y ciudades. Esto supuso la desintegración de la sociedad palestina y dio lugar a un fenómeno desconocido para ellos hasta el momento: el de los campos de refugiados que empezaron a extenderse a lo largo de las franjas de Gaza y Cisjordania, así como muchos de los países vecinos (Jordania, Siria y Líbano, principalmente). Este acontecimiento pasó posteriormente a conocerse con el nombre de Nakba. (Sayegh, 1983; Kana'na, 2000; Banat, 2002; Hussien, 2003; Allan, 2007).

Estructuras sociales

El estudio de las estructuras sociales es esencial a la hora de analizar la realidad de cualquier sociedad. En el caso de la sociedad palestina, debemos prestar atención primero a la forma de organización social básica, que

Estructuras sociales

componen las subestructuras que sustentan su sociedad: la familia, la aldea y el campo.

La familia ha jugado y sigue jugando un papel esencial en la formación y mantenimiento de la identidad social, cultural y política del pueblo palestino. Las condiciones a las que este pueblo se ha visto sometido desde hace más de sesenta años ha tenido un impacto directo en la estructura familiar y los miembros que la componen. La familia palestina está fuertemente determinada por el entorno en el que habita, por lo que la Nakba afectó de muchas y drásticas maneras:

Hasta el año 1948, el 80% de la población palestina vivía en áreas rurales,
lo cual implicaba que las familias dependían de los cultivos y el ganado.

- La división de la tierra basada en herencias familiares implicaba la relación social directa entre sus miembros, con el padre a la cabeza. La actividad social está directamente relacionada con las labores agrícolas, por lo que la cultura palestina está fuertemente ligada a la tierra.

- La familia palestina sufre una transformación radical en cuanto a tamaño y estructura tras los acontecimientos de la Nakba, que se ve agravada tras cada incursión del Estado israelí y la ocupación paulatina del territorio. (Sayegh, 1983; Thorpe, 1984; Kana'na, 2000).

La familia palestina puede identificarse con varios rasgos fundamentales: es extensa, patriarcal en la línea de sucesión y en la organización del hogar, polígama y estrechamente ligada a los lazos matrimoniales. La extensión de la familia palestina abarca tres o cuatro generaciones, cuyos miembros conviven en una misma unidad económica y comparten ingresos y gastos. La

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autoridad radica en las tierras del padre de familia, que se heredan por vía paterna; cuando una mujer se casa, es ella la que abandona el hogar familiar y pasa a vivir con la familia de su marido. El matrimonio es el centro de la familia y la poligamia está permitida bajo ciertas condiciones establecidas por la *Sharia*. (Muhawi & Kana'na, 2001: 20).

El ejercicio de la autoridad dentro de la familia se establece bajo tres criterios: género, edad y rango. Estos tres criterios se aplican al padre y al abuelo de la familia; su autoridad es prácticamente absoluta sobre cualquier miembro de la familia, mientras que la mujer no se beneficia de estos criterios. En su caso, la esposa del padre principal es la que ejerce la autoridad sobre el resto de mujeres de la familia. (Muhawi & Kana'na, 2001: 26).

La relación padre-hijo sienta las bases del sistema familiar palestino. Se basa en un lazo inquebrantable que el hijo muestra ante la sociedad debiendo obediencia absoluta al padre. El hijo ideal jamás se atrevería a cuestionar las decisiones familiares tomadas por el padre (muchas de ellas siguen el consejo de su esposa). Por otro lado, la relación padre-hija es esencial en el mantenimiento de la jerarquía familiar, puesto que es el padre el único consentidor del matrimonio de sus hijas, por lo que es él el encargado de decidir la formación de otras familias. La hija, soltera o casada, debe obediencia a su padre y a sus hermanos. (Muhawi & Kana'na, 2001: 28).

La relación de la madre con sus hijos se basa en los valores tradicionales de bondad y amor maternal, al igual que sucede en cuanto a la relación entre hermanos. La solidaridad entre familiares es uno de los rasgos más característicos de la familia palestina. Cuando nace un nuevo miembro, todos los familiares se implican en su crianza.

Estructuras sociales

La religión supone otro de los pilares fundamentales de la estructura social palestina. La gran mayoría de palestinos son musulmanes y la enseñanza de la doctrina islámica influye en la vida diaria tanto social como cultural de los palestinos desde su infancia.

Otro de los principales rasgos de la estratificación social palestina es la predominancia de las obligaciones por encima de los derechos. La educación religiosa y los fuertes valores patriarcales de la familia tienden a destacar el sacrificio y la dedicación ante la defensa de los derechos y la obtención de recompensas. Subyace a este comportamiento la búsqueda por mantener y salvaguardar la reputación familiar.

Si la familia supone la unidad básica de organización social, la aldea constituye su eje primordial. La aldea palestina es una agrupación de población influenciada por el entorno físico, geográfico y social en el que se establece; antes de la Nakba, la aldea llegó a convertirse prácticamente en una unidad administrativa, política, social, cultural y económica. Basada en el autoabastecimiento, la vida de sus miembros dependía del principio de herencia de la propiedad y del trabajo agrícola y ganadero. Los clanes o «curias» se unían en torno a una figura paterna principal y sus miembros establecían estrechos lazos de sangre y parentesco (Arraf, 1985).

Después de 1948, aldeas enteras fueron arrasadas y no quedó en ellas ni rastro de los clanes que las habitaban. No obstante, los lazos que unían a esos clanes siguieron en gran medida manteniéndose y facilitaron la organización en las revoluciones de 1965 y posteriores.

La vida en los campos de refugiados y la diáspora.

Se podría pensar que las estructuras sociales descritas hasta el momento pudieron trasladarse a la vida en los campos de refugiados, aunque la urgencia con la que fueron instalados, el desconocimiento del entorno y la obligación en el abandono de la tierra habitada hasta el momento impidieron que fuera así.

Refugiado es todo aquel palestino expulsado de su lugar habitual de residencia que tiene vetado el regreso al mismo. Los refugiados palestinos se distribuyen en 59 campos oficiales (19 situados en Cisjordania, 8 en la franja de Gaza, 10 en Jordania, 10 en Siria y 12 en Líbano). El resto de refugiados vive en la diáspora en distintos países del mundo, principalmente Estados Unidos y Australia. Se estima que el número actual de refugiados palestinos supera los cinco millones (Banat, 2002: 46).

Los campos de refugiados fueron establecidos en 1949 por la «Agencia de Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados de Palestina en Oriente Próximo – UNRWA» y están hasta día de hoy bajo su supervisión. La UNRWA es la encargada de la administración de los campos. Vela por las necesidades básicas de los residentes en cuanto a salud y educación y designa un director, persona encargada de tramitar las ayudas, registrar los neonatos, supervisar las instalaciones del campo como escuelas y clínicas, etc. (Budairi et al., 1990). La mayoría de los residentes viven en casas de dos o tres habitaciones que no superan los 50m². La densidad de población en los campos de refugiados es cada vez mayor debido al alto índice de natalidad (Banat, 2002). Esta superpoblación impide la existencia de espacios verdes o de recreo. Cuentan sin embargo con red eléctrica y abastecimiento de agua potable.

Recientemente se ha provisto también de sistema de saneamiento y alcantarillado. Existen además servicios básicos como guarderías y escuelas, mezquitas y clínicas.

Las relaciones sociales entre los habitantes de los campos de refugiados son estrechas y se ven reforzadas por la experiencia común de desarraigo: la emigración forzosa, la pérdida de la tierra y del sustento de vida, la separación o desaparición de familiares, supusieron una humillación difícilmente superable. Los palestinos decidieron apoyarse en la educación y los lazos familiares e intentaron recrear en los campos su vida campesina. Los campos intentan asemejarse lo más posible a esas aldeas perdidas, aunque la ruptura del sistema de clases, la pérdida de estatus social, el aislamiento, la desintegración de las familias y la persecución constante por parte del Estado israelí dificultan enormemente que la experiencia sea satisfactoria.

La personalidad palestina.

A la hora de analizar la personalidad del pueblo palestino no podemos olvidar su dimensión árabe e islámica: los palestinos comparten en gran medida los rasgos esenciales que definen a otros árabes y musulmanes. El sistema social palestino es parte integral del mundo árabe y después de 1948 fue aislado de él política, económica y socialmente. Esta distancia fue agravándose paulatinamente debido a las distintas incursiones colonialistas en la región. A partir de ese momento, la identidad palestina comienza a desarrollarse desde nuevas perspectivas, influenciadas por la amenaza constante a su identidad nacional y a su sistema de valores (Abu Injela, 1996). Esta experiencia forja una personalidad caracterizada principalmente por los siguientes rasgos:

- El palestino es una persona profundamente religiosa, su fe es parte de su legado. La religión forma parte de sus ritos, sus festividades y su actividad política. Palestina es considerada la cuna de las tres religiones del libro y entre sus fronteras se encuentran diversos hitos como la Mezquita al-Aqsa, la Cúpula de la Roca y la Iglesia de la Natividad.

- La capacidad de adaptación y supervivencia a lo largo del tiempo y el espacio, a pesar de los continuos ataques.

- El apego a la tierra. El campesino palestino ama y honra su tierra y a todos los seres conectados con ella.

- La capacidad de entrega, redención, sacrificio y martirio. La experiencia ha enseñado al palestino a sacrificar su hogar y su tierra para poder seguir adelante, aunque algunos jóvenes hayan estado dispuestos a sacrificar sus vidas por la causa.

- Defensa del honor y la dignidad. Muchos palestinos coinciden en la idea de que al pueblo palestino la dignidad es una de las pocas cosas que le queda.

- Respeto y veneración a la familia como pilar del hogar, la tierra y la nación.

El concepto de «memoria colectiva».

Los orígenes del concepto de memoria colectiva se remontan a los estudios sociológicos de Durkheim (1893-1912), que se centraron en el análisis de la estrecha relación existente entre distintos miembros de una misma comunidad, su cohesión y los rasgos comunes de su concepción del entorno. La figura de sociólogos como Halbwachs (1952) ha influenciado igualmente

El concepto de «memoria colectiva».

los estudios actuales sobre la memoria colectiva dentro del campo de las ciencias sociales. Sus teorías, contrarias a la percepción coetánea sobre la capacidad de recordar como una función meramente biológica, aseguraban que el proceso de memoria puede darse solo dentro de un contexto social.

Emile Durkheim acuñó el término de «conciencia colectiva» en el siglo XIX al hablar de la división de las clases trabajadoras y como forma de ejemplificar el papel que juega la determinación social en todo comportamiento humano. El actual concepto de «memoria colectiva» supone la identidad de un determinado grupo social construida sobre los testimonios y tradiciones que otorgan a sus miembros el carácter de comunidad. Contiene por tanto los conocimientos y creencias compartidos por todos los miembros de un grupo determinado, ya esté formado por unos pocos individuos o por una nación entera. La memoria colectiva permite a los miembros de ese grupo social compartir sus objetivos, comportamientos y actitudes y puedan adaptar puntos de vista individuales a las creencias comunes del grupo. En palabras de Durkheim, la memoria colectiva hace posible la convivencia social. Para él, las sociedades requieren una continuidad y una conexión con su pasado para preservar la unidad y la cohesión; el pensamiento colectivo requiere la necesidad de encontrarse para poder crear una experiencia colectiva que pueda ser compartida por el grupo. Esto genera a su vez la necesidad de crear mecanismos para poder mantener esa cohesión si el grupo se veía forzado a separarse.

Halbwachs, alumno de Durkheim, es el primer sociólogo en utilizar el término «memoria colectiva» y sus trabajos se consideran el marco fundacional de los estudios de este tipo. La memoria colectiva es un nexo de

unión entre una serie de acontecimientos pasados y el presente; también entre antiguas naciones y las actuales y es la base sobre la que se construye la identidad de un pueblo. En sus estudios, Halbwachs asocia los recuerdos personales de un individuo con la sociedad a la que pertenece. A la hora de explicar la naturaleza social de la memoria, Halbwachs asegura que el entorno social determina las experiencias de sus individuos, las hace más intensas y las dota de sentido. Los recuerdos de un determinado individuo pasan a ser colectivos como resultado de la interacción de ese individuo con su entorno social; los únicos recuerdos que no surgen de la contextualización social del individuo son aquellas imágenes que pertenecen a la esfera de los sueños (Halbwachs, 1952; Eyerman, 2002).

Halbwachs se aparta del enfoque de Durkheim al adoptar un enfoque instrumental presentista de la memoria colectiva. El enfoque presentista establece que las construcciones sociales de la memoria están influenciadas por las necesidades del presente. Halbwachs consideraba que la memoria colectiva está formada por situaciones y conceptos relacionados con la actualidad de los individuos de un determinado grupo. Para explicar el presente, los líderes del grupo reconstruyen su pasado desentrañando qué eventos son recordados y cuáles son eliminados, reorganizando así los eventos para que se ajusten al discurso social predominante (Halbwachs, 1952).

La memoria colectiva entre los refugiados palestinos.

Estudios antropológicos actuales determinan que la memoria colectiva perpetúa la identidad de un grupo al evocar una historia común. Dado que la historia actual de la comunidad de refugiados se basa en el desplazamiento,

la dispersión y la destrucción de las bases económicas, sociales y políticas de la sociedad anterior a la Nakba, el grupo comienza a formar una memoria colectiva que incluye las experiencias del periodo posterior. Estos estudios corroboran además que la relación de los refugiados con el proceso de reconstrucción de la conciencia nacional es más intensa entre los habitantes de los campos de refugiados (Issa, 2007).

El proceso de construcción de una memoria colectiva del pueblo palestino surgió en el mismo momento en que los primeros desplazados se sentaron delante de sus tiendas de campaña. Recordaban sus pueblos y hablaban entre ellos y con sus hijos y nietos del pasado común que compartían. Las narraciones sobre la vida anterior a 1948 se llenaban de detalles sobre fechas, acontecimientos importantes, recuerdos de la tierra, de las fiestas y las tradiciones, los recuerdos de las revoluciones de 1929 y 1936, de sus héroes y mártires.

Con el paso del tiempo, estas conversaciones pasaron a formar parte de un proceso complejo que tenía como objetivo establecer un sentir general. La labor de las generaciones futuras, que no han podido experimentar lo que es vivir en Palestina, es la de contar a sus hijos y nietos lo que ocurrió allí. De esta forma, los palestinos empezaron a utilizar la Nakba como referencia temporal y sus relatos se dividían entre lo ocurrido antes y después de la gran catástrofe. Del mismo modo, la generación que presenció los acontecimientos de 1948 componen «la generación de la Nakba», mientras que los nacidos después de ese año se consideran «la generación post-Nakba». Hay una diferencia esencial entre los miembros de ambas generaciones: los primeros experimentaron la vida en Palestina, cuentan con recuerdos de

acontecimientos vividos, mientras que los de la segunda generación solo pueden imaginar lo que pasó o visitar brevemente los distintos lugares en los que se desarrollan las narraciones que han escuchado desde pequeños e imaginar cómo pudo ser la vida allí (Bshara, 1997).

Los refugiados palestinos se llevaron su historia consigo y enseñaron a sus jóvenes desde las fronteras de su territorio lo que significa el amor y el orgullo por tu tierra, el dolor de ser un refugiado y la crueldad que supone el enfrentamiento constante.

A la hora de analizar el nivel de memoria colectiva entre los jóvenes refugiados, pudimos observar importantes diferencias de género. Los hombres poseen un nivel muy superior de memoria colectiva que las mujeres. Las conservadoras costumbres y tradiciones palestinas y el dominio patriarcal hacen que el papel del padre y el hijo sean predominantes. La sociedad palestina educa a sus hijos en la afirmación de las cualidades consideradas tradicionalmente como masculinas (la caballerosidad, la valentía, la galantería y la energía desbocada), mientras que a sus hijas les enseña a ser femeninas, decentes, cariñosas con su familia y cuidadoras del hogar (Banat, 2010). De esta forma, se comprende que haya más facilidad a la hora de inculcar una memoria colectiva en los hombres que en las mujeres.

En lo que respecta al nivel educativo, confirmamos que a mayor nivel educativo de los jóvenes y de sus padres, más intensa es la experiencia de memoria colectiva. La educación juega un papel importante entre los jóvenes refugiados, pues son muy conscientes de que la educación es un mecanismo indispensable para desarrollar su potencial e interactuar con el exterior para conseguir defensores de causa.

Los índices de natalidad o el grado de religiosidad no indican una influencia notable en el desarrollo de la memoria colectiva entre los jóvenes refugiados.

Principales conclusiones.

Los eventos traumáticos de la Nakba han quedado grabados en la memoria colectiva de los jóvenes refugiados y esta juega un papel esencial en la supervivencia de estos individuos. Las narraciones, tradiciones y experiencias comunes vividas conceden a estos jóvenes un sentido de comunidad.

Es indudable que la memoria colectiva ha contribuido enormemente al mantenimiento de la identidad nacional palestina al rescatar y revivir continuamente acontecimientos compartidos. Lejos de convertirse en un obstáculo para seguir avanzando, el recuerdo de los pueblos palestinos ha supuesto un nexo de unión y la base de la reconstitución de la identidad nacional. Al haber tenido que ser abandonados y posteriormente destruidos, los pueblos palestinos se convirtieron en un símbolo al que aferrarse.

La esperanza de poder regresar a su tierra, como denominador común, ha contribuido a fomentar actividades políticas, humanitarias, culturales y educativas entre los jóvenes refugiados. Este tipo de experiencias les han servido para adaptarse a su nueva realidad y poder soportar las duras condiciones en las que se ven forzados a vivir.

Durante el estudio se han podido observar dos fases en el desarrollo de la memoria colectiva del pueblo palestino tras la Nakba: por una parte, una primera fase en la que predomina una memoria de tipo sensorial por parte de la primera generación que experimentó el acontecimiento histórico y sus consecuencias más inmediatas; por otra, una fase de memoria oral,

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desarrollada por la segunda generación, que no presenció la Nakba y cuya experiencia se basa en las narraciones de la primera generación. La memoria del pueblo palestino pasa de reflejar la realidad vivida a mostrar su ausencia; de las imágenes a la palabra.

La memoria colectiva juega un papel fundamental en la supervivencia de la generación palestina más joven, les ayuda, en medio de las duras condiciones a las que deben enfrentarse a diario en los campos de refugiados en los que nacieron, a mantenerse unidos gracias a unas creencias, una visión y unas actitudes morales compartidas; los convierte en una unidad social con identidad propia. Cuanto más se les niega a estos jóvenes el derecho a regresar a su tierra, más fuerte es la memoria colectiva que los mantiene unidos. Sirva como ejemplo el relato de uno de los jóvenes entrevistados durante el estudio:

«Es cierto que no nací en 'Ajjur ni lo he visto nunca siquiera, pero conozco cada milímetro de su suelo gracias a lo que mi padre y mi abuelo me contaron sobre su vida allí. Mi abuelo nos habló tantas veces por ejemplo del mercado que montaban los viernes, que su imagen se ha quedado grabada en nuestros corazones como si hubiéramos paseado por allí. Nuestros padres faltarán un día y no podremos heredar sus tierras, pero nosotros y nuestros hijos heredaremos su amor hacia ella. Su testamento es el legado que nos han dejado gracias a sus narraciones y sus palabras de aliento para no rendirnos jamás».

Chapter one

1. Background and Literature Review Refugees 1.1 Introduction

The name Palestine is given to the region south west of greater Syria. It is the area located to the west of Asia on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. It has an important strategic location since it is a connection point between Asia and Africa continents (Boyasir, 1987; Budairi et al., 1990).

Several nations inhabited Palestine since early times as evidenced by the recovered and excavated antiquities. Its regions bear witness on the stages of human development from raising flocks to agriculture and plantation. On its land, the first city in the human history was built about (800 B.C.). It is the city of Jericho which is located north east of Palestine. The most ancient name of this land is "The Land of Canaan" since the first people to settle on this land as historically documented were the "Canaanites" who came from the Arab Peninsula about (2500 B.C.). The name Palestine was derived from people who were seamen. They may have come from west of Minor Asia and regions of Aegean Sea circa twelfth century B.C. The name was found in Egyptian ancient hieroglyphic language as "P L S T". They lived in coastal areas and quickly integrated into the Canaanite life. They did not have any distinguishing trace to them but the name (Ghouri, 1972; Haddad, 1987; Jibara, 1998).

Looking at the borders of Palestine, we find that the British occupation designated its borders especially in the period between (1920-1923). Its borders continued to change across history. However, it generally referred to

the lands between the Mediterranean, Dead Sea and Jordan River (Swidan, 2005).

In the Islamic era, greater Syria was divided into provinces called, "Ajnad". Palestine "Jund" province stretched from Rafah on the borders with Egyptian Sinai to "Al Lujun" 18 kilometers North West of Jenin city. This was based on the understanding that Palestine remained as part of greater Syria (Levantine). Its area reached 27009 km² according to contemporary divisions (Ghouri, 1972; Jibara, 1998).

Palestine has a moderate climate of the Mediterranean, so this encourages stability and productivity. Accordingly, Palestine is divided into three sections. First, there is coastal area in which the majority of Palestinians are concentrated. Second, there are mountain heights - the mountains of Galilee, Nablus, Hebron and Negev Plateau – where the Palestinian peasant lives. The third part is the Jordanian border where the Jordan River runs and pours into the Dead Sea. It is 400 meter below sea level, so it is considered the lowest region with very high temperatures all year long and it is famous for Banana and palm trees crops (Budairi et al., 1990).

Palestine occupies a great place in the heart of Muslims. The Holy Quran says that it is a holy and blessed land. There is the Al Aqsa Mosque which is the first "Qibla" (prayer direction) for Muslims. It is the third holiest mosque in Islam following Al Haram Mosque in Mecca and Prophet Mosque in Medina. On its land, so many prophets lived like Ibrahim, Lot, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob, Zachariah, Jonathan and Jesus. Also Prophet Mohammad May peace be upon him, visited it. A number of prophets from the prophets of Israel especially Yashua lived in it (Amro, 2007).

1.2 Status of Palestine across History

Archeological excavations indicate that people inhabited Palestine since the Stone Age (500 Thousand -14 Thousand B.C.). When the Canaanites came the Arab Peninsula circa (2500 B.C.), they came in great numbers and became the fundamental inhabitants of the country. They built more than 200 cities and villages in Palestine like Beesan, Ashkelon, Haifa, Acre, Hebron, Ashdod, Beersheba and Bethlehem. Some historians indicate that most of the contemporary residents of Palestine especially the villagers are descendants of the Canaanite, Amorite and Palestinian tribes as well as Arab tribes who settled in Palestine before and after Islamic conquests. They were all intertwined into one entity united by Islam and Arabic language. They became Muslims and Arabs under the Islamic regime over a period of 13 centuries (Boyasir, 1987).

The arrival of Prophet Abraham May peace be upon him to Palestine (circa 1900 B.C.) was considered as the shining light calling for monotheism in this blessed land. He was contemporary to the then governor of Jerusalem "Malki Sadek" who was a believer in monotheism and a friend of Abraham. Since Abraham was the father of prophets, he spread the monotheistic faith. Thus, the inhabitants of the land accepted his call of faith and He lived in Palestine for a while. He used to move freely in its lands as well as freely departing from it. Hebron had its name after him. His sons who were prophets followed his path after he passed away (Budairi et al., 1990).

Ismael settled in Mecca; Issac and his son Jacob settled and lived in Palestine. Jacob had twelve sons who were the tribes of the kinsfolk of Israel. They immigrated from Egypt and settled in it. They suffered from the persecution

of the Pharaohs for centuries. Prophet Moses was sent to them during the 13 century B.C. to salvage them from the Pharaoh and his tyranny. God has eradicated the tyrant and his armies; however, the Kinsfolk of Israel due to their nature of humiliation and fear refused to exit from the land of Egypt disobeying the request of Moses peace be upon him to do so (Natshe, 1984).

Moses may peace be upon him died before he entered Palestine. When a strong generation of Israelis was brought up following forty years of loss, their leader Yashua Ibn Nunn (Joshua) (circa 1190 B.C.) crossed with them the Jordan River until they reached Palestine. He was able to spread his control and influence on north east part of Palestine. However, disputes, catastrophes and chaos devoured the Kinsfolk of Israel for 150 years, their conditions only improved after Talut ascended the throne. He was able to defeat all his enemies (Ghouri, 1972; Boyasir, 1987).

When David may peace be upon him, a new stage of the light of monotheism started in the holy land of Palestine. God has bestowed monarchy upon him (circa 1004 B.C.); he continued his fighting of infidels in the holy land. All tribes were subject to his supremacy, and he moved his capital to Jerusalem. Following his death, his son Solomon may peace be upon him continued to build Palestine bringing more progress, prosperity and stability for a long time until Palestine became under the Islamic regime (Kiyali, 1985; Amro, 2007).

Following the death of Solomon, his monarchy was divided into two: The first kingdom belonged to the Kinsfolk of Israel north of Palestine contemptibly identified by the British Encyclopedia as "Tail Kingdom". However, it became weaker due to the corruption of its rulers; it fell in the hands of the Assyrians. Its inhabitants were displaced and scattered in Haran,

Khabur, Kurdistan, Persia and Arameans lived in their lands. As for the second kingdom, it was called the "Kingdom of Judea" and its capital was Jerusalem; however, it was weak and did not last long since it used to pay jizyah (tax) to the Assyrians. It was not long when it fell to the Babylonians under the leadership of Nebuchadnezzar who destroyed Jerusalem, demolished the temple and captured 40 thousand Jews (Kiyali, 1985).

The Old Testament referred to the sins committed by the Israelites and they deserved what happened to them since they destroyed and lost their kingdom. Isaiah who is one of their prophets says, in Isaiah 1:4 King James Version "Ah sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evildoers, children that are corrupters: they have forsaken the LORD, they have provoked the Holy One of Israel unto anger, they are gone away backward" (Ghouri, 1972).

"Earth desecrated under its dwellers for they violated laws and changed obligations and violated the eternal covenant"

However, the kingdom of Israelis did not last long in Palestine and not more than 4 centuries. Their kingdom was disintegrated and was often subject to the powers of the neighboring countries. This was a reference to the Canaanites the sons of Palestine and others who remained in their lands and never left or departed (Hoot, 1986).

The Persian Emperor Cyrus Qorash allowed the Jews to return to Palestine. Some returned and lived with Palestinian neighbors. Then, the era of the Greek Hellenistic regime took over Palestine; at that time the Jews were able to achieve their autonomy over Palestine. The Romans were able to take over Palestine in 63 B.C. and subjected it to their regime, so they abolished the

Jewish autonomy of Jerusalem and surrounding areas. The Jews were revolted against this, but the Roman military leader Titus quelled the rebellion and destroyed the temple. The Roman leader Julius Severus occupied and destroyed Jerusalem. The Roman emperor Hadrian built a new city on the rubble and devastation and named it Ilia Capitoline. Later it was called Ilia, which was Hadrian's first name. The Jews were prevented from entering Jerusalem, so their number diminished while the original inhabitants from the Canaanites and others from Arab tribes who used to inhabit Palestine before the arrival of the Israelis stayed in Palestine nor did they leave or immigrate from it. The Byzantine state (Roman State) took over the eastern side from the Roman State since 394 B.C. and continued its control over Palestine with the exception of very short periods of Persian influence until the launch of the Islamic conquest of Palestine in 18 H/736 A.C (Kiyali, 1985; Boyasir, 1987).

1.3 The Palestinian Question

The Zionist project was the first of the interpretations that emerged in response to the changing conditions and events that took place over an extended period of time in Europe. This project was based on the idea of Jewish migration to the land of Palestine; this idea was emphasized in the Torah. Therefore, Zionism entailed an identification of a place where Jews from all over the world collectively come to Palestine (Kiyali, 1985).

At the same time, the religious reform movement whose core of existence concentrated on this notion contributed towards the project. In addition, the outbreak of the French Rebellion contributed to the emergence and control of the Jewish factor over political, economic, and media circles. They were

inspired by the basic idea that, "the Jews would gather in Palestine in preparation for the return of the Messiah" (Ghouri, 1972).

On the other hand, following the significant political transformations witnessed by modern European states—especially in the nineteenth century—. Zionist organizations exploited to use Anti-Semitism movement and the Jews were able to achieve large scale control over all political, economic and media forums and platforms. Moreover, the increase in nationalist and patriotic sentiments in Russia and Eastern Europe, where most of the Jews of the world were residing, turned into hostility and animosity against the Jews; this contributed to the emergence of the Jewish problem which the Zionist entity exploited in looking for a substitute especially Palestine; this won the sympathy of many Europeans and Americans. Many Europeans and Americans sympathized with this idea (Saleem, 1982).

The weakness of the Ottoman Empire, where Palestine was under its yoke, led to the creation of actual setting for the establishment of the Zionist project. There was a talk about a state to the east of Suez Canal and west of Greater Syria (Levantine) and another state located in Uganda; however, the choice was Palestine to achieve the Zionist project (Natshe, 1984; Hourani, 2000).

1.4 Palestinian Issue until 1918

Napoleon campaign on Egypt which he conquered in 1798 weakened the Ottoman Empire and opened the appetite of European colonizer to loot and divide the properties of this empire among themselves; The first letter to the of the British Foreign Ministry requested protection for the Jews. It was followed by a document promising to establish a national homeland for the

Jews in Palestine. The World Zionist Organization (WZO) was established and it held its first conference held in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland; it exerted all efforts and potentials to fulfill the Zionist project through contacts with all European and neighboring states (Ghouri, 1972; Budairi et al., 1990).

By the breakout of World War I in 1914, the number of Jews was around 80 thousand in Palestine. The negotiations with Sharif Hussein bin 'Ali, which were known as "Hussein-McMahon Correspondences" led to the declaration of the Arab revolt against the Ottomans; under his leadership, most Arab regions declared their independence. This contributed to the collapse and fall of the Ottoman Empire. It paved the way for the Mandate government and WZM to send Jews to Palestine and to establish a national homeland for them in Palestinian territories (Jibara, 1998).

Palestinians had early activities of resistance of the Zionist project; they carried out a series of armed clashes between Palestinian peasants and Zionist settlers, and the protests spread all over the Palestinian cities and countryside. Britain put Palestine under military rule until 1920; it appointed the Jewish Herbert Samuel as its first "high commissioner" in Palestine; thus, it contained the crisis. In a way that helped to control the conflict (Hourani, 2000; Kiyali, 2001).

The British mandate (Appendix E) period is considered the golden stage for settlement. Britain entered Palestine under the commitment to the Balfour Declaration. Thus, Jewish settlement was carried out under the monitor of a great power that backed and supported it. At this stage, the settlement activities were subject to political and strategic considerations. Settlements

were established in strategic areas and were in the form of closed communities called "Gheto" (Ghouri, 1972).

When the White Paper, issued in 1930, acknowledged the partition of Palestine into two states t determined the number of Jewish immigrants to come to Palestine over a period of four coming years. The WZM decided to accelerate settlement activities in areas not inhabited by Jews, to include the widest geographical area in the event that partition of Palestine takes place (Saleem, 1982).

Under the British occupation, Palestine was exposed to a big conspiracy; they were deprived of earning a living. The occupation deepened divisions and disputes between them. The number of Jews rose from 55 thousand in 1918 to 600 thousand in 1948. With the help of British colonization, they sought to confiscate Palestinian lands and form of Haganah gangs. In 1929, they established the Jewish Agency, which organized Jewish immigration from all spots in the world to Palestine; it established the Jewish government establishments economically, socially, and educationally; it established labor institution the Histadrut and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem (Saleem, 1982; Budairi et al., 1990).

1.5 Palestinian National Movement

Despite the harsh conditions that Palestinians witnessed in WWI, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the dedication of the Zionist project by the British government, the Palestinians and Arabs realized the risks of the settlements and the Jewish immigration; they sought to face this scheme at an early time. They established a number of parties and groups to resist Jewish immigration

and absolutely refused the English policy and struggled against it during the period of the Mandate. The first Palestinian national movement appeared and held its first Palestine Arab conference in Jerusalem in 1919. It called for the cancellation of Balfour Declaration, cessation of Jewish immigration, and sale of lands to Jews. It also called for the establishment of a national Palestinian government, and engagement into negotiations with the British government to end with the independence of Palestine. Palestinian figures emerged including Haj Amin Al-Husseini and Musa Kazim Al-Husseini. The Palestinian leadership was confined to Husseini and Nashashibi families. However, the Palestinian and Arab vigilance did not prevent the increase of emigration, because the position of the national movement at that time was counting on the prospect of a change in the position of the British government position with regard to the support of the Zionist project on one hand, and the Palestinian political parties were undergoing a vicious competition for leadership; this eventually weakened its role in facing the plan of Judaization (Azaar, 1996; Boyasir, 1987).

The National Movement implemented a series of comprehensive strikes all over Palestine in 1922 as well as a number of revolts the most important of which was "The Al-Buraq Revolt in 1921; it broke out in Jaffa and included of the entire regions of Palestine. It led to the fall and injury of 150 Jews. In addition, there was the second Al-Buraq revolution in 1929; its events broke out in the holy city of Jerusalem against the Zionist project and the British colonialism as well (Hoot, 1986).

The Palestinian revolution reached its peak within the years 1936-1939 following the increase in the Jewish immigration to Palestine as well as

carrying out activities that dedicate the Zionist entity in Palestine. Unfortunately, despite the significance of these revolutions, which called for the uprooting of Jews from Palestine and attainment of independence, the Palestinians aspirations and hopes in attaining their rights were lost in light of the British conspiracy against them, and the fall of most states in the Arab world under colonization (Hourani, 2000).

With the outbreak of World War II (1939-1947), the Palestinian revolution entered a new stage following the establishment of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine by a decision of the League of Arab States. This Committee was presided by Haj Amin al-Husseini; this move gave the Palestinian cause regional and international dimensions (Kiyali, 1985).

On the other hand, the Zionist movement completely exploited what had happened to the Jews during WWII, especially in Germany. It exerted all means to gain the sympathy of the world. They demanded that protection be given to the Jews by establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. The Palestinian question acquired an international dimension when British asked the United Nations to include it on its agenda in 1947. They recommended that the British Mandate over Palestine to be terminated and Palestine to be divided into two Jewish and Arab states as well as putting Jerusalem under international custody as stated its infamous resolution 181 (Appendix G).

The Palestinians and the Arabs rejected this unjust resolution and the 1948 war broke out, in which the Arab armies lost. The Zionist gangs, through international support, occupied the Palestinians lands. They committed massacres against unarmed Palestinian people in Kafr Kassem and Deir Yassin; and it displaced about 550 villages and 20 Arab cities (Appendix L).

This was the complete collapse of the Palestinian society as well as all of its components. 60% of the Palestinians were forcefully dismissed of their land and were in diaspora in all parts of the world. The Zionist movement declared the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 after it laid hand over 77% of the lands of Palestine (Abu Sitta, 1997; Banat, 2002).

The 1967 war led to the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Appendix H). The Palestinian society was exposed to structural deformities as a result of Israeli strategic policies, which relied on confiscation of land, water, settlement and destruction of institutions and political, economic and social infra structures which are expected on the long run to formulate the basis for any independent Palestinian entity. In addition, they made the Palestinian economy dependent on the Israeli economy and exploited Palestinian labor in the Israeli labor market. These measures overburdened Palestinians especially the series of laws, orders and military measures which aimed at tightening political and security grip over the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Hilal, 1974; Boyasir, 1987; Mansour, 1989).

The Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were affected by the developments witnessed by the Palestinian cause in terms of the emergence and development of the phenomenon of armed struggle and the war of attrition and its effects on the reality of Israeli socio-economic situations. This contributed to the construction of a paradoxical equation between political and organization forms which emerged in the West Bank and Gaza Strip like- The "National Front" and "the National Steering Committee" and the institutions of the occupation represented by military

rule, civil administration and various security apparatuses (Alawneh, 1989; Hilal, 2006).

Furthermore, the Palestinian national struggle was influenced by the interactions of Israeli parties and the changes witnessed in the region between 1977 and 1982; these years were the years of internal transformation inside Israel; it was when the Likud took power and launched war on Lebanon. There were also political repercussions that had a direct impact on adoption of the Arab summit Fez resolutions which called for reconciliation with Israel, or at the level of functional role project with Jordan (Kiyali, 1985).

The first Intifada in 1987 launched a new and important stage in the history of Palestinian national and political action. It "moved the conflict to the land of conflict" and the Palestinians, who were living inside the occupied territory, were able to take the initiative in means that were not previously familiar to the occupation. It made the cost of occupation of the Palestinian territories high and expensive; this forced Rabin to declare that, "A miracle only saves us from the intifada" (Rimawi, 2005).

Consequently, the major changes, which surprised the world and the region at the end of the former decade, found their negative manifestations in the huge imbalance of powers in favor of the United States and its ally Israel, as it was expressed at the Madrid Conference. The United States proposed a vision for a solution of the conflict based on redefining the conflict first, and considering the Palestinian regions as disputed lands rather than "occupied lands". This solution stems from the universal vision of Washington, where Israel constitutes an integral part of it. If the 1987 Uprising was the cause which brought forward the Oslo Accords (Appendix I) or the miracle that

Rabin waited for, the agreement itself was the cause for the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Hilal, 1998).

The Oslo Accords led to the establishment of a Palestinian Authority on some Palestinian cities, villages and camps that the Israelis wanted to just a security tool. Undeniably, Israeli policies confined the Authority within this concept on this understanding that Rabin considered the Oslo agreement only a security agreement (Hilal, 1998).

However, the Al-Aqsa intifada, which took place in the presence of the Palestinian National Authority, raised a number of serious questions on the Palestinian society both the national authority and opposition factions. The most important question is the issue of the political platform and the national terms of reference, the relationship of authority with the opposition, as well as providing personal and collective security and safety to the Palestinian people. The continuity of the Intifada became an urgent and persistent concern despite the two contradicting approaches towards it; the first approach is that of the Authority which considered the Intifada as a mean to improve its negotiating conditions. The second approach is related to the majority of national and Islamic forces involved in the Intifada; they considered the Intifada as a strategic option (Jaradat, 2003).

While all the Israeli and American solutions and proposals revolved around the security concept, they never accepted the idea of establishing a just and lasting peace; in fact, in the best cases, it is the establishment of a Palestinian security entity on an area of the West Bank, which does not exceed 45% (Appendix H).

1.6 Palestinian Issue after 1948

At the end of 1948 war, all Arabs felt shamed and humiliated. Arab Palestinian people were displaced, forcibly uprooted and expelled from their homes and land. The brutal and oppressive occupation systematically deprived the Palestinian people of almost all their basic human rights, and they were deprived of their legitimate rights to live in dignity on their own soil. Consequently, the people of Palestine focused on the education sector as the most important weapon for the restoration of their legitimate rights. Therefore, Palestinians stand out as one of the best educated among Arabs (Hoot, 1986).

In the meantime, many Arab countries gained their independence, succeeded in defeating the colonial powers and organized their own affairs. However, the ruling Arab authorities started adopting Western agenda in their regimes, often liberal, socialist or conservative, and each country sought to consolidate its rule, spread its control and influence individually, rather than focusing on Arab unity. This led to the dedication of the policy of fragmentation and division among Arab nations, but the Palestinians pinned their hopes on the idea of Arab nationalism in order to free their land from the Israeli Zionists especially during the era of Jamal Abdel Nasser (Swidan, 2005).

They raised the slogan of "unity as a way to achieve victory". However, those hopes vanished after the failure of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1958-1961. In addition, the catastrophe of the 1967resulted in the loss of the rest of the Palestinian lands over Sinai and the Golan Heights. This has led Arab regimes to think clearly about changing the track of their own vision by abandoning the idea of "liberation", expelling the Zionist occupation and

adopting the idea of "reconciliation." This reflected the real state of their helplessness and failure to resort to confrontation; meanwhile, the occupation was working to strengthen itself and increase its might gradually (Rimawi, 2005).

Therefore, as a way to show solidarity with the Palestinian position, the Arab states adopted the idea of resistance as a tactical stage which witnessed a state cautious action for fear of exposing the regimes to Zionist Jewish retaliation. Consequently, the Palestinians were prevented from using those states borders to carry out attacks against the occupying state. However, they were able to form and establish military forces on their lands in order to avoid the anger of the Arab masses and protesters that took to the streets to criticize the regimes and blame them for not defending Palestine. However, the Palestinians were able to form a military force on the Lebanese territory, especially in the southern part of Lebanon. The weakness of the regime in that country made it easy for the Palestinians to do so (Kiyali, 2001).

1.7 Palestinians and National Struggle

Palestinians tried to understand the trauma of 1948 by focusing on education as mentioned above and worked to consolidate affiliation to left-wing parties and movements whose goal was mainly national, such as the Nasserist Party, the Baath Party, the Arab Nationalists Movement, the Communist parties and some Islamic parties such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At the same time, Fatah movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization were formed and all tried to abandon Haj Amin al-Husseini and his role in the all-Palestinian government. In the aftermath of the Nakba, a conference of Palestinians in Jericho on 1 December 1948 called on Jordan to annex the West Bank. Then,

the West Bank was brought formally under Jordanian control, and approval was granted to complete unity between the two banks of Jordan in 1950, At the same time, the Egyptian authorities annexed the Gaza Strip and worked to besiege Haj Amin al-Husseini and the Higher Arab Committee in Cairo. It imposed a siege on him and the government of all Palestine, which led him to leave Cairo to Lebanon. By the end of 1952, the role of Haj Amin and his government fell under the accusations that he was responsible for the loss of Palestine (Abu Sitta, 1997).

At the grassroots level, Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir were active in Egypt and Jordan on the basis of their achievements in the 1948 war. However, these parties started to witness a state of retreat and self-containment, especially after Jamal Abdel Nasser staged fatal strikes against them (Boyasir, 1987).

In this environment, the Palestinian organizations with their limited capabilities sought to confront the Zionist enemy by crossing the armistice line, and infiltrating back to their villages to raid Israeli settlements adjacent to their land. In an effort to combat this persistent Arab infiltration, the Israelis carried out retaliatory attacks against them in the Gaza Strip in 1955. These attacks resulted in the death of 39 Palestinians. This led the people of the Strip to revolt against Israelis; therefore, the Egyptian state had no choice but to accept the idea of Palestinian national action by increasing the number of Palestinian militant and resistance groups (Kiyali, 1985).

At the beginning of 1956, the occupation authorities worked to eliminate the Palestinian guerrilla actions. This coincided with Britain's desire to maintain control of the Suez Canal and France's desire to strike Egypt because it

supported the Algerian revolution. The multilateral aggression decided to attack Egypt. Following this attack, Israeli troops firmly took control of Gaza Strip and Sinai and managed to eliminate the guerrilla actions in the Strip as they had previously planned. Also, Egypt closed its borders with Gaza; this had severe consequences on the arrival of militants to Gaza (Budairi et al., 1990).

As a result of the tightening measures against Palestinian resistance and the crackdown on Islamic parties in the Gaza Strip and Egypt, a group of leaders began to think about how to free and defend Palestine from the Israelis. They began to recruit a large number of young people to serve the Palestinian cause, thus reaped benefits from the Algerian revolution. This was the first seed to form Fatah movement headed by Yasser Arafat. It was the first to emerge from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Fatah formed an independent secular identity and set up its own military wing, which it called the "Storm" (Abdel Rahman, 1985).

1.8 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

At the same time, George Habash formed the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). The movement called for the adoption of the national Arab flag and the liberation of Palestine. They also supported the policy of Jamal Abdel Nasser. Following the failure of unity between Egypt and Syria, the Commission for Palestine was established in 1958 and it adopted socialist ideology. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1964, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was formed in 1967 (Asaad, 1987).

When talking about the establishment of the PLO, it is necessary to shed light on the role of the organizations in its foundation, as well as the desire of Jamal Abdel Nasser to deal with one entity that officially represents the Palestinian people to make it easy to control them. Accordingly, the Council of the League of Arab States called for the reorganization of the Palestinian people as a unified entity through the selection of representatives elected by the people. Ahmed al-Shukairi was chosen as the representative of Palestine in the Arab League, and he was assigned the task of establishing contacts with popular leaders and the Arab regimes in order to gain the right of selfdetermination and obtain its freedom. However, Al-Shukairi realized the negative role played by the Arab League in procrastination so he subjected such Arab regimes to de facto reality. As a result, the first founding session of the Palestinian Conference was held in Jerusalem, in which the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was incepted. He also stressed in the National Charter the notion of armed struggle towards the liberation of Palestine without giving up any inch of its territory, and decided to form the Palestine Liberation Army (Abdel Rahman, 1985; Asaad, 1987).

However, the Palestine Liberation Organization was very much disappointed and deceived by the illusions and fantasies invented by the Arab regimes for nearly twenty years. This was the result of the 1967 war, in which the Arab armies were defeated in the so-called the Six-Day War, when Palestinians lost the rest of their land. Israel then occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. This war had devastating effects on the Palestinian people. They were forced to leave their lands for the second time, and they lost their confidence in Arab regimes. Therefore, they decided to take the initiative and lead; this resulted in the gradual growth and the

development of the Palestinian movement. However, the Arab regimes failed Palestinians once more after focusing their goals on regaining the West Bank and Gaza Strip rather than the entire Palestine, as the original idea was namely, liberation of Palestine from the river to the sea (Asaad, 1987).

1.9 Palestinian Question during 1967-1987

During this period of time, the Palestinian identity was being formed through the leadership of the Palestinian factions that established the Palestine Liberation Organization, and achieved accomplishments, most notably is the recognition of the United Nations of the PLO as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. The organization also obtained a seat in the United Nations (Abdel Rahman, 1985).

On the Arab front, the leaders of the national action were under close scrutiny, and the Arab borders were closed in the face of the Palestinian resistance on one hand, and some Arab states, especially Egypt, signed a settlement agreement with Israel on the other hand. The Palestinian militants also left Jordan to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Algeria after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Ghalyon, 1994).

Given the Palestinian identity that started to take shape, especially after the defeat of the Arabs at the end of the 1967 war, Arab regimes tried to raise the morale and restore the deterrent force by announcing the regrouping of the armed forces and supporting the resistance, in addition to the non-recognition of Israel occupation entity. This announcement comes as a way to avoid the popular anger witnessed in the streets of Arab capitals, and their demands to allow the practice of guerrilla action in Lebanon and Jordan (Said, 2006).

The Palestinian position was clearly reinforced by Yasser Arafat's 1974 UN General Assembly speech, as a group of countries supported the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination and supported their right to defend themselves by various means, including armed struggle, as well as the right to return to their country and land. Undoubtedly, the armed struggle had a great impact on all countries of the world; this led them to realize the need to hear the voice of the Palestinian people and recognize their legitimate rights (Abdel Rahman, 1985).

The borders between Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan helped in the success of military operations across those territories. The Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance achieved a great victory over the Israeli army in The Battle of Karameh in 1968, but the course of events did not go as planned. There was a clash between King Hussein's Jordanian military and Yasser Arafat's PLO and ended with the expulsion of the Palestinian militants from Jordan in 1970. This conflict was called "The bloody events of Black September" (Asaad, 1987).

The Lebanese arena was not in a better position than the Jordanian one for the Palestinian resistance. Another clash broke out between the guerrillas and the Maronite battalions, and the resistance was dragged into the Lebanese civil war in 1975. At the same time, the Shiite Amal movement imposed a siege on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon; it lasted for more than two years. In addition, Egypt and Syria closed the borders in the face of Palestinian guerrilla action (Boyasir, 1987).

On the level of the Israeli state, it exerted its utmost efforts to eliminate the Palestinian resistance by adopting the policy of assassinations, demolition of

houses, killing of innocents and uprooting lands. They also invaded Lebanon with the aim of uprooting the Palestinian resistance and eliminating the continuous threat on their state, and they also established the South Lebanon Army (SLA), which in turn led to the end of resistance in Lebanon after the ceasefire agreement. However, the Zionist occupation government committed massacres against the Palestinian people in cooperation with the Christian forces, and in 1982, they committed the massacre of "Sabra and Shatila", which resulted in the death of large numbers of innocent Palestinians (Rimawi, 2005).

As a result, the Palestinian resistance decided to resort to a policy of revenge, and it carried out a series of guerrilla operations that caused huge losses for the occupation state.

1.10 The Arab States' Position towards the Palestinian Question

After the foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people, the Arab regimes felt that the heavy burden that they had been carrying was completely removed, and they no longer had any responsibility regarding the liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian National Resistance was left on their own. The role of the Arab countries was limited to providing political and economic support to the Palestinian people, abandoning the idea of military supplies and engagement in fighting with Palestinians. Moreover, the Arab countries were preoccupied with their own domestic problems and the crises that they occasionally suffered. In addition, Arab countries became enemies to Egypt after signing a settlement with Israel and the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978.

As for Iraq, it was preoccupied with the war with Iran for eight years (Abdel Rahman, 1985).

1.11 Palestinian Movements and the First Intifada 1987

It is important to note the emergence of an Islamic movement in the Palestinian arena like Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement; both took the initiative of defending the land of Palestine. The two parties were keen to exploit the circumstances in case of a crisis or conflict with the Israeli forces, and it was before the start of the Palestinian Intifada in 1978, which was later known as the "Children of the Stones." In this regard, it is important to shed light on the role of the Islamists in supporting projects in Palestine and their charitable work, especially on the social and educational levels, this helped them to gain large scale popularity among the Palestinian people. They became the first opponent of the Palestine Liberation Organization that was taking over all the Palestinian parties. The partisans of the Islamic camp slowly increased and had a large scale base in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Barghouthi, 1990).

With the outbreak of the spontaneous popular intifada in 1987, the oppressed Palestinian people made great sacrifices. Children, kids, young people, old people and women all took to the streets to confront the Israeli forces with their naked bodies, stones and all the strength they had to face the tanks and planes of the Israeli troops. Following the outbreak of the intifada, the Islamic party decided to work vigorously and actively in resisting the occupation. The Intifada was characterized by being peaceful resistance. The people went on strikes that broke the will of the Israeli occupation, boycotted Israeli goods,

fought collaborators, drug dealers and declared civil disobedience in some cities, especially the city of Beit Sahour (Hourani, 2000).

Upon the declaration of the Oslo agreement in 1993, Fatah stopped the activities of the first Intifada, but the Islamic movements decided to continue activities in order to fight the Israeli occupation, and Hamas had imposed an equation stating that it was the alternative to Fatah due to the achievements that they always gained at the social and educational levels, especially during university senates elections and providing aids to the most vulnerable groups in the Palestinian society. Hamas created a new form in Palestinian resistance, namely "martyrdom class," who carried out complex operations that seriously hurt the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties. They also carried out operations of kidnapping soldiers in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. They established a military wing known as "Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades". As a result, Israel forcibly deported about 415 leaders of Islamic Jihad and Hamas to" Marj al-Zuhour "in Lebanon in 1992 (Hilal, 1998; Banat, 2010).

However, the attempts of the Israeli occupation failed, and resulted in the increase of popular pressure on the one hand on the rejection of deportation policy. This increased the popularity of Hamas in light of the sympathy with the issue of deportees in media and on the political level. It gained extensive coverage all over the world. This led Israel to make concessions and accept the principle of return of deportees to their homeland Palestine (Azaar, 2006).

At the same time, under the Oslo agreement, resistance activities against Israel were frozen because of the agreements that stipulated security coordination and joint patrols between the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

However, The Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre in 1994 changed the course of events. One of the settlers committed a massacre against the Palestinian worshipers in the city of Hebron; 29 worshipers were killed. Under these circumstances, the Palestinian resistance decided to respond and retaliate. Then the Engineer of Martyrdom Operations, Yahya Ayyash, appeared to be the one who caused Israel heavy casualties. This led Israel to hold a special conference calling for the fight against terrorism. This was met with direct support from America and its allies. Based on the security coordination, Israel and the Palestinian Authority carried out major crackdown to uproot and eradicate Islamic movements. They assassinated leaders and arrested large numbers of the Islamic action leaders, in addition to the implementation of the policy of deportation against them (Hussien, 2003).

These pressures, however, failed. The Palestinian public sympathy for Islamic movements increased; they enjoyed the confidence of the people and received their unrelenting support, as well as their support to win any student senate elections or organizational leaderships.

1.12 PLO and the Peace Process

On many occasions, Arab leaderships tried to marginalize the role of the PLO leadership in many Arab conferences. This was followed by the announcement of Jordan that it would carry out a full legal and administrative disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. This was the year in which the First Intifada "Children of Stones" broke out; all national action factions extensively participated in the national action, driving Israel to assassinate Abu Jihad, the mastermind and the engineer of the intifada, as Israel claims; he was assassinated in Tunis in 1988 (Barghouthi, 1990).

In the same year, the Palestine National Council held its 19th ordinary session and voted on partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab. The PLO's National Council (PNC) also declared the independence of Palestine. However, the major states, led by United States and the European Union, did not recognize it on the ground under the justification that it was a mere fantasy or hope that could come true. This declaration in itself served the Palestinian cause in one way or another; it helped to bring into attention the Palestinian Question on the Arab, regional and international levels, after it witnessed a period of occasional marginalization (Ghalyon, 1994).

It is worth mentioning that the Gulf War in 1990 had a negative impact on the Palestinian cause, when Yasser Arafat stood by Iraq and supported its invasion of Kuwait. The Palestinians paid a high price for this support. Therefore, Kuwait and some Gulf states expelled the Palestinians working in those states and confiscated their money and property because of the Palestinian position supported Iraq at the time; furthermore, they prevented financial support of the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was the main cause of the Organization's financial crisis (Rimawi, 2005).

On the Israeli side, the State of Occupation exploited the conditions that affected the Arab region and the international arena, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, bringing a total of 92,000 new Jewish immigrants to Palestine (Jibara, 1998).

In this way, Palestinians found themselves forced to accept the settlement plan imposed by America in coordination with the Israeli government by holding a peace conference in Madrid in 1991. This was followed by a series

of indirect negotiations ended in the 1993 Oslo agreement, which was signed by Yasser Arafat, US President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The agreement states that the offices of the Palestinian Authority shall be located in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area in the first stage. This is followed by Israel handing over the control of the rest of the Palestinian cities to the Palestinian National Authority through giving them the power to monitor their daily life activities, and providing the services for health, education and services sectors (Hilal, 1998).

On the other hand, the PLO made significant concessions, the most important of which were: abandonment of armed struggle, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and negotiations being limited to occupied territories of 1967. The Palestinian Authority has nothing to do with the external security of the border, leaving the full control in the hands of Israel. The issues of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees living in diaspora will be subject to negotiations in the future. Demarcation of the borders of the Palestinian state and its area will be negotiated later (Abdel Rahman, 1985).

1.13 Palestinian Movements and the Second Intifada 1987

In light of the failure of negotiations with the Israeli side and hitting a stumbling block, and under Israeli arrogance, Palestinians felt that they did not achieve anything on the ground; Israel even increased settlements and the Jewish immigration to Palestine increased as well. Moreover, Sharon's visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque has turned everything upside down; it led to the outbreak of the second intifada, "Al-Aqsa Intifada" in 2000, and it continued for five consecutive years. The Israeli troops did not realize that the events will be transformed into an armed uprising that is different from the first

peaceful Intifada in 1987. As a result, all the Palestinian people participated in the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation, including Fatah movement; this caused Israel to suppress them in all ways and means; however, this did not affect the Palestinian national action despite the fall of a large number of Palestinian martyrs over a period of five years. In addition, Israel carried out a policy of collective punishment; it closed roads, demolished houses and detained protesters in the ongoing struggle. In this Intifada, the Palestinian resistance developed rapidly, especially among the Islamic movements that adopted the policy of martyrdom action, and carried out martyrdom operations that shook the Israeli state, destroyed its social structure and negatively affected the economic situation; the number of tourists coming to the state of occupation decreased significantly, in addition to the "exponential" growth of the Palestinian-led boycott of the Israeli goods (Forrester, 2007; Banat, 2010).

On the other hand, as stated above, Israel imposed a comprehensive siege on the West Bank, in particular the siege of President Yasser Arafat at his headquarters compound in the city of Ramallah, and finally assassinated him under the pretext that he was the only responsible person for organizing the events of the Intifada on one hand, and the official responsible for planning martyrdom and military operations carried out by Fatah movement on the other hand. In light of this, Arafat was poisoned by Israel. It also committed other crimes throughout the assassination of a large number of leaders of national action in various Palestinian factions inside or outside Palestine.

Israel has also built the Apartheid Wall (Appendix J) in the West Bank under the pretext of protecting the security of its citizens, bulldozing Palestinian

agricultural land, stealing olive trees, stealing thousands of dunums of Palestinian lands, preventing Palestinian farmers' access to their lands, and fighting against all forms of the Palestinian democracy. After Hamas's victory in the legislative elections in the Palestinian territories and the Gaza Strip over Fatah movement, the State of the occupation imposed a siege on Hamas and left it isolated after winning the elections in 2006. In that way, Israel did not show respect to the Palestinian voters, who elected Hamas as their representative in the legislative elections. Moreover, Fatah movement rejected the results of the elections. Consequently, the elections meant the starting point of the skirmishes and conflict between the two Palestinian parties. Hamas finally took control of the Gaza Strip, members of Fatah movement were expelled and they fled to Israel and then to Ramallah. Fatah, by contrast, quickly ousted Hamas from power, imprisoned them and banned any activities on all level by them in the West Bank (Azaar, 2006; Banat, 2010).

Under these circumstances, Israel committed a series of wars against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, the last of which was in 2014. It imposed a full-scale military blockade of Gaza until today. It prevented Gazan from winning their bread and prevented them from leaving Gaza. The national resistance in Gaza, on the other hand, baffled Israeli troops due to the development of its methods, so it captured a number of Israeli soldiers. Under Egypt auspices, Hamas demanded that Israel release 1000 prisoners for Gilad Shalit, who was released in 2012.

In spite of the continued siege imposed on the Gaza Strip until this day, and in light of the failing negotiations to end the division between Fatah and

Hamas, the national action factions in the Gaza Strip decided to organize the return marches on the borders a few months ago, in order to force Israel to lift the siege imposed on the Strip, where it caused a real crisis and it warns of a major humanitarian disaster in light of the desperate economic and living conditions, in addition to the reconstruction of the Strip following the waged wars which led to the destruction of buildings and infrastructure of the region (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 2014).

To sum up, the Palestinian people in general and the Palestinian refugees (Appendix F; Appendix K) in particular are still experiencing tragic living conditions on all political, social and economic levels as a result of the Israeli arbitrary daily practices against them. Following seventy years of the Nakba, the Palestinian people are still facing the most vicious occupation in human history.

These experiences have become firmly embedded in the collective memory of Palestinian refugee and cannot be erased, since they have left a wound that will never heal, but will, instead, be passed down from one generation to another - until 'the return' is achieved, which would put an end to their daily suffering (Banat et al., 2018; Dayyeh et al., 2018).

1.14 Palestinian Refugees

Palestine occupies an important geographical position; it lies at the heart of the Arab area—a strategic location that has intrigued many colonial powers in this part of the world. These countries have significantly contributed to the Zionist presence in the land of Palestine and in the subsequent emergence of the problem of Palestinian refugees. No crime in human history can be

compared to the crime of displacement of Palestinians from their homes in 1948 by the Zionist gangs, causing the Nakba (Palestinian exodus; literally: Catastrophe) of Palestine.

After the Ottoman Empire had been divided, Palestine fell under the British Mandate, which laid the ground for the immigration of Jews to Palestine (Natshe, 1984). Following this, Zionist leadership sought British government's approval to achieve their ambition of having sovereignty over Palestine. After negotiations between the Zionist movement and the British government, the British Foreign Secretary issued a pledge on 2 November 1917 to the Jewish Lord Rothschild, in which he gave the Jews the right to establish their national homeland in Palestine. Consequently, the Jewish immigration, the purchase of Palestinian land, and the training and arming of the Zionist organizations further continued (Nofal, 2004).

In fact, Jewish immigration to Palestine occurred in two phases. The first phase was before the issuance of the British Mandate, and it extended from 1880 till the beginning of the First World War (1914). Approximately 59,000 Jewish immigrants traveled to Palestine during this phase. The second phase was during the British Mandate of Palestine, from 1922 till the establishment of the "State of Israel." This phase included four waves of Jewish immigration, and the number of Jewish immigrants during this phase reached 457,000 (Sobani, 2007).

When Britain realized that the Zionist movement had become very powerful, it placed the question of Palestine before the United Nations. Subsequently, on 29 November 1947, the UNGA adopted Resolution Number 181 calling for the division of Palestine into two states: one for the Jews and the other for

the Arabs, and then to place Jerusalem under international tutelage. The Zionist leadership, headed by Ben-Gurion, agreed to this decision, while the Arabs and the Palestinians rejected it (Babadji, 1996).

Affected by the partition plan, the General Assembly decided to end the British Mandate of Palestine in May 1948. Simultaneously, the Zionist organizations took over the positions of the British Mandate and declared the establishment of the "State of Israel."

After the establishment of the "State of Israel," the armies of the Arab countries entered Palestine, progressing on all fronts where fighting had broken out. The newly-established Zionist state found its colonial project to be at risk, which prompted the western colonial powers to intervene and approach the Security Council to support Israel. Consequently, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 50 calling for a ceasefire between the Arab armies and Israel. Arab leaders rejected this resolution; however, as a result of persistent British pressure, the Arab leaders were compelled to accept the decision. The ceasefire allowed the Israeli occupation army to regain its strength, strengthen its control over the newly-captured Arab cities, and deport their Arab inhabitants. The number of Palestinian refugees in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was 800,000 (Morris, 1993; Banat, 2002, 2010; Abu Sitta, 2001; Sanbar, 2001), resulting in the Nakba, which was marked by the problem of the Palestinian refugees. As a result, Palestine was divided into the follwing three geographic regions:

- 1. The Arab lands occupied by the Jews after the 1948 war and constituting 77.8% of the total area of Palestine.
- 2. The West Bank occupying 20.9% of the area of Palestine.

- 1. Background and Literature Review Refugees
- 3. Gaza Strip occupying 1.3% of the area of Palestine (Salama, 2006).

Furthermore, Israel exhibited aggression against the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, displacing more Palestinians. The UNRWA estimated that 175,000 of its registered Palestinian refugees were displaced for the second time, of whom 17,500 fled the occupied areas for Syria, and 7,000 fled the Gaza Strip to settle in Egypt. UNRWA estimated that 350,000 people were displaced and became refugees for the first time (Jarrar, 1995).

1.14.1 Methods of Displacement

Various methods and means were used by the Zionist occupation to uproot the Palestinians from their homeland and deprive them of their property. The most prominent of these methods are as follows:

- The Zionist occupation committed many acts of slaughter and massacres against Palestinian civilians, such as the massacres of Deir Yassin and Dawaima.
- 3. They **forced Palestinian civilians** to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere, including in neighboring countries.
- The Zionist occupation used many terrorist means, including the demolition of houses, bombing Arab civilians in public places, destroying entire villages, and robbing them of public and private property.

The Israeli occupation used various methods of **psychological warfare** against Palestinian civilians with the aim of forcing them to leave their cities and villages, such as spreading rumors and leaking news of massacres.

1.14.2 Original Home Cities and Villages

After the 1948 Nakba, which resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel on 77% of the land of Palestine, and after the uprooting the Palestinians from about twenty cities and four hundred and twenty villages, about 957,000 (66%) of Palestinians became homeless. The Palestinian society's components and constituents completely collapsed, resulting in the emergence of a new phenomenon, called Palestinian refugees (Jibara, 1998).

Palestinian refugees came from twenty Palestinian cities, mainly Acre, Ramle, Bisan, Beersheba, Haifa, Jaffa, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Safad, Tiberias, etc., and from 420 villages, including Ajjur, Faluja, Zakaria, Dawaima, Al-Maghar, Tal as-Safi, Al-Bureij, Beit Netif, etc. (Jarrar, 1995; Banat, 2002).

1.14.3 Distribution of Palestinian Refugees in the World

After they were subjected to various methods of repression and displacement by the Zionist occupation, Palestinian refugees abandoned their homes in a random and unorganized manner. They went in different directions. Some of them went to the West Bank and Gaza Strip; others went to the neighboring Arab countries, namely Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Other groups went beyond the borders of the Arab areas (Appendix F).

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2017), approximately half of the Palestinian population, estimated at around 7.5 million, live in all parts of the world and constitute the largest and oldest group of refugees in the world. They are distributed throughout the world as follows:

- 1. 5 million people as the original refugees from 1948.
- 2. 1.5 million as unregistered refugees.
- 3. 773,000 refugees displaced by the 1967 war.
- 4. 263,000 refugees living within the Palestinian Territory occupied in 1948.

Additionally, the percentage of refugees living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and pre-1948 Palestinian territories is 41% of the total refugee population. The neighboring countries such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq host about 43% of the total Palestinian refugees. Around 16% of Palestinian refugees are dispersed in the rest of the world.

1.14.4 Palestinian Refugees in Camps

One-third of the Palestinian refugee population lives in 58 official camps established between 1948-1950 in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The remaining two-thirds live in the cities and towns of the host countries, and in the cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There are 10 camps in Jordan, 9 camps in Syria and 27 camps in the Palestinian Territories: 19 camps in the West Bank and 8 in the Gaza Strip (Sobani, 2007).

Palestinian Refugees constitute 47.9% of the total population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, accounting for a total of 2,159,015 refugees (PCBS, 2017).

1.14.5 Palestinian Refugees in the West Bank

Palestinian refugees in the West Bank constitute 33% of the total population, with 895,703 refugees, i.e., 3 out of every 10 Palestinian there are refugees. They are distributed over 19 refugee camps: Jenin, Tulkarem, Nur Shams,

Askar, Ein Beit al-Ma', Balata, Jalazone, Deir 'Ammar, Am'ari, Ein as-Sultan, Aqabat Jaber, Kalandia, Shuafat, 'Azza, Aida, Dheisheh, Al-Arroub Far'a, Qaddura, and Fawwar. The Nuweima and Karamah camps were evacuated after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (PCBS, 2017).

1.14.6 Palestinian Refugees in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip constitute 67% of the total population, with 1,263,312 refugees, i.e., there are 7 refugees out of every 10 people. The Gaza Strip has 8 refugee camps: Jabalia, Bureij, Maghazi, Khan Yunis, Nuseirat, Deir al-Balah, and Rafah (; PCBS, 2017).

1.14.7 Palestinian Refugees in Jordan

About 40% of all Palestinian refugees live in Jordan and constitute 32% of the total population of Jordan. They are distributed over 10 camps: Irbid, Souf, Jerash, Baqa'a, Zarqa, Marka, Jabal el-Hussein, Husn, Wihdat, and Talbieh (PCBS, 2017).

1.14.8 Palestinian Refugees in Syria

Palestinian refugees in Syria constitute 10% of the total Palestinian refugee strength and 2.3% of the population of Syria. They live in 11 official refugee camps: Yarmouk, Neirab, Khan Esheih, Deraa, Jaramana, Sbeineh, Khan Dannun, Hama, Homs, Qabr Essit, and Latakia Camp (Banat, 2002; PCBS, 2017).

1.14.9 Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon constitute 9% of all Palestinian refugees and 10.5% of Lebanon's population. Lebanon has 12 camps: Nahr al-Bared, Beddawi, Wavel, Sabra, Shatila, Mar Elias, Bourj el-Barajneh, Ain Al-Hilweh, Mieh, El-Buss, Burj el-Shemali, and Rashidieh (PCBS, 2017).

The real difference in Palestinian refugee statistics is reflected in the records of UNRWA, where the number of registered Palestinian refugees is 5,571,893, as follows:

- 1. The West Bank: 17%, with a total of 895,703 refugees.
- 2. The Gaza Strip: 24%, with a total of 1,263,312 refugees.
- 3. Jordan: 40%, with a total of 2,110,114 refugees.
- 4. Syria: 10%, with a total of 528,711 refugees.
- 5. Lebanon: 9%, with a total of 474,053 refugees (UNRWA, 2017).

1.14.10 Demographic and Social Conditions of Palestinian Refugees

Life is a bed of thorns growing up in a refugee camp, considering the existence of poverty, inadequate access to education, lack of access to recreational or sporting facilities and scarce opportunities. Hopelessness and despair abound. This is a reality that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have known as their childhood for the past 70 years.

The West Bank has the largest number of recognized Palestinian refugee camps. These camps suffer from suffocatingly high population densities. For example, the 22,855 inhabitants of Balata refugee camp live on less than 2

square kilometers of land. The population here is young, with 60% being less than 19 years old. Families live in square, concrete houses with just a few rooms; homes are ill-equipped to deal with the extreme heat of summer and the cold of the winter. Water is limited and often unclean, with plumbing being very basic and sewage systems inadequate.

These refugees were plunged into even greater poverty after being cut off from the Israeli labor market at the beginning of the Second Intifada. The camps are so crowded that the typical street is barely wider than a grown man's shoulders. Only a couple of streets are wide enough to accommodate a vehicle. The camps are becoming ever more crowded, with growing populations and limited opportunities for these refugees to make a life elsewhere. Most houses are designed to facilitate continued expansion upwards. They have unfinished flat roofs. At each corner juts out a square concrete pillar with rebar poking out at the centre, in the expectation that a new floor will be added in the future.

At street level sunlight is limited; facilities for children even more so. Extracurricular activities and play spaces are a dire necessity, but quite difficult to deliver. Even if these families had the money to send their children away from the camps for recreational or productive activities, during the Second Intifada there was always the fear that the children might run into the Israeli military when it invaded the city or camps.

With an average of 50 pupils per class, schools are extremely crowded, and the students have little to do when school is not in session, with the limited street spaces becoming a "play" area for many boys. The situation is worse for girls, who mostly remain confined to their cramped dwellings due to the

traditional social restrictions, which unfortunately are becoming more restrictive by the year. Many female children develop weak musculature and poor body balance because of an almost total lack of physical activity.

Making matters worse is the fact that the refugee camps have played host to the worst and most intense fighting during the Second Intifada. Inevitably, almost all the children are traumatized. Many constantly suffer sleep deprivation; they are afraid to sleep, for fear the Israeli military might come calling at night.

The refugee camps have the aura of medieval ghettos, with narrow alleyways often skirting open sewage ditches. Tens of dozens of one or two-room houses seem to lean on one other for support. These ghettos are without streets, sidewalks, gardens, patios, trees, flowers, plazas, or shops—among an uprooted, stateless, scattered people who, like the Jews before them, are in a tragic diaspora. Someone has said that for every Jew who was brought in to create a new state, a Palestinian Arab was uprooted and left homeless.

Dwellings are makeshift homes, a home that is only a room with a concrete floor and blankets stacked against the walls for beds. As for a toilet, it is just a closeted hole in the floor. The inhabitants of these houses have never known the convenience of a tub or a commode, nor may they hope to enjoy that most valuable of all luxuries, a room or even space where a person can retreat for an hour or even a few moments each day, seeking that solitude which melds mind, body, and spirit. It has been three decades, and most men look twenty years older than their age, for they are unable to ever secure jobs for themselves, which means that they are quite at a loss to find a means to lift themselves and their families from this morass of indigence and gloom in

which they seem perpetually mired. They return home looking demeaned, brutalized. Torn from their land, they have no more a sense of belonging or of self-worth. Ripped from the "mother earth"—an expression Palestinians repeatedly use— they feel orphaned, aliens everywhere.

"I am on my feet all day, my legs ache, and my head aches from the smoke, fumes, and heat. I work fourteen hours a day to make enough to feed my family. My health, perhaps also my mind, is breaking from the strain. The camp produces one generation after another of people who are trapped" homeless.

Such is the plight of the Palestinians, that there are only 293 hospital beds available for all the refugees in all the West Bank camps taken together—that works out to one per thousand inmates. Worse, there is only one doctor to attend to every 10,000 refugees.

The West is easily critical of refugees and how their numbers multiply. But the fact is that these families have few amenities or forms of recreation, save—perhaps the finest of all preoccupations for the lonely and bereft building a family and seeking strength for survival in that family. The Jewish diaspora's suffering in the ghettos did not destroy their families. Nor have the Palestinian diaspora's tribulations or the suffering in refugee camps destroyed the resilience and unity of Palestinian families.

In the overcrowded West Bank camps, it seems that when you live in the midst of regular chaos, you age quickly because you need to learn to look after yourself at an early age. Clearly, life in the West Bank refugee camps is an ordeal. Nevertheless, hope remains, as it must if we are to keep doing our

best to alleviate the suffering and improve conditions for generations of Palestinians to come, in the midst of all the complexity and chaos (Banat, 2002).

Palestine is extremely poor; Palestinians are almost entirely dependent on external aid for survival. The situation in the refugee camps teeters alarmingly close to severe malnutrition and starvation, considering the high fertility rate. Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have a number of characteristics, mainly:

- 1. **Age Structure:** Palestinian refugees are characterized as a mostly young population, i.e., 50% of the refugees are below the age of 15.
- 2. **Fertility Rate:** There is a marked increase in fertility, with 5 births per refugee woman compared to 4.3 for the non-refugee. With the inordinately large natural increase in numbers, it seems that a population explosion in the camps is imminent.
- 3. Disability Rate: Disability among Palestinian refugees is also a noticeable characteristic, having reached 6.4% compared with 4.9% among non-refugees. This is due to UNRWA's policy of financial belt tightening and the prevalence of endogamous marriages in the camps.
- 4. **Population Density:** There is extreme population density due to the increasing imbalance between the number of refugees and the land earmarked for the camps. This situation has compelled many refugees to flee their camps. In Al-'Arroub camp, for example, 3,640 people were displaced from the camp in ten years, according to a population survey carried out by the Applied Sociology Department in response

to the needs of the People's Committee for Camp Services. In all, 728 families have left the camp within 10 years, i.e., 72 families annually.

- 5. Health, Education, and Social Services: There is considerable pressure on health, education, and social services in the camps. Besides, there has been a clear policy of slashing the services provided by UNRWA in the camps. The last strike, stretching over 70 days in 2015, is evidence of these arbitrary cuts in funding.
- 6. **Poverty Rates:** High poverty rates present a clear problem and grave risk in the Palestinian refugee camps. Statistics indicate 47.5% of refugee families as being below the poverty line because of high unemployment rates, large family size, and a high dependency ratio.
- 7. Educational Achievement: There are high rates of educational achievement and low illiteracy rates among refugees in Palestinian camps (PCBS, 2017).

1.14.11 Effects of Displacement on Palestinian Refugees

The displacement and the violations perpetrated against the displaced Palestinian civilians have had many effects and the scars still exist today:

- 1. The displacement of Palestinians tore asunder Palestinian communities, dispersing them over far flung and unrelated geographical areas.
- 2. It led to a drastic transformation in the lifestyle of the refugees. Social relations were destabilized, with several psychological and humanitarian consequences. A refugee far from home feels alienated, isolated, separated from the family and unable to integrate into the host society, not to mention the hopelessness of ever being able to return to their homes or even meeting their families who stayed back.

- 3. New economic and political situations have been imposed on Palestinian refugees, depending on the areas where they sought refuge. The refugees lost their livelihood in their own country, as well as their movable and immovable assets. As for the host country, refugees are seen as intruders and beset with the seemingly intractable problems of unemployment and assimilation.
- The bare necessities of everyday life such as housing, employment, and food have become the dominant issues for Palestinian refugees (Jarrar, 1995; Salama, 2006).

1.14.12 Palestinian Refugees in International and Arab Forums

Throughout recorded history, Palestine has been the target of invasions by colonizing powers. As it has turned out, the Zionist occupation has been the most significant and brutal, with its various and extreme methods of repression and intimidation that have displaced thousands of Palestinian people, evicting them from their cities and villages since 1948, creating the so-called "Palestinian refugee problem". This issue has attracted the attention of many international players and institutions such as the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council, besides the League of Arab States and other international bodies.

1.14.13 Palestinian Refugees in General Assembly Resolutions

The British Cabinet decided to refer the file on the issue of Palestine to the UN on 14 February 1947, wherein the British authorities expressed the desire to terminate their mandate over Palestine. On 13 May 1947, the UN

constituted a special committee to discuss the Palestinian question. The committee placed their recommendations before the UN General Assembly. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 recommending the partition of British-ruled Palestine into three entities: an Arab state, a Jewish state, and an internationally-supervised zone comprising Jerusalem and its holy sites (Banat, 2002).

Once the UN Resolution was adopted and its implementation began, the situation in Palestine began to get out of hand. There were clashes between the Arabs and Palestinians on one side and the Jews on the other. In an attempt to resolve this situation, the General Assembly created the post of a UN Mediator for Palestine, appointing to this position Count Folk Bernadotte, who was briefed on the situation and submitted his report to the Security Council. Bernadotte's report called for an urgent resolution to the issue of refugees and returning them to their homes. As a result of this position, the Zionist gangs assassinated him on September 17, 1948, one day after the report was submitted. Pursuant to the report's recommendations, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 on 11 December 1948 (Masri, 2008).

The main point of this Resolution reads as follows:

"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible".

Resolution 194 is the basis for all UN resolutions on the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Its salient features are as follows:

- It is an international recognition of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties, which they have abandoned since 1948.
- 2. It affirms that the right of refugees to return is a collective and individual right; at the same time, it is a collective right. In other words, the resolution is indivisible, it is not permissible to talk about the right of a certain category of refugees to return and the denial of other groups' right to return. It is also an individual right, that is, no party may act on their behalf, whether in negotiating or renouncing this right (Masri, 2008).
- 3. The Resolution is considered mandatory for all UN member states. This status is periodically confirmed by the General Assembly whenever the Assembly addresses the question of the Palestinian refugees. This resolution is one of the resolutions relevant to the issue of Mandate. The UN Legal Committee has stated that all General Assembly resolutions related to the Mandate issue are binding on the member states. One of the conditions of admitting Israel to membership in the UN is its prior approval of the Resolution (Hamada, 2007).
- 4. The Resolution reconciles the right of return and compensation, and considers them complementary to each other.

As a result of the inability of the UN to compel Israel to implement the Resolution, UNRWA was established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 302 of 8 December 1949 (Babadji, 1996).

1.14.14 Palestinian Refugees in Security Council Resolutions

The role of the Security Council with regard to the Palestinian refugee issue has been limited. It has issued several resolutions, the most important of which are:

- Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967: This called for a just resolution of the refugee issue, without referring to the return home of Palestinian refugees in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (Dagher, 2001).
- Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973: It called upon both parties to begin talks and to implement the Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) forthwith, after the ceasefire (Masri, 2008).

1.14.15 Palestinian Refugees in Resolutions of the League of Arab States

The League of Arab States (LAS) was set up in 1945 for regulating and coordinating relations between its member States. As regards the Palestinian question in general, and specifically the refugee issue, the LAS has been working to lay down standards and adopt resolutions that deal with the problem of Palestinian refugees. The resolutions of the LAS in the 1950s typically contained a focus on facilitating access to international aid and relief for the Palestinian refugees, as also for issuing travel documents to help them move (Dagher, 2001).

Further, the LAS has passed a series of resolutions regarding the reunification of Palestinian families as well as the legal and political status of Palestinian refugees within the member states of the LAS (Masri, 2008). Among the most

important of the LAS's resolutions dealing with the Palestinian refugee problem are the following:

- Resolution 424 of 14 September 1952 which recommended issuing unified travel documents for all Palestinian refugees and also called for reuniting the separated families.
- 2. Resolution 914 of 31 March 1955 that recommended granting citizenship by some Arab countries to the Palestinian refugees.
- Resolution 1946 of 31 March 1964 recommended annual conferences of the supervisors in host Arab countries, on the affairs of Palestinian refugees.
- Resolution 4071 of 9 September 1981 recommended facilitation of travel and residence for Palestinian refugees. Moreover, this Resolution called upon the UNRWA to investigate the situation of the refugees receiving allocations.
- 5. Resolution 4243 of 31 March 1983 recommended establishment of contact by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the General Secretariat with Arab countries to discuss the Protocol on the Treatment of Palestinians in the Arab States (Palestinian Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Palestinian Refugees, 1990).

1.14.16 Palestinian Refugees in Peace Agreements

Neither the UN mediator to Palestine, nor the Conciliation Commission have been able to reach a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Palestinian refugee issue in particular. Nevertheless, international attempts and efforts have been continuing to thrash out a viable settlement. The

Security Council's Resolution 242, adopted in the wake of the June 1967 conflict, defined the principles of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, emphasizing the need for a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.

Attempts have been ongoing to achieve resolution of the problem of the Palestinian refugees through the ratification of many peace pacts and conferences, beginning with Oslo -1 in 1991, in 1993, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994), Oslo-2 (1995), etc. However, none of these projects has seen the light of day, and the Palestinian refugee question continues to be among the most complex and seemingly intractable issues for negotiation, even seventy years after the Nakba.

1.14.17 Proposed Solutions and Projects to Resolve the Palestinian Refugee Issue

Seventy years have elapsed since the Palestinian Nakba, yet the Palestinian refugee problem remains unsolved. Voluntary repatriation at the very outset might have been the appropriate solution for the international community to get out of the conundrum. To this end, the UN General Assembly in 1948 adopted Resolution 194(III) resolving that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date." The UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine was tasked with the implementation of this resolution, but Israel has obstinately and consistently refused to permit Palestinian refugees back into their homelands, except for a select few in the context of family reunification. Once it became clear that Israel would not budge from its attitude towards the Palestinian refugees, the international community began to seek another way out of the imbroglio.

Projects targeting resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem have been diverse in terms of form and proponents. Some have proposed resettlement and assimilation, whereas others suggested repatriation and compensation. Some among the many parties proposing solutions and plans to end the Palestinian refugee problem are mentioned below:

1.15 UN Projects

The UN has come up with innumerable proposals for resolving the problem of Palestinian refugees, including:

- Clapp Mission: In 1949, the UN deputed a mission to several Arab countries for studying their economies with a view to determining their capacity to absorb Palestinian refugees. This mission recommended the implementation of public works such as water programs and the like for the refugees (US \$ 49 million), with 70% being contributed by the US for the development projects (Salama, 2006).
- **2. Blandford Project**: In 1951, the UNRWA Commissioner-General submitted a plan that proposed the allocation of US \$ 250 million for the integration of Palestinian refugees with the Arab States (Zureiq, 1997).
- **3.** Hammarskjöld Project: In 1959, the UN Secretary-General prepared a draft proposal which suggested that the UN must continue to assist the Palestine refugees, while setting in motion programs for the rehabilitation and development of refugees so as to enhance their capabilities of supporting themselves in due course and to dispense with the assistance of UNRWA.

1.16 International Projects

The international position has never been very different from the Israeli attitude regarding the solution of the Palestinian refugee problem, whether as to resettling and absorbing them in the places of their residence, or compensating them for their property, or both. Several international projects have been put forth, among them:

- **1. Dallas Project**: In 1956, US Secretary of State Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a project that suggested the return of some Palestinian refugees and the resettlement of others in the Arab countries.
- Johnson Project: In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy's envoy Lyndon Baines Johnson suggested compensating and resettling Palestinian refugees away from their homeland.
- **3.** Vance Project: In 1969, US Secretary of State Cyrus Roberts Vance formulated a scheme that would resettle and compensate Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip.
- **4. Kissinger Project**: In 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger submitted a project to compensate and resettle two-thirds of the refugees in Jordan and the remainder in Syria.
- **5. Civets Project**: A 2006 project emerged from a report prepared by a British mission that was apparently investigating evidence. The mission visited the refugee camps in the Middle East in 1999 with the aim of abolishing the Palestinian refugees' right of return, resettling them, ending PLO, and replacing it with a political civil structure in order to perpetuate the Palestinian diaspora and enable resettlement (Farraj, 2005).

1.17 Arab Projects

Many Arab countries have contributed to the ongoing attempts for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Many of them have submitted projects and solutions to achieve this. The most important of these are:

- 1. Al-Jazeera Project: Syrian President Husni al-Zayyim's 1949 project proposed the settlement of 350,000 Palestinian refugees in the Al-Jazeera area in northern Syria.
- 2. Bourguiba Project: Tunisian President Bourguiba submitted a project in 1965 that proposed resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem in phases: a third of the territory taken by Israel would be returned to the Arabs. The refugees were to return to their new state; moreover, a reconciliation between the Arabs and Israel was also suggested.
- **3. King Hussein Project**: In 1972, King Hussein put forth a plan calling for the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees who were displaced in 1967 and the need to implement the UN resolutions on refugees so that the peace process might take place.
- **4. King Fahd Project**: King Fahd submitted a project in 1981 which pushed for the right of Palestinians to return or just compensation, as well as withdrawal of Israel from the territories occupied in 1967 and the placement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under UN tutelage, along with the recognition of Israel. This was the first project calling for the recognition of Israel (Salem, 1997).
- **5.** The Saudi Initiative: In March 2002, Saudi Arabia submitted an Arab initiative for peace. On the issue of Palestinian refugees, the initiative

stated that a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem must be agreed upon by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (Farraj, 2005).

1.18 Israeli Projects

Israel has submitted many projects and solutions, all based on total denial of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their towns and villages, from where they were ejected. These proposals invariably suggested an economic resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem, through the integration of Palestinian refugees in their present places of residence in the host countries; the objective clearly was to liquidate the issue of Palestinian refugees and end their cause. The most important of these projects are set out below:

- 1. Weitz Plan: In 1948 Yossef Weitz, director of the Land and Afforestation Department of the Jewish National Fund, submitted a plan to the Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, that would prevent forever the return of refugees to their homes by creating a new reality in which their repatriation would become impossible. The plan involved wholesale destruction of Palestinian cities and villages, preventing the Arabs from working in their lands, enforcing laws to prevent refugees returning to their homes, permitting Jews to settle in abandoned Arab areas to prevent the return of Palestinians and carrying out propaganda against the return of refugees while helping host Arab countries to absorb refugees.
- 2. Sharett Project: Israel's Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett submitted his 1956 project to the USA, wherein he proposed that Israel would raise

funds for compensating the Palestinian refugees on condition they were resettled in their host countries.

- **3.** Eshkol Project: In 1965 Levi Eshkol, Israel's Prime Minister, submitted a two-part project. The first part involved Israel financially contributing to the process of resettling Palestinian refugees in the host countries. The second part of the project aimed to give Israel freedom of commercial exchange with the Arab countries.
- **4. Allon Project**: In 1967, Israel's Foreign Minister Yigal Allon came up with a scheme to altogether liquidate the Palestinian refugee problem by denying Israel's responsibility in the Palestinian refugee issue. It attributed primary responsibility for the situation to the Arab countries, and called for the transfer of a large number of refugees to Sinai, regardless of Egypt's willingness or repudiation of such a plan.
- 5. Sharon Project: In 1971, Sharon submitted a proposal to liquidate and demolish Palestinian camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as to resettle Palestinian refugees in homes built for them in cities of the West Bank and inside Israel.
- 6. Gazit Project: In 1995, head of Israeli Military Intelligence Shlomo Gazit promoted a study entitled "The Palestinian Refugee Problem: possible final status arrangements for the refugee issue from an Israeli Perspective". The study suggested a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue through the return of some 1948 refugees and 1967 displaced persons to PA controlled areas in accordance with the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The remaining Palestinian refugees were to be absorbed by the host countries. UNRWA's operations would cease and all its authority

for refugee services transferred to the Palestinian Authority and the host countries. The material compensation was divided into two parts: a collective compensation for the integration and resettlement of Palestinian refugees in their places of residence and a personal allowance of US \$ 10,000 for each family. But this project ignores the lost property and the psychological, social, political, and economic toll (Zureiq, 1997; Abu Jaber, 2002).

Having reviewed the projects and solutions proposed by various international, Israeli, and even Arab parties, the study generally believes that these projects are based on a clear call for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the host countries on the one hand, and the denial of the right of return of the refugees in exchange for compensation on the other hand. The purpose is to eradicate the Palestinian refugee issue by obliterating the Palestinian national identity and perpetuating the occupiers' control over Palestinian lands, through the stratagem of forcibly integrating the Palestinian refugees into the new host communities to which they were displaced.

These projects and solutions aimed at replacing the right of return, concentrating efforts to implement resettlement projects, and working to rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees economically and socially and compensate them with the aim of integrating them later into their host countries. These projects and solutions included providing some financial assistance to enable the refugees build their own houses. Advocates of these proposals assumed that this assistance would contribute significantly to helping integrate Palestinian refugees in their various places of residence.

The study believes that a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue should involve repatriation and compensation for the Palestinian refugees. The difficulty of achieving this solution stems from the obstinate refusal of the Zionist occupiers to repatriate Palestinian refugees. Continuing US support for this unreasoning stand and the inability of the Palestinian negotiator to achieve any progress in the file of Palestinian refugees only serve to add insult to injury.

The impact of the 1948 Nakba on Palestinian society and its various dimensions and consequences, including the suffering of the Palestinian refugees, are still manifest today. There are about 7 million Palestinian refugees at home and in the diaspora. Their number has steadily increased since 1948, and till date they continue to endure extreme conditions in the camps.

The disaster of the Nakba, this cataclysmic event, has imprinted itself as the main Palestinian issue on their collective memory. It is the starting point for many experiences that can be grouped under the title of "the consequences of the Nakba". In addition to the destruction of an entire society, the Nakba represents an unbridgeable gap in the place, time, and consciousness of the Palestinians. The Nakba is the place, time, and consciousness.

1.19 Palestinian Refugees and Collective Memory

Sociologically, society consists of several communities which interact in a systematic manner and share stable and organized social relations. They nurture shared interests and goals that are governed by a set of values, customs, traditions, and standards which dictate their behavior and

relationships to ensure the survival and sustainability of the society. Every group is characterized by the proclivity of its members towards certain behavioral norms founded in their own values, and it is these that distinguish them from the members of other societal groups; each group exerts an influence on its members, persuading them to remain loyal to those norms in order to preserve and sustain their group entity (Othman, 1999).

The treachery and massacres perpetrated by the Zionists against Palestinians in 1948 marked an attempted physical extermination of indigenous Palestinians, with the motive of strengthening the myth of a barren land and the fictitious patriotism allegedly enshrined in religious texts. Last month's unearthing of the mass graves in Jaffa revisited the deliberate exclusion of Palestinians from the Israeli historical narrative, and the ramifications of creating space for a fortified collective memory which derives its legitimacy from the conscious effort to obliterate the oral testimony, historical archives, academic studies, and physical spaces which have been altered or obscured through Israel's implementation of the Plan Dalet (Masalha, 2014).

Israel's territorial expansion and occupation, achieved with the participation of the Jewish paramilitary group Haganah, was marked by a sequence of massacres, ethnically cleansing towns and villages of Palestinians in order to improve the Zionist narrative of their right to a national homeland. The expulsion, consisting of internal displacement and exodus to neighbouring countries, contributed to the forced disappearance and silencing of Palestinian memory because of the Israeli narrative being fortified through dominant violence. Palestinians scholars, including Elias Sanbar, describe the distortion of Palestinian identity through an incongruous reference to 'refugees', with

deliberate omission of the memory of the Nakba from international perspectives. Nur Masalha's distinctive work on collective memory relating to the Nakba encapsulates this theme, of how the massacres provided "the security, military and strategic explanations and justifications for 'purging' the Jewish state and dispossessing the Palestinian people" (Masalha, 2014).

The mass graves of Jaffa are shrouded in a thousand unanswered questions. Palestinian researchers are reluctant to commit to answers until their results are scientifically confirmed. Reports have largely centered upon the Zionist violence and the forced participation of village people in 'clearing' the streets to eradicate any evidence of the massacres. It has also been alleged that bodies were buried according to Muslim rites—a suggestion which would implicate the occupying power of coercing Palestinians to collaborate in concealment of the Zionist war crimes. Village elders have also spoken about their role in burying the bodies while towns were being shelled by Zionist forces, suggesting an imparting of memory which might have been previously stifled, despite a tenacity to uphold and conserve oral testimonies. While the discovery has reinforced the oral testimony of the Nakba massacre with concrete evidence, divulging the reasons behind the purported silence in the case of Jaffa would be equally germane to the Palestinian experience of atrocities and preservation of their history.

Memory frameworks differ according to a country's history. In Chile, memory narrative and testimony have been backed by movements clamouring for the truth regarding the fate of the disappeared. Pinochet's imposed culture of oblivion—a strategy which coincided with the amnesty laws designed to absolve the dictatorship from guilt—prompted the

Manifesto of Historians which attacked the manipulation of memory and called for the manifestation and development of collective memory. In a twisted way, the insistence upon oblivion pointed to the crude reality that atrocities had indeed been perpetrated by the US-sponsored dictatorship. In the case of Palestine, the memory framework is far more complex. Zionism attempted to obliterate Palestinians from the dominant narrative even prior to the actual advent of the illegal occupation. Therefore, apart from requiring scientific proof to combat the misinformation and establish the historical truth of what actually happened that led to these mass burials, the issue of oblivion for the Palestinians predates even recognition of the Nakba. The Zionist narrative is a major strategy employed to render the Nakba inconsequential, since the foundation of this narrative is erasing the very existence of Palestinians as indigenous people in the former Palestine (Masalha, 2014).

The process of formulating a collective memory began for the Palestinian refugees when they congregated in front of their tents. They remembered their villages, and talked of the past with their families and their children and grandchildren who were listening attentively. The memories always begin about life in the village before 1948. The lifestyle and work of those times are described in detail. They discuss dates, events, true stories, myths, the land, crop growing and yield, seasons and festivals, traditions, the national history of the village, and its role in the revolutions of 1929, 1936, the 1948 war, heroes and martyrs, etc.

Masalha (2014) argues that "Israeli positivist and revisionist historiography has long privileged state papers and official documents over the people's voices behind the documents". Consequently, the necessity has arisen of

asserting the triumph of Palestinian memory through amalgamating the dynamics of narratives in order to construct 'alternative histories and memories'.

Over time, these conversations and memories have become part of a complex process aimed at creating a general mindset. It is the task of the following generations, who have not experienced life in Palestine, to inform their progeny about the orange of Palestine through the seasons and holidays and about the wars that have torn as under this land.

Thus, the Palestinians began to use the Nakba as a temporary reference to events. For example, they can say, "This event happened two years before the Nakba," or "It happened one year after the Nakba." Event demographic classifications have become associated with the Nakba. The generation that witnessed the 1948 war is called the Nakba generation, and those born subsequently are dubbed the *post-Nakba generation*. Using the Nakba as a reference has different aspects, and this perhaps generates different or even conflicting connotations. The children from the Nakba generation, for instance, know of all that came to pass if they were there and had lived in Palestine before it changed. They posses that memory. However, this generation is generally accused of having failed to defend Palestine; that probably is the reason why that particular generation of Palestinian leaders feels the need to explain and justify their actions *during* the 1948 Palestine war. As for the post-Nakba generation, they can conceive of what might have happened, or even make brief visits to various places to understand what life was like, earlier (Bshara, 1997).

In turn, Palestinian collective memory is a sine qua non to give the lie to the institutionalized but fabricated history of Jewish 'nationhood'. While the identity of Palestinians cannot be disconnected from the Nakba, the context of the memory framework is still ensconced within the struggle for acknowledgement and recognition, being hindered and even overwhelmed by the excessive guilt which the international community attaches to the memory of the Holocaust, in exclusion to many other events equally gruesome, such as the Nakba. In line with Zionist propaganda, conventional history keeps regurgitating a metaphor of suffering that is reserved for allies of the imperialists, while consciously throwing a miasma over the Palestinian memory in order to suffocate it. The marginalization of Palestinians, primarily due to Zionist laws calculated to prevent any commemoration of the Nakba, has never been challenged by the international community, while these same purveyors of institutionalized falsehoods have not hesitated to create a highly profitable industry out of the Holocaust. Inevitably, it is the dominant narrative that has so far determined which peoples are entitled to memory. As for construction of the Palestinian alternative which is imbued with the continuity of oral tradition even prior to the Nakba, there has been a well thought out strategy of annihilation.

The Palestinian Nakba is a Palestinian event and a place of collective memory. It connects all Palestinians to a certain point in time, which for them has become a "present fact that will never disappear." For this reason, incalculable effort has gone into rebuilding and preserving that venerable past. All this striving has given birth to heavily documented and illustrated literature, much of it carrying photographic evidence of that past and those events, trying to piece together and evoke the sense of how Palestine was

before the Nakba, and they are evidence of the value of these efforts. The most important among these volumes includes a book entitled Jaffa: Scent of a City (Jaffa Research Center, 1991) and a book named Before Their Diaspora A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876-1948 by Walid Khalidi. Many other books prove the importance of photography as a powerful tool in retrieving the past. The images in these books give specific glimpses and provide striking flashbacks to that time, contriving to recreate fantasies of the social and cultural environment of that time, in its broadest sense. In addition, Nakba literature includes many literary works, such as The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist by Emile Habiby (2010), Days of Honey, Days of Onion: The Story of a Palestinian Family in Israel by Michael Gorkin (1993) and the autobiographical series Pathways of Exile by Faisal al-Hourani (2004). There are many other, similar works whose primary objective has been to chronicle and relive Palestinian life and society as they were before the Nakba and to portray the lives of the displaced Palestinian families (Msaeed, 2011).

In addition to books which depict and revive the Palestinian collective memory about the Palestinian refugee question, there have been some TV series, such as *Al-Taghriba Al-filistinia*, a TV series about the Palestinian exodus of 1948; it illustrates the humanitarian aspect of the Palestinian cause, including displacement, expulsion, deportation, sacrifices, separation, and struggle. This series, written by the Palestinian refugee writer Walid Saif and directed by the Syrian artist Hatem Ali, details the lives of Palestinians over more than five decades and combines tragedy and catastrophe. The series presents a visual document that re-energizes and revives the Palestinian collective memory. The importance of the series is that it presents the

Palestinian catastrophe in a narrative style which is easily comprehensible by broad segments of the Arab audience. Other expressive means, however, may fail to communicate the story as effectively and simply as this TV series does. More such series would help further preserve the Palestinian memory from vanishing in the torrent of frustration, conspiracies, and historical obfuscation.

If indeed there is to be a preservation and dissemination of Palestinian memory as to the Nakba, it is necessary to question ceaselessly the Israeli ploy of appropriating authenticity solely based upon archived information which is severely biased and patently ignores any possible Palestinian retrieval of memory. The same yardstick should be applied to the Palestinian elite, who live in ivory towers of affluence and are somewhat distanced from those subaltern memories. An insight into collective memory, far removed from moribund official records, which challenges the elite narrative is necessary to consolidate social history in a meaningful way. As Masalha (2014) states, "...the oral history of the Nakba is not only an intellectual project dictated by certain ideological commitments; it can provide an understanding of the social history 'from below' that Palestinian elite narratives and political history often obscure".

As with other aspects of the Zionist occupation, the illegal has been enshrined within an ostensibly democratic framework and duly embraced by the international community, while international law chooses to ignore this travesty of justice, offering Israel a clean chit for all the atrocities, often even justifying the slaughter and glossing over the displacement of millions of Palestinians by reiterating the specious pleas of the Jews' right to a national

homeland while denying Palestinians theirs, thus perpetuating a warped narrative that portrays Zionism as the victim. Unless this litany of lies is changed, the international community's indulgence towards Israel's insoluciance, moving from fabrication of events to justification of genocide will constitute another impediment to recognition of the Palestinian collective memory beyond the confines of the forcibly displaced communities.

To sum up, the concept of collective memory has been a tool for validation for social entities based on common interests, goals, and history. It focuses, too, on nationalism and culture, and is a certain notion in traumatized communities According to MacMillan (2009), history provides much of the fodder for nationalistic sentiment and is used and abused to form national identities. It is no wonder then that the remembrance of events or periods important to the people of a nation plays a crucial part in the invention and reproduction of national identity.

1.19.1 Refugee:

A refugee is aperson who has escaped from their own country for political, religious, or economic reasons or because of a war (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).

According to UNRWA, a Palestine refugee is "a person whose expelled from their normal place of residence in Palestine in 1948, or thereafter, or a person who left for any reason, but the Israeli occupation did not allow him to return to his former home, and the refugee remains in that status until he or his descendants return to their original homeland (Kana'na, 2000; Banat, 2002, 2014a; UNRWA, 2005; Salama, 2006).

According to Article 5 of the Palestinian National Charter, which was not included in the powers abolished in 1996 according to the Oslo Accords, "Palestinian refugees and Palestinians in general are Arab citizens who were habitual residents of Palestine, and Palestine's boundaries are consistent with those of the Mandate established in 1906 until 1947, whether they were expelled or remained there. Anyone born to a Palestinian Arab father after that date inside or outside Palestine is a Palestinian (Hafnawi, 1990).

1.19.2 Nakba (Catastrophe or Disaster):

Nakba or al-Nakba refers to the first wave of Palestinians displaced and forcibly expelled (approx. 800,000 people) from their homeland in 1948, and the accompanying consequences, including occupation and confiscation of their land. Today, 70 years after the Nakba, there are about 7.5 million Palestinian refugees; most of them still live in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in neighboring Arab countries (PCBS, 2017).

1.19.3 Naksa (Setback):

The popular Arab name for what is known as the Six-Day War or the 1967 War, which took place on 5 June 1967 between Israel and some Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and ended with Israel establishing control over the entire State of Palestine, the *Sinai* Peninsula, and the Golan Heights (Salama, 2006).

1.19.4 The Right of Return:

This is the right whereby one or several persons and / or their descendants demand to return to the places where they used to live, but were forced to

leave; this is also the right to repossess the property of which they were dispossessed or which they abandoned (Babadji, 1996).

The right of return is also reinforced in the UN General Assembly Resolution 194, wherein the issue of refugees is addressed in Article 11:

"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;" (Hafnawi, 1996).

1.19.5 Camp:

The camp is a population gathering built on a limited area of land, which is placed at the disposal of the UNRWA in order to accommodate Palestinian refugees and assist them in meeting their basic needs. The UNRWA provides full supervision of the camp and offers health services, education, relief, and social services for special hardship cases only (Banat, 2002).

1.19.6 Compensation:

This is to return something to its origin, to abolish the shortcomings in the moral and physical state of the individual and the community due to the difference between their living on their own homeland and in a state of being uprooted and displaced. This includes *personal material benefit*, such as movable and immovable property and businesses, and *public material benefit*, such as organizations, services, public property, and sources of natural

wealth. This also includes *personal moral benefit*, such as feeling safe, living in a family, and feeling happy, and *public moral benefit*, such as national identity, culture, history, and holy places (Abu Sitta, 2008).

1.19.7 Collective Consciousness:

This is made up of a set of shared beliefs, ideas, and moral attitudes which operate as a unifying force within a society (Durkheim, 1893).

1.19.8 Collective Memory

The literature of collective useful memory contains several conceptualizations. Theoretically, the roots of the concept of collective memory go back to the sociologist Durkheim (1893, 1912) who focused on the strength of the relationship of members of society and cohesion among them in his book The Division of Labor in Ancient and Modern Societies and on the collective thought of these communities. Some thinkers like Halbwachs (1952) have had a clear impact on most modern research on collective memory in the field of cultural sciences. The contents of this research discuss the theory of collective memory, which holds that an individual's process of remembering can arise or take place only within an appropriate social environment. This approach contrasted with the prevailing scientific perceptions of his time, which looked at the individual's memory and process of remembering as merely a biological function.

The French sociologist Emile Durkheim coined the term collective consciousness in the 19th century, in his book about the division of labor in society. This concept, commonly known as the "collective consciousness", exemplifies the crucial role that the social consciousness plays in human

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1. Background and Literature Review Refugees

behavior. According to Durkheim (1893), collective consciousness is the set of shared beliefs, ideas, and moral attitudes which operate as a unifying force within society; meanwhile, collective memory is a social group's identity constructed with narratives and traditions that are created to give its members a sense of community.

Collective memory is a term used in sociology, the study of human societies. It refers to the knowledge and beliefs shared by all the members of a particular group, whether that group encompasses a few individuals, a nation, or the planetary population as a whole. Collective memory allows members of a group to share common goals, behaviours, and attitudes. It also encourages individuals with differing views to conform to the overall beliefs of the group. In short, it makes human society possible (Durkheim, 1893).

Durkheim (1912) argued that societies require continuity and connection with the past to preserve social unity and cohesion. He stated that collective thought required individuals to physically join together to create a common experience that was shared by the group. Since the experience of collective effervescence requires the physical gathering of the community, it is important for groups to devise methods of extending that unity when the group disbands.

Collective memory is a link between a set of events in the past and the present; it is also a link between previous and subsequent nations, and it is the basis of identity formation. In his studies on collective memory, Halbwachs (1952) associates the individual's personal memories with the society to which they belong. Explaining the social nature of the individual's remembering,

Halbwachs (1952) believes that the social framework makes an individual's experiences more memorable and interpretive.

According to Halbwachs (1952), individuals' dependence on social reference frames, when remembering their past, makes of their memories a collective reference point. Individual memories no longer remain confined to the individual, but have a place within the social system as a result of the individual's interaction with their social environment.

Meanwhile, Maurice Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim, was the first sociologist to employ the expression "collective memory", with his work being regarded as the foundational framework for the study of societal remembrance. Halbwachs suggested that all individual memory was constructed within social structures and institutions. He claimed that individual private memory is understood only in a group context; these groups may encompass families, organizations, and nation-states. Halbwachs argued that the only individual memories that are not constructed through the group context are images from dreams (Halbwachs, 1952; Eyerman, 2002).

Moreover, Halbwachs deviated from the Durkheimian approach by adopting an instrumental presentist approach to collective memory. A presentist approach suggests that social constructions of memory are driven by the compulsions of the present. Halbwachs stated that current issues and understandings are what fashion collective memory. Groups choose different memories to explain present issues and concerns. In order to explain the present, leaders of a group reconstruct the past using rationalization to choose which events are remembered, those that are eliminated, and rearrange events to conform to the social narrative (Halbwachs, 1952).

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Contemporary anthropological studies say that collective memory perpetuates identity through the process of recalling a common history. Since this current or contemporary history of the refugee community in general is about displacement, dispersion, and destruction of the economic, social, and political basis of the pre-refuge society, the group begins to form a collective memory that includes a post-refuge period. Anthropological studies confirm that the relationship between refugees and the process of historical national re-consciousness is more pronounced among refugees living in camps than among those living outside them (Issa, 2007).

1.19.9 Palestinian Youth:

The term Palestinian youth refers to both males and females between 15–19 years of age in refugee camps in the West Bank, regardless of their social or legal status, race, class, or any other factor.

1.19.10 Exposure to Israeli Violence:

The expression means any form of Israeli violence that the youths' families were exposed to in the camps, including detention, home raids, injury, martyrdom, house demolition, job loss, ban on travel, deportation, compulsory house arrest, etc. (Banat, 2010).

Collective Memory —Nakba— Jawad A. Dayyeh

Chapter two

2.1 Introduction

Several studies have addressed the topic of Palestinian refugees, with different purposes. Some of them have addressed the refugee issue through the demographic dimensions, which served only to deny its historical and political reality. Some presented the question in an absolutely service-oriented manner, while others have addressed the issue and its association with aspects of regional and national security. A few studies examined the depth of this issue through the structural framework from which it was formed.

Due to the risk that exists of the need being ignored, of presenting an analytical vision of the reality which has resulted in actions whose consequences might threaten the secure future which the Zionist movement theorists have dreamed of, this study reviews a group of studies which have presented empirical perceptions about Palestinian children and their interaction with the consequences of the historical and political facts, and how these have produced children who have unique characteristics which distinguish them from other children in the world by drawing a living image that is full of hope and pain, to produce, at the end, active children who will be able to impose their presence in the studies of scholars of different specializations, and also in the agendas of politicians of various persuasions. After that, this study presents a critical vision and offers a brief commentary on some of the topics included in the reviewed studies.

2.2 Related Studies

Collective memory studies have burgeoned worldwide. Several researchers since 1990 have been focusing on studying the Palestinian narratives, in all of which Al-Nakba plays a crucial role. In a recent study, Zidan (2018) investigated the memories and fears of Nakba and displacement events as perceived by the first and second Palestinian generations of Deir Yassin village, Jerusalem Governorate, Palestine. The study approached the literature as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, which addressed both theoretical and applied research. The significance of this recent study is that it was the first to deal with this theme to the author's knowledge, given that seventy years has elapsed since the Nakba, and as such will be an important reference for those concerned with the area of collective memory. To achieve its ends, the study adopted a qualitative research approach using the sample survey method. The interview questionnaire is appropriate for the exploratory nature of the research, consisting of 20 items. The random purposive method was utilized, comprising of a sample size of (8) male and female Palestinian refugees of Deir Yassin village in Jerusalem Governorate of Palestine. Participants were approached in the West Bank by the researcher, and were formally asked to participate in the interview. The researcher analyzed the collected data using a qualitative research approach. The study obtained a number of findings, the major ones being: the residents of Deir Yassin exposed the trauma of asylum, displacement, and loss of security and stability leading to their sense of defeat, frustration and denial, and entering into a state of mental mourning. Findings show that the participants preserve a very strong collective memory of the Nakba, and fear is the natural feeling of the inhabitants of Deir Yassin, considering the daily massacres and the ongoing

Israeli occupation. The results revealed differences in expressing these fears among the refugees, due to place of residence. However, the inhabitants of Deir Yassin village nurse feelings of grief and pain. Additionally, the findings of the study revealed nostalgia as being the natural result of a feeling of insecurity, and there was a consensus on mechanisms to express nostalgia among the refugees. Moreover, the study may contribute to the realization of the extent to which the events of the Nakba have taken root among the refugees, and the subsequent generations' knowledge regarding the Nakba events. In addition, the study may assist in revealing the fears of the first generation, which have been transmitted to the second generation and have become unerasable. Refugees may age and pass on, but the youth will never forget.

In a mixed-method study employing both quantitative and qualitative analyses, Banat, Entrena-Durán, and Dayyeh (2018) examined the collective memory reproduction of the Nakba (the Catastrophe) among Palestinian refugee youth. The collective memory reproduction of the Nakba was evaluated using an index containing 27 items developed by the researchers, which was administered to 374 participants spread across various refugee camps in the West Bank. The findings show that Palestinian refugee youth preserve a strong collective memory of the Nakba. The statistics revealed that gender, parents' educational level, exposure to violence perpetrated by the Israelis, and grade point average (GPA) were significant predictors of collective memory reproduction of the Nakba. Traumatic experiences are not being erased, even as older refugees die, because the youth will never forget. As these refugees continue to be deprived of the right to return to the territory

where their ancestors had lived until they were violently expelled from the area, the collective memory reproduction of the Nakba only grows stronger.

A study by Barmil (2018) addressed the degree to which the Palestinian children's memories are associated with their homeland. The researcher used a qualitative approach to analyse the data gathered from a purposive sample, which consisted of 40 children who represent the fourth generation since the "Nakba". Interviews were used to measure national awareness in the camp children concerning a number of crucial issues associated with the subject of the research. By applying an analytical approach to review the children's answers, the researcher concluded that the camp children's memory reflected a clear awareness about their homeland. Moreover, the results of Barmil's (2018) study have served to refute all the Zionist allegations which attempted to influence the originality and genuineness of this memory, so that their specious claim that the Palestinian memory will fade as time passes by have failed. Indeed, the Palestinian conception of time is perplexing for them. Since they do not possess the beginning of time, how can they identify its end? As the poet Mahmoud Darwish described the Zionists, they are "those who pass between fleeting words".

Naïli (2018) reveals through her work with the Artasiyat in Kuwait how "hamula" ties are not valued only by refugees, but also by Palestinians exiled in other countries. This article seeks to analyze the question, "What role does the memory of the homeland play in refugees' lives in exile, and what are the main themes of this memory?" Drawing from the work of Rosemary Sayigh, Naïli engages with the concept of the "peasant past". Her research involves women from the Palestinian village Artas. These women were displaced after

the 1967 war and most of them migrated to a "working-class neighborhood" in Amman, Kuwait. The article makes the argument that peasant social relations help refugees survive in exile, by maintaining a collective identity and culture of resistance that works to create a social framework. Unlike other socio-locales of narratives of Palestine that stem from pre-1948 and focus on villages being demolished, Artas until relatively recently was still accessible to those native Palestinians who were displaced from there. This creates an interesting dynamic for study: to evaluate how Artas's accessibility changes the nature of the memories these women have of it, compared to narratives of former Palestine which pertain to socio-locales that have not been accessible to the memory holders since the Nakba. Although, unlike other refugees from 1948, the Artasiyat were able to visit Artas and witness its changes, this did not skew their perspective through any idealized imagery of their hope. The gardens and orchards of their home, as also the characteristics of Artas, were zealously aggrandized to encompass a "morally superior social order". The hyperbole found in the Artasiyats' memories is seen as an exaltation of essential values that these women see lacking in their host countries: "For the women of Artas (Artasiyat) in exile, the native village represents hope for a dignified life in the future, while their past way of life there provides them with a moral framework for the present". The Artasiyats' peasant backgrounds provide them with values to help cope with the uncertainties and difficulties of living in exile. They emphasize the "simplicity" of life in earlier times, despite now not having to work as hard in the fields and having "everything in their refrigerator". In Artas, they had more work but less worry. Solidarity is a central point in the Artasiyat collective memory. Artas was a "family of families" with ties that became even more important in exile. The values embraced by the Artasiyat when in Artas, including "solidarity,

simplicity, and contentment," are upheld even more strongly in exile to counter the challenges of their current region's socio-cultural landscape. Nostalgia in migrants (forced and voluntary) is layered and complex. It is often difficult to distinguish longing for the homeland with longing for "the good old days." However, for refugees and forced migrants, political contexts make any comprehension of collective memory even more difficult. Memory of the homeland becomes "consecrated as that of a paradise lost" when return seems improbable. This is exemplified by the collective memory of the Artas women, who since the Intifada in 2000 are for the first time cut off from their native village. The Artasiyat continue to replicate their former village society in their new areas of residence, upholding its values and collective memory.

Davis (2017) investigates how collective memory changes and how commemorations adapt over time to reflect the current collective memory and promote political goals, as the phenomenon pertains to Palestinian culture. In this piece, Davis analyzes events in Palestinian history through the politics of commemorative actions and the various spaces and actors that are involved. Metanarratives create a framework of understanding, but miss the embodied practices of commemoration that define Palestinian daily life within the struggle. Commemoration ties the past with present actions of activism, awareness, and education. The point is made that commemoration tends to "lionize" an event, and is known to be a "site or instrument of contention" due to discrepancies between official and unofficial representations of the past. Historical actions, such as commemorations, cannot be understood without historical representations (via language, culture, institutions, and more). Commemorative acts and spaces are observed, judged, and constructed with the goal of aligning them to faithfully represent the

collective memory. Collective memories are constructed by communities, and communities are in constant flux through time. Thus, commemorative acts, space, and even the object of commemoration change over time. Palestinian collective memory is deeply tied to imagery of the land. The Palestinian collective memory involves "images and descriptions of specific places and actual settings". Even if younger generations have never seen the land commemorated or been there, Palestinians remember specific dates, names, and places through collective narratives. Physical commemorative spaces are not common in Palestine due to lack of control over their land (until the post-Oslo construction of West Bank and Gaza). Palestinians focus on "memorial processions, meetings, and demonstrations". Palestinian commemoration (mainly of martyrs and their homes) should not be seen as a "fetishization of history", but rather be understood as an intrinsic part of identity construction. Palestinians work to connect their present with the past "not [to] be hostage to the past and sacrifice [the] present". The Nakba is the seminal event that Palestinians commemorate. However, commemoration of this did not commence until 1977, when the UN declared 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. For the first 30 years, the Nakba was a painful memory and the Palestinian leadership at the time urged people to think about liberation and resistance, and not about past losses. Therefore, it was not actually until 1998 that Palestinians began commemorating the Nakba. A March for Return was initiated, which involved participants traveling through a different destroyed Palestinian village each year, and more rallies and other events later followed. At the same time, the Nakba also meant an end to commemorations that occurred before 1948, like visits to Nabi Rubin on the Jaffa coast. A major point that

Davis attempts to make, thus, is that commemorative action is a way for Palestinians to control their own images, identities, and narratives.

Allan (2005) also worked with Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon to analyze the changes in the modes of Palestinian culture transmission in the wake of shifting socio-political circumstances and technology. In the article, Allan suggests that Palestinians (in Lebanon) rely on "fragmentary moments" from everyday life, more than oral performances and commemorative practices, for the purpose of memorializing 1948 and transmitting cultural heritage. This has a lot to do with new communication technologies that are altering historical discourse: "The processes of transmission [are] becoming less narrative-based, more visual and increasingly individuated". Palestinian historian Elias Sanbar catalogues how Palestinians view their own identity in a way of systemic disappearance since 1948. In other words, Palestinians cope with loss by recollecting and recreating their past as a way to counter the images of them being detached and diasporic. This recollection and recreation is predominantly preserved in refugee camps through the medium of oral history (mainly because the first generation of Palestinians that experienced the Nakba are illiterate). Oral practices through local narratives serve to memorialize the Nakba and help strengthen Palestine. They are so commonplace in everyday life that even younger generations who did not live through the Nakba feel a sense of shared experience and identification with these stories. Allan notes that exile is being overemphasized by scholarship and NGOs, and asks, "What is being affirmed, denied, or lost in the process?" Although NGOs provide much-needed immediate and short-term assistance, they do not help create a long-term solution to the refugee issue. NGOs, therefore, serve more or less to perpetuate the current situation by making it

barely "tolerable" from a physical perspective, potentially blunting any progress that might be made towards change. Memory and identity are very much alike, as they are not fixed but continuously adapt to the requirements of a community. The crucible of the 1948 exodus has not remained a constant memory, but has instead changed over time and influenced identity in different ways. During the years immediately following the Nakba, refugees in Lebanon objected to the term. They wanted, instead, to be referred to as "returnees," so as to not impart any aura of permanence to their situation. They were also apprehensive of using the expression "Nakba," and did not memorialize the event in ways that we see today. Politics, however, are very important for commemoration and the construction of national identity. Thus, it was not until the 1990s, with Yasser Arafat almost signing away the right to return of 1948 refugees in exchange for Palestinian statehood, that the Nakba emerged as a significant event calling for commemoration. The very purpose was to signal to the international community that this right was nonnegotiable. The goal of this research was to examine to what extent 1948 refugees are being respected as "legitimized agents of memory," and their narratives "being inscribed as public past and collective identity". It is argued that memories of the Nakba are lived conditions, not historical possessions. The process of transmission is a form of "poisonous knowledge" where the past continues to exist, but in the form of intractable suffering rather than some prized asset. It is no wonder then, that children are not too anxious to hear their grandparents' stories, because they are so painful for everyone. They would rather collectively remember the events during Eid or on other occasions to mourn those (and the land) that are not with them. Allan calls for a re-examination of the study of memory, because she finds it is not always a moral and therapeutic practice. She finds that the community is not always

actively engaged in the transmission of local, oral history that "restores Palestine." It is important to note that the physical and social spaces of the camp in Lebanon (Shateela) have gone through extraordinary local conflicts, including the Lebanon civil war and the "war of the camps." This has dramatically impacted the refugees' association with memories. Many memory anchors (i.e., photos, keys, etc.) that made it to Lebanon after 1948 were destroyed in later conflicts. As the gulf distancing 1948 from the present continues to widen, so does the difficulty increase for younger generations born outside the refugee camps to assimilate narratives about Palestine as part of their own identity and nationalism. This "imagined nostalgia" of inheriting the loss stemming from the Nakba creates feelings of "historical claustrophobia." When talking about the Nakba, memories are being rendered almost into myth in its transmission, which perhaps is not rubbing Palestinian youth the right way. They are being expected to pine for something they have never experienced. For example, in the NGO kids were told to draw pictures of Palestine, ignoring the fact that they have never set foot in the land, as if all Palestinians must have the same memory and perspective on their identity and how to resist. National identity, it seems, is much better organized through "imagined nostalgia" than through "the messiness of direct experience". New methods of commemoration are instilling new meaning into the Nakba. The Internet and TV were introduced to most camps around the time of the second Intifada. This created a sense of "transnational belonging" that is tied less to localities and kin than to the very nature of globalized communities. Internet provides a virtual space for young refugees to meet people and share their experiences across the diaspora. These narratives that are created and shared along vast swathes of imagined space are not dependent so much on the physical sores and eyewitness accounts of

the refugee youths' grandparents as on the tendency of representation practices to become increasingly visual and immediate in the internet age. Indeed, live coverage of the Intifada and the following events has been a powerful force in mobilizing solidarity among the Palestinian diaspora.

Partly contributing to the abysmal living conditions of the refugee camps, as Bshara (2014) explains, is the inordinately rapid transformation from "life in the Land" to an urban existence, with the attendant ineffectiveness and volatility of the socio-political institutions. The study focuses on the "urbanization" of refugee camps. Bshara argues that the Palestinian refugees, once mostly peasants, were pushed into an urbanized existence rather too soon. They did not go through the natural, evolutionary processes of urbanization from either an infrastructure or a sensibility standpoint. Palestinian refugee camps are deemed to be a spatial phenomenon, since the provisional shelters have "unmistakably developed into permanent living space". The boundaries between the "administrator" and "administered" have blurred, as UNRWA headquarters have, perhaps inevitably, become a part of the camps. Through use of the word makan ("place" in Arabic), Bshara emphasizes the factors of "power, status, and being" when talking about the spatial aspects of the refugee camp. He deems the construction of space a collective effort linked to remembrance (i.e., naming parts of the camp after villages lost), making the camps distinctive locations where national identities are made. He later goes on to dissect the "camp" itself as a "humanitarian" place when it is no longer a transient shelter and indeed is producing rather than consuming relief goods, as in the Palestinian context. In conclusion, Bshara notes that Palestinian refugee camps challenge the common assumptions about refugee camps in general. He states that divesting the

refugees of their original way of life fuels remembrance of those ways, thus propagating the refugee/non-refugee dichotomy. Before UNRWA's food ration program ended in 1982, it was used as a governing tool and significantly regulated construction practices. Bshara explains that this process of asymmetrical power reveals the transformation of live bodies into "humanitarian subjects" by NGOs. New political and economic positions after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 changed the dynamics of the camps. With the transfer of administrative power from NGOs to the PA, welfare governance fell through the cracks. Refugees were left to their own devices in coping with everyday struggles, impelling them to "take matters into their own hands and try to inflect social change by means of education, mobilization and sometimes by spatial practices". Bshara notes a third time period of spatial change as post-Arafat (2004), characterized by the West Bank/Gaza split. This was a period of massive market opening of the West Bank, as well as structural adjustment.

Additionally, Schiocchet (2014) uses the case studies of two Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, al Jalil (Muslim) and Dbaye (Christian), to examine the intricate dynamics of trust and suspicion in shaping the lives of refugees. The study suggests that although religion seems to be the significant difference between the two camps, religion influenced the different patterns of trust only indirectly, and the primary drivers of the seeming differences between them are more complex. The situation of being a refugee creates an experience of suspicion that is twofold: First, "hyperinformation," which is represented by the novel experiences stemming from being uprooted, rapid change, and constantly being devoid of redundancy; the other condition ironically is "hyperredundancy," meaning the forced experience of making

sense of their situation as a group and being treated as all the same. For instance, "To be a refugee is to be deprived not only of home and country, but also of individuality and all attributes of personal identity". Refugees are treated by the bureaucracy as a single constituency. They are regarded as systemically the same, thereby creating in refugees a sense of hyperredundancy and sentiments of being unimportant or dispensable. There is the suggestion that the condition of being a refugee emphasizes trust to a higher degree than is the case in other social situations. Engaging in suspicion is true not only for outsiders (i.e., anthropologists, social workers) but also toward Lebanese and Palestinians. "Economies of trust" in both camps were seen to be intrinsically moral and political; they were strategic and cemented by "honor." Honor implied a lack of suspicion and was the principal means of instilling trust. These are embodied practices and are subject to power dynamics: "boundary-maintenance disciplinary practices". In general, the main wellsprings of trust seem to be ties of family, religion, ethnicity, and politics, with individual variability amongst the prioritizing. However, there existed a general inclination to lean more on family, village, and "hamula" ties. Discrepancies amongst camps also existed, wherein affinity for nationhood was seen oftener in al Jalil than in Dbaye. In both camps, though, refugee status and the political volatility in Lebanon fostered mutual suspicions. The suspicion is potentially associated with a warped sense of identity. The refugees were not welcomed with open arms by the host nation; they were stripped of their parental land and community, denied their own individual identities, and treated as one, indistinguishable mass. It is no wonder then, that "The experience of uprooting makes refugeeness a strongly defining element of the refugees' own selves, even when not overtly expressed". Ambiguity about the refugees' own individuality enables them to

identify with their refugeeness, while simultaneously compelling them to strive to carve out their own niche in the world.

Rijke and Van Teeffelen (2014) investigate an important element of Palestinian identity with the term Sumud ("steadfastness"), and chart how the evolution of its connotations has coincided with the changes in the dominant forms of resistance of the Palestinians against Israel. Sumud is a national Palestinian concept, meaning to have a strong resolve to stay in the land. By interviewing several Palestinians throughout the West Bank, Rijke and Van Teeffelen (2014) find that today sumud has grown to become more "plural, 'democratic,' and closer to people's experiences in daily life". Sumud and the collective endeavor of clinging to the land dates back to the British Mandate era, but has been really utilized as a national concept only since 1960. This concept is part of the revival of a Palestinian national consciousness, as the Palestinian Liberation Organization cadres took over the leadership of the refugee camps. Refugees were known as samidin ("those who are steadfast"), considering that the everyday struggle for sustenance while retaining their human rights demanded a level of sumud. Martyrs and prisoners are immortalized as symbols of the resistance. Following the setbacks in Lebanon and Jordan from the 1967 war, focus shifted to Palestinians in the occupied territories. Sumud discourse became closely associated with Palestinians living on the "inside". A movement of resilience emerged, characterized by relentless strikes and demonstrations, and sumud started to take on new meanings. "Inside sumud" expanded to include strategic development and non-violent resistance of the colonial occupation, thus moving beyond its original symbolism to acquire more political and democratic connotations. Sumul grew further in the late 1970s and 1980s to absorb a sense of self-

sufficiency. Grassroots movements sprouted in various forms, manifesting in agriculture, women, and health committees. "Inside Palestinians" were working hard to resist any dependency on the Israeli economy and its collective economic punishment of the occupation. This strategy reached its zenith during the First Intifada, flaring up as "active noncooperation with the occupier". Rather than direct militant confrontation becoming the prototypical example of sumud, everyday acts of resilience began to characterize sumud. Examples of this newly defined sumud include a peasant who replants her olive tree after Israelis destroyed it, a family rallying to rebuild their house each time it is demolished, and a community still hanging on despite being encroached upon by the remorseless settlers. With the focus on the Oslo peace talks in the 1990s, sumud transformed again as audiences became less concerned with on-the-ground realities. After the Second Intifada and especially after construction of the wall in 2004, sumud has regained traction as a national symbol. The symbol of sumud has received quite a bit of scrutiny. Over the last 15 years politicians have utilized it as a means to "strengthen institutions" and promote a neoliberal economic agenda. To many, this corruption of sumud means opening up Palestine to a global market which would only weaken the struggle against colonial occupation, widen economic disparity, and hinder the general wellbeing of the population. Rather, what sumud truly means is to live life in Palestine as if it were still unoccupied, resiliently and to the fullest, in the face of colonial repression. This research finds that the academic debate over whether or not sumud can be considered "active resistance" does not hold water in the daily lives of Palestinians. To Palestinians, sumud is either/both demonstrating every day or just simply living a happy life in the occupation: "Sumud has thus developed from a nationalist symbol emphasizing the shared goals and values

of Palestinians to a way of life lived by individuals and communities". Something as simple as keeping traditional dabke dancing alive or even smiling your way through a checkpoint shows great agency. Sumud represents an inclusive notion of resistance. The researchers also find that sumud is employed in preserving and building communal relationships, while keeping the community always vibrant and healthy. Storytelling is one way of keeping the community alive and reclaiming lives. The interviews also revealed that joy—enjoying life—is an intrinsic part of sumud.

Furthermore, Mass (2013) concluded that Palestinian refugees and their descendants still preserve the national Palestinian identity due to the remembrance of Al-Nakba and the conflict which followed, as also the creation of a Palestinian diaspora through constant reaffirmation of living in exile and the dream of someday returning to the homeland as well as crystallization and reproduction of a collective memory which fosters this shared identity that continues to bind Palestinians.

Azoulay (2013) in her work highlights the fundamental distinctions between the history of the Jews and Israel and that of the Palestinians, through reorganization of historical archives. The author emphasizes that her work is not merely a description of a "state of knowledge," but is more an assertion of "civil distress". The Nakba and the ensuing occupation of Palestine are seen as a "regime-made disaster" that, ironically, forever linked the fate and history of Israeli Jews and Palestinians. The "disaster" is felt by the Palestinians through their expulsion, dispossession, and destruction (the "visible victim"), whereas the "disaster" for Israelis is their conscious act of trying to perpetually keep these "visible victims" out of the visual field.

Azoulay introduces the concept of constituent violence and the need for lawpreserving violence in order for it to persist. She proposes that even without Israelis carrying out military violence, their mere citizenship, something denied to Palestinians, promotes constituent violence. Regime violence is then sustained through the pitting of two distinct national entities against each other, rather than recognizing the sharing of land. For example, any solution advanced for resolution of this conflict invariably assumes a state of Israel distinct and separate from that of the Palestinians, rather than mooting cohesion between the two entities. Consequently, Palestinians are branded with labels that serve only to further differentiate them from their Israeli counterparts, such as outsider, refugee, occupied, or terrorist. Likewise, the perpetuation of expulsion (which refugees incarnate) can be viewed as a choice to reiterate and preserve the constituent violence-to keep the "visible victims" unseen. The goal of her archival work is to bring history back to point zero, so one can travel through it and "see the unseen." The writing of history requires serious consideration of the question of how to rehabilitate a space that is so over-determined by regime and constituent violence; how to reveal to universal gaze the narratives that have been overshadowed by naked power and obfuscated.

Furthermore, Daoudi, Dajani, and Barakat (2013) investigate how narratives are often manipulative, by their very nature; this is partly due to social conditioning, as it pertains to the dichotomous narratives of Palestine and Israel. Daoudi et al.'s (2013) article analyzes historical junctions that have left their imprint on collective memory in a way that has created a litany of dichotomous, demonizing narratives between Israelis and Palestinians. The author here looks at the main points of departure of the grand narratives

surrounding 1948, including narratives of the "Arab Invading Armies," a "Palestinian Exodus," and conflicting stories about Jerusalem. The article reflects the assumption that mutual understanding of the "other's" narrative will help "humanize the face of the enemy," thus facilitating peace. The word "narrative" derives from a root word that means both "to tell" and "to know." Inherently, narratives presuppose the presence of a narrator, and as such can be divided into six categories: (1) individual versus collective, (2) national narratives (how we see ourselves) versus reflexive (how we see others), (3) soft narratives (historical) versus hard (religious and political), (4) mythical narratives versus factual, (5) static narratives (peace) versus dynamic (conflict), and (6) legitimate narratives versus illegitimate. In a conflict, narratives are often fabricated to endorse a particular outcome or support some political interest. Mary Chamberlain, in her book Narratives of Exile and Return, notes that no matter how personal memories may seem, what we recall is not random but is shaped by the culture we are exposed to and our resultant social conceptions about the world. Exposure to a certain narrative permeates through generations, shaping people's values, thoughts, ideas, and actions. Terminology also plays a critical role in the fashioning of narratives, particularly the "other." The Palestinian narrative of course is that the Jewish settlers intruded and occupied their land, leaving the latter dispossessed and reduced to refugee status in foreign countries. The Israeli narrative on the other hand lays claim to a liberation of what they say is their land, thus opening for them the path to national revival. Furthermore, it states that the Jews encountered a hostile reception from the native Arabs upon returning to the land of their forefathers, leading to Arab aggression and their defeat, and many Palestinians' consequential refugee status. Clearly, the two narratives contradict one another, but the problem is that they are accepted by entire

populations as the solemn and incontrovertible truth. Narratives are designed to bolster certain positions; once endorsed by a critical mass of people, they inevitably become national narratives. In other words, fiction is transmuted into reality.

Landy (2013) also explores the subjective nature of collective memory, as well as its formation for Palestinians, and how collected memory can in fact paint a fuller picture. Through analyzing three pieces of literature-Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced, Palestinian Women: Narrative Histories and Gendered Memories, and What it Means to be Palestinian: Stories of Palestinian Peoplehood-Landy's goal in this paper is to answer the question "how do Palestinians narrate their memory and history so that they are more than voiceless victims of their own experiences?" While all three volumes operate at different levels and are intended for different audiences, "the central problematique for all three books is the relationship of memory and history for present-day Palestinian understandings of the collective self". Landy's aim is to highlight the stories of Palestinian women, whose voices, experiences, and perspectives are often marginalized in the collective enterprise of memory keeping. History and memory do not besiege each other; memory is constructed and is contingent upon present-day concerns. These three books focus on the socially located process of memory. For example, following the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, mountains of PLO archives were seized and destroyed by the IDF. The PLO was also exiled to Tunisia, moving even farther away from the Palestinian people, thus making it harder for Palestinians to rely on central institutional resources for creating a collective history. Inevitably, Palestinians turned to local and personal resources, initiating a "memory boom" in the late 1980s

and 1990s that led to creation of "village books." There was a gap in the narrative that needed to be filled. Moreover, there has been strong institutional opposition to Palestinian narration as being "emotional, manipulative and ahistorical". In the end, Landy notes that collected memory is superior to collective memory, because "writers need to allow for a multiplicity of voices from the past to be heard, voices which cannot be dominated by any single discourse of the present". The three books analyzed achieve this role, as they do not advocate a unitary collective memory. Rather, they use a spectrum of oral history to enable a complex, historiographical understanding of the Palestinian experience.

Farah (2013) also delves deep into the Palestinian struggle and history, using a more objective lens. Through field research on Palestinian refugees in Jordan, this article traces the political and ideological metamorphosis of the Palestinian liberation movements, as also the sentiments of refugees since the Nakba. Farah focuses on the refugee camps, and finds that the right of return is at the core of the Palestinian question. Refugee marginalization, especially because of the Oslo Accords and the Arab Spring, is inimical to the Palestinians' struggle for the right of return, and thus to the Palestinian national cause in general. A brief account of events and ideologies leading up to the Nakba is provided in the article, wherein Western imperialism cannot be separated from Zionism. Since the Nakba, Israel has consistently denied Palestinians the right to return, viewing as it does any concession related to the rights of refugees as directly threatening the Jewish character of their state. In the years immediately following the Nakba, the right of return for refugees was not seen as a separate item in a larger national agenda, but indeed constituted the very essence of the national struggle. There was a sense of

"collective calamity", when entire communities were expelled suddenly, simultaneously, and brutally. These first generation Palestinian refugees shared memories and stories that created a romanticized and idealized image of their former homeland, further reinforcing their desire for a right to return. The February through March 1968 al-Karameh battle erupted between PRM and Jordanian forces on one side, and the Israelis on the other. This was a huge mobilizing moment, as thousands of refugees flocked to join the ranks of the PRM. Refugee camps thus became recruitment pools for the armed struggle, and symbolic for the revolution and the nation at large: "the peasantrefugee represented the freedom fighter or the Fedayee". Black September 1970/1971-armed clashes between PRM and Jordan occurred and were followed by martial law. This caused PRM to relocate and go underground in Lebanon, where support for the rebels grew astronomically. Sweeping political and ideological changes contributed to emphasize a specifically Palestinian identity vis-a-vis an Arab one. The Palestinian struggle to gain independence also came only secondarily from an Arab nationalist view. The 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords was seen as a betrayal of the refugees' cause, as they've always held return, nation, and sovereignty as inseparable and non-negotiable concepts. As a result of this so-called "peace" agreement, the Palestinian liberation movement was diluted into an ambiguous Palestinian Authority (PA) that is neither a state nor sovereign. Both "governments" in Gaza and the West Bank are at the mercy of the Israeli occupiers. A fundamental problem with the Oslo Accords is that they assume the 1967 war to be the beginning of the conflict, rather than the forced expulsion beginning in 1948, thus contriving to eliminate the refugees and their demanded rights from the negotiation table. Also, internal dissensions developed amongst the Palestinians, between the "1948-refugees" and the

"1967-displaced," further exacerbating the societal schisms already festering thanks to the Israeli occupation. Beginning in the early 1990s and through the Arab uprisings, political Islam gained traction among refugees. This was primarily due to the free or affordable support they were receiving from groups like the Muslim Brotherhood or the Islamic Front. These groups slowly replaced the past heroes like Nasser, Guevara, and Arafat. The sense of a shared predicament and collective practices amongst Palestinians alone began to fade as the new millennium ushered in a combination of Islamization and globalization among the younger generations.

Today, Palestinians commemorate the Nakba, but Manna' (2013) shows that even the collective understanding of what the Nakba represents has been enlarged over time to include more than just the catastrophe of 1948. This article delineates the different dimensions of the Nakba, focusing on the collective aspect. The Nakba's meaning has changed and in some respects it has intensified over time, stemming from the Palestinian tragedy of exile, statelessness, and injustice. The Nakba is not a one-time event related to the war on Palestine, but an accumulation of events and experiences from 1948 leading up to the present day. Recent events (like the failed Oslo peace process, the Second Intifada, etc.) have only added new layers to the influence the Nakba has exerted as a collective experience. The author notes the deep schism between pre-1948 and post-Nakba periods in Palestinian history, and outlines the "Nakba experience" over six decades. Early interpretations of the Nakba and its causes, including Constantine Zurayk's work The Meaning of the Catastrophe helped conceptualize the Arab defeat as early as August 1948. His goal was to help fellow Arabs grasp fully the implications of the Nakba and to mitigate any of its long-term repercussions. Additionally, Musa

al-'Alami's book Ibrat Filastin focuses on all that went wrong and the reasons for the defeat in the war for Palestine. He cites the British and their politics as bearing the major share of the blame, but also points to internal unpreparedness among Palestinians. He presents the failure, advises selfcriticism, and provides a prescription for recovery. Both authors have worked primarily to understand the causes of the Nakba, placing Palestinians and their exile second. They had a pan-Arab lens rather than a localized Palestinian focus. For them the history of Palestine and Zionism leading up to the Nakba is critical to understanding the origins of the Palestinian tragedy. Refugees and the destruction of homes are heavily publicized dimensions of the Nakba, but other aspects such as internal fragmentation of society are rarely touched upon in the literature. The Nakba had a multifaceted, devastating effect on Palestine, including most importantly the loss of the homeland, dissolution of a unified Palestinian society, and the immediate and long-term subjugation of Palestinian communities. Palestinians faced harsh socio-political realities after the 1948 Nakba. The Palestinian experience with their Arab neighbors was also not pleasant, despite verbal support from leaders for their cause. There was little integration of Palestinians into city life or the workforce in the Arab countries where they settled, besides the intense competition for aid and resources. The host states were "liberated" of any responsibility by the existence of NGOs who helped to keep the Palestinians alive in refugee camps. Within the camps, refugees found some solidarity with one another: "The loss of the homeland and the feeling of injustice, betraval and victimization provided a feeling of commonality". Nonetheless, experiences did vary depending upon socio-economic background. The Palestinians in foreign refugee camps were mainly peasants who had depended on the land for survival. Consequently, the Nakba largely and effectively dismantled

Palestinian society: "The Palestinian people lost its unity and became homeless in a modern world based on the nation state system". Although refugee camps in some Arab countries facilitated Palestinians rebuilding their communities and also eased their transition, refugees in many other camps lost their primary source of livelihood, the land, and faced extreme humiliation as a result of the exile. New meanings of the Nakba took birth after June 1967, when events occurred that precipitously reshaped the Palestinian experience of exile. The growth of resistance movements and the PLO providing new and several targets for Israeli aggression, coupled with civil wars in Jordan and Lebanon, ultimately led to more destitution in the Palestinian refugee camps. Following the June War and the end of Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Palestinian society again changed. Some refugees were able to return to their homes and the Palestinian Authority began to accept the reality of self-governance. The underlying message of the article is that the Nakba was not a single event that plagued Palestinians for a specific moment in time, but that it is an ongoing affliction. Even more than 60 years after the creation of Israel on the ruins of Palestine, the catastrophe still exudes debilitating consequences that aggravate with time.

Nets-Zehngut (2012) elucidates how collective memory is formed from other forms of memory, and how its typically biased nature works both to serve and ultimately shackle the people it represents. This article discusses the collective memory of Israelis, specifically the gap in relation to Israeli-Jewish collective memory of the 1948 exodus. The article first establishes vital background information and terminology. Specifically, collective memory is defined as "a general category that includes various kinds of memories such as popular, official, autobiographical, cultural, and historical (that is produced

by scholars)". Wolf Kansteiner defines collective memory as representations of the past that are collectively adopted. Popular memory is defined as "representations of the past held by the society's members, best manifested directly by public opinion surveys." This type of memory is quite important, as it greatly affects behavior. Official memory is stated to be "the representations of the past adopted by the institutions of the state." Such memory is transmitted through state-certified textbooks, national museums, and other national publications. Autobiographical memory is a form of memory that is manifested typically in memoirs and oral histories, and by people who have directly experienced the events. Historical memory is the view of history manifested through the research community. Cultural memory is the way society views events from the past, being generally manifested through newspapers, films, monuments, and buildings. Cultural memory influences popular memory. Collective memory is not necessarily factual, as it "typically does not provide an objective history of the conflict, but largely expresses it in a manner that is functional to society's interests". Societal beliefs about a narrative associated with conflict typically incorporate four themes: justification of its outbreak, delegitimization of the enemy, positive imagery of the "in-group," and presentation of the "in-group" as the victim. Collective memory serves an important socio-psychological function in the climax of the conflict, but tends to hinder positive transformations toward peace between parties in the wake of the conflict. It is necessary to legitimize and humanize the rival too in collective narratives, for lasting peace to arrive. The passage of time promotes the necessary transformation of collective memories, hopefully so that change may occur.

A study by Msaeed (2011) explored a number of issues in order to identify the attitudes and awareness level of children with regard to the original place of inhabitance of their displaced families and the lifestyle that prevailed in that place. The study also discusses the sources through which they were introduced to this place of origin, in addition to their feelings regarding life in the camp and their beliefs about their prospect of going back to that original place. It also addresses their knowledge and awareness of the UN resolution 194. Furthermore, it aims to explore the extent of the children's knowledge from outside the camp of the original name of the place where their families were displaced. The purpose is to revive memories in the minds of the children and intensify their passion for possible return. It also seeks to identify the impact of a number of social and economic variables on the knowledge of the original place, interest, longing, and the belief in the prospect of returning to it. This study used a qualitative approach to collect data by means of face to face interviews which are divided into two sections: open and close-ended questions. The first section gathered some demographic and social background knowledge about the child and their family. The second section, on the other hand, consisted of 13 open-ended questions measuring the attitudes and knowledge of children living in Bethlehem governorate camps, regarding the original place of habitation of their displaced families as also the prospect of returning to it. The study was carried out on a nonrandom sample of 50 (male and female) children within the age group of 14 - 20years, who live in the "Aida refugee camp, and the Bethlehem city". The study results showed that all studied children (100%) knew the names of the villages and cities from where their families were displaced in 1948; there are no differences in the level of knowledge regarding the name of the original place between the children who live in the camp and those who live outside.

From among the sample examined, 72% have knowledge about the original place where the displaced families came from. As many as 86% know (a lot or little) about the reality of their families' life and its past history when they were in the villages and cities from where they were displaced. The study shows that 86% of the children are interested in returning to the original place of residence of their ancestors. However, the study also shows that a far lesser percentage, 48%, of the sample actually believe that there is a possibility of returning to the original villages and cities, compared with 34% who have actually lost faith in a denouement of this sort. The proportion of children who are not sure of the possibility of return is 18%. About 60% of the children have heard about the UN 194 resolution. Some 52% of children in the researched sample stressed that the right of return means return to the original place, without any reference to other details. The study results indicate that there was no impact of the families' economic level regarding interest and nostalgia for return. However, there certainly was an impact of gender and place of residence regarding the knowledge of the original place and the belief in the prospect of return. It is worth mentioning that only the independent variables gender and place of residence had a significant impact on knowledge of the original place and the belief in the prospect of return, whereas the remaining independent variables did not have any statistical significance.

Refugee camps play an important role in the formation and upholding of Palestinian collective memory, but Nets-Zehngut (2011) explains the psychological and political biases inherent in collective memory and also evaluates the objectivity of its component forms. Collective memory of a conflict affects the psychology and behavior of each party involved.

Collective memory consists of both autobiographical and indirect-collective memory. Through the analysis of four oral history projects by 1948 Palestinian refugees, Nets-Zehngut seeks out the characteristics of Palestinian autobiographical history and how they influence collective memory. These oral histories are compared to Israeli historical sources. Ultimately, the article finds that autobiographical accounts do not focus on the cause of the 1948 exodus and correlate rather well with Israeli documentation. Official, historical/academic, and indirect-collective Palestinian memories, however, focus almost exclusively on the causes of the exodus. Collective memory is typically skewed and biased, often negatively affecting how opposing sides react to one another. Similarly, indirect-collective memory is learned second hand rather than from first hand experiences, and consists of documents and oral accounts as primary sources. The authenticity of this form of memory may be called into question, as oral history is often regarded as distorted and untrustworthy. Both Israelis (Israeli-Jews) and Palestinians have a collective memory about their conflict, with the 1948 exodus remaining at center stage. The main debate revolving around this conflict is, were the refugees forcibly driven out or did they leave willingly? Israeli memory of the conflict is based almost entirely on historical documents, whereas Palestinian memory is derived mainly from oral accounts. The purpose of this research is to analyze autobiographical memory and the extent to which it is antagonistic towards the rival, and to answer whether oral history can safely be used in research.

While much of the literature on Palestinian identity uses data from Palestinians living in exile, Sorek (2011) adopts individual surveys carried out among Palestinians living within Israel to find that those who refer to a combination of events conveying both Palestinian heroism and victimization

identify most strongly with being Palestinian. While Sorek notes that the literature of the collective memory and national identity typically focuses on "the role of memories of events conveying Palestinian victimization and heroic victories," the article emphasizes the need to strike a balance between these two types of memory in order to formulate a stable national identity. An "individual-centered" quantitative analysis is employed to arrive at the conclusion that recalling both victory and victimization yields more national identification than either one alone.

Meanwhile, Rowe (2011) through her analytical history of the dabke dance demonstrates that the creation of shared traditions is effective for transmitting and strengthening national culture and identity. The aim of Rowe's research is to analyze how in Palestine and Israel the dabke folk dance has been socially engineered to improve allegiance towards Zionism, pan-Arabism, or Palestinian nationalism. She uses literature and historical narratives from the West Bank, Israel, and Lebanon to draw a line between dance and politics "and the multiple ways in which collective identities can be constructed and deconstructed". Questions are subsequently raised about the cultural autonomy of Palestine as a result of this appropriation. The three histories that historically (and politically) associate themselves with the dabke folk dance present a "post-nationalist critique" of dance in Israel/Palestine, revealing how dance can (re)define collective identity. The "invention" of shared traditions has a prominent role in homogenizing a community. This act, however, is highly selective and can be influenced by the ideological agendas of the political elite who enact the appropriation. Particularly for populations that have experienced trauma (i.e., war, exile, and colonization) it can be important to ensure the permanence of heritage to "demonstrate that the past

is not lost, but rather continues on into the future". In Palestine, when it came to rehabilitating cultural heritage, a "salvage paradigm", was introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century by an anthropological folklorist. The folklorist intervened out of concern that the Palestinian culture was on the verge of disappearing. This ushered in "spectacular" and highly politicized suppositions about the origin of local dance. Further, the politics of authenticity is complicated by the appropriation of Arab heritage by Israelis. Israelis claim Palestinian food and music as their own, yet this only serves to divide rather than becoming a bridge between the two cultures. Rowe's article shows how the appropriation of dabke by the three histories analyzed is used to either collectivize or divide the people in Palestine. Considering that the Jews who escaped persecution in Europe had come to occupy Palestine, it can be argued that they felt the need to reconstruct a vibrant, non-European cultural identity through Zionism. A "specifically Israeli" dance was needed to counter the existing European culture among Jews. This process can be seen as a rejection of the oppressive European culture as much as a justification for their occidental existence. Due to Israel's historically relatively recent, controversial, and abrupt creation, the settlers felt the need to socially construct a national culture quickly. This was necessary to provide a foundation for the nation to justify and normalize its existence: "This evoked a need for a collective identity that would appear dynamic and new, yet linked to an ancient culture of Jews in the southeastern Mediterranean". Jewish settlers in the 1930s and 1940s would envision the dabke they saw the "Arab shepherds" perform as a "legacy of an ancient Jewish civilization." Early Israeli choreographer Rivka Sturman worked diligently to socially construct the appropriation of dabke. Through observing Arab dances, he incorporated what he saw into performances for Zionist settlers. Zionist

wedding dances began to incorporate these indigenous movements, backed by claims that they were "a reflection of Jewish tradition". By the late 1930s Zionists were holding competitions to find the best choreographed "traditional Israeli dance." Over the years, there was a "collective forgetting" of the appropriated origins of dabke in Israel. This can be interpreted as a sign of the international community's acceptance of Israel's authentically ancient origins. Simultaneously, the violent suppression of the fact of the existence of an indigenous population must have created the impression that there was seemingly no culture to appropriate. The appropriation of Palestinian culture and subordination of its people worked to justify the existence of Israel. Palestinian collective identity (in the West Bank) became fragmented after the Nakba and the new "borders" that ensued. Being now ruled by Jordan, the Jordanian public affairs attempted to combat the erasure of the existence of Palestine by assimilating their collective identity into a Jordanian one. The notion of pan-Arabism permeated into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness to confront the strength of Israel throughout the 1950s, so that dabke gained a distinctly Arab identity. Pan-Arabism was felt throughout the region as a general anti-colonial movement. Although not specifically designed for Palestinians against Israel, this broader collective identity did give home to Palestinians exiled from what became Israel. The socio-political landscape for the people of the West Bank changed dramatically during the years of occupation (following their crushing defeat in the 1967 war), essentially ending pan-Arabism. The Palestinian liberation movement and the resulting PLO replaced pan-Arabism as the leading source of collective identity. This led to a third form of "salvaging" and appropriating the ancient dabke folkdance. Community organizations began teaching dabke to mixedgender classes of youth in refugee camps and in occupied territories, to help

sustain a connect with the past among Palestinian youth. Dabke was infused with a new symbolism of resistance to oppression and dispossession. Dabke is remembered by older community members as being a distinctly rural, "lower-class" practice and was never part of elite celebrations. Due to extreme censorship in the West Bank, Palestinians were unable to use written and sometimes even spoken transmission of their cultural history and trauma. New and creative ways had to be developed to express themselves and share stories between generations. By means of an analysis of the timeline of the evolution of dabke appropriation and its journey through three separate (but linked) histories, it is found that the performance of dabke has been heavily influenced by hegemonic political ideals rooted in ethnic nationalism.

Although the refugee camps have been largely ineffective in politically organizing themselves, Ramadan (2010) shows that the camps have become second homes to many Palestinians, and that refugee camp destruction is very devastating and threatening to Palestinian identity. The destruction of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon in 2007 affected the lives of 35,000 Palestinians. This article traces the physical and psychological importance of this camp through first-hand accounts and oral stories from its residents. The loss of this camp and the resultant displacement of its Palestinian residents is seen as a repetition of the Nakba. The author's argument is that refugee camps are not merely nondescript places resembling purgatory, where Palestinians simply linger waiting to return, but over time these places become meaningful and significant in their lives. This becomes most apparent while looking through the prism of loss. The destruction of Nahr al-Barid is a continuation of Lebanese camp destruction, following a string of such clashes between 1975 and 1990. This article seeks to find what else was destroyed besides

buildings and property, and what meaning is placed on the camps of refugees in exile in Lebanon. Ramadan does so by comparing the ruined Nahr al-Barid camp with the still "thriving" Rashidiyya camp in the south of Lebanon. A refugee camp is defined as "a temporary humanitarian space, usually set up by international humanitarian agencies and designed to meet the basic human needs of displaced people, including shelter, protection, and short-term relief". For over 60 years, Palestinian camps have been transformed into permanent structures that carry salient memories of births, deaths, and other experiences that give them spatial meaning. A place of refuge, in the midst of exiled dysphoria, is established through informal networks of social support among its inhabitants. The social relations and geographies of Palestine (those in Lebanon mainly coming from the North) that were shattered by the Nakba were reconstructed, although imperfectly, in the physical landscape of the camps. The camp is drenched in symbolic meanings, with slogans, posters, keys, flags, and kuffiyehs festooning every street corner: "Palestine was recreated in exile". The importance of maintaining the language of "camp" and "refugee" is central to the Palestinians' experience in Lebanon and their adamancy of returning home. However, in "waiting", Palestinians have created a space of meaningful ties and relations. It is often deemed as a "second homeland," rendering the term "home" as variable for displaced people. The hardships of living in the camps have often dominated the refugee narrative, despite its sense of "home." However, when looking through the lens of remembrance and of loss, like in the case of the Nahr al-Barid camp, refugees tended to describe their living situation as positive and, in any case, much better than their current situation of displacement. It is suggested that: "the destruction of Nahr al-Barid has laid bare the importance of the camp as a refuge for Palestinian existence in Lebanon". The hardships of living in

exile are thus much easier to deal with inside the camp than outside. Members of the Rashidiyya camp overwhelmingly expressed the position that they did not see a life outside the camp, stating the expense, lack of social services, and their need to stay within a Palestinian community. The importance of staying in the camp is precisely to keep Palestine and the right to return alive. The repeated destruction of camps in Lebanon, including the most recent one where Nahr al-Barid was decimated, is seen as a continuation of the Nakba. The current generation has witnessed its own version of the Nakba that was experienced by their parents and/or grandparents. For those that lived through the Nakba, the loss of Nahr al-Barid was stated as being probably even more devastating, since they had to work extremely hard to build what they had there. Efforts were made to return to the camp, not so as to not forget Palestine, but to return and remain in a camp as a necessary step in returning to Palestine; that is, so as not to dissolve into a foreign society.

The findings of Fincham's (2010) study show that Palestinian youth in Lebanon construct their identities through nationalist discourses of shared history, kinship, culture, and religion. The study by Masalha (2009) found that the year of the Nakba is a key date in the history of the Palestinian people; memory accounts of the traumatic events of 1948 are central to Palestinian history and the Palestinian society of today; and the Nakba remains at the heart of Palestinian national identity. Besides, Saloul (2009) concluded that as the Palestinians continue to be denied the right to return to their homes in Palestine, the relevance of narratives of Al-Nakba continues to increase, since memories of Al-Nakba reinforce the centrality of the land in Palestinian discourses of identity.

However, the Palestinian refugee crisis is still very much alive, and as demonstrated by Farah (2009) this is partly due to the ineffectiveness and internal-schisms of the PLO, compared to its much more proactive and organized Moroccan counterpart, the Polisario. Farah's (2009) article compares the construction of the national liberation movements of the Palestinians and the Sahrawi refugees of Western Sahara, drawing on ethnographic field research. Farah analyzes and compares how the refugee camps of each group are "incubators of political organization and repositories of collective memory". Farah finds that Palestinian refugee camps are "mapped" to mimic the past, a project of forming a national consciousness, whereas the Sahrawi refugees focus on the future through institution building. The article examines how refugee camps reflect the nature and political agenda of the institutions that represent them: "camps as venues refracting the structural dynamics, political contexts, and nationalist ideologies and praxis of the...Rio de Oro (Polisario)". Farah notes that these contexts have enabled the Polisario to transform refugee camps into "incubators" of social and political institutions in ways that the PLO was unable to. Palestinian and Sahrawi refugees can be legitimately compared due to the extreme similarity of their situation. Both parties are in exile and engaged in a struggle for independence from occupying forces. Both political factions of their respective displaced populations evolved through the 1960s and 1970s, with the principal bases being refugee camps. The PLO and Polisario are both Arab national liberation movements that have failed to realize any form of selfdetermination. Farah highlights how the Polisario actually drew much inspiration from the PLO. Major differences exist, however, in demographic scale and distribution of refugees; whereas the diaspora Palestinians are at the mercy of host communities or the targets of Israeli aggression, Sahrawi

refugees maintain a considerable amount of collective mobilization (being far from Algerian populations). The PLO movement has also invited a preemptive containment policy from neighboring and host Arab states, while the Polisario enjoy unwavering support from Algeria. The PLO was and continues to be badly fragmented, compared to the largely united Polisario. The attitude of the international community towards the aggressors (Israel and Morocco, respectively) is also relevant to understanding these differences, as it greatly impacts the peace processes. The "mapping" of refugee camps by both parties reflects a lot about each movement's concept of a national narrative. Sahrawis do not see themselves as "refugees," but rather as a nation in exile. They have thus organized their society to be futureoriented in a way that nurtures and promotes polity: "Sahrawi collective memory was reproduced as a reservoir of shared consciousness about the wider contexts of the collective struggle and as a spur for change". Palestinian leadership has not successfully harnessed the past in a way that would build a better future for them. Palestinian refugees have been forced into a defensive position as they constantly fight the erasure of their identity, land, and existence. Refugee camps are symbols of fighting for freedom. The PLO emerged 20 years after the Nakba, meaning the organization and mapping of Palestinian refugee camps were left largely to international organizations like the UNRWA. Thus, camps were put together in a way that best suited the distribution of aid rather than to facilitate political spaces. This set the stage for disorganized political mobilization. The Polisario began as a movement against the Spanish colonialist occupation, becoming an organized unit before the Sahrawi "exile." The PLO, by contrast, began 20 years after the exile of Palestinians and stemmed from an already disorganized political scene caused by the leadership of UNRWA. Within three years (1973-1976) of its

establishment, the Polisario conferred at a national convention, drafted a constitution, and embarked on the building of state and civil institutions. The "camp" was administered as provinces with popular committees to oversee education, health, and food distribution. Maintaining a discourse of "progress," the Polisario discouraged tribal factions and enforced a sense of national belonging. Sahrawis did not yearn for the past, but collectively expressed the main objective of an independent state. Education was key in this regard, as the Sahrawi leadership made primary education mandatory for each boy and girl. For Palestinians, education was seen as an element to be decided by individual families rather than society as a whole. National education was transmitted orally through family and village histories. This enabled a strong connection between Palestinian children and the land of the parents and grandparents. When the PLO eventually materialized, it did create infrastructure similar to the Sahrawi setup. The PLO drafted a constitution, formed a council, and developed into both a liberation movement and a quasistate. The PLO helped maintain the political essence of the Palestinian refugee problem. It prevented the refugee crisis from becoming merely a humanitarian issue, which is how it was addressed by NGOs. This is reflected by the popular verse "wal'u al-nar bil-khiyam, wirmu kroutat al-tamwin, la suluh wa la istislam, hatta nharrer falastin (Ignite the fire in the tents and throw away the ration-cards, no peace nor surrender, until we liberate Palestine)". The right of return thus was enshrined as the core of the Palestinian narrative, derived from the heart of the refugee experience. The PLO experienced massive resistance in ways that the Polisario did not (e.g., Black September, exiled from Lebanon, and deemed as a "terrorist organization" by the international community). The PLO was also deeply divided on the vision for a future Palestinian state. The absence of a program

for the future of Palestine from its leadership was often masked as adherence to "tradition" and going back to pre-1948 times. The PLO had many fundamental flaws, including an undemocratic structure and polarity over issues of armed conflict and citizenship, which have left the Palestinian national movement fragmented. Farah distinguishes how the failing of the leadership of the PLO was not meant to be minimized to spatial structures of refugee camps, but rather to see how the positioning of refugees in the program of national liberation is important. The Polisario sought the democratic involvement of the Sahrawis and the organization of camps as preparation for a future society, whereas the PLO was fixated on the past, on the right to return, on resistance and struggle, which collectively inhibited any form of liberation. Thanks to the position taken by the virtually unilateral Yasser Arafat leadership and the Oslo Accords, the position of refugees in the national movement was sidelined. Arafat did not speak for Palestinians anymore, and did not even consult the population before making decisions. The Palestinian leadership could learn from the Sahrawi case by looking at Palestinian refugee camps not only as breeding grounds for freedom fighters and as a means to foster historical symbolism, but also as a fertile ground for organizing popular memory to spur collective political advancement.

Moreover, Abourahme and Hilal (2009) explain how the refugees of the Dheisheh also choose to retain their decrepit infrastructure in order to not let any sign raise its head that they accept any presumed permanency of their situation, and to maintain their right to return. The authors explore how Dheishehs, and their political and community organizations, have transformed the "spatial logic of the camp." They have altered the collective perspective of the camp through improving its physical conditions, creating

meaningful and unifying works of art, and expanding the Dheisheh community to stretch beyond the camp's borders. In this excerpt, the authors consider the self-urbanization of Dheishehs in the context of other "peripheries" and in the "permanent temporariness" that marks camp existence. Apart from the historically limited UNRWA assistance, refugees have been mostly self-reliant in the creation and upkeep of their own societies. For example, many have had to build their own houses, maintain the infrastructure, organize services for basic needs, and manage their own institutions and recreational venues. The dynamic urbanization of the camp is in the same vein as of a growing political identity. Refugees build on land that is technically leased by UNRWA, as a way to challenge control. The camp itself serves as a living reminder and reflects the dispossession wrought by the Nakba. This dispossession is reflected through the camp's transient appearance, including "exposed sewage, bricolage housing, [and] unplanned growth" signifying rejection of any indication of permanency for their current life situation. Additionally, efforts made by the Israeli Civil Authority to improve or blend the camp into the surrounding landscape have been opposed, since these are seen as attempts to erase the camp and refugee identity, and thwart the right to return. Although Dheishehs long for temporariness to their situation, they recognize that no progress can be made in a transient state. Thus, they purposely create a "permanent temporariness" within the camp. Self-urbanization, as opposed to the lobbying of public institutions, helps refugees connect their private and collective struggles to beget recognition in the political sphere.

Bjawi-Levine's (2009) study examines the interplay between a lack of clear national identity due to political turmoil, and an un-established personal

identity due to adolescence, in the lives of Palestinian refugee children. The article utilizes data extracted from research conducted at two different Palestinian refugee camps in Amman from 2004 to 2005. This research examines the complex relationships existing between the discourse on children's rights and their identities. Children represent the majority population in Palestinian refugee camps. During both Intifadas, children were center stage and became icons of resistance. The understanding and definition of "child" varies considerably, because it is a dynamic stage of life: "The child is now constructing, as well as being constructed by, her/his circumstances, an actor to be analyzed in relation to class, gender and ethnicity". This makes it even more difficult to clearly discuss children's rights and agency. Bjawi-Levine emphasizes the role of children in effecting social change, through analyzing the tenuous understanding of how Palestinian refugee children identify themselves and their national identity. Since citizenship and nationality are somewhat abstract concepts colored by modern society, their relationship to selfhood and identity is obscured. The child refugees have ambivalent identities, strung out between Palestine and Jordan, because of the two states' entangled histories. Through discourse on children's rights, these refugees are better able to convey and discuss their dilemma. Anxiety rises in refugee children about nationalist movements for Palestine and the fear of being naturalized in Jordan. This anxiety is accentuated by official actions by the Jordan leadership to assimilate Palestinian refugees; in part because such initiatives fail to actually provide Palestinians equal status among their Jordanian peers in society. Inevitably, this further fuels Palestinian nationalism, creating dichotomy and ambivalence within refugee children's understanding of their identities.

Johannsen and Ryseck (2009) provide a succinct history of the UNRWA and its historically controversial relationship with Palestinian refugee camps. A third of the 4.6 million people registered with UNRWA as of June 2008 lived in one of the agency's 58 refugee camps. In these camps UNRWA manages health, school, distribution centers, and other sources of common necessities. UNRWA is the UN's longest running institution, given the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has often been subjected to intense criticism (including accusations of hiring members of Hamas in Gaza, becoming a target for Israeli air strikes in 2009, etc.). UN Resolution 194 (III) was passed in 1948 regarding the "refugee question" and is the most quoted document by the UN. Specifically, paragraph eleven is of particular importance, as it grants Palestinians the choice of return, naturalization in the host country, or resettlement in a third country. The Palestinians were also deemed as entitled to reclaim property or commensurate compensation for losses stemming from Israel's actions and its responsibility in making them refugees. This provision, though, has consistently been rejected by the Israeli government. To this day, Israel does not own up to any responsibility for the fate of Palestinian refugees. Instead, Israel portrays itself as the constant victim of Arab state aggression. Considering their own domestic compulsions, neighboring Arab host countries also reject naturalization, pointing to the "Right of Return" in Resolution 194 as the right course to be adopted. The General Assembly annually renews this resolution, despite its having been rejected for all practical purposes by Israel and the host Arab states. UNRWA was established in 1949, when it became clear that a quick solution was required to the refugee problem. Five percent of UNRWA's funding comes from UN funds, but the rest is based on donations from member states, the US and the EU being the largest contributors. Its mandate was originally for only three

years, but has been annually extended until today. Refugees have to register with UNRWA in order to receive assistance. UNRWA has created a working definition of a "Palestinian refugee" to differentiate between those that qualify for assistance and those who do not. There are Palestinian refugees who do not meet the criteria to receive UNRWA aid, but are still considered Palestinian refugees. The UNRWA definition is primarily based on necessity. Eligibility requires Palestinian refugees to be "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict". Eligibility was expanded in the mid-1960s to include the descendants of registered male refugees. This clause, coupled with high birth rates, led to a continuous increase in registered refugees, from 914,000 in 1950 to 4.6 million (as of 2009). UNRWA is apolitical and intended to be a short-term, purely relief organization: "The main goal was to improve the economic situation of the refugees until a political solution would be found". UNRWA does not provide any legal or political assistance to refugees, but lays this responsibility at the host countries' doors. As a result, though, the refugees lack civil rights and international protection, and are burdened by poor economic standards. Nonetheless, the extent of UNRWA's power has continuously increased over the years, especially since the 1967 war. UNRWA has faced innumerable challenges, given the charged and precarious political scenario in which it operates, including the constant fluxes in points of contact and leadership. Despite the drawbacks and criticism, however, the UNRWA is still believed to be indispensable for offering humanitarian relief to Palestinian Refugees.

On another note, Nets-Zehngut (2008) demonstrates the biased nature of Israeli collective memory on the conflict with Palestine, due to the crafting of this collective memory through state-sponsored institutions. Countries involved in conflicts that are not well documented with official records are inclined to create a collective memory that shows themselves in a positive light, while demonizing their rivals. Creating a positive collective memory yields a positive collective identity. This makes a country's people better suited to handle the tremendous challenges stemming from the conflict. Political leaderships are influential in constructing collective memories. The Information Center in Israel is one of its main institutions that works toward building an Israeli collective memory. It especially focuses on the "Arab/Israeli conflict regarding two specific events: the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 War of Independence and the infiltrators of 1949 to 1956". The purpose of this article is to explore the publications coming out of the Information Center from the early 1950s until 2003. The implications analyzed are in regard to the role of the Israeli state, and its functioning institutions, in crafting public knowledge and collective memory about the issue. It is also about state construction of collective identity in general. Collective memory is "a collection of representations of the past that are collectively adopted". It is mostly formed around critical events involving the group in question. Collective memory is influenced by the present while using the past to invoke special interests in the present. Additionally, it is driven by the present since it is a cultural phenomenon of interpreting the past through the eyes of the present. The collective memory of a society is shaped by cultural traditions, memory makers such as elites and influential people in the group, and memory consumers who are the members of society that accept these interpretations. The state plays an important role as memory maker,

constructing the past in a way that suits its interests. The state does this through a variety of mediums including national holidays, anthems, educational curriculums, and monuments and museums. Adoption of memory by the memory consumers has to be done through the consumption of "media memories" either discursively, orally, or visually. Overall, collective memory is typically dichotomous in nature, presenting the host country as humane and victimizing their rivals as unethical oppressors. Collective memory can be used as a divisive tool by the state and in particular the political class to create a collective identity amongst its people to best serve its own interests.

Moreover, Issa (2007) concluded that there is a political awareness among Palestinian children about affiliation, and defeating the Israeli occupation, as well as a determination that is reflected in these children clinging to the right of return to their cities and villages from which their ancestors were obliged to emigrate. However, there is a deficiency in expressing the historical dimension and the political terminology which are associated with Nakba. The findings of The Refugees Studies Centre at Oxford University (2007) indicated that the Palestinian identity will be rebuilt through the internal factors and by identifying the political and collective will and determination, such as the popular memory which implies the identity.

The study by Amro (2007) revealed that oral narration constitutes the basic source of information retrieval for refugees. There are other sources, but refugees do not rely on them in the retrieval of the collective memory, mainly visiting the village and taking photographs of it as well as maintaining some documents which remained with them and prove their ownership of their lands from which they were forced to emigrate in 1948. Witteborn (2007)

found that Palestinians while vocalizing their narratives generally addressed some themes consistently, such as living in a divided space, being dislocated persons, and resisting collective punishment in their authorial roles. Allan's (2005) study suggested that cultural transmission depends less on oral performance and commemorative practices memorializing 1948 than on fragmentary moments that make up the idiomatic fabric of the refugees' everyday life.

Khalili (2007) also analyses the construction of the Palestinian national narrative and identity, and its dramatic shift due to the rise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in refugee camps. Khalili's work is based on a year (2001–2002) of field research in refugee camps in Lebanon. Through various in-depth and some informal interviews, Khalili observed the transformation of Palestinian refugee practices of remembrance. She finds that the commemorative narratives of Palestinian refugees rescinded from heroism and martyrdom, associated with the fida'iyyin freedom fighters, to one of tragedy, loss, and exile post-1980. "Mnemonic practices" is a major focus in this paper, and Khalili utilizes it as a tool to understand the modes of remembrance for Palestinian refugees. A "mnemonic practice" is not the sharing of a specific memory that an individual has experienced. Rather, it is the social invocation of past events or individuals that act as "containers" for particular narratives, through the medium of ceremonies, funerals, monuments, storytelling, and holidays. For example, Khalili explains how "memory" can be viewed as something larger than what happens "inside our head," and can be viewed as both an individual and collective event. Looking at memory through such a prism helps to understand the processes of identity formation, contestation, and cultural (re)production. The shift in Palestinian

refugees' commemorative narrative happened over time, with alteration in transnational and local environments. Heroic narratives took place during a period of rich, transnational discourse on national liberation, while Palestine experienced dominant local institutions and political factions (Nakba-Naksa). This mnemonic narrative was replaced after the 1980s with one of tragedy and defeat, at a time when political parties were being replaced by the NGOs. These organizations tapped into the prevailing transnational humanitarian discourse that exploded throughout the 1990s, fostering sympathy for the Palestinian cause and thereby attracting international donors. When a narrative changes, so does its audience and target. The heroic narrative targeted refugees, the oppressed, giving the rallying call that moved them to fight for freedom. The later narrative of tragedy and misery, though, was put out for the international community of donors. Khalili thus concludes that the mnemonic narratives are constructed along with a process of institution building. This article showed how the introduction of NGOs in refugee camps (replacing Palestinian political parties), leading to a transnational (and thus very neoliberal) focus and a shift to humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, has transmogrified the Palestinian refugee narrative. Palestinian refugees are no more resilient martyrs, heroes, and militants; the collective narrative now painted depicts victimhood that overshadows their previous colors. The correlation between the decline in militant leftism and the rise of neoliberalism through the shaping of oppressed identities makes for an interesting analysis.

A similar experience of hardship and political volatility is seen with Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon through Abu-Lughod's (2006) review of Julie Peteet's book *Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian*

Refugee Camps. The book is a history and ethnography of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, focusing on the relationship between place and identity. It targets the places Palestinians left in 1948, illustrating in detail the stark transformation in refugee camp organization, relations between refugees and the Lebanese, and the highly emotional experiences of living in exile. "Places" are either places of memory or physical living in the camp; in both, a lot has happened over the last 60 years. Having accessed and studied archived materials from organizations that were giving initial relief after the exodus, "Peteet challenges the literature on refugees by showing that Palestinians participated in and changed the aid institutions that constituted them". The "refugee" is thus not simply an object that receives aid and who is ministered to by organizations. Peteet shows that the UNRWA played a contradictory role by not just "enumerating and administering but also employing and educating." The production of space and "spatializing identity" pertains to the construction of refugee camps between 1948 and 1968. It also pertains to the division among village lines and "the struggles over privacy and space, gender and class, and the widening sense of connection and identity that developed." Peteet emphasizes the 1969 Cairo Accords as being a watershed moment in the transition toward militancy and power in the refugee camps of Lebanon. Camps were transformed into "active national spaces." This period of resistance represented "autonomy, connection, and hope". Peteet then moves on to explain how this period was all too brief, soon to be replaced by gloom. Returning in the 1990s to the Shatila Camp (where she did most of her research) after a ten-year absence, she found that it possessed "no infrastructure, little employment, poverty, poor education, incarceration, mistrust of others, social isolation, and dreams only of emigration". She recounts how the Lebanese were only imitating the

same tactics of exile and humiliation that the Israelis used, treating the refugees as "guests" who could make claim to no rights. Peteet's overarching call is for the social justice of refugees' rights. She challenges the US and Israel to acknowledge and rectify their responsibility in the persecution of refugees, and spotlights the failures of Palestinian, Lebanese, and militia leaderships in protecting the refugees' rights.

Sorek opens with a statement made by Azmi Bashara (a contemporary Arab-Israeli politician) in 2006: "We have to convene every 15th of May to commemorate the Nakba, and on the 23rd of July to celebrate the answer." The toppling of the Western-backed government in Egypt was seen as a victory for Arab nationalism. It is also a perfect example of the fight against the victimization of the Palestinian national narrative. The theoretical discussions and controversies in the field of the national identity collective memory scholarship have concentrated mostly on four dimensions: First, malleability vs. persistence of national memories and the conditions that might explain the level and nature of their persistence (Olick & Robbins, 1998; Spillman, 1998); second, instrumentalism versus culturalism, which is an approach that sees "memory entrepreneurship as a manipulation of the past for particular purposes" as opposed to selective memory as an inevitable consequence of the fact that we interpret the world (Olick & Robbins, 1998); third, the tension between considering individuals as bearers of memories versus focusing on collective commemorative representations (Olick, 1999; Schwartz & Schuman, 2005); and fourth, classification of the spatial and temporal organization of public commemorations in divided societies (Vinitzky-Seroussi, 2002; Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz, 1991). However, Sorek claims that the symbolic themes connecting memory and national

identity have generally been overlooked. According to her, theirs is a threepart connection, through heroism and sacrifice, victimhood, and guilt or shame. Sorek seeks to find how these concepts are interdependent in shaping national identity. "Heroism", she claims, refers to the sacrifices one makes for national fortitude. However, employing victimization during national conflicts relates to the "beliefs about the justness of national goals", while simultaneously "emphasizing the evil of the opponents' goals and delegitimizing their characteristics". Post-WWII, globalization and NGOization have played a part in turning victimhood into resourceful capital. While the earlier myths of heroism were in fact stories of defeat, they did play an important role in crafting national identity. The focus, for example, is on the "act of rebelling" at a certain point in history, even if the outcome was a failure. A distinct Palestinian identity can be traced back to at least the 17th century. The nationalization of such an identity, however, did not come about until after WWI with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the British Mandate. 1967 presumably was the final nail in the coffin of Arab nationalism and any hope of turning back the clock. It also ushered in the realization that Israel was now quite firmly embedded within the international community, and was not about to budge. Palestinians on the "inside" subsequently turned to the Israeli political sphere for answers: "surveys conducted between 1976 and 1995 among the Palestinians in Israel found that the ratio of those who defined themselves as both Palestinian and Israelis in this period tripled". These Palestinians did not actively join in either Intifada against the occupation, despite these events being "heroic milestones" for both Palestinians on the within and outside. Through the individual-based surveys, Sorek creates a data table reflecting the frequency of mention of various events by the respondents. He finds that, "after being

Muslim, the two strongest predictors of Palestinian identification are heroic Palestinian revolts and the interaction of Arab victories with the Nakba (1948 war)". In fact, participants who referred to both the Nakba and Arab victories were four times more likely to self-identify as Palestinian. Arab ethnic solidarity plays a major role in the politicization of Palestinians inside Israel, but it is broadcasted "in Palestinian terms". The study also finds that respondents mentioning Arab victories "were significantly more likely to define themselves as both Palestinians and Israelis." This can probably be explained by the respondents trying to gain more equality amongst their Jewish counterparts in Israel, by illustrating an image of a more balanced military struggle between Israel and Palestinian rebels. Sorek also finds that collective memories that were not directly experienced by the individual seem to fade over time. More recent events become more apparent (i.e., the surprisingly high number of people that mentioned the 2006 July War-in some cases even more than the Nakba). It is implied that recent, victorious events are used to counterbalance a victim narrative, although in a way that does not diminish the value of the Nakba experience in the shaping of national identity. This paper shows that many events since 1948 enthusiastically employ such moments of triumph that are equally resourceful in building national identity far from the incessant victimization pictures of previous Palestinian narratives.

Samra and Zeender (2006) make a point similar to Azoulay's theme of constituent violence in objecting to Palestinians living within the occupied territories being regarded as mere "refugees." Calling displaced Palestinians in ancient Palestine and what are now known as the West Bank and Gaza "refugees" only serves to reinforce Israeli power and violence as well as its

recognition as a state. Being labeled as a refugee by UNRWA is important, because it grants these Palestinians certain aid and security, but internally displaced persons (IDPs) experience specific rights that refugees (or simply the "homeless" as they are often referred to) do not. UNRWA's goal is to administer minimalist, "apolitical" aid and it is in no way concerned with the rights of refugees. Thus, referring to displaced Palestinians as refugees, coupled with the reliance on the UN aid institution, seemingly seals the fate of Palestinians and their right of return.

Al-Khatib, Arafat, and Musmar (2005) demonstrate that the quality of life for most Palestinian women within the refugee camps is in many ways seemingly worse than that of the Artasiyat, due to poor living standards. The goal of this research was to investigate the perceptions of Palestinian refugee women regarding their health and wellbeing while living in hazardous housing conditions. The study defines "Palestinian refugee" as those living in Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost their homes and livelihood due to the conflict with Israel. The research was undertaken in Al-Ein refugee camp near Nablus, constructed in 1950; as of 2005, 65% of the camp's population was less than 20 years old. Additionally, 70% of the buildings here were at least three stories high. Through questionnaires, interviews, and statistical data, Al-Khatib et al. (2005) found that overcrowding, poor construction and sanitation, and a shortage of open, green spaces are some of the physical features of the camp that negatively affect its women residents. Furthermore, the role of women in society significantly declined upon entering refugee camps. They became confined to the household, unable to contribute to the family in any meaningful way. Women remain uneducated, cooped up inside houses without decent lighting or

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sanitation, doomed only to bear and rear children. These factors, besides countless others, create a higher risk of physical and mental ailments.

Abdel-Nour (2004) examines agency if there were to be an eventual peace settlement, and how Israel might be expected to eventually own up responsibility for its role in the Palestinian exodus. Abdel-Nour uses scholarly historical accounts of 1948 to answer the question "How are Israelis to incorporate the Palestinian refugee problem in their national memory?" She concludes that it is reasonable for Israelis to adopt the notion of taking responsibility while maintaining national identity (Benny Morris) and to reject the notion of avoiding responsibility while ignoring mountains of evidence (Shabtai Teveth). She also finds that it is unreasonable for Israelis to take responsibility for the Palestinian exodus in a way that jeopardizes their national bond. The question of the Palestinian refugee crisis has consistently dominated the Israel-Palestine conflict. One way to view this question is to find the responsible party and extract an appropriate response, but this way can be inherently skewed by Palestinian claims for the right to return. Abdel-Nour focuses on a second possible vantage point, which is removed from the rough and tumble of everyday politics. Her suggested approach focuses on the historical narratives of both Israelis and Palestinians, and how they "remember" the origin of the refugee crisis. Abdel-Nour focuses on how Israelis "can reasonably be expected to remember" their history with Palestinians, should they ever come to a peace settlement. The open access to Israeli archives versus Arab ones, coupled with Israel being the largest beneficiary of the Palestinian exodus, has led to more academic work being available on the subject of Israeli responsibility. The author aims to elucidate how Israeli responsibility is conceptualized in the historical accounts of

Benny Morris, Shabtai Teveth, and Nur Masalha, and how these conceptualizations impact Israelis' national collective identity. Bernard William's work *Shame and Necessity* is used as a starting point in defining "responsibility". Agency is important in laying out responsibility. Abdel-Nour emphasizes that the most important agents, relating to Israel's responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem, are the members of Yishuv's political and military forces. That being said, when the actions of the agents continue to live long after their deaths through the surge of national pride, then the sense of responsibility also survives. A collective bond to the state of Israel links contemporary Israelis with the Yishuv's leadership and military, making the question of Palestinian refugees relevant to their lives.

Similarly, Khalili (2004) unveils how national commemorations are used divisively to promote a homogenous, master collective memory, and how grassroots commemorations consequently develop to "fill in the gaps." The Oslo Accords and the presumed renunciation of the right of return sparked new commemoration practices in refugee camps in Lebanon, with specific focus on the villages left behind. These practices are not just exercises in nostalgia, but have come to be the basis of political identity for the new generation of Palestinian refugees. "State-sponsored" commemoration of the Nakba fell dramatically in Lebanon after expulsion of the PLO in 1982; however, grassroots practices continued. Khalili employs personal interviews and field research at the Burj al-Barajneh camp in Lebanon to examine how commemoration practices influence and are in turn influenced by elite politics. The study finds that the official commemorations focused on historical events, an omnibus "master narrative" of Palestinian struggle, and an idealized, general image of the Palestinian homeland. Grassroots

commemorations, on the other hand, harked back to the specific villages in Palestine from where the refugees, or their parents, hailed. The nationalist commemorations were more a celebration of homogenous peoplehood, compared to the grassroots efforts that tended to embrace more local, subtle, and meaningful nuances of their collective identities. The differences between nationalist versus grassroots commemoration practices are inherently political. This became strikingly apparent in the 1990s, when aspirations clearly diverged and the refugee camps came out in open opposition to their (now exiled) leadership. Refugees began to demand their place in the polity because the PLO clearly did not anymore represent their best interests, in particular the right to return. The grassroots commemorative practices emerged as a means for refugees to gain control of their polity and collective identities. The engagement and evocation of a collective memory became imperative during such politically contentious periods, and hence can be viewed as very political acts.

Although the UNRWA has mostly been concerned with the living conditions in the refugee camps, Shemesh (2004) points out that the refugees during the 1950s were more focused on the Right to Return and solutions that addressed occupation first. The author argues that the 1960s and the onslaught of the PLO were by no means the pinnacle of a Palestinian "awakening," nor should it be viewed as constituting the height of the liberation movement. Instead, he suggests that it was in the 1950s and through the role played by Nasser's Egypt that the Palestinian identity was "revived". The 1950s were the formative years for the Palestinian national movement: "a period when its tenets, aims, and characteristics were shaped and later embodied in the fida'i organization". The Palestinian awakening occurred as a direct consequence

of the events of 1948, indeed they did not "wait" until the 1960s. The study examines how Palestine, despite being a fragmented society, was able to establish a viable militant national struggle. Additionally, it analyzes how the liberation movement was able to rally the masses and gain popular support. The dedication of Palestinian society to serving its national goals reflects a key element of the new Palestinian national awakening-solidarity. The "first national awakening" of the Palestinians occurred in the 1920s, and the Nakba was its first major tragedy. This trauma has been passed down to succeeding generations, embedding itself in their collective memory. Collective memory has helped form the tenets and goals of the Palestinian national movement, making it very effective in garnering solidarity and unifying society. Fragmentation of society after 1948 created new social networks, since people could no longer rely on traditional family/clan support. In fact, feelings of social displacement among refugees were much stronger than those of economic disparity. "The Land" (al-Ard), referring to "a value system beyond physical possession", remains the primary driver of unity and tenet of collective memory amongst Palestinians. It is no wonder, then, that the "return" is deeply ingrained in refugee souls, having become their heritage, memory, and identity. Idealized images of their home villages, even if for those who have never been there, are commonly expressed through various mediums. Refugees in numerous surveys even agree that they do not seek to improve their current decrepit conditions in the camps, because that might be perceived as an acceptance of their situation as permanent and their not wanting to return to the homeland. The sentiment of return grew stronger in the second generation of the Nakba. This "revolution generation" assumed responsibility for the national liberation struggle in the 1960s. Refugee life thus became heavily politicized, but it also represented social solidarity.

Refugees, and the liberation movement overall, called for a rejection of solutions for current social situations without first dealing with the occupation. The movement's motto was "Everything for the Liberation of the Land–Rejection of Ideological Differences". This is one reason why the movement was able to rally the entire refugee population. Since the movement was framed as a national movement, not a social one: "The Palestinian saw only the political aspect of his reality and ignored his daily life where there was no hope of change other than by solving the political problem". The harsh new environments that generated feelings of alienation served paradoxically to unite Palestinians into one national collective identity. The solidarity developed amongst refugees during the 1950s was critical in igniting the new national awakening.

Sa'di (2002) investigates how, although the new millennium has brought about a more unified Islamic identity in the Middle East, Palestinians construct their specific collective identity and the multitude of challenges this entails in the wake of political turmoil. Sa'di begins his article by noting how the Palestinian identity intrinsically hinges on the collective experience of dispossession and exile; as well as international mis-recognition of Palestinian rights and suffering. Sa'di explains that despite the post-1948 attempt to erase Palestine and its people from history, localized experiences and sentiments can still permeate through to ensure their existence. What with the destruction or withholding of archives and documents, and with limited large-scale institutions, Palestinians are obliged to reconstruct their heritage by other means. Their heritage is primarily transmitted through first-person accounts and the passing down of stories. Pierre Nora's concept of "sites of memory" is used as a tool to understand how individual stories can constitute

a national narrative. In the Palestinian case, the "site of memory" (lieu de memoire) is al-Nakba. The Nakba places Palestinians in an "eternal present," a historical starting point that enforces the Palestinian collective memory of exile. Strenuous efforts have been made by Palestinians and scholars alike to recreate the existence of pre-Nakba Palestine in an effort to reinforce existence-to render the past as it was lived and to remember. Sa'di cites various stories of remembrance, including Said, Kanafani, and Darwish to reinforce the common theme of homelessness. He writes of the importance of the home to Palestinians, and how the homelessness ensuing after the Nakba has forever plunged Palestinians into a collective experience of exile. There is a sense of betrayal that they are still not in their home, Palestine, notwithstanding the divisions and differences that exist between Palestinians "on the inside" and refugees. He also uses historical literature to show the rift between pre- and post-Nakba life, and the intensity evident in the minutiae of the stories. For Palestinians, shared memories of al-Nakba meet the need for social cohesion and national identity. In this way, the Palestinian identity hinges upon dispossession and exile, stemming from the Nakba. Palestinian identity is also related to the international ignorance or conscious misrepresentation of their rights and suffering. Communities are ultimately imagined and need to be reinvented through social constructs promoting nationalization, among them traditions, museums, canons, and heroes. These are top-down processes that foster and nurture the goal of nationalization. A bottom-down process of collective memory is generated through localized experiences and sentiments. Palestinians rely heavily on story telling for identity reconstruction, due to their being dispersal over a large area and a lack of national archives and institutions. However, individual life stories cannot create a collective national identity that everyone can identify with,

unless these stories are situated in the "sites of memory" as described by Pierre Nora. In this case, the lieu de memoire is the land of Palestine in general, or a specific village that people were displaced from during/after the Nakba. The Nakba created two distinctions among Palestinians that shape their identities: those on the inside, and refugees. The analogy of a typical Palestinian home can help understand this dichotomy better. The inside is perceived as having closeness, privacy, and happiness, while the outside is acknowledged as being in constant struggle, competition, and under the microscope of the public gaze.

Kansteiner (2002) defines collective memory as "a set of representations of the past that is adopted by the society and its members". Typically, collective memories revolving around conflicts consciously and subconsciously serve as complete, congruent narratives legitimizing the action of a particular party. These narratives then work to help villanize the rival while simultaneously garnering or maintaining support from those in the respective society, or abroad. Collective memory is important politically to the Israeli-Palestine conflict because it influences who is determined as being at fault, significantly affecting the proposed solutions and future outcomes for each party. Collective memory on either side is deeply rooted in the pursuit of psychological wellbeing. It is difficult for both parties to discuss the 1948 exodus. For the Israelis, they cannot cope with feelings of immorality or illegality, whereas for Palestinians it helps their self-esteem to talk about expulsion rather than leaving out of fear or in response to the calls of leaders. The social aspect utilizes both psychological and political characteristics of collective memory. Leaders construct their nation and pride around the sentiments of the people, and in ways that benefit their side over the other at

the negotiation table. Data for Kansteiner's (2002) research includes Israeli documented history derived primarily from the work of Benny Morris. Palestinian documented history on the other hand is virtually non-existent. There are, however, a number of oral history projects that have kicked off since the 1990s: four such projects were used in this research. The study analyzed the Palestinian oral data collected and came to the conclusion that autobiographical memory tends to be objective. Indirect-collective memory, though, tends to be biased and exploitive. The overall collective memory is a blend of these two types of memory, but is still considerably expulsionoriented in nature. Autobiographical memory was found to be more of an atypical memory-of-conflict source than indirect-collective memory, and thus can be used as a possible primary source. Indirect-collective memory seems to be more biased and distorted, since it inherently has to go through a transformative process that is influenced by the national narrative, whereas it is quite difficult to change the memory of a direct-experience. Collective memory is often discussed as an inclusive phenomenon. This research shows the importance of differentiating between the two types of collective memory, reflecting as it does their discrepancies.

Furthermore, it appeared from the study by Abdel Razzaq (1991) that there is political awareness among children in camps of the West Bank regarding their homeland, Palestine. Thus, they realize that the idea of peaceful coexistence between Arabs and Israel is impracticable as the Jews have occupied Palestine and murdered Arabs in their homes. Camp children also manifested a strong positive trend towards the right of return, and believed that this will not be achieved except by force.

Another important historical landmark that has influenced Palestinian collective identity is the birth of the UNRWA, which as al-Husseini (2000) elucidates has become more of a governmental body than an administerer of relief-aid. This article discusses the relationship between UNRWA and the PLO and how it evolved from "uneasy coexistence to active partnership". Although initially created in 1949 as a temporary solution for relief to Palestinian refugees, the UNRWA has come to be a quasi-state institution. It manages health, educational, and social service institutions among many other responsibilities normally handled by national governments. The UNRWA has ultimately come to be inextricably linked with the nation-building process.

Knowing the predictors for Palestinian identification is important, but even more fundamental is what Palestinian collective identity entails, and Kimmerling (2000) strives to answer this question by tracing Palestine's historical roots. A year before the signing of the "Declaration of Principles" (1992), a survey of the occupied West Bank and Gaza was conducted that asked people where their loyalties lay (interpreted here as expressions of collective identities). Results found that both among men (38%) and women (50%), loyalties above all were in regard to family. The Palestinian people came second, then the Islamic nation, and last (3% of men, 1% of women) was the Arab nation—almost total rejection of a pan-Arab collective identity! "Palestinism" has been interpreted differently throughout the past, according to conflicting group interests. Collective identity is not the same as a national identity, but it is argued here that it is a necessary precursor. Collective identity is essential for establishing an individual identity and a social and political order: "They are also an integral part of the makeup of the individual

level of identities and feelings of loyalty towards different socio-political entities". Kimmerling essentially defines collective identity through using Charles Tilly's advice in assuming that states essentially produce collective identities and vice versa. Consequently, different states produce different types of identities, which in turn create different types of collectivities. The purpose of Kimmerling's article is to analyze the evolution of the collective identity called "Palestinian," understand the ideology behind "Palestinism," and investigate the institutions at play in the formation of this collective identity. The terms qawmiyya (general Arab peoplehood) and wataniyya (more regional loyalties) are terms used to express the "beginning" of collective identities in Arabia. These concepts were initially a direct response to Ottoman rule and their attempt at "Ottomanism." The Arabic language and Islamic religion both played their part in attempting to craft an Arab identity and carve out states from the Empire: the latter quickly faded as it spread farther and included non-Arabs/non-Arabic speaking people. Ottomanism was seen as an extension of the Arab Caliphate and thus ruled over Muslims (who were given full rights) and only protected minorities (even Arab Christians and Jews). Physical boundaries are also a key indicator of collective memory formation because "they often acquire intense symbolic significance, and the direct impact of political action is frequently earliest and strongest in a geographic context". In the period around 1850 (the earliest records of the Ottoman period) there were "about 340,000 permanent inhabitants-300,000 Muslims, 27,000 Christians (mostly Arabs) and 13,000 Jews". The first conception of a Palestinian territory was formed when the Egyptians invaded the area and revolted against the Ottoman Empire (in 1834). This invasion dramatically altered the face of the Middle East as the societal structure was demolished. The invasion ruined the former inter-

relationships of political power and social engagement between the diversity of religious, ethnic, and socio-economic groups: "The relationship of the government to the governed, the market to the producers, the foreigner to the native were radically changed". The Egyptians did not establish a sense of collective national identity for the native population, especially among the elites who were more attached to and benefited more from Ottomanism. The revolt was largely against these elites and Ottomanism; consequently, the Egyptians infused a new collective Islamic identity that also served as a basis for organizing society. Economic globalization, political transformation, and colonial shifts can have a dramatic impact on collective identities. "Penetration" from the "outside" (i.e., European markets) may have had two effects on collective identity: (1) it laid the ground for the "us versus them" dynamic and the need to create borders of distinction and (2) it fragmented local structures and created "particularistic interests". From the early to mid-1800s, both existed in the Holy Land. The Crimean War (1854–1856) and the American Civil War (1861–1865) changed the course of the global market, turning merchants to Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, and Sidon for cash crops. This incentivized local merchants and notables to expand their land ownership, and ushered in a new "land owning self-conscious class, backed by the Tanzimat reform". In 1918 King Faysal declared independent Arab constitutional government with authority over all Syria. This gave a new sense of hope and 'asabiyya to Arab history: "Implementation of the Syrian Congress's aims meant nullification of the Balfour Declaration and the hope of freedom from British colonial rule". The Muslim population of Palestine eagerly adopted Syria's political identity and a sense of nationalism. A movement backed by academics and various newly formed newspapers emerged in support of the local population and region to be ruled by King Faysal, and recognized as part

of southern Syria. The British Mandate is regarded as a pivotal event in the formation of a Palestinian collective identity, but is also noted as a root cause for its subsequent collapse. The mandate officially established Palestine as a state: "Britain created a minimalist state, gave it the name 'Palestine,' and drew its final geographical, political, and social boundaries". At the same time Britain established the framework for the Jewish-Zionist polity. Palestinism refers to the belief that Palestine developed its own Arab collectivity separate from other states or pseudo-states in the region. Palestinism simultaneously also entails that the Arab population of Palestine became "a part of alqawmiyya al-arabiyya from which the right of self-determination is drawn within the geographical boundaries of the mandatory state". This was nourished by three factors: post-WWI creation of present-day borders in the Middle East, creation of Mandate Palestine, and rapid development of Jewish settlements. After 1948 and the partition of Palestine in Israel into the West Bank and Gaza, a systematic attempt at "de-Palestinization" ensued. A "Jordanian identity" was imposed on the West Bank, while Israel created the "Arab-Israeli." Throughout this process, Palestinian identity was preserved in refugee camps. After 1967, Palestine in many ways reflected its original colonial state: "Following 1967 the three territorial parts of Mandatory Palestine were re-united under Jewish-Israeli control, which in many ways recreated the initial Palestinian condition". Major cleavage now existed between Palestinians within Israel and those living in exile. The PLO also contributed to the revitalization of the Palestinian identity. Overall, the "Palestinian case" is not an exception to collective identity construction. It developed rather typically compared to most colonially-produced collectivities and Palestinians were not simply passive subjects subject to initiatives from the "other." For instance, collective action during the

Egyptian invasion is cited as an example of will without collective identity. In review, Ottomanism was an identity with aligning interests for Arab elites, while the peasantry only identified with clans. Islam was used to bridge the gaps between groups, like rich and poor, literate and illiterate, and more. The embracing of the pan-Syrian movements stemming from both Faysal's success and failure implies that collective identities at least partly serve as veiled coping mechanisms to assist people in adjusting to sociopolitical volatility. At least before nationalism takes form, collective boundaries are constantly drawn and redrawn based on dynamic sociopolitical realities, creating loyalties and imagined communities. This malleability of collective identities provides evidence of the coping mechanism that they can prove to be in times of political turmoil.

Post-Nakba (1948) through pre-Nakba commemoration (1998) was an interregnum of silence, demonstrating how commemorations change over time. The Kafr Qasim massacre of 1956 was an important event that Palestinians commemorated, but "modestly" (i.e., with 2-hour work stoppages, community prayers, etc.). Since Palestinians were living under military rule until 1966, Israel did its utmost to undermine these "modest" actions. Returning to destroyed villages is another example cited of a significant Palestinian act of commemoration. This act, however, is restricted to only Palestinians living inside Israel, and is allowed one day a year—on Israel's "Independence Day". This shows that stories cannot be separated from physical, geographical locations. Palestinians are also known to commemorate individuals, primarily martyrs, heroes, and prisoners. This act is the earliest known form of commemoration, dating back to the post-Ottoman period. Some famous examples include the commemoration of

Izzeddin al-Qassam, Nasser Arafat, and Mahmoud Darwish. The commemoration of politics became predominant after the rise of organized resistance and liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Posters and graffiti came to be physical manifestations of commemoration. Older forms of commemoration (poems, visits, and monuments) are being replaced with digital graphics that can be consumed and shared much more easily through the internet and social media. Museums are also noted as another form of physical commemorative space. Ultimately, commemorations are used partly by Palestinians for nation building and partly political promotion, in order to move towards a just future and resolution of the conflict.

In another study, Shakhshir (1990) concluded that the Palestinian children consider Palestine as their homeland and that the Jews who occupy their country are strangers. Besides, the Palestinian child recognizes an Israeli from the way the latter holds a weapon and from their military uniforms. Consequently, Palestinian children do not wish to live with the Israelis or to study with Israeli children, due to their mistreatment of Palestinians and the wars Israel has unleashed against them. Differences between the Arabic language and Hebrew language as well as the various customs and traditions also influence the children's opinion significantly. However, Hazboun (1989) emphasized that there is a political and historical communication process through which the character of the Palestinian refugee has been identified. Hence, they are considered a historically active element in different locations of the diaspora. Refugees have fostered a common understanding among themselves about the future course towards resolving their issue. However, the intransigent Israeli attitude towards tackling the Palestinian refugee question has given birth to new forms and patterns of rejection amongst the

refugees. This is particularly seen with regard to the Palestinians' stand on settlement and integration in Arab societies as well as about putting an end to the camp phenomenon.

Moreover, Sayigh (as cited in Barmil, 2018) has indicated that the development of the Palestinian identity of the residents of camps adjacent to Beirut has been influenced by several factors including dispersion, poverty, oppression, as well as being controlled by non-Palestinian authorities. Despite the new situations which emerged in the Palestinians' life in exile, such as the change of status, holding responsibilities, the level of political control, and instability, these factors were not significant for the Palestinians and they have overcome these difficulties as they feel that the place where they live is temporary. Also, it is not their homeland and they do not have a government here that will defend them, like others have. The Palestinian memory has, therefore, evolved along these lines and the situation has become indisputably clear for camp residents.

Finally, the study conducted by Sirhan (1970) about the children in Al-Wihdat and Al-Baq'a camps in Jordan and two other camps in Lebanon has concluded that children in these camps have a high level of national awareness. This is probably because they realize who they are and who their enemies are, and they also know where they came from and the reasons which have forced them live in their current situation. The Palestinian children are not willing to accept any compromise or compensation other than the liberation of Palestine. Palestine is the only place which the Palestinian children feel is their actual homeland. For these children, dispersion and expatriation have not extinguished the national existence of the Palestinian people, a fact

represented in the Palestinian refugees' preservation of habits, values, and emotional relationships. All camp children hold that Palestine is an Arab country. Also, the Palestinian revolution is a vital motivation for children in camps and it has become an integral part of children's life style.

2.3 Comments on Previous Studies

It is clear from the foregoing review of the previous literature that several studies have approached collective memory as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, an approach that encompasses both theoretical and applied research. Researchers from various backgrounds have put in outstanding effort in dealing with this phenomenon from different aspects; this subject holds an outstanding rank in the world in general and in Palestinian society in particular. These studies in general have aimed at identifying this phenomenon in terms of definition, historical framework, tools, and effect. A limited number of studies dealt with the topic from a field perspective through the youth.

Nevertheless, these studies have all benefited the present dissertation, through shedding light on the phenomenon of collective memory in its varied dimensions. They encouraged the researcher to proceed with studying this topic from the youth point of view; as such, the current study will in some ways be a continuation of the previous studies and will carry out their recommendations.

In spite of extensive studies on collective memory among first generation Palestinian refugees, empirical studies of this important concept among Palestinian youth are scarce. The Palestinian experience under occupation

was and still is the most tragic one after seventy years of the Nakba, which is a landmark in the history of Palestinians, even as Israelis wait for the modern Palestinian youth to forget the robbed homeland, and its painful collective memory.

It is true that groups and individuals come to share the same renderings of the past (Coman et al., 2009). But it is imperative to preserve the Palestinian collective memory across the generations and in the minds of the youth. According to Gross (2002), collective memory constitutes a particularly important basis for nationhood and national identity, since it establishes a link between generations, which creates an image of temporal continuity and legitimates the existing sociopolitical reality

2.4 Statement of the Problem

In spite of several and extensive studies on collective memory among first generation Palestinian refugees, empirical studies of this important concept as it is prevalent among youth have been scarce. The Palestinian experience under occupation was and continues to be the most tragic one after seventy years of the Nakba, which is a landmark in the history of Palestinians. Israelis wait, and do everything within their considerable power to ensure that young Palestinians forget their robbed homeland, and its painful collective memory.

The main purpose of the current study was to investigate the collective memory of Al-Nakba among Palestinian youth. Differences in collective memory of the Nakba between the participants were also assessed, to determine the demographic characteristics that may influence this concept among youth.

2. Previous Studies and Methodology

The study is intended to be of considerable significance among the major studies that deal with collective memory among Palestinian youth, many of whom live their own Nakbas today, under the ongoing Israeli occupation. Hopefully, the study will become an important reference for those concerned with the area of collective memory of the Nakba, especially in the findings it will reveal about this worldwide phenomenon.

It is true that groups and individuals come to share the same renderings of the past (Coman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst, 2009). But it is imperative to preserve the Palestinian collective memory across generations and in the minds of the youth. According to Gross (2002), collective memory constitutes a particularly important basis for nationhood and national identity, since it establishes a link between generations, which creates an image of temporal continuity and legitimates the existing sociopolitical.

2.5 Questions of the Study

The present study seeks to answer the following questions:

- 1. What is the level of the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth?
- 2. How have Palestinian refugee youth preserved the collective memory of the Nakba?
- 3. How do Palestinian refugee youth draw upon the collective memory of the Nakba?
- 4. What are the indicators of the collective memory of the Nakba as perceived by Palestinian refugee youth?

5. Are there any statistically significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to their gender, family exposure to Israeli violence, birth rank in the family, religion degree, region, parents' educational level, and grade point average?

2.6 Hypotheses of the Study

Taking into consideration the set objectives, questions, and variables of the study, the study addresses the following main hypotheses:

- 1. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender.
- 2. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to family exposure to Israeli violence.
- 3. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to birth rank in the family.
- 4. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to religion degree.
- 5. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to region.

- 6. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to father's educational level.
- 7. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to mother's educational level.
- There is no statistically significant correlation at α≤0.05 between GPA and the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.
- 9. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and exposure to Israeli violence.
- 10. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and family birth rank.
- 11. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and religion degree.
- 12. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and father's educational level.
- 13. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and mother's educational level.
- 14. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and region.

15. There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and GPA.

2.7 Methodology and Design

The study is a descriptive research study that used a mixed-methods approach of quantitative and qualitative designs, and a questionnaire, which was appropriate to the exploratory nature of the research and helped provide more meaningful in-depth data.

2.8 Population and Sampling

The target population consisted of Palestinian refugee youth residing in refugee camps on the West Bank in 2018, and it included 15974 such youth; the population comprised 8108 males and 7866 females. In terms of the region, 8230 of the youth live in refugee camps in the northern part of the West Bank, 4178 in the middle and 3566 in the south of the West Bank, as indicated in table 3.1 (PCBS, 2018).

	Males		Females	
Region	Population	Required Sample	Population	Required Sample
North	4180	262	4050	253
Middle	2114	132	2064	129
South	1814	114	1752	110
Total	8108	508	7866	492

Table (3.1). Distribution of the study population and sample by gender and region.

The overall sample was composed of 1,000 youth (508 males and 492 females) between 10–14 years of age selected in a stratified manner by gender and region. The participants were from Balata, Askar, Amari, Jalazoun, Dhaisheh, and Arroub refugee camps. The sample size was calculated using the sample size calculator available on the sampling website http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm, with a margin of error of 0.03, as indicated in appendix A.

In all, 1000 youth participated in the study. The demographic breakdown of the participants was as follows: gender, birth rank in the family, grade point average (GPA), religion degree, parent's educational level, family exposure to Israeli violence, and region. Respondents' GPA score was between 50 and 99 points (M 74.56 SD 10.83). Males represented 50.8% of the participants, while the remaining 49.2% were females; the majority (48.9%) were of moderate birth rank in the family; and nearly half (56.9%) were moderately religious. In terms of the youths' academic achievement, their GPA was

between (50-99, M 74.56 SD 10.83); also, their parents were educated, with 47.5% of the fathers having reached the secondary level compared to 40.5% of the mothers. Half (51.5%) of the youth live in refugee camps in the north of the West Bank, 26.2% in the middle, and 22.3% in the south; the majority (58.8%) of the youths' families have been exposed to various forms of Israeli violence (tables no. 3.2-3.9).

Gender	Ν	Percent %
Male	508	50.8
Female	492	49.2
Total	1000	100

Table (3.2). Sample distribution by gender.

Table (3.3). Sample distribution by family birth rank.

Family birth rank	Ν	Percent %
Eldest	299	29.9
Middle	489	48.9
Youngest	212	21.2
Total	1000	100

Table (3.4). Sample distribution by degree of religion.

Religion degree	Ν	Percent %
High	328	33.9
Moderate	550	56.9
Low	89	9.2
Total	967	100

Missing= 33.

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Father's educational level	Ν	Percent %
Basic	158	15.8
Secondary	475	47.5
Diploma	199	19.9
Bachelor and above	168	16.8
Total	1000	100

Table (3.5). Sample distribution by father's educational level.

Table (3.6). Sample distribution by mother's educational level.

Mother's educational level	N	Percent %
Basic	223	22.3
Secondary	405	40.5
Diploma	231	23.1
Bachelor and above	141	14.1
Total	1000	100

Table (3.7). Sample distribution by region.

Region	Ν	Percent %
North	515	51.5
Middle	262	26.2
South	223	22.3
Total	1000	100

Table (3.8). Sample distribution by exposure to Israeli violence.

Exposure to Israeli violence	Ν	Percent %
Yes	588	58.8
No	412	41.2
Total	1000	100

Table (3.9). Sample distribution by grade point average (GPA).

Variable	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
GPA	985	50	99	74.56	10.83

Missing=15

2.9 Instrumentation

Collective memory of the Nakba was evaluated using an index of a 27-item scale, introduced by Dayyeh (2018). The researcher approached the participants at their locations in the refugee camps in the West Bank, and asked them to complete the questionnaire; however, youth who were between 10-14 years of age were interviewed only in their homes. A questionnaire that adopted a 5-point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neither, disagree, and strongly disagree) was used to measure the responses. The sample survey instrument sought background information that included gender, birth rank in the family, grade point average (GPA), religion degree, parents' educational level, family exposure to Israeli violence, and region, as indicated in appendixes B and C.

2.10 Instrument Validity

Validation of the instrument proceeded in two distinct phases. The initial phase involved a group of referees and expert arbitrators, who provided some comments on the tool, as indicated in appendix D. The second phase involved the implementation of a pilot study (N=40) to validate the survey using exploratory factor analysis. Factor loading for all items exceeded 0.60 (0.61 to 0.89), which meant that those items were suitable for measuring every item

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of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth, as indicated in table 3.10.

No.	Items	Extraction
1.	I know my hometown that my forefathers were forced to leave.	0.70
2.	Reading rather than visiting Palestinian villages is enough.	0.61
3.	I ask my parents about my forefathers' town which they were forced to leave.	0.62
4.	Any direction which does lead to destroyed Palestinian cities and towns is misleading and suspicious.	0.65
5.	I feel relaxed when my father tells us about our hometown.	0.63
6.	The right of return is sacred and imprescriptible.	0.67
7.	When I introduce myself, I mention my forefathers' hometown.	0.79
8.	I search for pictures of my hometown in the media.	0.67
9.	I feel nostalgic about my forefathers' hometown which they were forced to leave.	0.68
10.	I watch T.V. series depicting the Palestinian Nakba.	0.72

Table (3.10). Factor analysis of collective memory scale.

h	<u> </u>	1
11.	I look forward to hearing the elders' stories about	0.69
	destroyed cities and villages.	
12.	The camp is a live testimony of displacement and	0.62
	loss for Palestinians.	
13.	I feel sorry about what happened to Palestinians	0.77
	as a result of displacement.	
14.	The camp is a passageway towards my	0.69
	hometown.	
15.	I still keep some items that remind me of my	0.84
	hometown.	
16.	I feel proud to be a Palestinian refugee.	0.67
17.	I can't express my feelings about the Nakba	0.85
	event.	
18.	I have inner feelings that the Nakba will occur	0.62
	again.	0.02
19.	I feel as if I live the Nakba every day.	0.66
20.	I avoid all that reminds me or relates to the	0.86
	Nakba.	
21.	I impatiently wait for the Nakba activities to take	0.73
	place.	
22.	I will never forget the Nakba as long as I live.	0.89
23.	I attach great importance to the Palestinian	0.68
	refugees.	0.00
, <u> </u>		

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24.	I defend the Palestinian refugee issue, whenever it is necessary.	0.62
25.	I like to read about the history of my hometown.	0.67
26.	I participate in the Nakba anniversary activities every year.	0.66
27.	I will not hesitate to sacrifice my life to return to my hometown.	0.76

2.11 Instrument Reliability

The reliability was tested using Cronbach's Alpha and split-half coefficients to ascertain reliability and consistency of the survey. Cronbach's Alpha and split-half for the survey instrument were 0.81 and 0.78, respectively, indicating very good reliability and consistency, as indicated in table 3.11.

Table (3.11). Reliability of collective memory scale.

Model	No. of items	Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha	27	0.81
Guttman Split-Half	27	0.78

2.12 Statistical Analysis

Data were analyzed using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). The questionnaire items were rated on a 1–5 Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree), with the highest score indicating a high level of collective memory. Descriptive statistics gauged collective memory scores among the sampled population. The following

statistical techniques were employed: Standardized Regression, T-test, Oneway analysis of variance, Tukey test, Two-way analysis of variance, Cronbach's Alpha, Split-Half Coefficient, and Factor Analysis; and to understand the findings of the study, the mean score key in table no. 3.12 shown below will be useful.

Table (3.12)	. Mean	score ke	y for the	findings	of the study.

No.	Mean score	Key of collective memory degree	Standard
1.	1 – 2.33	Low	One Standard Deviation below
2.	2.34 - 3.67	Moderate	Mean
3.	3.68 – 5	High	One Standard Deviation above

Chapter three

3. Findings and Discussion

The study aimed at identifying the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth. This chapter details the findings, as follows:

3.1 Degree of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.

What is the degree of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth?

Numbers, mean score, standard deviation, and percentage were used to answer the above question. *Table* (4.1) *presents the results*.

Table (4.1). Number, mean score, standard deviation, and percentage of collective memory of the Nakba total score among Palestinian refugee youth.

Variable	Ν	Mean*	Std. Deviation	Percent %
Collective memory	1000	4.29	0.35	85.8
total score				

*Mean out of 5 points.

The mean score of the collective memory scale as experienced by the sample of 1,000 youth participants of the study was high (M 4.29 SD 0.35), as indicated in table 4.1. The total score showed that (85.8%) of the Palestinian refugee youth preserved a very strong collective memory of the Nakba.

3.2 Indicators of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.

What are the indicators of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth?

Numbers, mean score, standard deviation, and percentage were used to answer the above question. *Table (4.2) presents the findings*.

Table (4.2). Mean scores, standard deviation, and percentage for the indicators of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth ranked in a descending order.

Indicators of collective memory	Mean*	Std.	Percent	
indicators of conective memory	Ivican	Deviation	%	
I know my hometown which my	4.84	0.52	96.8	
forefathers were forced to leave.	0-	0.52	20.0	
The right of return is sacred and	4.75	0.56	95.0	
imprescriptible.	1.75	0.50	22.0	
I attach great importance to the	4.67	0.64	93.4	
Palestinian refugees.	1.07	0.01	23.1	
I feel nostalgic about my				
forefathers' hometown which they	4.63	0.64	92.6	
were forced to leave.				
I will not hesitate to sacrifice my	4.58	0.73	91.6	
life to return to my hometown.	т.50	0.75	71.0	

I ask my parents about my			
forefathers' town which they were	4.56	0.67	91.2
forced to leave.			
I feel relaxed when my father tells	4.55	0.75	91.0
us about our hometown.	4.55	0.75	91.0
I like to read about the history of	4.54	0.70	90.8
my hometown.	4.34	0.70	90.8
I look forward to hearing the			
elders' stories about destroyed	4.51	0.67	90.2
cities and villages.			
The camp is a live testimony of			
displacement and loss for	4.49	0.72	89.8
Palestinians.			
The camp is a passageway towards	4.49	0.80	89.8
my hometown.	4.49	0.00	09.0
I feel sorry for what happened to			
Palestinians as a result of	4.49	0.66	89.8
displacement.			
I defend the Palestinian refugee	4.49	0.77	89.8
issue, whenever it is necessary.	4.47	0.77	07.0
When I introduce myself, I mention	1 1 1	0.84	00 0
my forefathers' hometown.	4.44	0.04	88.8
I feel proud to be a Palestinian	4.43	0.87	88.6
refugee.	4.43	0.07	00.0
I will never forget the Nakba as	4.43	0.71	88.6
long as I live.	5	0.71	00.0

I watch T.V. series depicting the	4.22	0.70	06.6
Palestinian Nakba.	4.33	0.79	86.6
I search for pictures of my	4.30	0.82	86.0
hometown in the media.	4.50	0.02	00.0
I still keep some items that remind	4.27	0.82	85.4
me of my hometown.	7.27	0.02	05.4
I participate in the Nakba	4.11	0.88	82.2
anniversary activities every year.	4.11	0.00	02.2
I impatiently wait for the Nakba	4.08	0.88	81.6
activities to take place.	4.08	0.88	81.0
Any direction which does lead to			
destroyed Palestinian cities and	4.00	1.17	80.0
towns is misleading and suspicious.			
I feel as if I live the Nakba every	3.84	0.88	76.8
day.	5.04	0.00	70.0
I have inner feelings that the Nakba	3.80	0.99	76.0
will occur again.	5.00	0.77	70.0
I can't express my feelings toward	3.69	1.15	73.8
the Nakba event.	3.09	1.15	73.0
Reading rather than visiting	3.34	1.65	66.8
Palestinian villages is enough.	3.34	1.03	00.0
I avoid all that reminds me or	3.32	1.28	66.4
relates to the Nakba.	5.54	1.20	00.7
Total	4.29	0.35	85.8

*Mean out of 5 points.

3. Findings and Discussion

Findings revealed that the indicators of the collective memory of the Nakba as perceived by the Palestinian refugee youth were ranked in descending order as follows: I know my hometown which my forefathers were forced to leave (M 4.84 SD 0.52); the right of return is sacred and imprescriptible (M 4.75 SD 0.56). The students emphasize that they attach great importance to the Palestinian refugees (M 4.67 SD 0.64); and they feel nostalgic about their forefathers' hometown which they were forced to leave (M 4.63 SD 0.64). Moreover, the youth indicated that they will not hesitate to sacrifice their lives to return to their hometown (M 4.58 SD 0.73); and they ask their parents about their forefathers' town which they were forced to leave (M 4.56 SD 0.67); since they feel relaxed when their father tells them about their hometown (M 4.55 SD 0.75).

Furthermore, the youth indicated that they like to read about the history of their hometown (M 4.54 SD 0.70); they look forward to hearing the elders' stories about destroyed cities and villages (M 4.51 SD 0.67); and the camp is a live testimony of displacement and loss for Palestinians (M 4.49 SD 0.72), as indicated in table no. 4.2.

3.3 Differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.

3.3.1 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender.

T-test was used to validate the above hypothesis. *Table (4.3) presents the results*.

Gender	Ν	Mean*	Std. Deviation	Df	<i>t</i> -value	Sig.
Male	508	4.37	0.30			
Female	492	4.21	0.39	998	7.556	0.000
Total	1000	4.29	0.35			

Table (4.3). T-test for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender.

*Mean out of 5 points.

In relation to gender, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the males (M 4.37 SD 0.30) compared to (M 4.21 SD 0.39) for females, T-test value was (7.556 P=0.000), as indicated in table (4.3). The hypothesis is therefore rejected.

3.3.2 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to exposure to Israeli violence.

T-test was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Table (4.4) presents the results.*

Table (4.4). T-test for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to family exposure to Israeli violence.

Exposure to	N	Mean*	Std.	Df	<i>t</i> -value	Sig.
Israeli violence	- ,		Deviation			~-8.
Yes	588	4.35	0.28			
No	412	4.21	0.42	998	5.857	0.000
Total	1000	4.29	0.35			

*Mean out of 5 points.

As for the exposure to Israeli violence, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the youth whose families have been exposed to Israeli violence (M 4.35 SD 0.28) compared to (M 4.12 SD 0.42) for the youth whose families have not been exposed to Israeli violence. T-test value was (5.857 P=0.000), as indicated in table (4.4). The hypothesis accordingly is rejected.

3.3.3 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to family birth rank.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.5–4.6) present the results.*

Table (4.5). One-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to family birth rank.

Source	Df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	2	0.070	0.035		
Within groups	997	127.504	0.128	0.274	0.760
Total	999	127.574			

In terms of family birth rank, findings revealed that there are no significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth, F-value was (0.274 P=0.760), as indicated in table (4.5). Similarity has been found in the youth's collective memory mean scores of the Nakba despite

their family birth rank, as indicated in table (4.6). The hypothesis therefore is accepted.

Table (4.6). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to family birth rank.

Family birth rank	Ν	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Eldest	299	4.30	0.35
Middle	489	4.29	0.31
Youngest	212	4.28	0.43
Total	1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.4 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to religion degree.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.7–4.8) present the results.*

Table (4.7). One-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to religion degree.

Source	Df	Sum of	Mean	F-value	Sig.
Source	21	squares	square	I vulue	~-8.
Between groups	2	0.344	0.172		
Within groups	964	118.781	0.123	1.396	0.248
Total	966	119.125			

With regard to religion degree, findings revealed that there are no significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth, F-value was (1.396 P=0.248), as indicated in table (4.7). Similarity has been found in the youth's collective memory mean scores of the Nakba despite their religion degree, as indicated in table (4.8). The hypothesis is accepted.

Table (4.8). Mean scores and standard deviation for thedifferences in the collective memory of the Nakba amongPalestinian refugee youth according to religion degree.

Religion degree	Ν	Mean*	Std. Deviation
High	328	4.32	0.41
Moderate	550	4.28	0.31
Low	89	4.26	0.28
Total	967	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.5 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to the region.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.9–4.10) present the results.*

Table (4.9). One-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to the region.

Source	Df	Sum of	Mean	F-value	Sig.
Source		squares	square	1 value	515.
Between groups	2	0.683	0.342		
Within groups	997	126.891	0.127	2.684	0.069
Total	999	127.574			

As for the region, findings revealed that there are no significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth, Fvalue was (2.684 P=0.069), as indicated in table (4.9). Similarity has been found in the youth's collective memory mean scores of the Nakba despite their region, as indicated in table (4.10). The hypothesis therefore is accepted.

Table (4.10). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to the region.

Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
North	515	4.32	0.36
Middle	262	4.26	0.28
South	223	4.27	0.40
Total	1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.6 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to father's educational level.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.11–4.13) present the results.*

Table (4.11). One-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to father's educational level.

Source	Df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Between groups	3	5.369	1.790		
Within groups	996	122.206	0.123	14.585	0.000
Total	999	127.574			

In terms of father's educational level, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the youth whose fathers are well-educated (M 4.36 SD 0.30) compared to (M 4.18 SD 0.40) for the youth whose fathers are less-educated; F-value was (14.585 P=0.000), as indicated in *tables (4.11-4.13)*. The hypothesis is accordingly rejected.

Table (4.12). Tukey test for the source of differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to father's educational level.

Father's	Basic	Secondamy	Diploma	Bachelor
educational level	Dasic	Secondary	Dipionia	and above
Basic		-0.15563*	-0.01673	-0.17664*
Secondary			0.13890	-0.02101
Diploma				-0.15991*
Bachelor and				
above				

Table (4.13). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to father's educational level.

Father's educational level	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Basic	158	4.18	0.40
Secondary	475	4.34	0.25
Diploma	199	4.20	0.49
Bachelor and above	168	4.36	0.30
Total	1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.7 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to mother's educational level.

One-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.14–4.16) present the results.*

Table (4.14). One-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to mother's educational level.

Source	Df	Sum of	Mean	F-value	Sig.
Source		squares	square	I vulue	5 - 5-
Between groups	3	6.670	2.223		
Within groups	996	120.905	0.121	18.314	0.000
Total	999	127.574			

As for mother's educational level, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the youth whose mothers are well-educated (M 4.39 SD 0.31) compared to (M 4.15 SD 0.33) for the youth whose mothers are less-educated; F-value was (18.314 P=0.000), as indicated in *tables (4.14-4.16)*. Accordingly, the hypothesis is rejected.

Table (4.15). Tukey test for the source of differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to mother's educational level.

Mother's educational level	Basic	Secondary	Diploma	Bachelor and above
Basic		-0.16049*	-0.19551*	-0.24084*
Secondary			-0.03503	-0.08035
Diploma				-0.04533
Bachelor and above				

Table (4.16). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to mother's educational level.

Mother's educational level	Ν	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Basic	223	4.15	0.33
Secondary	405	4.31	0.39
Diploma	231	4.34	0.29
Bachelor and above	141	4.39	0.31
Total	1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.8 There is no statistically significant correlation at $\alpha \le 0.05$ between GPA and the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.

Standardized regression was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables* (4.17) presents the results.

Table (4.17). Standardized regression between GPA score and the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.

Variables	Ν	Beta-value	Sig.
GPA*Collective memory of the Nakba	1000	0.198	0.000

Findings indicated that there is statistically significant positive correlation between the academic achievement of the Palestinian refugee youth and the collective memory of the Nakba. Beta value was (0.198 P=0.000), as *indicated in table (4.17)*. The hypothesis accordingly is rejected.

3.3.9 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and the exposure to Israeli violence.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.18–4.19) present the results.*

Table (4.18). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and the exposure to Israeli violence.

Source	Df	Sum of	Mean	F-value	Sig.
		squares	square		
Gender	1	6.410	6.410	55.036	0.000
Family birth rank	1	3.507	3.507	30.108	0.000
Gender*Family birth rank	1	1.000	1.000	8.586	0.003
Error	996	116.008	0.116		
	990	110.008	0.110		
Total	1000	18573.963			
Corrected Total	999	127.574			

In regard to gender and the exposure to Israeli violence, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the males whose families were exposed to Israeli violence (M 4.39 SD 0.28); F-value was (8.586 P=0.003), as *indicated in table (4.19)*. The hypothesis therefore is rejected.

Table (4.19). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and family birth rank.

Gender	Exposure to Israeli violence	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Male	Yes	328	4.39	0.28
Whate	No	180	4.34	0.31
Female	Yes	260	4.29	0.26
1 emaie	No	232	4.11	0.47
Total		1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.10 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and family birth rank.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.20–4.21) present the results.*

Table (4.20). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and family birth rank.

Source	Df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Gender	1	6.108	6.108	50.755	0.000
Family birth rank	2	0.084	0.042	0.349	0.705
Gender*Family birth rank	2	0.943	0.471	3.918	0.020
Error	994	119.616	0.120		
Total	1000	18573.963			
Corrected Total	999	127.574			

In terms of gender and family birth rank, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the males in middle family birth rank (M 4.40 SD 0.26); F-value was (3.918 P=0.020), as *indicated in table (4.21)*. The hypothesis is thus rejected.

Table (4.21). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and family birth rank.

Gender	Family birth rank	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
Male	Eldest	174	4.33	0.27
	Middle	223	4.40	0.26
	Youngest	111	4.39	0.38
Female	Eldest	125	4.26	0.43
	Middle	266	4.20	0.33
	Youngest	101	4.16	0.46
Total		1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.11 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and religion degree.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.22–4.23) present the results.*

Table (4.22). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and religion degree.

Source	Df	Sum of	Mean	F-value	Sig.
		squares	square		~-8.
Gender	1	5.686	5.686	50.143	0.000
Religion degree	2	0.602	0.301	2.653	0.071
Gender*Religion degree	2	3.153	1.576	13.901	0.000
Error	961	108.974	0.113		
Total	967	17963.712			
Corrected Total	966	119.125			

As for gender and religion degree, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the males in high religion degree (M 4.47 SD 0.27). F-value was (13.901 P=0.000), as *indicated in table (4.23)*. The hypothesis therefore is rejected.

Table (4.23). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and religion degree.

Gender	Religion degree	Ν	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	High	161	4.47	0.27
Male	Moderate	279	4.31	0.31
	Low	55	4.35	0.24
	High	167	4.16	0.46
Female	Moderate	271	4.25	0.31
	Low	34	4.11	0.29
Total		967	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.12 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and fathers' educational level.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.24–4.25) present the results.*

Table (4.24). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and fathers' educational level.

Source	Df	Sum of	Mean	F-value	Sig.
		squares	square		0
Gender	1	9.565	9.565	85.142	0.000
Religion degree	3	4.910	1.637	14.570	0.000
Gender*Religion	3	4.230	1.410	12.551	0.000
degree	5	1.230	1.110	12.551	0.000
Error	992	111.444	0.112		
Total	1000	18573.963			
Corrected Total	999	127.574			

In terms of gender and fathers' educational level, the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth favored the males whose fathers are well-educated (M 4.46 SD 0.30); F-value was (12.551 P=0.000), as *indicated in table (4.25)*. The hypothesis is thus rejected.

Table (4.25). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and fathers' educational level.

Gender	Fathers' educational level	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	Basic	64	4.34	0.39
Male	Secondary	238	4.36	0.26
whate	Diploma	110	4.35	0.29
	Bachelor and above	96	4.46	0.30
	Basic	94	4.08	0.37
Female	Secondary	237	4.32	0.25
1 cillare	Diploma	89	4.01	0.62
	Bachelor and above	72	4.22	0.24
Total		1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.13 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and mothers' educational level.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.26–4.27) present the results.*

Table (4.26). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and mothers' educational level.

Source	Df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Gender	1	4.413	4.413	38.275	0.000
Religion degree	3	5.929	1.976	17.142	0.000
Gender*Religion degree	3	0.432	0.144	1.250	0.290
Error	992	114.370	0.115		
Total	1000	18573.963			
Corrected Total	999	127.574			

With regard to gender and mothers' educational level, the findings revealed that there are no significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and mothers' educational level; F-value was (1.250 P=0.290), as *indicated in table (4.26)*. Similarity has been found in the youth's collective memory mean scores of the Nakba despite their gender and mothers' educational level, as *indicated in table (4.27)*. Thus the hypothesis is accepted.

Table (4.27). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and mothers' educational level.

Gender	Mothers' educational level	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	Basic	105	4.20	0.27
Male	Secondary	195	4.41	0.29
Whate	Diploma	116	4.41	0.26
	Bachelor and above	92	4.43	0.32
	Basic	118	4.10	0.37
Female	Secondary	210	4.21	0.44
1 emaie	Diploma	115	4.27	0.30
	49	4.30	0.28	
Total		1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.14 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and region.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.28–4.29) present the results.*

Table (4.28). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and region.

Source	Df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Gender	1	4.918	4.918	40.603	0.000
Religion degree	2	0.036	0.018	0.150	0.860
Gender*Religion degree	2	0.172	0.086	0.708	0.493
Error	994	120.409	0.121		
Total	1000	18573.963			
Corrected Total	999	127.574			

As for gender and region, the findings revealed that there are no significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and region, F-value was (0.708 P=0.493), as *indicated in table (4.28)*. Similarity has been found in the youth's collective memory mean scores of the Nakba despite their gender and region, *as indicated in table (4.29)*. The hypothesis therefore is accepted.

Table (4.29). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and region.

Gender	Region	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	North	322	4.39	0.28
Male	Middle	97	4.35	0.29
	South	89	4.34	0.34
	North	193	4.20	0.45
Female	Middle	165	4.21	0.25
	South	134	4.21	0.43
Total		1000	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.3.15 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \le 0.05$ in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and GPA.

Two-way analysis of variance was used to clarify the above hypothesis. *Tables (4.30–4.31) present the results.*

Table (4.30). Two-way analysis of variance for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and GPA.

Source	Df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F-value	Sig.
Gender	1	3.457	3.457	29.290	0.000
Religion degree	2	3.686	1.843	15.615	0.000
Gender*Religion degree	2	0.534	0.267	2.262	0.105
Error	979	115.562	0.118		
Total	985	18307.656			
Corrected Total	984	126.684			

Finally, in terms of gender and GPA, the findings revealed that there are no significant differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and GPA, F-value was (2.262 P=0.105), as *indicated in table (4.30)*. Similarity has been found in the youth's collective memory mean scores of the Nakba despite their gender and GPA, as *indicated in table (4.31)*. Thus the hypothesis is accepted.

Table (4.31). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth according to gender and GPA.

Gender	GPA	N	Mean*	Std. Deviation
	70-	172	4.32	0.27
Male	70-84	214	4.40	0.29
	85+	117	4.40	0.33
	70-	216	4.11	0.44
Female	70-84	217	4.27	0.32
	85+	49	4.33	0.31
Total	1	985	4.29	0.35

*Mean out of 5 points.

3.4 Discussion and Recommendations

3.4.1 Introduction

The current study aimed at identifying the collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth. This chapter presents a discussion of the findings, following which appropriate recommendations are made.

3.4.2 Discussion

Findings indicated that Palestinian refugee youth preserve a very strong collective memory of the Nakba. Collective memory is based on sharing of values, norms, experiences, a common destiny, and a common history, that are more widespread among Palestinians taking into consideration their extremely tragic experiences under Israeli occupation, after seventy years of the Nakba; these are stored in the Palestinian collective memory and unerasable. In these terms, Maas (2013) argued that communities have a history that in an important sense is constituted by their past; one that is unforgettable.

Historically, a Palestinian camp does not basically manifest a structure similar to that of Palestinian society, since it is a foreign and urgent body with regard to social structure; the cultural and political systems of Palestinian society. The camp is an expression that represents the emergent Palestinian concentrations through an enforced diaspora which the Palestinians in 1948 and post 1967 war were subjected to. Palestinian refugees constitute the largest single group of refugees on the globe, with one in three refugees worldwide being a Palestinian. It is estimated that there are about seven million Palestinian refugees in the world, distributed through 59 official

camps; 19 are in the West Bank, 8 in Gaza Strip, 10 in Jordan, and 10 in Syria, in addition to 12 in Lebanon; the rest are in the Arab diaspora in the Arab countries without the camps and in the international diaspora, i.e., beyond the limits of the Arab World in the two Americas, Australia, and other countries.

Moreover, as all the camps are overcrowded, they contain virtually no open or green spaces that can be used for recreational purposes or sporting activities. Camp residents live in cramped dwellings that do not exceed 30 square meters, at a rate of two rooms for one family; inevitably, the housing conditions of Palestinian refugees are among the worst in the world. The health situation of Palestinian refugees is generally poor (Budairi et al., 1990; Ugland, 2003; Fincham, 2010). Additionally, the statistics provided by the PCBS (2017) reflect the highest percentage of poverty and difficult socioeconomic conditions in the refugee camps, where 47.5% of the refugee families are at risk of poverty, which is a result of the high unemployment; high fertility rate; large family size; and a high dependency rate. In this context, a male youth from Arroub camp said, "We are living in misery, we have nothing, it is very crowded, your window opens into your neighbour's window, a street is one meter wide, as refugees we need a solution that gives us our rights".

In fact, these camps which bear witness to the catastrophe, homelessness, and uprooting of Palestinians from their lands and homeland symbolize their daily sufferings at all levels: cultural, social, economic, and political. They are still, up to the present day, waiting for a political decision to put an end to their pain and suffering, as was promised to them by the international community, although the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 194 (III),

which resolved that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date" (UN, 1948).

Moreover, we must not lose sight of the fact that refugees prepare the ground for reproduction of the collective memory of the pain of the past, the Nakba in 1948, the massacres committed by the Israelis, and the places from which they were displaced and uprooted in their youth. When growing up, they heard their parents' stories about homes that were left behind, or about land that was lost when the Zionist movement declared the formation of the "nascent state of Israel" on 78% of Palestinian lands; so children will not forget all these memories when they become youth and Palestine takes deep root in their hearts like an olive tree. Stories about the earth baptized with the pain of olives will remain in the heart of the Palestinian who cannot forget the image of his homeland, which will stay forever in his collective memory. Palestinian refugees took their history with them, lived on the borders of their country, and taught their youth the meanings of pride and homeland, and the bitterness of being a refugee and the cruelty of confrontation.

In short, youth worldwide have played a pioneering role in being the leaders and providing the impetus for liberation movements. With more focus, we will find that Palestinian people starting with the family, school, and the larger society respectively raise the child on an authentic culture of belonging to their country and its just cause; this culture grows inside the child without any barriers or reservations. This is how the culture of struggle was created in the collective memory of refugee youth. The refugee camps witnessed the birth of the Palestinian resistance factions, and from there the struggle began, the

rush and race of young refugees to struggle against the occupiers, convinced that resistance is the only way to bring their families back to their homelands, taking into consideration the fact that the majority of the Palestinian suicide martyrs (Istishhadiyin) were refugees (Banat, 2010). In this context, it is pertinent to hear what the Palestinian refugee suicide martyr (Istishhady) Mahmoud Salem, one of the executors of the dual operation in Ashdod city on 14 March 2004, had to say to the Palestinian people in his last will and testament, "We have to defend our blessed land against the occupiers until the last drop of blood in our veins. We will fight them until Jaffa, Haifa and Ashkelon return". Commenting on this subject, a male youth from Balata refugee camp said, "I will never lose sight of our hopes of returning to our own city, Jaffa. The Nakba has been echoing in our minds for seventy years, and the camp has been the biggest witness to that event. So far, we have found no Arab or international serious attempt to recover our rights, and we have found these regimes only talking about peace and surrender". By the same token, in very touching and passionate words, the Palestinian female suicide martyr (Istishhadiya) and lawyer Hanadi Jaradat from Jenin governorate said in her will, "By God's force and determination, I have decided to be the sixth Istishhadiya who would make out of her body separate explosive fragments to kill the Zionists and destroy every settler and Zionist since it is not us alone who have to pay the price and harvest the price for their crimes (Nakba)". She carried out a high quality martyrdom operation in Haifa on 4 October 2003 to exact revenge on the Israelis who killed her brother Fadi and cousin Salah in cold blood in Jenin on 12 June 2003. Besides, she was greatly disturbed by the brutal Israeli aggression against Jenin camp in particular and the Palestinian people in general (Banat, 2010).

Therefore, I can say that the expulsion of Palestinian refugees has turned into a factor of strength for the Palestinian people in the struggle against occupation. Palestinian refugees are more determined than ever to resist the occupation and return to their villages, towns, and cities. The mother of the suicide martyr Fatima Najjar is a woman who experienced the Nakba of Palestine. She saw the exodus of the Palestinians from their lands in 1948. Her days were mixed with grief and sorrow. That woman, whose face would tell the pitfalls of that bitter time, did not hesitate, even for a moment, before carrying out a martyrdom operation amid a large group of Israeli soldiers in Gaza Strip on 23 November 2006, confirming that the Nakba generation, the generation of the 1948 Palestinian exodus, marks the beginning of the martyrdom and repatriation generation.

Differences according to gender were also found, consistently with the traditional gender role expectations in the Arab Palestinian society. Male refugee youth preserved a higher collective memory of the Nakba than female. Palestinian society has conservative customs and traditions, with male patriarchal dominance and social upbringing that are based on gender inequalities of power and discrimination. Patriarchal ideology is deeply rooted in Palestinian society, where the notions of father and brother are prevalent. Palestinian culture seeks to direct males towards affirmation of masculine qualities like manhood, chivalry, bravery, gallantry, daring, and stamina. On the other hand it stresses on directing females towards feminism, decency, decorum, virginity, love of children, home economics, and stability. Consequently, it was easy to increase the collective memory reproduction of the Nakba among males. At the same time, the Palestinian female also suffers from the Israeli crimes, disintegration of economic and social structure, and

uprooting of thousands of Palestinians from their homes. She is the mother, the captive, the activist, and the martyr. She also bears witness to the suffering of the Palestinian people and their tragedy. This has reinforced her collective memory (4.10), like that of males, and pushed her to actively participate in the struggle against the occupiers. In this regard, a female youth from Ayda refugee camp said, "As refugees, we are waiting for the day on which we shall return to our home, Ajjur, even if we have to sacrifice ourselves to this end; what was taken by force can only be restored by force". In this regard, Punamäki (1986) concluded that the previous experiences due to occupation cause more tension and stress than the problems of everyday life. Women with the highest scores of traumatic experiences associated with the occupation tended to evaluate all life events as stress compared to women who were less exposed to the shock, showing a statistically significant difference therein. As for the patterns of adaptation of Palestinian women under occupation, general anxiety and unpleasant feelings were the most common responses to stress instances in the study sample. The results have shown the relatively high level of suffering of women under Israeli occupation as reflected in psychological health through anxiety, aggressiveness, psychiatric symptoms, and general wellbeing.

Moreover, the findings reveal that academic achievement (GPA) among youth and their parents' level of education positively correlated with collective memory reproduction of the Nakba. In this context, Firjani (1998, p. 3) points out that the actual benefits, of the essential role played by higher education in the evolution of developing societies, are far more than the anticipated economic calculations. Higher education plays a substantial role in the formation of a higher level of human capital in any society. Higher

education institutions lay the ground for the cognitive revolution of knowledge and sophisticated abilities, leading to higher levels of human capital which are the primary reason and the backbone for progress in this century.

Education is highly valued among Palestinian refugees, as it provides them with full awareness of the Nakba and a more powerful enemy, perceived as both unjust and oppressive; that is retained in their collective memory. The refugees consider education an important mechanism by which they seek to develop their potential, interact with others to advocate their just cause, and defend it in the international arena.

The study findings also reveal that birth rank in the family, degree of religion, and region of residence in the West Bank do not make for any significant difference in collective memory among Palestinian refugee youth. This indicates that collective memory is not particularly influenced by these variables and is more likely to be affected by factors other than birth rank in the family, degree of religion, or region.

Finally, the findings show that Palestinian refugee youth whose families were exposed to different forms of Israeli violence preserved a higher collective memory of the Nakba. There is hardly any Palestinian family which has not experienced pain due to the Israeli violence against Palestinians. The Palestinian experience under occupation was and still is the most tragic one in terms of victims and violence; it has left indelible scars as a result of acts of killing, injury, handicaps, physical and psychological torture due to house demolition, confiscation of lands and water, arrests, raids, pursuit, and other forms of violence (Banat, 2010).

The Israeli occupation itself sanctifies force and violence and cannot live without these factors nor suspend them. The Kufr Qassim, Deir Yassin, Sabra, and Shatella massacres are just some examples. Israel perpetrates massacres every day against the Palestinian people; about four million Palestinians have been exposed to collective punishment on a daily basis for seventy years. What Israel has done on the ground is considered a catastrophe against Palestinians and hundreds of researchers are at a loss for words when they even try to describe these massacres. In this context, Said (2006) points out that the policy of the occupiers has been to continue to persecute, suppress, and maltreat the Palestinians using ways and practices far more devious and vicious even than the methods used in South Africa during the Apartheid regime there. These results emphasize that there is hardly any Palestinian family in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which has not experienced some pain due to Israeli violence against Palestinians. The Palestinian experience under occupation was and still is the most tragic one in terms of victims and violence; as stated earlier, Zionist atrocities encouraged by an indulgent international community have left behind a trail of tears littered with wanton acts of killing, maiming, and physical and psychological torture inflicted through every conceivable means including house demolition, confiscation of lands and water, arrests, raids, pursuits, and gratuitous violence.

It is certain that Palestinians did not chose this battle; they wish that they were like the rest of the peoples of the world, focused entirely on the development of their independent state and peacefully pursuing their political, economic, and social aspirations. However, they are obliged to endure the presence of the implacable Israeli occupier who brought destruction and hatred to this part of the world more than a century ago (Soibelman, 2004).

Palestinians now represent the largest group of refugees, who are being overlooked since the Second World War. The situation is still present and it is clearly witnessed in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and in the diaspora. The diaspora experience has had an unforgettable impact on the Palestinian social structure: displacement and humiliation; loss of land and source of income; the cold and scarcity of food; search for relatives; grief over martyrs; living in camps or in the open; charity from others and their pitying gaze; and above all the loss of territory as a space for the roots of social life and the people's collective memory and/or identity. This has entailed what can be described as a deterritorialization of the Palestinian people from their traditional life scenario. All these along with other accompanying events have led to traumatic experiences that are ineradicable from their collective memory; creating a festering wound that never seems to heal, and which will be passed on from generation to generation until the return.

3.4.3 Conclusion

The traumatic events of Al Nakba have become entrenched in the collective consciousness of Palestinian refugee youth. Collective memory plays a key role in the survival of the Palestinian issue among the refugee youth. Palestinian refugee youth have been able to preserve a strong collective consciousness as described by Durkheim (1893): a collective consciousness based on shared beliefs, ideas, and moral attitudes which operate as a unifying force within society. A social group's identity is constructed with narratives and traditions that are created to give its members a sense of community.

Without a doubt, collective memory has contributed to the preservation of the Palestinian national identity by retrieving and reviving common history. Instead of being an obstacle to shaping the nation—which requires overcoming small, petty affiliations—the memory of the village has become a link between these affiliations and the nation. Because the Palestinian village was dispossessed, it was transformed by memory into a symbol of Palestinians' belonging and clinging to their homeland. Since the history of the refugee population is about displacement, expulsion, and destruction of the economic, social, and political foundations of the pre-refuge community, the group has begun to form its own collective memory of the post-refuge phase, while continuing to evoke the past.

Anthropological studies confirm that "the relationship between refugees and the process of historical national re-consciousness is more pronounced among Palestinian refugees living inside camps than among those living outside". Palestinian refugees have managed to overcome the hardships resulting from the displacement and expulsion, which they all experienced, to form their own world. They have succeeded in turning these difficulties into motivators. The refugees have succeeded in forming cohesive groups despite the difficult conditions, which they had not experienced in the pre-refugee phase. In fact, they have been able to organize themselves to a considerable extent in these camps (Issa, 2007).

Nevertheless, the process of forming the collective memory of the refugee began at a time when the homeland was just a dream and not a reality. The refugees' hope of returning to their homes, as a common denominator, has contributed to activating the political, humanitarian, cultural, and educational

activities among them, as well as to restructuring the refugees' mindset. This experience has enabled them to adapt to the new reality in which they find themselves, and thus to withstand all the conditions and difficulties facing them. The refugees started to remember their villages and towns from which they were expelled, and they told stories to their children and grandchildren in front of their tents in the refugee camps about what happened, about their customs on occasions and holidays, about the revolutions they waged against the occupation, about martyrs and heroes, etc.

The study observed that there are two successive stages of the post-Nakba Palestinian memory. The initial stage of sensory memory was formed by the first generation, who experienced the Nakba in all its ferocity and consequences. The second, linguistic memory stage came about through the second generation, who had not lived during the Nakba. This second stage generation draws heavily on the information passed down from the first generation. The memory has transformed from being one that portrays a reality to one that breathes absence, and from a visual memory that speaks the language of sensory images to an auditory memory that utters words and phrases.

Consequently, the process of forming a collective memory began among the Palestinian refugees. Over time, these memories became part of a complex process that would go on to create a general mindset, and the task of subsequent generations became telling their children and grandchildren about Palestine. The conversation expanded to include memories of the camp, which have become a symbol of Palestine. This is what was pointed out by a young man from Arroub refugee camp:

"It is true that I was not born in 'Ajjur, and I have never seen it, but I came to know every inch there from what my father and late grandfather told us about their life there. My grandfather told us about the days of 'Ajjur and its land, about the Friday Market there, until its picture and name became engraved in our hearts and were written on our foreheads. Our parents will pass away one day, but we, along with our children, will inherit the love of our land, before we inherit the land ownership documents from them. This right is the will of our fathers and forefathers who passed away while they were advising us not to give it up, even on our dead bodies."

In the same context, a young girl from Balata refugee camp said:

"Whoever believes that the first generation of displaced persons will die, and that the new generation will forget and will not pursue their right of return is wrong. I think that the children of refugees who have lived the life of the camps and the cruelty will not forget their right of return, whatever sacrifices this goal may cost them".

The issue of the Palestinian refugees and its accompanying calamities, uprooting, and displacement is a pressing and grim question that must be placed in the right context through documenting the collective memory of past generations and passing it on to subsequent generations, the generations of tomorrow, so that it will remain etched in their hearts and will never be forgotten by young people.

Palestinians have consistently faced the most brutal occupier that history ever knew; ironically, it is this remorselessness of the intruder that has served to preserve Palestinian youth's collective memory. Al Nakba's traumatic events

hold firm in the collective consciousness of Palestinian refugee youth. Collective memory plays a key role in the survival of the Palestinian issue among the refugee youth. Palestinian refugee youth were able to preserve a strong collective consciousness as Durkheim (1893) once described, a collective consciousness based on shared beliefs, ideas, and moral attitudes which operate as a unifying force within society; a social group's identity is constructed with narratives and traditions that evolve so as to offer its constituents a sense of community.

It is true that aged refugees will pass on and equally true that the youth shall never forget. According to Sayegh (1983) we are Palestinians, we were Palestinians, we are still Palestinians, we will stay like this forever, we will return to Palestine sooner or later. This determination means one thing; as the refugees continue to be denied the right of return, the collective memory of the Nakba continues to burn, an ever-brighter flame. This is the story of the Palestinians, the saga of separation of peoples from their land and the inevitable emergence of the collective memory of Al Nakba.

3.4.4 Recommendations

In light of the study results and discussion, the following recommendations are made:

1. The concept of collective memory of the Nakba must be given the utmost importance in the curriculum and the different media outlets.

- 2. Further research is essential to expand understanding of collective memory of the Nakba aspects among Palestinian refugee youth within different methodological contexts.
- 3. A sample survey study should be carried out in terms of the psychological aspects related to denial of the right of return for Palestinian refugees.
- 4. A further research in the area of the traumatic experiences of the Nakba among the Palestinian generations of the Nakba is essential.
- 5. Moreover, a comparative study of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian youth in the diaspora is recommended.

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
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References

Appendix (A). Sample Size Calculator.



Appendix (B). Questionnaire in English.



Granada University Faculty of Peace & Conflict PhD. Program of Social Sciences

Dear Youth,

Thank you for participating in this questionnaire. It is part of a research being conducted at Granada University under the auspices of the PhD. Program of Social Sciences. Your answers will help to explore the collective memory of the Palestinian refugees after 70 years of Nakba. Be assured that your information will be kept confidential and only used for the research topic. Thank you for your time.

Prepared by: Jawad Dayyeh Supervised by: Dr. Mario López Martínez

Section one: General information.

Your GPA

Gender 1.Male 2.Female Family birth rank 1.Eldest 2.Middle 3.Youngest

Appendixes								
Degree of reli	gion							
1.High	2.Moderate	3.Low						
Father's educa	tional level							
1.Basic	2.Secondary	3.Diploma	4.Bachelor and above					
Mother's educ 1.Basic2.Seco	ational level ndary 3.Diple	oma 4.Bacl	nelor and above					
Region (West	Bank)							
1.North	2.Middle	3.South						
Was the famil 1.Yes 2.No	y exposed to ar	ny form of Israe	eli violence?					

Section Two: Questionnaire items.

Please answer the following questions according to the following scale (1= Strongly agree, 2= Agree, 3= Neutral, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly disagree)

No.	Items	SA	A	N	D	SD
1.	I know my hometown which my forefathers were forced to leave.					
2.	Reading rather than visiting Palestinian villages is enough.					

1	
3.	I ask my parents about my forefathers'
5.	town which they were forced to leave.
	Any direction which does lead to
4.	destroyed Palestinian cities and towns is
	misleading and suspicious.
	I feel relaxed when my father tells us
5.	about our hometown.
6.	The right of return is sacred and
0.	imprescriptible.
	When I introduce myself, I mention my
7.	forefathers' hometown.
8.	I search for pictures of my hometown in
0.	the media.
	I feel nostalgic about my forefathers'
9.	hometown which they were forced to
	leave.
10	I watch T.V. series depicting the
10.	Palestinian Nakba.
	I look forward to hearing the elders'
11.	stories about destroyed cities and
	villages.

b			
12.	The camp is a live testimony of		
12.	displacement and loss of Palestinians.		
	I feel sorry for what happened to		
13.			
	Palestinians as a result of displacement.		
	The camp is a passage way towards my		
14.	hometown.		
15.	I still keep some items that remind me		
15.	of my hometown.		
16.	I feel proud to be a Palestinian refugee.		
10.	I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I		
17.	I can't express my feelings toward the		
17.	Nakba event.		
	I have inner feelings, that the <i>Nakba</i> will		
18.	occur again.		
	occur again.		
19.	I feel as if I live the <i>Nakba</i> every day.		
	I avoid all that reminds me or relates to		
20.	the Nakba.		
01	I impatiently wait for the Nakba		
21.	activities to take place.		
			_
22.	I will never forget the <i>Nakba</i> as long as		
	I live.		

	I attach great importance to the			
23.	Palestinian refugees.			
24.	I defend the Palestinian refugee issue,			
24.	whenever it is necessary.			
	I like to read about the history of my			
25.	hometown.			
	I participate in the <i>Nakba</i> anniversary			
26.	activities every year.			
	I will not hesitate to sacrifice my life to		 	
27.	return to my hometown.			

Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation.

Jawad Naji Dayyeh

Appendix (C). Questionnaire in Arabic.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم



أخى الطالب / أختى الطالبة

تحية وبعد،،،

يقوم الباحث بإجراء دراسة حول "الذاكرة الجماعية لدى اللاجئين الفلسطينيين بعد مرور سبعون عاماً على النكبة"، وقد وقع عليك الاختيار عشوائياً لتكون ضمن عينة الدراسة، لذا أرجو منك التعاون بتعبئة هذه الاستبانة بما يتوافق مع وجهة نظرك، علماً بأن بيانات الدراسة هي لأغراض البحث العلمي فقط، وسيتم الحفاظ على سريتها، ولا يطلب منك كتابة اسمك أو ما يشير اليك، شاكرين لك حسن تعاونك.

إعداد: أ. جواد ناجي دية

إشراف: د. ماريو لوبث مارتين

القسم الأول: معلومات عامة

الرجاء وضع دائرة حول رمز الإجابة التي تنطبق عليك

الجنس ذكر أنثى

الترتيب الولادي في الأسرة الأول الوسط الأخير

المعدل العام

درجة التدين متدين متدين إلى حد ما غير متدين

Collective Memory —Nakba— Jawad A. Dayyeh

مستوى تعليم الأب أساسي فما دون ثانوي دبلوم بكالوريوس فأعلى مستوى تعليم الأم أساسي فما دون ثانوي دبلوم بكالوريوس فأعلى أساسي فما دون ثانوي دبلوم بكالوريوس فأعلى أساسي فما دون ثانوي دبلوم مكالوريوس فأعلى أساسي فما دون ثانوي دبلوم ماكل أساسي فما دون شاعل أساسي فما دون ثانوي دبلوم ماكلوريوس فأعلى أساسي فما دون ثانوي الخلي فالإسرائيلي شمال الضفة وسط الضفة جنوب الضفة

القسم الثاني: فقرات الاستبانة

أرجو منك قراءة الفقرات الآتية بعناية، والاجابة عنها بوضع دائرة حول رمز الاجابة التي تراها / ترينها مناسبة.

لا أوافق بشدة	لا أوافق	بین بین	أو ا فق	أو افق بشدة	الفقرات	الرقم
5	4	3	2	1	أعرف بلدي الأصلية التي هاجر منها أجدادي	.1
5	4	3	2	1	يكفي القراءة عن المدن والقرى الفلسطينية المدمرة بدلاً من زيارتها	.2
5	4	3	2	1	أسأل والدي عن بلدي الأصلية التي هجّر منها أجدادي	.3

5	4	3	2	1	بوصلة لا تشير إلى المدن والقرى الفلسطينية المدمرة مشبو هة	.4
5	4	3	2	1	أشعر بالراحة عندما يحدثنا أبي عن بلدي الأصلية	.5
5	4	3	2	1	حق العودة حق مقدس لا يسقط بالتقادم	.6
5	4	3	2	1	عندما أعرّف على نفسي أذكر بلدي الأصلية	.7
5	4	3	2	1	أبحث عن صور لبلدي الأصلية في وسائل الإعلام	.8
5	4	3	2	1	لديّ شوق لزيارة بلدي الأصلية التي هجّر منها أجدادي	.9
5	4	3	2	1	أشاهد مسلسلات عن النكبة كالتغريبة الفلسطينية	.10
5	4	3	2	1	أتشوق لسماع القصص التي يرويها الكبار عن المدن والقرى الفلسطينية المدمرة	.11
5	4	3	2	1	المخيم شاهد حي على ما لحق بالفلسطينيين من تشرد وضياع	.12

Collective Memory —Nakba— Jawad A. Dayyeh

5	4	3	2	1	أشعر بالأسى على ما حل بالفلسطينيين في النكبة من تشرد وضياع	.13
5	4	3	2	1	المخيم جسر العبور إلى بلدي الأصلية	.14
5	4	3	2	1	احتفظ بأشياء تذكرني ببلدي الأصلية	.15
5	4	3	2	1	أفتخر بأني لاجئ فلسطيني	.16
5	4	3	2	1	لا أستطيع التعبير عن مشاعري تجاه حدث النكبة	.17
5	4	3	2	1	تتتابني مشاعر داخلية أن حدث النكبة سيحدث مرة أخرى	.18
5	4	3	2	1	أشعر وكأنني أعيش حدث النكبة	.19
5	4	3	2	1	أتجنب كل ما يذكرني بحدث النكبة	.20
5	4	3	2	1	أنتظر قدوم فعاليات النكبة بفارغ الصبر	.21

5	4	3	2	1	لن أنسى حدث النكبة ما حييت	.22
5	4	3	2	1	أعطي قضية اللاجئين الفلسطينيين قدر اً من الأهمية	.23
5	4	3	2	1	أدافع عن قضية اللاجئين الفلسطينيين كلما اقتضى الأمر ذلك	.24
5	4	3	2	1	أحب أن أقرأ عن تاريخ بلدي الأصلية	.25
5	4	3	2	1	أشارك في فعاليات أحياء ذكرى النكبة كل عام	.26
5	4	3	2	1	لن أتردد بالتضحية في حياتي مقابل العودة إلى بلدي الأصلية	.27

شاكرين لكم حسن تعاونكم معنا،،،


جواد ناجي دية

No.	Professor's name	University	Country
1.	Francisco Entrena Durán	University of Granada	Spain
2.	Hasan Yahya	Jackson Community College	USA
3.	Hassan Karaki	Lebanese University	Lebanon
4.	Mohamad Toufic Houri	Beirut Arab University	Lebanon
5.	Abdelmajid Naceur	Tunis University	Tunis
6.	Sharif Kana'na	Birzeit University	Palestine
7.	Tiziana Chiappelli	University of Florence	Italy
8.	Mohamed Shishtawy	Benha University	Egypt
9.	Hasan Barmil	Al-Quds Open University	Palestine
10.	Mohammed Namourah	Al-Quds Open University	Palestine
11.	Khaled Katalo	Al-Quds Open University	Palestine

Appendix (D). Group of Referees and Expert Arbitrators.

12.	Rabee Owais	Al-Quds University	Palestine
13.	Omar Remawi	Al-Quds University	Palestine
14.	Iyad Hallaq	Al-Quds University	Palestine
15.	Sohail Hassaneen	Al-Quds University	Palestine






Palestine under the British Mandate, 1923-1948

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)

(Passia, 2002b)


Appendix (F). Palestinian Refugees: Displaced from Urban and

Rural Areas.




(Palestinian refugees, 2000)

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
Appendix (G). Palestine UN Partition Plan, 1947.

(Passia, 2002b)



Appendix (H). Palestine: West Bank and Gaza Strip.


(Passia, 2002b)



Appendix (I). The Oslo Accords between Palestinians and Israelis.

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)


Appendix (J). Palestine: West Bank Separation Wall.



West Bank Wall - Map 2006


(Passia, 2002b)

Appendix (K). Palestinian Refugee Camps.



(UNRWA, 2017)


Appendix (L). Palestinian Loss of Land, 1946-2000.



(Passia, 2002b)



Figure (1). Distribution of the participants by gender.



Figures

Figure (2). Distribution of the participants by family birth rank.







Figure (3). Distribution of the participants by religion degree.



Figures

Figure (4). Distribution of the participants by exposure to Israeli violence.







Figure (5). Distribution of the participants by father's educational level.



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Figure (6). Distribution of the participants by mother's educational level.






Figure (7). Distribution of the participants by region.




Figure (8). Distribution of the participants by grade point average (GPA).








Figure (9). Degree of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.



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Figure (10). Indicators of collective memory of the Nakba among Palestinian refugee youth.










Figure (11). Palestinian Youths' Drawings of the Nakba as Perceived in their Collective Memory.




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


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







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








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
Collective Memory —Nakba— Jawad A. Dayyeh



















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

















La generación mayor pasa la llave (o el testigo) a la generación más joven para mantener la idea de resistencia y de la memoria

[© Hamdi Abu Rahma]



Mantener el registro de propiedad de la tierra o la casa forma parte de la resistencia y la memoria



In Jerusalem



My homeland is not a suitcase, and l am no traveller

— Mahmoud Darwish —

AZQUOTES



Este grupo lleva el nombre de una luchadora



Carrera que lleva el nombre de ideas patrióticas




Niños bailando con símbolos de identidad y canciones palestinas delante de soldados israelíes



The Right of Return graffiti on the Separation Wall in West Bank





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Ejemplo de resistencia y resiliencia. Tomado de Nablus