

UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA



**“We, the New Citizens of Europe”:
European identity in Central and Eastern European
Member States of the European Union.
Determinants, Contents and Consequences**

Aleksandra Anna Sojka

Tesis Doctoral
Programa de Doctorado en Ciencias Sociales

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Doctoranda:
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Granada, enero 2015

*To my mother Maria, and my
grandmother, Anna and Helena,
for teaching me about the
importance of not giving up on
my dreams*

*Z dedykacją dla mojej mamy
Marii i moich babć, Anny i
Heleny, które nauczyły mnie
podążać za moimi marzeniami*

Dziękuję

Abstract

The fifth wave of European Union (EU) enlargement towards Eastern Europe (2004/2007), produced a historically significant transformation. The extension of European citizenship to millions of new citizens in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) generated a *de facto* reunification of the continent. These developments raise important questions regarding underlying political loyalties. Does this formal reunification of Europeans translate into the presence of a common *European identity* across the Union, or has the sense of political identification been diluted through such expansion?

This thesis addresses this highly relevant question by carrying out a theoretically grounded comparative investigation of European identification in the new CEE member states and the more established EU countries. European identity is approached as a socio-political reality rooted in the individual orientations of regular citizens and elites. On the basis of social psychologists' findings, two basic dimensions of European identification are distinguished: the *cognitive* aspect which denotes "identification as European", and its *affective* element which refers to "identification with Europe". Moreover, I also explore the meanings attached to such European belonging, as influenced by different political contexts and national elites, and their consequences for EU support.

My results suggest that ordinary citizens frame European identity in the same terms in old and new member states, mostly as a civic belonging. However, at the same time, the new citizens of the EU are less likely to perceive themselves as European, a difference which is due to a rather low self-perception as Europeans of the older generations and can be explained by their primary socialization as outsiders of the community. Elites, on the other hand, tend to identify with Europe and as Europeans to the same extent in both new and old member states, but here the difference arises in the contents of such identification.

The research undertaken in this thesis aims to move the scholarly debate forward in several ways. Firstly, it offers a multidimensional analysis of the state of European identification, its determinants, contents, and consequences, and addresses the question of the viability of a European identity after the Eastern enlargement. Secondly, it contributes to the theoretical debate on the concept and operationalization of European identity in empirical research by pointing out and explaining relevant East/West differences in this aspect. Finally, it explores the role of affective determinants in the formation of EU support, which has largely been overlooked in scholarship on EU attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe.

Resumen

La quinta ola de ampliación de la Unión Europea (UE) hacia el Este (2004/2007), constituye una transformación de dimensión histórica. La extensión de la ciudadanía europea a millones de nuevos ciudadanos en Europa Central y Oriental (PECO) forjó una reunificación *de facto* del continente. Esta evolución plantea cuestiones importantes con respecto a las lealtades políticas subyacentes. ¿Se ha traducido esta reunificación formal de los europeos en la presencia de una identidad europea común para toda la UE, o se habrá diluido el sentimiento de identidad comunitaria mediante esta expansión?

La tesis aborda esta cuestión mediante una investigación comparativa de la identificación europea entre los nuevos estados miembros y los países ya establecidos de la UE. La identidad europea se analiza como una realidad socio-política enraizada en las orientaciones individuales de los ciudadanos comunes y de las élites. Sobre la base de los hallazgos de los psicólogos sociales, se distinguen dos dimensiones básicas de identificación europea: el aspecto cognitivo que denota “la identificación como europeos”, y el elemento afectivo que se refiere a “la identificación con Europa”. Por otra parte, también se exploran los significados atribuidos a tal pertenencia, teniendo en cuenta la influencia de los diferentes contextos políticos y de las élites nacionales, así como sus consecuencias para el apoyo a integración.

Los resultados desvelan que los ciudadanos conceptualizan su identidad europea en términos muy similares tanto en los nuevos como en los antiguos Estados miembros; esto es; la identidad europea se concibe como una pertenencia cívica. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, los nuevos ciudadanos de la UE son menos propensos a percibirse a sí mismos como europeos, una diferencia que podría deberse a las percepciones de las generaciones mayores en estos países, cuya socialización primaria tuvo lugar fuera de la comunidad europea. Las élites, por el contrario, tienden a identificarse con Europa y como europeos en la misma medida en los nuevos y en los antiguos Estados miembros, pero aquí la diferencia surge en el contenido de dicha identificación.

El objetivo de esta tesis es contribuir al debate académico en varios aspectos. En primer lugar, ofrece un análisis multidimensional del estado de identificación europea, sus determinantes, el contenido y consecuencias, y aborda la cuestión de la viabilidad de una identidad europea después de la ampliación hacia el Este. En segundo lugar, contribuye al debate teórico sobre el concepto y la operacionalización de identidad europea en la investigación empírica, señalando y explicando las diferencias pertinentes Este/Oeste al respecto. Por último, se explora el papel de los determinantes afectivos en la formación del apoyo a la UE, que han sido en gran medida obviados en los estudios sobre actitudes en Europa central y oriental.

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Introduction

“Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, nous unissons des hommes”¹

– Jean Monnet, 1952

“Nous devons faire l’Europe non seulement dans l’intérêt des pays libres, mais aussi pour pouvoir y accueillir les peuples de l’Est qui, délivrés des sujétions qu’elles ont subies jusqu’à présent, nous demanderont leur adhésion et notre appui moral (...). Nous considérons comme partie intégrante de l’Europe vivante tous ceux qui ont le désir de nous rejoindre dans une communauté reconstituée.”²

– Robert Schuman, 1956, quoted in Avery (2010)

The fifth wave of European Union (EU) enlargement to include Eastern Europe (2004/2007), produced a historically significant transformation. The extension of European citizenship to millions of new citizens in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) generated a *de facto* reunification of the continent following decades of separation into two political blocs. The political community of Europeans now includes over five hundred million people and spans across Western and Eastern Europe. However, in terms of European Union (EU) cohesion, these developments raise important questions regarding underlying political loyalties. Does this formal reunification of Europeans translate into the presence of a common *European identity* across the EU, or has the sense of European identity been diluted through such expansion? For this thesis I have addressed these questions by carrying out a comparative study of individual public opinion and elite orientations in the new CEE member states and the more established EU countries.

¹ “We do not unite countries, we unite people”

² “We must make Europe not only in the interests of the free countries, but also to be able to welcome the peoples of the East who, freed from the subjection that they have suffered until now, will ask to join us and request our moral support. (...) We consider all those who wish to join us in our renewed community to be an integral part of Europe, the living Europe” (translation by Avery, 2010, 12).

1. Identity, enlargement, and European integration

The issue of political loyalties has been at the heart of European integration since its inception. The founding documents of the European Union (EU) include references to an envisaged “de facto solidarity” (The Schuman Declaration, 1950) in an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1957), and the early theorists of European integration, such as Karl Deutsch (1957) and Ernst Haas (1958), situated the identity-building aspect of the process at the center of their theories. However, as long as the European integration process prioritized trade liberalization, the potential of identities for generating positive—or negative—EU attitudes was largely ignored. For the majority of its history, European integration has been an elite-driven process, with a relatively small group of bureaucratic and political elites at its heart (Haller 2008). Such “Euroelitism” is characterized by elites who tend to be substantially (but not entirely uniformly) more supportive of integration, their attachment to Europe being customarily stronger than that of the general population (Best 2012). However, over time, the nature of the European project has changed considerably, with citizens gradually gaining influence over the process. The presence of a European *demos*, rooted in the existence of a European political identity, has become the subject of popular debates and scholarly interest within European political studies over the last two decades. This is largely due to the fact that the simultaneous processes of *widening* and *deepening* have dramatically shifted the internal and external limits of Europe, thereby contributing to the politicization of the process and scope of European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009).

These processes laid foundations for the institutionalization of a European political entity and broadened the scope of integration, which in turn, raised the issue of political legitimacy and the loyalty of citizens. The existence of a European Union with a common currency and a supranational European citizenship—implying an important *deepening* of integration—was established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. By creating the status of citizen of the Union, the Treaty provided the emerging polity with its *people*. Therefore, it supplemented the EU with its corresponding political community and added a more distinctly supranational, social and political character to the process based hitherto mainly on economic integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007, 132; Habermas 2012, 61). However, the extension of European policy scope beyond the common market also politicized European integration, activating the polarizing potential of political identities within the EU and initiating debates regarding its democratic legitimacy (Beetham and Lord 1998; Scheuer

2005; Cerutti and Lucarelli 2008; Fuchs 2011a; Lucarelli 2011). In response, European institutions have promoted “the EU as a new citizenship and Europe as a new political identity” (Bruter 2005, 73). This was primarily undertaken through the use of symbols³ (Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005) and the promotion of common values⁴, intended to strengthen the feelings of commonality among Europeans, as a necessary basis for establishing a European identity and, therefore, solidarity.

Eastward expansion of the EU further contributed to the rise in prominence of the European identity question. The welcoming of twelve new countries as members of the EU in the so-called “Big Bang” EU enlargement stimulated reflection on the borders of European Union and the possible limits to its *widening* (Mach and Pozarlik 2008). An assumed common identity was essential to this enlargement process, as inclusion of the ten post-communist⁵ states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE-10) was to a great extent justified on the grounds of common identity and shared norms and values (Schimmelfennig 2001; Sjursen 2002). The revolutions of 1989 that freed this part of the continent from Soviet dominance initiated a sense of “kinship-duty” towards the East in Western Europe, making enlargement appear inevitable (Sjursen 2006)⁶. The prevailing perception in the acceding states, meanwhile, was that CEE countries had always been part of Europe and now needed to “return” to it after almost half a century of political and economic division (Grabbe and Hughes 1999; Brusis 2001; Batt 2002). Political elites across the ideological spectrum in these candidate states spoke of the historical necessity of such a “return to Europe”, implying a return to normality (Copsey 2013) and strong identification with Western values and

³ The Constitutional Treaty (CT) included official recognition of the European flag, the anthem, EU’s motto—“United in Diversity”—and a European Day. Upon rejection of the CT, these were dropped from the text of the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon (2007). European institutions, however, continue to use them.

⁴ The issue of what elements and values constitute European identity has been the preoccupation of European leaders for quite a while. At the 1973 Copenhagen summit, the “Declaration on European identity” was issued, highlighting the principles of representative democracy, rule of law, social justice, respect of human rights, as well as the institutions and policies of the common market as its underlying values (Stråth 2002).

⁵ In the literature it is customary to refer to these countries as “post-communist”, however, it must be noted that none of these countries actually implemented a communist system in the exact meaning of the term, this is why, I use the term post-communist interchangeably with “post-socialist” as more adequate to describe the legacies of systems implemented under Soviet domination.

⁶ As the quote at the beginning of the chapter illustrates, as early as 1956, Robert Schuman (presumably inspired by events in Budapest) noted the necessity of welcoming Eastern European countries as part of the European Community if they were to liberate themselves from Soviet domination (Avery 2010). However, it was not possible to discuss any real possibility of membership until the 1990s. Only in 1993 were the political, economic and legal criteria to be fulfilled by potential candidates established at the Copenhagen meeting of the European Council, constituting a roadmap to membership for post-socialist countries.

norms, which to great extent inspired the post-1989 changes (Schimmelfennig 2003). There was, thus, on both sides of the process, a clear affective motivation for EU accession based on an assumed shared identity and the historical inevitability of reuniting the continent.

At the same time, some debates in the media and academia focused on possible negative impacts that enlargement might have on the cohesion of the European political community and its emerging identity (Weiss 2003; Fuchs and Klingeman 2006; Katzenstein and Checkel 2009; Thomassen and Bäck 2009; Risse 2010). Concern was raised that Eastward enlargement could dilute whatever tenuous European identity existed: the number of member states almost doubled and included countries which, in comparison to existing members, had significantly less economic development and shorter histories of democracy. Differences in values and attitudes were also expected, as Mau and Verwiebe have noted,

the inclusion of additional members raises the question of the extent to which these new members fit the social and cultural self-image of the EU, and whether the result is not a greater discrepancy between the values propagated by the EU and the member countries' own sets of values, thus obstructing integration (2010, 330).

Whether an underlying common identity could survive the enlargement process was therefore questioned by some observers⁷. Within the candidate states themselves, a feeling of disillusionment with the EU existed, due to the lack of enthusiasm for their accession by established EU members (McLaren 2006, 156). The difficult and prolonged membership negotiations, which included a tough stance on EU conditionality and the decision to impose several restrictions on the new EU citizens' rights—most importantly, transitional periods of up to seven years on the free movement of labor—contributed to a more sober assessment of the idealistic assumptions regarding the “return to Europe”.

Therefore, in spite of the assumed shared identity underlying the accession process of CEE countries, ambivalent attitudes in the established member states about enlargement—as translated into specific conditions for membership—seriously undermined the position and perception of the new European citizens as equals within the community. Moreover, such differentiation has been maintained following accession, with prominent debates regarding

⁷ Furthermore, these doubts could be better understood if we take into account that for decades the Soviet-dominated “Eastern Europe” constituted the significant Other against which Western Europe could construct its image and identification. In these terms, Eastern enlargement constituted also a radical shift in the imagined borders of Europe which challenged “mental security” of both Eastern and Western Europeans (Mach and Pozarlik 2008).

the desirability of workers' mobility from the new CEE-10 member states⁸ and political unwillingness to include some of these countries in the Schengen area of free cross-border movement⁹. Therefore, while an assumption of shared identity was an important trigger for Eastern enlargement, inclusion of the new member states in the European political community was not always straightforward, and sometimes it appeared that only a second-class European citizenship had been granted to these new EU citizens. Moreover, there was concern that whatever "European identity" had existed prior to Eastern enlargement was now so diluted that no meaningful European political community could come to fruition. However, any potentially divisive effect of Eastward enlargement on the prospects of European political identity needs to be empirically determined: this is therefore the objective of my thesis.

2. Aims and research questions

A shared European identity constitutes a central tenet of contemporary EU politics (Kohli 2000; Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Risse 2010; Fuchs 2011a; Kaina and Karolewski 2013). Moreover, the ongoing economic and financial crisis has sparked debates about solidarity and the legitimacy of transnational governance across Europe, further highlighting the functional role of identification within European political institutions (Fuchs 2011b), especially as a buffer against discontent (Wessels 2007). The questions which arise, therefore, are whether reunification has impinged on the possibility of a common *European identity* across the EU, and whether we can actually observe any negative impact of Eastward enlargement on European political identity, as anticipated by some scholars (Weiss 2003; Fuchs and Klingeman 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Thomassen and Bäck 2009; Mau and Verwiebe 2010). In this sense, the aim of this study is to investigate European

⁸ This debate emerged in France, among other Western countries, around the time of accession, in relation to the draft of the Constitutional Treaty and the Bolkestein Directive. The figure of the "Polish Plumber" was used to represent the threat from cheap Central and Eastern European labor (Wyrozumska 2007). Following accession, the perceived threat from Eastern European migrants—that is, new European citizens moving freely in search of work within the EU—has been the key stimulus for the emergence of the Eurosceptic UKIP in the United Kingdom (Sherwood 2014). It also prompted Nicolas Sarkozy to promise in 2010 to expel Roma migrants—mostly from Central and Eastern European member states—from France (Saltmarsh 2010).

⁹ Concerns regarding the rule of law in Romania and Bulgaria have been cited as reasons for preventing their entry to the Schengen Area. The Dutch immigration minister was quoted by *The New York Times* in 2011 in relation to the vetoing of entry for Bulgaria and Romania: "It is also a matter of trust and confidence that our collective external borders will be safe and secure. At the moment, it is clear that there are still significant shortcomings in the field of anticorruption and the fight against organized crime" (Castle 2011).

identification in the enlarged EU, with a focus on possible differences between the new and old member states. Therefore, the basic research question addressed in this thesis is as follows:

Did the Eastward enlargement of the European Union thwart the emergence of a common European political identity?

The starting point for this study is the observation of a puzzling contradiction regarding the issue of European identity within the new member states. On the one hand, after the fall of communism, EU membership received widespread support in CEE and was framed by political elites as an integral part of the political and economic changes in these countries—as the “return to Europe” slogan indicated—providing a solid basis for attachment to the European Union. On the other hand, some recent studies of European identity have detected a generally lower level of European identification in CEE countries (Kuhn 2012; Sanders et al. 2012). These studies, however, have not explored the sources of these perceived differences. Therefore, the objective of the present study is to verify whether we can speak of a substantial divide in terms of European identification between the new and established member states of the EU. Thus, the first research question can be formulated as follows:

Q1. Are the new European citizens from Central and Eastern Europe less likely to hold a European identity, in comparison to their Western counterparts?

In order to address these questions and explore European identification within the enlarged EU, I have adopted the social identity theory framework. On the basis of social psychologists’ findings, we can distinguish between two processes central to the formation of social identities: the *cognitive* process (based on perceived similarity), which denotes “identification as European”; and its *affective* development (based on positive distinction), which refers to “identification with the Europe”. Such a two-dimensional empirical analysis of European identity reveals that while citizens of post-communist EU member states are on average less likely to perceive themselves as European than their Western counterparts, their attachment to Europe is deep-seated. Here, I intend to explain this persistent difference.

In order to fully understand the political consequences of European identity it is not enough to merely look at its relative strength, stability, and determinants, we must also explore its subjective meanings (Huddy 2013); that is, establish who is perceived to be included in/excluded from the community of Europeans. Scholars of European politics have

famously argued in favor of an EU identity based on the values of “constitutional patriotism” (Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001; Habermas 2012), indicating a predominantly civic concept of belonging. However, when assessing the effects of the Eastward expansion on European identity, some authors have suggested that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries may exhibit stronger opposition to such a cosmopolitan notion of European citizenship and identity based on supranational institutions (Weiss 2003; Thomassen and Bäck 2009) and attach more importance to ancestry (Liebich 2010) and religion as constitutive elements of the political community (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, 14; Risse 2010). Thus, in order to verify these assumptions and further explore the impact of Eastward enlargement on the prospects of a common European identity, we must also explore its socially constructed meanings (contents), as influenced by different national political contexts and political leaders. Therefore, the second research question reads as follows:

Q2. Is there any difference in the way the new European citizens from Central and Eastern Europe conceptualize European identity, in comparison to their Western counterparts?

Finally, from the point of view of the broader framework of political systems, the existence of a shared identity facilitates continued support from members of the political community, even when outcomes may not always be to their benefit (Easton 1979). Consequently, the functional value of identity for a political system cannot be overestimated and the development of a European identity is crucial to maintain support for the EU and ensure its political legitimacy (Lucarelli 2011; Fuchs 2011a). Affective factors should therefore also constitute a key factor in the formation of political support within the new EU member states. However, comparative empirical research on CEE attitudes—both as candidate countries and member states—has so far focused on utilitarian and ideological factors in relation to support for European integration (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004; Tverdova and Anderson 2004; Guerra 2013a). Therefore, in exploring the *consequences* of European identification for EU support, I address this gap and aim to answer the following question:

Q3. What is the role of affective factors in the formation of EU support in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe?

I explore this question in a comparative framework, focusing on two periods: the time following accession in 2004; and 2012, when public perceptions of the EU had been

influenced by the economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s. My hypothesis is that the economic and political difficulties experienced by the EU could undermine the “unconditional support” for membership (a general positive image of the EU), which was a key dimension of support for EU membership in CEE countries prior to accession (Guerra 2013, 143). In this sense I argue that almost ten years after the first Eastern enlargement, given the perceived declining performance of the European economy and the issue of solidarity looming as the main challenge ahead, the importance of more stable, affective factors must be re-evaluated.

3. Contribution to current research

With this thesis I hope to move scholarly debate forward in several ways. Firstly, I present a multidimensional analysis of the state of European identification and address the question of viability of a European identity within the expanded EU. Secondly, I contribute to the theoretical debate on the concept and operationalization of European identity in empirical research. Finally, I explore the role of affective determinants in the formation of EU support, which has largely been overlooked in scholarship on Central and Eastern Europe.

The first contribution lies in my consideration of the empirical evidence regarding the state of European identity within the enlarged EU, and addresses the determinants of the existing differences observed between East and West Europe. This relates to a broader shift towards issues of political community-building in post-Maastricht discourses on European integration and a renewed consideration of affective factors in EU scholarship (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Bruter 2005; Risse 2010; Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012; Cram 2012), as well as socialization and experience as sources of European attitudes and identification (Bruter 2003; Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009; Kuhn 2012). The study of European identification in the EU is framed within a progressive politicization of public opinion on EU issues (Hooghe and Marks 2008; Börzel and Risse 2009), which occurred in the context of referenda on treaties¹⁰, but also in other aspects of EU policies, such as the introduction of the common currency or expansion towards the East

¹⁰ National public opinion made its mark when the Maastricht Treaty was rejected in a Danish referendum (1992), when the Nice Treaty was rejected by Ireland (2001), and especially when the Constitutional Treaty (CT) was defeated in the referenda in France and the Netherlands (2005), bringing CT’s approval process to a halt and obliging European leaders to abandon the Constitutional project in favor of a less politicized solution. Most recently we have witnessed the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland (2008), which was then approved in a second referendum with some concessions to address the worries of the Danish people.

of Europe¹¹ (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010). The European Union was created as an elite-driven project of economic integration with an extremely limited role afforded to the general public. This was especially true in the early phases of integration, deemed the era of “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), when citizens remained passively supportive and rather uninterested in the politics and technicalities of European integration. Accordingly, integration was initially perceived (and studied) as an international relations’ issue and, thus, external to national politics. Consequently, the post-Maastricht process of politicizing European integration resulted in the disappearance of such *permissive consensus* (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) among European public opinion and an increasingly visible public contestation of EU policies and treaties, referred to as *constraining dissensus* (Hooghe and Marks 2005). This growing prominence of the public has not been matched, however, by developments in political representation at the European level. The role of the European Parliament—elected directly since 1979—remains limited when compared to national parliaments and European elections continue to constitute second-order electoral processes¹². Nonetheless, in spite of relative low turnouts and the absence of real European parties, the politics of the EU slowly ceased to be an external issue of international relations and became part of domestic political conflict (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kulahci 2012; Conti 2014). This process has reached its peak in the context of the economic crisis of the late 2000s and there is currently no doubt that citizens’ attitudes “shape and constrain the process of European integration” (Gabel 1998, 333).

In theoretical terms, this study is inscribed in the framework of the constructivist turn in EU scholarship (Schimmelfennig 2014), which coincided with the emergence of broader debates regarding “the return of culture and identity” in international relations (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Checkel 2005) and the increasing popularity of constructivist perspectives in social sciences in general. Constructivist approaches to the EU are based on the notion that social ideas and identities matter for European integration (Parsons 2003). Their main assumption is that ideational and intersubjective structures such as collective identities, culture, values and norms shape socio-political preferences and interactions in a way which

¹¹ Danish (1992) and Swedish (2003) rejection of the common currency and the debates in France and Great Britain regarding the consequences of free labor mobility after the Eastern expansion are only a few examples of important national political debates on specific European policies.

¹² EP elections have been characterized as second-order due to the following three basic characteristics in comparison to (first-order) national elections: the turnout is significantly lower; smaller parties tend to do better; and national governing parties usually suffer losses (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

cannot be explained by considering only utilitarian factors of behavior (Schimmelfennig 2014, 35). This thesis is therefore framed by a social constructivist perspective as its basic assumption is that not only interests, but also social identities constitute relevant explanatory factors for political behavior (Risse 2010). In this sense, the adoption of social identity theory to explore European identity as shaped by membership of the EU constitutes a complementary theoretical setup, since it supplies a framework to formulate testable empirical hypotheses regarding European identification, while sharing the premise of the constructivists that social identities are socially constructed, and that their meaning is to great extent context-dependent (Mols and Haslam 2008, 446). By considering European identity from the point of view of social identity theory, I am able to show how, while there are no differences in the general structure of EU attitudes in the new member states, we can still expect to find relevant differences in terms of European identification if we take into account how social identities are developed and consider the specificities of Eastern enlargement.

The second pertinent contribution of this research project—related to the previous point—is that it provides an empirical example of how a more careful operationalization of the concept of European identity can contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of European integration. Identity research has been on the rise within the social sciences for several decades (Fearon 1999; Huddy 2001; Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003; Abdelal et al. 2006), while in political science scholars have incorporated identity as a central analytical category, recognizing the fact that, not only rational choice, but also psychological processes of group identification can offer a vantage point for understanding political behavior (Smith 2004). As Bruter (2005) has noted, political identities constitute some of the most substantial elements of individuals' self-perceptions and to a large extent determine their beliefs, attitudes and behaviors (2005, 3). However, studies of European integration have often conflated different types of attitude (identity, support, trust) and behavior (voting in referenda and EP elections) under a common denominator of "EU support." In addition, even when European identity has been analyzed separately, most studies do not adequately discern the different dimensions of European identity (Díez Medrano 2010). This study offers a more careful consideration of European identity and its elements, as reflected in individual orientations, and the differences between individuals in the old and new member states attest to the importance of such a multidimensional approach.

Finally, from the point of view of political systems, collective identities constitute a critical source of legitimacy for political communities (Easton 1975; Easton 1979). This is

why scholars of the European Union (EU)—especially since the 1990s (Duchesne 2010)—have become increasingly interested in political identification within Europe¹³. The starting point for my discussion of the determinants and consequences of European identity is the assumption that it constitutes a key dimension of the broader set of European attitudes (Scheuer 2005; Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Moreover, it has been acknowledged to be a basic explanatory dimension in the field of political sociology of the EU and a significant explanatory factor concerning citizens’ support (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De Vreese 2013). My contribution is therefore to demonstrate that European attitudes in the new member states are not only shaped by utilitarian considerations related to perceived benefits, but also, and to a great extent, through the processes of European identification.

4. Research design, methods and data

In terms of research design, this study constitutes a theoretically grounded comparative investigation of European identity as a socio-political reality rooted in the individual orientations of regular citizens and elites. Several elements require clarification here, most notably methodological considerations regarding the empirical exploration of social identities, the geographical scope of my analysis, the time span covered by the study, and the concrete methods and data used in the analyses. I will now address these elements.

Firstly, an important aspect of my *methodological choices* relates to how the already significant challenge of theorizing European political identity is further complicated by obstacles encountered when we try to empirically verify its existence and consequences. Political identities constitute complex social phenomena that are difficult to observe directly, and existing quantitative measures of identity have taken the brunt of criticism. As Kaina and Karolewski have noted, “[the] current development of quantitative empirical research on European collective identity is still unsatisfying because of a shortage of standardized, longitudinal, reliable and valid data as well as suitable methods of measurement” (2013, 18). Different studies provide unreliable and incommensurable empirical evidence, leading to conflicting assessments regarding the existence and character of European identity. Some authors even suggest that, “in few areas is the attitude questionnaire of such doubtful utility

¹³ See, for example the work of Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2001; Carey 2002; Citrin and Sides 2004; Bruter 2005; McLaren 2006; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Thiel 2011.

as in the domain of cultural values and meanings” (Smith 1992, 57). However, as Bruter points out, if we assume that we should discard quantitative efforts to measure identity on the basis that it is something that is experienced rather than expressed and, as such, remains “a prisoner of language,” we should also do away with qualitative approaches for the same reason (Bruter 2013, 25). Therefore, while noting the limitations of cross-national survey questions, I adopt a comparative quantitative approach to exploring individual European identity, as the most appropriate tool for my study.

The focus of this research is the *Central and Eastern European new EU member states*, a group of ten countries defined through their experience of socialist domination after WWII, their association with the Eastern bloc during the cold war era and the processes of revolution and transition during the 1980s and 1990s which concluded in accession to the EU. Nevertheless, while these countries share important historical legacies, as well as recent experiences of profound economic, political and societal change, the new member states are far from homogenous. There are significant divergences in their histories and polities prior to and during the imposition of socialist regimes which constitute important legacies and sources of differential present-day institutional and economic performance. There is a rich scholarship exploring the sources and consequences of these dissimilarities in post-socialist CEE (Linz and Stepan 1996; Offe 1996; Vachudová 2005; Ramet 2010; White, Batt, and Lewis 2013), a summary of which is beyond the scope of this introduction. However, some of the most relevant differences which continue to yield influence on the social, political and cultural characters of these countries include their nationalist struggles; their relationship to historical empires; the presence or absence of statehood prior to 1989; the character of the socialist systems imposed; the presence and character of communist opposition; and the method of transition adopted after 1989. Moreover, there is also much heterogeneity between the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe in terms of their trajectories and economic and political performance following 1989, as well as in their accession processes and performances as EU members, as will be discussed in chapter 3 (Henderson 1999; Mikkel and Pridham 2004; Batt and Wolczuk 2013; White, Batt, and Lewis 2013). Therefore, my aim is not to suggest that by treating them jointly as the “new EU member states”, we are dealing with a homogenous group. The element which connects the CEE-10 is their situation as newcomers to the EU and the status of their people as “new European citizens”, enabling an analysis of European identification from a new perspective in terms of the processes of European identity constitution. Therefore, whenever I refer to new EU member states, I

mean the ten post-communist Central and Eastern European member states which joined the EU between 2004 and 2007.

This brings me to another issue requiring clarification: the *timespan* of this study. The “Eastern enlargement” of the EU, could refer to the entire process of expansion towards the East of the continent, that is, its 2004 and 2007 waves, as well as the most recent accession, that of Croatia in 2013. However, for this study I have utilized data regarding public opinion and elite perceptions from 2007 and 2009, and public opinion surveys covering the period between 2004 and 2012, a time limit which excludes consideration of Croatia as an EU member. Nevertheless, for simplicity, I refer to the extension of EU membership to the ten new Central Eastern European countries in 2004 and 2007 as the “Eastern enlargement” of the EU.

In terms of *method*, the necessity to identify and account for the contextual character of individual EU attitudes has increasingly been recognized within political science research in recent years (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Stegmueller 2013). The most widely used methodological design in recent empirical comparative studies on EU attitude formation have been hierarchical models¹⁴ as this is the most appropriate tool for analyzing nested data, such as that from cross-national studies (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Moreover, this approach enables adequate exploration of the potential causal heterogeneity between groups. Most studies concerning new member states have utilized data solely from the region and developed specific models for CEE countries focusing on the legacy of the 1990s transitions (Cichowski 2000; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Tverdova and Anderson 2004). However, as Garry and Tilley have rightly observed, such an approach “renders impossible an explanation of attitude formation that can be elaborated for, and tested on, the single newly enlarged EU” (Garry and Tilley 2009, 538). In these terms, and taking into account that a significant aspect of this study is its comparative nature—exploring possible differences and convergences between new and old member states of the EU—hierarchical models incorporating all EU countries are the most suitable method of analysis. The multilevel approach enables me to account for the nested structure of individual attitudes, verify the assumed effect of the context of the new member states on European identification, and explore a possible causal heterogeneity between East and West.

¹⁴ The underlying statistical assumptions of hierarchical models relevant to this study are further discussed in the research design sections of chapters 4-6.

As far as the *data* analyzed in this thesis is concerned, I make use of two principal sources. The *IntUne dataset* constitutes the main source and it is analyzed in chapters 4 and 5, where I consider the determinants and content of European identity. This survey was developed within the framework of the IntUne project¹⁵. The project included two waves of public opinion and elite surveys, with fieldwork conducted in 2007 and 2009. The dataset includes a parallel questionnaire¹⁶ for elite and public opinion in 18 EU countries¹⁷ and explores different aspects of citizenship and identity in the enlarged European Union in a comparative elite-public perspective. The IntUne *public opinion* survey includes representative samples for the participant countries. The IntUne *elite* survey includes national MPs (with relevant numbers of frontbenchers), economic elites (CEOs of major companies in the country), top personnel from the most important media outlets in each country, and top leaders of the principal trade unions¹⁸. Despite a great deal of empirical analysis regarding attitudes towards the processes of European integration—mainly based on Eurobarometer data (Citrin and Sides 2004b; Bruter 2005; Green 2007; Duchesne and Frogner 2008; McLaren 2006; Fligstein 2008; Fuchs 2011b)—systematic comparative research on elites and citizens is less readily available, especially in the context of the post-2004 EU¹⁹. Therefore, while the data used in parts of this thesis limits the scope of analysis to a specific time point, it nevertheless offers a privileged perspective for a comparative analysis of the degree of Europeanization of identities in the aftermath of the Eastward

¹⁵ The IntUne Project “Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe” was financed within the 6th Framework Programme of the EU and ran between 2005 and 2009. It covered 18 European countries, engaging 29 European institutions and more than 100 scholars across Europe. It was coordinated at the University of Siena. More information on the project is available at www.intune.it. I would like to express my gratitude to the Coordinators or the Spanish team, Miguel Jerez Mir and Mariano Torcal, as well as the Coordinators of the whole project, Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia, for allowing me to use this data in my thesis.

¹⁶ An overview of the survey questions is included in annex 1.

¹⁷ Old member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. New member states: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. However, there are no public opinion survey results for the Czech Republic and Lithuania, and no elite survey results for Estonia and Slovenia.

¹⁸ The composition of the samples is described in annex 2.

¹⁹ The exception here are some of the studies based on the IntUne data: excellent analyses of elite positions regarding the different elements of European citizenship can be found in the edited volumes by Conti, Cotta, and Tavares (2011) on Southern Europe, Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli (2012) for the whole of Europe, and Wesolowski, Slomczynski and Dubrow (2010) for the case of the Polish elite. More specifically on European identity we find the studies of Jerez-Mir, Real-Dato, and Vázquez-García (2009), and Sojka and Vázquez (2014) for the case of Spain.

enlargement, enabling me to compare both the levels and determinants of European identity between old and new member states' elites and public opinion.

The second data source is the *Eurobarometer* study²⁰ (EB) which provides an invaluable source for studying European attitudes across time, in both member states and candidate countries. In my study the Eurobarometer data is used as the principal data source in chapter 6, to compare attitudes before and after the economic crisis, and is also utilized in chapter 4, to check whether patterns observed in the IntUne data are also perceptible when we analyze more longitudinal attitude trends.

5. Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured into six chapters. In the first two chapters I articulate the theoretical model applied in the study. In *chapter 1*, I formulate the concept of European political identity and the ensuing assumptions about its primary processes which guide this research project. Drawing on social identity theory, theories of political legitimacy, and previous studies of European identification, I discuss European political identity as a multidimensional concept. I present its underlying socio-psychological processes, as well as its potential content, relationship to national identities and the role of national elites in the process of identity formation. I argue that we must consider at least three aspects of supranational political identification in the enlarged EU: identification as European (cognitive identity); identification with the European Union (affective aspect); and the criteria for membership (content of European identity).

In *chapter 2*, I expand our understanding of identification processes within the EU by exploring their consequences for European attitudes, as well as the determinants of identification itself. More specifically, I explore the question of what makes people more favorable to European integration and what makes them identify as part of the European

²⁰ The Eurobarometer survey is a study which monitors the state of European public opinion and is developed on behalf of the European Commission. It includes around 1000 face-to-face interviews per country for all EU member states, carried out in spring and autumn and regular surveys of public opinion in candidate countries. Before the 2004 expansion there was also a separate survey for the CEE-10 candidate countries, the "Central Eastern Eurobarometer" (1990-1997) and the "Candidate Country Eurobarometer" (2000-2003). The results of these studies have been published biannually since 1973. The reports are easily accessible on the webpage of the European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm, while the raw data and questionnaires are available for downloading via the ZACAT Online study catalogue <http://www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer/data-access/>.

political community. Firstly, I review and critically reflect upon the most important approaches to the question of what drives attitudes towards the EU in general. I present the major explanatory frameworks of EU support and place identity within these frameworks as an *explanatory* variable. Then I move on to discuss the specific determinants of European identification, and European identity as a variable *to be explained*. I close the chapter with a theoretical model of identity as an integral element of European attitudes.

The objective of *chapter 3* is to contextualize the topic of European political identity in the CEE-10 member states by drawing together existing theoretical assumptions about EU attitude formation and European political identity, specific assumptions made about Eastern enlargement and its actual outcomes. I discuss the normative debates on European identity which emerged in the wake of Eastern enlargement. I then present the existing empirical evidence regarding the nature of EU support and European political identity in the CEE-10, and explore the possible differences and points of convergence between new and old EU member states. I conclude by discussing possible differences which might arise in the application of the general model of determinants of European identity to the CEE-10 countries. This discussion constitutes the basis for a comprehensive model of European identity and support. In the final section of this chapter I articulate my research hypotheses regarding the determinants, contents and consequences of European political identity between the East and West of the EU.

Chapter 4 provides a theoretically motivated empirical account of the state of European identity following the Eastward enlargement. In the first part I present a descriptive analysis of the two aspects of European identification: its affective side and the cognitive element. To this purpose, I analyze the data for individual countries and compare public and elite opinion from the new CEE countries and the established member states. In the second part I explore the determinants of European identity and try to uncover the sources of differential levels of European identification between the East and West of Europe. Building on existing research and the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapters, I advance two main arguments. Firstly, I argue that the European identity question should be approached through analysis of both its cognitive (i.e. self-perception as European) and affective (i.e. attachment to Europe) dimensions, and I empirically verify the proposed theoretical distinction. I then present the results of this two-dimensional empirical analysis of elite and public opinion attitudes. The descriptive analysis reveals some

important differences between citizens in the new and old member states and I further endeavor to explain these differences in a multivariate analysis.

The different meanings of European identity are explored in *chapter 5*. Here, the objective of my analysis is to examine the perceived contents of a shared European identity and verify in this respect the assumed East-West differences. As in the previous chapter, my focus is a comparison of the perceptions held by elites and regular citizens of CEE-10 and the established EU member countries. Firstly, I explore the existing empirical evidence regarding the contents of European identity, through a consideration of the importance of different elements in a descriptive analysis. These elements can be broadly placed into two differing conceptualizations of European identity: an inclusive, voluntaristic one, based on civic values, and a more exclusionary one, based on ethnic belonging. In the second part of the chapter, I develop a set of explanatory models of European identity elements, in order to verify whether there is in fact any difference in the meaning of European identity between new and old member states. Furthermore, I explore the link between elite positions and public attitudes.

In *chapter 6*, I investigate the importance of political identities as determinants of EU attitudes in the new member states, as compared with utilitarian factors, before and after the economic and financial crisis (2004-2012). I argue that almost a decade after the first Eastern enlargement, given the perceived declining performance of the European economy and the issue of solidarity accepted as the main challenge ahead, the importance of the more stable, affective factors must be re-evaluated. Firstly, on the basis of the comprehensive model of EU attitude formation, taking into account the influence of political identities and economic factors, I formulate several hypotheses related to the impact of the crisis. I discuss the impact of the Great Recession on European identity and support in the newly enlarged EU. In the empirical part of the chapter, I test the proposed theoretical model of EU perceptions in the CEE-10 countries, immediately following accession (2004) and after the economic crisis had taken effect (2012). Subsequently, I apply the same model to the entire EU and further test for the differential impact of interests and identities between East and West. Finally, I discuss the empirical results, focusing on the importance of political identities as a key element in structuring European attitudes, and the changing character of the economic factor in the new member states.

In the *concluding section*, I discuss the main findings of the thesis and their implications for future research.

Chapter 1

Concept and operationalization of European identity

“L'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup, ni dans une construction d'ensemble: elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait.”²¹

– Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950

1. Introduction

The fact that European identity has puzzled scholars in a wide array of academic disciplines—from philosophy, history and cultural studies to sociology and political science—implies definitional and methodological heterogeneity (Recchi 2014). Consequently, it is often the case that studies which claim to be focusing on “European identity” rest on radically different epistemological and theoretical assumptions. Therefore, in order to properly assess the determinants and consequences of identity within the political community of the enlarged EU it is necessary to first establish its conceptual elements, as well as theoretical assumptions about the underlying processes and its outcomes. In this sense, the objective of the present chapter is to spell out the conceptualization of European political collective identity adopted in the research project, based on existing theoretical and empirical frameworks, especially the Social Identity Theory (SIT) and theories of political legitimacy and support in political systems.

Clarifying the theoretical underpinnings of this study is a daunting task not only because identity itself is a challenged concept, but also due to the fact that the reference point for a hypothetical European identity is not easy to delimit. European identity can refer both

²¹ “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”

to a European political collective identity, as well as a broader geographical identity²². In the case of the latter, being European can be claimed by anybody who feels attachment to the continent, be it a citizen of an EU member state or not. The meaning and scope of the notion of Europe is, thus, ambiguous and contested, to say the least. Numerous scholars argue that ambiguity is inherent to this concept, as it is not and has never been, a precisely delimited space or notion (Delanty 1995, Pittaway 2003, Balibar 2004, Jenkins 2008, Delanty 2013). From this point of view European identity, is “an abstraction and a fiction without essential proportions” (Stråth 2002, 388) and the European Union can be regarded as just yet another “contour” drawn on the changing map of European meanings. However, with the most recent Eastern enlargements the EU expanded from 15 to 28 member states and it is, thus, becoming more representative of the continent, whatever the limits of Europe might be.

The focus of this study is on European identity as related to the process of European integration. Yet, even in this sense the vagueness persists as European Union is an evolving economic and political community, and as such it constitutes a “moving target” for defining the character, content and limits of a possible underlying political identity. Moreover, studies of European integration have often conflated different types of attitudes (identity, support, trust) and behavior (vote in referenda and EP elections) under a common denominator of “EU support.” In addition, even when European identity is analyzed separately, most studies do not discern “the different dimensions of European identity; and [fail] to unpack the various meanings that citizens attach to the idea of identification with Europe” (Díez Medrano 2010, 47). Thus, while articulating a clear and coherent conceptual foundation constitutes a basic step in any kind of rigorous research project, in the case of such fuzzy and misused term as European identity, it becomes even more important.

The starting point is to establish the broad framework for the empirical assessment of European identity in the enlarged EU, informed by normative debates surrounding Eastern enlargement. In his recent review, Ettore Recchi differentiates between two main strands of European identity inquiries: studies which analyze “putative collective identities on the basis

²² In this sense, Gabriele Griffin and Rosi Braidotti note that, Europe as “an idea, an ideal, and a geopolitical reality has had varying contours throughout history. At the turn of the twenty-first century, its meaning remains in flux as changing political realities require a continual and critical interrogation of the term, mediated by the context” (2002, 8–9). Therefore, Europe must be understood as an idea in the process of becoming and definition, its contours depending on the context one is considering and always having in mind the historical memory of the continent marked by shifting borders and violence.

of cultural, historical, political or legal materials”, and those which constitute empirical research on personal identities (Recchi 2014, 1). On a similar note, Fuchs, distinguishes between normative and empirical inquiries into European identity (Fuchs 2011b), while Bruter talks about top-down and bottom-up perspectives (Bruter 2005). Therefore, we can distinguish two main approaches in European identity research. On the one hand, we find historical or philosophical normatively-oriented, top-down analyses which focus on the question of what unites Europeans in terms of cultural, historical and religious heritage²³ (Delanty 1995; Stråth 2002; Mayer and Palmowski 2004; Delanty 2013). Ultimately, the question which is to be answered in these studies is what does “Europe” mean and who can/should be considered European from this point of view. On the other hand, bottom-up, empirically-oriented analyses approach European identity as a socio-political reality rooted in individual orientations which, when aggregated, constitute a collective identity. The research undertaken in this thesis belongs to the latter type. As the research design makes clear, I approach European identity from a bottom-up, empirical perspective in order to answer the question of who feels European, what is meant by being European and what are the attitudinal consequences of European identity, in an enlarged European Union.

With the purpose of systematically approaching the complex issue of European identity as a dependent variable, this chapter describes the main points which have been raised in the existing scholarship on the topic. Its objective is to formulate a theoretical concept of European collective identity which will allow me to formulate specific research hypotheses driving the present research project. In what follows I proceed in two steps. First, I provide an overview of general theoretical approaches to social and political identities as an object of empirical enquiry. Consequently, I discuss the specific theoretical underpinnings of European political identity as a multidimensional concept and part of individual attitudes towards the EU.

²³ The idea of Europe, its identity and unity, have permeated all of the continent’s history since Antiquity, from medieval notions of Christendom, through Enlightenment and nineteenth century nation-building, to the efforts of European integration in the XX century (Delanty 1995; Stråth 2002). Unarguably, the origins and development of the idea of Europe as an identity are crucial to understand contemporary discourses of European unity, however, in this dissertation, while acknowledging the importance of such historical and normative analyses, I will focus on European identity as a socio-political identity, rooted in current individual orientations of average citizens and elites.

2. Theoretical aspects of collective political identity

Undoubtedly, the most critical step in any analysis lies in its definition of a rigorous conceptual framework. However, as Juan Díez Medrano notes, the increasing scholarly interest in European identity has not always been accompanied by “conceptual clarity as to what was being investigated, realistic assumptions about the social and cognitive processes shaping the citizens’ approach, and systematic empirical tests of theoretically informed hypotheses” (Díez Medrano 2010, 46). Thus, the objective of the following section is to provide clear and coherent theoretical model of collective political identities which can then be applied to the analysis of European identities in the enlarged EU.

2.1 Ambiguity of the concept of identity

Decades of political behavior research provide strong evidence to the centrality of group identities to politics. We know that partisan identities are essential to the understanding of electoral choice, some social identities may generate strong commitment to political action, while national identities might increase support for civic norms or constitute a source of political conflict (Huddy 2013). Thus, social identities constitute variable and complex phenomena which influence political attitudes and behavior in multiple ways. However, their centrality to social and political realities, and the increasing scholarly interest in identity research have not yielded much consensus on the concept itself. Literally, identity denotes sameness, the quality of being identical (Malmborg and Stråth 2002, 11). However, far from straightforward, as Martin Kohli notes, identity is “one of those terms that have haunted the sociological imagination because they are so exceedingly vague or even vacuous but at the same time seem to capture such important dimension of social life” (2000, 114–115). Such ambiguity of “identity” makes it a very hotly debated concept in the social sciences.

The perceived ambiguity of the concept of identity and its “definitional anarchy” (Abdelal et al. 2006) is why some scholars suggest that we should abandon it as an analytical category. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) famously argue that due to its omnipresence in social research—especially its weak version, as formulated in the constructivist paradigm—, and (resulting) conceptual vagueness, identity cannot constitute a valid analytical category and we must find better, less ambiguous terms to denote its functions in the society (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Specifically, they propose alternative terms such as identification (which

would point to the process and its agent)²⁴, self-understanding (the cognitive and affective sense of one's social location), or commonality and connectedness (to denote sharing common attributes or relational ties).

In spite of such dire critique of the concept of identity, many authors still argue for its usefulness as an analytical category (Bruter 2005; Abdelal et al. 2006; Karolewski 2009; Fuchs 2011b). In this study, I join the latter and, while acknowledging the “slippery” nature of the concept (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001), I argue for the validity of identity as an analytical tool for social and political research on the European Union, if we adopt an empirical, bottom-up perspective. The assertion of its analytical validity rests on collective identity's functional value to the European Union, conceived as a political system (Hix 2008; Fuchs 2011b). The theoretical outline below clarifies the link between individual orientations and individual-level processes that define one's identity, which under specific circumstances become aggregated to collective political identities, central to the legitimacy of political regimes.

2.2 From social identity to collective political identities

Social identity constitutes the element which provides continuity between individuals' self-perception and their social embeddedness (Brewer 2001; Herrmann and Brewer 2004). Social identity theory (SIT), developed in social psychology in the works of Henri Tajfel and John Turner, has been the theoretical tool adopted in most theoretically driven empirical research of European identity up to date (cf. Fuchs 2011b; Sanders et al. 2012; among others), as it offers social scientists a way to conceptualize the psychological process of social identity formation and predict their impact on socio-political behavior (Mols and Haslam 2008). While a detailed explanation of Tajfel and Turner's theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will highlight its most relevant assumptions which allow me to theorize political collective identity in general, and more specifically European political identity.

²⁴ My focus is indeed on the individual identity, as well as the process and its determinants which underpin it, at the individual and contextual level, which warrants the use of the term identification as well. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that there is an important theoretical difference between the two: identity can be viewed as a property of the individual which combines different identifications – links to social groups of reference (Duchesne and Frogner 2008). Here, I use the term identity interchangeably with identification to refer to the latter, social aspect of identities.

The original “social identity theory” emphasizes psychological motivation as key to the development of any social identity: it is based on membership evaluation and affective attachments. Tajfel (1981) defines social identity as “that part of individual self-concept which derives from his [sic] knowledge of membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (1981, 255). From this perspective, positive distinction, which relies on differentiating positively the group one belongs to, is assumed to constitute a basic process of social identification, together with demarcation, which denotes establishing clear boundaries between the in- and the out-group. Therefore, defining who does not belong, constitutes a key dynamic to the process of identity construction²⁵.

Tajfel’s psychologically focused theory has been further developed by Turner and colleagues into “self-categorization theory.” Self-categorization theory puts greater emphasis on the cognitive processes of social identities and assumes that it is the perceived similarity to a group (again, in contrast to the out-group) that constitutes the impulse for the development of social identities (Turner et al. 1987). This aspect of identification is sometimes interpreted as identity’s function of reducing social complexity (Karolewski 2009).

These two psychological routes to developing a social identification are best understood as separate dimensions of identity. Thus two basic processes of identity are delineated: the cognitive process, whereas identity is based on perceived similarity and serves individuals to reduce social complexity; and an affective process, which rests upon positive group distinction and helps individuals acquire a more positive self-image (Karolewski 2009). In other words, the *cognitive* process of self-categorization refers to the perceived self-location in the society—“identification as”—, and must be distinguished from the *affective* process – “identification with” (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). These theoretical points are summarized Table 1.1 (following page).

²⁵ There has been much debate on the consequences of this point for the analysis of community building, as it has been sometimes interpreted as a natural tendency of humans towards ethnocentrism - developing feelings of superiority towards the out-groups. However, such straightforward interpretation of SIT has been questioned. In their review of SIT, Mols and Weber (2013) point out that the tendency to in-group favoritism observed in experimental setup by Tajfel and Turner was only displayed because it constituted the only way to establish positive differentiation (see also Risse 2010, 27 on the same issue). More recent experimental evidence shows that such preference for in-group disappears if differentiation can be established in another way (Mols and Weber 2013, 507).

Table 1.1 Basic dimensions of social identity in social psychology


Social identity	Process	Function	Dimension
<i>Cognitive</i>	Perceived similarity	Reducing social complexity	Identification <i>as...</i>
<i>Affective</i>	Positive distinction	Acquiring of a positive self-image	Identification <i>with...</i>

Note: Based on Tajfel 1981, Turner et al. 1987, Citrin et al. 2001, Karolewski 2009.

The processes sketched in Table 1.1 summarize the basic tenets of social psychologists approach to social identity processes and its functions. However, some scholars have warned against a too straightforward interpretation of these functions in terms of their influence on political attitudes and behavior (Mols and Weber 2013). Specifically, in their review of SIT inspired EU attitude research, Mols and Weber note that in order to better understand how the formulation of identities operates, we must pay attention to changing social contexts in which they work, especially in terms of their specific meaning in different (national) contexts and the role of political leaders in manipulating these meanings (Mols and Weber 2013).

On a similar note, Leonie Huddy (2001) in her review of social identity theory, argues that while the work of social psychologist is very useful to understand the role of social identities in politics, some additional elements must be considered for this theory to be entirely appropriate for understating how subjective group membership shapes political behavior. Specifically, Huddy contends that we must explore further the subjective meanings of social identities, instead of only looking at the boundaries of group membership. Moreover, she notes that it is necessary to evaluate identity's relative strength (instead of assuming a simple division between individual and group membership), as well as account for their stability in terms of politics (as opposed to the fluid and weak identities created by psychologists in lab experiments) (Huddy 2001). Thus, social identity theory and self-categorization theory must be supplemented by some further elements which will make them more appropriate to understand social identities' political consequences. These elements are summarized in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 Dimensions of social identity: general theoretical model



Note: Based on Citrin et al. 2001, Huddy 2001, Karolewski 2009, Mols and Weber 2013, Huddy 2013.

We can best analyze identities' consequences for attitudes and political behavior if we pay attention to the following specific elements of social identity: the cognitive and the affective dimensions of identification, together with their strength, stability and specific meanings, affected by national contexts and political leaders (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013). This approach is clearly located within a social constructivist paradigm (Mols and Haslam 2008; Risse 2010), as it assumes that identities are social constructions and structures of meaning²⁶ (Triandafyllidou and Wodak 2003). This in turn implies that they are not simply ascribed to members of a group because of their similarities, rather they are shared self-understandings constituted in social processes (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001).

Gender, ethnicity, religion, class, nation, ideology can all constitute basis for social identities, but what distinguishes a political collective identity? As noted above, social identity is the element which provides continuity between individuals' self-perception and their embeddedness in the fabric of the society which surrounds them. *Collective* identities, on the other hand, denote social identities based on "large and potentially important group differences" (Kohli 2000, 117) which are emotionally powerful (McMahon 2013, 1) and are

²⁶ Moreover, this thesis is framed by a social constructivist perspective in a broader sense, as it is assumed that not only interests, but also social identities constitute relevant explanatory factors for political behavior (Risse 2010), as discussed in the introduction.

shared with a larger collective aware of such membership (Risse 2010, 22). Furthermore, a *political* collective identity is a collective identity with consequences for politics (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Huddy 2013) where identification is combined with conviction that the group can achieve its goals through political action (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). In other words, it is a collective identity which refers to groups and structures which are politically relevant (Bruter 2005, 1), implying the belief that the group in question should be granted political rights or, even, substantial sovereignty. The latter claim has been central to the demands of nationalist movements, making the issue of what defines a nation (and, thus, a national identity), a strongly contested topic (Herrmann and Brewer 2004). Unsurprisingly, thus, the most sophisticated theoretical approaches to political collective identities have been developed in the field of nationalism studies (Smith 1993; Brubaker 1999; Miller 2000). This has important theoretical consequences for how political collective identity has been theorized in a supranational context such as the EU, as illustrated in the next section.

A political collective identity also acquires functions specific to the group of reference. The cognitive and the affective functions, described above as pertinent to social identities in general, are complemented by concrete political purposes of collective identity. In his study of citizenship and collective identity in Europe, Karolewski (2009) names three such functions derived from nationalism studies: national community building, identity politics, and solution of collective dilemmas. The first one—national community building—denotes the process by which political authority and institutions are bestowed with legitimacy. Identity politics is directly related to national community building and it refers to the way identity is used to politically mobilize existing social groups, or how it is constructed by elites in order to provide democratic legitimacy to existing institutions. Finally, solving collective dilemmas provides a perspective to explain dilemmas of collective action (Karolewski 2009, 33–44). Thus, the specific functions of political collective identities underline their importance as sources of popular legitimacy for a political community, with the role of the elites at the heart of the process of shaping political identification.

What all of the above outlined functions have in common is their applicability in the context of “imagined communities” (Anderson 2006), communities where members will never meet most of their fellow-nationals. As Anderson (2006) has famously argued, formation of collective identities in the context of nations—large groups where face-to-face

contact with most members is simply impossible—, makes it necessary to look for alternative ways in which the community is created as real in its members' minds. Thus, identity is forged via common history, culture, a shared public sphere, as well as by means of specific “identity technologies” such as symbols (Bruter 2005; Kaina and Karolewski 2013). Moreover, one of the most important markers of membership in modern nation-states is citizenship. As Seyla Benhabib argues, from a sociological point of view, collective identity constitutes an essential element of citizenship, together with political membership and social rights and claims (2005, 162). Thus, when discussing a political collective identity we must consider its relationship to the citizenship as established in the political community.

2.3 Identity and political support

A final note must be made regarding the relation of our concept of interest –identity– to some of the central concepts in political sociology, such as support and democratic legitimacy, as formulated in the field of political science. The importance of identity of the legitimacy of political systems has been long acknowledged. Back in XIX century, Tocqueville (1835) in his analysis of the young American democracy suggested that it was likely to succeed as a political regime because it has already developed a feeling of allegiance to the new nation. As Abraham Lincoln has famously put it, the legitimacy of a democratic government depends on the government being “by the people, of the people and for the people”²⁷. While a government by the people refers to the procedural elements of democracy which imply citizens' participation (input legitimacy), a government for the people denotes a government whose performance is favorably judged in the eyes of the citizens (output legitimacy, Sharpf, 1999). Finally, the government being “of the people”, points to the importance of people's identification with the community and the political regime as central to its democratic legitimacy. Thus, identity as a source of legitimacy and stability for a political system has been the object of political analysis since the foundation of the discipline, due to the fact that, as Hooghe and Marks note, “political institutions that lack emotional resonance, are unlikely to last” (2008, 117). This is exactly why scholars of the EU have increasingly taken up the issues of attitudes and identity as important research topics.

²⁷ “Gettysburg Address”, speech by Abraham Lincoln on November 19, 1863, at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, USA.

Public attitudes towards political systems have been the focus of study in political science for many decades. The first significant classification of these orientations was that developed by Almond and Verba in their milestone *The Civic Culture* (1963). Almond and Verba define political culture as the “particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of the nation” (Almond and Verba 1965, 14–15) and distinguish between three modes of such orientations (cognitive, affective, and evaluative) and their different political objects. In the revision of their classic study this approach is modified and cognition, affect, and evaluation are conceptualized as dimensions of orientations which are then classified into system culture, process culture, and policy culture. System culture is the dimension which includes attitudes towards national community: a sense of national identity and legitimacy attitudes (Almond and Verba 1980, 28).

While Almond and Verba’s study contributed to a greater consideration of political attitudes as essential elements of political systems, perhaps the most influential formulations of the concept and elements of political support has been that put forward by David Easton (Easton 1975; Easton 1979). In his systems theory Easton distinguishes between three objects of political support: political community, political regime, and political authorities; and two modes of orientation: specific and diffuse support. The former, specific support, is related to authorities and varies with perceived short-term outputs of the system. The diffuse orientations, on the other hand, are thought to be largely independent of these short-term outputs and its objects are political regime and the community. In Easton’s model, diffuse support for political authorities is expressed in forms of trust and legitimacy beliefs, while diffuse support for a political community is a “a sense of we-feeling, common consciousness or group identification” (Easton 1975, 447). The importance of trust, legitimacy beliefs, and identification is underlined by the fact that they provide “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1979, 273), thus, locating identity at the center of political system’s stability.

In her adaptation of Easton’s framework, Pippa Norris (1999, 2011) locates national identities as the most diffuse and deeply-seated element of systems support. She also notes that national identity has particularly important consequences for social cohesion and legitimacy in multicultural communities containing several distinct nationalities (Norris 2011, 25). Hence, the question of identity can be expected to be particularly relevant for the

legitimacy of institutions in the context of a political system such as the EU, where many different nations co-exist and cooperate.

In sum, political identity as part of subjective legitimacy, that is, a legitimacy of the political system which rests upon the beliefs of the citizens (Fuchs 2011b, 31), is necessary for a political system to survive major shocks and hard times which might fall on the community. Such stability and continuity of political support cannot be guaranteed in the framework of legitimacy based solely on short-term outputs of the system (Scharpf 1999). This is due to the fact that stable identification with a political community can act as a potential “buffer” against political discontent and skepticism (Wessels 2007, 290).

3. European identity—towards a conceptual framework

As argued above, in spite of its conceptual ambiguities, European identity can constitute a useful analytical category if we acknowledge its functional value for political systems. In this particular case, we consider its role for the EU as a political system²⁸, in which political identity is being shaped in the context of a constantly changing institutional and legal setting of the evolving Union, its “floating referent” (Inglehart 1970a).

Already the early theorists of European integration, such as Deutsch (1957) or Haas (1958), put the community building aspect of the process at the center of their theories. However, it was only with the process of institutionalization and broadening of EU policies and its politicization, that the issue of identities and subjective legitimacy has become more salient. Unsurprisingly, the importance of a collective European political identity has been acknowledged as increasingly relevant in post-Maastricht EU studies, when a significant deepening of integration occurred, as discussed in the introduction. The prevailing idea was that, as these early scholars of European integration have envisaged, mutual trust between its citizens ought to grow and ultimately develop into feelings of transnational solidarity (Habermas 2012, 60). Such expectations have not been fulfilled, but still a large portion of European identity research is devoted to answering the question of what kind of collective identity *does* exist in the EU (Bruter 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010; Karolewski 2009; McMahon 2013). These previous studies constitute the reference point for the present research and provide important theoretical points regarding a collective political identity in a supranational setting.

The conceptual framework for analyzing collective political identities discussed in the previous sections is applicable mainly to the context of national communities, therefore, it needs to be modified to become suitable for exploring the specific context of an emerging supranational community. In what follows, I determine how the general theoretical framework of political collective identities, outlined above, applies to the case of the EU,

²⁸ Approaching the EU as a political system allows for the application of tools from comparative political science (Hix 2008; Hix and Høyland 2011) and solves the $n=1$ problem, a situation where the EU as an “unidentified political object” (in the words of Jacques Delors) could not be compared to any other cases. Such approach is framed by the theoretical perspectives developed under new institutionalism (Rosamond 2013), and more specifically, sociological institutionalism which assumes that “institutions do not simply affect the strategic calculations of individuals, as rational choice institutionalists contend, but also their most basic preferences and their very identity” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 948).

and I review the most important theoretical conceptualizations of European identity which can be found in the existing empirical research. Consequently, I discuss two issues specific to the European identity debate—its relation to national identities, and its possible meanings as an emerging supranational identity.

3.1 European identity as a collective political identity

In order to be considered *political*, collective identities must imply identification with groups which are politically relevant. Thus, when speaking of European identity in relation to the EU, it must be distinguished from the more general geographical European identity, as it is conceptualized in relation to the specific processes of integration and the citizenship and institutions of the EU²⁹. Several authors attempted to formulate a conceptualization of European political identity in these terms. Sophie Duchesne suggests to approach it “as psycho-sociological or socio-political process of citizens’ attachment to the European space or community designed by integration” (Duchesne 2010 quoted in Recchi 2014). Cerrutti, on the other hand, proposes that a political identity in the EU is

the feeling of quasi-polity’s members that they belong together with respect to some but not all things political (those managed by the EU beyond the member states) because they share with each other certain values, principles and goals including a sufficient degree of identification with the European institutions (2011, 5).

Therefore, different authors emphasize different elements of European identity: the cognitive (self-understanding as members), and affective (attachment) aspects of the individual, as well as the collective level of identification. The tenets of social identity theory, provide us with a theoretical tool to approach European identity in a more comprehensive way, as both affective and cognitive orientations, which allows us to understand better the underlying processes of these attitudes. This model of identity is adopted in the analyses of American identity, as well as European identity by Citrin and his colleagues (2001, 2004a, 2004b) as they distinguish between self-categorization as a group member, affect toward the group and beliefs about the criteria for inclusion in the group.

²⁹ In the present thesis whenever I use the term European identity, I refer to the political collective identity forged in the context of integration and EU institutions, unless stated otherwise.

Some authors have expanded this basic approach based on social identity theory. Drawing on social psychology models, Fuchs (2011) puts forward an adaptation of social identity theory to the specific context of European identity research. In his model he discerns between two levels of identification: on the one hand, identification with a collective; on the other hand, the contents of such identification. At both levels he distinguishes between cognitive processes and affective/evaluative ones. According to Fuchs, there are thus, four dimensions to European identity: at the level of identification, he proposes to differentiate between a subjective assignment to a collective (cognitive processes at the level of identification) and an affective attachment to the collective (affective/evaluative processes at the level of identification). In terms of the contents, Fuchs's model includes a subjective assumption of shared similarities (cognitive process at the level of contents) and a positive evaluation of these assumed similarities (affective/evaluative processes at the level of contents). Thus, he emphasizes the necessity to consider more carefully not only who identifies but also what this identification means and how it is evaluated.

Another adaptation of social identity theory is formulated in the recent review of the state of the art in European identity research by Kaina and Karolewski (2013). They argue that if we are to assess European identity's potential effect on political behavior, the cognitive and affective/evaluative dimensions (or modes of orientation) must be supplemented by a third one, that of behavioral intentions (conative dimension), as the highest level of identification. They point out that cognitive orientations might not be sufficient to underpin concrete political behavior, even when they are influenced by affective and evaluative attitudes. It is only when those become activated in situations of danger or conflict, they can potentially be translated into behavioral intentions and political behavior (Kaina and Karolewski 2013, 20). The conative element seems to be especially relevant for crisis situations such as the recent economic and political problems in the EU which have made patent the absence of strong feelings of solidarity between the European people, and thus made clear the weakness of the existing identification in Europe.

Finally, we must also consider how European political identity is directly linked to the existence of a European citizenship since, as noted previously, citizenship constitutes one of the most important markers of membership in modern nation-state. In its classic formulation, citizenship is "the status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with

which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1950). This has been the starting point for some empirical analyses of identity in relation to European citizenship, such as the study by (Thomassen and Bäck 2009) who distinguish between a sense of European citizenship (readiness to accept other citizens of the Union as equal in rights) and sense of European community (mutual sympathy and trust). Based on Benhabib’s work, Sanders and colleagues (2012) develop a multidimensional approach to European citizenship and analyze identity as one of its key dimensions, together with representation and scope of governance³⁰. In their study, they combine theoretical work on multiculturalism, citizenship, and social identity theory, and define European political identity as a subjective sense of citizenship constituted by a sense of belonging to Europe and the salience of such belonging (Sanders et al. 2012, 63).

As illustrated by the review above, especially in the most recent studies, scholars attempt to address the perceived shortage of rigorous conceptual basis to European identity research (Díez Medrano 2010) and account for the multidimensionality of the concept. In the present study, I adopt a conceptual model based on these discussions. My focus is on two basic dimensions of European political identity recognized in the studies based on SIT: the cognitive process which refers to “identification as European / citizen of the Union” and its affective development, “identification with Europe / EU” (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Citrin and Sides 2004a; Citrin and Sides 2004b; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010; Fuchs 2011b). I am substantially interested in how both dimensions work in old and new member states of the EU. Furthermore, as suggested by Mols (2001, 2013), I consider their strength and stability without losing sight of their socially constructed meanings—the criteria for being considered European—, which are expected to be influenced by different national contexts and the way political leaders construct and mobilize collective identities.

3.2 European and national identities: A contested relationship

Social identities should be analyzed in relation to the groups which constitute their reference points, as well as in terms of how different identities relate to each other (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 10). Therefore, in order to properly understand European identity, we should not only consider supranational elements—those pertaining to the European integration

³⁰ This is the theoretical model of European citizenship adopted in the IntUne project and summarized by Cotta and Isernia (2007).

process, and the institutions of the EU–, but also analyze its relationship to the existing national identities, since identity within the EU is principally embedded in national contexts. National identity and its theoretical framework have been a (contested) point of reference for the conceptualizations of a European political identity. Consequently, to explore the relationship between the two is essential to our understanding of how European political identity is shaped in the enlarged Europe.

From the perspective of its relation to the national identities, three main approaches to European political identity have been discerned (Ichijo and Spohn 2005). The first one, a position adopted by some of the early scholars of European identity and proponents of a unified Europe, has been to assume that as European identity becomes stronger, national identities will become less and less relevant. This has not been the case, however. To the contrary, it might seem that the second group—those who assumed that national identities would continue to constitute the main frame of reference, and a European political attachment would remain rather insignificant—have been proven right in the light of the results of recent European opinion polls (Ichijo and Spohn 2005). This is the case if we consider only exclusive identities, that is, if we compare the share of people who identify solely as nationals with those that consider themselves solely Europeans.

The existing empirical studies demonstrate that most European citizens declare to identify both as nationals and Europeans (or Europeans and nationals) and the construction of European identity does not seem to be a zero-sum process (Citrin and Sides 2004a; Bruter 2005; Risse 2010). Therefore, the third approach, which assumes that identities are multiple and not exclusionary in principle, seems to be the most adequate (Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010). While a few of the early studies which included identitarian variables in their analysis suggested that national identity could be negatively related to European attitudes (Carey 2002; Christin and Trechsel 2002), the prevailing assumption in most recent scholarship has been that the two identifications do not stand in opposition to each other³¹; rather, the expectation is that some mixture of national

³¹ Duchesne and Frogner (2008) argue that national and European identification are directly related but depending on the context this relationship can be either cumulative (no conflict) or competing (thus, conflicting). In their longitudinal analysis of Eurobarometer data (1982-2005) for Western Europe they show that European and national identities tend to be independent of each other in times of low politicization of European issues, while in times of high politicization of European integration, high national pride might hamper European identification.

and European identity will be the result of the process of Europeanization of political identities (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Ichijo and Spohn 2005; Risse 2010).

As far as the exact character of the relationship between European and national identity is concerned, it has been suggested that different political identities can either remain separate (there is no overlap between different groups' membership), cross-cutting (some but not all members of one group identify with another group), or nested—where everyone of the smaller community is member of the wider community (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 8–10). The latter model assumes a hierarchy of identities, distinguishing between core and periphery identities, just as in the case of regional identities in a federal system (Risse 2010, 24). It can be assumed that the EU resembles a federal system, where different nation-states become united under common supranational institutions, and thus a nested model of European and national identities could be plausible (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). However, Risse (2010) in his study of Europeanization of national identities argues for a fourth possibility, that of a “marble cake,” where national and European identities are assumed to be inherently intertwined and it is hard to establish a hierarchical relationship between them³². This latter model in which national and European identities are approached as interweaved seems to be the most consistent with much empirical research regarding European identity. How these identifications interact must be considered both at the level of the collective—the national community—, as well as at the individual level.

At the *collective* level, there is much consensus on the fact that the relationship between European and national identities will take on different forms in different national contexts, depending on how the pre-existing collective identity has been constructed (Malmberg and Stråth 2002; Díez Medrano 2003; Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003; Díez

³² The “marble cake” model is very similar to the intersectional approach in feminist studies which takes into account how different social categories interact to create complex hierarchies of power in contemporary societies. In the last decade, intersectionality has become an important concept in women's and gender studies, and there has been much debate on its different conceptualizations (among others, Yuval-Davis 2006), as well as on its methodological aspects (McCall 2005). Yuval-Davis (2006) defines intersectionality as a way to “avoid attributing fixed identity groupings to the dynamic process of positionality and location ,on the one hand, and the contested and shifting political construction of categorical boundaries on the other” (2006, 200). In my previous project on the position of new European citizens/European migrants within the shifting borders of the European Union, I apply this theoretical approach to analyze the complex position, between privilege and disadvantage, of white migrant European women employed in the racialized sector of domestic work (Sojka 2009, 2012).

Medrano 2010; Schlenker-Fischer 2011; Mols and Weber 2013). The importance of the way Europe has been historically framed in the national context bears special relevance to this observation. As Malborg and Stråth note, “in national political debates ‘Europe’ often enters as a dimension of national identity rather than a project of transnational unification” (2002, 9), thus, preceding the process European integration and the construction of a political identity among Europeans. These historical processes result in patterns of mutual support and reinforcement, as well as opposition and demarcation. From a theoretical point of view, the most important element is to recognize that we cannot assume that national attachments are inherently positively or negatively related to Europe. Therefore, a relational perspective on the relationship between national and European identities implies that

European element in national identities is not simply an emerging property of or identification with the transnational institutions, rather it is constituted in continual interaction between nationally formed European orientations and the developing transnational European framework (Spohn and Triandafyllidou 2003, 8).

Thus, it is important to account for the way the European element has been constructed in the national frames.

Furthermore, Schlenker-Fisher (2011) shows that the differences in the extent to which national identities are compatible with European identification are at least partly conditioned by the way cultural diversity has been framed within the national community. These findings further highlight the necessity to consider supranational European identification in its national context shaped by particular national history and community-building processes, as well as, influenced by institutions and political leaders who actively construct and mobilize identities (Hooghe and Marks 2004). As Duchesne and Frogner (2008, 156) note, elites and mass media may promote the European political system as either complementary to the national belonging, or represent it as a rival competing for sovereignty.

At the *individual* level, on the other hand, the most important point to explore is the existence of identifications which are exclusive or inclusive of identification as European (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2005). This point is related to the “marble cake” model and its assumption that people can hold multiple, non-conflicting identities (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010). Such perspective allows for the conceptualization of the complex relationship between different political identities without necessarily presupposing any opposition, for example, between national and European identifications at the individual level (Bruter 2005). In these terms, the principal distinction lies between those who identify

as solely national and those citizens who hold some kind of double or mixed identity, both as nationals³³ and Europeans. Furthermore, such dual perspective can be considered as the most appropriate for the analysis of political identities in the EU as it reflects the way in which EU citizenship has been established, as contingent on the national one. If constructed as inclusive, national identity may reinforce European identification, as the multiple identities theory posits (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Kuhn 2012). Exclusive national identity, may, on the other hand, constitute an important obstacle to support for the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005), and make the emergence of a supranational identification more difficult. This point is further discussed in the next chapter, where I consider the explanatory factors to European identity and support for the EU.

To sum up, far from being an irremediable obstacle to the formation of supranational identity, the relationship between national and European identification has proved so far to be complex and dependent mostly on the national context (Díez Medrano 2003). At the collective level, it is influenced by ideas surrounding national identities and the ways in which elites actively construct both types of identities. At the individual level, the main distinction is to be drawn between those who identify exclusively as nationals, and those who recognize some kind of mix of European and national identities.

³³ The importance of subnational–regional and local–identifications should not be overlooked here. Especially in certain European contexts, regions and nations other than the majority one, constitute strong points of reference for political identities. Most recently the Scottish and Catalan cases of nationalist claims for political independence, have further underlined the importance of such competing national identities in the framework of multinational European states. Nevertheless, the present study is focused on Central and Eastern European countries, where in spite of presence of important minorities (such as the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia) regional and competing national identities present less of a challenge to the dominant identification, and, thus, I focus on national and European identifications and their relationship.

3.4 Meanings of European identity

As argued before, in order to analyze the state of European identity in the enlarged European Union, we must explore not only the question of who considers oneself part of the European political community, but also how such belonging is conceptualized. From a social constructivist perspective, “it is difficult to understand the consequences of group identification without understanding its subjective meaning to group members” (Huddy 2013, 12). In other words, we must explore the elements which denote the limits of inclusion in the European political community, the criteria of membership, as suggested by the general social identity model.

European identity research has relied to a great extent on theoretical clues from studies of nationalism. However, the EU does not possess most of the elements which contribute to establishing a political “imagined community” of the nation: there is no common European history, memory, language, or even educational or media systems, which is why for some, the viability of a shared European identity is, to say the least, uncertain (Smith 1992; Scharpf 1999). Nevertheless, many scholars of European identity point out that it would be an error to apply concepts coined in the framework of nation-states in the context of an emerging supranational regime. They argue that the emergence of a “hard” European identity similar to national identities—based on shared historical memory and common culture—, is not what is at stake (Kohli 2000; Cerutti 2011; McMahon 2013). If we assume that the emerging European political identity must not replace national identities, rather, a new kind of Europeanized national identities is being constructed (Risse 2010), it would not make sense to expect a strong identity, formed on the basis of a common culture, language, and shared history, as in the case of most national identities.

In fact, the founders of the European project envisaged a common European identification as an “antidote to antagonisms fostered by ethnocentric national loyalties” (Citrin and Sides 2004a, 42). Accordingly, European identity has been promoted by the European institutions as an inclusive type of identity, as EU’s motto “United in diversity” suggests. The European flag, anthem, Europe day, as well as a European currency and a citizenship of the Union, all constitute symbols which are aimed at fostering a feeling of

civic allegiance among Europeans³⁴ (Shore 2000; Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005). In this sense, as Jürgen Habermas (2001) argues, in the case of EU as a polity in progress, the political sense of belonging, strengthened by the construction of European citizenship, might take priority over the more cultural aspects of European identification. Thus, while due to cultural, historical and linguistic diversity in EU-28, European identity cannot meet the requirements of “hard” identities, Habermas (2001) famously contends that it could be constructed upon certain values—such as those of liberal democracy—rather than the pre-political elements on which many national identities have been constructed. Such formulation points to political culture as the basis for a collective European identity, an identification based on “constitutional patriotism”. Similar arguments for an identity based on the civic values are made by other authors, who see the future of European identity as a “an identification with democratic or constitutional norms, and not with the territory, national or cultural traditions (...) essentially a legal identity, as opposed to cultural identity” (Delanty 2000, 115). However, even such open and inclusive formulation of European identity based on civic allegiance to institutions and citizenship includes a potentially exclusive component as well.

As Brubaker (1999, 64) notes, “citizenship itself, by its very nature, is an exclusive, as well as an inclusive status. On a global scale, citizenship in itself is an immensely powerful instrument of social closure”. The citizenship of the Union, contingent on the national one, effectively excludes from the European political community non-EU nationals—mostly economic migrants from less developed countries—, a fact which might foster perceptions related to ethnic notions of European belonging (cf. Balibar 2004). Such possibility of a more exclusionary version of European political identity³⁵ is noted by several authors. Kohli (2000), for instance, points out that that “there may be a new ‘European nationalism’ turning outwards, or inwards against those who represent the wider world” that is, foreign ethnic immigrant communities (2000, 128). Delanty (2000, 115) claims that European identity has

³⁴ These symbols have been mentioned explicitly on the Constitutional Treaty. However, when the Treaty failed, the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon dropped all constitutional references in order to decrease its potential politicization, consequently, the reference to EU symbols have been dropped as well, except for the mention of the common currency.

³⁵ In terms of the normative debates regarding European cultural identity, this is not new as, for instance, David Theo Goldberg (2006) argues, contemporary notions of Europeanness imply inevitably whiteness and Christianity which poses important problems of belonging for the numerous non-White and non-Christian communities present on the European soil (cf. Balibar 2004).

potential for exclusion, for drawing its boundaries against the “non-Europeans”. Interestingly, until recently, many Central and Eastern Europeans have been included in the latter category, thus, the extension of citizenship of the Union to these citizens—still often perceived as migrants in socio-economic terms (Sojka 2009, 2012)—, has shifted the European borders also *within* Western European societies.

How can we analyze the content of European identity—the criteria for membership in the emerging political community of Europeans—, from the point of view of individual perceptions? Michael Bruter (2005) proposes to distinguish between two basic dimensions to European political identity: a cultural one, where belonging is perceived on the basis of culture, values, religion and ethnicity; and a civic one, defined as identification with a political structure, institutions, rights and rules of the political community (2005, 12). Other authors distinguish between three dimensions: civic, cultural, and ethnic constructions of European identity (Schlenker 2013), its civic, cultural, and ascribed components (Mansfeldova and Spicarova Staskova 2009; Wesołowski, Słomczyński, and Dubrow 2010) and even possibly more elements (Lengyel and Goncz 2012).

The basis for distinguishing these components lies in theoretical debates surrounding the character and defining elements of a national identity. Specifically, the debate regarding the foundations for the legitimacy of a political community revolves around the civic-ethnic dichotomy. In the history of European political thought, such distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms can be traced back to the XVIII and XIX century thinkers. First, the French Revolution introduced the idea of a political community based on a social contract (Rousseau 1762) and allegiance to the state, which was later taken up by Renan (1882) who famously claimed that it is not race, ancestry, language or religion that unite nations, but a continued consent of the people. The second model, based on common culture, emerged in relation to German unification in the works of German thinkers such Fichte (1807), who emphasized common language as the basis for national communities. In this sense, at the beginning of the XX century, Meinecke famously distinguished between two mutually exclusive discourses regarding the origins of a nation: those based on common culture and ethnicity where inclusion is based on ancestry, and those based on political constitution and social contract (Meinecke [1908] 1970). This distinction has been taken up by authors who analyzed different frames of nationalism: Kohn ([1944] 2005) treats both dimensions as mutually exclusive types, while Smith (1993) notes every nationalism contains both elements in varying degrees. More recently, Kymlicka (2001) has argued that a third element must be included, that of cultural frame of citizenship.

The debate surrounding these categorizations has structured much of nationalism studies, with arguments in favor of the mutually exclusive character of the civic-ethnic dichotomy (Miller 2000), and scholars who reject this view and argue that all three elements (ethnic, civic, and cultural) are being used simultaneously as criteria for membership in the nation (Brubaker 2004).

From the point of view of studies of individual orientations, it is important to note that this scholarship relied to a greater extent on normative and theoretical arguments than empirical evidence. The civic-ethnic dichotomy in studies of nationalism has been the object of much criticism for its essentialist character and analytical and normative ambiguities (Brubaker 1999). From the perspective of this study it is especially important to note that this dichotomy has been infamously applied to distinguish between a more civic Western nationalism, and Eastern nationalism which supposedly emphasizes more cultural and ethnic elements as the basis for a nation³⁶ (Smith 1993; Kohn [1944] 2005). Such theoretical distinction has been criticized for its normative and ethnocentric assumptions, as well as a lack of empirical basis (Shulman 2002). Moreover, in their study, Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) conclude that we have to be careful with simple cross-national comparisons, as these two concepts have potentially different meanings in different national contexts across Europe.

Keeping these debates as a reference point, in order to offer a simple frame of reference, my objective is to consider the two basic conceptualizations of identity, as related to the character of boundaries drawn around the supranational community of Europeans. On the one hand, a more inclusive concept based on civic values and voluntary in character is considered. On the other hand, the more exclusionary notion of European identity establishes boundaries of community through reference to ancestry and religion. The content of European identity is, thus, analyzed in terms of which elements—broadly framed as more ethnic or more civic—, denote being a true EU citizen in the perceptions of public opinion and elites. Therefore, it does not imply any normative considerations or an essentialist model of European identity. The distinction between ethnic and civic elements provides the theoretical framework for an empirical assessment of the contents of a European identification, while also offering the possibility to empirically verify the claims related to a

³⁶ See chapter 5.

qualitative difference in European identity between old and new member states, as discussed in chapter 3.

4. Summary: European political identity—a theoretical model

As EU's influence now spans over a wide array of policies and areas, some scholars argue that this diversification of fields of integration makes it necessary to conceptualize attitudes towards the EU as multidimensional as well (Scheuer 2005; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Wagner 2012; Hobolt 2014). While in much of the existing research terms such as support, Euroscepticism, and European identity have been used interchangeably, in their recent work Boomgaarden and colleagues (2011) argue for a more nuanced approach. They demonstrate that it is necessary to distinguish between distinct and independent dimensions of EU attitudes: evaluation of its performance (economic and political), utilitarianism (general support and perception of benefits), strengthening (both in terms of deepening, as well as widening of the EU), affection/emotions in relation to the EU, and a sense of European identity (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Furthermore, they show that each of these different dimensions needs a separate explanatory model. Sanders and colleagues (2012) also argue that European attitudes are structured in several dimensions and analyze identity as separate from representation (composed of trust and political efficacy) and scope of governance (current, future, and geographical) (Sanders et al. 2012). Thus, there seems to be a growing awareness of the necessity to approach European attitudes as multidimensional. In the present research project I am interested specifically in the determinants and consequences of one of these dimensions: I focus on European political identity, which I assume to constitute a separate dimension of European attitudes, most importantly, distinct from the more general concept of support (cf. Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Cram 2012; Sanders et al. 2012).

European identity is constituted by individual self-perceptions as members of the European political community, as well as its perceived content, which refers to the criteria of membership in the community. On the basis of social psychologists' findings, I distinguish two processes which are central to the formation of such self-perception: the cognitive process, which denotes "identification as European" and is based on perceived similarity; and the affective aspect which refers to "identification with EU" and can potentially be triggered by a natural psychological tendency towards positive social distinction. The attitudinal and behavioral consequences of both elements of social identities

can be best assessed in relation to the strength and stability of European identification. The relationship to national identity is influenced by different national political contexts and political leaders. However, the hypothesis of multiple identities and “marble cake” model indicates that European and national identification should not be opposed to each other. Finally, the criteria for membership in European political community are socially constructed and, and thus, context-dependent and influenced by the national elites. The elements which denote being European can be fitted into two basic conceptualizations of European identity based on debates in nationalism studies: a more open civic notion of Europeanness and a more exclusionary ethnic-based concept of being European.

In conclusion, political identities constitute central pieces of democratic legitimacy of political regimes. Consequently, European identity is relevant as far as it can provide the emerging political system of the EU with continuity and stability beyond out-put oriented legitimacy, with elites at the heart of such process of identity-building. The proposed theoretical model allows me to systematically analyze the issue of European political identity as a dependent variable within the enlarged EU and explore potential differences between old and new member states. In the next chapter, I discuss the explanatory approaches which have been put forward in the existing scholarship and which could account for the possible differences in the strength and meanings of European identity between East and West.

Chapter 2

European identity as a dimension and a determinant of European attitudes

“There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a *new order of things*. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long *experience* of them.”

– Nicolás Machiavelli, *The Prince*

“You can’t fall in love with the single market.”

– Jacques Delors

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I formulated the concept of European political identity and the ensuing assumptions about its underlying processes which guide this research project. I argued that supranational political identification in the enlarged EU should be approached as a multidimensional concept, as we must consider at least three aspects to it – identification as European (cognitive identity), identification with European Union (affective aspect) and the criteria for membership (content of European identity). I also discussed how, as a result of their politicization, identities constitute a relevant factor to consider for the formulation of political support. The present chapter will expand our understanding of the latter aspect

of identification processes – here I explore their consequences for European attitudes, as well as the determinants of identification itself.

Jacques Delors famously stated that “you cannot fall in love with the common market”, highlighting the necessity of going beyond purely economic integration if the citizens were to develop affective attachment to the European project. Over the recent decades European integration did expand to areas beyond the common market. It evolved from an elite-driven, international project focused on economy (and perceived, thus, as external to national communities), into a *Union* where supranational policies formulated by European institutions increasingly regulate matters which have been historically an exclusive dominion of the state. Furthermore, EU policies affect more and more directly the lives of its citizens. Direct experience with the new order of things is key to new regime’s endurance, as Machiavelli points out in his *opus magnum*, quoted at the beginning of this chapter. In the context of the supranational structures of the EU, citizens become familiarized with its institutions and policies both in terms of actual experience (most importantly, by means of rights which accrue from the citizenship of the Union), as well as indirectly, with the increased coverage of EU issues by the media, which grew substantially with the recent economic and political problems experienced during the crisis. The deepening of integration and its politicization brought the EU closer to its citizens, however, ironically, this did not generate a greater attachment of the people, rather, it triggered more resistance and contestation, deemed “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009), as discussed in the introduction.

This rising contestation of EU politics is due to the fact that the transformations of territorial boundaries which have taken place with the deepening of European integration also deeply restructure European societies, as well as affect national political arenas by re-configuring the lines of political conflict (Kulahci 2012; Conti 2014). In their study of Western European countries, Kriesi and colleagues (2012) point out that these processes, which prominently include the “Europeanization of national debates” and the “domestication of European issues”, constitute a new “critical juncture” which structures the society in terms of winners and losers of globalization *and* European integration (Grande and Kriesi 2012). Moreover, Kriesi et al. argue that in the Western European countries they analyze, a new political cleavage emerges, embedded in the existing structure of economic and cultural

dimensions, as losers of European integration become politically mobilized by new parties of the populist right, mostly through the appeal to their cultural anxieties.

Going beyond the analysis of Western European context, Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat (2012) notes that losers of the process of European integration constitute the potential electorate of Eurosceptic parties on both extremes of the ideological spectrum across Europe. In his study, he shows that identity threat, presented in terms of both a defense of national democracy on the left, and a more ethnic political belonging on the right, figures prominently among the basic causes of the upsurge in the representation of the Eurosceptic parties, together with negative cost/benefit evaluations of European integration and the perceived elitist and opaque character of European institutions (Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat 2012, 167–168). These developments in the national political arenas and their consideration in studies of parties and political conflict, have also had an impact on EU attitudes research, as greater attention is now paid to the sources of negative attitudes (popular Euroscepticism) and the consequences of such political mobilization against the EU (Wessels 2007; Fuchs, Magni-Berton, and Roger 2009; Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013).

In this chapter I explore the question of what makes people more favorable to European integration and what makes them identify as part of European political community. In what follows I discuss the general model of EU attitude formation and the specific explanatory factors which affect European identification. I review and critically reflect upon the most important approaches to the question of what drives attitudes towards the EU in general, and European identity in particular. Accordingly, mirroring the way in which research on European attitudes has developed, the chapter is structured into two parts. Firstly, I present the major explanatory frameworks of EU support and place identity within these frameworks as an *explanatory* variable. Then I move on to discuss the specific determinants of European identification, and European identity as a variable *to be explained*. I close the chapter with a theoretical model of identity as an element of European attitudes.

2. Interests or identities? Determinants of European attitudes

As public opinion gained importance in European Union politics, the determinants of European attitudes have been taken up as an important topic of research. If we approach the EU as a political system (Hix and Høyland 2011), these attitudes can best be analyzed with the help of the theoretical tools of political support and democratic legitimacy. Consequently, the majority of empirical studies of attitudes towards the European Union draw on the Eastonian framework of political support, discussed in the previous chapter. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) adapt it to the context of the EU and differentiate between *utilitarian* (based on costs and benefits) and *affective* (diffuse and emotional) support for the EU. Similarly, Scharpf (1999) distinguishes between *output-* and *input-oriented* legitimization of the EU. While the latter type of legitimacy (input) relates to affective and diffuse type of support, the former (output) is thought to be based on concrete perceived policy outcomes as legitimating elements. Thus, two basic dimensions of attitude formation emerge: affective attitudes which are linked to diffuse support, and utilitarian considerations which rest on short-term outputs of the system.

Scholars of EU attitudes, however, have often found it hard to empirically distinguish between specific and diffuse EU support (Hobolt 2014). Hence, most studies, while drawing on these theoretical frameworks, often work with more general measures of support for the EU, such as membership support, perceived benefits from integration, or the desired speed of integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998; Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; McLaren 2006). Moreover, in view of the falling levels of EU support in the recent decades, an increasing number of scholars also analyze the determinants of discontent and negative attitudes towards the EU, often referred to as popular Euroscepticism (McLaren 2007; Wessels 2007; Fuchs, Magni-Berton, and Roger 2009; Boomgaarden et al. 2011). In addition, recently, it has been suggested that even more dimensions should be distinguished, as discussed previously; however, in what follows, I will focus on explanatory approaches which have proved to be useful in most studies of general EU support.

A wide array of studies since late 1970s, but especially since the 1990s, following the Maastricht Treaty, have explored, among others, economic factors, cost-benefit calculations, cognitive shortcuts, party cueing, values, knowledge and identities as important

explanatory factors of European support. On the basis of this previous rich body of research, four basic theoretical perspectives which have received strong support in empirical research on the formation of European attitudes can be distinguished: instrumental rationality, heuristics, socialization processes, and affective factors (Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006; Loveless and Rohrschneider 2008; Szmolka Vida 2008; Sanders et al. 2012). I will briefly review them here.

2.1 Instrumental rationality

Since European Union originates in a process of economic integration, it comes as no surprise that one of the most widely acknowledged approaches to explaining attitudes towards the EU is the utilitarian model, which relies on perceived gains and losses from the process of integration, as determinants of European attitudes. The *instrumental rationality* approach rests on the assumption that economic conditions and specific outcomes of trade liberalization and other integration policies influence support for the EU, as citizens make rational calculations about the benefits they accrue from European integration (Gabel 1998).

The utilitarian perspective is related to the concept of output-oriented legitimacy, as discussed above—concrete perceived policy outcomes are thought to constitute the basis of EU support, as individuals are expected to make rational calculations regarding these outcomes. Moreover, we can distinguish two levels of such calculations—the “sociotropic” utilitarian perspective emphasizes the impact of perceived and real material benefits from integration at the collective level of country (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel and Palmer 1995), while the “egocentric” utilitarian approach focuses on perceived gains from membership and the integration process at the individual level (Gabel and Palmer 1995). In both cases, winners of European integration—those who materially benefit from the process, or perceive it as favorable to them or their country—are expected to become more supportive of the EU.

This line of analysis is related to the wider processes of globalization, and the resulting creation of sectors of societies which are hurt by the processes of economic openness in general, and the construction of a single market in particular. While its founders envisaged European integration as a source of economic prosperity for the whole of

European societies³⁷, we need to analyze the real distributional effects of globalization and European economic integration. These can be determined by taking into account that different sectors of the economy and their workers are more or less exposed to the pressures of international competition. Unarguably, European integration presents greater opportunities for highly skilled, educated and mobile citizens, while it has undermined the position of the less-skilled and less mobile, mostly blue-collar workers, and, especially, those in traditionally protected sectors (Kriesi et al. 2006; Fligstein 2008; Grande and Kriesi 2012). This division has unquestionable consequences for how EU support and European identification are structured in the society (Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009). Kriesi et al. (2006, 922) propose to refer to this antagonism as a conflict of integration/demarcation: winners of integration, who benefit from the process will support integration and the opening of national borders, losers, on the other hand, will seek protection from the negative effects of integration and support maintenance of national boundaries.

Both individual human capital (education, sector of occupation level of income), as well as perceptions of personal situation and national economy have been used to determine whether individuals benefit from the opportunities created by the common market, and, as a consequence, become more supportive of further integration. Moreover, previous studies have also focused on the relationship between national economic characteristics and support for integration, as support for EU membership is assumed to be higher in countries which benefit most from trade liberalization and EU fiscal transfers. In these terms, macro-level indicators which have proved to be correlated with individual levels of support include perceptions of national economy and the status of a state as net beneficiary in terms of contributions to the EU budget (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Some authors have also analyzed the relationship between other individual socio-economic characteristics and support. For instance, Nelsen and colleagues find that Catholics are far stronger supporters of integration than Orthodox or Protestants, and ultimately the least supportive tend to be those who are atheists and agnostics (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001; Nelsen, Guth, and Highsmith 2011).

³⁷ The Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, states as its objective “the economic and social progress” of European countries and “constant improvement of the living and working conditions of its people”.

To sum up, at the heart of the instrumental approach lies the assumption that European attitude formation is based on cost-benefit calculations as grounded in subjective perceptions of economy and benefits from the integration. The utilitarian perspective is, thus, directly linked to the evaluation of economic performance, deriving its hypotheses from rational choice theory and the economic models of voting (Lewis-Beck 1988) and pointing clearly to a model of “out-put oriented legitimacy” in the European Union (Scharpf 1999). However, given the low levels of knowledge about the EU, the ability of citizens to understand and accurately assess their individual and country gains from integration is disputed. Thus, while rational utilitarian explanations of EU support have proved useful in the existing literature, they do not seem to offer the sole basis for understanding European attitudes. Other theoretical frameworks have been put forward which try to address the question of how European citizens formulate their attitudes towards the EU in the absence of solid knowledge about its politics and policies.

2.2 Heuristics and cues

European integration remains quite an abstract issue for regular citizens, and the assumption that individuals are able to base their evaluations on well-thought-out attitudes or direct personal experience of European politics is, at best, problematic (Janssen 1991, 468). These limitations to instrumental rationality approach are recognized by the proponents of *heuristics* approaches, who argue for the existence of cognitive shortcuts in European attitude formation. These shortcuts can take on different forms, but they primarily relate to the domestic political arena, as citizens are more familiar with it than with the remote and abstract realm of supranational institutions. Thus, proponents of the heuristics approach argue that European attitudes are shaped predominantly within the national context, and, therefore, mediated by domestic political attitudes (Anderson 1998; Kritzinger 2003; Guerra 2008), and cues from national parties and political leaders (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

The work of Anderson (1998) on *domestic proxies* constitutes the point of reference in terms of how cognitive shortcuts from the national political context affect European attitudes. Anderson finds that citizens are rather ill-informed about the EU, and thus lack a solid basis for the development of their attitude towards it. Consequently, he provides empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that instrumental factors are in fact mediated by domestic political attitudes—national “proxies”—which are used as the more immediately

accessible basis on which attitudes towards the remote political system of the EU are formulated. Specifically, the assumption confirmed in his research is that of *transfer* (Sanders et al. 2012), as he demonstrates that those citizens who are satisfied with the way their national political institutions work, tend to support the EU membership more (Anderson 1998, 590). More recently, Sara Hobolt (2012) argues further that the quality of national institutions functions as a benchmark for evaluating EU democracy, and the relationship is positive. Furthermore, in her research Hobolt draws attention to the importance of knowledge about the EU institutions as a key mediating factor of this process.

There is however, no agreement on how heuristics work in European attitude formation. Other authors have offered a contrasting explanation and argue for a process of *substitution* (Sanders et al. 2012). In this sense, Sánchez Cuenca (2000) claims that citizens are in fact capable of discerning between the two levels of institutions (national and supranational) and that “the worse citizens’ opinion of national institutions and the better the opinion of supranational ones, the stronger the support for European integration” (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000, 169). His argument is based on the assumption that the “opportunity cost” of transferring sovereignty is reduced in a context of dissatisfaction with national institutions. This process has been also demonstrated to work for the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (Ilonszki 2009). Muñoz et al. (2011) try to reconcile both perspectives and put forward a two-level congruence/compensation model. They argue that at the individual level institutional trust is transferred—it “spills over onto different levels of government, and therefore, trustworthiness is congruent” (2011, 552). At the country level, on the other hand, a substitution process is at work—citizens who live in countries with general low levels of political trust (and poorly performing institutions) tend to deposit higher trust in EU institutions.

While the exact nature of the relationship between perceptions of national context and European attitudes is still somewhat contested, it is clear that perceptions of performance of national institutions must be taken into account when explaining European attitudes. The more immediate national polity constitutes a kind of natural benchmark against which the EU is judged and provides a more accessible institutional framework which can serve as a cognitive basis for attitude formation, especially among those citizens with lower knowledge levels.

The other explanatory perspective which posits that European attitudes are mediated by cognitive shortcuts from the domestic political context is *cue theory*. This approach derives its initial hypotheses from public opinion research in the US context, which suggests that citizens rely on cues from political elites in the process of political attitude formation (Zaller 1992). In this sense, some scholars show that attitudes towards the European Union are also guided by the position of elites and that of political parties (Ray 2003a; Hooghe and Marks 2005)³⁸. Political elites, as well as mass media—the other possible cueing actor— may strongly influence how European political system is perceived by the public opinion, and they can promote it as either complementary to the national community, or depict it as a rival competing for sovereignty (Duchesne and Frogner 2008, 156). Thus, their role in European attitude formation is not always positive. While elites and intellectuals might positively influence the way EU is depicted and incorporated into national discourses, they can also constitute an obstacle to the development of favorable opinions and European identifications (Bruter 2005, 4). In this sense, one of the key problems is that of “short-sighted elites that abuse the EU to justify unacceptable policies while failing to acknowledge Union’s merits in achieving political successes” hindering the legitimacy of the EU among citizens (Lucarelli 2011, 204). Furthermore, previous empirical analyses demonstrate that if political elites remain supportive of the European integration and do not use it as an element of political contestation, they can successfully promote national identities inclusive of attachment to Europe; whereas a division among elites over this issue may provide grounds for Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 437). Therefore, there is an important link between the way political elites engage in European integration and the perception of the EU by the public opinion. Nevertheless, the effect of public opinion preferences concerning European integration on political elites’ agendas should not be overlooked, as mass-elite linkages on European issues in fact include two simultaneous processes: a top-down political elite cueing process and a bottom-up as party supporters influence elites in their positions (Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries 2007).

To summarize, whether it is the domestic proxies, compensation for poorly performing national institutions or cues from elites and parties, there is much empirical evidence to the importance of economic and political context in the formation of European

³⁸ Here the Chapel Hill Expert Survey developed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is an extremely useful resource – a survey which, on the basis of expert opinions, estimates party positions on issues related to European integration. The datasets are available at <http://chesdata.eu/>.

attitudes. However, even though national performance -economic and political- has attracted much attention of the scholars of European attitudes, it is plausible that in times of high politicization of EU policies, citizens do evaluate European institutions' *performance* directly. While the politicization of the EU has its roots in the deepening of the integration process following the Maastricht Treaty, the working of European institutions has become especially salient in the context of the Great Recession and the Eurozone problems post-2008. Hence, some authors argue that in order to establish sources of European attitudes we must take into account perceptions of EU political performance—how citizens evaluate EU democracy (Rohrschneider 2002) and how much confidence they deposit in its institutions (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). Hobolt's findings seem to confirm the importance of such more direct evaluations of the EU, as she demonstrates that while less knowledgeable citizens indeed tend to rely on national proxies, those with higher levels of knowledge about the EU tend to evaluate it more directly (Hobolt 2012). Furthermore, in the context of one of the major economic shocks since the EU has been established, the Eurozone crisis, the mass media coverage of European politics has increased, thus, it makes sense to include the perceptions of economic performance of the EU among the explanatory factors of European attitudes.

2.4 Socialization and cognitive mobilization

While heuristic models rest on the assumption that attitude formation is to a great extent determined by cognitive shortcuts, socialization models assume that direct experience with institutions influences individual perceptions (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 14). In this sense, especially, from the point of view of constructivism and sociological institutionalism, the expectation is that institutions will affect individual interests, preferences, and identities (Parsons 2003; Risse 2004; Risse 2010). And as pointed out in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, crucial for any new political structure's endurance is experience with the new order of things. However, this process is hampered in the context of supranational institutions. European institutions are rather remote and relatively inaccessible to its citizens (even though there are important efforts being made to bring them closer to the people of Europe), and thus, it is more difficult for them to influence directly individual attitudes and perceptions, as the domestic proxy model posits.

Moreover, there is no evidence to confirm the assumption of a general socialization effect over the last 60 years. There seems to be no relationship between longer EU membership and mutual trust and feelings of community among the general population (Thomassen and Bäck 2009; Sanders et al. 2012; Bruter 2005; Risse 2010)³⁹. Rather, the effects of socialization can be observed on certain segments of the society—the winners of integration, highly-skilled, educated, and mobile elites of European societies (Fligstein 2008). More specifically, Fligstein's analysis points to the importance of social experience as a decisive factor shaping European attitudes. In this sense, the emerging European polity becomes reality for its citizens through transnational practices which are nowadays more and more habitual because of the facilities for cross-border trade, travel, work and study offered within the single market, at least among the more educated and well-off Europeans. Theresa Kuhn in her analysis of transnational practices in Europe shows that this effect is especially strong among lower educated citizens, once again pointing to the importance of knowledge

³⁹ There is no agreement on this point. Bruter (2005) and Risse (2010) argue that length of membership should have a positive impact on European attachment, while Green (2007), with data which does not include the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, finds that the citizens of the more recent member states tend to identify more as Europeans than citizens of older member states, he interprets that as a symptom of a process of alienation from Europe through the experience of membership (Green 2007, 100-101).

and education levels as key mediating factors for the rest of the determinants or European attitudes mentioned here (Kuhn 2012).

The importance of human capital to European attitudes has been noted already in very early analyses of support for European integration. Ronald Inglehart (1970) shows that education and mass media communications can have a positive effect on the formation of favorable attitudes towards the European Union. He argues that through a process called “cognitive mobilization” (an element of the broader processes of social mobilization in advanced societies), and as a result of exposure to education and mass communication, people become more aware of remote political communities and institutions. *Cognitive mobilization*, where accompanied by positive discourses of opinion leaders and favorable coverage in the mass media, constitutes a crucial determinant of EU support (Inglehart 1970b, 48). Moreover, the importance of political awareness for EU attitude formation has been further confirmed in more recent studies, such as Hobolt’s (2012), as mentioned earlier (however, see Sanders et al. (2012), for contrasting results on the mediating role of political sophistication).

Thus, while there seems to be little evidence of a general socialization effect due simply to European Union membership, unarguably, certain sectors of European societies possess the necessary human capital to develop attachment to a remote and abstract supranational political institutions. This is the case of younger, better educated and mobile citizens, entrepreneurs or employed as white collar workers, as well as political and other types of elites. Moreover, these sectors of European societies are also more exposed to transnational experiences which correlate with a more positive perception of the EU.

2.6 Affective factors

So far I have discussed how individual European attitudes can be explained by processes of rational cost/benefit calculations, the mediating role of the domestic context, the influence of political elites and the mass media, as well as the impact of cognitive mobilization, socialization in European institutions, and transnational contacts. However, as argued in the beginning, since the 1990s there is a growing recognition of the influence of affective factors on European attitudes. Thus, the last important approach to explaining European attitudes is directly related to the central topic of this thesis—the role of collective identities.

Identity is by no means new to the study of European integration. However, as Hooghe and Marks (2004) note, while early theorists such as Haas (1957), Deutsch (1958) and Inglehart (1970) focused on the effect of integration on identities, in the most recent research identity has become one of the most relevant explanatory variables of EU support. While citizens do rely to a great extent on rational cost/benefit calculations, recent studies show that affective factors have at least as powerful effect on European attitudes as rational calculations (Carey 2002; McLaren 2006), or can even constitute more important explanatory factors (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 415). As I have pointed out in earlier sections, this is the result of the extension of European policy scope beyond the common market, which has politicized European integration, activating the potential of political loyalties. Especially most recent analysis point to the importance of such “soft” (in contrast to “hard” economic rationality) *affective/identitarian factors* in EU public opinion research (Hooghe and Marks 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De Vreese 2013; Mitchell 2014a).

The affective approach considers national identities as important determinants of European attitudes; however, in line with my discussion of the contested relationship between national and European identity in the previous chapter, their influence cannot be assumed to be straightforward. While some studies show that national attachment and national pride could be potentially detrimental to EU support (Carey 2002; Christin and Trechsel 2002), the prevailing assumption is that the way national identities are constructed and framed by political leaders conditions their impact on European attitudes (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Therefore, as discussed in the previous chapter, national context shapes the

meanings of European and national identities, and how the latter relate to European integration⁴⁰ at the level of collective identities.

At the individual level, the most relevant distinction is to be made between national identities which are inclusive of European attachment and those which remain exclusive of the supranational element (Hooghe and Marks 2005). Therefore, while in principle national identity tends to be positively correlated with support for the EU, national identity formulated as exclusive of European identification constitutes a strong predictor of negative attitudes towards the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Moreover, this negative effect of exclusive national identities is amplified in national contexts where elites are divided on the issue of European integration, as the cue theory posits (Hooghe and Marks 2005).

The other possible manner of approaching the issue of affective determinants of European attitudes is to consider to what extent European integration has been framed as a threat. I have already discussed how European integration, and the broader processes of deterritorialisation and globalization, structure European societies into winners and losers. Losers of integration are more prone to becoming politically mobilized by Eurosceptic actors who relate to identity threats (Grande and Kriesi 2012; Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat 2012). In this sense, Lauren McLaren (2006) distinguishes between resource-based group threat and symbolic threat as two important factors which fuel rejection of European integration at the individual level. She argues that the utilitarian cost-benefit approach is only valid for the actual winners of integration (elites of the society) while those who do not perceive any clear gains or losses determine their positions on European Union in relation to these perceived threats to either national resources (welfare state benefits, jobs) or nation's symbols (language, culture)⁴¹. In a similar line, other authors argue that anti-immigration sentiments constitute important predictors of European attitudes, especially in terms of support for

⁴⁰ This has been demonstrated, for instance, by Juan Diez Medrano in his study of how citizens in the UK, Germany and Spain conceptualize European integration. He shows that British past as an empire strongly conditions current Euroscepticism, while German and Spanish pro-European attitudes have been framed as such by the elites in response to concrete political circumstances and incentives (Diez Medrano 2003).

⁴¹ Kriesi et al. (2006) on the other hand, argue that while these threats are central to political mobilization by populist right parties, individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as clearly distinct phenomena (Kriesi et al. 2006, 922).

further enlargements (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008).

The debate between proponents of economic approaches and those who emphasize the importance of affective factors has structured much of the research on European attitudes as both have proved to be important drivers of support for European integration. More recently, scholars have tried to find a common ground between both approaches suggesting that they are mutually shaping or even part of the same explanatory framework. In this sense, Garry and Tilley (2009) show that macroeconomic factors condition the impact of affective factors—they find that in countries which are net-beneficiaries of EU fiscal transfers, the negative effect of exclusive identity becomes diluted. De Vries and Kersbergen (2007), on the other hand, propose to integrate both approaches as part of a broader process of political allegiance in the EU, and also show that the effects of exclusive identities are mitigated by economic factors, both at the individual, as well as at the contextual level.

To conclude, as summarized in Table 2.1, we can distinguish four major theoretical frameworks which explain attitudes towards the EU. Utilitarian attitudes, factors related to heuristics (most importantly, domestic proxies, but also political cues), and socialization combined with cognitive mobilization processes, and complemented by consideration of national and European identification processes explain a great deal of variation in individual European attitudes. While rational calculations and domestic proxies remain one of the most widely acknowledged predictors of European attitudes, in the recent years the importance of affective determinants has been highlighted (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De Vreese 2013). Identities—national and European—as determinants of European attitude formation have received an increasing attention from scholars of EU public opinion. This development mirrors the changes in the focus of European politics at large, which shifted from strictly economic integration to a much wider spectrum of policies. European and national identities constitute important explanatory factors in such a context, but what explains the formation of a European identification? This is the focus of the next section.

Table 2.1 Summary of theoretical approaches to European attitudes

Theoretical perspective	Determinants	Authors
Instrumental rationality		
<i>Sociotropic</i>	Country economic situation and economic perspectives, country benefit from integration	Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998
<i>Egocentric</i>	Personal economic and labor situation and prospects, individual benefit from integration	Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998
Heuristics		
<i>Domestic proxies</i>	Attitudes towards national political system (trust, satisfaction with democracy) and authorities (support for incumbent government), contextual variables – quality of national democracy, satisfaction with democracy	Anderson 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002; Ray 2003b; Guerra 2008; Ilonszki 2009; Muñoz, Torcal, and Bonet 2011; Guerra 2013b; Hobolt 2012; Isernia, Fiket, and Westle 2012
<i>Political cues</i>	Political ideology, cues from political leaders and political parties	Ray 2003a; Hooghe and Marks 2005
<i>EU performance</i>	Perception of political (institutional trust, satisfaction with democracy) and economic performance	Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider 2002; McLaren 2007
Socialization		
<i>Cognitive mobilization</i>	Education, exposure to mass media	Inglehart 1970b, Kuhn 2012
<i>Knowledge</i>	Knowledge about the EU	Hobolt 2012
<i>Transnational practices</i>	Transnational mobility, European labor mobility	Fuss, García-Albacete, and Rodríguez-Monter 2004; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2012
Affective factors		
<i>National identity</i>	Strength and meaning of national identity	Carey 2002; Christin and Trechsel 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004
<i>European identity</i>	Strength of European identification	Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Carey 2002; Díez Medrano 2003
<i>Perception of threats</i>	Perception of threats (resource-based and symbolic threat), fear of immigration	McLaren 2002; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2006; de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008

3. Resources, experience or attitudes? Determinants of European identity

The explanatory approaches sketched above provide a general picture of European attitudes research. However, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, European political identity constitutes both an important determinant of attitudes towards the EU, as well as a central dimension of these attitudes. In terms of dependent variable, its determinants have been often derived from the general models outlined in the previous chapter (cf. Sanders et al. 2012). However, as Boomgarden et al. (2011, 18) note, when considering the factors which might influence attitudes in relation to the EU and formulating expectations about the effects of the different elements of the established explanatory frameworks, it is important to keep in mind the exact dimension of European attitudes that we are seeking to explain. In line with this observation, in the present study I argue that political identity constitutes a separate dimension of European attitudes, and, therefore, it is necessary to formulate a specific explanatory model, informed by the theoretical assumptions regarding the processes of political identification. In other words, I aim at explaining the differences in the levels of European citizens' self-perceptions as Europeans and their attachment to the European Union considering specifically how people develop social identities.

While research on the determinants of European identification is scarcer than that on general attitudes, the increasing number of empirical studies of European identity as rooted in individual socio-political attitudes provides a solid basis to the present study (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Bruter 2005; Kaina 2006; Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010; Sanders et al. 2012; Kaina and Karolewski 2013; Roose 2013). However, just as in the case of the explanatory models of attitudes towards the EU, there is no agreement on a comprehensive model and different authors emphasize different mechanisms of identity formation in the EU. Sanders et al. (2012) propose to apply a similar approach as in the case of general European attitudes and distinguish between cognitive mobilization, instrumental rational perspectives, political mobilization and affective/identitarian explanations of European identity (Sanders et al. 2012, 71). However, such perspective stands in contradiction to the assumption that European identity must be analyzed through the specific lens of social identity formation processes. Among those who recognize the need to develop specific explanatory models, Ruiz Jiménez (2004) proposes to differentiate between cultural, instrumental and civic factors which drive identification with Europe (Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004, 2). Risse (2010),

on the other hand, argues that identities in the EU are affected by interest change, interaction, incremental socialization, socialization through persuasion, as well as crises and critical junctures (Risse 2010, 88-103), while Roose (2013) distinguishes between identification by personal gain, through personal experience, and that triggered by elite construction. Thus, several different elements have been considered as influencing European identification, most of them overlapping in these typologies.

In their review of European identity theory in the context of EU governance, Kaina and Karolewski (2013) provide a synthesis of the existing approaches dividing them between those which focus on contextual factors and those which study the predispositions of individuals. Among the individual-level factors they include resources, experiences and attitudes as principal determinants of European collective identity (Kaina and Karolewski 2013; Kaina 2006). In what follows, I present a framework which follows the latter outline, while keeping in mind the elements proposed in the general formulation of sources of European attitudes, the more specific assumptions of existing European identity studies, as well as the theoretical formulation of European political identity as a social identity, as outlined in the previous chapter.

3.1 Individual-level factors

3.1.1 Resources

What individual-level attributes and factors contribute to acquiring a supranational identity? Firstly, the importance of *individual resources* reflects the findings of research on general European attitudes. In this sense, we must consider the influence of one's socio-economic status, education, political interest and information, as well as language skills and their social capital (Kaina and Karolewski 2013). The impact of these elements has been verified in empirical studies of European identification, documenting the fact that people who speak foreign languages (Fuss, García-Albacete, and Rodríguez-Monter 2004; Fligstein 2008), are more highly educated (Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2012) and express greater interest in politics (Boomgaarden et al. 2011) are more likely to acknowledge some form of European identification. Here the cognitive mobilization model provides us with a well-established theoretical framework which explains the role of individual resources in supranational identity formation.

Cognitive mobilization theory (Inglehart 1970b), as discussed previously, assumes that education and mass media communications have a significantly positive effect on the formation of favorable attitudes towards the European Union. More specifically, in terms of European political identity, Ronald Inglehart (1970) argues that through exposure to education and mass communication, people become more aware of remote political communities and institutions, such as the EU. Cognitive mobilization, if complemented by favorable attitudes of opinion leaders and positive coverage in the mass media, constitutes an important factor for the development of “a sense of commitment” to European community (Inglehart 1970b, 48), and, thus helps us explain how individual resources become central to the processes of identity formation in a supranational setting. Such positive effect of cognitive mobilization has been confirmed as one of the most relevant factors in empirical studies of European identity (Sanders et al. 2012; Roose 2013).

The relevance of socio-economic status to the formation of European identity, which entails consideration of education, information, language skills etc., points our attention to a specific part of European societies—their political, economic and other types of elites. In fact, one of the basic expectations of the early theorists of European integration, was that increased cooperation between European states would result in shifting of elites’ loyalties. In this sense, Ernst Haas defined integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center” (Haas 1958, 16). The expectation of neofunctionalists like Haas was that European integration would affect the interests and preferences of its major actors—elites and interest groups—which would result in a shift in their political loyalties towards the new supranational institutions. Therefore, the impact on political attitudes and loyalties, considered as one of the key dynamics of integration, is by definition unequally distributed among the society. Accordingly, elites, more mobile and highly educated, are unarguably the winners of European integration and, therefore, tend to be more aware of European institutions and establish a supranational political identity more easily. Losers of these processes not only remain attached to their national communities (Fligstein 2008), but also can feel increasingly threatened by supranational institutions taking over in areas which constitute the markers of these communities (McLaren 2006). Thus, as Fligstein argues, European integration can be viewed as a “social class project” which divides the society, and is perceived as elitist and against the nation by those who position themselves on the right on the political spectrum, and elitist and against the national

welfare states, by those who are on the left (Fligstein 2008, 251). This is exactly the potential political conflict which Eurosceptic parties are exploiting (Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat 2012). This points our attention to the persistent elite-mass gap in European attitudes which is also reflected in the degree of Europeanization of identities.

Political, economic and other types of societal elites not only tend to be on average more educated, more mobile and benefit more from integration than the majority of citizens, but also participate in European institutions far more than the general public (Herrmann and Brewer 2004). This has a powerful effect on their identities and interests which often cease to be narrowly defined through their national belonging, as they socialize in these new environments (Laffan 1997). In the case of the EU, “European socialization implies that the involvement in European venues causes a redefinition of norms and practices, and these European norms and values gradually become ‘internalized’ as part of the self” (Beyers 2010, 909). Consequently, the elite-mass gap which has been observed in terms of support for further European integration and specific European policies (Hooghe 2003; Müller, Jenny, and Ecker 2012) is even more likely to occur in terms of the degree to which identification with supranational institutions is established among the elites. Thus, the elite-mass gap in the degree of European identification is due to the effects of cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1970) amplified by socialization in international institutions and greater transnational contacts (Laffan 1997; Checkel 2005; Risse 2010). The case of the elites of European societies, much more pro-European than the average citizens, points to the fact that while individual resources might have a significant impact on European identities, these are also related to greater exposure to European socialization and its impact on identities.

3.1.2 Experience

This brings us to the second element of the explanatory model of European identification, *experience*, which denotes the *socialization* dimension of the general European attitude formation model. In general terms, socialization refers also to the broader processes through which individuals develop a sense of membership in a collectivity and adapt their behavior to the norms of that particular group (Checkel 2005). Moreover, as argued above, from the point of view of constructivism and sociological institutionalism, experience with

European institutions should affect individual perceptions and identities (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 14; Risse 2010, 88).

Especially transnational experiences seem to play a positive role, in line with early theory of Deutsch. Karl Deutsch (1957), in his transactionalist model assumed that integration would result in increased cross-border transactions which in turn would foster a sense of community, whereby “security communities” would be created, where war would no longer be feasible. Therefore, from the point of view of transactionalist approach, community formation would stem from the increased transnational contacts of citizens and elites. In this sense, the emerging European polity becomes a reality for its citizens through transnational practices which are nowadays more and more common. As discussed previously, the facilities for cross-border trade, travel, work, and study offered within the single market foster trans-border contacts, at least among the more educated and well-off Europeans (Fuss, García-Albacete, and Rodríguez-Monter 2004; Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009; Kuhn 2012; Mitchell 2012; Mitchell 2014b). Such importance of transnational practices for European identification has been confirmed by recent studies. Kuhn (2012) for instance, finds a positive effect on both cognitive, as well as affective dimensions of identity, with a more pronounced effect among the lower-educated Europeans. Moreover, the assumption that experience fosters European identification underlies several European policies such as the Erasmus program for student exchange in higher education. Mitchell (2012, 2014b) finds evidence to support such contact hypothesis regarding the effect of the Erasmus program, which assumes that transnational contacts between Europeans might foster a stronger European identification.⁴²

This aspect is especially relevant from the point of view of EU citizenship. The right to travel and work around the EU allows for an increased intra-European mobility, which is beneficial not only in economic terms of optimum labor force allocation, but also because it contributes to the development of European awareness and loyalties among those who move. Thus, the experience of travelling, studying and working without legal obstacles in any EU country—the essence of European citizenship—will likely contribute to the development of European identification. This expectation is based on the fact that European citizens who

⁴² There is, however, some disagreement on this point, as other recent studies, suggest that optimism about the European exchange programs fostering a European identification might be too far-reaching (Sigalas 2010; Kuhn 2012).

live in a different European country than that of their origin not only get to know their fellow European citizens, but also come in closer contact with EU policies which the citizenship of the Union entails (Rother and Nebe 2009, 120). Some authors even argue that in such a diverse community as the EU, where there is no common language, common history or public space and multiple national identities co-exist, intra-European mobility could offer the most solid foundation for “political socialization that can inculcate a feeling of belonging, a feeling of membership in the community” (Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 2013, 373). Nevertheless, intra-European migration is still very low in the EU, less than 3% of EU citizens⁴³ actually live in another EU member state. Thus, its impact is so limited within the European societies, that it has little real potential to provide a widespread basis for identification for the majority of European societies.

Face-to-face contacts with other Europeans and direct experience with European institutions are possible only for a small fraction of European societies, particularly the mobile and educated elites (Fligstein 2008), as well as intra-European labor migrants (Triandafyllidou and Maroufof 2013), but what about the rest? As Herrmann and Brewer (2004) argue, there are two aspects to how institutions affect identities in the EU: one is socialization, which relies on institutions’ salience, the other is persuasion, that is “the direct role that institutions may play in creating and engaging correspondent social identities among their constituencies” (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, 15). I will consider both of them.

From the point of view of socialization in European norms and institutions, based on Easton’s framework, it could be hypothesized that a prolonged exposure to the positive results of specific European policies could eventually turn into a more diffuse kind of support and affect political identities. In this sense, some of the authors suggest that there might be such an incremental socialization process at work (Risse 2010, 91). However, the empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that longer EU membership fosters more positive attitudes towards the EU at the country level is contradictory (Fligstein 2008), as discussed in the previous section.

⁴³ Eurostat data on cross-border activities from 2012. Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/EU_citizenship_-_statistics_on_cross-border_activities. Accessed on June 1, 2014.

Nevertheless, we must not reject socialization as a trigger of European identification entirely. There is another aspect to it which must be highlighted: political predispositions (Sears and Funk 1999), as well as values and primary social identities (Inglehart 2008) are internalized early in life through socialization and tend to remain rather stable throughout adulthood. The assumption that European identity constitutes a social identity points to the fact that it should also develop in a similar way as other political and social identities. The existing literature on collective identification with the EU points to the importance of “primary socialization” that occurs in the early years of one’s life when Europeanizing discourses and symbols are internalized (Recchi 2014). In this sense, Verhaegen (2014) develops a study of panel data collected among adolescents and young adults in Belgium and finds empirical support to the assumption that indeed in the case of European identity, just as in case of other political identities, it develops and is crystalized during mid-adolescence and tends to be stable among adults (Verhaegen 2014). Therefore, identification with Europe should be developed early on in life and remain stable.

This aspect of social identities is very relevant to consider if we are interested in social identity change. It implies that important identity changes do not occur within individuals, rather, if social identities (European identities included) crystalize in earlier stages of life, change could only materialize with generational replacement. Inglehart in his study of intergenerational value change⁴⁴ argues that “to a large extent, one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s pre-adult years and these change mainly through intergenerational population replacement” (Inglehart 2008, 131). His primary hypothesis is that intergenerational value change occurs if a generation grows up under significantly different conditions than those which shaped the views of previous generations. This hypothesis is supported by his observation of a change towards more post-materialist values which occurred in post-war Western Europe (Inglehart 1971; Inglehart 2008). The empirical evidence on this effect in terms of European identification is surprisingly limited. However, in an earlier study, Inglehart finds that younger cohorts in several Western European countries seem on average more supportive of European integration than those socialized before the process has taken off (Inglehart 1967). This point could have very significant consequences for the new member states, where only the youngest cohorts have

⁴⁴ In this line of research Inglehart (1971, 2008) famously focused on the change from materialist values emphasizing economic and physical security and post-materialist values, emphasizing autonomy and self-expression.

been socialized under democratic institutions and with the prospect or reality of being an EU member state. I will come back to that point in the next chapter.

Persuasion, on the other hand, refers to the conscious efforts to construct identity on part of the elites (Risse 2010; Roose 2013), through symbols (Bruter 2005), as well as political discourses which bear the potential of constructing national identities as inclusive and positively related to European attachment (Risse 2010). These efforts are triggered by the assumption that, as Benedict Anderson has famously observed, political communities are imagined communities where face-to face contact is limited (Anderson 2006), and as such in order for their members to internalize the feeling of commonality with other group members, media and symbols play a crucial role. The case of European identification is no different: other forms of experience of EU countries, its cultures and people, as well as of EU institutions—most notably, mass media discourse, and news regarding European politics, as well as exposure to European symbols—constitute an important identity-building factor (Bruter 2003; Díez Medrano 2003; Bruter 2005; Guerra 2013a). In his study of European identity, Bruter (2005) finds that indeed both exposure to positive news regarding the EU, as well as European symbols positively impact the levels of European identification. In sum, persuasion models of European identity formation rest on the assumption that identity change can be successful if the new identity resonates with the established national narratives and identities, as argued in the previous chapter.

3.1.3 Attitudes

The last dimension of individual-level factors which are expected to influence European identity formation are *values and attitudes*. Here we come back to the discussion in the chapter on the concept of European identity—where I argued that in delimiting the concept we must carefully distinguish between elements of EU identity (affective and cognitive, as well as its meanings) and other general attitudes towards the EU, such as diffuse and specific support (trust in European institutions, satisfaction with European democracy, etc.). There is however an inherent problem to the attitudinal factors of European identity formation: they are difficult to disentangle from the general attitude model discussed above. Such difficulty stems from the fact that it is challenging to separate those attitudes which influence European identity formation, and those which form part of the construct of identity (Kaina and Karolewski 2013, 17). There is a significant methodological danger here - if one fails to

discern adequately between elements of either, we might try to explain the dependent variable with factors which are part of its inherent structure, which could result in a misspecification of the model. However, by developing the explanatory models on the basis of the theoretical model of social identity, there is a solid theoretical basis to discern between at least two relevant attitudinal factors: evaluative and affective elements.

Evaluative attitudes include elements of instrumental rationality and performance model – perceptions of benefits from integration, trust in European institutions, and positive perceptions of its functioning. This bundle of determinants can be derived directly from our theoretical model of identity, which, based on social identity theory, assumes that one of identity formation's basic processes is acquisition of a *positive self-perception*. Thus, positive evaluations of European Union, both in economic as well as political terms, should strengthen European identification as social psychology tells us that people seek to build their identities in relation to groups which are perceived in positive terms and can improve their self-perception.

Affective individual determinants, on the other hand, refer to the strength and meaning of national and European identities. This element makes reference to the cognitive process of European identity formation, based on perceived similarity. The relationship between national and European identity has been extensively dealt with in the previous chapter, so here I will just point out the two principal points regarding the effects of national identities on European identification. On the one hand, if constructed as inclusive, national identity may reinforce European identification, as the multiple identities theory posits (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Kuhn 2012). Exclusive national identity, may, on the other hand, constitute an important obstacle for support for EU (Hooghe and Marks 2005), and even more so or the emergence of a supranational identification. Thus, the influence of national identities on European identification is far from straightforward and it depends largely on the national context (Díez Medrano 2003), the meanings attached to national and European identities and particularly, the way elites actively construct both types of identities.

To sum up, we find several elements which are expected to favor the development of European identification at the individual-level, grouped into factors which make reference to individual resources, experiences, and attitudes (as summarized in Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Summary of determinants of European identity at the individual level

Dimension	European identity determinants	General EU attitude model	Authors
<i>Resources</i>	Education, political interest, knowledge, foreign languages	Cognitive mobilization	Inglehart 1970b; Fuss, García-Albacete, and Rodríguez-Monter 2004; Fligstein 2008; Kuhn 2012
<i>Experiences</i>	Transnational contacts, media and European symbols exposure, generational change	Socialization	Bruter 2005; Díez Medrano 2003; Inglehart 2008; Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009; Kuhn 2012, Mitchell 2012a, 2014b
<i>Attitudes</i>	<i>Evaluative</i> (performance of and benefits from European institutions) <i>Affective</i> (national identity, attitudes towards migrants)	Instrumental rationality Affective factors	Hooghe and Marks 2005 Duchesne and Frogner 2008

In general, the existing research tells us that those citizens of the EU who are more educated, more mobile and benefit from European integration processes due to their socio-economic status tend to identify as Europeans more than those who are less educated, have less transnational experiences and are among the losers of EU policies. Experience, rather than in terms of “incremental socialization” as related to the length of membership, is conceptualized here in terms of generational change. The basic assumption is that when younger cohorts have been socialized under significantly different institutional set-up than the older generations, the new context shapes their attitudes and identities. Moreover, in terms of attitudes, citizens who hold a positive image of the EU and have a national identity inclusive of European attachment should identify as Europeans more easily. The impact of these factors can help us explain differences in the individual-level differences in cognitive and affective European identity, however, there is also much variability between the different member states of the EU. Thus, contextual-level factors could account for the differential effect of the national context, as the next section makes clear.

3.2 Contextual factors

The process of formation of European identities, while it depends the great extent on individual-level characteristics, as argued above, must necessarily be understood in terms of the historical, social, and cultural specificities of each national context (Bruter 2005). Therefore, in order to adequately understand the way European identity is constructed across the EU we must incorporate *contextual factors* into our theoretical model; that is characteristics which refer to the level of political community.

In their theoretical model of European identity determinants, Kaina and Karolewski (2013) propose to distinguish here between exogenous and endogenous factors. *Exogenous* determinants are those which refer to perceptions of external threats and danger from the outside strengthening group members' sense of community (Kaina and Karolewski 2013, 16). The *endogenous* contextual factors, on the other hand, point to the importance of cultural and institutional determinants, such as common values, norms and symbols (*cultural*) and the existence and quality of institutions (*institutional*). Among the endogenous factors, Kaina and Karolewski also include *process-related* factors, those which refer to the homogenization of European societies and the development of a European public, shaped by discourses on a European collective identity. However, as the authors note, this is still the vaguest element of their model.

The operationalization of contextual factors in the context of an empirical quantitatively oriented research is quite challenging. While institutional factors such as quality of governance and macro-level economic indicators can help us control for difference in the political and economic context, in a comparative study of even relatively similar countries, such as the member states of the EU, there are still elements which differ importantly between the national contexts and are difficult to account for quantitatively – this is the case especially of the cultural and process related factors. However, taking into account *elite positions* in a given country might constitute a good proxy of these differences, in line with the cue theory discussed in the previous sections. As Risse (2010, 96) notes, elite discourses account for important differences between EU member states, as they influence the way in which the EU is portrayed and shape the process whereby supranational identification becomes part of the reconstructed national identity.

Political elites, thus, define and articulate the national versions of European identity and, consequently, shape the degree of Europeanization of identities among the national mass public (Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Risse 2010; Schmidt 2011). Elites, in particular political leaders, can influence public opinion's perceptions of comparative and normative fit of identities, in order to exploit them for their political purposes (Mols and Weber 2013, 509). In this sense, the research of Marcussen and colleagues (1999) shows how elites can indeed purposively alter national identity frameworks in order to incorporate the European element. They demonstrate how and why, since 1950s, German and French national identities have become compatible with identification with Europe, while the English national identity remains exclusive of such identification. Their main argument is that the European element must resonate with the pre-existing national identities. Provided that this condition is met, elites can introduce new identity constructions easier at moments of critical junctures in state's history choosing a new identity framework which suits best their perceived interests (Marcussen et al. 1999; Díez Medrano 2003). While there is evidence that elites can indeed influence existing identities, it is also true that these are rather stable constructions and in order to be effectively altered a set of conditions must be met, a pre-existing compatibility being the most important one.

4. Summary: What drives European identity and support for the European Union

In this chapter I explored the question of what makes people adopt favorable stances towards European integration and which elements foster a European political identification. I discussed the major explanatory frameworks of EU support and placed identity within these frameworks as an *explanatory* variable (see Table 2.1). Consequently, I considered the specific determinants of European identification, analyzing European identity as a variable *to be explained* (see Table 2.2).

Individual European attitudes can be explained to a great extent by rational calculations of cost/benefit, the influence of domestic context, political elites and the mass media, as well as cognitive mobilization and transnational contacts. Citizens who perceive personal and country-level benefits from European integration, who are better educated and experience more transnational contacts, as well as live in countries where there is less political conflict on issues of European integration have been found to be significantly more positively oriented towards the EU. In addition to these elements, especially since the 1990s there is a growing recognition of the influence of another very relevant factor that shapes European attitudes—the affective dimension. In this sense, national and European identifications have been acknowledged to influence support for the EU at least to the same extent as utilitarian considerations. Moreover, while national identities do not constitute obstacles to European integration in principle, it has been found that if they are constructed as exclusive of European attachment, they can become a significantly negative factor.

European identity, on the other hand, determines individual attitudes to a great extent, mainly due to the fact that it represents the most deeply seated kind of diffuse support for the community, to use the Eastonian terms. Thus, it is a crucial element for EU support and its political legitimacy, an observation which has triggered an increasing interest in its determinants. These determinants, while related to the general model of European attitudes, are also quite specific in terms of European political identity as a social identity. We can distinguish between resources, experiences, and affective and evaluative attitudes as principal factors in European identity formation, keeping in mind that national contexts mediate the impact of such individual-level factors, as well as shape the contents of European identification. In general, the existing research tells us that those citizens of the EU who are

more educated, more mobile, and benefit from the European integration process due to their socio-economic status tend to identify as European more readily. In terms of attitudes, citizens who hold a positive image of the EU (evaluative aspect) and have a national identity inclusive of European attachment (affective aspect) should identify as Europeans more easily. These factors explain a great deal of variation in European attitudes and identification between individuals. However, we also encounter much variability between European countries within the enlarged EU. Some scholars even argue that there might be also a broader divide in these terms, that between new and old member states. This is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 3

New European citizens: Central and Eastern European attitudes and identities

“What does European mean to a Hungarian, Czech or a Pole? For a thousand years their nations have belonged to the part of Europe rooted in Roman Christianity. They have participated in every period of its history. For them, the word Europe does not represent a phenomenon of geography but a spiritual notion synonymous with the word “West”. The moment Hungary is no longer Western – it is driven from its own destiny, beyond its own history: it loses the essence of its *identity*”

– Milan Kundera, *The Tragedy of Central Europe*

1. Introduction

In the preceding chapters I discussed the operationalization of European collective political identity as a social identity, its underlying theoretical model, as well as its determinants and consequences. However, while much empirical research in the recent decades addressed the issue of European identity and its sources in Western and Southern Europe, the subject received much less attention in scholarship on new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. CEE-10 countries have been members of the EU for only a decade. Consequently, their citizens have had much less time to form their opinion on European integration and experience European citizenship. On the other hand, as public opinion data is made available with some time-lag, scholars have had relatively little time to develop their analyses, and studies which cover the period following the accession are still less frequent than those which include only established EU member states.

The objective of this chapter is to discuss the normative debates on European identity which emerged in the wake of Eastern enlargement and to present the findings of the existing studies of European identification as part of public opinion orientations in CEE-10 countries.

This will provide a basis for my hypotheses on the relevance and role of identities in terms of EU attitudes, between East and West of Europe.

The Eastward enlargement of the EU marked a new era for the process of European integration, as it almost doubled the number of member states and brought in countries which, in comparison to previous members, were significantly less economically developed and had a shorter democratic record. This challenged in important ways the institutions, policy-making processes, and policies of the EU in which the interests of 28 member states and its citizens have to be accommodated. However, the impact of EU membership on the newly admitted countries was perhaps even more dramatic. After the revolutions of 1989, EU accession process constituted a continuation of the reforms undertaken in the context of the triple post-communist transitions (Offe 1996). These changes in the institutional and policy frameworks of CEE countries are often referred to as their Europeanization in the context of EU conditionality on the road to accession. In this sense, the promise of EU membership functioned as a strong external incentive to reform institutions and adopt *acquis communautaire*, the body of EU law (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Accordingly, in the aftermath of accession, much research focused on the effects of pre-accession conditionality and of the broader processes of Europeanization on institutions, policies, and politics of the newly admitted member states (Pridham 2005; Vachudová 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2006; Lewis and Mansfeldová 2006; Haughton 2007; Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Lewis and Markowski 2011). These developments also generated some (albeit comparatively more limited) academic interest in the structure and determinants of mass attitudes in these post-socialist new member states. The resultant studies focus especially on the issue of EU support, before and after accession, and approach the task as a test of the applicability of existing theories to CEE countries.

From this perspective, it is plausible that theoretical frameworks formulated in the context of Western democracies could be inadequate to explain formation of European attitudes in countries whose societies have “characteristics which differentiate them from states which were involved in previous stages of European integration” (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006, 142). As mentioned in the introduction, such differential characteristics are thought to be rooted in historical experience of socialist regimes, nation-building under adverse circumstances, and—more recently—an intense period of market reforms and democracy-building. These intense societal and political changes have left a mark on the

citizens of post-socialist countries. There is a wealth of scholarship on the impact of post-communist legacies in terms of political attitudes and political culture and it would be beyond the scope of this chapter to review them in depth (Mishler and Rose 1997; Mishler and Rose 2001; Klingemann, Fuchs, and Zielonka 2006; Rose 2009; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). However, their main assumption is that these legacies continue to influence attitudes in the region and some scholars even suggest that, as a result, in Central and Eastern Europe regime ideals become more relevant to European attitude formation than in the West, especially in terms of greater incompatibility with values guiding market economies and liberal democracies (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006). Additionally, another source of concern is that the observed weaker civic engagement and lower levels of trust in these countries could possibly undermine the prospects of a common European identification, as mentioned previously (Fuchs and Klingeman 2006).

While there might be indeed some differences between Eastern and Western publics, other scholars have suggested that “there is little theoretical or empirical reasons to believe that fundamental factors driving mass opinions about the EU as an object would be completely dissimilar in East and West” (Tverdova and Anderson 2004, 3; see also Guerra 2013). In order to verify these assumptions, much of the scholarship has focused on testing the existing models of EU support in Central Eastern European public, in the context of candidate countries (Cichowski 2000; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004; Tverdova and Anderson 2004; Christin 2005; McLaren 2006), and more recently, already as new member states (Loveless 2010; Wagner 2012; Guerra 2013a; Guerra 2013b). More specifically on the topic of European identity, the existing research so far is rather limited. Most importantly, while some studies seem to confirm the latter position and argue that there are no significant differences in the cognitive processes which underlie attitudes and identities in the new member states (Sanders et al. 2012), significant differences in levels of European identification persist and need further analysis and explanation. As noted in the introduction, this study takes a middle ground in this discussion. While I do not argue in favor of any essential differences in the cognitive processes between East and West of Europe, I am nevertheless interested in how the changing context of accession and economic problems which emerged in the first decade of membership affect the ways in which attitudes and identities are formed in the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The objective of this chapter is to contextualize the topic of European political identity in the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe by drawing together the existing theoretical assumptions about EU attitude formation and European political identity and the specific assumptions about and outcomes of Eastern enlargement. I start with the discussion of the broader significance of Eastern Enlargement for the European political community, especially in terms of political identities. Consequently, I discuss the existing empirical evidence regarding the nature of EU support and European political identity in member states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as explore the possible differences and points of convergence. These discussions will constitute a basis for a comprehensive model of European identity and support between East and West, which takes into account the influence of political identities. In the final section of this chapter I will articulate the theoretical model adopted in this study together with the ensuing hypotheses regarding the determinants, contents, and consequences of European political identity between East and West of the EU.

2. Eastern Enlargement: interests or identity?

One of the principal characteristics of Eastern enlargement was that the newly admitted members from Central Eastern Europe were often portrayed as driven by rational calculations about European integration and its concrete material benefits: membership of the EU encapsulated the promise of improved economic performance and increased social welfare, as well as enhanced quality of governance and a guarantee for the recently re-established democratic institutions. Moreover, the addition of new member states could be explained in terms of material benefits for the old member states as well; it provided the existing EU members with access to new markets and cheap skilled and unskilled labor (a fact which, admittedly, also contributed to the politicization of enlargement and social opposition in some of the old member states⁴⁵). On the other hand, when objections to the planned “Big Bang” enlargement were being raised in the public discourse, the expected economic and political costs were often the argument against it, reinforcing the perception of the extension of the EU as a rational decision which could be analyzed in terms of cost/benefit calculation.


At the same time, political elites in the candidate countries spoke of a historical necessity of a “return to Europe” which would reaffirm their status as modern European states (Grabbe and Hughes 1999, 189). This famous slogan represented the affective motivation for EU accession. Moreover, elites in the old member states and the European institutions (sometimes reluctantly) asserted that there were normative and identity-related reasons for the Enlargement towards the Eastern end of the continent. Therefore, the political discourse surrounding the admission of new member states from Central Eastern Europe combined arguments related to normative, as well as utilitarian considerations, on both sides of the accession process.

⁴⁵ For instance, trade unions and workers from most EU old member states were hugely opposed to the liberalization of services proposed in the *Bolkestein Directive* which was being prepared around the time of the Eastern enlargement (2004-2005). The Directive aimed to extend the principle of mutual recognition to services, in order to facilitate the completion of the single market. The protests were driven to a great extent by the fear of social dumping from the new member states as well as xenophobia, a debate best symbolized by the figure of the “Polish plumber” which emerged in the French debate on the Constitutional Treaty – the worry that a Polish worker would be able to work in France under Polish labor laws (Maatsch 2007, 273). Another example of such opposition based on perceived threats from the Enlargement was the adoption of transition periods for free mobility from the new member states by most of EU-15. Such move was especially disappointing for CEE-10 candidates as freedom of labor is one of the pillars of the single market, and freedom of movement constitutes a basic tenet of EU citizenship.

2.1 Interests as the driving force

In terms of interests as a basis for the enlargement, unarguably, one thing that all of the CEE member states have in common is that they have been and remain significantly less well-off than the old member states of North-Western Europe⁴⁶. We can get a good idea of this gap in economic prosperity between the two groups of countries by a comparison of GDP per capita in the newly admitted member states and the old members (EU-15). In Figure 3.1, we can observe these differences between the two groups, as well as the unequal levels of economic prosperity within the CEE region itself.

Figure 3.1 GDP in Central and Eastern European EU member states



Note: EU27=100. The table with the complete data can be consulted in the annex to this chapter. Data: Eurostat.

With the first wave of CEE accession (2004) the average GDP per capita of the CEE-10 countries represented only half of that of Western Europe (EU-15). Thanks to high levels of GDP growth in the initial years of membership at least partially driven by the economic facilities of single market and substantial fiscal transfers from the EU—via its regional and cohesion, as well as agricultural policies—, this difference diminished slightly over the course

⁴⁶ And those of Southern Europe as well, albeit the differences, are less pronounced, especially following the economic and financial crisis.

of the first decade of membership⁴⁷. These developments confirm Tsoukalis's (2005) observation that EU enlargement works as "convergence machine" for poorer members and validates the expectations of those who supported EU accession based on expected material benefits⁴⁸. Admittedly, such general division between old and new member states in terms of economic prosperity obscures, however, important variation among CEE countries. While Slovenia and Czech Republic have been closer to the EU-27 average than the rest of the CEE-10 countries from the start, and their GDP has not varied greatly, others were much worse-off initially and many experienced a strong improvement in their economies following accession. Particularly, Romania's and Bulgaria's GDP per capita represented only 30% of EU's average GDP in 2004, 40% at the moment of their delayed accession (2007) and it reached the level of 50% of EU's average by 2012.

Overall, the progress has been most pronounced in Lithuania, Slovakia, and Latvia where GDP per capita rose in almost 20 points after 2004 (in terms of the EU-27 average) but significant disparities in levels of economic development still persist. Hungary is a noteworthy case, as GDP per capita of Hungarians almost did not vary over the years, which resulted in the loss of its position as one of the forerunners of CEE-10 in economic terms, as other countries experienced far greater economic improvements after accession. Overall, while significant differences persist among the CEE-10 countries, the relative economic poverty of these countries constitutes a central factor to be taken into account when analyzing patterns of EU attitudes (Garry and Tilley 2007), a factor which becomes especially relevant after accession (Guerra 2013a).


The other aspect in which the newly admitted member states were expecting to benefit as a result of their EU accession was the stability and quality of democratic institutions. On the surface, there are not any problems: since the 1990s all CEE-10 countries are ranked as free by the Freedom House. However, this basic assessment conceals important differences. Undoubtedly, the quality of democracy is more difficult to assess comparatively

⁴⁷ These economic developments after accession are discussed further in the last chapter of the thesis, where I explore the impact of the financial and economic crisis on EU attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe.

⁴⁸ However, some authors note that economic development based on "catching up" with Western levels of wealth and prosperity could also contribute to reinforcing the historically persistent economic backwardness of the region. This is due to the "international demonstration effect" which generates demand for higher standard of living in countries where productive capacity and technological innovation are not strong enough to sustain such high levels of consumer culture, which results in greater spending rather than saving and investing (Epstein 2014).

than economic prosperity. However, there are several indicators at hand which might help us get a general picture. The World Bank governance indicators—which include scores on the following aspects of governance quality: Voice & Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption—offer a snapshot of all EU democracies, both in the wake of the enlargement and in 2012⁴⁹.

Figure 3.2 Quality of governance (WBI, 2004 and 2012 compared)



Note: Figure represents the mean (scaled to 0-1) of World Bank governance indicators.

Figure 3.2 represents the quality of governance in EU-27 countries ordered according to their WBI score⁵⁰. Here also we can discern a difference between the new and the more established member states, albeit less clear-cut than in the case of economic indicators. We can see that most CEE-10 member states remain in the lower part of the graph (the perceived quality of their institutions tends to be poorer), however, we also find countries like Italy or

⁴⁹ WBI, admittedly can be debatable for their operationalization of governance, as well as the methodology of their construction (cf. Thomas 2009). However, they offer the necessary coverage for this study in terms of time span and countries included.

⁵⁰ The World Bank governance indicators are constructed on the basis of a variety of data sources, surveys and public, private and NGO experts, the methodology and the data are publicly available at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx>.

Greece closer to the bottom of the graph. Moreover, in the context of the economic crises some of the old members such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have seen a worsening of their countries democratic governance, which makes the division between the two groups of countries even more blurry. There is also much regional heterogeneity within the CEE-10 group: while in 2004 Slovenia and Estonia had the best performing institutions, clearly, Romania and Bulgaria experienced most problems. Among the best democratic performers in the region in terms of WBI, we find Slovenia and Estonia⁵¹.

The comparison over time demonstrates that overall in all CEE-10 countries there has not been much change in terms of quality of their institutions following the accession. Only Poland seems to improve its democratic institutional performance somewhat in the first decade of membership. Moreover, in some cases—when EU conditionality could no longer motivate continuing institutional reform—a negative trend was observed. Some link such development to the fact that possible sanctions which could be imposed on EU member states, have much less of an effect than the threat of withholding membership altogether in the pre-accession phase (Sedelmeier 2014). Here Hungary must be singled out yet again, as the country which has experienced the most significant decline in the quality of its democratic institutions, confirmed by different indicators, studies, as well as news reports. As Ilonszki puts it, “formerly a front runner in the democratic transition and consolidation in CEE, after her entry to the EU, Hungary became one of the problem children in the European family” (2009, 1042). PM’s Orban constitutional changes and policies⁵² have been

⁵¹ An excellent source for comparative assessment of the developments in CEE countries are the *Bertelsmann Stiftung* Transformation Index reports. The BTI index evaluates quality of democracy and market economy, as well as political management in almost 130 developing and transition countries across the world. The 2013 edition of the report ranks Czech Republic as the second most successful transition country in the world (after Taiwan), Estonia, Poland and Slovenia are ranked also in the top five. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, on the other hand, are the countries which receive the lowest scores among the CEE-10 countries and the latter two have been classified as defective democracies by BTI 2014. Another comparative study is the *Nations in Transit*, yearly reports of the democratic developments in almost 29 countries published by the Freedom House. According to the Nations in Transit 2014 study, all CEE-10 countries are consolidated democracies, except for Romania and Bulgaria where their score classifies them as semi-consolidated democracies, and Hungary is close to sliding back into that category. Similarly as in the case of the WBI, in the Nations in Transit 2014 reports Slovenia and Estonia stand out as those with the best quality of democratic institutions.

⁵² Following the electoral success of Victor Orban’s centre-right Fidesz party in 2010, his government used its parliamentary supermajority of two-thirds to push through controversial constitutional reform which has been criticized for not being consulted or agreed by any wider political or social forces beyond Orban’s affiliates. The reforms modified, among others, electoral rules and imposed political control over key institutions such as the judiciary and the media. Moreover, the new Constitution also includes references to the Christian heritage of Hungarians and politicizes the issue of kinship nationality of Hungarian minorities in neighboring states by granting them electoral rights (Batory 2010).

widely criticized for being at odds with democratic principle of checks and balances, a fact which continues to cause a widespread preoccupation in Europe—as reflected in an official statement by the European Parliament issued in 2012⁵³. This process of democratic institutional deterioration is often referred to as “backsliding of democracy” and is closely linked with the winners/losers split of Hungarian society where social consolidation has not followed the deep systemic changes which occurred in the last two decades (Agh 2013).

Another source of concern is the fact that the worst democratic performers of the EU, the laggards of accession—Romania and Bulgaria—are not improving their failing institutions after accession, and infringements on the rule of law continue in these member states. In this sense, the second round of Eastern enlargement in 2007 has been sometimes considered as a political decision made prematurely (Wagner, Iancu, and Dimulescu 2013). Both countries have not managed to reach the entirety of the objectives of institutional pre-accession reform as its enforcement in some areas remained limited to mere adoption and not implementation of EU rules. This has been a special source of concern in Romania where judiciary reforms developed in the wake of EU accession and under the incentive of EU conditionality have turned out to have only a limited effect (Mendelski 2012). Moreover, a reform-related power struggles between Prime Minister Ponta and President Băsescu caused a major institutional crisis in 2012. This is why combating corruption and further reforming the judiciary in both countries have been important objectives of the EU (Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012). Nevertheless, such negative perceptions of their ability to enforce the rule of law, together with unresolved issues with organized crime control contributed to the withholding of Schengen agreement⁵⁴ from these member states.

Overall, it can be concluded that there seems to be a divide in terms of quality of governance between CEE-10 and old member states, yet, not as clear-cut as in terms of

⁵³ The “European Parliament’s resolution of 16 February 2012 on the recent political developments in Hungary” reads: “The European Parliament (...) expresses serious concern at the situation in Hungary in relation to the exercise of democracy, the rule of law, the respect and protection of human and social rights, the system of checks and balances, equality and non-discrimination”. Full text of the resolution adopted is available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0053+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. Accessed on June 5, 2014.

⁵⁴ These concerns have been expressed by various Western European politicians. The Dutch immigration minister was quoted by The New York Times in 2011 saying about vetoing Bulgaria’s and Romania’s Schengen entry, “It is also a matter of trust and confidence that our collective external borders will be safe and secure. At the moment, it is clear that there are still significant shortcomings in the field of anticorruption and the fight against organized crime” (Castle 2011).

economic prosperity. Here also we find much heterogeneity between the countries and, in contrast to the case of economy, there does not seem to be much improvement following accession. Moreover, in some cases we can even speak of “democratic backsliding”, which leads to a conclusion that EU membership does not automatically guarantee the stability of democratic institutions, as some have hoped. Therefore, while much progress has been made in bringing the CEE-10 member states closer to the EU-15 in economic terms, the expected benefits in terms of political stability and quality of democratic institutions did not materialize in all CEE-10 countries. Furthermore, perceptions related to their relative poverty and issues with democratic institutions in some of the countries contribute to a negative image of CEE-10 member states in the eyes of the rest of European citizens which potentially undermine the prospects of a common identity. This is especially the case of Bulgaria and Romania, whose denial of Schengen entry and preoccupation about migration from these countries expressed by some of European leaders, effectively positions them as second-class European citizens.

2.3 Identity as justification

As mentioned previously, while the process of Eastern Enlargement has been perceived to a great extent in terms of a cost/benefits decision, with important benefits expected on part of the newcomers, it also relied heavily on political elite discourse, focused on issues of common identity. Eastern enlargement constituted the final step in the process which originated in the anti-Soviet revolutions across Eastern Europe, and as such accession symbolized a crucial phase of reunification of the continent after almost five decades of block division along ideological lines.

There is a widespread agreement that norms played an important role in the process of the most recent EU enlargements. In this sense, EU official discourse legitimized the aspirations of new Central and Eastern European democracies to become members of the community, conceived as a European club of liberal democracies⁵⁵ (Risse 2010, 206). As Schimmelfennig (2003, 5) argues, Eastern enlargement “was not a rational efficient institutional arrangement for the Western organizations” because neither the economic nor security benefits would compensate the trouble of expanding (Schimmelfennig 2003; see also Sjursen 2002 on this point). Rather, Schimmelfennig shows how the supporters of enlargement among EU member states and within European institutions used rhetorical action to neutralize their opponents. Supporters argued that since the EU is an organization committed to a pan-European democratic community organized around the principles of social pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and representation, applicants from Central Eastern Europe who complied with these norms could not be rejected as it would be incoherent with the established aims of the EU. The result was that opponents could not argue against those principles without risking their credibility and they had to accept the enlargement as a fact (Schimmelfennig 2003). In this sense, the community identity of European institutions as democratic and open was used to enforce and justify the Eastern enlargement.

⁵⁵ In this sense, the article 49 of TFEU (consolidated text as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon) stipulates that “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.”. The article 2 of TFEU states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

Moreover, some studies point to the fact that the Eastward enlargement of the EU was based not only on such normative reasons, but also on specific assumptions regarding a common identity shared by CEE-10 countries and old member states. Thus, such perspective allows to understand the commitment to the Enlargement in spite of its envisaged costs, as common identity implies solidarity with perceived members of a community. As Sjørusen (2002) argues, in this sense, Eastern enlargement can be explained by a sense of “kinship-duty” towards the East of Europe on part of Western Europe. She points out that the preference of Central and Eastern European candidate states over more long-standing candidates such as Turkey, illustrates the fact that “the decision of enlargement is a result of an understanding of who the Europeans are and what it means to be European” (Sjørusen 2002, 508). Thus, widening of the EU symbolized the long-awaited reunification of Europeans separated during the Cold War era.

In these terms, also from the point of view of the newcomers the process of accession symbolized the long-expected reintegration in Europe, reflected in its being a priority in foreign policy following 1989. Political elites in the candidate states, across the ideological spectrum, spoke of a historical necessity of a “return to Europe” which implied a return to normality (Copsey 2013) and strong identification with Western values and norms which to great extent inspired the 1989 revolutions (Schimmelfennig 2003). Thus, the affective motivation for EU accession was based on the assumption that the CEE countries had been part of Europe for most of their history, but needed to “return” to it, as they have been separated due to unfortunate historical developments (Brusis 2001). Therefore, the cultural dimension was very relevant to the formation of a kind of “unconditional” EU support in candidate countries, which rested to a greater extent on the idea of a necessity to forget the past and join the West, rather than on perceptions of specific benefits from membership (Guerra 2013a, 51). Some authors even point out that “the accession efforts of the CEE countries cannot be understood outside the framework of identities in European politics” (Drulák 2001, 13). Therefore, while there were important utilitarian factors which influenced the process of enlargement, ideas about norms and values (mostly the positive value of liberal democracy and market economy), as well assumed shared European identity constitute central elements to be considered when analyzing how EU attitudes and identities have been shaped in the new member states.

3. EU support in Central Eastern Europe: evidence and explanatory frameworks


While public opinion in Western Europe has been the object of study since as early as the 1970s, as membership negotiations progressed with Central and Eastern European candidate states in the late 1990s scholars started asking questions about what drives favorable EU attitudes in these post-socialist countries. This issue was not only relevant theoretically, but it had direct political consequences as well: membership referenda were to be held across the region in 2003 and the dynamics of EU support among mass publics had high political stakes. This is why initially much of the scholarship on European attitude formation in CEE focused on explaining the intention to cast a positive vote in a future referendum on EU membership (Cichowski 2000; Ehin 2001; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Tverdova and Anderson 2004; Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004; Doyle and Fidrmuc 2006)⁵⁶.

Not all citizens, however, had a direct say on the membership/enlargement step. The two countries which joined in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania, ratified the accession treaties within their national parliaments. Also in the old member states the parliamentary way of ratification was applied, with unanimous positive votes in most national parliaments. Thus the only referenda on EU membership in relation to the fifth wave of enlargement were held between spring and autumn of 2003 in the eight Central and Eastern European candidate countries that were to join the EU in 2004. The results pointed towards a general positive consensus, albeit undermined by a general passivity or even political apathy (Copsey 2013).

As Figure 3.3 illustrates, in spite of signs of public opinion fatigue with the accession process in some countries prior to the referenda (Guerra 2013a), the outcomes of the plebiscites were overwhelmingly positive.

⁵⁶ Most of these early studies of the region relied on the data of Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). This public opinion study has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission between 1990 and 1997 to monitor the economic and political change in as many as 20 countries of the post-communist region, covering future applicant or candidate countries and selected former Soviet Republics (CIS). More information and the datasets are available here: <http://www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer/survey-series/central-eastern-eb/>.

Figure 3.3 EU membership referenda results




Source: European Election Database. <http://eed.nsd.uib.no/>

The highest share of positive votes was cast in Lithuania and Slovakia (over 90% of votes were positive), while the lowest was recorded in Estonia and Latvia (still, over 65% of those who voted in both countries were in favor of EU membership). When compared to previous EU accession outcomes, eight out of ten highest “yes” votes in any accession referendum in EU’s history were recorded in these new Central Eastern European candidate countries (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2005, 4), indicating the scale of support for EU membership in the post-socialist countries.

However, such a positive interpretation of the outcomes of membership referenda in CEE countries could be misleading. There was another aspect to them which overshadowed these results, in spite of clear win of the “yes” option: the issue of EU membership failed to attract the attention of most of the citizens in candidate countries and turnout was rather low (see Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4 EU membership referenda turnout




Source: European Election Database. <http://eed.nsd.uib.no/>

Also in these terms the CEE-8 countries made history—seven out of the eight polls in the region stand as the lowest level of turnout in the history of accession referenda (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2005, 4). It was the lowest in Hungary (45,6%), the only country where less than half of those with voting rights chose to express their opinion on membership. Low turnout was an especially relevant issue in Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia where 50% of votes have to be cast for a referendum to be valid. However, in spite of such concerns, in all three countries the legally established threshold was surpassed, even if only barely in some cases, such as Slovakia (52%). Therefore, while those who cared enough to vote in the CEE-8 countries supported EU membership to great extent, there were quite high numbers of citizens who either opposed it or abstained from expressing their opinion, which indicates that the apparent consensus could conceal a more divided public opinion on the issue of EU membership support.

In the context of the region, these outcomes point to another crucial issue: that of citizens' apathy and lack of political mobilization which generally characterizes post-socialist societies. Numerous studies on the social and political legacies of communism agree on the alienating effect of decades of communist rule and point to a generalized political

apathy and lack of trust in political institutions as some of their most relevant outcomes (Mishler and Rose 1997; Fuchs and Klingeman 2006; Rose 2009; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). These factors have been reinforced by scandals of political corruption under new democratic regimes (Guerra 2013a), as well as, in some cases, a vibrant political competition, for which the citizens of former communist countries were ill-prepared (Ceka 2013). In these terms, a generalized lack of engagement with the European political process across CEE-10 countries comes as no surprise and, consequently, also, the turnout in European Parliament (EP) elections has been significantly lower than EU average.

Figure 3.5 European Parliament elections–turnout in CEE-10




Turnout in EP elections (Figure 3.5) has been lower than EU average in all CEE-10 countries in all three electoral contests which have been held since the accession. The few exceptions are Estonia (in 2009), Latvia (in 2004 and 2009) and Lithuania (in 2004 and 2014). The lowest numbers, a historic 13% of citizens who cared to vote in Slovakia in EP 2014 elections, could even serious problems with the legitimacy of those elected. Does this mean that the new European citizens are opposed to European integration? The answer seems to

lie elsewhere. While political disaffection is a widespread problem of contemporary democracies, low turnout in CEE-10 is qualitatively different. Legacies of communist times trigger political disaffection which combined with low information levels about the EU in the new member states results in these worryingly low levels of turnout in EP elections, in spite of the underlying passive public support in most CEE-10 countries (Guerra 2008, 213).

In spite of the fact that political elites managed to secure enough passive support on part of the citizens to approve the accession treaties, the negotiation process eroded peoples' enthusiasm regarding integration. Moreover, another source of disillusion with the EU, as discussed in the introduction, was the lack of enthusiasm for enlargement on part of the established EU members and the initial restrictions on some the new EU citizens' rights which have been imposed within the process of accessions—most importantly, a reduction in eligibility for full agricultural subsidies and transitional periods of up to seven years on the free movement of labor (McLaren 2006, 156). Furthermore, once the CEE-10 countries joined the EU and benefits failed to materialize immediately, support for European integration dropped in the new member states. Half a year after accession of the first wave of CEE-10 countries, support for membership was on average just over 50% in late 2004 and lower than the aggregate levels of positive membership perception in the old member states (see Figure 3.6 below).


Figure 3.6 Support for EU membership in CEE-10 (2004)



Note: Question: Generally speaking do you think that (our country)'s membership of the European Union is...? Data: Eurobarometer 62.0 (autumn 2004).

In these terms, only in five out of the eight countries which joined the EU in the first wave of Eastern enlargement more than half of the respondents indicated that membership was a good thing immediately after accession (see Figure 3.6). In Hungary, Czech Republic, and Latvia the number was below 50%, with the lowest share of positive views recorded in the latter (just over 40%). However, this does not indicate that there was strong opposition to European integration in the new member states following the accession, rather, there was little knowledge about the EU and still not a lot of direct experience which contributed to greater ambivalence (membership as neither good nor bad), a response which was significantly more widespread in the new member states than in the more established EU countries. Finally, citizens of Romania and Bulgaria, still in line for membership at that time, expressed a predominantly positive EU perception. These two countries also had a bigger share of citizens who did not know what they thought about EU membership.

Figure 3.7 EU membership support in CEE (2004-2012)




Data: Eurobarometer 2004-2012. Table with detailed data for all CEE-10 countries can be found in the annex to this chapter.

As far as the subsequent development of support after Enlargement is concerned, we can observe a dip in positive membership perceptions after the accession (as Figure 3.7 illustrates) in all CEE countries, except for Poland, where accession fatigue manifested itself even earlier, before membership referendum (Guerra 2008). Such negative trend in the early

years of membership can be explained by the realization that the (maybe excessive) expectations related to EU membership would not be fulfilled immediately. This negative development, however, soon became reversed in most of CEE-10 countries. When the benefits of EU membership started to become obvious, an increase in positive perceptions of the EU continued in most countries until the crisis hit European economies.

Figure 3.8 EU membership support in CEE, by country (2004-2012)



Data: Eurobarometer 2004-2012. Table with detailed data for all CEE-10 countries can be found in the annex to this chapter.

Given the heterogeneous economic and political developments in Central Eastern Europe, it is not surprising to see that there is no uniformity in how EU support developed across the CEE countries after accession either. While Romania and Lithuania were the most optimistic about EU membership around enlargement time, in Latvia levels of support were rather low already at the moment of the accession, and became even worse over time. Latvia, as well as Czech Republic and Hungary are the most Eurosceptic countries in CEE, and Slovenia joined this group during the economic crisis. Romania, Slovakia, and Poland, on the other hand, are the three CEE countries in which in 2011—at the height of the Eurozone problems—still a majority of citizens perceived membership as something good. These developments are further explored in a comparative East-West perspective in chapter 6.

What causes different individual-level responses to EU membership in the new member states? Early studies of determinants of support for future EU membership in CEE countries focused mainly on utilitarian factors and the influence of values. While both approaches have been widely tested in the context of Western Europe, in the post-socialist candidate countries, their meaning was conditioned by the recent experience of economic and institutional transitions and, therefore, slightly different. These differences justified the formulation and testing of context-specific models of European attitude formation (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Christin 2005; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006). The need for specific models was driven by the fact that both ideological preferences regarding free market economy and democracy, as well as rational calculations had as their point of reference the process of post-1989 changes.

Before becoming EU members, the ten new member states from Central Eastern Europe have experienced the processes of triple transitions: (re)establishing democratic institutions, implementing market economy, and redrawing of national boundaries (Offe 1996). This was a highly volatile period, during which the economy and politics have been re-shaped as the institutional foundations for democracy and free market economy were being laid. However, maybe most importantly in terms of individual attitudes' formation, the societies of CEE countries have been deeply restructured by these reforms, dividing its citizens into winners who benefited from the process, and losers for whom these changes represented unemployment, poverty, and insecurity. Furthermore, as noted in the previous section, EU accession should not be viewed as a separate process, rather, it ought to be considered an extension of the post-socialist transitions, as it triggered further important institutional transformations in the region (Böröcz and Sarkar 2005, 166). Thus, it was reasonable to expect that the context and the outcomes of transitions affected EU attitudes, and assume that citizens in candidate countries formulated their opinions on EU on the basis of how well they fared in the process (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Tverdova and Anderson 2004; Christin 2005). These effects are considered mainly in terms of two types of determinants of EU attitudes: on one hand, values and ideological preferences; on the other hand, experience with market reforms and the winner/loser status, further reinforced in the context of membership of the single market.

3.1 Fighting for democracy: ideological preferences

In terms of the specific influence of *ideological preferences* on EU membership support in CEE candidate countries, the evidence is somewhat conflicting. Some authors anticipated more relevance of political values than utilitarian factors. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2007) argue that such ideological factors could be actually more important in CEE countries than in the old member states because citizens in the former lacked both information and experience to evaluate integration on the basis of a rational cost-benefit calculation (cf. Wagner 2012).

Indeed, in an early study Cichowski (2000) found that attitudes toward democracy and free market economy constituted the strongest predictors of favorable stances towards the EU among citizens in Central and Eastern Europe. This could be interpreted as a hopeful stance on the role of the EU membership as a guarantor of institutional stability, both in terms of democratic structures as well as market reforms. In a similar line, Guerra (2012) finds that what drove support before accession was the “European factor,” that is a general idea of a “return of Europe,” understood as a civilizational choice and perceived as a generally positive development for the countries of CEE providing basis for an “unconditional support” for the EU (Guerra 2012, 2013). However, while we find some evidence to the importance of value and ideology, the assumption that these factors are more important in the new CEE member states than in Western Europe, does not receive empirical confirmation in other studies (Garry and Tilley 2007) and, in fact, the results of most of the post-accession analysis point in the direction of utilitarian mechanisms as the most relevant factors.

Still, values could shape EU support after accession. After the enlargement became reality, citizens in the new member states experienced the actual effects of the membership, and they could compare and contrast them to their initial expectations and develop a more nuanced outlook on European integration. In this sense, in a more recent study, Loveless (2010) suggests that we should take into account perceptions of social inequality generated within the context of the free market. He finds empirical evidence to support the claim that while CEE citizens might agree with market norms in principle, their perceptions of too much inequality influence negatively their stance on EU membership, in spite of such basic ideological congruence. Thus, while strongly linked to values, this finding highlights the

relevance of the actual experience with free market economy among the citizens of new member states.

3.2 Falling in love with the free market: instrumental rationality

While people in CEE countries were hopeful that democracy and capitalism (and the EU as its guarantor) would improve their lives in many ways, the deep economic and social changes which occurred post-1989 have been very costly for some, as noted above. Thus, studies on candidate countries' support for European integration incorporated *utilitarian considerations* based on the experience of transition to capitalism as their central explanatory dimension. Here, the argument is similar to that developed in Western European contexts: societies become divided due to the fact that greater economic openness (in the case of the CEE-10, represented first by the economic transition, and continued during accession and eventual membership of the single market) presents greater opportunities for those citizens who are highly skilled, educated and mobile, and undermines the position of those less-skilled and less mobile, mostly blue-collar workers (Kriesi et al. 2006; Grande and Kriesi 2012). These societal divisions have incontestable consequences for how EU support and European identification are structured in the society (Favell 2008; Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009).

Similarly to the case of the EU-15 countries, in the post-socialist member states' studies, winners (of transitions and, thus, probable winners of the ensuing integration) were defined on the basis of their individual characteristics such as education, occupation, and income (Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004), as well as evaluation of personal financial situation (Cichowski 2000), sometimes combined with future expectations (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). The findings of these early studies point clearly to the correlation between self-interest of winners of post-socialist transitions, as well as, albeit to lesser extent, perceived country benefit, and EU support. As Caplanova et al. note,

politicians may speak of 'the tide of history' and the 'noble task of reuniting Europe' and appeal to some sort of shared ideal based on a sense of civic duty may help cement support, but unless people actually perceive benefit from the Union such appeals are unlikely to be successful (2004, 285).

Thus, while not discarding the value-based theories, these authors point out that support ought to be based on perceived future gains in order to effectively provide a strong foundation for integration in the new member states.

Moreover, in contrast to the old member states, economic changes have been much more profound and rapid in Central and Eastern Europe, and thus, could be potentially even more polarizing. Thus, it is very probable that the conflict of integration/demarcation (Grande and Kriesi 2012) is reproduced in the new member states with important consequences for identity formation: winners of integration, who benefit from the process will support integration and the opening of national borders. Losers, on the other hand, will seek protection from the negative effects of integration and support a clear demarcation of national community, in detriment to a supranational identification.

In terms of *contextual factors*, the utilitarian approach receives further confirmation. Christin (2005) finds that the lower the GDP growth and slower the pace of democratization in candidate countries, the higher the probability that their citizens will hold a positive view of the EU, as they perceive a need for reforms which EU integration (and the associated conditionality) would effectively foster. These contextual factors also seem to mediate the effect of the individual winner/loser status: where economic and democratic reforms are slow, people seem to be more in favor of EU membership irrespectively of how they perceive the outcomes of transition. On a similar note, Garry and Tilly (2007) argue that the relative poverty of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe accounts for their (relatively) higher levels of support for the EU independently of individual characteristics. These observations remain in line with Sánchez Cuenca's argument that support for the EU will be higher in countries where the "opportunity cost" of transferring sovereignty to the EU is lower (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

3.3 Heuristics and cues: domestic proxies

Another issue to be taken into account is that even if European integration could be seen as a continuation of processes post-socialist transition, the idea of a European supranational institutions and citizenship is a relatively new phenomenon in Central Eastern Europe, and citizens could only form a more or less informed opinion on the process once their country became a member state. This observation triggered another set of studies which looked into the role of *national proxies* in the new member states (Guerra 2008; Wagner 2012). This line of enquiry follows the general model developed in the 1990 in Western European member states' public opinion analysis. As discussed in the previous chapter, the work of Anderson (1998) on domestic proxies constitutes the point of reference in terms of how cognitive shortcuts from the national political context affect European attitudes. Anderson finds that

citizens are rather ill-informed about the EU, and thus lack a solid basis for the development of their attitudes towards it. Consequently utilitarian considerations are in fact mediated by domestic political attitudes—national proxies—which provide a more immediately accessible basis on which attitudes towards the remote political system of the EU are formulated. Not unexpectedly, Wagner (2012) finds that the use of cognitive shortcuts is particularly important among those with lower levels of political sophistication. Furthermore, before the accession even those with higher level of knowledge relied to a great extent on proxies from the national context (Wagner 2012, 242).

The fact that the use of cognitive shortcuts in CEE countries decreased as the experience with the EU increased, is not surprising taking into account that citizens of these countries had no real experience of European integration before accession and could only formulate independent views on EU institutions once these had a more direct effect on their lives. This is why it is important to revisit the existing theoretical frameworks and explore European attitudes in new member states once their citizens have had enough time to form their opinion on the basis of perceived and not only anticipated effects of European integration.

The other explanatory perspective which posits that European attitudes are mediated by cognitive shortcuts from the domestic political context is *cue theory*. However, here it is important to point out that the use of heuristics in Central and Eastern European member states is more plausible in terms of perceptions of national economic and political performance, rather than taking cues from political parties. The low levels of political trust in these countries make it unlikely that people would form their opinion regarding the EU on the basis of their partisan orientation. This legacy of untrustworthiness which opposes “us” the people against “them”—the *nomenklatura* of communist parties—is one of the most important legacies of the non-democratic socialist regimes institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997), as discussed earlier.

To summarize, while comparative analyses of EU attitudes in CEE-10 countries so far have focused on explaining support for EU membership in Central and Eastern Europe (before and after accession), and have dealt principally with the influence of values, rational calculations, and national proxies in the context of societies structured by transitions to democracy and capitalism, most recent analysis point to the importance of “soft” (in contrast to “hard” economic rationality) affective/identitarian factors in EU public opinion research.

European and national identification, as well as perception of threats has been confirmed as one of the principal determinants of EU attitudes, however, its consideration in empirical research on Central and Eastern Europe has been rather limited.

4. European identity in Central and Eastern Europe: contradictory or complementary?

As argued in the previous chapter, affective determinants, and especially the identity issue, have become central to the current understanding of public opinion in the old EU member states. Such centrality of identification to European politics in the CEE-10 countries is also the expectation of the present study. However, what this study contends is that there are specific assumptions about the new member states, related to their historical experience of being separated by the Iron Curtain from the rest of Europe, as well as their position in the European integration process, which could contribute to a more complex supranational identification processes than in the case of Western Europeans.

The historical instability of political borders and cultural boundaries in the region contributes to an ambiguous position of Central and Eastern Europeans—between Europe and the East as its culturally constructed Other, between otherness and proximity—and influences the formation of political identities in the region (Batt 2013, 7). Moreover, the cultural memory of bloc division of Europe is still very much alive. In this sense, the vindication of the concept of “Central Europe” was fundamental for the intellectual elites of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia during the last decades of the socialist rule. It constituted a challenge towards the bipolar logic of the Cold War that delegated these states to the periphery, as well as an attempt to actually move their positions to the core and differentiate themselves from those further East (Pittaway 2005, 118). Thus, the identities of new European citizens are influenced by, on the one hand, the legacy of the socialist past and memory of its status as the “Second World”, separate from the Western sphere (Regulska 1998, 40), and, on the other hand, the desire to be considered Western and European. This aspiration has been acknowledged as legitimate for the CEE-10 states through the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Nevertheless, some authors argue that the divide between the fully European Europe and the not-yet-fully European “Eastern Europe” constitutes a central premise of these recent EU enlargements (Böröcz 2001, Kuus 2004). The imposition of transitional periods for free mobility of workers together with political elites’ negative

discourse on migration from Eastern European member states are just some examples which point to the re-creation of boundaries within the re-united political community of Europeans.

In the remaining part of this chapter, I discuss the factors which contribute to such complexities of Central and Eastern Europeans' political identities in the enlarged EU. Firstly, I discuss the perceived impact of Eastern enlargement on European identity. Consequently, I present the examples of studies which did explore the affective element in relation to CEE European attitudes and their findings. On this basis, I conclude by discussing the possible differences which might arise in the application of the general model of determinants of European identity to Central and Eastern Europe.

4.1 Who fears the enlargement?

Even though Eastern enlargement of the EU has been to large extent justified by arguments relative to common values and norms, as well as an underlying common European identity, some authors argue that such "European reunification" has had an adverse effect on the sense of community within the EU. In this sense, Katzenstein and Checkel assert that "following the 2009 enlargement, a politically cohesive Western Europe centered on the EU is receding, while a politically looser and more encompassing Europe is rising" (2009, 213). While the contention that prior to Eastern enlargement the EU has been politically cohesive could be arguable, there is no doubt about the fact that the 2004 and 2007 enlargements almost doubled the number of member states and brought in countries with different historical legacies than those of Western Europe. The subsequent concerns relative to EU's cohesiveness as a political community refer mostly to the perceived differences in political culture and political attitudes between the two groups of member states, as well as the importance of religion and role of national identities.

Firstly, the argument that enlargement has made it more difficult for a European *demos* to emerge is based on the perception of an East/West divide in terms of political culture caused by

different traditions and historical events in the distant past, but also socialization and experience in the opposing societal systems in which people in eastern and western Europe lived from the end of second World War until the collapse of the communist states (Fuchs and Klingeman 2006, 28).

These perceived differences materialize in the unequal levels of civic engagement and trust in other people (Thomassen and Bäck 2009) which supposedly indicate divergent conceptualizations of democratic community, between Western and Central-Eastern Europe, that complicate the objectives of political integration (Fuchs and Klingeman 2006, 28). However, while we might indeed find differences in political attitudes which can be attributed to the legacy of communism (as discussed in the previous section), such assumption of inherent difference in how democratic communities are conceptualized stands in opposition to the observation that support for integration in CEE-10 countries has been to large extent driven by strong identification with Western values and norms.

Another issue which has been raised in relation to the impact of Eastern enlargement on European political identity has to do with religion and ancestry. In their influential work on European identity Katzenstein and Checkel (2009, 14) suggest that Eastward enlargements have profoundly transformed European political identification processes, making the emergence of a common identity a greater challenge, notably due to the importance attached to religion as a constitutive element of belonging in the new member states. They argue that confessional identities (Catholic and Orthodox) entered the European public sphere with the Eastern enlargement and threaten the idea of a secular constitutional European identity, especially since Polish elites “are seeking to re-Christianize a godless Europe lost in the grip of secularism” (2009, 215)⁵⁷. Risse (2010, 211) also notes that the Orthodox churches support a more exclusionary project which is hostile to foreigners. These generalizations are problematic, at best. Firstly, they clearly refer to the much contested assumption of a qualitative difference between civic Western nationalism and Eastern ethnic belonging, which has been theoretically questioned and empirically disproved, as discussed in chapter 1. Moreover, there is much heterogeneity across the region in terms of the role attached to religion: while Poles, Lithuanians or Bulgarians (and especially their political elite) might indeed attach importance to the religious element, Czechs and Estonians probably put less emphasis on it, as my discussion in chapter 5 exemplifies. Thus, the assumption that new European citizens brought in “confessional” meaning to European

⁵⁷ Such appreciation obviously stems from the debates surrounding European Constitutional Treaty, in which Polish political elites demanded that a religious reference be included in the preamble. While it did not constitute a very relevant issue in the limited public debate which occurred in Poland on the topic (Wyrozumska 2007). Polish society was not unfavorable to such a requirement. In a public opinion survey in 2006 51% of Poles agreed with the proposition that the constitutional treaty of the EU should make an explicit reference to god, while the result in Hungary was 38% and 18% in Estonia (Pollack, Muller, and Pickel 2012, 232).

identity must be verified empirically. Moreover, it is possible that political elites' positions, such as that of some of the Polish or Hungarian leaders who put strong emphasis on the Christian heritage of Europe, do not reflect wider cultural preferences and concerns of public opinion in these countries. In any case, such assumptions must necessarily be verified empirically. In a more balanced tone, Risse (2010) recognizes that while Christianity has been part of European values since the inception of the EU, the change which occurred with the Eastern enlargement is that it “added a distinctive voice to those in Western Europe who have long complained that European integration embarked too much on a secular project” (2010, 211).

In terms of the impact of religious identities on European attitudes, evidence from studies of public opinion in the old member states (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001) indicates that if there is any effect of religion, Catholicism tends to be associated with more positive attitudes towards integration. Moreover, Nelsen et al (2011) show that Catholicism has positive impact on EU support in these new member states and Guerra (2012) finds that the impact of religion has become positive after accession. Thus, the specific impact of religious identities in the new member states on European identity formation, its content, and EU support has to be verified, but if we take the studies of general EU support as a point of reference, in principle the impact of religion should not be negative.

Finally, a significant source of preoccupation has been the possibility that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries may remain more attached to their recently regained national sovereignty and exhibit higher levels of Euroscepticism, as well as a stronger opposition to the cosmopolitan notion of a European citizenship and identity based on supranational institutions (Weiss 2003). This expectation is of central importance to this study and I will analyze its implications in more details in the following section.

4.3 Supranational institutions and national identities in new member states

The relative absence of consideration of the effects of identity in comparative analyses of EU attitudes in new member states is all the more surprising, as we find several important reasons for which these factors could be central to the understanding of EU attitudes in the region. National identities have been a cornerstone of political mobilization against communism and their redefinition was central to the processes of post-socialist transitions (Offe 1996). Moreover, the process of EU accession was based on the adoption of Western norms and institutional arrangements, which could easily be seen as yet another imposition on national sovereignty and national identities even if they have been embraced by the political elites (Vetik, Nimmerfelft, and Taru 2006). Lastly, as Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) note, in comparison to old EU member states most of these countries are characterized by high ethnic diversity which could trigger concerns regarding the role of supranational institutions in supporting minorities' claims. With the exception of Poland and the Czech Republic, all new CEE member states face the issue of important minorities, the Roma minority being the object of most xenophobia. This is an especially relevant issue in the Baltic states—Estonia and Latvia have both significant Russian minority populations (over 20%). In the case of Hungary, there are also important national minorities in the neighboring states—most of them in the other new EU members and their link to the national community has been further politicized by current political leaders (Batory 2010). However, from the point of view of this study, the issue of minorities is slightly less probable to constitute an obstacle to supranational identification, as it was more likely to constitute a concern and source of opposition to the EU before the accession, in the context of lack of information, little direct experience with EU institutions, and EU conditionality which could mean certain requirements related to minorities' protection.

Thus, the most salient point for this analysis is to consider the relationship between national identities and supranational European identification in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nationalism played an important part in the opposition to the communist regimes in these states and political mobilization against it was formulated in terms of regaining national sovereignty. This could have far-reaching consequences for European identification. As Weiss (2003) notes, “a strong subjective longing for national identification is to be expected in the post-communist countries, whose late national sovereignty followed lengthy epochs of foreign rule” (Weiss 2003, 378). Such expectation

of a strong sense of national belonging was based on the fact that all CEE-10 countries recovered their independence after 1989 and some of them were even building new nationhood as independent states, such as in the case of Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). Thus, a redefinition of national belonging was one of the constitutive elements of the post-socialist transitions.

From this point of view, a restored strong national allegiance could indeed constitute an obstacle to the formation of European political identification in the region. This could be the case especially in the newly independent countries where accession to supranational institutions might be perceived as a threat to national identities (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). In this sense, for instance in Latvia and Estonia, there was a widespread worry about losing national sovereignty which was just very recently acquired after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991⁵⁸ (Mikkel and Pridham 2004). In fact, McLaren (2006) demonstrates that the three Baltic countries and Slovenia were the candidate countries which exhibited the highest levels of concern regarding symbolic threat from the EU (loss of national identity and language), even if these anxieties diminished in the run-up to accession⁵⁹.

Moreover, due to the way in which enlargement has been set up, a process of differentiation could materialize, as EU accession of CEE countries relied on them fulfilling criteria of Western economic and political model under EU conditionality. In this sense, in one of the few studies which explicitly focuses on the role of identities in the run-up to accession, Vetik and colleagues (2006) argue that a “reactive identity” in the new member states constitutes an important source of Euroscepticism, and it emerged due to the fact that the Enlargement has been based on the premise that the less economically developed CEE countries adapt to the rules and regulations of the European community. According to the authors, this has activated a process of differentiation of “us” versus “them” in the region which has been translated into negative positions on European integration in spite of the perceived economic and political benefits.

⁵⁸ These concerns have been addressed, for instance in the referendum campaigns in Latvia by opposing the EU with the Soviet Union where membership was based on conviction and not military force, and arguments in favor of gaining influence as a small state through membership in an internationally relevant organization (Mikkel and Pridham 2004, 734).

⁵⁹ McLaren also finds that the impact of symbolic threat on EU support in new member states is smaller than the influence of worries regarding group resources, such as the expense of joining the EU, loss of social benefits or harm to the farmers (McLaren 2006).

From this perspective, it is important to investigate the meanings of national identities. As discussed in the previous chapter, the specific manner in which national and European identities are actively constructed and framed by political leaders conditions their impact on European attitudes. Here the importance of elite discourse cannot be overlooked – as their role is central to the process of shaping the content of political identities. In the case of CEE countries, in the run-up to accession there was a prevailing consensus on the necessity of European integration among the political elites in Central and Eastern Europe, as the “return to Europe” slogan posits. European integration was considered by the national elites as a way to assure national independence and sovereignty, as well as a guarantee for further modernization and democratization (Grabbe and Hughes 1999)⁶⁰. As such, the recovered political sovereignty of CEE-10 countries has been configured as essentially embedded in Western institutions and economies. Moreover, attitudes to European integration in CEE-10 are affected to great extent by a desire to be considered European (McMahon 2013; Haughton 2014); the catchphrase “return to Europe” refers to establishing institutional frameworks similar to those of Western European countries and asserting the “essentially European character of national identity” (Batt 2002, 1). From this point of view, it is entirely possible that even in spite of the recent experience of regaining national sovereignty, national identity does not constitute an obstacle to the formation of positive attitudes and European identification in the region, as it has been configured as essentially embedded in Europe. Moreover, national identity could reinforce it, as becoming European citizens is considered as cornerstone of being recognized as modern and “Western” and breaking with the past of Soviet rule and domination. In this sense, loss of identity and sovereignty did not seem to preoccupy much citizens of candidate countries (Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004) and, as discussed above, the embeddedness in European (Western) institutions has been considered as a crucial aspiration for these countries.

In spite of the apparently compatible way in which CEE national identities have been constructed, favored also by the political leaders, the role of the latter in shaping identities could be questioned in Central and Eastern European member states, due to the prevailing lack of institutional trust. Specifically, for the case of Estonia, an earlier study by Vetik

⁶⁰ Similarly as in the Southern European member states upon their accession – for the case of Spain cf. Vázquez, Delgado and Sojka (2013). In fact, a study into the regional patterns of EU support in the enlarged EU demonstrates that elites in these Southern European member states tend to support more a strengthening of European integration than those of Central and Eastern Europe (Lazic et al. 2012).

(2003) provides evidence to how in spite of a widespread agreement among the elites that European integration would provide important benefits in terms of economy and security, there was a strong popular perception of threat to national identity which fueled Euroscepticism among Estonian mass opinion (Vetik 2003). Such a gap between pro-European elites and mass attitudes is an issue in all of EU member states. However, in the case of the post-socialist countries it could be even greater due to the historical legacies of communism which materialize in very low levels of institutional trust, as discussed previously.

Moreover, the initially overwhelmingly enthusiastic positions on EU membership evolved as the pre-accession negotiations proved to be rather long, complex, and it became manifest that there could be divergent interests between the EU and the candidate states (for instance, on issues such as agricultural subsidies or free movement of labor). This resulted in a more nuanced understanding of membership costs and benefits among the political elites in Central and Eastern Europe (Henderson 2008, 105). In this context, Eurosceptic parties emerged, however, Euroscepticism has been mostly formulated in its soft version. This was due to the fact that in most post-socialist Central and East European states there was a widespread perception that there was no real alternative to joining the EU, even if there could be doubts about specific aspects of European integration, a situation which has been deemed as “constrained contestation” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008, 350).

To summarize, there are several elements which might contribute to the politicization of national identities in Central and Eastern European new member states. However, it seems that even in spite of high salience of national identification in the region as a result of the recent redefinition of national belonging and recuperation of national sovereignty, it should not be negatively related to European identification. This is due to the fact that accession relied upon adopting Western European norms and its objective was to a great extent asserting the European character of national identity and modern (and, thus, “Western”) character of the newly independent states. Moreover, in the context of “constrained contestation” mainstream parties and political elites did not undermine the consensus of EU accession, rather, they focused on concrete policy elements and institutional setup of the EU.

4.5 Becoming European citizens: previous empirical evidence

In the previous section I discussed the broader historical, political and structural factors which could condition the emergence of European political identification in Central and Eastern European new member states. But what empirical evidence do we actually have regarding European identity in Central and Eastern European new EU citizens? Comprehensive empirical comparative studies of European identity as either dependent or independent variable in the process of European attitude formation in CEE new member states are still quite infrequent, but some of the existing studies offer good starting point for further investigation.

As far as EU attitudes are concerned, in one of the few studies on EU support in CEE countries which incorporates the affective dimension, Wagner finds that national affective identity (attachment to country) has no direct effect on support for the EU (Wagner 2012, 247), but it does have a strong positive effect on European identity, a finding which hints at the compatibility of both types of identities in the region. Garry and Tilly also find that inclusive national identity correlates positively with support for EU membership in CEE countries upon their accession (Garry and Tilley 2007). These observations confirm the expectation that in principle in CEE-10 there should not be a negative effect of national identification on European attitudes.

In terms of explaining European identification in the new member states, the existing empirical evidence is quite limited. Kaja Schilde's recent article (2014) tests some elements of the explanatory frameworks of identification with Europe with data from CEE countries as candidate countries. Schilde finds that, prior to accession members of ethnic minorities in CEE countries were inclined to feel more European, as well as those with higher levels of knowledge and residing in urban areas. She also finds that age and national pride affect negatively European identification, as well as—surprisingly—expectation of benefits from the EU (2014, 661). Schilde's study, however, has several limitations. Most importantly, it tests the explanatory frameworks of established member states on candidate countries, and as such cannot account for the factors which drive European identification among citizens of new member states already as European citizens (in its dimension of experience). Moreover, the author does not include all the relevant factors in the model and does not consider how these processes differ/converge with those of Western Europeans which makes it impossible to comparatively assess whether any real differences exist. In these terms, the work of

Sanders and colleagues (2012) overcome these difficulties. They focus on European citizenship as a multidimensional concept after the enlargement, with European identity as one of the core dimensions studied. In their study they test explanatory factors related to cognitive mobilization, utilitarian considerations, political cues, and affective factors. They conclude that while European identification is indeed lower in CEE countries, the general structure of attitudes and the underlying cognitive processes are quite similar between East and West (Sanders et al. 2012, 229). However, they do not offer any answers as to why European identity is actually lower in the new member states of CEE.

Other studies explore the experience of European citizenship, especially in terms of mobility which constitutes a basic EU citizenship right. The inclusion of new member states implies that a great number of Central and Eastern European citizens can now move within the borderless area of the EU and their movement is termed as mobility, and no longer as migration. As discussed in the previous chapter, Poles and other nationals of the new EU Member states, just as Italians, the French, or the British are legally considered mobile EU citizens entitled to reside and search for work under conditions of non-discrimination in any EU Member state.

There is no agreement on the effect of intra-European mobility on citizens' identities in the new member states. On the one hand, the reality is that in spite of these legal measures, nationals of the new Member states very often remain in the social situation of "migrants" in terms of labor market possibilities, political discourses and public imaginaries, and we can speak of a paradox of "migrants from European Union countries", who, in legal terms, exercise their right to free movement of labor around the EU, but on the social and economic level remain within the community of non-EU migrants (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009; Sojka 2012). Moreover, the limitations imposed on one of the basic European citizenship rights in the form of transitional periods for free movement of workers⁶¹ effectively undermined the perceptions of new European citizens as equal in the first few

⁶¹ As discussed previously, Eastern enlargement and the granting of the right to move freely as workers to the nationals of the new EU member states caused much preoccupation with the possible mass labor migrations from the region of Central and Eastern Europe. These preoccupations were accompanied by the apprehension related to the possibility of substituting native workers of the EU-15 with cheaper Central and Eastern European ones (a good example of such a discourse is the "Polish Plumber" myth, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter). Such concerns resulted in the adoption of transitional periods for the EU-8 workers' mobility by twelve out of fifteen EU Member states in 2004. The only countries which applied the free workers movement principle from the start were the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and Sweden (Castles and Miller 2009).

years of membership. If cognitive European identity is based on perceived similarity this fact could contribute to lower levels of European identification. This is why some scholars expect a differential impact of mobility on European identification between new and old member states: the impact of mobility in terms of more favorable attitudes and stronger European identity is expected to be more pronounced in old member states (Triandafyllidou and Maroufouf 2013, 388). However, this hypothesis is only partially confirmed in the study by Triandafyllidou and Maroufouf. Their main finding is that movers from old member states tend to have a more positive view of the EU than stayers from their countries of origin, while movers and stayers from the new member states do not differ as much. Other scholars, however, observe a positive impact and argue that the increased mobility of CEE-10 citizens as a result of European integration has a powerful normative impact in terms of both informal, mass-level interactions and socialization of the growing number of CEE officials interacting with counterparts in Brussels and elsewhere in the old member states (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). Such arguments are in line with the literature on socialization effects of international organizations (Checkel 2005). Therefore, the assumed positive effect of European mobility and the potential East-West differences in this respect must be further researched.

5. European identity between East and West of Europe: Research hypotheses

The existing empirical analyses regarding European identity in Central and Eastern European member states of the EU are still rather limited in spite of the great interest in political identification which has emerged in scholarship of the EU in the recent years. This issue is all the more interesting as, on the one hand, Eastern enlargement has been justified to great extent on the grounds of common identity and shared norms and values, while at the same time academic and media debates surrounding enlargement predicted a negative impact on the cohesion of European political community and the emerging identity. Therefore, the aim of this study is to contribute to these debates and provide empirical evidence in terms of what drives European identification in the new member states, what are the meanings of European identity in these countries, and how such affective factors influence EU support. My main argument is that while there are no differences in the general structure of EU attitudes, and the underlying cognitive processes of European identification are similar between East and West, we can still expect to find relevant differences in terms of European identification if we take into account how social identities are developed and consider the specificities of Eastern enlargement. In this sense, I formulate the basic hypotheses of the study which are subsequently empirically tested in chapters 4-6.

In terms of the differences between new and old member states, citizens of the CEE-10 member states have had much less time to actually form their *identification* as part of the European political community. For them membership has been a possibility only since the 1990s, and a reality for less than a decade. Moreover, when it became a possibility it was framed in terms of a promise of economic improvement and modernization facilitating affective identification (based on positive distinction). However, change in terms of cognitive identification, based on experience and political socialization can be more difficult. As argued in the previous chapter, socio-political identities are shaped as part of primary socialization and intergenerational value change occurs whenever the formative experience of the younger cohorts is substantially different from the one that shaped the outlook of the older generations. In this sense, we might expect that these processes constitute the most important source of differentiation in comparison to the old member states, who have taken EU for granted for much longer. Therefore, having in mind the theoretical model of European identification formulated in chapter 1, my first set of hypotheses reads:

H.1 There is no difference in terms of affective identification with Europe in the old and the new EU member states.

H.2 Citizens of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe are less likely to perceive themselves as Europeans, as compared to the old EU member states.

Moreover, I anticipate that the lower levels of cognitive European identification in Central and Eastern Europe could be unequally distributed between different age groups. Thus, I expect that younger people in the CEE-10 new member states, especially those who have been socialized post-1989, should adopt a European identification more easily, as they have experienced European integration as something more natural and an integral part of the post-1989 changes, when European citizenship and its benefits are becoming slowly normalized. In this sense I formulate my third hypothesis as follows:

H.3 There is an interaction effect between age and cognitive European identification in Central Eastern Europe: older citizens in these new member states are less likely to identify as Europeans than younger people in these countries.

Secondly, this study advances a theoretical argument regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of European identity. The case of new EU member states reinforces the argument in favor of a *multidimensional approach* to the concept of European political identity. In the first chapter, I distinguished two processes which are central to the formation of social identity: the cognitive process, which is based on perceived similarity; and the affective aspect which relies on a natural psychological tendency towards positive social distinction. The *determinants* of European identity, as discussed in chapter 2, while related to the general model of European attitudes, are also quite specific in terms of the affective and cognitive processes which underlie social identity. We can, thus, distinguish between resources, experiences, and attitudes as principal factors in European identity formation, and the impact of these individual-level factors, is mediated by national contexts. Thus, my basic expectation in this aspect can be summarized as follows:

H.4 The determinants of the dimensions of European political identity reflect the social identity theory model. Affective European identity is influenced to a greater extent by positive evaluative perceptions while cognitive European identity by factors related to resources and experience of the EU.

In order to correctly assess the viability of a European identity in the enlarged EU it is not enough to look only at the strength and stability of identification, we must also understand what such identification means to the members of the community. Thus, in terms of the *contents* of European identity, as argued in chapter 1, the elements which denote being European can be fitted in its two basic conceptualizations based on debates in nationalism studies: a more open civic notion of Europeanness and an exclusionary ethnic-based concept of being European. Keeping in mind that European belonging has been fostered by the institutions of the EU as a political belonging, rather than a hard identity based on culture and ancestry, I test the hypothesis regarding its predominant civic character:

H.5 European identity is conceived predominantly in civic terms in both old and new member states.

Nevertheless, the criteria for membership in European political community are socially constructed, and, thus, context-dependent. While the different historical experience of Central Eastern European member states might influence the ways in which their newly acquired supranational belonging is formulated, we should not overstate the importance of such legacies. This is why my objective is to empirically test the arguments advanced by some scholars who expect ancestry and religion to play a greater role in how European identity is delimited in the new member states:

H.6 In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to origin (be born in Europe and have European parents) as an element delimiting European identity.

H.7 In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to religion (being Christian) as an element delimiting European identity.

As far as the *consequences* of identities are concerned, as argued in the previous chapter, individual EU attitudes can be explained to a great extent by rational calculations, the influence of domestic context, political elites and the mass media, as well as cognitive mobilization and transnational contacts. In these terms, utilitarian perceptions constitute one of the most widely acknowledged predictor of individual attitudes in CEE countries. Some authors even argue that, after accession, the importance of the utilitarian factor becomes more salient as determinant of support (Guerra 2013a). Since EU accession of CEE countries to a great extent has been framed in terms of benefits, I expect that these factors

could potentially have a more pronounced effect in the new member states than in the more established EU countries. Therefore, the first hypothesis which will be tested in this chapter is related to the possible difference between new and old member states, and the role of such utilitarian considerations.

H.8 Utilitarian considerations constitute a stronger predictor of positive EU perceptions in the CEE new member states, than in the old member states.

Comparative analyses of EU attitudes in CEE-10 countries so far have focused on explaining support for EU membership in Central and Eastern Europe (before and after accession), and have dealt principally with the influence of values, rational calculations, and national proxies in the context of societies structured by transitions to democracy and capitalism. However, most recent analysis of public opinion attitudes in the enlarged EU point to the importance of the affective factors. European and national identification, as well as perception of threats has been confirmed as one of the principal determinants of EU attitudes; however, its consideration in empirical research on Central and Eastern Europe has been rather limited. Therefore, the objective of this study is to demonstrate that such affective determinants of EU attitudes constitute a key explanatory dimension of support also in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe:

H.9 In the new member states, identities constitute at least as strong of a predictor of positive EU perceptions as utilitarian considerations.

Furthermore, in the last chapter I also account for how the processes of EU attitude formation might have changed with the economic crisis. Specifically, I argue that when the positive image of EU in terms of economic benefits and effective governance of the crisis has been undermined, European identity could become a more important factor to explain positive perceptions of the EU:

H.10 The effect of European identity as a predictor of positive EU perceptions is stronger after the effects of the crisis has made its mark on European public opinion.

Finally, and bearing in mind the importance of elites to the process of European integration, I extend my analysis to include both types of actors in European politics and I test the above stated hypothesis on both groups, public opinion (a) and elites (b). As discussed in chapter 2, there is a significant elite-mass gap in the degree of European

identification which is due to the effects of cognitive mobilization and becomes amplified by socialization in international institutions and greater transnational contacts. In this sense, my basic expectations is that elites should be more homogenous between East and West of Europe but there could still be relevant East/West differences as outlined in my hypotheses above.

In the chapters that follow I test the above-stated hypotheses (summarized in Table 3.1) in complete multilevel models, where assumptions regarding the differences between old and new member states can be statistically verified. In the models, I include all relevant alternative explanatory factors, as discussed in previous chapters, to adequately account for the importance of identities in terms of individual perceptions of public opinion and elites.

Table 3.1 Overview of research hypotheses

Theoretical element	Hypothesis
<i>Affective and cognitive: Concept and determinants of European identity between East and West (chapter 4)</i>	
<i>Hypothesis 1:</i> <i>Affective European identity</i>	<i>H.1</i> There is no difference in terms of affective identification with Europe in the old and the new EU member states.
<i>Hypothesis 2:</i> <i>Cognitive European identity</i>	<i>H.2</i> Citizens of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe are less likely to perceive themselves as Europeans, as compared to the old EU member states.
<i>Hypothesis 3:</i> <i>Effect of socialization</i>	<i>H.3</i> There is an interaction effect between age and cognitive European identification in Central Eastern Europe: older citizens in these new member states are less likely to identify as Europeans than younger people in these countries.
<i>Hypothesis 4:</i> <i>Determinants of European identity</i>	<i>H.4</i> The determinants of the dimensions of European political identity reflect the social identity theory model. Affective European identity is influenced to a greater extent by positive evaluative perceptions while cognitive European identity by factors related to resources and experience of the EU.
<i>Civic or ethnic: Contents of European identity between East and West (chapter 5)</i>	
<i>Hypothesis 5:</i> <i>Contents of European identity</i>	<i>H.5</i> European identity is conceived predominantly in civic terms in both old and new member states.
<i>Hypothesis 6:</i> <i>The importance of ancestry</i>	<i>H.6</i> In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to origin (be born in Europe and have European parents) as an element delimiting European identity.
<i>Hypothesis 7:</i> <i>The importance of religion</i>	<i>H.7</i> In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to religion (being Christian) as an element delimiting European identity.
<i>Identities or interests: Consequences of European identity between East and West (chapter 6)</i>	
<i>Hypothesis 8:</i> <i>Economic factor</i>	<i>H.8</i> Utilitarian considerations constitute a stronger predictor of positive EU perceptions in the CEE new member states, than in the old member states.
<i>Hypothesis 9:</i> <i>Identity as a determinant of EU support</i>	<i>H.9</i> In the new member states, identities constitute at least as strong of a predictor of positive EU perceptions as utilitarian considerations
<i>Hypothesis 10:</i> <i>The impact of the crisis</i>	<i>H.10</i> The effect of European identity as a predictor of positive EU perceptions is stronger after the effects of the crisis has made its mark on European public opinion.

6. Annex to chapter 3

Table 3.2 GDP in EU-27 (2004-2012)

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Austria	128	125	125	123	124	125	126	128	129
Belgium	121	120	117	115	115	117	120	120	120
Cyprus	91	93	93	94	99	100	96	93	91
Denmark	125	123	124	122	124	123	127	125	125
Finland	116	114	114	117	118	114	114	115	115
France	109	110	108	107	106	108	108	109	108
Germany	115	115	115	115	115	114	119	122	123
Greece	94	90	92	90	93	94	88	81	76
Ireland	142	144	145	146	131	128	128	128	128
Italy	107	105	104	104	104	103	102	101	100
Luxembourg	252	253	269	273	262	251	261	264	262
Malta	80	80	78	78	81	84	87	86	86
Netherlands	129	130	131	132	134	132	129	129	127
Portugal	77	79	79	78	78	80	80	77	76
Spain	101	102	104	104	103	103	98	96	95
Sweden	126	121	122	125	123	120	123	125	126
United Kingdom	124	124	122	117	114	112	107	105	104
<i>EU-15</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>113</i>	<i>112</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>109</i>	<i>109</i>
Bulgaria	35	37	38	40	43	44	44	46	47
Czech Rep.	78	79	80	82	81	82	80	81	81
Estonia	57	61	66	70	69	63	64	69	71
Hungary	63	63	63	61	64	65	66	67	66
Latvia	46	49	53	57	58	54	55	60	64
Lithuania	51	54	57	62	64	58	62	67	71
Poland	50	51	52	54	56	60	63	65	67
Romania	34	35	39	43	49	50	51	51	53
Slovakia	57	60	63	68	72	72	74	75	76
Slovenia	86	87	87	88	90	86	84	84	83
<i>CEE-10</i>	<i>56</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>68</i>

Note: GDP per capita. Volume indices of real expenditure per capita in PPS. EU27=100. Data: Eurostat

Table 3.3 EU membership support in CEE, by country (2004-2012)

EU membership is... A good thing %	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Rep.	45	44	51	45	46	40	31	31
Estonia	52	41	56	61	61	62	52	49
Latvia	40	36	43	37	27	23	26	25
Lithuania	69	57	62	65	55	51	48	49
Hungary	49	39	39	40	31	34	38	32
Poland	50	54	62	71	65	61	62	53
Slovenia	52	43	57	56	59	50	39	39
Slovakia	57	50	61	58	62	68	59	52
Bulgaria	59	50	55	52	48	54	47	48
Romania	75	61	62	71	66	64	55	57
<i>CEE-10 average</i>	55	48	55	56	52	51	46	44
<i>EU-15 average</i>	61	54	56	61	56	58	52	51

EU membership is... Neither good nor bad. %	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Rep.	42	44	38	38	40	46	51	48
Estonia	36	42	34	30	32	31	39	40
Latvia	43	47	44	48	49	51	52	51
Lithuania	22	27	25	24	29	31	34	31
Hungary	36	42	38	41	45	42	45	44
Poland	37	34	31	21	25	28	27	33
Slovenia	38	46	36	35	29	36	43	39
Slovakia	37	42	31	34	31	26	33	37
Bulgaria	26	31	27	34	37	31	39	38
Romania	14	24	23	20	22	23	30	28
<i>CEE-10 average</i>	33	38	33	33	34	35	39	39
<i>EU-15 average</i>	24	27	25	23	26	25	27	27

EU membership is... A bad thing	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Czech Rep.	10	11	10	15	12	13	16	19
Estonia	10	11	8	7	6	6	7	9
Latvia	14	15	11	12	21	24	19	21
Lithuania	6	12	10	8	10	13	14	16
Hungary	10	14	19	17	21	22	15	22
Poland	8	8	6	6	7	8	8	10
Slovenia	5	9	6	7	11	13	16	21
Slovakia	4	7	6	6	5	5	7	10
Bulgaria	6	9	9	5	7	7	8	10
Romania	4	8	8	5	7	8	11	11
<i>CEE-10 average</i>	8	10	9	9	11	12	12	15
<i>EU-15 average</i>	12	16	16	13	15	14	18	19

Data: Eurobarometer 2004-2012 (62.0, 64.2, 65.2, 67.2, 69.2, 71.3, 73.4, 76.3, 77.3). Entries in the table are percentages.

Chapter 4

Affective and cognitive: Concept and determinants of European identity in old and new member states of the EU

“Stworzyliśmy Europę, teraz musimy stworzyć Europejczyków.”⁶²

– Bronisław Geremek, *Unia Europejska i jej kryzysy*

1. Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapters, the issue of European identification as a basis for a democratic polity in Europe has received increased attention in the scholarly discussions of European politics of the recent decades. In relation to the Eastern enlargement, several authors anticipated a negative impact of such widening of the EU for its social, economic, and political cohesiveness (Fuchs and Klingeman 2006; Katzenstein and Checkel 2009; Thomassen and Bäck 2009; Mau and Verwiebe 2010). The concern is that whatever tenuous “European identity” existed prior to the Eastern enlargements, it could become so diluted that no meaningful European political community can come to fruition. However, such—potentially divisive—effect of Eastward enlargement on the prospects of European political identity must be empirically tested, and it is the objective of the present chapter to analyze public opinion and elite orientations regarding their European identification in a post-enlargement European Union.

Building on existing research and the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapters, I advance two main arguments. First, I argue that the European identity question should be approached by analyzing both its cognitive (i.e. self-perception as European) and affective (i.e. attachment to Europe) dimensions, and I provide empirical evidence to support

⁶² “We have made Europe, now we need to make Europeans.”

this theoretical distinction. Secondly, such two-dimensional empirical analysis of European identity reveals that while citizens of post-communist EU members are on average less likely to see themselves as European than their Western counterparts, their attachment to Europe is deeply seated. In this sense, here I aim to explain this persistent difference and argue that citizens of post-communist Europe have not yet internalized their perception of being European to the same extent as their Western counterparts, due to their short experience as citizens of the Union; however, the new European citizens are unquestionably attached to the “European project” and, in due course, socialization of the younger generations could form the foundations for a more widespread cognitive identity. Finally, as for the elites, the perennial gap between them and the public in supporting and identifying with the EU is still there, and this applies to elites in Central Eastern Europe as well.

The chapter is organized as follows, the first part focuses on descriptive analysis of the two aspects of European identification: its affective side and the cognitive element. With this purpose, I analyze the data for elites and public opinion and compare new CEE countries’ with old member states on both dimensions. In the second part of the chapter, I explore the determinants of European identity and try to uncover the sources of differential levels of European identification between East and West of Europe.

2. European identity in East and West: research hypotheses

In my empirical analysis, I follow the theoretical model of European political identity as a social identity formulated in the previous chapters of this thesis. Thus, I look at the degree to which European identification has been incorporated into the political identities of elites and citizens of the enlarged EU, both as attachment to Europe (affective dimension), as well as self-perception as national and/or European (cognitive dimension).

There are two reasons for separately analyzing *cognitive* and *affective* dimensions of identity. First, the cognitive dimension of European identity is more demanding than the affective dimension: “seeing” oneself as European demands a certain degree of socialization and sense of belonging that affective identification does not require. Affective identification with Europe is more straightforward as this dimension of European identity taps into the affective or emotional closeness that EU citizens have to the idea of Europe as a political community. It is easy to imagine how one could be attached to Europe due to the perceived positive outcomes, while it might be more difficult to identify as a European, as the latter entails perceiving similarity to the rest of the community of Europeans.

I argue that the importance of distinguishing between the two dimensions of European identity becomes clear when studying European identity in the Central and Eastern European new member states of the EU. Existing empirical studies of European identity have almost exclusively focused on Western and Southern Europe, and this subject has received much less attention in the scholarship on the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. Even though the Eastward enlargement generated some academic interest in the structure and determinants of mass attitudes in the post-communist new member states, the resulting research has focused mainly on the issue of EU support and the question of the applicability of existing theories to CEE countries, as discussed in detail in chapter 3. However, we know relatively little about what triggers European identification in CEE new member states. In this sense, on the one hand, some of the more recent studies of European identity, which incorporate all countries of the expanded EU, detect a generally lower levels of cognitive identification in Central and Eastern Europe (Kuhn 2012; Sanders et al. 2012) but do not explore the sources of such difference. On the other hand, attachment to Europe in the East is as deeply seated as it is in the West. This is due to the fact that after the fall of communism, there was widespread support for the idea of the “return to Europe” through

EU accession, as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that citizens in the East would be less attached to Europe than their Western counterparts.

***H.1** There is no difference in terms of affective identification with Europe in the old and the new EU member states.*

***H.2** Citizens of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe are less likely to perceive themselves as Europeans, as compared to the old EU member states.*

In this sense, in this chapter I aim to reconcile these, only apparently, contradictory expectations. My main argument is that the higher levels of identification as only national (as opposed to European and national or national and European) in the new member states are not due to a stronger national allegiance as a result of recently recovered independence, as some authors have suggested (see previous chapter). Rather, the main reason for this is that citizens of post-communist Europe have not yet internalized their self-perception as European to the same extent as their Western counterparts due to their short socialization as members of a European political community. Here, the *socialization* argument explains a generational gap in cognitive identification as Europeans in Central and Eastern Europe, and suggests that while older people might find it more difficult to embrace a newly found supranational belonging, younger people might find identification with Europe as more natural. This theoretical expectation is summarized in H3:

***H.3** There is an interaction effect between age and cognitive European identification in Central Eastern Europe: older citizens in these new member states are less likely to identify as Europeans than younger people in these countries.*

Second, and related to the first point, the two dimensions of European identity have different underlying causes. As argued previously, the affective aspect of European identification refers to “identification with Europe” and can potentially be triggered by a natural psychological tendency towards positive social distinction. The cognitive dimension of identity refers to one’s self-perception as it relates to European identity and denotes “identification as European” based on perceived similarity. Therefore, I expect that these differential sources of affective and cognitive identification will be reflected in the way its determinants work. This expectation is reflected in the following hypothesis:

H.4 The determinants of the dimensions of European political identity reflect the social identity theory model. Affective European identity is influenced to a greater extent by positive evaluative perceptions while cognitive European identity by factors related to resources and experience of the EU.

In order to account adequately for the determinants of European identification between East and West of Europe and verify the above-stated hypotheses, in the second part of this chapter I present explanatory models which include all three dimensions of determinants of European identification as discussed previously: resources, experience and attitudes. While my main focus is on the effect of socialization and the presence of intergenerational difference, I also explore other possible causal heterogeneities between East and West of Europe: I check to what extent perceived benefits and national identity have a differential effect on European identification in the new member states. In this sense, the assumptions of multiple identities and “marble cake” model indicates that European and national identification should not be opposed to each other.

What about the elites? An important set of explanations regarding European attitudes deals with the gap in support for the EU between elites and the public (Haller 2008). National political elites have been the driving force of European integration processes for decades, and in the CEE countries this was no different. Throughout the 1990s there was a general elite consensus on the issue of EU membership, with some EU-pessimist leaders emerging in the run-up to accession (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). In spite of the recent upsurge in the presence of Eurosceptic parties in EU core countries, a common situation in all member states seems to be that mainstream elites tend to be more positively oriented towards European integration, while citizens remain much more critical of it (Hooghe 2003; Vetik 2003; Müller, Jenny, and Ecker 2012). But do we find any differences in terms of affective and cognitive identification, as well as the content of their European identity? These questions need empirical testing and therefore, I test all hypothesis delineated above both for average citizens (a) as well as the elites (b).

3. Method and data

The data used in this chapter was collected within the framework of the IntUne project. The project included two waves of public opinion and elite survey, with fieldwork conducted in 2007 and 2009. As described in the research design section, the dataset includes a parallel questionnaire for elites and public opinion in 18 EU countries and explores different aspects of citizenship and identity in the enlarged European Union in a comparative elite-public perspective. The IntUne public opinion survey includes representative samples for most participant countries (except for the Czech Republic and Lithuania). The IntUne elite survey included national MPs (with relevant number of frontbenchers), top personnel of most important media of each country, and members of the principal trade unions⁶³.

As far as the method of the study is concerned, a multilevel approach is adopted in the explanatory analysis. Such a perspective allows me to account for the nested nature of the data (individuals nested within states), as well as adequately assess the influence of the contextual variables, especially, the influence of the context of the new member states of the EU. As Steenbergen and Jones (2002) note, the goal of multilevel analysis is to formulate an explanatory model of a dependent variable at the lowest level of analysis (in this case, individual identification with Europe and as European) while considering the information from more levels of analysis (in this case, the individual attitudes and characteristics, as well as and the contextual variables which vary with country). Consequently, hierarchical models allow us to build more comprehensive explanatory models which include information from all relevant levels of the society, as well as account for causal heterogeneity – by specifying cross-level interactions (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219)⁶⁴. The latter allow me to test whether the effect of an individual level variable (level-1) varies as a function of country level characteristic (level-2). In this case, I test for differences as in the context of new EU member states.

⁶³ The composition of the samples is described in annex 2.

⁶⁴ There is also an important statistical reason for applying these kind of models. In studies where the “naïve pooling” approach is adopted, a researcher chooses to ignore the contextual layer of the data, and explore individual-level variables by pooling data from different contexts, for instance, countries. In this case, the assumption of independent errors will be violated and may lead to Type 1 errors, where predictors appear to be significant where in fact they are not. To solve this problem, some studies include dummy variables (e.g. country dummies) to absorb the between-groups differences; however while it solves the problems of clustered errors, such approach is not useful to account for possible causal heterogeneity. In the multilevel models the correlation between errors due to the clustering of individual-level observations within groups is taken into account and it is referred to as “intra-class correlation” (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 220).

In order to apply a multilevel approach, however, the number of level-2 units (states) in a single wave of the IntUne survey would be insufficient for the chosen method to work adequately (Stegmueller 2013). The solution to this problem adopted in the study is to combine both waves of the survey (2007 and 2009) and conduct the analysis on a complete dataset with country/year variable being the level-2 unit and a control for the survey's wave (cf. Arzheimer 2009).

3.1 Dependent variable

This study contends that European identity, considered as a political collective identity, is constituted by at least two important dimensions: the affective and the cognitive dimension of identification. In order to assess to what extent the European identification has become a part of political identities in the post-enlargement EU, I analyze separately dependent variables which operationalize these two aspects of European identification.

On the one hand, I consider the *affective* dimension of European identity, which is based on positive self-perception and identification with the European Union and Europe, as discussed in chapter 1. The affective dimension is operationalized as attachment because this measure taps into the intensity of the sentiment of belonging to the community of Europeans. Here I use the “attachment to Europe” question, an item within a battery of questions that relate to the different territorial levels such as the locality, the region and the country, which indicates the individual consideration of Europe as a community of reference:

People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not at all attached to the following?

While the original question allows for the expression of the intensity of sentiment towards Europe on a four point scale, for the purpose of the multivariate analysis I transform it into a binary variable which compares those who do not feel attached to Europe (not at all attached and not very attached) with those who recognize being attached or very attached to Europe.

Admittedly, a significant issue which could be raised against choosing this variable in the context of this study is that the respondents are asked about Europe and not specifically

the European Union. While in more recent Eurobarometer surveys (since 2010) this question is indeed formulated as “attachment to the European Union”—an improvement in terms of how affective attitudes towards the EU can be measured more accurately—in our dataset the attachment question still has its generic form of attachment to Europe. In spite of such problems, there are several arguments in favor of using this question to operationalize the affective aspect of European identity and assuming that it taps into the affective dimension of a political identity with the European Union as its referent. Firstly, the other items included in this battery of questions clearly make reference to different levels of community or even government (local, regional, state) which is a strong indication to consider that the respondents would treat the question as related to the EU and, thus, implicitly gauging the affective attitudes towards the political community of Europeans, rather than a more abstract geographical identity. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, we find rather strong correlations of this variable with indicators of trust in the institutions of the EU, perception of benefits from the EU, as well as national identification in its affective aspect. This leads me to assume that the attachment question constitutes a satisfactory measure of the affective dimension of identity. Moreover, in the absence of more direct measures in most cross-national surveys, attachment to Europe has been often treated as a proxy of identity in previous research (for instance, Deutsch 2006) and some authors even argue that it is the most reliable measure of this concept (Sinnott 2006).

On the other hand, according to my theoretical model, the second dimension of European identity is constituted by the *cognitive* aspect which refers to a self-perception and *identification as European*. Here I consider the item which taps self-identification in the context of multiple identities, often referred to as the so-called “Linz/Moreno question”⁶⁵. This item asks the respondents to indicate their self-perception in terms of European and/or national. More specifically, the question reads:

⁶⁵ The origin of the “multiple identities” survey item is often linked to the work of Luis Moreno who applied it in his research on regional identities in Catalonia and Scotland (Moreno 1986). However, as Coller (2006, 110) notes, while the item was first introduced to a wider audience in a survey on Catalan regional identity developed by Richard Gunther (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986), its intellectual author is Juan Linz who formulated it to investigate regional identities within the context of the Spanish transition to democracy and most likely contributed it to the latter survey. The multiple identities question was later adopted in numerous surveys on issues of regional, national and European identities. Also Moreno himself recognizes that his formulation of the question was based on the conceptual and empirical work of Linz in the late 1970s (Moreno 2006). The original formulation of the self-identification question included a scale which asks the respondent to indicate whether one feels “only national”, “more national than from the region”, “equally nation and from the region”, “more from the region than national”, or “only from the region”.

Do you see yourself as...? (Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only.

Here, however, the focus is not on those who hold exclusive identities (strictly national or strictly European). Rather, building on previous research, my substantial interest is in the existence of identifications which are exclusive or inclusive of identification with Europe (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2005). This approach is based on the assumption that people can hold multiple, non-conflicting identities (Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Risse 2010). Such perspective allows for the conceptualization of the complex relationship between different political identities without necessarily presupposing any opposition, for example, between national and European identifications (Bruter 2005). Thus, I operationalize cognitive European identity as the share of respondents who embrace some kind of layered or mixed identity and recognize holding an identity inclusive of identification as European—either solely European or national and European. In other words, the cognitive identification variable indicates the degree of Europeanization of identities (Risse 2010).

3.2 Independent variables

The analysis of the determinants of European identification follows the theoretical model of European political identity proposed in chapters 1 and 2. Therefore, I include variables⁶⁶ which operationalize the three dimensions of individual-level determinants of European identification: resources, experience, and attitudes, as well as introduce contextual factors. All models include a dummy variable which indicates the effect of the context of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.

As far as *resources* are concerned, for the public opinion, the cognitive mobilization model provides an established theoretical framework which explains how better educated people are more able to connect to a remote political community, and thus, develop a European identity (Inglehart 1970b). Thus, I expect the same process to be at work in both old and new member states of the EU, and anticipate a positive effect of education and political interest on European identification. The importance of political interest has been acknowledged by numerous studies of political attitudes and here the expectation is that a higher level of political interest has a positive impact on European identification, as it

⁶⁶ In the annex 1 to this thesis I include variables' overview with the exact wording of the survey questions, as well as summary of descriptive data on each variable used in the explanatory models.

indicates a general positive effect of cognitive mobilization and the ability to connect to a more remote political community. Moreover, in terms of resources, we must consider the impact of another variable used to indicate the individual position of winner/loser of European integration: occupation. Both education and occupation are introduced as dummy variables. Occupation distinguishes between self-employed, employed, manual workers, and those without a paid job, while in terms of education, I differentiate between those with only elementary education, secondary education, vocational qualifications, A-levels, or a university degree. As discussed previously, European integration presents the greatest opportunities for more educated, mobile citizens, especially high-skilled workers, while those less mobile, with lower levels of education and blue-collar workers can experience it as a significant threat and, thus, seek the protection of the nation state and support the maintenance of national boundaries. This has been validated in previous studies and is also reflected in the data used in this study. The exploratory analysis of the data at hand in the next section confirms this observation: manual workers and those with low levels of education exhibit the lowest levels of European identity, affective and cognitive. This is why these are precisely the reference categories in our explanatory models (manual worker and none/primary education).

In the case of the elites, the dimension of resources is more difficult to operationalize, since by definition we are dealing here with the most privileged strata of European societies, and as such I expect them to be much more homogenous than the public opinion. Thus, the variable which makes reference to occupation is modified to suit the specific character of this group. Here, I consider the difference between political elites (reference category) and the rest of the elites (economic, media, and trade union elites considered together). The assumption is that since these are national political representatives they could exhibit stronger attachment to the national framework and be more resistant to a supranational identification than economic, trade union or media elites whose roles are not endowed with such clear national mandate. On the other element related to individual resources, education, there is hardly any heterogeneity among the elites, especially among the new member states, where only less than 5% of those surveyed admits to not having undertaken university degree studies. In some countries (Bulgaria), 100% of those surveyed holds a university degree. Therefore, the education variable is omitted in the explanatory models for elites. Due to overall high levels of identification which relies on cognitive mobilization and rather

homogenous character of the elite group, I do not expect significant impact of resource-related factors, other than the probable stronger national attachment of the political elites.

The second set of explanatory variables are those which refer to personal *experience* and the socialization dimension of the general European attitude formation model. Transnational experiences seem to play an especially positive role, in line with the early theorizing of Deutsch (1957), who assumed that community formation would stem from increased transnational contacts of citizens and elites. Such positive impact of transnational contacts on European identification has been documented in empirical research (Fuss, García-Albacete, and Rodríguez-Monter 2004; Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009; Kuhn 2012). Therefore, in terms of experience, I consider the impact of factors which operationalize both a direct experience with the EU as well as the more diffuse effects of socialization. For the public opinion this explanatory dimension includes an indicator of interest of knowledge about the EU, and a variable which indicates whether the respondent has visited another EU country in the past year. As far as the influence of knowledge is concerned, as Hobolt (2012) has shown, people with better knowledge of the EU tend to evaluate it more directly instead of relying on proxies. Thus, the expected effect of this variable is similar to that of education and political interest: those who know more about the EU should be also able to identify with it more easily. The EU knowledge variable is constructed by summing correct answers to four questions which test respondents' knowledge of the current member states of the EU. The effect of direct experience of the EU is operationalized as the number of times the respondent has visited another EU country in the last year. Studies of transnational practices have shown that international travel correlates positively with European identification (Kuhn 2012) and such positive effect is also the expectation of this study. Both these factors, knowledge and EU visit, are possibly related to greater perceived similarity with other Europeans and could constitute a solid basis for social identification processes.

Moreover, the effect of age could be considered as part of the dimension of experience as well. The existing literature on collective identification with the EU points to the importance of "primary socialization" that occurs in the early years of one's life when Europeanizing discourses and symbols are internalized (Recchi 2014). If social identities (European identities included) crystalize in earlier stages of life, change could only materialize with generational replacement. This socialization argument implies a generational divide in cognitive identification with Europe in the East because many East Europeans experienced

their primary socialization under the communist system with no symbolic or discursive reference to a shared common European identity with Western Europe. In contrast, younger people in the East who grew up during the post-communist transitions, were exposed to the Europeanizing discourse that accompanied the process of reuniting with Europe through EU enlargement. This suggests that while older people might find it more difficult to embrace a newly acquired supranational belonging, younger people might find identification with Europe as more natural. In these terms, my expectation is that younger generations, especially in the new member states, tend to identify more as Europeans as they have been socialized in the more recent times when European integration was either a possibility or a reality. Thus, we should find a negative effect of the age variable in the new member states.

For the case of the elites, the factors related to experience are also slightly different due to the specific character of this group. By definition, we are dealing here with the part of the society which tends to exhibit the characteristics which account for cognitive mobilization: higher education and exposure to mass media. Thus, here rather than an effect of the diffuse factors, I consider elements which might account for direct socialization with Europe. On the one hand, I consider the impact of having lived in another EU country, on the other hand, contacts with European institutions. Both are expected to correlate with higher levels of European identification.

I also consider the effects of *attitudinal* factors. As far as attitudinal determinants of European identity are concerned, evaluative attitudes are characterized by instrumental rationality including perceptions of benefits from integration (personal and at the level of the country) and general trust in European institutions. This set of determinants can be derived directly from the social identity theory, which assumes that one of identity formation's basic processes is acquisition of positive self-perception (Tajfel and Turner 1979), as discussed in chapter 1.

On the one hand, we can expect that positive *evaluative* attitudes will affect European identification since social identities rely to a great extent on positive distinction and on the individual need to acquire positive self-image. Therefore, it implies that those who have a positive image of the EU should also exhibit higher levels of European identity, especially in its affective aspect. This applies equally to the public opinion, as well as the elites. I include two indicators of such positive evaluations of the EU: trust and perception of benefits

from membership. In terms of operationalization of trust, for the public opinion, I follow the approach of Garry and Tilley (2007) and combine two indexes of national and European trust by subtracting the value of trust in national institutions from the value of trust in European institutions⁶⁷. Thus, the trust variable for public opinion indicates whether one has more trust in European institutions than in the national ones. Among the elites trust is operationalized as an index⁶⁸ of trust in EU institutions (European Commission and European Parliament), as there is no data on trust in national institutions for the political elites.

The other item which makes reference to evaluative attitudes is the classic EU membership benefit question. This has been often used as a proxy of EU support and it indicates the utilitarian dimension of European attitudes. As discussed in previous chapters, there are two basic aspects to the utilitarian perspective: the “sociotropic” aspect emphasizes the impact of perceived and real country material benefits from integration at the collective level, while the “egocentric” approach focuses on perceived personal gains from integration. Here, for the case of the elites I analyze the impact of the sociotropic factors (benefit to the country), and for public opinion that of egocentric considerations (personal benefit).

Finally, *affective* attitudes as determinants of European identification refer to the influence of national identification and its content and relationship to Europe. As discussed in chapter 2, the strength and meaning of national identity plays a crucial role in determining European identification. The multiple identities approach posits that if constructed as inclusive, national identity may reinforce identification with Europe (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Kuhn 2012). Here, I test several elements related to national identification. On the one hand, as the multiple identity theory posits I expect national identity—operationalized as attachment to the country—to be positively related to European identification. However, in line with the discussion of the meanings of identities, if national identity is conceived as being exclusive and is based on kinship, ethnicity, and religion, it

⁶⁷ National trust combines trust in national government (0-10) and national parliament (0-10), and its Cronbach alpha scale reliability coefficient is 0,871. For EU institutional trust, I combine trust in European Commission (0-10) and trust in European Parliament (0-10), with a scale reliability coefficient of 0,899. The resultant trust variable goes from -10 (no trust in the EU, complete trust in national institutions) to +10 (complete trust in the EU and no trust in national government and parliament).

⁶⁸ With a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability coefficient of 0,788.

should affect negatively identification with Europe⁶⁹. However, the influence of national identities on European identification is complex and likely depends on individual as well as contextual factors and especially the way elites actively construct both types of identities (Díez Medrano 2003). Therefore, in addition to individual-level determinants of European identity, we need to take into account the way in which the national context shapes identity. Cues from elites are particularly important. I include country-level aggregate measures for elite positions with the percentage of elites who claim to be attached to Europe in a given country. The expectation is that people tend to identify more as Europeans in countries where elites construct political identities as inclusive of attachment to Europe.

3.3 Control variables

The control variables are included at two levels: the individual level and the contextual level. In terms of *individual* characteristics I control for sex, religion, and ideology for both elites and public opinion. Previous studies have shown that women tend to support less the EU, therefore, it could also be the case that there is a gender difference in terms of European identification.

Religion, on the other hand, has played a significant role in the debates surrounding the enlargement, therefore it is important to include the religious factor in the model. Previous research has documented a positive effect of Catholicism, as well as Protestantism and to some extent Orthodox Christianity, on support for European integration (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001; Nelsen, Guth, and Highsmith 2011). On the other hand, some authors have hypothesized that Catholic and Orthodox believers in the new member states might be more opposed to the European Union project, and thus, also less eager to identify as European (Katzenstein and Checkel 2009; Risse 2010). Therefore, I check for the effect of the religious factor in the enlarged EU.

Finally, ideology is an important control to consider in terms of European attitudes. However, it is less probable that it could be a relevant factor in the new member states due to the fact that party systems are rather volatile and the probability of party cueing is reduced

⁶⁹ The index variable which operationalizes an ethnic concept of national belonging is constructed by combining three items which include the consideration of Christianity, being born in the country and having parents of the country's nationality as indicators of an exclusive, ethnic-based concept of national belonging. The scale reliability coefficient is a solid 0,730.

in the post-communist context, where trust in political institutions tends to be low. Nevertheless, it is introduced in the models as a control variable.

In addition to individual level determinants of European identity, we need to take into account the way in which national *context* shapes identity. In these terms elites' European identification is introduced as an explanatory variable together with other *contextual* controls which might condition differences in European identification between countries. The contextual controls include net EU fiscal transfers as share of country's GNI, and the Christianity contextual variable. On the one hand, in countries with higher fiscal transfers from the EU, European identification, especially in its affective aspect, could be higher because receiving funds from the EU might trigger positive evaluative processes which foster affective attachment. The Christianity contextual variable, on the other hand, refers to the prevalence of religious identification within each country. It is constructed from the individual religion variable as the share of citizens who identify as Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant within a given country. In terms of the impact of religion, previous studies document the positive effect of religion on European attitudes, as discussed above. Since Christianity constitutes an important, albeit disputed part, of European cultural legacy, European identification, thus, could be easier in countries which high percentages of Christian (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox) believers.

Finally, I also include unemployment as a contextual factor to operationalize the differences in the shape of economy of the different member states. An alternative macro-economic could be GDP per capita, however, there is a strong correlation with the new member states dummy and the inclusion of that variable in the models could cause problems of multicollinearity. This is why I discarded its use in the models.

4. Results and discussion


4.1 Descriptive results: The end of supranational identities?

As a first step of the empirical analysis, I explore the descriptive picture of European identification, its cognitive and affective elements, after the enlargement. The analysis is presented along the two main comparative dimensions of this study: the comparison between new and old member states, as well as that between elites and public opinion. Moreover, for each aspect analyzed, I present the results disaggregated by country since simple group comparisons between new member states from Central and Eastern Europe and old member states could conceal important country-level variation. The basic objective of this initial step in the analysis is to verify the extent of supranational identification with Europe and the main differences between old and new member states, and their elites and public opinion.

4.1.1 Public opinion

I start the analysis with the affective dimension of European identification among public opinion. Figure 4.1 presents the percentages of respondents who consider themselves attached or very attached to Europe for each country separately and aggregated for the two groups. The first interesting fact is that, on average, citizens of new member states are more attached to the EU than their Western counterparts⁷⁰. While there are significant differences between the CEE member states (Hungary being the country where citizens seem to express the strongest attachment to the EU, and Estonia the weakest), in all six CEE countries included in the study more than 60% of the public recognizes their attachment to Europe. Moreover, the level of attachment to Europe in Hungary, over 80%, is the highest among all the countries in the dataset. This is not the case for the old member states of the EU-15 where the share of people who identify with Europe in its affective aspect does not reach this threshold in at least three countries: Greece, Spain, and the UK.

⁷⁰ The difference is statistically significant at .001 level (two-sample t-test).

Figure 4.1 Affective European identity, Public opinion (2009)


Data: IntUne Public opinion survey (2009). Question: People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not at all attached to the following? Europe. “Not at all attached” and “not very attached” grouped as “not attached”, “somewhat attached” and “very attached” grouped as “attached”.

Several causes could trigger a general stronger affective identification with Europe in the new member states. One explanation could be that as the new CEE EU member states have recovered their full independence only recently, their citizens report stronger ties to all institutional levels in general⁷¹. Another relevant factor behind this configuration could be the fact that even though the EU does not represent the primary political community of reference in CEE countries, its structures are often seen as a guarantee of democratic changes, as well as an alternative to the ill-performing national institutions of young democracies (Ilonszki 2009). In this sense, the widespread support for the idea of the “return to Europe” through EU accession, as discussed in the previous chapter, represented the path to economic modernization and a democratic guarantee. These predominantly positive perceptions of the EU could lead to stronger affective attachment, in line with the assumptions of the social identity model.

⁷¹ This is confirmed for the case of attachment to the country, which is also stronger in the CEE countries in the same dataset. The data for country level attachment is not shown here.

In the theoretical model of European identification, I consider the importance of the strength of European identification, as well as its stability. In these terms the IntUne data are insufficient to evaluate a more long-term trends in European identity. However, some of the Eurobarometer studies do incorporate identity items which are comparable to those used by this study, and we can therefore use them to explore the stability of the patterns uncovered by my analysis. In this sense, Figure 4.2 presents the results on the attachment to the EU question, over the period following the accession.

Figure 4.2 Affective European identity, Public opinion (2006-2012)




Data: EB studies 65.2 (2006), 67.2 (2007), 73.3 (2010), 77.3 (2012). Question: Please tell me how attached you feel to... European Union . Very attached (4) Fairly attached (3) Not very attached (2) Not at all attached (1). Share of “attached” and “very attached”.

The advantage of the Eurobarometer is that it includes all EU member states, and therefore, we can expand the analysis to all ten new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The significant difference to the IntUne data is the overall lower levels of European affective identification. This is due undoubtedly to a more precisely formulated question: here the attachment question addresses attachment specifically to the EU and not Europe. However, in spite of this, we can see that the pattern observed in the IntUne data—stronger affective European identification in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe—holds for the whole period of 2006-2012. Moreover, it seems that as levels of affective identification drop in the context of the economic crisis, this drop is less steep in the CEE-10 countries.

Undoubtedly, new member states' citizens are attached to Europe, but what about the second aspect of European identity, the cognitive identification? Here we find an inverse situation. As discussed previously, to operationalize the cognitive dimension of identification, I consider the share of response to the multiple identities' question, drawing the line of comparison between those respondents who identify exclusively as nationals and those who acknowledge some form of European identification (national and European, European and national, and solely European). The results are represented in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 Cognitive European identity, Public opinion (2009)




Data: IntUne Public opinion survey (2009). Question: Do you see yourself as..?

On average, the percentage of citizens who hold identities inclusive of European identification, that is, who think of themselves as national and/or European, is significantly lower in Central Eastern European new members (51,5%) than in the old member states (65,5%)⁷². In other words, the European element of self-perception has much less presence and the share of citizens with exclusive national identification in the new member states (an average of 48,5%) is significantly higher than in the countries which have been members of the EU longer (34,5%).

⁷² The difference is statistically significant at .001 level (two-sample t-test with unequal variances).

When we look at the country-level patterns, we can clearly observe such difference. The exception among the old member states is the UK, where, unsurprisingly, national identification exclusive of European self-perception is clearly predominant and it is even higher than in the new member states. Among the CEE member states, only Slovenia has a share of Europeanized identities comparable to the old members' average. Moreover, citizens in CEE member states identify as solely European rather infrequently.

Here again we can use the Eurobarometer data to construct a more long-term picture of European cognitive identification to contrast my findings and verify whether the cognitive difference is reflected in other surveys as well. It is important to note that the Eurobarometer incorporates the "Linz-Moreno" question in a slightly modified form, as it asks the respondents "In the *near future*, do you see yourself as... (Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only". Such formulation has been criticized by scholars of European identity as being very vague as it is not clear whether it addresses current self-perception or some ambiguous projection of the future (Bruter 2005; Bruter 2013). In spite of this issue, it is similar to the cognitive identity question in the IntUne survey and it can serve as a contrast for my findings and measure of stability of European inclusive identification. In Figure 4.4 I present a comparison of the levels of European cognitive identification in EU-15 countries and the new CEE-10 member states after accession.


Figure 4.4 Cognitive European identity, Public opinion (2004-2012)

Data: EB studies: 62.0 (2004), 64.2 (2005), 67.1 (2007), 73.4 (2010), 76.4 (2011), 77.3 (2012). Questions: In the near future, do you see yourself as... (Nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only. Inclusive identity is the share of “nationality and European”, “European and nationality”, and “European only”.

The results confirm my observation of a difference in levels of cognitive identification between old and new member states of the EU. The gap between new and old member states is clear and stable over the last decade. Another interesting observation is that, while there is a negative trend in affective European identification following the economic crisis, in terms of cognitive identification, we can observe a slight increase in the share of citizens who perceive themselves as European in the whole of the enlarged EU after 2004.

Finally, Figure 4.5 puts the previous results together and presents a comparison of the cognitive and the affective European identification by country. We can see that in each CEE country in our sample the share of citizens who perceive themselves as European is consistently smaller than the share of those who are attached to Europe. The biggest gaps between affective and cognitive European identity occur in Hungary and Bulgaria. This brings us to an important point: while citizens of CEE countries express strong attachment to European Union institutions (and overall high levels of institutional trust in the EU, as confirmed by other studies, cf. Armingeon and Ceka [2014]) it might be that they still have problems with considering themselves first-class European citizens.

Figure 4.5 Cognitive and affective European identity compared, Public Opinion




Undoubtedly, there is an important qualitative difference in citizens' European identity between the new and the old member states. If we take a look at old member states, affective and cognitive European identity are on equal footing, and the gap between the two dimensions is rather small especially among the founding states such as Italy or Germany. This suggests that in the old member states, and especially in the founding members, it comes as something natural that those who are attached to European Union as a political community, also consider themselves as belonging to it. This is not the case for the citizens of the new member states though, an observation which points to the necessity of a more cautious approach to the issue of European identification between East and West. Attachment to European political institutions and considering oneself a European citizen are two different aspects of the notion of Europeanness, and my findings suggest that they should not be used interchangeably.

4.1.3 Elites

What about the elites? Can we observe analogous patterns of difference between the two groups of countries? The assumption of this study is that due to similar processes of European socialization and high levels of cognitive mobilization which characterize this social group, there should not be such pronounced differences between the elites of the new and the old member states. The following figures offer a first empirical approximation that confirm this assumption.

Figure 4.6 Affective European identity, Elites (2009)



Data: IntUne Elite survey (2009). Question: People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to European Union. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached or not at all attached to the following? European Union. “Not at all attached” and “not very attached” grouped as “not attached”, “somewhat attached” and “very attached” grouped as “attached”.


Firstly, we observe equal levels of affective European identity⁷³ in both groups of countries (Figure 4.6). Overall, attachment to Europe is very high among the elites, it is on average well over 80%, and only three countries fall below this threshold: Greece and United Kingdom among old member states, and Bulgaria in the case of CEE countries. Moreover,

⁷³ The elite surveys asked respondents to indicate their attachment with the European Union and not Europe, as it was the case mass public opinion surveys. However, as discussed previously, there is no reason to believe that using attachment to the EU would produce different results from using attachment to Europe.

clearly, affective identification is much more widespread among the elites than the public opinion.

As far as the second dimension of identity is concerned (Figure 4.7), also Europeanized identities have strong presence among the elites of both groups. Exclusive national identification is rather scarce among the elites, but it is slightly higher among the elites of the new member states (13% as compared to 7,5% among old member states' elites)⁷⁴.

Figure 4.7 Cognitive European identity, Elites (2009)



Data: IntUne Public opinion survey (2009). Question: Do you see yourself as..?


The two countries with the highest level of exclusive national identifiers among the elites are the UK and Czech Republic, both well-known for the Euroscepticism of its political elites (Mansfeldova and Spicarova Staskova 2009; Real-Dato at el. 2012). Also Polish and Bulgarian elites exhibit a level of exclusive national identification above average. Mostly, however, the elites seem to hold multiple identities and see themselves as national and European (as well as, to a lower degree, European and national). Therefore, overall among the elites we find a much more uniform picture than in the case of public opinion. Both

⁷⁴ The difference is statistically significant at .001 level (two-sample t-test with unequal variances).

affective and cognitive European identity is widespread, more than 80%, and in many cases more than 90%, of the elites are attached to the EU and think of themselves as European. In spite of the fact that in the case of the CEE member states their socialization with EU institutions has been shorter than in the case of their Western counterparts, the differences between elites in both groups are not apparent. This is possibly due to the effect of cognitive mobilization among elites, as well as the more homogenous character of this group in terms of education and socio-economic position. The only countries which stand out are the famously Eurosceptic Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the elites of Austria, France, Germany, and Spain, as well as Lithuania incorporate self-perception as European at levels close to 100%.

Moreover, when comparing the affective and the cognitive aspect of European identity among the elites on a single graph (Figure 4.8) we can see that in this case, levels of both match or are rather close in most countries. The biggest gap in the aggregate level of identification as European and identification with Europe can be observed in Greece.

Figure 4.8 Cognitive and affective European identity compared, Elites



To summarize, when we analyze European identity as part of multiple political identities in Europe there are no signs of the end of supranational identification. To the contrary, it becomes clear that supranational feeling of belonging is quite widespread in post-enlargement European Union. European identity is especially prevalent among the elites.

Their share of affective and cognitive European identification is 80% or more in all countries (with the exception of the British elite). Among average citizens, in most countries more than 50% are attached to Europe (with the exception of Greece and the UK), and between 30% (in the UK) and more than 80% (Italy) view themselves as Europeans.

There is, however, an important difference in the cognitive and affective aspects of identification between the old member states and the CEE new members. Namely, while citizens of Central and Eastern European countries feel quite attached to the European Union (affective dimension), it does not necessarily translate into “feeling” or considering themselves European (cognitive aspect) to the same extent as citizens in the old member states. A possible explanation to that is that while they might feel attached to the European Union as an alternative to their sometimes less efficient national institutions—as the performance hypothesis posits (see, Ilonszki 2009)—, they have not yet interiorized the feeling of being European due to their short experience as citizens of the Union, in line with the socialization theory (Checkel 2005). This observation offers an initial confirmation for my second hypothesis. At this point, in a simple descriptive analysis I am unable to uncover the reasons for these differences, which could disappear if we control for individual-level characteristics and attitudes. The second part of empirical analysis in this chapter explores the sources of this gap.

4.2 Regression analysis: individual-level determinants of European identity

As discussed previously, there are many factors which could potentially influence individual European identification which can be attributed both to individual characteristics (resources, experience, and attitudes), as well as the impact of the context in which one lives. However, before verifying the explanatory potential of the independent variables proposed in a multivariate setup, I explore how European identification varies with some basic individual characteristics among average citizens and the elites. In Table 4.1 (below) we can observe how the levels of affective and cognitive European identification diverge across different social groups in new and old member states, elites and public opinion. The identity variables are recoded as dummy variables, therefore their group means also indicate the percentage of European identifiers in each group. The overall means indicate the differences in levels of affective and cognitive European identity observed already in the descriptive graphs in the previous section.

Sex and ideology do not seem to have a big influence on European identification and the biggest differences between groups can be found according to age, religion and type of employment. As far as the effect of religion is concerned, Orthodox believers have the lowest share of European identifiers in both cognitive and affective terms, and this effect is present among the average citizens, as well as the elites. Catholics, on the other hand tend to identify as Europeans on average more frequently, with the exception of cognitive identification among new member states where we find the highest share of European identifiers among the atheists (see Table 4.1 on the next page).

Table 4.1 Socio-demographic correlates of European identity

	Cognitive European identity				Affective European identity			
	Public Opinion		Elites		Public Opinion		Elites	
	Old Member States	New Member States	Old Member States	New Member States	Old Member States	New Member States	Old Member States	New Member States
Overall mean	0,66	0,51	0,92	0,87	0,65	0,68	0,87	0,86
<i>Sex</i>								
Man	0,70	0,55	0,91	0,86	0,65	0,69	0,86	0,86
Woman	0,62	0,49	0,95	0,88	0,65	0,68	0,91	0,86
<i>Age</i>								
16-24	0,70	0,67	-	-	0,65	0,70	-	-
25-34	0,69	0,61	0,93	0,88	0,63	0,70	0,80	0,80
35-44	0,66	0,56	0,93	0,90	0,61	0,69	0,85	0,81
45-54	0,66	0,52	0,93	0,89	0,65	0,67	0,88	0,88
55-64	0,65	0,45	0,92	0,83	0,67	0,69	0,88	0,90
65+	0,63	0,38	0,88	0,88	0,68	0,67	0,87	0,81
<i>Religion</i>								
Catholic	0,70	0,53	0,94	0,88	0,68	0,72	0,90	0,90
Orthodox	0,58	0,40	0,84	0,78	0,47	0,69	0,78	0,78
Protestant	0,64	0,55	0,84	1	0,72	0,70	0,85	0,93
Atheist	0,70	0,58	0,94	0,83	0,63	0,64	0,89	0,81
<i>Ideology</i>								
1 (Left)	0,71	0,51	0,94	0,79	0,66	0,67	0,86	0,87
2	0,78	0,58	0,96	0,94	0,72	0,70	0,91	0,86
3	0,60	0,51	0,92	0,81	0,61	0,65	0,90	0,84
4	0,72	0,59	0,88	0,87	0,68	0,73	0,84	0,88
5 (Right)	0,62	0,55	0,89	0,88	0,64	0,78	0,78	0,82
<i>Elite type</i>								
Political			0,90	0,84			0,88	0,88
Economic			-	-			0,86	0,81
Trade Union			0,96	0,87			0,83	0,83
Media			0,95	0,92			0,85	0,84
<i>Employment</i>								
Self-employed	0,70	0,61			0,66	0,70		
Employed	0,69	0,60			0,66	0,70		
Manual worker	0,54	0,47			0,55	0,67		
Without paid job	0,64	0,45			0,64	0,67		

Note: Entries in the table are means within each group. Data: IntUne combined 2007 and 2009 dataset.

In terms of age, we can clearly see that among citizens of the new EU member states cognitive European identification tends to become lower with age and it is especially low in the oldest group (only 38% of people over 65 years old in the new member states sees themselves as Europeans), while there is almost no difference between the youngest age groups of new and old member states. We do not find a similar effect on affective European identity among public opinion or on either dimension of identity among the elites. This observation leads me to believe that the assumption of a socialization effect and a consequent generational change among the new member states' citizens could be right. However, this must be further verified in a multivariate analysis, where I am able to control for other intervening factors.

Finally there seems to be a limited influence of employment type. Among the public opinion, manual workers are those with the lowest share of European identifiers, especially on the cognitive dimension, confirming the findings of earlier studies and authors who argue that European integration is a class project (Fligstein 2008). Amid the elites, political representatives exhibit the lowest levels of inclusive European identification in its cognitive dimension, while, at the same time, their attachment to Europe tends to be stronger than among other types of elites.

Overall, socio-demographic variables seem to have little effect on European identification among the elites, while among the average citizens the most relevant finding is a strong negative effect of age on cognitive European identity in the new member states. What about the other variables proposed as possible determinants of European identification? In the Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, I present bivariate correlations of the items included in the resources, experience, and attitudes explanatory dimensions for elites and public opinion.

In terms of *resources*, as expected, European identification seems to vary with education levels of average citizens, equally in new and old member states (see Table 4.2, on the following page). While there is a positive effect of higher levels of education for both cognitive and affective European identification, this positive influence is especially pronounced on self-perception as European (cognitive identity), an observation which is in line with the cognitive mobilization theory that assumes that those more educated are able to connect more easily to a remote political community. In this sense, also political interest has a positive effect, as expected, and its impact is lower in the new member states.

Table 4.2 Bivariate correlations between European identity and independent variables, Public opinion

Cognitive European identity	Old Member States	New Member States	Affective European identity	Old Member States	New Member States
<i>Resources</i>			<i>Resources</i>		
Education	0,21***	0,23***	Education	0,12***	0,12***
Political interest	0,19***	0,13***	Political interest	0,16***	0,12***
<i>Experience</i>			<i>Experience</i>		
EU knowledge	0,17***	0,22***	EU knowledge	0,15***	0,11***
Visit EU	0,16***	0,20***	Visit EU	0,16***	0,07***
<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>			<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>		
Personal benefits	0,32***	0,28***	Personal benefits	0,33***	0,19***
Country benefits	0,32***	0,28***	Country benefits	0,32***	0,19***
Trust EU	0,28***	0,24***	Trust EU	0,34***	0,21***
Trust national	0,19***	0,16***	Trust national	0,24***	0,13***
<i>Affective attitudes</i>			<i>Affective attitudes</i>		
National identity	0,02	-0,05***	National identity	0,32***	0,32***
National identity (Ethnic)	-0,19***	-0,18***	National identity (Ethnic)	-0,03***	0,02
European identity (affective)	0,40***	0,27***	European identity (cognitive)	0,40***	0,27***

Note: Entries in the table are Pearson correlations. *** Significant at .001 level. Data: IntUne combined 2007 and 2009 dataset.

Variables which make reference to the dimension of *experience* (EU knowledge and visiting EU countries) increase the strength of European identification as well, and in the new member states their effect is stronger for cognitive European identification than the affective attachment to Europe.

As far as the effect of *attitudes* is concerned, positive evaluations (in terms of membership benefits and EU trust) are clearly correlated with European identification. The interesting fact here is that, contrary to the assumption underlying much of the analysis of the enlargement, the effect of perceived benefits seems to be stronger in the old member states than in the CEE new members. Therefore, it would seem that European identification of the new European citizens from Central and Eastern Europe relies to a lesser extent on perceived benefits. This, however, must be further verified in a multivariate setting to make sure that this difference is not due to other influences.

Affective factors are also quite relevant, as national identification correlates positively with affective European identity in both groups of countries, while it has a very limited and negative effect on cognitive identification in the new member states. Moreover, in line with my previous theoretical discussion, empirical evidence seems to confirm that an ethnic formulation of national identity can constitute an obstacle to European identification in its cognitive aspect and the magnitude of this negative correlation is comparable between

the two groups. Finally, it must be highlighted how the correlation between the two dimensions of identification (cognitive and affective, last row of the table) is significantly smaller in the new member states. Therefore, indeed there is empirical evidence to the fact that distinguishing both dimensions of identification is especially relevant in the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe.

To summarize, all the independent variables seem to work as expected. The most important difference between citizens of new and old EU members is found in terms of the effects of evaluative and affective attitudes. On the one hand, while national identity correlates positively with affective European identification in both groups, it has a very small but negative effect in the new member states on cognitive identification, and no relation to it in the old members. The utilitarian membership variable, on the other hand, has a relatively strong and positive relationship to European identity in both dimensions, however, its strength is lower in the new members.

As far as the correlates of elites' European identities are concerned (Table 4.3 on the following page), we obtain less significant relationships overall. Firstly, the effect of education is not significant. Moreover, the actual frequencies of education below university levels are almost inexistent in most countries which leads me to discard this variable in further analysis for the elites, as the reference category (none or primary education) is empty in several countries.

On the dimension of experience among the elites, the correlations are, rather surprisingly, not significant for cognitive aspect of European identity. In the case of affective European identification, contact with EU institutions correlates positively in old member states, and having lived in another EU country has a relatively small but positive effect in the CEE member states' elites. Therefore, we do not find much evidence for the impact of socialization, probably because in the elite group levels of direct and diffuse European socialization are already very high. Overall we find the highest correlations of European identification of elites with their evaluative attitudes, and as in the case of average citizens perception of benefits seems to be less correlated with European identification among the new member states' elites. Finally, in terms of affective elements, national identification seems to be positively related to affective European identity, while its impact is negative but not statistically significant on cognitive dimension. The elements which are used to operationalize an ethnic concept of national identity do not constitute a satisfactory reliable index in the case of the elites, so this variable is also dropped from the elite data analysis.

Table 4.3 Bivariate correlations between European identity and independent variables, Elites

Cognitive European identity	Old Member States	New Member States	Affective European identity	Old Member States	New Member States
<i>Resources</i>			<i>Resources</i>		
Education	0,03	0,01	Education	0,06	0,03
<i>Experience</i>			<i>Experience</i>		
Lived in the EU	0,02	0,12	Lived in the EU	0,04	0,09***
Contact with EU institutions	0,09	0,10	Contact with EU institutions	0,20***	0,07
<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>			<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>		
Trust EU	0,25***	0,23***	Trust EU	0,33***	0,26***
Country benefit	0,32***	0,07	Country benefit	0,28***	0,16***
<i>Affective attitudes</i>			<i>Affective attitudes</i>		
National identity	-0,05	-0,08	National identity	0,26***	0,25***
European identity (affective)	0,38***	0,22***	European identity (cognitive)	0,38***	0,22***

Note: Entries in the table are Pearson correlations. *** Significant at .001 level. Data: IntUne combined 2007 and 2009 dataset.

It can be concluded that for the average citizens all individual-level explanatory variables have an impact in the direction expected, indicated by previous theoretical discussion. Among the elites, also as expected, the number of relevant factors is much smaller, undoubtedly due to greater homogeneity of this group, and the attitudinal factors seem to be playing the most important role. However, correlations might conceal spurious relationships and the real impact of the selected variables on European identification can be only assessed once the control and other independent variables are taken into account. This is the objective of the next and last section of this chapter.

4.2.1 *Public opinion*

Table 4.4 reports the coefficients from multilevel⁷⁵ logistic regressions on cognitive and affective dimensions of European identification with the public opinion survey data. For easier interpretation of the regression results, I have standardized all the non-dichotomous independent variables by subtracting their mean and dividing them by two standard deviations, thus rendering all coefficients roughly comparable with each other, including those of the binary predictors (Gelman 2008)⁷⁶.

I start the analysis with models which include only control variables, to isolate their effects, before exploring the effect of individual-level factors which might explain European identification. In all models I include a control for wave, to make sure that there is no change over time and the pooling of the two surveys is warranted, as well as a dummy which indicates the effect of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.

First of all, the CEE new member states dummy indicates that indeed there is a difference in cognitive European identification between new and old member states, observed already in the descriptive analysis. However, the coefficient decreases and is only significant at .10 level once we include all relevant individual-level factors⁷⁷. In terms of affective European identification, the effect of the dummy is positive, as observed in the descriptive analysis, but it fails to obtain statistical significance when we control for all relevant individual-level factors.

⁷⁵ As a starting point for the analysis in this section I run empty models (without any independent variables), in order to ascertain the level of intra-class correlation (ICC) which indicates the amount of variance due to the differences between level-2 units (country-time index, in this case). In the case of the explanatory models of European identity I find that for the public opinion models 6,4% (affective identity) and 10% (cognitive identity) variance is due to differences across countries, while for the elites these numbers are 9% (affective identity) and 20% (cognitive identity). Clearly, we are presented with a case where a multilevel approach is necessary to adequately model the data at hand. Moreover, it seems that the portion of variance between states (that is, those due to contextual factors) is significantly higher in the case of explanatory models of cognitive identification.

⁷⁶ The advantage of standardizing the independent variables is that the magnitudes of the coefficients are directly comparable because they present the change in the dependent variable for a change from a low to a high value in the independent variables. For more details on the advantages of this approach see Gelman (2008).

⁷⁷ Moreover, this difference is statistically significant in models with all individual-level predictors when I include in the analysis all 32 country/survey wave pairs (level-2). However, in the analyses presented here there are only 29 level-2 units, due to the fact that for three country/year pairs there is no data on elite positions which are included in the subsequent, contextual models.

Table 4.4 Regression on European identity, Public opinion

	Variables	Cognitive Model 1	Cognitive Model 2	Affective Model 1	Affective Model 2
	CEE New Member states	-0,626** (0,218)	-0,478* (0,248)	0,302 (0,189)	0,359 (0,205)
Controls					
	Age	-0,282*** (0,031)	0,115** (0,040)	0,119*** (0,031)	0,263*** (0,040)
	Sex (Ref: Woman)	-0,270*** (0,030)	-0,064 (0,034)	0,014 (0,030)	0,202*** (0,034)
	<i>No religion</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
	Catholic	-0,200*** (0,048)	0,121* (0,053)	0,081 (0,045)	0,127* (0,052)
	Orthodox	-0,330** (0,106)	0,010 (0,116)	-0,215* (0,104)	-0,286* (0,117)
	Protestant	-0,164* (0,064)	0,068 (0,071)	0,100 (0,064)	0,068 (0,071)
	Other	-0,240*** (0,067)	0,014 (0,073)	-0,018 (0,064)	0,034 (0,072)
	Ideology	-0,108*** (0,030)	-0,065* (0,033)	-0,011 (0,030)	-0,069* (0,034)
Individual-level variables					
<i>Resources</i>					
	<i>Manual worker</i>		<i>Ref.</i>		<i>Ref.</i>
	Self-employed		0,247** (0,075)		0,131 (0,077)
	Employee		0,195** (0,061)		0,067 (0,063)
	Without paid job		0,148* (0,061)		0,070 (0,063)
	<i>None/basic primary</i>		<i>Ref.</i>		<i>Ref.</i>
	Basic secondary		0,261*** (0,062)		0,187** (0,063)
	Vocational		0,395*** (0,059)		0,222*** (0,061)
	A-levels		0,572*** (0,061)		0,303*** (0,063)
	University		0,832*** (0,063)		0,484*** (0,064)
	Interest in politics		0,356*** (0,035)		0,301*** (0,035)
<i>Experience</i>					
	EU Knowledge		0,382*** (0,036)		0,237*** (0,037)
	EU visit		0,357*** (0,039)		0,363*** (0,039)
<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>					
	More trust in EU than national		0,302*** (0,035)		0,566*** (0,036)
	EU benefits - personal		1,080*** (0,034)		1,254*** (0,036)
<i>Affective factors</i>					
	National identity		0,108** (0,035)		1,198*** (0,035)
	National identity (Ethnic)		-0,677*** (0,039)		-0,141*** (0,040)
	Wave (2009)	-0,017 (0,201)	-0,027 (0,229)	0,047 (0,174)	0,063 (0,189)
	Constant	0,497*** (0,102)	0,580*** (0,116)	0,775*** (0,088)	0,901*** (0,096)
Model information					
	Observations	21943	21943	21943	21943
	Number of groups	29	29	29	29
Model fit					
	Log likelihood	-13521,65	-11870,54	27131,33	23217,66
	AIC	27065,3	23791,07	-13554,67	-11583,83

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression computed with the `xtmelogit` command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$ (only for contextual variables). Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 public opinion survey.

In the models which include only control variables (model 1), their impact is mostly in line with the findings of bivariate analysis presented in the previous section. On the cognitive aspect, women tend to identify less as Europeans, as well as older people and Orthodox believers. The only evidence which is slightly contradictory to my earlier descriptive analysis is that Catholics also seem to see themselves as Europeans to a lesser extent than those without religion; however, this negative effect disappears when we control for other individual-level variables. In terms of the impact of control variables on affective European identification, the effect of age is positive and there does not seem to be any difference between men and women. Here, again, Orthodox believers tend to be less attached to Europe.

The second set of models includes all relevant individual-level explanatory variables (model 2). As described in the previous sections of this chapter, in my analytical approach I follow the theoretical model of identity adopted in this study and include individual level variables which operationalize the explanatory dimensions of resources, experience, and attitudes. The results largely confirm earlier bivariate analyses and my theoretical expectations. Moreover, model fit (log likelihood and the AIC criterion) improves substantially upon adding these predictors, which indicates that the individual-level differences in European identification are indeed due to a great extent to the three explanatory dimension proposed in the theoretical model.

In terms of *resources*, even when we control for all relevant explanatory variables, self-employed, employees and even those without a paid job tend to identify more *as* Europeans than manual workers. However, we do not find a similar effect in the affective dimension, as socio-economic differences do not seem to have any impact on identifying *with* Europe (affective aspect of identity). On the second element of the resources dimension, education and interest in politics, their positive effect is clearly confirmed. The strongest impact of holding a university degree (as compared to none or only primary education) stands out and it is especially salient in terms of identifying as European, in line with cognitive mobilization theory.


The variables which operationalize the explanatory dimension of *experience*, both in its diffuse aspect (EU knowledge) and direct contact (EU visit) impact positively European identification, affective and cognitive. However, the coefficients are rather small.

The impact of positive *evaluative attitudes* is overall positive and significant; however, clearly the perception of membership benefits has the highest impact, especially on greater affective identification.

In terms of *affective attitudes*, the impact of national identity is positive, however, the coefficient for cognitive identification is rather small. Therefore, we can confirm that the multiple identity model is prevalent in the enlarged EU, especially in terms of affective identification. National identification impacts European identity negatively only when it is constructed as exclusive, ethnic-based belonging, as the last factor in the model illustrates. The negative impact of ethnic concept of national identity is especially strong on cognitive European identification.

Finally, the question which must be answered is whether the determinants of different dimensions of European political identity reflect the social identity theory model, as hypothesized at the beginning of this chapter. In order to do that I compare the impact of the different explanatory factors on the two dimensions of identity. However, since the dependent variable is binary and, thus, I am applying logistic models, coefficients from logistic regressions cannot be directly compared across different models (Allison 1999). In order to overcome this problem, I calculate and compare average marginal effects⁷⁸ of independent variables from the two models (Figure 4.9), which can be compared across models.

⁷⁸ Computing marginal effects can help us measure the effect of independent variables in a logistic regression as it indicates the change in probabilities induced by a one unit change in the independent variable, fixing all covariates at given values. Average marginal effect (AME) is the average of marginal effects at different values. Therefore, average marginal effects help us assess more adequately the effect of an independent variable and compare across models.

Figure 4.9 Average marginal effects, logistic regression on European identity, Public opinion

Note: Average marginal effects calculated from model 2 in Table 4.4 with margins command in Stata.

We can see that the probability of holding a cognitive European identity—which, according to the theoretical model, is based on perceived similarity—is affected more strongly by factors related to cognitive mobilization (university education and interest in politics) and diffuse experience of the EU (EU knowledge). It is also negatively related to ethnic concept of national identity. On the other hand, the probability of holding an affective European identity—based on positive evaluative attitudes as its underlying process is acquiring positive self-image—increases to a greater extent with such positive evaluative perceptions (EU trust and benefits), as well as affective identification with the nation. Therefore, the differences in the effects of the independent variables included in the models are consistent with the theoretical model of European identity, and, thus, these results confirm that the proposed theoretical model is largely validated in empirical analysis for public opinion.

4.2.3 Elites

My previous empirical results and its discussion offer a detailed picture of how European identification works at the individual-level among average citizens in the enlarged EU. But what about the elites? Can we apply the same model? Table 4.5 reports the coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions on cognitive and affective dimensions of European identification for the elite data.

To start with, the model with control variables only (model 1) confirms the results of my earlier descriptive analysis. In terms of the effect of sex, contrary to the findings among public opinion, among the elites women tend to identify more as Europeans and with Europe. Age has a positive impact on affective identification and this effect holds even when the rest of individual-level variables is introduced. Religion has a widespread negative effect on elites' European identification, and its impact is especially negative on cognitive European identification in the case of Orthodox and Protestant Christians. There seems to be no influence of ideology on European identity.

The second set of models includes the relevant individual-level explanatory variables (model 2), following the theoretical model of identity adopted in this study, and in both cases the model fit information (log likelihood and AIC criterion) indicates a significant improvement upon adding these individual-level variables.

Table 4.5 Regression on European identity, Elites

	Variables	Cognitive Model 1	Cognitive Model 2	Affective Model 1	Affective Model 2
	CEE New Member states	-0,738 (0,512)	-0,644 (0,436)	-0,202 (0,191)	-0,223 (0,218)
<i>Controls</i>					
	Age	-0,282 (0,176)	0,059 (0,203)	0,346*** (0,079)	0,316*** (0,085)
	Sex (Ref: Woman)	0,479* (0,231)	0,415 (0,260)	0,296** (0,093)	0,256* (0,099)
	<i>No religion</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
	Catholic	-0,371 (0,256)	-0,233 (0,291)	-0,039 (0,097)	-0,174 (0,105)
	Orthodox	-0,913 (0,486)	-1,358** (0,504)	-0,531* (0,244)	-0,827** (0,268)
	Protesant	-0,813* (0,357)	-0,755 (0,403)	-0,161 (0,155)	-0,323 (0,167)
	Other religion	0,072 (0,445)	0,141 (0,492)	-0,269 (0,192)	-0,338 (0,206)
	Ideology	-0,062 (0,178)	0,188 (0,200)	-0,052 (0,085)	-0,065 (0,093)
<i>Individual-level variables</i>					
<i>Resources</i>	Elites (Ref: Political)		-0,804*** (0,233)		-0,024 (0,089)
<i>Experience</i>	Lived in the EU		0,781** (0,286)		0,533*** (0,094)
	Contact with EU		0,435* (0,206)		0,593*** (0,084)
<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>	Trust EU		1,431*** (0,208)		0,968*** (0,094)
	EU benefits - country		1,118*** (0,327)		0,883*** (0,249)
<i>Affective factors</i>	National identity		-0,804** (0,296)		1,077*** (0,107)
	Wave (2009) ⁷⁹			0,110 (0,186)	0,142 (0,212)
	Constant	2.554*** (0,245)	3,008*** (0,231)	-0.559*** (0,094)	-0,679*** (0,106)
<i>Model information</i>	Observations	1635	1635	3301	3301
	Number of groups	16	16	33	33
<i>Model fit</i>	Log likelihood	-482,87	-390,28	-2108,12	-1908,71
	AIC	985,73	812,57	4238,24	3851,42

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression computed with the xtmelogit command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, *p<0.10 (only for contextual variables). Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 elite survey.


⁷⁹ There is no dummy for wave in the model of cognitive European identity for the elites because this question has been only included in the 2009 wave of the survey.

In terms of *resources*, we observe that the political elites indeed tend to identify more as exclusively national, as the negative coefficient for cognitive identification indicates. There is, however, no effect on affective identification with Europe between the different types of elites.

As far as *experience* is concerned, the lower impact of cognitive identification among elites is confirmed. Direct experience with the EU has a significantly positive effect in both dimensions, affective and cognitive, but, undoubtedly the biggest impact is of *utilitarian* considerations and *affective* factors. Trust in EU institutions and perceptions of EU membership benefits clearly strengthen both cognitive and affective identification. The effect of national identification is different on each of the dimensions. As far as cognitive identification is concerned, elites attached to their country tend to identify less as Europeans. On the other hand, the affective dimension is compatible with affective attachment to the nation, and national identity and identifying with Europe are mutually reinforcing.

So can we say that the two-dimensional model of European identification also works for the elites? To answer that question we can look at Figure 4.10 which represents the average marginal effects of independent variables in the two models, and compare them.

Figure 4.10 Average marginal effects, logistic regressions on European identity, Elites



Note: Average marginal effects calculated from model 2 in Table 4.5 with the margins command in Stata.

The effects of political elite and national identity are significantly different from the rest of the factors, as they influence negatively the probability of identification as European (cognitive identity), while there is almost no effect of political elite on affective identification, and the influence of national identity is positive. On the other hand, factors related to experience as well as evaluative attitudes have a more pronounced effect on the probability of affective European identification. Therefore, there seems to be some evidence in favor of distinguishing between the two dimensions (the effect of independent variables differs between the two dimensions of identity) but these differences do not fit with the theoretical distinctions made at the beginning of the thesis. Therefore, the theoretical model of European identity which assumes a difference between its cognitive and its affective aspect based on the underlying processes of perceived similarity and positive distinction seems to work better for average citizens. This is not surprising since elites in general exhibit very high levels of Europeanized identity due to their prevalent European socialization and the effects of cognitive mobilization.

4.3 Regression analysis: The influence of contextual variables on European identity

So far I have discussed the individual-level explanatory factors of European identity and their relationship to the bi-dimensional concept of European identification for public opinion and elites. In this last section, I test the hypothesis related to the differential impact of some variables in the context of the new member states. In order to do that, I include interaction terms between the CEE new member states dummy and selected individual-level variables which, based on the theoretical discussion and descriptive analysis, I would expect to have a differential impact in the new member states. These factors are: age, membership benefits, and national identity.

First of all, the assumption about a differential impact of *age* builds on theoretical arguments related to socialization in international institutions (Checkel 2005) and value generational change (Inglehart 1967; Inglehart 2008). The existing literature on collective identification with the EU points to the importance of “primary socialization” that occurs in the early years of one’s life when Europeanizing discourses and symbols are internalized (Recchi 2014). This socialization argument implies a generational divide in cognitive identification with Europe in the East because many East Europeans experienced their primary socialization under the communist system with no symbolic or discursive reference to a shared common European identity with Western Europe. In contrast, younger people in the East who grew up during the transition away from communism were exposed to the Europeanizing discourse that accompanied the process of reuniting with Europe through EU enlargement. This suggests that while older people might find it more difficult to embrace a newly found supranational belonging, younger people might find identification with Europe as more natural.

In contrast, attachment to Europe in the East is as deeply seated as it is in the West because membership in the EU was a widely popular political goal throughout the 1990s, and there was a general elite consensus in Central Eastern Europe on this issue. Although the EU did not represent the primary political community of reference in CEE countries, the EU was often seen as an alternative to the ill-performing national institutions of the young democracies in the East (Ilonszki 2009). Given that attachment to Europe is not as demanding as cognitively identifying with it, there is no reason to expect that citizens in the East would be less attached to Europe than their Western counterparts. However, I expect to see the same generational divide on this dimension of European identity as well, with young

people being more attached to Europe than older people who lived their formative years in a system rooted in the ideological divide running through the heart of Europe.

The second interaction, with the *utilitarian variable*, tests the expectation that European identification in the new member states of Central Eastern Europe might be based to a greater extent on perceived benefits from integration. This assumption is derived from the debates which have emerged with the Eastern enlargement and its meaning for the new member states. Since enlargement was represented often in terms of future gains, it is possible that European identification in the new member states could be influenced to a greater extent on utilitarian attitudes and perceived benefits, especially in terms of affective identification, which is based on acquiring a positive self-image. However, the descriptive analysis in the previous section seems to indicate the contrary, and the utilitarian variable seems to have less of an influence on European identification in the new member states.

Finally, I check for a differential impact of *national identity* in Central Eastern Europe. Specifically, I am able to empirically verify the assumption that national identification could constitute a greater obstacle to supranational identification in the post-communist new member states due to their recently regained independence. As argued in the previous chapter, a substantial worry regarding the Eastern enlargement was that a restored strong national allegiance in the region could indeed constitute an obstacle to the formation of European political identification in the new member states.

Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 on the following pages summarize the results for the explanatory models of European identity (affective and cognitive) with contextual variables included for public opinion and elites.

Table 4.6 Regressions on European identity: Interaction effects, Public opinion

Variables	Cognitive Model 3	Cognitive Model 4	Affective Model 3	Affective Model 4
CEE New Member states	-0,357 (0,238)	-0,340 (0,240)	0,279 (0,235)	0,247 (0,229)
Interactions				
CEE * Age		-0,835*** (0,074)		-0,397*** (0,079)
CEE * Benefits		-0,294*** (0,073)		-0,418*** (0,082)
CEE * National identity		-0,087 (0,079)		0,150 (0,083)
Controls				
Age	0,115** (0,040)	0,077 (0,040)	0,263*** (0,040)	0,216*** (0,041)
(controls for religion and ideology omitted)				
Individual-level				
<i>Resources</i>				
Self-employed (Ref. Manual worker)	0,248** (0,075)	0,255*** (0,075)	0,131 (0,077)	0,139 (0,077)
Employee	0,195** (0,061)	0,213*** (0,061)	0,066 (0,063)	0,074 (0,063)
Without paid job	0,149* (0,061)	0,157** (0,061)	0,070 (0,063)	0,072 (0,063)
Basic secondary education (Ref. None or primary education)	0,266*** (0,062)	0,298*** (0,062)	0,193** (0,063)	0,198** (0,063)
Vocational	0,399*** (0,059)	0,431*** (0,060)	0,224*** (0,061)	0,230*** (0,061)
A-levels	0,577*** (0,061)	0,610*** (0,061)	0,307*** (0,063)	0,314*** (0,063)
University	0,840*** (0,063)	0,885*** (0,064)	0,490*** (0,064)	0,494*** (0,064)
Interest in politics	0,355*** (0,035)	0,368*** (0,035)	0,300*** (0,035)	0,301*** (0,035)
<i>Experience</i>				
EU Knowledge	0,377*** (0,036)	0,368*** (0,036)	0,235*** (0,037)	0,234*** (0,037)
EU visit	0,353*** (0,039)	0,332*** (0,039)	0,360*** (0,039)	0,356*** (0,039)
<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>				
More trust in EU than national	0,303*** (0,035)	0,309*** (0,035)	0,567*** (0,036)	0,571*** (0,036)
EU benefits - personal	1,079*** (0,034)	1,051*** (0,034)	1,253*** (0,036)	1,190*** (0,037)
<i>Affective factors</i>				
National identity	0,107** (0,035)	0,095** (0,036)	1,196*** (0,035)	1,225*** (0,038)
National identity (Ethnic)	-0,675*** (0,039)	-0,704*** (0,040)	-0,140*** (0,040)	-0,146*** (0,040)
Contextual				
EU Fiscal transfers	-0,530* (0,285)	-0,560* (0,288)	0,071 (0,283)	0,041 (0,275)
Unemployment %	0,196 (0,187)	0,206 (0,188)	-0,390* (0,185)	-0,387* (0,179)
Christian %	0,638*** (0,192)	0,645*** (0,193)	0,168 (0,190)	0,173 (0,185)
Elites – Affective EU identity	0,541** (0,175)	0,551** (0,177)	0,536** (0,174)	0,536** (0,169)
Wave (2009)	-0,128 (0,166)	-0,129 (0,167)	0,131 (0,164)	0,130 (0,160)
Constant	0,532*** (0,080)	0,530*** (0,081)	0,888*** (0,079)	0,869*** (0,077)
Model information				
Observations	21943	21943	22173	22173
Number of groups	29	29	29	29
Model fit				
	-11859,54 23777,09	-11787,36 23638,72	23213,85 -11577,92	23173,93 -11554,97

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression computed with the xtmeologit command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, *p<0.10 (only for contextual variables). Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 public opinion survey.

4.3.1 Cross-level interactions, Public opinion

Before testing the hypothesis regarding causal heterogeneity between east and west of Europe, I first include contextual variables in the models which might contribute to a better model fit. EU fiscal transfers (as share of GDP) indicates benefits from EU membership through EU funding and rate of unemployment accounts for differences between countries in terms of the shape of economy and level of economic development. The inclusion of a Christianity contextual variable accounts for the differential salience of religion in different national settings of the EU, a principal worry regarding the future of European identification, as discussed in the previous chapter.


The analyses with contextual variables and cross-level interactions offer several interesting results (Table 4.6). Firstly, once I introduce the contextual variables, the coefficient for the dummy for new member states is further reduced in the models of cognitive European identification. It seems that its effect is absorbed by the EU fiscal transfers factor, which is not significant in the model but its impact is considerably negative. Previous research on EU support demonstrates that relative poverty of the new member states from Central Eastern Europe might explain their stronger support for European integration (Garry and Tilley 2007; Guerra 2013b). For the issue of identity we could make an inverse argument, since the CEE dummy loses its statistical significance when we introduce the EU fiscal transfers variable. It could be that its negative sign has to do with the fact that as the new member states present lower levels of economic development (and, thus, qualify for greater amounts of EU regional development funding) it is more difficult for their citizens to perceive themselves as Europeans, in terms of similarity with western Europeans, which is the basis of cognitive identification.

Another interesting result in terms of the contextual variables is that the effect of Christianity is positive both for affective and cognitive European identification. This is to say that in countries where salience of Christian religion is higher, people tend to identify more as Europeans and tend to be more attached to Europe. These findings are in line with previous research on the impact of religion on EU attitudes (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001; Nelsen, Guth, and Highsmith 2011). Moreover, it directly rejects the claims that Eastern enlargement has made it more difficult for a European identification to emerge due to the salience of confessional identities in the new member states. My results indicate that in countries where we find more Christian identifiers, people tend to identify as Europeans more easily.

As far as the cross-level interactions are concerned, the results are quite revealing. The interaction of national identity with the new member states dummy is not significant. This indicates that national identity does not have a substantially different effect in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, according to my empirical findings, the concern that national identities could constitute obstacles to the formation of European identity in CEE-10 countries are unfounded.

Secondly, the utilitarian variable does indeed function slightly differently in the new member states: the interaction is negative and significant for both affective and cognitive identity. Taking into account the fact that the independent effect of the membership benefit variable is strongly positive in the model, the interaction term indicates that the positive impact of perceived benefits on European identification in the new member states is actually reduced. In other words, while all citizens who consider that European integration is beneficial to them tend to perceive themselves as Europeans to a greater extent and be attached to Europe more strongly, this effect is slightly smaller in CEE countries. Figure 4.11 graphically represents these effects.

Figure 4.11 Membership benefit interaction, logistic regression on cognitive European identity, Public opinion




Note: Predicted probabilities from logistic regression on cognitive European identity. Calculated from the models presented in table 4.6 with the margins command in Stata.

For cognitive European identity, and holding all other variables at their means, even among those who perceive the benefit of EU membership, citizens of new EU member states tend

to be about 10 percent less likely to identify as Europeans than their Western counterparts (Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.12 Membership benefit interaction, logistic regression on affective European identity, Public opinion




Note: Predicted probabilities from logistic regression on affective European identity. Calculated from the models presented in table 4.6 with the margins command in Stata.

On the affective identification, we find a slightly different situation: among those who do not perceive EU membership benefit, citizens from the new EU member states are still 10 percent more likely to be attached to Europe (Figure 4.12). This indicates that perception of benefits has a stronger positive effect on both aspects of identity in the West than in the new member states and it validates empirically my earlier discussion of the way in which EU accession was to a great extent motivated by an affective motivation encapsulated by the slogan of “return to Europe”. The affective dimension was very relevant to the formation of a kind of “unconditional” EU support in candidate countries, which rested to a greater extent on the idea of a necessity to forget the past and join the West, rather than on perceptions of specific benefits from membership (cf. Guerra 2013). However, the cognitive identification is still lower, even in spite of such “unconditional” affective attachment to the European project. The third interaction term gives us some clues as to what might be the cause of this.


The most relevant interaction terms is that of age. Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14 present the marginal effects of being from a new member state on perceiving oneself as European and being attached to Europe, for different age cohorts.

Figure 4.13 Age interaction, logistic regression on cognitive European identity, Public opinion



Note: Predicted probabilities from logistic regression on cognitive European identity. Calculated from the models presented in table 4.6 with the margins command in Stata.

Here the main finding is that identification as European (cognitive) is statistically indistinguishable between East and West for those under the age of 45 (figure 4.13). However, older cohorts in Central and Eastern Europe (45+) are significantly less likely to identify as Europeans than their peers in the same age cohorts in the West. For instance, Eastern European citizens that belong to the 55-65 age cohort are about 20 percent less likely to see themselves as European than citizens from Western Europe.

Figure 4.14 Age interaction, logistic regression on affective European identity, Public opinion

Note: Predicted probabilities from logistic regression on affective European identity Calculated from the models presented in table 4.6 with the margins command in Stata.

In terms of affective European identity, citizens from the Central and Eastern Europe are on average more likely to be attached to Europe than citizens in the West for all age cohorts. However, this relationship is statistically significant only for the younger cohorts (i.e. those under the age of 35) and there is no statistically significant difference in the levels of attachment to Europe in East and West for those who are 35 or older. Substantively speaking, those who belong to the youngest cohort (16-24) in the East are about 17% more likely to be attached to Europe than youngsters from the same cohort in the West. Interestingly, while age is positively related to attachment to Europe in the West, older people in the East are slightly less likely to be attached to Europe as can be seen by the downward slope of the regression line. In a nutshell, there is no evidence to suggest that citizens from the new member states of the EU are less likely to be attached to Europe than citizens of old member states. If anything, the evidence points to higher levels of attachment to Europe among the young in the East.

4.3.3 Cross-level interactions, *Elites*

The models of elite European identity are not improved with the addition of contextual variables and interaction terms (Table 4.7) in the same way as we observe for public opinion. There is no differential impact of age, as expected. The interaction term with national identity does not achieve significance either. The coefficient of the interaction term with the benefits variable is the highest and indicates a similar effect as in the case of citizens: the impact of perceived benefits on European identification is reduced in new member states. While it fails to achieve statistical significance in the model with all three interactions, in a separate regression, not shown here, with the addition of the interaction with the utilitarian variable the AIC and log likelihood criteria indicate that it improves the model.

Overall, these results confirm that elites between East and West of Europe are more homogenous than average citizens and I cannot confirm any causal heterogeneity between the two groups even if there might be some indication of a more unconditional attachment to Europe in the case of the elites of the new member states, as in the case of the average citizens. In order to account better for the differences between countries, other contextual factors should be taken into account than the economic factors considered here.

Table 4.7 Regressions on European identity: Interaction effects, Elites

	Variables	Cognitive Model 3	Cognitive Model 4	Affective Model 3	Affective Model 3
	CEE New Member states	-0,817 (0,577)	-0,814 (0,588)	0,128 (-0,268)	0,112 (-0,267)
Interactions					
	CEE*Age		-0,106 (0,394)		-0,128 (0,171)
	CEE*Personal benefits		-0,448 (0,659)		-0,647 (0,494)
	CEE*National identity		-0,387 (0,587)		0,252 (0,244)
Controls					
	Age	0,055 (0,202)	0,068 (0,206)	0,316*** (0,085)	0,314*** (0,085)
	Sex (Ref: Woman)	0,415 (0,260)	0,398 (0,261)	0,253* (0,099)	0,252* (0,100)
	Catholic (Ref. No religion)	-0,252 (0,289)	-0,254 (0,290)	-0,166 (0,105)	-0,165 (0,105)
	Orthodox	-1,354** (0,475)	-1,357** (0,478)	-0,757** (0,260)	-0,754** (0,260)
	Protestant	-0,653 (0,398)	-0,660 (0,399)	-0,314 (0,167)	-0,309 (0,167)
	Other religion	0,130 (0,491)	0,119 (0,492)	-0,333 (0,205)	-0,329 (0,206)
	Ideology	0,208 (0,199)	0,192 (0,200)	-0,069 (0,093)	-0,075 (0,093)
Individual-level variables					
<i>Resources</i>	Elites (Ref: Political)	-0,792*** (0,233)	-0,766** (0,234)	-0,025 (0,088)	-0,024 (0,089)
<i>Experience</i>	Lived in the EU	0,762** (0,286)	0,751** (0,286)	0,542*** (0,094)	0,540*** (0,094)
	Contact with EU	0,451* (0,206)	0,452* (0,207)	0,593*** (0,084)	0,591*** (0,084)
<i>Evaluative attitudes</i>	Trust EU	1,417*** (0,208)	1,380*** (0,212)	0,969*** (0,094)	0,967*** (0,095)
	EU benefits – country	1,089*** (0,326)	1,103*** (0,331)	0,877*** (0,249)	0,915*** (0,255)
<i>Affective factors</i>	National identity	-0,800** (0,294)	-0,780** (0,295)	1,084*** (0,107)	1,123*** (0,114)
Contextual variables					
	EU Fiscal transfers	0,146 (0,560)	0,167 (0,563)	-0,574* (0,279)	-0,572* (0,277)
	Unemployment	0,839 (0,473)	0,823 (0,476)	0,569* (0,227)	0,568* (0,225)
	Wave (2009)			-0,017 (0,207)	-0,012 (0,205)
	Constant	2,857*** (0,210)	2,858*** (0,211)	-0,667*** (-0,096)	-0,682*** (-0,096)
Model information	Observations	1635	1635	3301	3301
	Number of groups	16	16	33	33
Model fit	Log likelihood	-388	-387	-1905,05	-1903,41
	AIC	812	817	3848,11	3850,82

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses.
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 elite survey.

5. Conclusions

The objective of this chapter was to provide a theoretically motivated empirical account of the state of European identity after EU's Eastward enlargement. Building on existing research and the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapters, I argued that the European identity question should be approached by analyzing both its cognitive (i.e. self-perception as European) and affective (i.e. attachment to Europe) dimensions as the two have different underlying causes.

My main argument was that the necessity to apply such two-dimensional approach becomes clear when studying European identity in the Central and Eastern European new member states of the EU. We know relatively little about what triggers European identification in CEE new member states but previous studies detect a generally lower level of cognitive identification in Central and Eastern Europe. The data at hand indicate that attachment to Europe in the East is as deeply seated as it is in the West (H1a confirmed). This can be due to the fact that after the fall of communism, there was widespread support for the idea of the "return to Europe" through EU accession, as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that citizens in the East would be less attached to Europe than their Western counterparts. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the new European citizens from CEE-10 countries are indeed less likely to hold cognitive European identification than West Europeans are (H2a confirmed) but it also gives us important clues as to what causes such difference. I find a significant interaction effect between age and identification as Europeans in Central Eastern Europe, as younger people in the new member states are more likely to identify as European than older people in these countries (H3a confirmed). Socio-political identities are formed as part of primary socialization processes and tend to remain stable the course of life. Therefore, the socialization argument I advance suggests that as new generations of EU citizens from the East socialize into the European political community, this gap in cognitive identification should disappear over time. This, combined with the fact that East Europeans are unquestionably attached to the "European project" suggests that, in due course, this reservoir of positive feelings could form the foundations for a more widespread cognitive European identification in the Eastern part of the EU as well.

In the analysis I also explored other possible causal heterogeneities between East and West of Europe. In this sense, I check to what extent perceived benefits and national identity

have a differential effect on European identification in the new member states. The multiple identities and “marble cake” theoretical models indicate that European and national identification should not be opposed to each other. In this sense, my findings confirm that, contrary to initial concerns, national identity in CEE-10 does not seem to constitute a greater obstacle to the development of European identification because EU membership has been justified in terms of Europeanized national identities.

As far as the European identity of the elites is concerned, the main conclusion is that, indeed, due to the effects of cognitive mobilization and greater exposure to European socialization, political, economic, trade union, and media elites are very similar in old and new member states. Therefore, there is no difference in levels of affective European identification in the new and the old EU member states (H1b confirmed), and contrary to the case of average citizens, also levels of cognitive European identity are similar (H2b rejected). Moreover, the homogeneity of the elites is confirmed as far as we do not observe any effect of age on their identification in the European community (H3b rejected).

Finally, I also provide empirical evidence which puts to test the theoretical distinction between affective and cognitive aspects of European identity, as proposed in the beginning of this thesis. The analysis in this chapter confirms that indeed for the case of average citizens the estimated effects of the proposed determinants of European identity seem to fit with the proposed theoretical model (H4a confirmed). This assumption is, however, disproved for the elite (H4b rejected), a finding which is likely to be linked to the effects of the overall high levels of European socialization and cognitive mobilization in this part of the society.

6. Annex to chapter 4

Table 4.8 Cognitive European identity, Public opinion

Do you see yourself as...	Nationality only		National and European		European and national		European only	
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009
Austria	40,9	31,0	43,8	53,3	9,4	9,2	5,1	4,8
Belgium	25,1	30,1	51,3	45,4	12,8	13,3	9,3	9,1
Denmark	35,7	32,2	53,6	56,1	7,5	7,4	2,0	3,0
France	29,5	26,4	56,1	57,9	9,3	10,4	3,3	3,8
Germany	25,6	25,5	50,5	50,3	13,8	12,8	7,1	9,0
Greece	41,8	42,2	49,7	50,6	5,8	5,1	2,0	1,0
Italy	15,9	17,7	72,2	69,7	6,1	7,4	4,0	3,2
Portugal	36,2	34,2	46,7	45,9	5,8	8,3	7,2	9,5
Spain	22,7	22,9	58,6	56,2	9,0	9,6	6,3	6,7
United Kingdom	65,5	66,5	20,0	22,1	5,0	4,2	4,6	1,6
<i>Old member states average</i>	<i>33,9</i>	<i>32,9</i>	<i>50,3</i>	<i>50,7</i>	<i>8,4</i>	<i>8,8</i>	<i>5,1</i>	<i>5,2</i>
Bulgaria	49,7	58,6	37,3	33,6	5,2	3,5	1,9	0,7
Estonia	47,7	44,9	39,6	43,5	5,6	5,0	2,8	3,6
Hungary	51,5	56,9	45,1	38,6	2,5	3,4	0,6	0,5
Poland	52,0	44,8	41,4	47,5	5,4	4,2	0,5	0,7
Slovakia	45,1	41,9	41,5	44,3	7,4	7,3	2,8	3,6
Slovenia	37,6	37,0	52,7	52,0	5,6	5,1	1,8	3,3
<i>New member states average</i>	<i>47,3</i>	<i>47,3</i>	<i>42,9</i>	<i>43,2</i>	<i>5,3</i>	<i>4,7</i>	<i>1,7</i>	<i>2,1</i>
<i>Difference NMS/OM</i>	<i>13,4</i>	<i>14,5</i>	<i>-7,3</i>	<i>-7,5</i>	<i>-3,2</i>	<i>-4,0</i>	<i>-3,4</i>	<i>-3,1</i>

Note: Q. Do you see yourself as...? (NATIONALITY) only (0), (NATIONALITY) and European (1), European and (NATIONALITY) (1), European only (1) Data: IntUne Public Opinion 2007 and 2009 survey. Entries in the table are percentages.

Table 4.9 Cognitive European identity, Elites

Do you see yourself as...	Nationality only	National and European	European and national	European only
Austria	2,5	77,3	16,8	0,8
Belgium	5,6	67,3	22,4	3,7
Denmark	9,8	82,4	5,9	0,0
France	2,4	82,3	13,7	0,0
Germany	2,2	72,5	21,0	2,2
Greece	16,2	75,7	5,4	2,7
Italy	10,8	69,2	12,5	5,8
Portugal	5,8	74,2	15,8	2,5
Spain	1,4	79,5	15,1	3,4
Great Britain	25,5	64,6	4,6	0,0
<i>Old member states average</i>	8,2	74,5	13,3	2,1
Bulgaria	20,0	62,9	16,4	0,7
Czech Republic	25,5	62,8	8,5	1,1
Hungary	7,4	83,6	8,2	0,0
Lithuania	3,3	90,2	6,5	0,0
Poland	17,8	75,6	4,4	1,5
Slovakia	5,8	72,5	12,5	5,0
<i>New member states average</i>	13,3	74,6	9,4	1,4
<i>Difference NMS/OMS</i>	5,1	0,1	-3,9	-0,7

Note: Q. Do you see yourself as...? (NATIONALITY) only (0), (NATIONALITY) and European (1), European and (NATIONALITY) (1), European only (1) Data: IntUne Elite 2009 survey. This question was not asked in 2007 wave of the elite survey. Entries in the table are percentages.

Table 4.10 Affective European identity, Public opinion

Attachment to Europe	Not at all attached		Not very attached		Somewhat attached		Very attached	
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009
Austria	7,0	5,2	21,3	21,2	37,3	44,1	34,5	29,5
Belgium	10,6	9,9	25,5	27,0	44,6	41,6	19,3	21,5
Denmark	4,8	6,2	22,5	19,3	49,9	50,3	22,8	24,3
France	15,2	11,7	25,1	26,9	41,1	42,9	18,5	18,5
Germany	6,2	6,4	19,5	18,3	44,6	45,3	29,6	30,0
Greece	16,5	16,6	33,5	35,7	35,5	32,8	14,5	15,0
Italy	4,9	5,2	15,0	18,3	52,1	50,0	28,0	26,6
Portugal	9,4	12,1	16,7	18,0	47,8	47,4	26,1	22,6
Spain	10,4	10,0	30,2	35,1	40,7	38,7	18,7	16,2
United Kingdom	22,3	22,8	33,9	28,1	33,4	38,8	10,3	10,3
<i>Old member states average</i>	<i>10,7</i>	<i>10,6</i>	<i>24,3</i>	<i>24,8</i>	<i>42,7</i>	<i>43,2</i>	<i>22,2</i>	<i>21,4</i>
Bulgaria	19,0	8,3	26,4	20,9	36,1	39,3	18,5	31,5
Estonia	19,1	15,6	25,2	24,1	40,6	47,3	15,2	13,1
Hungary	2,6	2,8	13,4	15,1	37,0	40,4	47,0	41,6
Poland	4,6	5,1	19,3	21,4	52,0	53,0	24,1	20,5
Slovakia	8,9	4,8	32,2	31,6	39,9	43,1	19,1	20,5
Slovenia	8,3	9,9	19,9	22,1	41,8	38,2	29,9	29,8
<i>New member states average</i>	<i>10,4</i>	<i>7,8</i>	<i>22,7</i>	<i>22,5</i>	<i>41,2</i>	<i>43,6</i>	<i>25,6</i>	<i>26,2</i>
<i>Difference NMS/OMS</i>	<i>-0,3</i>	<i>-2,8</i>	<i>-1,6</i>	<i>-2,3</i>	<i>-1,5</i>	<i>0,4</i>	<i>3,4</i>	<i>4,7</i>

Note: Q. People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you: very attached (1), somewhat attached (1), not very attached (0) or not at all attached (0) to Europe? Data: IntUne Public opinion 2007 and 2009 survey. Entries in the table are percentages.

Table 4.11 Affective European identity, Elites

Attachment to European Union	Not at all attached		Not very attached		Somewhat attached		Very attached	
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009
<i>Country</i>								
Austria	0,9	0,9	13,8	16,1	54,3	50,9	31,0	32,2
Belgium	3,2	2,8	8,9	7,3	46,0	42,2	41,9	47,7
Denmark	0,8	0,0	8,3	4,1	28,9	61,2	62,0	34,7
France	0,8	0,0	8,3	2,4	51,2	34,2	39,7	63,4
Germany	12,9	2,2	35,7	10,9	41,4	48,6	10,0	38,4
Greece	0,8	6,8	9,7	27,0	43,6	37,8	46,0	28,4
Italy	0,0	2,5	4,2	8,3	53,3	50,8	42,5	38,3
Portugal	0,7	0,0	7,4	5,0	51,0	45,8	40,9	49,2
Spain	3,0	2,0	11,1	6,1	43,4	48,7	42,4	43,2
United Kingdom	1,7	14,7	19,3	11,0	53,8	45,9	25,2	28,4
<i>Old member states average</i>	2,5	3,2	12,7	9,8	46,7	46,6	38,2	40,4
Bulgaria	4,8	1,5	21,8	22,1	56,5	57,4	16,9	19,1
Czech Republic	5,8	2,2	18,2	14,1	51,2	57,6	24,8	26,1
Estonia	0,0	n/d	13,8	n/d	65,1	n/d	21,1	n/d
Hungary	2,5	0,8	6,6	7,4	40,5	45,9	50,4	45,9
Lithuania	1,9	0,8	15,9	11,5	62,6	59,0	19,6	28,7
Poland	1,6	0,0	3,3	8,2	32,8	44,4	62,3	47,4
Slovakia	0,0	0,8	14,2	6,7	50,8	49,2	35,0	43,3
<i>New member states average</i>	2,4	1,0	13,4	11,6	51,4	52,2	32,9	35,1
<i>Difference NMS/OMS</i>	-0,1	-2,2	0,7	1,8	4,7	5,6	-5,3	-5,3

Note: Q. People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached (1), somewhat attached (0), not very attached (0) or not at all attached (0) to European Union? Data: IntUne Elite 2007 and 2009 survey. Entries in the table are percentages.

Chapter 5

Civic or ethnic? Contents of European identity in the enlarged European Union

“But what is a European? This is a question often posed but rarely answered, and the lack of an answer, coupled with the seeming lack of a sense of community, is often cited as one of the great weaknesses of the European project; nothing raises more doubts in Europe, it seems, than the lack of a sense of what it means to be European.”

– John McCormick, *Why Europe Matters*

“It is in the character of Europeans to be unsure of their true character, to disagree and endlessly quarrel about it.”

– Zygmunt Bauman, *Europe. An Unfinished Adventure*

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the empirical evidence regarding the existence of a common European identification across the enlarged EU. I also analyzed the individual-level and contextual factors which favor identification as European/with Europe for average citizens and elites. However, in order to fully understand the political consequences of European identity it is not enough to look at its relative strength, stability, and determinants. We must also explore its subjective meanings (Huddy 2013), that is, establish who is perceived as included/excluded from the community of Europeans. What does it mean to be European to average citizens and national elites of the enlarged EU? Where are the limits of the community drawn? These are the basic questions which are addressed in this chapter.

The problem of what it means to be European has been the topic of numerous philosophical, theoretical, and empirical analyses of cultural, historical, and legal materials,

as framed by the EU, as well as beyond it (Str ath 2002; Delanty 2005; McCormick 2010; Risse 2010; Delanty 2013). As the quotes above illustrate, there is hardly any consensus on the answer to that question, and some philosophers even suggest that such ambivalence constitutes the very essence of Europeanness (Str ath 2002; Bauman 2004). Therefore, also European identification as rooted in individual perceptions is far from straightforward and it can have divergent meanings within the enlarged EU. The specific *content* of European identity as rooted in individual perceptions is influenced by attitudes and resources, as well as different national contexts in which such contents are constructed, with political leaders as key actors in the process of shaping them (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013; Mols and Weber 2013). In this chapter, I tackle this issue from a bottom-up perspective, by comparatively analyzing the evidence from public opinion and elite surveys.

In terms of specific meanings, European political identity and the citizenship of the Union have been promoted by the institutions as an inclusive type of identity, represented by the “Unity in diversity” motto of the EU. Moreover, scholars of European politics have famously argued in favor of an identity based on the values of “constitutional patriotism” in the EU (Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001; Habermas 2012), pointing to a predominantly civic concept of belonging. However, when assessing the effects of the Eastwards enlargements on European identity, some authors suggest that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries may exhibit stronger opposition to such cosmopolitan notion of European citizenship and identity based on supranational institutions (Weiss 2003) and attach more importance to ancestry (Liebich 2010) and religion as a constitutive elements of political community (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, 14; Risse 2010). These assumptions can be traced back to the contested civic/ethnic division in concepts of nationhood and the presumed differences between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe in this respect. From this perspective, the West stands for a civic conception of national identity and the East is linked to cultural or ethnic formulations of nationality, as discussed in chapter 1 (Kohn [1944] 2005; Smith 1993). However, while the differential historical experience of Central Eastern European member states might influence the ways in which their newly found supranational belonging is formulated, we should not overstate the importance of such legacies either. To the contrary, as Ray Taras argues, “we must debunk myths about the supposedly nationalistic essentializing east” (2010, 21). In other words, it is important to empirically verify whether such presumed differences in how European belonging is formulated are reflected in the attitudes of the new European citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. This consideration

is of central importance in the context of the ongoing debates on the viability of a European demos within the enlarged EU, and the starting point for my study.

The objective of the analysis presented in this chapter is to explore empirical evidence on the subject of perceived contents of a shared European identity. As in the previous chapter, my focus is on the comparison between the perceptions held by elites and citizens of new, Central and Eastern European (CEE), and old EU member countries. Here I consider several elements which could delimit European belonging, in order to provide an empirically grounded answer to the question of potential differences between East and West of Europe on this aspect of European identity.

The chapter is organized as follows: first, I refer back to the arguments presented in chapter 1, I discuss the ways in which belonging to the political communities in general, and the European community in particular, has been analyzed in previous studies, and on this basis I formulate my hypotheses. Secondly, I explore the existing empirical evidence regarding the contents of European identity by considering the importance of different elements in a descriptive analysis. These elements, discussed in more details in the next part of the chapter, can be broadly fitted into two different conceptualizations of European identity: a voluntaristic one, based on civic values, and a more exclusionary one, based on ethnic belonging. In the last part of the chapter, I develop a set of explanatory models of European identity elements, in order to verify whether there is in fact any difference in the meanings of European identity between new and old member states. I also explore the link between elite positions and public opinion attitudes.

2. Contents of European identification between East and West: Research hypotheses

The starting point for the analysis presented in this chapter is the assumption that in order to understand European political identity in the enlarged EU, we must explore not only the question of who considers oneself part of the European political community, but also how such belonging is conceptualized. In this sense, one of the issues raised in the debates regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU was that such conceptualization could be different in the accession states. The arguments surrounding the Eastward enlargement of the EU have been already discussed in chapter 3, here I will recall some the most relevant points raised, which lead my hypotheses.

As discussed in chapter 1, the scholarly debate regarding the foundations for legitimacy of political communities has revolved to a great extent around the civic-ethnic dichotomy formulated in studies of nationalism and national identity (Kohn [1944] 2005; Meinecke [1908] 1970). While such dichotomous framework has been the object of much criticism for its essentialist character and analytical and normative ambiguities (Brubaker 1999), it proved to be quite resilient as a conceptual tool for analyzing the contents of national identity and citizenship (Smith 1992; Smith 1993; Miller 2000; Janmaat 2006; Reeskens and Hooghe 2010; Ariely 2013). Some scholars have also argued in favor of further distinguishing between a cultural (language and religion) and an ascribed (kinship) element in the ethnic dimension (Kymlicka 2001); however, there is no agreement on this point. As far as analyses of public opinion are concerned, for instance, Janmaat (2006) argues in favor of the existence of an ethnic, political and cultural dimension, while Reeskens and Hooghe's (2010) results confirm a basic ethnic and civic distinction, while discarding the argument for a third cultural dimension. Therefore, the debate is far from being settled.

From the perspective of this study, it is especially important to note that the civic-ethnic dichotomy has been used to establish a normative distinction between two basic models of nationalism: its civic version, which supposedly is to be found in the West, and Eastern European nationalism, depicted as based on cultural and ethnic elements (Smith 1993; Kohn [1944] 2005). This commonplace distinction is based on the observation that in Western Europe and the U.S the institutions of the state precede or coincide with the emergence of the idea of a nation. The result is that in these countries nationalism is, thus,

based on citizenship. On the other hand, in Central and Eastern Europe nationalist movements emerged in the context of multiethnic empires and its objective was to redraw the limits of political communities in accordance with the principle of ethnicity, contributing to the emergence of the idea of nation in relation to the concept of people, instead of citizenship, in contrast to the West (Kohn [1944] 2005). A similar theoretical distinction is that proposed by Smith (1993), as he differentiates between Western civic model based on territory, institutions, rights, and obligations, and the non-Western concept of nation based on descent. Such theoretical expectations have been the object of much criticism for their ethnocentric assumptions and emphasizing differences between East and West of Europe while ignoring divergent forms of nation-building within both parts of Europe (Kuzio 2002)⁸⁰. Another substantial critique has been the fact that most of these studies rely on theoretical or institutional analysis, and until quite recently there has been a conspicuous lack of evidence to whether public opinion perceptions actually reflect these claims. In this sense, Schulman (2002) for instance, demonstrates with survey data that there is little evidence to confirm the assumption of an essential difference in the way nation has been conceptualized between East and West of Europe. Rather, he contends, both elements are present in the public opinion perceptions of nationality⁸¹. However, there is no agreement on this point either and evidence from other public opinion studies tends to be rather mixed (see Janmaat 2006, Ariely 2013).

The civic/ethnic debate on the character of nationhood between East and West is relevant to the present study for two reasons. Firstly, even as numerous scholars have argued that the emergence of a “hard” European identity, similar to national identities (based on shared historical memory and common culture) is not the desired endpoint of the construction of a European polity (Kohli 2000; Cerutti 2011; McMahon 2013), European identity research has relied to a great extent on theoretical clues from studies of nationalism. The prospects of a common European identification measured against the standards of national identities look rather grim, and this has led some authors to be pessimistic about the future of a common identity within the EU, due to cultural, historical and linguistic diversity in the enlarged EU

⁸⁰ However, admittedly, the model has been also applied to analyze the differences within Western Europe, such as in Brubaker’s study in which he applies the civic-ethnic dichotomy to analyze the concepts of nationhood in France and Germany (Brubaker 1992).

⁸¹ His study, however, has been criticized for assuming the cross-national validity of his latent constructs, instead of empirically testing them prior to operationalization of the different notions of nation (Miller 2000)

(Smith 1992). Others argue that even if European identity cannot meet the requirements of “hard” national identities, it could be modelled on “constitutional patriotism” and based on values of liberal democracy (Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001; Habermas 2012). Finally, instead of assuming that it would follow one conception or another, some scholars also try to analyze the existing perceptions of European identity by combining both perspectives. In this sense, Michael Bruter (2005) proposes to distinguish between two basic dimensions to European political identity: a cultural one, where belonging is perceived on the basis of a shared culture, values, religion and ethnicity; and a civic one, defined as identification with a political structure, institutions, rights and rules of the political community (2005, 12). In a similar manner, in studies derived from the IntUne project the contents of European identification are operationalized as achieved versus ascribed European identity (Best 2009; Sanders et al. 2012). Other authors distinguish more dimensions: Schlenker (2013) analyses the relationship between cosmopolitanism and civic, cultural and ethnic constructions of European identity, Mansfeldova and Spicarova (2009) look into the civic, cultural, and ascribed components of elite identities (Wesołowski, Słomczyński, and Dubrow 2010), and others argue that even more elements should be distinguished⁸². Therefore, while it might be formulated under different labels, the civic/ethnic distinction remains the basic frame of reference also in the debates regarding the contents of European identification. In these terms, based on previous research and the normative assumptions about European identity and citizenship, I expect that both, in old and new member states, European identity is conceived in civic terms:

H.5 European identity is conceived predominantly in civic terms in both old and new member states.

The second reason for which the civic/ethnic debate is applicable to this study is that, as discussed in the previous chapters, some authors suggest that the newly admitted EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe differ from the previous members in terms of attitudes towards the EU as a supranational community. In this sense, the civic/ethnic debate

⁸² In more recent analyses, scholars contend that we should consider the contents of national and European formulation of identity jointly. In this sense, working with the IntUne public opinion data, Segatti and Giuglielmi (2014) propose to distinguish between a national cultural dimension, a European cultural dimension, and the religious, ethnic and civic elements (European and national). Lengyel and Goncz (2012), on the other hand, in their analysis of the IntUne elite survey (2007 wave), also argue for the pooling of national and European elements together and propose to discern a primordial component, an ethno-symbolic factor, a Christianity element, and a civic aspect and language component.

has been brought back with the post-1989 changes and the accession of post-socialist countries, as one of the issues which have been raised in the examinations of the effect of Eastward enlargement has been the possibility that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries may exhibit stronger attachment to their recently regained nationhood and support a more restricted scope of political identities. In this sense Best (2010) argues that historical legacies matter to the formation of nationalism, and in countries which used to be parts of large multinational empires religion is often a core element of national identity. This is the case of Poland and Lithuania, which have been historical parts of the Russian Empire⁸³ and Bulgaria and Greece, which belonged to the Ottoman Empire (Best 2010, 937). This is why some authors suggest that the citizens of the new member states could attach greater importance to religion as a constitutive element of European belonging, which is contradictory to the presumed predominantly secular character of European identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapters, a significant concern was that the new European citizens would exhibit stronger opposition to the cosmopolitan notion of European identity based on supranational institutions (Weiss 2003). This could be due to the fact the citizens in these new member states presumably reject immigrants to a greater extent and emphasize more the importance of ancestry⁸⁴ as basis for inclusion in the community of citizens (Liebich 2010).

Bearing in mind how the ethnic-civic debate has structured most of nationalism studies, it becomes even more important to consider such assumed differences between the Eastern and Western parts of Europe regarding their concept of European identity. In the case of national identity, the results of empirical studies of such presumed divide seem to be mixed and while some authors argue against it (Kuzio 2002; Shulman 2002), others find at least partial evidence to the difference in concept of national identity between East and West of Europe (Janmaat 2006; Ariely 2013). If indeed, the citizens of the new member states value more the restricted notion of national identity based on ancestry and religion, such concept could easily spill over to their emerging identification as EU citizens. However,

⁸³ In the case of Poland, the legacies of its historical division between the three empires, the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Prussian domination, continues to yield influence in the current-day social and political make-up of the country (cf. Guerra 2008).

⁸⁴ Liebich (2010) see the evidence to that in the fact that *ius sanguinis* (citizenship acquired by having parents who are citizens of the nation) is the only way of acquiring nationality at birth in the new member states of the EU and these countries tend to make the acquisition of citizenship easier to co-ethnics and their descendants, rather than second and third generations of migrants.

while the differential historical experience of Central Eastern European member states might influence the ways in which their newly found supranational belonging is formulated, we should not overstate its importance either and the potential differences have to be verified empirically. Therefore, I formulate the following hypothesis which will be tested in my empirical analysis:

H.6 In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to origin (be born in Europe and have European parents) as an element delimiting European identity.

H.7 In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to religion (being Christian) as an element delimiting European identity.

Thus, in order to offer a simple frame of reference for the testing of hypotheses related to the contents of European identity between East and West of Europe, my objective in this chapter is to consider the two basic conceptualizations of identity, in terms of the character of boundaries drawn around the supranational community of Europeans. On one hand, an inclusive concept based on civic values and voluntaristic in character is considered. Here I consider elements such as respecting EU laws and institutions, exercising citizenship rights, mastering a European language and simply feeling European denotes a kind of open European identity, accessible simply by virtue of choice and behavioral compliance. On the other hand, the exclusionary notion of European identity establishes boundaries of community through reference to ascribed elements such as ancestry and religion⁸⁵. Therefore, it is not my objective to evoke the debates regarding the ethnic/civic character of nationalism between East and West. Rather, the distinction between ethnic and civic elements of European identity serves as a theoretical tool for establishing what kind of formulation of European belonging prevails in individual orientations of the citizens of the enlarged EU.

⁸⁵ An important element of the academic debate surrounding the concept of ethnic identity refers to its primordial vs. socially constructed character. Primordialists conceptualize ethnic groups as fixed and natural and non-negotiable (Geertz [1973] 2000) and point to such ascribed elements as ethnic descent and religion as their natural “markers”. While constructivist approach these as a social and situational phenomenon and a product of an individual process determined by contextual factors such as elite influence, level of information, contact with other individuals and socialization (Brady and Kaplan 2000). In the present study, I adopt the latter position, and even when I discuss the perceptions of ethnic elements, I assume that these are no natural properties of individuals, rather, they are socially constructed categories, as well.

The proposed hypothesis are verified in the empirical analysis for average citizens (a) and elites (b). Firstly, I explore the data descriptively to establish broad patterns of how contents of European identity are formulated by elites and public opinion in new and old member states. Secondly, the initial observations are verified in an explanatory analysis where I account for alternative explanatory frameworks to establish whether the East/West difference matters.

3. Method and data

Despite a great deal of empirical analysis regarding attitudes towards processes of European integration, empirical evidence which could be used for comparative research on the meanings of European identity is rather scarce, especially in the context of the post-2004 EU⁸⁶. This is why, in spite of its limitations of country coverage and over time, the data from IntUne project constitute the most adequate data source for my study also in terms of the contents of European identity. This choice is motivated by the fact that, in addition to variables on European attitudes and identification, the IntUne survey also includes a set of items which can be used to operationalize the different meanings of European identity⁸⁷. Therefore, it offers an excellent tool to explore elites' and average citizens' perceptions of the specific meanings of European identity, in a comparative perspective. By analyzing the data in a multilevel setup, I am able to empirically test whether any significant difference in the meanings of European identity exists between East and West of Europe. Moreover, I verify the assumption that the meaning of identity is shaped by the political leaders, by combining the data of the public opinion and elite survey.

As in the previous chapter, here also I use both waves of the IntUne survey. However, for the descriptive analysis in the first part of the chapter, I focus on the most recent results

⁸⁶ As far as I could determine, in the period following the Eastern enlargements, one Eurobarometer study in spring 2009 (survey 71.3) takes up the issue of European identity meanings and incorporates a similar set of items as the IntUne study, for all EU-27 member states. However, instead of asking the respondents to indicate the perceived importance of each element, it asks them to name the three most important characteristics of being European. Such formulation of the question makes it significantly more difficult to analyze and compare the outcomes. Moreover, there is of course no data for the elites. This makes the IntUne survey quite unique in terms of how deeply it allows the researchers to explore European identity—its strength, determinants and contents in one (almost) identical survey for public opinion and the elites.

⁸⁷ The composition of IntUne dataset for elites and public opinion is described in more detail in the previous chapter and in the annexes. Tables with summary tables for the variables used are included in the annexes to the thesis.

from the 2009 wave. The comparison to 2007 (full tables in the annex to this chapter), demonstrates that also the aggregate measures of the meanings of European identity are extremely stable between the two waves of the IntUne survey. For the explanatory analyses, I pool both waves and perform regression analysis on the complete set of IntUne data to obtain a higher number of level-2 units, which is more suitable for a multilevel approach. The small and insignificant coefficient for the wave control (Wave 2009) indicates that even when accounting for most important individual and contextual factors, there is no effect of change over time and meanings remain stable.

3.1 Dependent variable

In this chapter I am substantially interested in how elites and public opinion conceptualize the boundaries of a European political community and what the markers of belonging within the community are. Therefore, the following question from the IntUne survey constitutes the basis for the operationalization of my dependent variable:

People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following? Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important.

The specific items include: to be Christian, to be born in Europe, to have European parents, to respect the European Union's laws and institutions, to feel European, to participate in EU elections (elite survey), to exercise citizens' rights (public opinion survey), and to master a European language⁸⁸. These indicators are of course not exhaustive and ideally we should include other possible variables. Nevertheless, these elements allow me to grasp the main elements which define how identity in the European Union is conceptualized and how the boundaries around the European community are drawn, across old and new member countries of the EU.

⁸⁸ An additional item was available in the dataset: one that refers to the importance of common culture for being European. However, this item is discarded in the study due to several reasons. Firstly, the formulation of the question is rather vague (it is not at all clear what such a shared culture should be to the respondents) and, therefore, it could cause further problems of cross-national comparison. Also previous studies demonstrate that the cultural dimension does not constitute a separate latent dimension of the concept of nationality (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010) and as I am substantially interested in comparing the inclusive formulation of civic identity with the restricted ethnic European belonging, culture theoretically falls somewhere in-between. The instability of the cultural item was also reflected in my exploratory analyses of the data. All of these issues with this item led me to discard it in the empirical analysis.

In terms of the principal dimensions of analysis, based on my theoretical discussion in the previous section (and in chapter 1), my assumption is that we can distinguish between two broad conceptualizations of European identity: its ethnic and its civic dimension. In the operationalization of these dimensions, I follow the approach proposed by Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) in their study of perceptions of national citizenship. The ethnic concept of European identity is measured by the items which delimit an exclusionary conceptualization of citizenship, based on ascribed characteristics. I include here those items which refer to a common ancestry and religion as the basis for inclusion in the community of citizens: to have European parents (*ius sanguinis*), to be born in Europe (*ius soli*), and to be Christian.

The civic formulation, on the other hand, is constituted by the indicators which reflect a voluntaristic form of identity which is, in theory⁸⁹, open and inclusive, as formulated in the concept of European “constitutional patriotism”. Thus, here I include the normative factor (to respect EU laws and institutions), a participative factor (to participate in European Parliament elections—for elites, and to exercise citizens’ rights in the EU—for citizens), as well as the linguistic element, and the item which makes reference to a voluntary and affective attachment (feel European) as the basis for delimiting European belonging.

The first step in the analysis is to empirically verify whether these elements constitute two latent dimensions and, thus, whether the elements mentioned above could be combined into single items which would operationalize the civic and ethnic dimension of European belonging. For that purpose, I perform an initial test and check for the scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) for each set of items. The results are summarized in the table below.

⁸⁹ But see my discussion of the exclusive potential of citizenship in chapter 1.

Table 5.1 Scale reliability coefficients for the dimensions of European identity

Dimension	Items	Public opinion	Elites
<i>Ethnic European identity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to be born in Europe • to have European parents • to be Christian 	0,707	0,681
<i>Civic European identity</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • to respect the European Union's laws and institutions • to feel European • to participate in EU elections (elite survey⁹⁰), to exercise citizens' rights (public opinion survey) • to master a European language 	0,667	0,491

Note: Entries in the table are scale reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha).

The scale reliability tests indicate that indeed the proposed elements are conceptually related but the coefficients are not entirely satisfactory. While there seems to be more agreement on the elements which constitute the ethnic dimension of European identity (the coefficients could be acceptable⁹¹), there is much less agreement on the civic elements, especially among the elites⁹². Taking into account that previous studies also point out the difficulty of operationalizing these dimensions across different national contexts, such results are not surprising. As Reskens and Hooghe (2010) demonstrate in the case of national identity, while there is evidence to the empirical validity of the theoretical civic/ethnic dichotomy, the measurement of both concepts is not equivalent cross-nationally which can

⁹⁰ This item is only included in the 2009 wave of the elite survey.

⁹¹ The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient ranges between 0 and 1, the closer to 1, the greater the internal consistency of a construct. The rule of thumb here is that coefficients above 0.7 are acceptable in low-stake analysis such as that in social sciences (Tavakol and Dennick 2011).

⁹² I also check for internal consistency of these dimensions within separate countries (not reported here), and the results vary from country to country. While the items could constitute a latent variable in some national contexts, in others it was not acceptable to combine these elements into single dimensions. Additionally, I also run a confirmatory factor analysis (principal component analysis, results not shown) to further explore the applicability of the two dimensions to the data at hand, and the analysis also confirmed that the two-dimensional conceptual model could be only fairly satisfactorily applied for the case of public opinion, as the coefficients above indicate, but not for the case of elites. For the elites, it seems that it would be more appropriate to distinguish between the religious factor, the primordial element (being born in Europe, having European parents), the normative aspect, and the participatory element.

render comparisons invalid. In the case of European identity, a concept far less salient in the minds of Europeans as the previous chapter show, we can expect even more ambiguity.

Since my objective is to verify whether there are any differences in the elements which constitute European identity between old and new member states of the EU, rather than put forward claims about the underlying structure of the meanings of European belonging in the minds of European citizens and elites, I avoid combining these elements into single constructs. It could only be done with certain confidence for the case of public opinion, and, thus, render the comparison to elites impossible. Moreover, much information would be lost, especially in terms of country-level heterogeneity and I could risk running into problems of measurement equivalence. Reeskens and Hooghe (2010) suggest that due to the differences in how the dimensions of national identity are understood between different national contexts, valid cross-national comparison regarding the ethnic/civic character of identity can be best developed using single items which best represent a given dimension, such as respect of institutions and having national ancestry. Thus, the solution adopted in this study is to analyze all above-mentioned elements individually in descriptive analysis (whilst grouped in the two proposed theoretical dimensions).

To make the interpretation of the results more straightforward, I transform all elements into binary variables, grouping those who consider an element as very important or somewhat important (recoded as 1), and those who think it is not at all important or not very important (recoded as 0). In this way the descriptive tables and graphs indicate the country-level aggregate share of citizens /elites who consider a given item as important to European identity. Consequently, I consider the determinants of each sub-element, in separate logistic regression models, and I test for the link between aggregate elite positions and individual-level perceptions.

3.2 Independent variables

In order to go beyond a simple descriptive approach to the issue at hand and verify whether there are any significant differences in the perceptions of the contents of European identity between East and West of Europe, in the second part of the chapter, I formulate several regression models. Given the fact that individual attitudes are nested in different national contexts and the meanings of European identity are affected by the way national identity is constructed by national leaders, the models are multilevel logistic regressions, applied

separately to the different elements of European identity. In order to properly establish the impact of the effect of new member states, I account for a number of relevant individual-level and country-level factors which might influence different conceptualizations of European identity.

Most importantly, the new member states dummy is included in all models in order to assess the effect of the context of Central and Eastern European new member states. The dummy, thus, indicates whether the differences in levels of consideration of the elements of European identity which we have observed in the descriptive analysis hold when we account for all relevant alternative explanations of the observed variation.

In the first set of models, I include only *individual-level variables*⁹³ to isolate their impact. The *control* variables include age, sex (reference: woman), religion (reference category: Christian, that is Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox), and an ideology measure on a 10-point scale. The control variables are the same for models of public opinion and elites. The rest of the individual-level predictors follow the explanatory model formulated in earlier chapters: resources, experience and attitudes, which have been established as principal determinants of European identification, and therefore I also expect them to play an important role in the way its meanings are formulated.

In terms of *resources*, for the public opinion, I include political interest and different levels of education, which together operationalize the effects of the cognitive mobilization process. I expect them to have a positive effect on the elements of the civic dimension, and no effect or a negative effect (in the case of education) on the consideration of the ethnic elements as important. The other factor included previously in the resources dimension, occupation, is not considered here as I do not expect the different employment types to affect specific contents of European identity (this is confirmed in an exploratory regression analysis which did include the effects of different types of occupation). For the elites, on the other hand, as in the previous chapter, the effect of education is not included in the models due to the prevalent homogeneity on this aspect. I do, however, control for the type of elite (reference category: political elite), to check whether the perceptions of the national political

⁹³ See annex for variables' description and summary statistics.

representatives are significantly different than those of economic, media, and trade union elites.

The explanatory dimension of *experience* includes the variable which operationalizes direct experience of other EU countries as the frequency of visit to another EU country in the past year (EU visit). I expect this variable to correlate positively with the civic elements, and have no effect on the ethnic dimension.

The third individual-level set of predictors included the evaluative and affective *attitudes*. Here, trust and EU membership benefits (operationalized in the same way as in the previous chapter) are expected to correlate positively with civic aspects of identity.

I complete the models by including *contextual* variables to account for country level differences which might influence the content of European identity. Since the presence of migrants and minorities might politicize the issue of identity, the models also account for the percentage of foreign population in the country (Foreign population %). Moreover, I add a variable which operationalizes the salience of religion in the national context as the aggregate measure of religious affiliation as Christian (Christian %). The latter is only included for the public opinion due to the fact that public opinion data is not available for all CEE countries included in the elite dataset.

Finally, as argued above, the development of European identification depends also on the way elites in a given country construct national and European belonging. On the basis of this assumption, I also include among the contextual variables aggregate elite positions on different aspects of national identity. The elite position variable indicates the share of elites who consider each identity element somewhat or very important in each country (for instance, in the model of the religious factor as an element of European identity, I add as a contextual variable the share of elites who consider it to be relevant for national identification in each country). In this way I am able to check whether the individual level attitudes regarding European identity contents correlate with the way elites construct national identities.

4. Results and discussion

4.1 Descriptive analysis

The figures 5.1-5.4 represent the share of average citizens and elites who think that a given element of European identity is either important or very important for being considered European. The figures represent the percentages for all the countries included in the study, as well as the mean percentages for old and new member states, to facilitate the assessment of the gap between the two groups. The graphs represent the data for the 2009 survey, while the more detailed data for both waves can be found in the tables annexed to this chapter.

4.1.1 Civic elements of European identity

The empirical evidence is quite straightforward: European identity is conceptualized as associated predominantly with civic elements, both for average citizens, as well as the elites. On average, respecting the laws and institutions of the EU is the most important element for being considered European for citizens of the new member states and elites in the old EU member countries⁹⁴. Speaking a European language and feeling European, on the other hand, are also viewed as very relevant to most Europeans, the linguistic element is the most important element for the citizens of old member states, while for the elites of CEE countries it is feeling European. Overall, the participatory factor is the one that receives the least consideration across the board, indicating clearly that European citizenship remains a passive type of citizenship with great weight on respecting the rules, but much less consideration of the actual political participation.

The emphasis on the civic elements is the strongest among elites as, on average, more than 90% consider these elements important, with slightly more country-level heterogeneity among the old member states. The differences between the elites in the two groups of countries are not very significant with the exception of the participatory factor. Here, the elites of CEE countries clearly consider participating in EP elections as less important (less than 70% agree) than their Western counterparts (over 80% consider it important to be European).

⁹⁴ In the graphs, OMS refers to the old EU member states and NMS to the new member states of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe.

Figure 5.1 Civic contents of European identity, Public opinion





Figure 5.2 Civic contents of European identity, Elites



For public opinion, the civic elements are slightly less relevant than for the elites, but still, on average, 80% recognize these elements as important, with pronounced differences depending on the civic element. While the importance of respecting the law and speaking the language is comparable to the position of elites (around 90% agree), feeling European and exercising rights are significantly less relevant to average citizens. Further differences become apparent if we look at the East-West gap. The voluntaristic element of feeling European is considered as significantly more important by the citizens of new member states (85% as compared to 77% in the old EU member countries). This observation, together with the results of the previous chapter, points to the importance of cognitive identification in the CEE countries, which remains significantly lower than affective attachment to Europe. The participatory factor, on the other hand, receives much less attention from the citizens and it is slightly less important to citizens of CEE countries (68% agree it is important, as compared to 72% in the old member states).

Looking more in depth at the country-level results for public opinion in both groups, it becomes obvious that while, on average, the most consistently highly valued elements of all four are the normative and the linguistic factor, the element that accounts for the biggest part of variation between countries is the importance put on the participatory aspect to European identity. In this sense, we might distinguish three groups: countries in which exercising citizens' rights is perceived as not a relevant aspect of being European (especially Denmark and Slovakia, where less than 60% of public opinion recognize the participatory factor as important); countries where the participatory element receives medium support (over 60% but still below the mean: Slovenia, Estonia, and Hungary as well as Belgium, France and Germany); and countries where citizens value all three elements, the participatory, the linguistic, and the normative element, rather highly (especially Portugal and Italy, as well as Bulgaria). As we can see no clear East-West division can be drawn from such a perspective.

If we look at the country level differences in the civic formulation of European citizenship among the elites, we can observe that in spite of the overall high scores on all civic elements (in some cases the agreement is total, such as the importance of speaking the language in Denmark), the biggest variance is found again on the participatory factor. Here as well we can discern some clusters of countries. Among those that put least importance on element we find Hungary (only slightly more than 50% of Hungarian elites consider that

participating in EP elections is important to being European), as well as the elites of Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Greece, therefore, mostly new CEE member states. Consequently, it seems that the difference observed between elites in the East and West in terms of the importance of the participatory factor is quite consistent at the country level. The only exception among the CEE countries are Bulgarian elites, whose positions remain closer to countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, and Denmark, with a comprehensive civic conception of European citizenship, valuing highly all civic elements (all values over 80%). Moreover, it must be noted that among the old member states, British elites and public opinion have consistently the lowest scores on all four factors (except for exercising rights, where their citizens come second after the Danes, and elites are second from the bottom, after the Greeks). This observation remains in line with research on British Euroscepticism that indicates that general levels of knowledge about the EU and awareness of European politics are rather low.

4.1.2 Ethnic elements of European identity

As far as the ethnic-based formulation of European identity is concerned it is immediately clear that these elements receive far less support from the elites, as well as public opinion. On average, belonging based on kinship is recognized as important by less than half of the elites and slightly more than half of citizens; however, there are important differences between countries, as well as between East and West of Europe. Overall, Christianity is considered as the least significant aspect of being European; however, it is also the variable with the highest between-country variation: the share of affirmative scores is anywhere between 8% (Danish elites) and 58% (Bulgarian publics). Therefore, there is little agreement on the importance of religion to European identity, and this element seems very context-dependent.

Among the elites, the importance attached to the ethnic and religious features of European identity is clearly higher in the new member states of Central Eastern Europe. Being Christian is the element which receives the lowest scores in general, but with a significantly stronger support on part of the CEE elites (33% see it as important, as compared to 18% in the West). Here, however, we must take into account that the average for the elite sample in new member states is strongly influenced by the responses of the Polish (53%) and Lithuanian (48%) elites, as the exploration of country-levels reveals. Elites in old member states consider being Christian as of little importance, except for the Italian (43%)

and German (35%) case. Also, being born in Europe and having European parents is considered as significantly more important in the new member states of the EU, the difference on both elements is around 10%.

Thus, while in the case of the elites the importance put on the ethnic-based notion of European citizenship is clearly smaller, the biggest disparities occur on the religious factor. We can distinguish among those countries where elites attach almost no importance to the religious element (Denmark, Portugal, UK, Spain, and, unsurprisingly, France) and those that consider it somewhat important (Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Lithuania). Poland is the only case among elites where the importance of Christianity as an element of being European is acknowledged as important by more than half of the respondents, even though the survey was carried out when the presence of religiously fervent parties in the Parliament has diminished, after the 2007 election.

Likewise, public opinion in CEE countries seems to value the elements related to an ethnic-based concept of European identity to a greater extent than their Western counterparts. The share of ordinary citizens in the new member states who recognize being born in Europe and having European parents as important to European identity is again about 10% higher. Therefore, the assumption that citizens of the new member states value more the element of ancestry than their Western counterparts might have some basis in the data, but this effect might be spurious. It is necessary to verify this observation in a multivariate setting where alternative explanations will be accounted for. On the religious element, we do not observe any East-West difference. Therefore, at least from the descriptive analysis, it seems that the perceived importance attached to religion as an element of European identity is a function of elites' attitudes. This also must be verified in a multivariate setting.

Figure 5.3 Ethnic elements of European identity, Public opinion






Figure 5.4 Ethnic elements of European identity, Elites



As far as the variation in the perceptions of European public opinion is concerned, clearly, there is a group of countries where the ethnic elements of European identity obtain generally low levels of support from average citizens (Belgium, Denmark, and France, as well as Estonia, and Slovenia). Another group which might be discerned are those countries where the ethnic element is valued rather highly by the public opinion but the relevance of the religious factor remains low (Spain and Hungary). The third group is composed of countries where more than 50% of the respondents consider religion important for defining the limits of European belonging, and this perception is accompanied by an overall high salience of the other ethnic elements. In this third group of countries we find Italy, Portugal, Poland, Greece, and Bulgaria. Therefore, there does not seem to be any East-West difference in terms of importance of Christianity as an element of European identity. Rather, what all of the countries included in the latter group seem to have in common is the importance of religion in the society and Church as an institution in the public life. However, such explanation needs to be further tested in a multivariate setting as it is possible that other factors could explain such high salience of ethnic elements in these countries.

Finally, in order to make comparisons between old and new member states' elites and public opinion easier, Figure 5.5 represents plots of the two dimensions of European identity. As discussed before, since the proposed elements cannot be combined into single items with confidence, I apply the strategy suggested by Reskens and Hooghe (2010) and compare the single items which represent each theoretical dimension best: for civic identity it is the normative element (respecting EU law and institutions) and the participatory factor (to participate in EU elections -elite survey-, to exercise citizens' rights -public opinion survey-) and for the ethnic dimension, the element of ancestry (having European parents – *ius sanguinis*) against the religious component. The results for the four the variables are plotted by country below. The graphs depict differences between countries in the ethnic and the civic content of European identity, for elites and public opinion.

Figure 5.5 Dimensions of European identity compared, Elites and public opinion



With the elements of the two dimensions plotted, we can see clearly that there is much more agreement on the civic formulation of European identity and variation on this aspect is linked to the extent to which the participatory factor is considered important. While there is no clear East-West division, on average the latter element is considered slightly less important in the new member states, a fact which could be linked to the more general issues with political participation in these new democracies, as well as the effect of shorter socialization in European institutions. The East-West difference in the consideration of participation as important is, quite surprisingly, more pronounced among the elites.

On the other hand, the ethnic-based notion of European belonging is much less salient and there is much more between-country variability than in the case of the civic elements. For the public opinion, there does not seem to be any clear East-West difference, rather, citizens in countries (new and old members) where religion is relevant to the concept of nationhood and/or the Church plays significant role in the public life tend to value the religious factors more. Elites of the new member states, on the other hand, do put more emphasis of the religious element, on average.

These results, thus, partially contradict claims according to which Eastward enlargement challenges civic and secular identities within the EU. Christianity, as well as ethnic based belonging more broadly, as perceived elements of European belonging seem to be a function of national political/social context and there is a clear divide in these terms only among the elites. These observed differences and latter assumption regarding the importance of the contextual factors must be further tested in the following, last section of the chapter.

4.2 Regression analysis: Determinants of the contents of European identity

4.2.1 Public Opinion

In the previous sections, I explored descriptively elites' and public opinion perceptions of the contents of European identity. In what follows, I present the results of a series of multilevel logistic regression models on the elements of European identity, which further test the observed East-West differences. Due to the fact that we are dealing here with data regarding perceptions clustered by countries, a multilevel approach is applied which allows for the adequate modelling of nested data with contextual predictors, as discussed in previous chapter. My substantial interest is to check whether the dissimilarities between old and new EU member states observed in the descriptive analysis hold when we account for alternative explanations of these differences to be able to validate or reject hypotheses formulated at the beginning of this chapter.

In terms of how the *control* variables affect the different concepts at hand, we observe a clear gender and age difference (results in table 5.2, below). Women tend to consider all proposed elements as slightly more important, especially those of the civic dimension of European identity. Older people, on the other hand, also emphasize more the importance of all elements, but the impact of age is most positive on the ethnic aspects. Moreover, we observe a very significant effect of religion. Unsurprisingly, those who indicate that their religious confession is Christian also tend to value the religious element of European identity significantly more. Being a Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox believer increases the probability of considering Christianity as an important element of Europeanness by about 30%. Identifying as a Christian believer also affects positively the consideration of the all the other elements, especially the ethnic and the normative features of European identity. Finally, ideology correlates positively with greater consideration of the ethnic and the religious factors of European identity. Therefore, those who consider themselves as rightwing, tend to value being Christianity more as part of European belonging. Overall, the most significant differences in terms of the effect of socio-demographic controls are observed in relation to the religious element: older rightwing citizens who identify as Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox believers tend to consider Christianity as an important element of European belonging.

Table 5.2 Regressions on contents of European identity (Individual-level variables), Public opinion

Variables	Be Christian	Be Born in Europe	Have European Parents	Respect EU Law	Feel European	Exercise Citizen's Rights	Speak a European Language
CEE New Member states	0,163 (0,185)	0,392* (0,165)	0,489*** (0,143)	0,339* (0,180)	0,848*** (0,174)	-0,217 (0,198)	-0,206 (0,174)
Controls							
Age	0,815*** (0,034)	0,438*** (0,033)	0,477*** (0,032)	-0,037 (0,054)	0,338*** (0,040)	0,128*** (0,035)	0,148** (0,050)
Sex (<i>Ref. Woman</i>)	0,158*** (0,031)	0,079** (0,030)	0,085** (0,029)	0,423*** (0,049)	0,175*** (0,037)	0,180*** (0,032)	0,300*** (0,046)
Religion (<i>Ref. Christian</i>)	1,289*** (0,042)	0,312*** (0,034)	0,332*** (0,034)	0,326*** (0,055)	0,208*** (0,042)	0,077* (0,037)	0,086 (0,054)
Ideology	0,569*** (0,031)	0,290*** (0,030)	0,309*** (0,029)	0,078 (0,049)	0,092* (0,037)	0,019 (0,032)	0,133** (0,045)
Resources							
<i>None or basic primary education</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
Basic secondary education	-0,306*** (0,061)	-0,073 (0,062)	-0,030 (0,060)	0,022 (0,090)	0,102 (0,070)	-0,061 (0,065)	0,045 (0,082)
Vocational	-0,427*** (0,058)	-0,030 (0,058)	-0,031 (0,056)	0,063 (0,086)	0,049 (0,066)	-0,127* (0,060)	0,289*** (0,080)
A-levels	-0,623*** (0,059)	-0,144* (0,059)	-0,159** (0,057)	0,246** (0,091)	0,147* (0,068)	-0,118 (0,062)	0,382*** (0,084)
University	-0,869*** (0,059)	-0,296*** (0,058)	-0,255*** (0,056)	0,242** (0,090)	0,249*** (0,068)	-0,106 (0,062)	0,344*** (0,083)
Political interest	-0,114*** (0,033)	-0,050 (0,032)	-0,099** (0,031)	0,107* (0,051)	0,114** (0,038)	0,576*** (0,034)	0,122* (0,048)
Experience							
EU Knowledge	-0,163*** (0,034)	-0,007 (0,033)	-0,004 (0,033)	0,069 (0,055)	0,166*** (0,041)	0,074* (0,035)	0,268*** (0,050)
EU visit	-0,156*** (0,035)	-0,165*** (0,032)	-0,147*** (0,032)	0,062 (0,055)	0,081* (0,041)	-0,063 (0,035)	0,407*** (0,059)
Attitudes							
More trust in EU than national	0,012 (0,033)	0,093** (0,032)	0,063* (0,032)	0,677*** (0,053)	0,380*** (0,040)	0,293*** (0,035)	0,160*** (0,047)
EU benefits – personal	0,023 (0,032)	0,189*** (0,031)	0,175*** (0,030)	1,047*** (0,055)	0,920*** (0,039)	0,443*** (0,033)	0,438*** (0,049)
National identity	0,224*** (0,033)	0,234*** (0,030)	0,255*** (0,029)	0,583*** (0,043)	0,531*** (0,034)	0,330*** (0,031)	0,297*** (0,043)
Wave (2009)	-0,031 (0,171)	0,044 (0,152)	0,078 (0,132)	-0,119 (0,164)	0,023 (0,160)	-0,092 (0,183)	-0,140 (0,160)
Constant	-0,459*** (0,087)	0,689*** (0,077)	0,479*** (0,067)	2,604*** (0,085)	1,687*** (0,081)	1,018*** (0,092)	2,306*** (0,082)
Observations	22835	22902	22820	22945	22886	22786	23019
Number of groups	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
Log likelihood	-13108,1	-13990,6	-14426,2	-6457,3	-10206,7	-12615,4	-7236,3
AIC	26252,2	28017,2	28888,4	12950,6	20449,3	25266,8	14508,6

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression computed with the xtmelogit command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, × p<0.01 (only for contextual variables). Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 public opinion survey.

As far as the effects of *resources* are concerned, in line with our expectations, higher education levels are associated with more weight of the civic elements of European identity, except for the participatory factor, where we observe no such effect. Moreover, education also seems to foster a more open concept of European identity, as it affects negatively the consideration of ethnicity and religion as important to being European. In these terms, the effect is the strongest on the religious element: people who received a university education are about 10% less likely to consider being Christian as important to being European, as compared to those with only primary or no education at all. Political interest clearly favors the consideration of exercising citizens' rights as relevant to being European. Its effect is also slightly negative on the ethnic elements and positive for the rest of the civic aspects. Therefore, we might conclude that as expected, higher education and political interest promote a concept of European identity based on the notion of "constitutional patriotism".

The effect of *experience*, operationalized as knowledge and socialization through visiting other countries of the EU, also yields some interesting results. It tends to have a significant and positive effect on the civic elements such as the linguistic and the voluntaristic factors, but the coefficients are not very high. However, having travelled to other EU countries does contribute to a more open concept of European belonging, as it reduces the probability of considering religion or ancestry as important to being European.

The most pronounced relationships are observed on the *attitudinal* variables. Positive evaluations of the EU correlate with greater consideration of all elements of the civic dimension. Especially in terms of membership benefits, we find a marked effect on the normative and voluntaristic elements (people who perceive EU membership as beneficial are 25% more likely to emphasize these elements as important). Greater EU trust also correlates strongly with perceiving the respect of law and institutions as relevant to being European. Likewise, national attachment has a positive effect on the civic conceptualization of European identity, as well as, to a lesser extent, on a greater consideration of the ethnic elements. Here it is important to note that, as my previous theoretical discussion indicates, most probably it is not enough to consider only whether one is attached to country but also, how the national identity is conceptualized.

Finally, the element of greatest interest to my study is the effect of *the new member states* dummy. To begin with, in the models with only individual-levels predictors, we observe several key differences between new and old member states. There seems to be

indeed more weight placed on being born in European and having European parents to be considered as European citizen among the new European citizens, as well as on two elements of the civic dimension: the normative and the voluntaristic elements. Clearly, the most significant difference is the greater consideration of feeling European for being European. Moreover, the importance of the religious factor is not larger in the new member states, contrary to our expectations.

However, the inclusion of *contextual variables* (Table 5.3) modifies these effects. It seems that ethnic-based, more exclusionary concept of national identity of the national elites (Elite Nat. ID), as related to religion, having European parents, and being born in Europe, does have an effect on the individual-level conceptions of European identity. Moreover, the new member states dummy ceases to be significant in the models of the ethnic factors when we control for elite positions. That is, rather than some stable difference between new and old member states of the EU, we observe that valuing highly the elements of ancestry is a function of the way in which national identity has been constructed in some of the European countries. We do not, however, observe such an effect in terms of civic formulation of European identity, except for the issue of language.

The other contextual variables, country's share of Christian believers and foreign population also have some relevant influence, but only on the linguistic and the participatory elements. In this sense, the effect of Christianity is positive on both elements that is citizens in countries with greater share of Christian believers tend to emphasize the participatory element slightly more. Moreover, people in countries with greatest share of foreign population tend to value more speaking a European language as an element of European identity.

Therefore, the most important finding is that in countries where elites emphasize more the ethnic-based concept of national identity, and perceive religion and language an important markers of national belonging, citizens tend to consider these elements as more important for the European identity as well. These findings are not surprising since consideration related to ethnic notions of identity, as well as the issue of language and religion are easily politicized, which is not the case for the civic elements. Looking at the model fit criteria, these findings are further validated, as the regressions on the religious factor, the ethnic and the linguistic elements are clearly improved by adding the contextual variables.

Table 5.3 Regressions on contents of European identity (Contextual variables), Public opinion

Variables	Be Christian	Be Born in Europe	Have European Parents	Respect EU Law	Feel European	Exercise Citizen's Rights	Speak a European Language
CEE New Member states	-0,230 (0,178)	-0,080 (0,172)	0,200 (0,173)	0,186 (0,207)	0,671*** (0,200)	-0,184 (0,206)	-0,258 (0,175)
Controls							
Age	0,815*** (0,034)	0,439*** (0,033)	0,478*** (0,032)	-0,038 (0,054)	0,338*** (0,040)	0,129*** (0,035)	0,150** (0,050)
Sex (<i>Ref. Woman</i>)	0,159*** (0,031)	0,081** (0,030)	0,087** (0,029)	0,423*** (0,049)	0,176*** (0,037)	0,180*** (0,032)	0,301*** (0,046)
Religion (<i>Ref. Christian</i>)	1,285*** (0,042)	0,307*** (0,035)	0,326*** (0,034)	0,325*** (0,056)	0,201*** (0,042)	0,071 (0,037)	0,079 (0,055)
Ideology	0,569*** (0,031)	0,290*** (0,030)	0,309*** (0,029)	0,079 (0,049)	0,093* (0,037)	0,019 (0,032)	0,135** (0,045)
Resources							
<i>None/basic primary education</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>	<i>Ref.</i>
Basic secondary	-0,305*** (0,061)	-0,066 (0,062)	-0,025 (0,060)	0,022 (0,090)	0,106 (0,070)	-0,056 (0,065)	0,051 (0,082)
Vocational	-0,430*** (0,058)	-0,023 (0,058)	-0,025 (0,056)	0,065 (0,086)	0,055 (0,066)	-0,124* (0,060)	0,291*** (0,080)
A-levels	-0,625*** (0,059)	-0,140* (0,059)	-0,157** (0,057)	0,246** (0,091)	0,149* (0,068)	-0,115 (0,062)	0,390*** (0,084)
University	-0,872*** (0,059)	-0,294*** (0,058)	-0,253*** (0,056)	0,242** (0,090)	0,253*** (0,068)	-0,101 (0,062)	0,350*** (0,083)
Political interest	-0,115*** (0,033)	-0,050 (0,032)	-0,099** (0,031)	0,105* (0,051)	0,114** (0,038)	0,576*** (0,034)	0,122* (0,048)
Experience							
EU Knowledge	-0,162*** (0,034)	-0,004 (0,033)	-0,002 (0,033)	0,069 (0,055)	0,166*** (0,041)	0,072* (0,035)	0,266*** (0,050)
EU visit	-0,153*** (0,035)	-0,159*** (0,032)	-0,142*** (0,032)	0,063 (0,055)	0,084* (0,041)	-0,064 (0,035)	0,407*** (0,059)
Attitudes							
More trust in EU than national	0,009 (0,033)	0,087** (0,032)	0,058 (0,032)	0,676*** (0,053)	0,376*** (0,040)	0,293*** (0,035)	0,160*** (0,047)
EU benefits - personal	0,024 (0,032)	0,187*** (0,031)	0,174*** (0,030)	1,049*** (0,055)	0,919*** (0,039)	0,441*** (0,033)	0,437*** (0,049)
National identity	0,221*** (0,033)	0,232*** (0,030)	0,253*** (0,029)	0,582*** (0,043)	0,529*** (0,034)	0,329*** (0,031)	0,293*** (0,043)
Contextual variables							
Foreign population %	-0,076 (0,176)	-0,276 (0,162)	-0,129 (0,157)	-0,327 (0,216)	-0,115 (0,204)	0,255 (0,217)	0,457* (0,192)
Christian %	-0,199 (0,172)	0,065 (0,141)	0,133 (0,146)	-0,057 (0,181)	0,270 (0,171)	0,613** (0,195)	0,671*** (0,191)
Elite Nat, ID – Christian	0,792*** (0,181)						
Elite Nat, ID – Born		0,568*** (0,145)					
Elite Nat, ID – Parents			0,303* (0,157)				
Elite Nat, ID – Law				0,062 (0,165)			
Elite Nat, ID – Feel					0,092 (0,178)		
Elite Nat, ID – Rights						0,200 (0,177)	
Elite Nat, ID – Language							0,566** (0,176)
Wave (2009)	0,074 (0,131)	0,069 (0,115)	0,101 (0,116)	-0,136 (0,160)	0,027 (0,149)	-0,086 (0,159)	0,002 (0,137)
Constant	-0,475*** (0,066)	0,654*** (0,059)	0,453*** (0,059)	2,594*** (0,082)	1,660*** (0,076)	0,990*** (0,081)	2,274*** (0,068)
Observations	22835	22902	22820	22945	22886	22786	23019
Number of groups	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
Log likelihood	-13099,8	-13982,2	-14422,0	-6456,1	-10204,2	-12611,1	-7230,4
AIC	26241,6	28006,5	28886,0	12954,3	20450,5	25264,2	14502,8

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression computed with the xtmelogit command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, x p<0.01 (only for contextual variables). Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 public opinion survey

4.2.2 Elites

Having analyzed the determinants of the different meanings of European identity among average citizens, I now turn to explaining the variability in the perceptions of the elites. The results of regression on the elite data are presented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5.

Table 5.4 Regressions on contents of European identity (Individual-level variables), Elites

Variables	Be Christian	Be Born in Europe	Have European Parents	Respect EU Law	Feel European	Speak a European Language	Exercise Citizen's Rights
CEE New Member states	0,746*** (0,210)	0,207 (0,160)	0,374** (0,140)	-0,369* (0,220)	0,429* (0,249)	0,162 (0,312)	-0,718* (0,289)
Controls							
Age	0,476*** (0,096)	0,211** (0,077)	0,285*** (0,077)	0,073 (0,145)	0,282 (0,153)	0,317* (0,153)	0,636*** (0,131)
Sex (Ref: Woman)	-0,181 (0,119)	0,051 (0,091)	0,070 (0,092)	-0,075 (0,179)	0,334 (0,203)	0,349 (0,195)	0,791*** (0,173)
Religion (Ref: Christian)	2,010*** (0,148)	0,387*** (0,086)	0,476*** (0,086)	-0,160 (0,165)	-0,077 (0,170)	-0,114 (0,172)	0,009 (0,149)
Ideology	1,111*** (0,107)	0,461*** (0,083)	0,471*** (0,083)	0,348* (0,150)	0,024 (0,162)	0,102 (0,157)	-0,144 (0,138)
Resources							
Elites (Ref: Political)	0,292** (0,101)	0,015 (0,080)	0,012 (0,080)	-0,270 (0,156)	-0,226 (0,164)	-0,279 (0,163)	0,097 (0,136)
Experience							
Lived in the EU	0,022 (0,106)	-0,158 (0,086)	-0,013 (0,086)	-0,309 (0,161)	0,358 (0,191)	0,453* (0,188)	-0,514*** (0,146)
Attitudes							
Trust EU	-0,324** (0,100)	0,079 (0,080)	0,046 (0,080)	1,116*** (0,146)	0,770*** (0,156)	0,455** (0,153)	0,586*** (0,133)
EU benefits - country	-0,547* (0,224)	-0,483** (0,181)	-0,527** (0,183)	0,850*** (0,237)	0,971*** (0,256)	1,059*** (0,255)	0,133 (0,275)
National identity	0,118 (0,109)	0,155 (0,082)	0,222** (0,082)	0,378** (0,139)	0,637*** (0,130)	0,434** (0,138)	0,459*** (0,134)
Wave (2009)	-0,195 (0,206)	-0,116 (0,156)	-0,195 (0,136)	-0,073 (0,216)	-0,147 (0,239)	-0,244 (0,303)	
Constant	-1,463*** (0,109)	-0,120 (0,078)	-0,139* (0,068)	2,854*** (0,117)	2,999*** (0,128)	2,968*** (0,158)	1,356*** (0,142)
Observations	3305	3308	3305	3312	3301	3303	1653
Number of groups	33	33	33	33	33	33	16
Log likelihood	-1532,78	-2201,17	-2176,02	-783,38	-717,59	-745,49	-803,54
AIC	3091,56	4428,34	4378,04	1592,77	1461,18	1516,97	1631,08

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression computed with the `xtmelogit` command in Stata. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$ × $p < 0.01$ (only for contextual variables). Data: IntUne 2007 and 2009 elite survey

Overall, we obtain much less significant results for the elites, with some interesting patterns in terms of the East-West difference. Firstly, as far as the impact of the *control variables* is concerned, as for the public opinion, age has a positive effect on almost all elements of identity. There is, however, almost no difference between men and women

except for the consideration of participation in EP elections, as women tend to value this element more highly. Unarguably, the most important effect is that of religion and ideology: rightwing and religious elites value the ethnic elements of European identity considerably higher than the rest. Also political elites seem to emphasize the religious element to a greater extent. Therefore, the socio-demographic variables have stronger effect on the ethnic dimension of European identity: while the consideration of this element by the elites is overall quite low, as the descriptive analysis revealed, older political representatives who identify as Christian are much more likely to consider Christianity as an important element of European belonging.

In terms of the other independent variables, the item which operationalizes *experience* yields mixed results: while having lived in another EU country contributes to a greater consideration of the linguistic factor, quite surprisingly, it actually decreases the probability of the elites of considering participation as important to European identity. However, we find the most pronounced effect of evaluative *attitudes*: considering EU membership as beneficial correlates rather strongly with the civic elements of European identity (except for the participatory factor) and actually reduces the probability of considering ethnic elements as relevant by the elites. Finally, national attachment has a significant and positive effect on civic elements.

As far as the East-West differences are concerned, we observe *the effect of the new member states* dummy on several elements of European belonging. On the one hand, even when we account for all relevant alternative explanatory factors, elites from the new member states are more likely to emphasize the element of ancestry (having European parents) and religion as relevant to European belonging. On the other hand, they are also significantly less likely to consider the normative and participatory factors as important to being considered European, as compared to their Western counterparts. Finally, they are also slightly more likely to consider the voluntaristic element as important.

The inclusion of contextual variable (Table 5.5) does not improve further any of the models, therefore, I restrict the discussion of the results to the individual-level predictors.

Table 5.5 Regression on contents of European identity, (Contextual variable) Elites

Variables	Be Christian	Be Born in Europe	Have European Parents	Respect EU Law	Feel European	Speak a European Language	Exercise Citizen's Rights
CEE New Member states	0,935*** (0,259)	0,296 (0,201)	0,469** (0,175)	0,006 (0,299)	0,339 (0,319)	0,137 (0,400)	-0,699 (0,562)
Controls							
Age	0,478*** (0,096)	0,212** (0,077)	0,287*** (0,077)	0,080 (0,145)	0,279 (0,153)	0,316* (0,153)	0,636*** (0,131)
Sex (<i>Ref. Woman</i>)	-0,181 (0,119)	0,051 (0,091)	0,069 (0,092)	-0,070 (0,179)	0,333 (0,203)	0,349 (0,195)	0,791*** (0,173)
Religion (<i>Ref. Christian</i>)	2,026*** (0,149)	0,391*** (0,086)	0,482*** (0,087)	-0,127 (0,166)	-0,084 (0,171)	-0,115 (0,173)	0,009 (0,149)
Ideology	1,109*** (0,107)	0,459*** (0,083)	0,468*** (0,083)	0,330* (0,150)	0,027 (0,163)	0,103 (0,157)	-0,144 (0,138)
Resources							
Elites (<i>Ref. Political</i>)	0,288** (0,101)	0,014 (0,080)	0,012 (0,080)	-0,272 (0,156)	-0,225 (0,164)	-0,279 (0,163)	0,097 (0,136)
Experience							
Lived in the EU	0,024 (0,106)	-0,157 (0,086)	-0,011 (0,086)	-0,296 (0,161)	0,356 (0,191)	0,452* (0,188)	-0,513*** (0,146)
Attitudes							
Trust EU	-0,327** (0,100)	0,077 (0,080)	0,043 (0,080)	1,101*** (0,146)	0,774*** (0,156)	0,456** (0,153)	0,586*** (0,133)
EU benefits - country	-0,545* (0,224)	-0,484** (0,181)	-0,528** (0,183)	0,842*** (0,237)	0,973*** (0,256)	1,059*** (0,255)	0,133 (0,275)
National identity	0,123 (0,109)	0,157 (0,082)	0,225** (0,082)	0,392** (0,138)	0,634*** (0,130)	0,434** (0,138)	0,459*** (0,134)
Contextual variable							
Foreign population %	0,312 (0,255)	0,145 (0,200)	0,155 (0,174)	0,577 (0,324)	-0,145 (0,321)	-0,041 (0,403)	0,025 (0,623)
Wave (2009)	-0,176 (0,202)	-0,109 (0,155)	-0,187 (0,135)	-0,062 (0,204)	-0,151 (0,239)	-0,246 (0,304)	
Constant	-1,463*** (0,107)	-0,119 (0,077)	-0,138* (0,067)	2,857*** (0,112)	2,999*** (0,128)	2,967*** (0,158)	1,357*** (0,144)
Observations	3305	3308	3305	3312	3301	3303	1653
Number of groups	33	33	33	33	33	33	16
Log likelihood	-1532,04	-2200,91	-2175,62	-781,72	-717,49	-745,48	-803,54
AIC	3092,09	4429,81	4379,24	1591,44	1462,98	1518,96	1633,08

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a multilevel logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, *<0.05 (only for contextual variables). Data: Intune 2007 and 2009 elite survey

5. Conclusions

This chapter addressed two issues related to the concept of a European identity in the enlarged EU: on one hand, I analyzed the meanings of European belonging in a comparative perspective, on the other hand, I explored the differences between new and old member states in this aspect. The principal conclusion which can be drawn from the empirical analysis presented in this chapter is that, overall, we observe the strongest differences between new and old member states among the elites, while average citizens seem to be quite similar in terms of their perceptions of what it means to be European.

As far as the two dimensions of European identification are concerned, we observe that elites and public alike emphasize to a much greater extent European belonging based on civic elements (H.5 confirmed). The elements on which most consensus is observed, both between old and new member states, elites and citizens alike, is the importance of the respect of European laws and institutions and speaking European language in order to be considered a European citizen. This reveals the prevalent idea of EU as a community based on civic values, sustained in almost equal measure by elites and the public of all member states across the EU. While the normative and linguistic factors are widely accepted as the most important elements defining European belonging, we find much variation on the participatory element (exercising citizens' rights for public opinion, and participating in EP elections for elites), and its significance is especially low for the CEE new member states' elites. The latter finding might indicate the effect of a shorter socialization in European institutions. Finally, both elites and average citizens in the new member states tend to emphasize more the idea that actually feeling European is key to being European. This observation is very relevant from the point of view of the findings from the previous chapter – it further confirms that for the new European citizens, European identity is to greater extent problematized as a self-perception, rather than for their Western counterparts.

In terms of the ethnic-based formulation of European citizenship, the main finding is that being Christian is considered as the least important element defining European belonging. Moreover, for average citizens, contrary to initial expectations, there is no East/West difference regarding the idea that being Christian is important to being European (H7a rejected). Furthermore, once we control for the effects of elite formulation of national identity, the difference also ceases to be significant for the consideration of the ethnic elements: having European parents and being born in Europe. Therefore, in line with my

theoretical assumption that the way elites construct identities affects the content of European identity, the findings suggest that citizens tend to consider European identity in ethnic terms in countries where elites emphasize more such ethnic-based concept of national identity, and religion and language are politicized as markers of national belonging. Consequently, we must reject the hypothesis that the elements related to ancestry (being born in European and having European parents) are more important to the citizens of the new member states (H6a rejected). For the elites, on the other hand the findings of this study suggest that there is in fact an East-West difference, and elites from new member states actually emphasize to a greater extent the religious factor (H.7b confirmed) as well as value more the element of ancestry as relevant to European belonging (H.6b confirmed).

As far as the determinants of different conceptualizations of European identity are concerned, higher levels of education clearly reduce the probability of considering ethnic-based components of European identity as important, while religious identity and age constitute good predictors for such considerations. In terms of the civic concept of European belonging, there is a positive association with higher education levels, and a small effect of socialization by means of visiting other EU countries for the public opinion. Finally, in terms of the elite-public opinion link, we find strong correlation between elite positions regarding national identities and individual attitudes in terms of religious, ethnic and linguistic elements of European identity.

To conclude, while European identification is mostly formulated in civic terms, it is also quite country specific. The analysis presented in the chapter disproves a strong and stable difference between new and old member states among average citizens, once we account for relevant individual-level differences and the effect of how national identity is constructed by the elites. Therefore, in spite of the diversification resultant from the Eastern enlargement of the EU, European political identity is still formulated as a normative and secular idea, contradicting the claim that it would “bring religion back” in the process of European identity construction. The importance of the ethnic, religious, and linguistic elements of European identification seems to be strongly conditioned by the way in which national elites construct identities across Europe; their consideration as relevant for national belonging might spill over to European identity and foster a much more exclusionary construct than the project of a civic based post-national belonging assumes.

6. Annexes to chapter 5

Table 5.6 Ethnic elements of European identity, Public opinion (2007 and 2009)

For being European how important it is to...	Be Christian		Be Born in Europe		Have European Parents		Overall share ethnic elements
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	
Austria	40,57	43,50	61,5	66,1	55,4	59,2	54,4
Belgium	28,77	29,05	59,8	57,3	54,7	52,5	47,0
Denmark	32,76	31,12	55,4	52,7	51,7	49,9	45,6
France	19,16	18,82	53,5	51,7	49,1	46,7	39,8
Germany	40,49	39,96	52,6	52,0	48,5	48,8	47,1
Greece	62,65	55,58	54,9	54,4	49,1	51,6	54,7
Italy	56,28	51,23	82,5	77,2	76,5	72,6	69,4
Portugal	45,01	54,39	76,2	77,8	70,1	71,7	65,9
Spain	32,23	28,51	72,4	69,8	63,6	60,3	54,5
United Kingdom	39,88	36,93	45,6	51,8	37,7	44,4	42,7
Old member states average	39,78	38,91	61,4	61,1	55,7	55,8	52,1
Bulgaria	55,23	56,54	77,6	81,4	74,1	78,6	70,6
Estonia	30,06	27,47	59,6	57,6	56,0	53,9	47,4
Hungary	36,28	36,26	69,8	71,0	70,2	73,3	59,5
Poland	63,57	54,48	77,4	72,8	71,2	67,8	67,9
Slovakia	45,03	43,91	71,1	73,7	67,2	71,5	62,1
Slovenia	31,26	29,01	60,7	60,2	54,0	53,3	48,1
New member states average	43,57	41,28	69,34	69,5	65,5	66,4	59,2
<i>Difference OMS/NMS</i>	<i>3,79</i>	<i>2,37</i>	<i>7,91</i>	<i>8,37</i>	<i>9,81</i>	<i>10,64</i>	<i>7,15</i>

Note: Survey question: People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following? Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important. Entries in the table are percentages of "important" and very important". Data: IntUne survey 2007 and 2009 for public opinion.

Table 5.7 Civic elements of European identity, Public opinion (2007 and 2009)

For being European how important it is to...	Respect European Law and Institutions		Feel European		Master a European Language		Exercise citizen's rights		Overall share civic elements
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	
Austria	87,9	85,0	82,4	81,5	95,2	93,6	85,3	75,3	85,8
Belgium	91,4	90,9	75,6	73,9	95,0	92,7	64,5	60,8	80,6
Denmark	91,4	91,5	80,0	79,2	91,2	93,2	59,6	53,8	80,0
France	90,7	89,1	75,7	74,7	89,5	87,5	71,9	67,7	80,8
Germany	88,5	88,8	71,5	74,1	93,5	94,0	67,2	68,3	80,7
Greece	86,5	85,4	67,9	73,1	85,5	82,0	74,7	77,9	79,1
Italy	96,7	95,5	90,7	88,8	95,0	94,8	87,8	87,3	92,1
Portugal	94,8	93,2	87,6	85,9	93,2	92,7	87,0	85,7	90,0
Spain	90,0	90,6	80,2	76,2	87,2	88,3	81,4	76,8	83,8
United Kingdom	80,1	82,4	56,1	59,6	78,3	78,0	63,3	63,3	70,1
Old member states average	89,8	89,2	76,8	76,7	90,3	89,7	74,3	71,7	82,3
Bulgaria	95,9	94,3	91,3	88,8	86,4	84,5	78,4	79,4	87,4
Estonia	89,9	92,5	83,7	76,9	91,6	91,7	71,5	67,3	83,1
Hungary	95,3	93,7	89,8	92,2	88,1	86,0	63,0	63,8	84,0
Poland	91,4	90,2	88,2	88,0	89,7	87,9	74,8	74,1	85,5
Slovakia	90,1	91,2	85,2	88,1	90,6	91,4	59,9	58,7	81,9
Slovenia	91,2	89,6	80,3	77,5	92,2	91,2	66,2	63,9	81,5
New member states average	92,3	91,9	86,4	85,2	89,8	88,8	69,0	67,9	83,9
<i>Difference OMS/NMS</i>	<i>+2,50</i>	<i>+2,66</i>	<i>+9,65</i>	<i>+8,55</i>	<i>-0,59</i>	<i>-0,89</i>	<i>-5,27</i>	<i>-3,81</i>	<i>+1,60</i>

Note: Survey question: People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following? Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important. Entries in the table are percentages of "important" and very important". Data: IntUne Public Opinion survey 2007 and 2009.

Table 5.8 Ethnic elements of European identity, Elites (2007 and 2009)

For being European how important it is to...	Be Christian		Be Born in Europe		Have European Parents		Overall share ethnic elements
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	
Austria	22,1	17,0	33,9	37,6	32,1	33,1	29,3
Belgium	9,9	14,0	30,7	34,3	36,3	33,0	26,4
Denmark	24,2	8,0	34,7	30,0	36,1	31,4	27,4
France	21,6	11,4	49,6	52,5	57,4	50,4	40,5
Germany	31,2	34,8	34,2	29,2	35,3	28,9	32,2
Greece	31,1	18,9	50,4	40,5	49,6	47,3	39,6
Italy	38,9	42,9	67,2	55,5	52,8	55,5	52,1
Portugal	20,8	9,2	62,5	53,3	59,2	48,3	42,2
Spain	19,3	10,1	54,7	47,3	46,9	44,6	37,2
United Kingdom	4,3	9,3	24,3	41,3	22,9	29,4	21,9
Old member states average	22,3	17,6	44,2	42,1	42,9	40,2	34,9
Estonia	38,2	n/d	74,1	n/d	71,2	n/d	n/d
Bulgaria	41,6	31,5	52,0	44,8	49,2	45,9	44,2
Czech Republic	28,6	16,8	46,3	54,7	47,9	42,1	39,4
Hungary	30,3	24,8	47,5	41,7	60,7	45,5	41,7
Lithuania	37,7	47,5	47,8	51,6	55,3	53,7	48,9
Poland	55,4	53,0	62,8	53,3	66,9	59,3	58,5
Slovakia	34,2	24,4	52,1	56,7	56,4	53,3	46,2
New member states average	38,0	33,0	54,7	50,5	58,2	50,0	46,5
<i>Difference OMS/NMS</i>	+15,7	+15,5	+10,4	+8,3	+15,4	+9,8	+11,6

Note: Survey question: People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following? Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important. Entries in the table are percentages of “important” and very important”. Data: IntUne Elite survey 2007 and 2009.

Table 5.9 Civic elements of European identity, Elites (2007 and 2009)

For being European how important it is to...	Respect European Law and Institutions		Feel European		Master a European Language		Participate in EP elections	Overall share civic elements
	2007	2009	2007	2009	2007	2009	2009	2009
Austria	94,7	97,5	92,9	94,9	92,9	95,8	78,8	91,8
Belgium	94,4	95,3	87,7	88,0	87,7	97,2	85,9	91,6
Denmark	92,9	94,1	85,6	83,7	85,6	100,0	94,0	93,0
France	93,9	91,7	96,5	95,9	96,5	96,7	88,5	93,2
Germany	90,2	91,1	83,7	86,1	83,7	99,3	91,9	92,1
Greece	95,8	94,6	98,4	98,7	98,4	64,9	78,9	84,3
Italy	97,6	98,3	91,1	94,1	91,1	92,4	66,2	87,8
Portugal	90,8	85,8	98,3	95,8	98,3	94,2	78,2	88,5
Spain	97,3	96,6	96,6	93,9	96,6	91,2	74,2	89,0
Great Britain	84,3	84,4	85,7	85,2	85,7	89,0	79,7	84,6
Old member states average	93,2	93,0	91,7	91,6	91,7	92,1	81,6	89,6
Estonia	98,2	n/d	97,3	n/d	97,3	n/d	n/d	n/d
Bulgaria	98,4	96,3	94,4	94,8	94,4	93,2	82,8	91,8
Czech Republic	86,0	87,4	88,4	88,4	88,4	92,6	66,3	83,7
Hungary	90,0	89,2	98,3	94,0	98,3	94,2	51,7	82,3
Lithuania	95,7	93,4	94,9	94,3	94,9	95,0	64,8	86,9
Poland	85,0	88,9	99,2	97,0	99,2	91,0	76,1	88,3
Slovakia	97,4	91,7	97,4	94,2	97,4	92,5	68,4	86,7
New member states average	92,9	91,1	95,7	93,8	95,7	93,1	68,4	86,6
<i>Difference OMS/NMS</i>	-0,2	-1,8	+4,1	+2,2	+4,1	+1,0	-13,3	-3,0

Note: Survey question: People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following? Very important, somewhat important, not very important, not at all important. Entries in the table are percentages of “important” and very important”. Data: IntUne Elite survey 2007 and 2009.

Chapter 6

Identities or interests? Consequences of European identity for EU support, before and after the crisis

“Certainly, you have to go far in Western Europe to find such enthusiastic Europeans –that is, supporters of a supranational community called Europe–, as you will find at every turn in Eastern Europe. Travelling to and fro between the two halves of the divided continent, I have sometimes thought that the real divide is between those (in the West) who have Europe and those (in the East) who believe in it. And everywhere, in all the lands, the phrase people use to sum up what is happening is ‘the return to Europe’.”

– Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern*

1. Introduction

In the previous chapters, I explored the extent to which we can speak of a European identity across the enlarged EU, and the determinants of such European identification in new and old member states. I demonstrated that, while the new European citizens from Central and Eastern Europe are very much attached to Europe (affective identity), their self-perception as Europeans (cognitive identity) remains significantly lower. However, this does not mean that they reject their newly acquired supranational belonging, rather, we observe a generational gap, as young people are similar in both groups, while it is the older citizens in the new member states that perceive themselves to a lesser extent as Europeans, a fact which could be explained by the effects of their shorter socialization as members of the European political community. Moreover, in the previous chapter, I also discussed the elements which delimit European belonging in the minds of Europeans and I determined that, while it is a predominantly civic concept, national elites’ discourses regarding national identity—if it is constructed as more exclusive and ethnic-based belonging—could also foster a less open type

of European identification. Having analyzed the determinants and the contents of European identity, in what follows I explore the consequences of European identification for European support.

As discussed in chapter 2, the focus in comparative empirical research on Central and Eastern European attitudes—both as candidate countries, as well as member states—has been so far on the utilitarian and ideological factors in relation to support for European integration. However, as argued in the introduction, affective determinants, and especially the European identity issue, have become central to the current understanding of public opinion regarding the European Union (Hooghe and Marks 2005; de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007; Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De Vreese 2013). Moreover, the ongoing economic and financial crisis sparked debates on matters of solidarity and legitimacy in transnational governance across Europe, further highlighting the functional role of identification with European political institutions (Fuchs 2011b), especially as a buffer against discontent (Wessels 2007).

The economic downturn which occurred at the end of the first decade of the XXI century (sometimes referred to as the Great Recession), triggered severe recessions in almost all EU countries, accompanied by banking and sovereign debt crises in various Eurozone countries. These developments contributed to a deep change in the perceptions of the EU, as it no longer can be viewed as a guarantor of economic stability. The problems in the EU-15⁹⁵ member states of Southern EU periphery, and the resulting division between debtors and creditor countries received a great deal of attention in the media and political discourse. These perceived difficulties could undermine their “unconditional support” for membership—a general positive image of the EU, which was a key dimension of support for EU membership in CEE-10 countries before accession (Guerra 2013a, 143). Moreover, most of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe also experienced deep economic problems precisely because upon choosing market economy in their post-1989 transition they opted for a deeper connection to the global economy in general, and the European economy in particular.

⁹⁵ EU-15 denotes the fifteen EU member states before the Eastern enlargement, EU-17 refers to these fifteen member states plus Malta and Cyprus, CEE-10 is short for the ten Central Eastern European new member states.

In this context, I explore the importance of political identities as determinants of EU attitudes in the new member states, comparing to utilitarian factors, before and after the crisis has made its mark on public opinion perceptions of the EU. The main assumption is that, the above described problems could seriously undermine the perception of benefits from membership, a central determinant of EU support, according to the utilitarian approach (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007; Gabel and Palmer 1995). Therefore, I argue that almost ten years after the first Eastern enlargement, given the perceived declining performance of European economy and the issue of solidarity as the main challenge ahead, the importance of more stable, affective factors as determinants of EU attitudes must be re-evaluated.

The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I discuss the impact of the Great Recession on the perceptions of the EU and European identity. Consequently, on the basis of the comprehensive model of EU attitude formation which takes into account the influence of political identities and utilitarian factors, I formulate several hypotheses related to East-West differences and the impact of the crisis. In the empirical part of the chapter, the proposed theoretical model is tested on EU perceptions in Central and Eastern European countries, immediately after the accession and after the Great Recession has reshaped public opinion across Europe. Subsequently, the same model is applied to the whole of the EU-27 as I further test for the differential impact of interests and identities, between East and West. Finally, the empirical results are discussed, focusing on the importance of political identities as a key element in structuring European attitudes, and the changing character of the utilitarian factor in the new member states.

2. Interests and identities before and after the crisis: research hypotheses

While much research in the recent decades has addressed the issue of attitudes towards European integration and its determinants in Western and Southern Europe, the Eastward enlargement brought about academic interest in the structure and determinants of mass attitudes in the post-socialist new member states (Kucia 1999; Cichowski 2000; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004; Tverdova and Anderson 2004; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006; Christin 2005; Garry and Tilley 2009; Wagner 2012; Guerra 2013a; Guerra 2013b). Most of these studies focus specifically on EU support before or/and after accession and approach the issue as a test of the applicability of existing theories to CEE countries. The existing theoretical frameworks and empirical studies regarding attitudes towards European integration are discussed in details in chapter 2 and 3, therefore, here, I will only summarize the most important points which drive my research hypotheses.

The first issue which must be addressed are the possible differences in the factors which shape mass opinion in the new and the old EU member states. Historical experience of socialist regimes, nation-building under adverse circumstances, and, more recently, an intense period of market-building and democratic reforms which deeply re-structured societies in Central and Eastern Europe, could all affect the way in which the new European citizens relate to the issue of European integration, as discussed in chapter 3. While some scholars suggest that these processes structure differently EU attitudes and identities in the CEE-10 member states (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006), others argue the cognitive processes which underlie EU attitude formation in new and old member states are very similar (Sanders et al. 2012, 229). This study contributes to this debate by testing several hypotheses regarding the determinants of EU attitudes and the role of identities in new and old member states. In view of the previous studies on the topic, I do not assume that there are any essential differences in the cognitive processes between East and West of Europe, but I am still interested in how the changing context of accession and economic problems which emerged in the early phase of membership affect the ways in which attitudes are formed in the CEE member states.

In terms of specific predictors of public opinion attitudes towards the EU in these new member states, early studies put much emphasis on the *ideological preferences* as

determinants of EU support: their basic expectations was that attitudes towards democracy and market economy should constitute the most important predictors of support for the planned EU membership (Cichowski 2000; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006). Another relevant explanatory framework is that of *domestic proxies*, which relies on the observation that most citizens of Central and Eastern European new member states have a very limited knowledge of the institutions of the EU and, therefore, have to rely on clues from national institutions in forming their opinion on European integration (Guerra 2008; Wagner 2012). However, the most widely accepted explanation of EU support in the region is that of *instrumental rationality*. As the quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates, people in CEE-10 new member countries were hopeful that implementing democracy, capitalism, and the joining the EU as a guarantee for these changes, would improve their lives in many ways, and the process was framed as a symbolic “return to Europe”, as discussed in chapter 3 (Cichowski 2000). However, the deep economic and social changes which occurred post-1989 and continued in the framework of European integration have been also very costly for some people. Thus, scholars of EU support in Central and Eastern Europe often focus on utilitarian considerations based on the experience of transition to capitalism as their central explanatory dimension. The findings of these studies confirm that winners of post-socialist transitions tend to be significantly more pro-European (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002; Caplanova, Orviska, and Hudson 2004; Tverdova and Anderson 2004). Moreover, some authors argue that, after accession, the importance of the utilitarian factor becomes more salient as determinant of support, underlining further the importance of economic perceptions in the region (Guerra 2013a). Therefore, the first hypothesis which will be tested in this chapter is related to the possible difference between new and old member states, and the role of such utilitarian considerations. Since EU accession of CEE countries has been framed to a great extent in terms of its benefits, I expect that these factors will have a more pronounced effect in the new member states than in the more established EU countries:

H.8 Utilitarian considerations constitute a stronger predictor of positive EU perceptions in the CEE new member states, than in the old member states.

While the research on EU attitudes in the CEE-10 countries has been mostly focused on interests as their principal determinants, European and national identification, as well as perception of threats have been confirmed as one of the principal determinants of attitudes in recent research (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006; de

Vries and van Kersbergen 2007; Wessels 2007; de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008).

The affective approach considers not only European identification, but also national identities and identity threat as key determinants of European attitudes. As discussed in chapter 1, the most relevant distinction is to be made between national identities which are inclusive of European identity and those which remain exclusive of such identification (Hooghe and Marks 2005). In this sense, national identity formulated as exclusive of the European element, constitutes a strong predictor of Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005). From this point of view, a stronger national allegiance could constitute an obstacle to support the EU in the CEE-10. This could be the case especially in the newly independent countries where accession to supranational institutions could constitute a bigger threat to national identities (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is important to investigate the meanings of identities. Specifically, in CEE countries European integration has been considered as a way to assure national independence and sovereignty, as well as a guarantee of further modernization and democratization (Grabbe and Hughes 1999). As such, the newly found political sovereignty has been configured as essentially embedded in Western institutions and economies. This is what the catchphrase “return to Europe” encapsulated—establishing institutional frameworks similar to those of Western European countries and asserting the “essentially European character of national identity” (Batt 2002, 1). Therefore, it is entirely possible that following the accession national identity does not constitute an obstacle to the formation of positive attitudes in the region, and cognitive and affective European identification constitute important foundations of stable EU support. In this sense, as summarized in hypothesis 9, I expect that the impact of identity will be at least as significant as that of utilitarian interests:

***H.9** In the new member states, identities constitute at least as strong of a predictor of positive EU perceptions as utilitarian considerations.*

Finally, in terms of how the crisis has affected attitudes towards the EU in old and new member states, this chapter argues that almost ten years after the first Eastern enlargement, and given the perceived declining performance of European economy and the issue of solidarity as the main challenge ahead, the importance of more stable, affective factors must be re-evaluated. Undoubtedly, the economic and financial crisis has substantially undermined the perception of benefits from membership and the image of the

EU as a guarantor of economic stability. Since European identity can function as a buffer against discontent and a “reservoir of goodwill” which might maintain support for a political system in times of declining outputs, I check whether, in line with such assumption, its impact is greater after the crisis. This is summarized in hypothesis 10:

***H.10** The effect of European identity as a predictor of positive EU perceptions is stronger after the effects of the crisis have made its mark on European public opinion.*

In order to explore the consequences of European identity on EU perceptions, I test the proposed hypotheses in a series of statistical models of public opinion survey data immediately after the accession (2004) and after the Great Recession has made an impact on the perceptions of average citizens. While I am chiefly interested in the way in which attitudes are formed in the new member states, in order to be able to draw conclusions about possible differences between CEE-10 and the old member states of EU-15, I present both a country-by-country test of the proposed theoretical model, as well as a single hierarchical model for EU-27, controlling for the effect of new member states. In contrast to the previous chapters, in the absence of suitable data, I am unable to develop the analysis for the elites as well.


3. The impact of the crisis on European attitudes

While the 2004-2007 Eastern enlargement constituted an unprecedented challenge to the European Union, soon enough another, even greater challenge arose. The onset of the global financial crisis and the ensuing recession, followed by the banking and sovereign debt crises in several EU member states have painfully highlighted the flaws inherent in the setup of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The political inability of European leaders to efficiently tackle the problems, and the austerity measures which followed, proved to be a ripe ground for populism and a growing popular and party-based Euroscepticism (Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013; Demetriou 2014), even in countries such as Germany, where questioning the foundations of European integrations was until recently unthinkable (Scicluna 2014).

Whereas problems in the periphery of the old member states focused most of the attention in the coverage of the European branch of the crisis, new member states also paid a high price for choosing the Western economic model. As the graph below illustrates, GDP growth in the CEE EU member states after the 2004 enlargement has been steadily higher than the average of the EU-15, contributing to a closing of the gap in GDP between new and old member states. However, after experiencing several years of economic boom, when the financial crisis made its mark on European economies, recessions hit the CEE economies harder than most of the old member states (see Figure 6.1) and further divisions emerged between these countries.

Poland is the only EU economy which managed to avoid recession at the end of the first decade of the XXI century. The Baltic countries, on the other hand, have deeply suffered the disadvantages of deregulated capitalism. As early as 2008-2009 these champions of neoliberal market policies experienced profound recessions, managing to overcome the problems relatively quickly by implementing even more reforms at the expense of their citizens' suffering. As Tsoukalis (2014) notes, the Soviet experience seems to have prepared them for endurance and pain which followed from more structural reforms during the crisis. Moreover, countries such as Romania and Hungary continue to suffer from a combination of slower change with erroneous policy choices and both had to apply for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF, when the global economic downturn struck Europe. Overall, as Connolly remarks, with the exception of Poland, the region suffered "a more severe reversal of pre-crisis output trends than any other region of the world economy" (Connolly 2012, 64).

Figure 6.1 GDP growth (2004-2012)




Note: Graph represents percentage change over previous period. The detailed data for all EU-27 countries can be found in the annex to this chapter. Data: Eurostat.

Problems in the periphery of the Eurozone also affected the CEE-10 countries more directly. Slovakia, for instance, as a Eurozone member, was one of the countries which contributed to the first bailout of Greece. This caused a severe government crisis and public opinion uproar, as it was portrayed in the media as “the poor Slovaks paying for the rich Greeks” (*The Economist* 2010). Thus, just a few years after becoming EU members, as a result of the global financial crisis, the “downside of capitalist system embedded in a global economic order” was revealed in CEE-10 countries (Hoen 2011, 31) and some of the previously established roles within the community have been inverted. Problems did not come from the new member states, rather from the heart of the pre-existing institutional setup and longer-established members. In the crisis, the CEE countries were “green islands” (Poland), champions of reform (the Baltic states) and even contributors to the rescue funds constituted to save some of the most troubled EU members (Slovakia, and the rest of the CEE countries which adopted euro as their currency in the recent years). In what follows, I explore how these challenges affected European attitudes in three aspects: the image of the EU, its perceived meanings, and the levels of European identity. As in the previous parts of this thesis, my substantial focus is on the comparison between new and old member states of the EU.

3.1 Perception of the EU

As the effects of the crisis made its mark on public opinion, popular support for integration suffered a clear decline over the recent years. The economic problems triggered by the global financial crisis have been successfully exploited as political munition among populist, nationalist, and Eurosceptic parties, as the 2014 elections to the European Parliament made clear. These changes in the perceptions of the EU are very easily traceable when we look at public opinion surveys of EU attitudes from the last decade.

Figure 6.2 Change in perception of the European Union (2004-2012)



Note: Survey question: In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? Responses very positive and fairly positive grouped as “Positive” and fairly negative and very negative grouped as “Negative”. EU-15 – EU member states before 2004, CEE-10 – ten new member states from Central Eastern Europe who joined in 2004/2007.

As Figure 6.2 illustrates, in the period around the Eastern accession (2004-2007) more than 50% of European citizens held a positive image of the EU, and only 10-15% exhibited a negative stance, with a slightly higher share in the old member states. At that point, around one third of European public opinion remained neutral regarding the EU and did not admit to holding either a positive or a negative image. These numbers, however, became quite different as the economic problems unraveled. In 2012, only one third of EU citizens remained positive about the EU in the old member states, and those holding a positive view of the EU (30%) were actually outnumbered by those with a negative

perception (31,5%). This change was slightly less dramatic in the CEE-10 new member states. We can see that there positive perceptions dropped to less than 40% but in contrast to the more established members, still the share of those with a negative view of the EU is only around 20%. Therefore, it seems that the drop in positive views in CEE-10 countries had as its effect a bigger number of people without a clear image of the EU, rather than a dramatic rise in negative attitudes, as occurred in the old member states of the EU.

If we look further at the ways in which these perceptions changed in different EU countries, we can see that, as could be expected, the biggest drops in support can be observed in the EU-15 periphery most hardly hit by the Eurozone crisis (see Table 6.1). Unsurprisingly, positive perceptions of the EU in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland plummeted by 30-40% during the crisis and the negative views rose by 20-30%. As a result, by 2012 the share of positive stances dropped to less than 30% in EU-15, and negative views of the EU almost doubled. Unsurprisingly, Britain is the most acute example of popular Euroscepticism in the old member states—in 2012 only 16% of the Brits still hold a positive view of the EU while almost half of the citizens (47%) have a negative image. Positive perceptions of the EU in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe dropped significantly as well, however, here the drop was less steep, as observed before. In contrast to the old member states, new European citizens became to greater extent neutral about the EU (almost 45%) and in 2012 positive views of the EU (average of 35%) still outnumbered the negative stance (around 20%) in CEE countries. Among the most Eurosceptic new member states, we find Czech Republic and Hungary, with slightly more than one third of its citizens considering that the EU has a negative image.

Table 6.1 Perceptions of the EU, by country (2004/2012)


Country	2004			2012			Change 2004/2012		
	Negative %	Neutral %	Positive %	Negative %	Neutral %	Positive %	Negative %	Neutral %	Positive %
Austria	26,7	39,1	34,3	36,0	41,5	22,6	+9,3	+2,4	-11,7
Belgium	8,4	31,9	59,8	24,7	38,5	36,8	+16,4	+6,6	-23,0
Denmark	20,6	39,8	39,6	18,5	49,0	32,5	-2,0	+9,1	-7,1
Finland	22,0	44,1	33,9	33,2	44,9	21,9	+11,2	+0,8	-12,0
France	16,7	28,9	54,4	26,8	33,4	39,8	+10,1	+4,5	-14,6
Germany	16,4	36,9	46,7	26,5	43,7	29,8	+10,1	+6,8	-16,9
Great Britain	30,5	33,9	35,5	47,1	36,6	16,4	+16,5	+2,7	-19,2
Greece	10,2	30,2	59,6	41,7	32,7	25,6	+31,5	+2,6	-34,0
Ireland	5,0	17,6	77,4	28,9	34,4	36,7	+23,9	+16,8	-40,7
Italy	7,5	26,1	66,4	29,6	40,3	30,2	+22,1	+14,1	-36,2
Luxembourg	9,8	28,3	61,9	24,1	34,2	41,8	+14,3	+5,9	-20,2
Portugal	12,7	27,3	60,0	38,2	36,8	25,0	+25,5	+9,5	-35,0
Spain	6,6	31,3	62,1	33,9	43,3	22,8	+27,3	+12,0	-39,3
Sweden	31,5	30,0	38,6	33,3	37,2	29,5	+1,9	+7,2	-9,1
The Netherlands	17,0	39,2	43,8	30,1	35,7	34,3	+13,1	-3,5	-9,6
Mean EU-15	16,1	32,3	51,6	31,5	38,8	29,7	+15,4	+6,5	-21,9
Bulgaria	10,0	21,8	68,2	15,4	29,6	55,0	+5,4	+7,8	-13,2
Czech Republic	20,6	41,4	38,0	34,0	43,7	22,3	+13,5	+2,3	-15,7
Estonia	12,6	50,2	37,2	12,2	54,0	33,9	-0,4	+3,8	-3,3
Hungary	14,7	40,0	45,3	33,3	42,7	24,0	+18,6	+2,7	-21,3
Latvia	15,4	44,8	39,8	15,5	58,9	25,7	+0,1	+14,1	-14,2
Lithuania	5,0	33,0	62,0	11,6	53,7	34,8	+6,6	+20,7	-27,3
Poland	11,3	41,6	47,1	14,2	45,3	40,5	+2,9	+3,7	-6,5
Romania	4,3	14,5	81,1	14,6	35,1	50,4	+10,2	+20,5	-30,8
Slovakia	11,3	43,4	45,4	23,4	42,5	34,1	+12,2	-0,9	-11,3
Slovenia	5,2	30,5	64,3	23,6	37,4	39,0	+18,4	+6,9	-25,3
Mean CEE-10	11,0	36,1	52,8	19,8	44,3	36,0	+8,7	+8,1	-16,9

Data: Eurobarometer 62.0 (2004) and 77.3 (2012). Entries in the table are percentages.

3.2 Meanings of the EU

The increase in general Euroscepticism is not the only result of the economic problems of the recent years. Another way to understand the changes in European public opinion in the last decade is to look at the meanings which citizens attach to the EU. In this sense, the rise in general negative attitudes, is accompanied by a significant drop in the share of citizens who consider the EU can still be associated with some of its traditional positive goals and values. Most notably, in 2012 significantly fewer citizens continue to believe that the EU embodies its founding values of preserving peace and democracy (see figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 Meanings of the EU in new and old member states (2004 and 2012)




Note: Question: What does the EU mean to you personally? The figures show the average share of respondents who mentioned the item in a given year. Cyprus and Malta excluded. Data: EB 62.0 and EB 77.3.

The drop in positive meanings is especially apparent as far as EU association with economic prosperity is concerned. Between 2004 and 2012, the share of citizens who think that European integration entails economic well-being halved in the countries of EU-15. This drop is even steeper among the citizens of the new member states. While in 2004 CEE-10 citizens were significantly more positive about the fact that EU membership could bring economic prosperity than their Western counterparts, there has been a negative convergence, and in 2012 only around 14% –one third of the 2004 level–continue to believe so. Here it can be assumed that such drop is, at least partially, the effect of a more direct experience of integration after 2004 and the realization that the EU will not bring economic propensity overnight, and not only the consequence of economic crisis.

Finally, there are also positive developments. In terms of threat perception, and in spite of the rise in popularity of parties with nationalist stances, the share of citizens who consider the EU to be threat to national identity has actually dropped between 2004 and 2012. It is especially low in the new member states (less than 10%), a picture which contradicts the view that citizens in these countries could possibly perceive the EU predominantly as a threat to their recently regained sovereignty.

3.3 European identity

As discussed in chapter 1, the role of political identities in political systems' stability lies in the fact that they provide a pool of positive attitudes that helps members to accept or, at least, tolerate outputs the effects of which are not entirely to their benefit (or even opposed to their own interests) (Easton 1979, 273). Therefore, the existence of a well-rooted political identity facilitates the emergence of a more stable support for the political system. Political identity, as part of subjective legitimacy—that is a legitimacy of the political system which rests upon the beliefs of the citizens—, is necessary for a political system to survive major shocks and hard times which might fall on the community pointing to the functional value of identity (Fuchs 2011b). Accordingly, in the context of the EU, empirical studies confirm that European identification serves as a buffer against negative attitudes (Wessels 2007) which puts this element of EU attitudes at the center stage of the developments during the crisis of the first decade of 2000s.

Figure 6.4 European identity (2004 and 2012)

Note: Cognitive European identity: share of “National and European,” “European and National”, “Only European”. Affective European identity: Share of “Very attached” and “Fairly attached” to Europe/European Union. Cyprus and Malta excluded. Data: EB 62.0 and EB 77.3.

In these terms we can observe two major developments in the EU in the context of the Great Recession of the first decade of XXI century (see Figure 6.4). On the one hand, cognitive European identity, has actually grown—in spite of the crisis, slightly more people declare to identify as Europeans⁹⁶ in 2012 than in 2004, both in new member states, as well as in the old ones. The share of those who identify either as European and national (or the other way round) or solely European is, on average, around 60% in the old member states. Cognitive European identity is slightly lower in CEE-10 countries, as demonstrated in chapter 4, due to shorter socialization of the older generation as European citizens and persistent differences in levels of economic and social welfare. Still, between 2004 and 2012 the share of citizens who acknowledge the European element of their self-perception grows from 50.5% to 53.5% in CEE-10 countries.

The picture is less positive, however, when we look at the affective component of European identity: while in 2004 almost 70% of EU citizens (slightly more in the new

⁹⁶ Here I operationalize European identity in its affective and cognitive aspect, as discussed in chapter 4.

member states than in EU-15, as discussed in chapter 4) declared to feel attached or very attached to Europe, in 2012 this number dropped to around 45%, being still slightly higher in the new member states (48%). These observations further support the theoretical distinction in terms of the two dimensions of identity, as proposed in chapter 1. Cognitive European identity (based on perceived similarity) remains rather stable, while affective identity—established through the association of positive meanings with the object of identification—, decreases as the general opinion of citizens on the EU becomes substantially worse.

What conclusion can be drawn from this initial descriptive picture? Unarguably, Euroscepticism has become an acute issue in the post-recession Europe. However, in the case of the new member states, the predominant trend seems to be towards becoming more neutral, rather, than negative, while negative attitudes increase sharply in EU-15, especially in its Southern periphery. Furthermore, even if after several years of crisis, fewer citizens perceive the EU in the positive terms of peace, democracy, and economic prosperity, feelings of threat to identity have not been activated in spite of the growing presence of Eurosceptic and nationalist parties. European identity remains stable in its cognitive aspect (or even grows, if only slightly) while the affective identification has decreased, but still around 40%-50% of EU citizens feel attached to the EU. In this context the main question of the present chapter is whether such declining perceptions of the EU as an effective economic actor affects the determinants of EU support over this period, especially in terms of the importance of political identities, as the “reservoir of goodwill” which might maintain support for a political system in times of its declining outputs.

4. Research design and data

In order to answer the main question of the chapter, I devise a comparative empirical research design with Eurobarometer data. Specifically, I focus on two time points: autumn 2004 (EB 62.0), shortly after accession of the first group of Central and Eastern European member states, and spring 2012 (EB 77.3), after the Great Recession has made its mark on European economies and societies. Admittedly, in order to trace changes in attitudes over time a panel dataset would be more appropriate, however, this kind of data is not readily available, much less for all Central European countries. Eurobarometer, on the other hand, does include all EU countries in its regular surveys and it could possibly be used to construct a model which would better account for change at the country-level European identification over time. However, the EB does not contain questions regarding perceptions of the EU and identity in most of its studies after 2004. After a careful inspection of the available data, the two chosen datasets constitute the best possible combination of data availability and time spread, to reflect the impact the Great Recession, and more specifically the Eurozone problems, on perceptions of the EU in the new member states.

In chapter 2, I discuss in details the theoretical perspectives which have been put forward to explain variation in EU perceptions. Attitudes of citizens towards the EU are formed at the individual level with intervening factors such as socio-economic characteristics, domestic proxies, economic expectations, values and political identities, all of which have been discussed previously. This chapter, thus, follows the model formulated previously, and explores—within the limits of the dataset at hand—the effects of instrumental rationality and affective factors while controlling for the impact of normative evaluations and domestic proxies.

It is also necessary to take into account the social embeddedness of individuals in the context of specific countries with different economic and political characteristics. Unarguably, such disparities between countries have become more salient with the Eastward enlargement of the EU as the CEE-10 constitute a group of relatively poorer countries. Furthermore, some scholars argue that such differences are also present in terms of attitudes in the new member states, shaped to an important extent by previous non-democratic regimes, with most notable differences in levels of trust (Mishler and Rose 1997; Thomassen and Bäck 2009), civic engagement (Fuchs and Klingemann 2002), and salience of political identities (Weiss 2003). As in the previous chapters, a multilevel model allows me to test for this assumed difference and account adequately for the clustering of the data.

4.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this part of the study is the perception of the European Union, as I am substantially interested in exploring the impact of interests and identity on its positive perceptions. The measure used in this study is the EU image item from the EB study, with the following question:

In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

There are several arguments in favor of using this item. In previous research on EU support this measure has been used less frequently than others, such as positive/negative perception of EU membership or perceived country benefit from membership, both more directly related to regime support. However these more traditional measures have not been repeated in EB surveys since 2011. Moreover, the EU image question offers the possibility to choose between answers which vary from “very negative”, “negative”, “neutral”, to “positive”, and “very positive”. Therefore, this survey item is more sensible to different positions regarding the EU as it is measured on a 5 point scale, in comparison to the binary character of the membership support measures. Thus, it allows to express feelings about the EU which might vary between outright rejection, mild rejection, through indifference to being mildly positive and very positive about the EU. Most notably, in some of the recent studies of EU attitude formation, the importance of indifferent positions receives a renewed consideration (Stoeckel 2013; Van Ingelgom 2014) and my assumption is that it is particularly important to account for these positions in the context of more recent member states, where citizens might be less knowledgeable about the EU and adopt such positions more readily. Therefore, the image variable constitutes the most suitable operationalization of the dependent variable in this part of the study.

4.2 Independent variables: Utilitarian expectations and identities

The independent variables included in the models reflect the main objective of the chapter: to verify to what extent utilitarian perceptions and political identities constitute determinants of EU attitudes, before and after the crisis.

The *utilitarian* factors include several predictors: occupation, education, personal expectations, and perception of the EU in terms of economic prosperity. As noted above, in the context of the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, early analyses emphasized the importance of the social divide between transitional winners and losers. Occupation and education can be fitted in this dimension since, as discussed in chapter 2, higher educated and white collar workers have been found by previous studies to be significantly more positive about European integration due to their privileged position to reap benefits from the process. However, central to the utilitarian dimension is a general positive orientation in terms of future expectations (the “winners of transition” argument), operationalized with a variable constructed on the basis of three distinct survey questions which refer to one’s future expectations regarding life in general, financial situation of the household and personal job situation⁹⁷. In concordance with the discussion above, I expect to find a positive impact of future expectations, which should be have a stronger effect for the citizens of CEE-10 countries, as transitional winners will support to greater extent further reforms which EU membership entails. The last element of the utilitarian approach is a more general consideration that EU membership brings economic prosperity. This explanatory dimension is referred to as the “economic factor” and it is expected to have a positive impact on overall EU attitude. Overall, I expect the utilitarian factor to have a stronger effect in the new member states of CEE, as EU accession has been portrayed in these countries as a means to achieving Western European levels of economic development and general welfare, as discussed in chapter 3.

As my previous discussion has shown, even though most studies of EU attitudes in the new member states focus on the utilitarian and ideological factors of EU support, there are important reasons to expect that identification constitutes an important element of EU support in these countries. Thus, in terms of the impact of political identities, there are four elements to this dimension which operationalize the influence of *affective* factors in EU

⁹⁷ The Cronbach’s alpha measure of scale reliability is 0,709 for the 2004 survey and 0,726 for the 2012 data. An overview of the elements considered in the models, its operationalization and summary statistics can be found in Annexes 3-5.

attitude formation, relative to the national and European identities and their relationship. National identity in its affective aspect is controlled for with the inclusion of the variable which refers to attachment to one's country. I also include perception of the EU as threatening to the existence of national identities (association of the EU with the threat of loss of cultural identity). Identity threat should have a negative impact on EU support, and its effect could be stronger in the new member states, as in these countries the fresh memories of regaining national sovereignty might make it dearer to their citizens.

European identity is operationalized with two variables which account for the two dimensions of identity as mentioned above⁹⁸. Cognitive European identity denotes the self-perception as European (either as part of the national belonging, or solely as a European), in contrast to holding an exclusive national identity (perceiving oneself as only national). The affective European identity, on the other hand, is operationalized as attachment to Europe/EU⁹⁹ as it denotes identification based on evaluative attitudes and positive distinction. Thus, in line with the previous discussions, I expect that European identity constitutes at least as important determinant of positive EU perceptions as the utilitarian rationale, also immediately following the enlargement.

4.3 Control variables

The control variables include general *socio-economic indicators* such as age (coded in 6 category age cohorts), sex (reference category woman), and habitat (reference category village), as well as elements related to the most relevant alternative explanatory frameworks: normative factors and domestic proxies. As note before, some of the previous studies have argued that *normative* orientations could constitute an important determinant of EU attitudes, especially in the post-socialist new member states structured to greater extent by the experience of transitions. While the empirical evidence largely rejected the view that these

⁹⁸ While affective and cognitive European identity both refer to the underlying dimension of European identity, there are theoretical arguments in favor of distinguishing them as substantially different dimensions of the concept, as argued in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, in order to exclude possible problems with multicollinearity in the model (that is, the possibility that there could be a linear relationship between these independent variables which would cause the other coefficients in the regression to be unstable), I checked the bivariate correlations of independent variables in the model, as well as ran a series of parallel regression models with the individual level independent variables and calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) as suggested by Fox (1991). The tests did not reveal any multicollinearity problems.

⁹⁹ The 2004 survey includes the question of attachment to Europe, while the 2012 survey asks about feeling attached to the European Union. The EB has not asked about attachment to Europe since 2007.

elements should have more impact in the new member states, I include them as control variables. Normative preferences regarding EU membership as a source of democratic stability and peace, while not the most significant, could still constitute a noteworthy element of EU attitude formation.

Moreover, an important issue to be taken into account is that European integration is a relatively new phenomenon in Central Eastern Europe, and citizens could only form a more or less informed opinion on the process once their country had become a member state. This observation triggered a set of studies which look into the role of *national proxies* in the new member states (Guerra 2008; Wagner 2012). However, it is important to point out that the use of heuristics in Central and Eastern European member states is more plausible in terms of perceptions of national economic and political performance, rather than taking cues from political parties. As Guerra (2012) notes, the very low levels of political trust in these countries make it unlikely that people would form their opinion regarding the EU on the basis of their partisan orientation¹⁰⁰. Thus, for this reason I include the perception of national democracy and trust in national institutions as controls in the model.

Finally, in terms of the contextual level variables, previous research provided empirical evidence on the relationship between national economic characteristics –such as macro-level indicators of national economy and whether a state is a net beneficiary of EU budget– and support for integration (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Therefore, in the second part of my explanatory analysis (hierarchical models with data for all EU-27 countries), I control for the effect of the context of the new member states (CEE-10) as well as some principal economic characteristics: GDP growth and net fiscal transfers from the EU (as a % of GNI)¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ As discussed in chapter 3, this untrustworthiness which opposes “us” the people against “them”, the *nomenklatura* of communist parties, is one of the most important legacies of the non-democratic socialist regimes institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997).

¹⁰¹ As the new member states are significantly poorer than the EU-15, especially in 2004, there could be some multicollinearity issues between the dummy for CEE-10 countries and contextual economic indicators such as Net fiscal transfers in 2004. In order to discard such potential problems, I ran a series of diagnostic tests on the issue as suggested by Fox (1991) and the multicollinearity in the 2004 model does not seem to be causing any problems (square root of VIF is not greater than 2), therefore, it should not affect the robustness of the results presented.

5. Results and discussion

5.1 Determinants of individual EU attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe, before and after the crisis

The first step of the analysis is to assess the importance of the two factors of interest—identities and utilitarian considerations—as part of the broader model of European attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe, before and after the crisis. In order to compare the impact of the different theoretical factors I run a series of regression analyses in all CEE-10 countries for 2004 (Table 6.2) and 2012 (Table 6.3)¹⁰².

While there is much heterogeneity between the countries of the region, all elements included in the models account for a good portion of variation in the individual-level attitudes towards the EU immediately after the accession (Table 6.2). The adjusted R² is anywhere between an acceptable 19% of explained variance (Slovenia) and a satisfactory 44% in Bulgaria.

As far as the controls are concerned, *domestic proxies* seem to have some impact, especially in terms of satisfaction with national democracy, and it is overall positive—those satisfied with the workings of national democracy and trusting national institutions develop more positive perceptions of the EU. The impact of satisfaction with national democracy is the strongest in Czech Republic and Estonia. *Normative factors*, on the other hand, receive a more mixed support. Their impact is relatively low with the exception of perceptions of EU as a source of democracy in Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Poland. Therefore, in line with previous research, normative reasons do not constitute the strongest predictors of EU attitudes in the region.

¹⁰² In order to make the results of the regressions more easily interpretable, all variables have been centered on their mean. Furthermore, all numeric variables have been divided by two times their standard deviation, allowing the interpretation of numerical variables in the same way as binary output – as change from low to high values. For a detailed discussion of this approach see Gelman (2008) and Gelman and Hill (2006).

Table 6.2 Linear regression models predicting positive perceptions of EU in CEE-10 (2004)

Variables	Czech Rep.	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia	Bulgaria	Romania
Controls										
Age	0,156 (0,086)	0,095 (0,079)	-0,159* (0,080)	0,192* (0,085)	0,156 (0,088)	0,159 (0,098)	0,073 (0,072)	0,078 (0,098)	0,088 (0,106)	-0,003 (0,083)
Sex (Ref.: Woman)	-0,085 (0,050)	-0,003 (0,052)	-0,089 (0,052)	0,064 (0,059)	0,069 (0,058)	0,018 (0,057)	-0,061 (0,044)	-0,148** (0,055)	-0,012 (0,060)	-0,001 (0,060)
Habitat (Ref.: Village)	-0,091 (0,052)	0,014 (0,053)	-0,207*** (0,054)	0,044 (0,059)	0,042 (0,063)	-0,159** (0,060)	0,020 (0,043)	-0,071 (0,055)	-0,137* (0,069)	-0,031 (0,054)
National trust	0,190** (0,059)	0,271*** (0,053)	0,236*** (0,053)	0,260*** (0,064)	0,149* (0,063)	0,278** (0,091)	0,178*** (0,051)	0,088 (0,056)	0,195** (0,074)	0,120* (0,054)
National democracy	0,381*** (0,061)	0,420*** (0,066)	0,232*** (0,057)	0,201*** (0,058)	0,235*** (0,062)	0,256*** (0,057)	0,202*** (0,051)	0,203** (0,066)	0,174** (0,063)	0,466*** (0,064)
EU=peace	0,135* (0,053)	0,164** (0,060)	0,204*** (0,055)	0,123 (0,075)	0,078 (0,064)	0,179** (0,062)	0,179*** (0,046)	0,097 (0,057)	0,169* (0,067)	0,084 (0,062)
EU =democracy	0,344*** (0,058)	-0,042 (0,067)	0,219*** (0,056)	0,036 (0,085)	0,099 (0,069)	0,282*** (0,069)	0,072 (0,052)	0,056 (0,061)	0,300*** (0,068)	0,143* (0,060)
Utilitarian considerations										
Occupation (omitted)										
Education < 15	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Education >15	0,057 (0,084)	0,277** (0,086)	0,090 (0,060)	0,070 (0,093)	0,152 (0,088)	-0,086 (0,081)	0,093 (0,070)	0,036 (0,077)	-0,035 (0,083)	0,026 (0,068)
Education >20	0,232* (0,104)	0,215* (0,091)	0,172* (0,086)	0,004 (0,101)	0,061 (0,091)	-0,015 (0,094)	0,147 (0,090)	0,035 (0,090)	0,031 (0,097)	0,057 (0,080)
Personal expectations	0,291*** (0,076)	0,246*** (0,050)	0,169** (0,055)	0,322*** (0,060)	0,233*** (0,059)	0,265*** (0,064)	0,183*** (0,049)	0,042 (0,056)	0,196** (0,064)	0,140** (0,051)
EU = prosperity	0,368*** (0,057)	0,076 (0,064)	0,257*** (0,058)	0,196* (0,078)	0,343*** (0,059)	0,340*** (0,068)	0,494*** (0,046)	0,266*** (0,060)	0,552*** (0,066)	0,320*** (0,059)
Affective factors										
National identity	-0,002 (0,061)	-0,180** (0,057)	-0,164* (0,074)	-0,019 (0,059)	0,019 (0,064)	-0,149* (0,076)	-0,089 (0,045)	-0,007 (0,073)	-0,113 (0,075)	-0,057 (0,055)
EU=loss of identity	-0,267*** (0,072)	-0,018 (0,064)	-0,524*** (0,114)	0,129 (0,086)	-0,348*** (0,091)	-0,333** (0,106)	-0,280*** (0,058)	-0,285*** (0,075)	-0,701*** (0,096)	-0,257* (0,108)
European identity (Affective)	0,367*** (0,074)	0,389*** (0,057)	0,310*** (0,072)	0,468*** (0,058)	0,315*** (0,060)	0,283*** (0,071)	0,267*** (0,053)	0,338*** (0,068)	0,143* (0,061)	0,337*** (0,062)
(Cognitive)	0,206*** (0,051)	0,129* (0,055)	0,253*** (0,055)	0,255*** (0,059)	0,002 (0,061)	0,259*** (0,060)	0,264*** (0,046)	0,135* (0,057)	0,303*** (0,067)	0,174** (0,059)
Constant	3,343*** (0,041)	3,380*** (0,034)	3,299*** (0,043)	3,461*** (0,038)	3,772*** (0,038)	3,579*** (0,049)	3,425*** (0,036)	3,687*** (0,033)	3,783*** (0,049)	3,636*** (0,038)
Observations	877	813	808	797	758	759	989	771	699	794
R-squared	0,387	0,296	0,374	0,286	0,237	0,316	0,416	0,215	0,462	0,316

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a linear regression, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results for occupation not shown. Dependent variable – perception of the EU. All independent variables are standardized. Data: EB 62.0, October-November 2004.

Unsurprisingly, *utilitarian considerations* do matter across CEE; however, not in terms of resources such as higher education or different occupation status (the latter was not significant in any of the models, and it is not shown due to space limitations). Rather, utilitarian considerations matter in terms of a more straightforward positive future outlook or positive economic perceptions. In these terms, winners of transitions (those with positive

expectations for the future) tend to be more positive about the EU in all of the countries except for Slovenia. The second element of the utilitarian dimension—considering the EU as source of economic prosperity—has an even greater impact and it is only insignificant in Estonia. For half of the CEE countries—Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania—association of the EU with economic prosperity constitutes the factor with the strongest positive impact on EU perceptions. Therefore, we find strong support for the hypothesis that utilitarian calculations constitute a significant factor in EU attitude formation across the region.

In terms of the *identitarian approach*, first of all, national identity does not seem to constitute a significant obstacle to the formation of positive EU perceptions. Its negative impact in 2004 is the highest in Estonia—in line with the observations of Vetik et al (2006) who note a kind of “reactionary identity emerging in this country around accession—, and it also seems to have some negative impact on EU perceptions in Poland and Hungary, but compared to other factors the values of the coefficients are not very high. European identity, on the other hand, matters in all of the countries. However, it becomes clear that the affective dimension is the most relevant. Affective European identity constitutes the single most important positive factor in Latvia, Slovenia, and Hungary, and it comes second in all of the other CEE states. Cognitive European identity also has a positive impact in all of the CEE-10 countries except for Lithuania, but its impact is considerably lower than that of the affective dimension in most countries (except for Bulgaria and Slovakia).

Finally, perception of the EU as a threat to cultural identity has a considerably negative impact on all of the countries except for Estonia and Latvia. This could be due to the presence of big Russian minorities in both of these countries, which constitutes a substantial threat to national identity and potentially deactivates the negative effect of such threat from the EU. In this sense, as discussed previously, being considered European, and thus, Western, can be constructed as the opposite of association with the Soviet past, Russia, and “the East”. The impact of identity threat on Euroscepticism is Bulgaria and Romania and Hungary, where it constitutes the most significant predictor of EU attitudes in the proposed models. These are also countries in which cognitive identification has a substantial effect on EU perceptions. We can conclude, thus, that the extent to which EU perceptions are linked to issues of national identity and threat vary greatly between countries, while the impact of affective European identity is more homogeneously positive across the region.

Table 6.3 Linear regression models predicting positive perceptions of EU in CEE-10 (2012)

Variables	Czech Rep.	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia	Bulgaria	Romania
Controls										
Age	-0,049 (0,078)	-0,030 (0,071)	0,091 (0,089)	-0,101 (0,077)	-0,140 (0,078)	0,013 (0,072)	0,017 (0,077)	0,096 (0,094)	0,052 (0,083)	0,070 (0,093)
Sex (Ref.: Woman)	-0,006 (0,050)	-0,053 (0,047)	0,028 (0,056)	-0,001 (0,050)	0,010 (0,049)	-0,042 (0,046)	0,007 (0,049)	0,050 (0,053)	-0,037 (0,050)	-0,039 (0,064)
Habitat (Ref.: Village)	0,077 (0,050)	-0,073 (0,047)	-0,065 (0,058)	-0,059 (0,050)	-0,003 (0,054)	-0,042 (0,051)	0,127* (0,049)	0,015 (0,053)	0,074 (0,059)	0,034 (0,057)
National trust	0,405*** (0,079)	0,167*** (0,050)	0,171** (0,064)	0,243*** (0,065)	0,318*** (0,081)	0,324*** (0,056)	0,235*** (0,045)	0,397*** (0,062)	0,185** (0,063)	0,460*** (0,087)
National democracy	0,403*** (0,061)	0,286*** (0,060)	0,116 (0,061)	0,214*** (0,057)	0,260*** (0,061)	0,270*** (0,059)	0,526*** (0,059)	0,261*** (0,065)	0,277*** (0,063)	0,344*** (0,066)
EU=peace	0,237*** (0,060)	0,076 (0,058)	0,225*** (0,068)	0,110 (0,064)	0,038 (0,072)	0,151* (0,065)	0,091 (0,064)	0,155* (0,060)	0,199*** (0,056)	0,205* (0,088)
EU=democracy	0,189** (0,069)	0,123 (0,070)	0,303*** (0,069)	0,191* (0,086)	0,354*** (0,069)	0,316*** (0,057)	0,338*** (0,068)	0,124 (0,074)	0,129* (0,056)	0,322*** (0,078)
Utilitarian considerations										
Occupation (omitted)										
Education <15	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Education >15	0,119 (0,130)	0,006 (0,089)	-0,039 (0,070)	-0,110 (0,112)	-0,059 (0,116)	0,046 (0,071)	0,108 (0,119)	0,015 (0,082)	-0,064 (0,080)	0,139 (0,075)
Education >20	0,098 (0,142)	0,019 (0,094)	0,034 (0,096)	-0,045 (0,119)	0,010 (0,119)	0,087 (0,081)	0,148 (0,131)	0,121 (0,094)	0,062 (0,093)	0,235** (0,089)
Personal expectations	-0,041 (0,060)	0,057 (0,043)	0,178** (0,068)	0,049 (0,045)	0,177*** (0,050)	0,127* (0,049)	0,192*** (0,052)	0,112 (0,064)	0,035 (0,054)	0,195** (0,061)
EU=prosperity	0,360*** (0,088)	0,269** (0,082)	0,394*** (0,083)	0,263** (0,088)	0,356*** (0,061)	0,345*** (0,073)	0,250*** (0,073)	0,365*** (0,077)	0,269*** (0,064)	0,375*** (0,089)
Affective factors										
National identity	-0,055 (0,049)	-0,012 (0,049)	-0,185*** (0,056)	-0,111* (0,051)	-0,079 (0,047)	-0,064 (0,059)	-0,060 (0,057)	-0,126* (0,060)	-0,098 (0,067)	0,133* (0,057)
EU=loss of identity	-0,270*** (0,074)	-0,140 (0,077)	-0,342*** (0,102)	-0,161 (0,093)	-0,086 (0,078)	-0,399*** (0,089)	-0,091 (0,070)	-0,429*** (0,091)	-0,622*** (0,100)	-0,274* (0,123)
European identity (Affective)	0,541*** (0,062)	0,320*** (0,053)	0,522*** (0,055)	0,257*** (0,053)	0,161** (0,051)	0,488*** (0,060)	0,577*** (0,064)	0,361*** (0,058)	0,600*** (0,055)	0,243*** (0,066)
(Cognitive)	0,256*** (0,055)	0,086 (0,051)	0,249*** (0,056)	0,190*** (0,052)	0,194*** (0,053)	0,061 (0,052)	0,185** (0,057)	0,192** (0,059)	0,172** (0,061)	0,190** (0,065)
Constant	3,046*** (0,039)	3,242*** (0,030)	2,925*** (0,036)	3,182*** (0,035)	3,433*** (0,039)	3,231*** (0,029)	3,080*** (0,035)	3,236*** (0,032)	3,513*** (0,039)	2,986*** (0,044)
Observations	892	857	900	838	841	761	900	892	875	807
R-squared	0,44	0,24	0,34	0,21	0,26	0,44	0,45	0,32	0,46	0,32

Note: Entries in the table are coefficients from a linear regression, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Results for occupation not shown. Dependent variable – perception of EU. All independent variables are standardized. Data: EB 77.3, May 2012.

The same explanatory models are tested for the 2012 data, after the Great Recession has made its mark on European attitudes and perceptions (Table 6.3). The explanatory power of the proposed model remains similar as in 2004, however the impact of the different dimensions slightly changes.

In the 2012 models, the impact of *domestic proxies* is overall positive and significant with the exception of the influence of satisfaction with national democracy and Hungary.

We observe the strongest positive effect of satisfaction with democracy in Slovakia and Czech Republic, and that of national trust in Romania and, again, Czech Republic.

In terms of the *interests vs. identity* question we observe some significant changes in the determinants of EU perceptions after the crisis. National identity has a relatively small negative effect on EU perceptions in Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, and Romania, and overall its impact is not very considerable. The identity threat variable on the other hand, seems to be losing some of its importance—it has a negative effect in six out of the ten countries with the strongest impact in Bulgaria. However, in 2012 European identity—mostly in its affective dimension—constitutes the most significant positive predictor in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Overall the influence of affective European identity increases, as compared to the 2004 model, in six out of the ten CEE countries, while that of cognitive identification is also higher in five out of the ten cases. Therefore, there could be some evidence to support the hypothesis which posits a bigger role of identification in European attitude formation after the crisis.

As far as the *utilitarian* considerations are concerned, the biggest change can be observed in terms of how personal future expectations matter. Almost a decade after the accession referendums, the “winners of transition” argument loses its explanatory power. People who have a positive outlook towards the future tend to be significantly more positive about the EU only in half of the CEE-10 countries: Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania, and even there the effect of this variable is not sizable.

What can be concluded from this first step of analysis? Utilitarian considerations and European identity constitute the two strongest predictors of positive EU perception in the region. Affective factors seem to be gaining importance after the crisis, while the impact of being a “winner” of transition and integration matters less in relation to EU attitudes in 2012. In terms of sources of Euroscepticism, national identity does not necessarily constitute a significant obstacle to favorable EU attitudes in most of the countries, and, more importantly, perception of identity threat becomes somewhat less important in the recent years. In order to provide definitive answers to the hypothesis formulated at the beginning of this chapter, I now turn to the analysis of the whole set of EU-27 countries’ data.

5.2 Determinants of EU perceptions in the enlarged EU, before and after the crisis

As mentioned in the introduction, most studies concerned with new member states focus on data only from the region and develop specific models for CEE-10 countries. However, such approach makes it impossible to test the relevant theoretical models on the whole of the enlarged EU and provide definitive answers regarding possible differences between new and old member states. Thus, here I present a single hierarchical model which incorporates all of the EU countries, and allows me to account for the possible differential effect of the context of the new member states.

The first step in verifying the possible differences in EU attitudes formation, between new and old member states, is to compare the bivariate correlations of our main independent variables and the dependent variable in the two groups (Table 6.4). Here we can already observe some interesting patterns.

Table 6.4 Bivariate correlations of EU perception with selected independent variables

EU perception	2004		2012	
	West	East	West	East
<i>Individual variables</i>				
<i>Domestic proxies</i>				
National trust	0,24	0,24	0,33	0,27
National democracy	0,24	0,22	0,33	0,30
<i>Normative preferences</i>				
EU= peace	0,26	0,27	0,25	0,17
EU= democracy	0,26	0,28	0,25	0,24
<i>Utilitarian considerations</i>				
Personal expectations	0,13	0,26	0,10	0,19
EU= prosperity	0,31	0,37	0,21	0,27
<i>Affective factors</i>				
National	0,02	0,09	0,05	0,05
EU= loss of identity	-0,25	-0,16	-0,24	-0,18
European (Cognitive)	0,29	0,28	0,31	0,29
European (Affective)	0,38	0,29	0,46	0,42
<i>Contextual variables</i>				
CEE-10	0,06		0,12	
GDP growth	0,09		0,11	
Net EU fiscal transfers	0,08		0,08	

Note: Table entries are Pearson correlation coefficients. All significant at .001 level.

In terms of *utilitarian* considerations, as the analysis in the previous section indicates, personal expectations matter much more in the new member states immediately after the accession, however, their impact becomes less significant after almost a decade of membership. On the other hand, perception of EU as a source of economic prosperity matters in both groups of countries, with a stronger effect in the new member states.

As far as the *affective* factors are considered, national identity does not seem to be correlated with EU image, while perception of threat to identity has a considerable negative effect in both groups of countries. However, it is the European affective identity that has the strongest impact on positive perceptions of the EU, especially after the Great Recession.

Finally, *contextual* variables—GDP growth and net EU fiscal transfers—have a positive effect. Therefore, it seems that people in countries with higher levels of growth and bigger transfers from the EU budget tend to feel more positive about the EU. Also, new member states (CEE-10) seem to be more positive about the EU than their Western counterparts, especially after the Great Recession. The latter observation is anticipated already in the descriptive analysis of how the attitudes have changed between 2004 and 2012 in the previous sections. As previously noted, the drop in positive perceptions of the EU has been smaller in CEE-10 countries, and the increase has been mostly in neutral attitudes, and not in negative perceptions.

However, these are only correlations, and these relationships have to be verified in the general model, where the effect of other relevant variables is controlled for. This will also allow me to test for the possible differential impact of some of the variables, between new and old member states¹⁰³.

The integrated model for 2004 (Table 6.5) offers some interesting insight into the sources of EU support immediately after the enlargement.

¹⁰³ The Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) for the 2004 model is 10%, while in 2012 it is 5,5% - the between countries heterogeneity has clearly diminished following the economic crisis, from the aggregate level data it seems that EU countries converge not so much on a more negative stance, but a more neutral one.

Table 6.5 Regression on positive perceptions of EU (2004)

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Individual level						
Controls						
Age	0,017	(0,017)	0,017	(0,017)	0,015	(0,017)
Sex (<i>Ref.: Woman</i>)	-0,025*	(0,011)	-0,025*	(0,011)	-0,024*	(0,011)
Habitat (<i>Ref.: Village</i>)	-0,020	(0,011)	-0,020	(0,011)	-0,019	(0,011)
National trust	0,196***	(0,012)	0,195***	(0,012)	0,195***	(0,012)
National democracy	0,249***	(0,012)	0,249***	(0,012)	0,247***	(0,012)
EU=peace	0,214***	(0,012)	0,214***	(0,012)	0,214***	(0,012)
EU=democracy	0,180***	(0,013)	0,181***	(0,013)	0,181***	(0,013)
Utilitarian considerations						
Manual worker	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
House person	-0,004	(0,023)	-0,004	(0,023)	-0,007	(0,023)
Student	0,060	(0,031)	0,060	(0,031)	0,059	(0,031)
Unemployed	-0,038	(0,024)	-0,038	(0,024)	-0,037	(0,024)
Retired	0,020	(0,020)	0,020	(0,020)	0,022	(0,020)
Farmer	0,005	(0,046)	0,005	(0,046)	0,004	(0,046)
Self-employed	0,016	(0,025)	0,016	(0,025)	0,016	(0,025)
Managers	0,024	(0,021)	0,024	(0,021)	0,024	(0,021)
Other white collar	0,028	(0,019)	0,028	(0,019)	0,029	(0,019)
Education <15	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Education >15	0,082***	(0,015)	0,083***	(0,015)	0,083***	(0,015)
Education >20	0,080***	(0,016)	0,080***	(0,016)	0,081***	(0,016)
Personal expectations	0,159***	(0,011)	0,159***	(0,011)	0,136***	(0,014)
EU=prosperity	0,299***	(0,012)	0,299***	(0,012)	0,285***	(0,016)
Affective factors						
National identity	-0,106***	(0,012)	-0,106***	(0,012)	-0,107***	(0,012)
EU=loss of identity	-0,337***	(0,015)	-0,336***	(0,015)	-0,367***	(0,018)
European identity						
(Affective)	0,412***	(0,012)	0,412***	(0,012)	0,412***	(0,012)
(Cognitive)	0,210***	(0,011)	0,210***	(0,011)	0,209***	(0,011)
Contextual factors						
CEE-10	0,185*	(0,106)	0,047	(0,139)	0,047	(0,139)
GDP (2004)			0,089	(0,134)	0,088	(0,134)
Net fiscal transfers (2004)			0,260**	(0,092)	0,260**	(0,092)
Cross-level interactions						
CEE*Personal expectations					0,063**	(0,022)
CEE*EU means prosperity					0,032	(0,024)
CEE*EU means loss of identity					0,095**	(0,032)
Constant	3,444*** (0,051)		3,245*** (0,233)		3,248*** (0,232)	
Log likelihood	-24251,34		-24247,38		-24237,92	
AIC	48556,67		48552,76		48539,83	
Observations	21533		21533		21533	
Number of groups	27		27		27	

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates (xtmixed command in Stata) with standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, * p<0.01 (only for contextual variables). All variables are standardized. Data: EB 62.0 (2004).

Firstly, the model for 2004 demonstrates that immediately after the accession, even when we account for the effect of all relevant individual-level variables (model 1), citizens in the new member states were slightly more positive about the UE than their Western counterparts. This effect, however, disappears when controls for economic contextual variables are included (model 2). Therefore, this finding is in line with previous studies which argue that the significantly more positive attitudes towards the EU in the CEE-10 countries can be explained by their relatively lower levels of economic development in these countries (Garry and Tilley 2009; Guerra 2013b).

As in the case of individual country models, domestic proxies and ideological factors seem to play a positive role as determinants of EU's image. The former, especially, positive evaluations of national democracy correlate positively with an improved image of the EU. However, it is the variables in the affective dimension that have the strongest impact, while the utilitarian factors are relevant but slightly less so.

Affective European identity constitutes the strongest determinant of positive EU perceptions, and cognitive identification also has a positive impact but it is significantly lower. Therefore our H9 is further confirmed. In terms of the utilitarian factors, we find some positive effect of education and positive future expectations but they are relatively small, when compared to the general economic factor, the second strongest positive predictor of EU perceptions in the whole model. In terms of negative effects, greater Euroscepticism is determined mainly by perception of identity threat, while national identity has a much smaller (albeit also significantly negative) impact.

To test for possible East-West differences, in model 3, I introduce cross-level interactions which account for a differential effect of personal expectations, association of the EU with economic prosperity, and identity threat in the new member states. The model fit criteria indicate that the model which includes interaction terms is substantially improved. In terms of the utilitarian considerations, as expected, positive future personal expectations matter slightly more in the CEE-10 new member states while there is no difference in the way the general economic factor affects perceptions of the EU (H8 confirmed). The identity threat interaction is significant too, and it has a positive coefficient. Since the main effect of identity threat is negative this can be interpreted as a reduced effect of this variable in new member states, in other words, the negative effect of identity threat on EU perceptions is significantly smaller in CEE-10 countries.

Table 6.6 Regression models on positive perceptions of EU (2012)

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Controls						
Age	-0,032*	(0,016)	-0,031	(0,016)	-0,031	(0,016)
Sex (<i>Ref.: Woman</i>)	0,020*	(0,010)	0,020	(0,010)	0,020	(0,010)
Habitat (<i>Ref.: Village</i>)	0,002	(0,011)	0,002	(0,011)	0,002	(0,011)
National trust	0,256***	(0,012)	0,256***	(0,012)	0,256***	(0,012)
National democracy	0,297***	(0,012)	0,298***	(0,012)	0,298***	(0,012)
EU=peace	0,177***	(0,012)	0,177***	(0,012)	0,178***	(0,012)
EU=democracy	0,197***	(0,013)	0,197***	(0,013)	0,198***	(0,013)
Utilitarian considerations						
<i>Education <15</i>	<i>Ref.</i>		<i>Ref.</i>		<i>Ref.</i>	
Education >15	0,020	(0,015)	0,020	(0,015)	0,021	(0,015)
Education >20	0,064***	(0,017)	0,065***	(0,017)	0,065***	(0,017)
<i>Manual worker</i>	<i>Ref.</i>		<i>Ref.</i>		<i>Ref.</i>	
House person	-0,009	(0,026)	-0,009	(0,026)	-0,010	(0,026)
Student	0,013	(0,032)	0,014	(0,032)	0,016	(0,032)
Unemployed	-0,068**	(0,021)	-0,068**	(0,021)	-0,068**	(0,021)
Retired	0,007	(0,020)	0,007	(0,020)	0,008	(0,020)
Farmer	0,033	(0,048)	0,032	(0,048)	0,034	(0,048)
Self-employed	-0,000	(0,024)	-0,001	(0,024)	-0,001	(0,024)
Managers	0,000	(0,022)	0,000	(0,022)	0,000	(0,022)
Other white collar	-0,004	(0,018)	-0,003	(0,018)	-0,004	(0,018)
Personal expectations	0,099***	(0,011)	0,099***	(0,011)	0,108***	(0,013)
EU= prosperity	0,277***	(0,015)	0,277***	(0,015)	0,233***	(0,019)
Affective factors						
National identity	-0,068***	(0,011)	-0,068***	(0,011)	-0,068***	(0,011)
EU=loss of identity	-0,322***	(0,016)	-0,322***	(0,016)	-0,346***	(0,019)
European identity						
(Affective)	0,494***	(0,012)	0,494***	(0,012)	0,495***	(0,012)
(Cognitive)	0,163***	(0,011)	0,163***	(0,011)	0,164***	(0,011)
Contextual factors						
CEE	0,329***	(0,063)	0,179*	(0,102)	0,174*	(0,101)
GDP (2012)			-0,040	(0,062)	-0,038	(0,062)
Net fiscal transfers (2012)			0,206*	(0,095)	0,211*	(0,094)
Cross-level interactions						
CEE*Personal expectations					-0,023	(0,021)
CEE*EU means prosperity					0,113***	(0,030)
CEE*EU means loss of identity					0,080*	(0,033)
Constant	2,890***		2,945***		2,948***	
	(0,038)		(0,047)		(0,047)	
Log likelihood	-26168,24		-26165,84		-26156,15	
AIC	52390,47		52389,68		52376,31	
Observations	23113		23113		23113	
Number of groups	27		27		27	

Note: Entries are maximum likelihood estimates (xtmixed command in Stata) with standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, * p<0.01 (only for contextual variables). All variables are standardized. Data: EB 77.3 (2012).

The same explanatory model is tested with the 2012 data (Table 6.6), when the financial and economic crisis has already made its mark on European societies.

We can see that after the crisis, citizens in the new member states tend to be significantly more positive about the EU (model 1), and here this effect is reduced when we control for contextual economic variables, but it is still significant (model 2). Therefore, while before the crisis the overall more positive perceptions of the EU in the new member states could be explained by economic difference, it seems that in 2012, citizens in these countries tend to hold a significantly more positive view of the EU even when we control for such differences. This could be due to the fact that perceptions of the EU have been affected significantly more negatively by the effects of the crisis in the old member states, than in the CEE-10 countries, as the previous descriptive analysis reveals.

In terms of the individual-level factors there are several interesting changes in comparison to the 2004 results. First of all, the effect of *domestic proxies* increases: both national trust and satisfaction with national democracy have a more pronounced positive effect on EU image in 2012, than before the crisis. There is not much change in the (smaller) relevance of the *normative* factors.

As far as the *utilitarian* variables are concerned, the effect of positive future expectations in 2012 is rather small and become reduced as compared to the 2004 model. Also the coefficient for the general economic factor becomes smaller.

Most importantly, in comparison to 2004, *affective* European identity becomes more significant in predicting positive EU perceptions, while the importance of cognitive identity is slightly reduced. In order to confirm that there has been in fact change in the importance of affective identity as determinant of positive EU perceptions, I run a pooled hierarchical model using the 2004 and 2012 data. The coefficient for change in 2012 as compared to 2004 is 0,082 and it is significant at .001 level (data not shown), our H10 is, therefore, confirmed, and the importance of distinguishing the different dimensions of identity is further underlined here. Positive perceptions of the EU correlate highly with affective identification and this effect becomes more important after the crisis, while cognitive identification is less relevant and does not become more salient in the comparison over time.


Finally, another relevant observation is that factors related to national identity and identity threat seem to play a less important role in the 2012 model. The negative impact of national identity is very small, and the identity threat variable continues to be a relevant

source of Euroscepticism. However, overall, so far we do not find evidence of a politicization of national identities against the EU in the context of the crisis.


In terms of interactions (model 3), in 2012 personal expectations no longer seem to matter more in the CEE-10 countries, but there is a significant difference in the impact of the general economic factor. Citizens of new member states who continue to believe that EU can be associated with economic prosperity tend to be significantly more positive about it than those in the old member states who believe the same is true (see Figure 6.5 for a graphic representations of the interaction terms). On the other hand, the impact of identity threat in new member states is again reduced. Therefore, people who believe that EU entails identity threat tend to be negative about it, but slightly less so in Central Eastern Europe.

Figure 6.5 Interaction terms, regression on EU perceptions (2012)

Linear Prediction, Fixed Portion



Linear Prediction, Fixed Portion



Note: Predictions from regression on EU perception, calculated from the models presented in table 6.6 (2012 data) with the margins command in Stata.

To summarize the findings of this chapter, my initial hypotheses regarding the impact of economic and affective factors on EU support are confirmed in the empirical analysis. In terms of the utilitarian considerations, positive future expectations correlate with more positive image of the EU and the economic factor does indeed constitute a strong predictor of positive EU perceptions in the enlarged EU. However, positive future expectations (the “winners of transition argument”) have a stronger positive impact in new member states only immediately after the accession, while the economic factors become more relevant in the CEE-10 countries after the crisis (H8 confirmed). As far as the affective factors are concerned, European identity is in fact the strongest predictor of EU support, especially after the crisis, but only in its affective aspect (H9 confirmed). Finally, in terms of the differential effect of identity before and after the crisis, comparing between the two models, the positive effect of the affective dimension of European identity actually becomes stronger in 2012 which indicates that in times of economic hardship affective attachment to the EU does indeed become a more relevant factor to explain EU support in the enlarged EU (H10 confirmed). The latter finding is in line with some other recent research regarding the changing relevance of affective factors for the formation of EU support in the context of the crisis (Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013). This potential change should be further explored, as more recent data is made available, to see whether there is a real transformation in the structure of European attitudes with a growing relevance of the more stable affective factors after the crisis.

6. Conclusions

In the decade that followed the Eastern enlargement, the EU has suffered one of its biggest crises so far. Deep economic problems of the Eurozone affected directly many European citizens and undermined the idea that European integration could only bring benefits to the people of Europe. The inability of European political leaders to agree on efficient answers to the difficulties further contributed to the perception that the Union was no longer the solution and could actually be the problem. The initial divide between new and old member states, has been substituted by a possibly even bigger division between creditors and debtors, painfully drawing public attention to the issues of solidarity in a political community. Consequently, popular and party-based Euroscepticism have been on the rise in the first decade of the XXI century.

This is obviously a very different context than that of the 2004/2007 Eastern enlargements when the EU was viewed in these countries predominantly positively, as a guarantor of democratic institutions, and accession was perceived in terms of increased future welfare. Accordingly, early studies of EU attitudes in Central and Eastern European countries focused on utilitarian and normative factors as main elements in attitude formation. This chapter argues that almost ten years after the first Eastern enlargement and in the context of a perceived declining performance of European economy and the issue of solidarity as the main challenge ahead, the importance of more stable, affective factors must be re-evaluated. In this sense, I explore the importance of political identities as determinants of support for the EU in the new member states, as compared with utilitarian factors, before and after the crisis.

The question of political identities has been recognized as a key dimension of European attitudes in the last decade, however, its impact has not yet been researched thoroughly in the new member states. Attesting to the change of scope of integration which occurred in the 1990s,—when it shifted from strictly economic to broader policy issues of a political community—, this chapter shows that European identity constitutes a key determinant of positive perceptions of the EU, immediately after accession, as well as almost a decade later, after the Great Recession. In line with recent research on the topic, my findings confirm that the effect of affective factors seems to become more significant in the recent years, when the image of EU membership as a source of European prosperity has been undermined. Furthermore, and contrary to popular assumptions, perceived identity threat has

actually less impact on Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe than in the old member states.

This is not to argue that utilitarian considerations have lost their weight. However, it seems that the character and source of these attitudes changed slightly over the course of the last decade. While immediately after the accession positive future expectations constituted a significant source of support for the EU in Central and Eastern Europe—in line with the “winners of transition” argument—, more recently it is a more general positive economic perception that determines EU support in Central Eastern European member states. Moreover, my empirical analysis shows that the effect of this general economic factor is actually stronger in these new member states than in the more established members.

These findings should be interpreted in the light of some limitations. As noted in the beginning, the analysis is based on cross-sectional data which implies that I cannot provide definitive account of the changes occurred at the individual level during the Great Recession. Rather, I focus on comparisons between individuals at two points in time. Moreover, I cannot make definitive claims about causality as it is also possible that people who feel more positive about the EU tend to acknowledge a European identity more readily, rather than the other way around. However, I do argue that there is an important relationship between identity and EU support, especially in times of economic crisis.

In spite of such limitations the present study sheds new light on the determinants of European attitudes in the new member states, extending the existing research which focused on utilitarian and ideological factors, to consider the role of political identities as key factors in the region and the whole of the enlarged EU after the crisis. Moreover, it presents an integrated approach to EU attitudes, testing the theoretical model on all EU member states, while accounting for the possible differences in EU attitude formation between the new and the old member states which remain in the wake of the first decade of their membership.

7. Annex to chapter 6

Table 6.7 GDP growth in the EU-27, by country (2004-2012)

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Austria	2,60	2,40	3,70	3,70	1,40	-3,80	1,80	2,80	0,90
Belgium	3,30	1,80	2,70	2,90	1,00	-2,80	2,30	1,80	-0,10
Denmark	2,30	2,40	3,40	1,60	-0,80	-5,70	1,40	1,10	-0,40
Finland	4,10	2,90	4,40	5,30	0,30	-8,50	3,40	2,80	-1,00
France	2,50	1,80	2,50	2,30	-0,10	-3,10	1,70	2,00	0,00
Germany	1,20	0,70	3,70	3,30	1,10	-5,10	4,00	3,30	0,70
Greece	4,40	2,30	5,50	3,50	-0,20	-3,10	-4,90	-7,10	-7,00
Ireland	4,20	6,10	5,50	5,00	-2,20	-6,40	-1,10	2,20	0,20
Italy	1,70	0,90	2,20	1,70	-1,20	-5,50	1,70	0,40	-2,40
Luxembourg	4,40	5,30	4,90	6,60	-0,70	-5,60	3,10	1,90	-0,20
Netherlands	2,20	2,00	3,40	3,90	1,80	-3,70	1,50	0,90	-1,20
Portugal	1,60	0,80	1,40	2,40	0,00	-2,90	1,90	-1,30	-3,20
Spain	3,30	3,60	4,10	3,50	0,90	-3,80	-0,20	0,10	-1,60
Sweden	4,20	3,20	4,30	3,30	-0,60	-5,00	6,60	2,90	0,90
United Kingdom	3,20	3,20	2,80	3,40	-0,80	-5,20	1,70	1,10	0,30
EU-15	<i>2,40</i>	<i>2,00</i>	<i>3,20</i>	<i>3,00</i>	<i>0,10</i>	<i>-4,60</i>	<i>2,00</i>	<i>1,50</i>	<i>-0,50</i>
Bulgaria	6,70	6,40	6,50	6,40	6,20	-5,50	0,40	1,80	0,60
Czech Rep.	4,70	6,80	7,00	5,70	3,10	-4,50	2,50	1,80	-1,00
Estonia	6,20	8,90	10,20	7,30	-4,10	-14,10	3,30	8,70	4,50
Hungary	4,80	4,00	3,90	0,10	0,90	-6,80	1,10	1,60	-1,70
Latvia	8,80	10,10	11,00	10,00	-2,80	-17,70	-1,30	5,30	5,20
Lithuania	7,40	7,80	7,80	9,80	2,90	-14,80	1,60	6,00	3,70
Poland	5,30	3,60	6,20	6,80	5,10	1,60	3,90	4,50	2,00
Romania	8,50	4,20	7,90	6,30	7,30	-6,60	-1,10	2,30	0,60
Slovakia	5,10	6,70	8,30	10,50	5,80	-4,90	4,40	3,00	1,80
Slovenia	4,40	4,00	5,80	7,00	3,40	-7,90	1,30	0,70	-2,50
CEE-10	<i>6,19</i>	<i>6,25</i>	<i>7,46</i>	<i>6,99</i>	<i>2,78</i>	<i>-8,12</i>	<i>1,61</i>	<i>3,57</i>	<i>1,32</i>

Note: Entries in the table represent percentage change over previous period. Data: Eurostat.

Conclusions

“We are doubtless rather too blasé today to believe in the ‘European Dream’ as we did in the aftermath of the War. Nevertheless, Europe needs its dream and, without it, renaissance and reunification would be illusory. Eastern and central Europeans, being less privileged than us and less concerned to protect a comfort which they do not yet enjoy, are more open to that ‘European Dream’.”

– Jacques Delors, *Reuniting Europe: Our Historic Mission*

The shift in the borders of the European Union (EU) which occurred with its Eastward enlargement raises important questions regarding its cohesiveness as a political community. While the process of enlargement has been justified to a great extent in terms of a shared identity or even a “kinship duty” of the West towards the East of Europe, some academic and media debates have focused on its anticipated negative impacts on the cohesion of the European political community and its emerging identity. Has the existing sense of identity been diluted by such an expansion of the European political community? By taking up this issue as its main topic, the objective of this thesis was to provide empirical evidence which could allow for a better understanding of the state of European identity after the Eastward enlargement. In this sense the main question was formulated as follows: Did the Eastward enlargement of the European Union thwart the emergence of a common European political identity? In the research presented in the previous chapters I have addressed this highly significant issue by developing a theoretically grounded, comparative investigation of the individual orientations of regular citizens and elites.

For this study I conceptualized European identification as a multidimensional socio-political reality, rooted in individual perceptions and influenced by resources, experience and attitudes. Building on previous research and utilizing the theoretical framework of social identity theory, I have argued that European identity should be approached by analyzing both its cognitive and affective dimensions, as the two have different underlying causes. The

affective aspect of European identification refers to “identification with Europe” and can potentially be triggered by a natural psychological tendency towards positive social distinction. The *cognitive* dimension of identity refers to one’s self-perception as part of the European community and denotes “identification as European” based on perceived similarity. Moreover, in order to assess the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of European identity we need to explore also the *meanings* attached to European belonging. From this perspective, the elements which denote being European can be fitted into two basic conceptualizations—based on debates within nationalism studies: an open and civic notion of Europeanness built on normative, linguistic and participatory elements, and an exclusionary ethnic concept of being European, rooted in ancestry and religion. These perceived criteria for membership in the European political community are socially constructed and, thus, context-dependent and influenced by the discourses of national elites.

From such a multidimensional perspective there are several key conclusions to be drawn on the basis of the research presented in this thesis concerning the determinants, contents, and consequences of European identity. Overall, the hypotheses regarding an East-West difference in terms of the existence and determinants of European identity are supported in the case of public opinion, but not for the case of the elites, while the opposite results are found for hypotheses regarding the difference in content of such identification. This indicates that patterns of East-West differentiation are distributed unevenly for the two actors concerned. On the one hand, once we control for the effects of how national identity is constructed in different national contexts, we can assert that ordinary citizens in the old and new member states frame European identity in the same terms, mostly as a civic belonging. At the same time, however, while they remain attached to the EU, the new citizens of the Union are significantly less likely to perceive themselves as European. This difference is triggered by a comparatively low level of self-perception as Europeans among older generations, which can be explained by the fact that their primary socialization occurred outside of the community of Europeans. Elites, on the other hand, tend to identify with Europe, and as Europeans, to the same extent in both new and old member states, but here differences arise in the contents of such identification, as elites in the new member states tend to place more value on religion and ancestry as elements of European identification, even when we control for all relevant alternative explanations of such a difference.

Therefore, as far as the main research question of this study is concerned, we can assert that even though levels of cognitive European identification of the new EU citizens are in fact lower, the similarity between the younger cohorts suggests that the observed gap between new and old member states could be closed relatively easy with the socialization of new generations as European citizens, which is already happening. Such conclusion is strengthened by the fact that citizens in CEE-10 countries are clearly attached to the European project, even in spite of the problems experienced by the EU in the first decade of membership. Here my analysis reveals that negative perceptions of the EU have not increased as dramatically as in the more established member states, which suggests that the new European citizens are still more open to the “European dream” than their Western counterparts, as the quote at the beginning illustrates. Moreover, in terms of meanings, both elites and average citizens in the new member states tend to emphasize more than their Western counterparts the idea that actually feeling European is key to being European. This observation is very relevant from the point of view of the findings related to the affective-cognitive gap found in the new member states, as it further confirms that for the new European citizens, European identity constitutes primarily an issue of a self-perception and not only attachment, while such distinction is not problematized to the same extent in the West.

In what follows, I discuss the details of these findings, their implications for the wider debate regarding European identity within the enlarged EU, and address some questions which go beyond the scope of the thesis and require further research.

1. Main findings

My first research question referred to the possibility that the new European citizens were less likely to self-identify as Europeans. While we know relatively little about what determines European identification in the new member states of Central Eastern Europe, previous studies have discerned a generally lower level of identification as European among the citizens of these countries (Kuhn 2012; Sanders et al. 2012). However, I contend that affective attachment to Europe in these countries should equal that found in the established EU member states, since after the fall of communism there was widespread support for the idea of a “return to Europe”. This slogan, embraced by the elites of the candidate countries, implied a return to normality and an acceptance of Western values and institutions: it should therefore provide a strong foundation for attachment to the EU. Here, the necessity to apply a two dimensional approach to *European identity* becomes clear as these observations suggest we should not expect any difference in terms of identification with Europe (attachment) (H1), but that the new European citizens might be less likely to identify *as* Europeans (H2), due to a much shorter socialization in EU membership. The empirical evidence presented in chapter 4 does suggest that attachment to Europe (*affective* identity) among ordinary citizens in the East is as deep-seated as it is in the West (H1a confirmed) but Central and East Europeans do indeed possess lower levels of *cognitive* European identification than West Europeans (H2a confirmed).

My analysis of identification determinants reveals the causes of this difference. In line with arguments regarding primary socialization processes and intergenerational value change (H3), there appears to be a significant interaction effect between age and identification with Europe in Central Eastern Europe. Younger people in the new member states are as likely to identify as Europeans as young people in the West, and significantly more so than older people in these new member countries (H3b confirmed). In contrast, we do not observe a similar effect in the other EU member states, where European identification seems to increase with age. The argument I advance is based on the assumption that political identities are formed as part of the primary socialization processes. Over time, as more and more young citizens from the East continue to be socialized into the European political community, this gap in cognitive identification should disappear. The process of socialization, combined with the fact that Central Eastern Europeans are unquestionably attached to the “European project” suggests that even if we find some evidence of lower identification as Europeans in the new member states of the EU, in due course, affective

identity could be matched by a more deep-seated cognitive identification, as is the case among the ordinary citizens of Western Europe.

As far as European identity among elites is concerned, my main conclusion is that due to the effects of cognitive mobilization and greater exposure to European socialization, political, economic, trade union, and media elites in both old and new member states are extremely similar: they are equally likely to identify *with* Europe (H1b confirmed), and, in contrast to average citizens, also identify *as* Europeans to the same extent (H2b rejected). The homogeneity of elites is further confirmed by there being no observable effect of age on identification across the European community (H3b rejected). Therefore, in these terms elites appear to construct their European identity in the same unproblematic way as ordinary citizens in the West, where we find no negative impact of age, and affective and cognitive identity seem to go hand in hand.

I also tested the theoretical distinction between affective and cognitive aspects of European identity empirically. I expected determinants related to experience and resources to have a stronger impact on cognitive identity (as it is based on perceived similarity), while positive evaluations of the EU should influence affective identity (based on positive distinction) to a greater extent (H4). My analysis did indeed confirm that for regular citizens the estimated effects of the proposed determinants of European identity appear to fit with the theoretical model (H4a confirmed), but this assumption was not confirmed among elites (H4b rejected). This is in line with previous findings: since affective and cognitive identification tends to be rather high for elites, due to the effects of cognitive mobilization and socialization, this theoretical distinction bears less relevance for such a homogenous part of society for which supranational identification (affective and cognitive) is quite straightforward.

The second question posed by this study was concerned with the East-West difference in the *contents* of European identity; that is, its socially constructed meanings. My expectation was that European identity would be conceived predominantly in civic terms (H5). However, I also tested the assumption in relation to the greater relevance of ancestry (H6) and religion (H7) as elements of European identity in the new member states. The principal conclusion which can be drawn is that, overall, the strongest East-West differences are found between the elites, while regular citizens seem to be quite similar in terms of their perceptions of what it means to be European. More specifically, my findings indicate that

overall, elites and public alike greatly emphasize European belonging based on civic elements (H.5a and H5b confirmed). This denotes an idea of the EU as predominantly a community based on civic values, a vision sustained in almost equal measure by elites and the public of all member states across the EU. While normative and linguistic factors are widely accepted as the most important elements defining European belonging, my results reveal substantial variation concerning the participatory element (exercising citizens' rights for public opinion, and participating in EP elections for elites), the significance of which is especially low for CEE elites, perhaps indicating the effect of a shorter socialization within European institutions. Finally, both elites and regular citizens in the new member states tend to place more emphasis on the idea that actually feeling European is key to being European. This observation further confirms that self-perception is a larger part of European identity for the new European citizens than it is for their Western counterparts.

Although European identification is mostly formulated in civic terms, the degree to which this is so varies between countries. In terms of the elements which can be labeled as ethnic, my main finding was that the religious factor (being Christian) is considered the least important element of European belonging. Moreover, and contrary to initial expectations, there is no East/West difference regarding the idea that being Christian is important to being European among average citizens (H7a rejected). Therefore, in spite of the diversification resulting from the enlargement of the EU, European political identity is still formulated as a normative and secular idea by ordinary citizens across Europe, contradicting the claim that the process of Eastward enlargement would "bring religion back" into the process of European identity construction. Furthermore, once we control for the effects of elite formulation of national identity, East-West differences regarding ethnic elements—having European parents and being born in Europe—also cease to be significant. Therefore, in line with my theoretical assumption that the way elites construct national identities affects the content of European identity, these findings suggest that citizens tend to consider European identity in ethnic terms in those countries where elites emphasize ethnic-based concepts of national identity, and religion and language are politicized as markers of national belonging. Consequently, we must reject the hypothesis that the elements related to ancestry (being born in Europe and having European parents) are more important to citizens of the new member states (H6a rejected), as the importance of these factors is clearly tied to the manner in which elites construct national identity in different EU member states, rather than any stable East-West differences. For elites, on the other hand, my findings suggest an East-West difference

does exist, with elites from new member states actually emphasizing religious factors to a greater extent (H7b confirmed) and placing a higher value on ancestry as a determinant of European belonging (H6b confirmed). The importance of ethnic, religious and linguistic elements of European identification, therefore, appears to be strongly conditioned by the way in which the elites across Europe construct identities; their consideration as relevant for national belonging might spill over to European identity and foster a much more exclusionary construct than the project of a civic-based post-national belonging predicted by scholars and fostered by European elites.

Finally, I have addressed the *consequences* of European identity for political support. In chapter 6, I analyzed the impact of interests and identities on perception of the EU. In terms of utilitarian considerations, factors related to perceived benefits from integration do matter slightly more for positive perceptions of the EU in the CEE-10 member states than in the more established members (H8 confirmed). However, positive future expectations (the “winners of transition argument”) only had a stronger positive impact in new member states immediately following accession, while the economic factor becomes more relevant in the CEE-10 countries after the crisis. Therefore, while utilitarian considerations do have a stronger impact on positive EU perceptions in the new member states, the character of this dimension changes over time. Initially, those who could be characterized as winners of transition/integration in the CEE-10 were slightly more likely to view the EU favorably than their Western counterparts (the assumption of early models of support which tested for the impact of the effects of transitions), while after the economic crisis, a more straightforward association of the EU with prosperity has a greater impact. This finding suggests that, a decade after accession, models based on references to the post-1989 changes might be losing applicability.

As far as affective factors are concerned, European identity is the strongest predictor of EU support (H9 confirmed), and identity threat perception has a negative effect on EU perception, although this is actually less significant in the new member states. Therefore, in line with the basic assumption of the research, affective factors play a central role in the formation of EU support in the enlarged EU. Moreover, in terms of the differential effect of identity before and after the crisis, the positive effect of the affective dimension of European identity becomes stronger in 2012, indicating that in times of economic hardship, affective attachment to the EU does indeed become more relevant for explaining EU support in the enlarged EU (H10 confirmed). These findings are summarized in Table 7.1, below.

Table 7.1 Summary of hypotheses and findings

Theoretical element	Hypothesis	Public opinion (a)	Elites (b)
<i>European identity between East and West (chapter 4)</i>			
<i>Hypothesis 1:</i> <i>Affective European identity</i>	<i>H.1</i> There is no difference in levels of affective European identity in the old and the new EU member states.	Confirmed	Confirmed
<i>Hypothesis 2:</i> <i>Cognitive European identity</i>	<i>H.2</i> Cognitive European identity is lower in the new member states as compared to the old EU member states.	Confirmed	Rejected
<i>Hypothesis 3:</i> <i>Effect of socialization</i>	<i>H.3</i> There is an interaction effect between age and cognitive European identification in Central Eastern Europe, younger citizens in the new member states are less likely to identify as European than older people in these countries.	Confirmed	Rejected
<i>Hypothesis 4:</i> <i>Determinants of European identity</i>	<i>H.4</i> The determinants of different dimensions of European political identity reflect the social identity theory model. Affective European identity is influenced to a greater extent by positive evaluative perceptions while cognitive European identity by factors related to resources and experience of the EU.	Confirmed	Rejected
<i>Civic or ethnic: Contents of European identity between East and West (chapter 5)</i>			
<i>Hypothesis 5:</i> <i>Contents of European identity</i>	<i>H.5</i> European identity is conceived predominantly in civic terms in both old and new member states.	Confirmed	Confirmed
<i>Hypothesis 6:</i> <i>The importance of ancestry</i>	<i>H.6</i> In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to origin (be born in Europe and have European parents) as an element delimiting European identity.	Rejected	Confirmed
<i>Hypothesis 7:</i> <i>The importance of religion</i>	<i>H.7</i> In the new EU member states of Central Eastern Europe more importance is given to religion (being Christian) as an element delimiting European identity.	Rejected	Confirmed
<i>Identities or interests: Consequences of European identity between East and West (chapter 6)</i>			
<i>Hypothesis 8:</i> <i>Economic factor</i>	<i>H.8</i> Economic factors constitute a stronger predictor of positive EU perceptions in the new member states	Confirmed	n/d
<i>Hypothesis 9:</i> <i>Identity as a determinant of EU support</i>	<i>H.9</i> Identities constitute at least as equally strong predictors of positive EU perceptions as interests, in old and new member states.	Confirmed	n/d
<i>Hypothesis 10:</i> <i>The impact of the crisis</i>	<i>H.10</i> The effect of European identity as a predictor of positive EU perceptions is greater after the crisis.	Confirmed	n/d

2. Implications of the study

As stated in the introduction, with this thesis I hope to move scholarly debate forward in several ways. Firstly, by addressing the issue of European identity as a multidimensional concept, I am well-equipped to tackle questions concerning the viability of a European identity in the expanded EU. This question is especially relevant in the modern-day European Union as a common political identification is key to continued support for European integration, especially in times of economic hardship, such as the crisis of the late 2000s. While citizens do rely to a great extent on rational cost/benefit calculations, recent studies have demonstrated that affective factors have at least as powerful an effect on European attitudes as rational calculations, and can even constitute more significant explanatory factors. The results of this study confirm the latter statement, for both new and old member states of the EU. As I pointed out in the introduction, this is the result of an extension of European policy scope beyond the common market, which has politicized European integration, activating the potential of political loyalties. In these terms, much recent analysis has highlighted the importance of such “soft” *affective/identitarian factors* in EU public opinion research. This study, thus, contributes a novel understanding of the observed East-West differences in this respect and highlights the importance of context for the analysis of public opinion and elite attitudes in the enlarged EU.

Most importantly, the findings of the research presented in this thesis indicate that the lower levels of identification as Europeans in the CEE-10 member states are not due to a stronger national allegiance resulting from recently recovered independence, or any inherent opposition to supranational belonging. It is rather that citizens of post-communist Europe have not yet internalized their self-perception as European to the same extent as their Western counterparts, due to their short socialization as members of a European political community. Therefore, while attachment to Europe and its positive perception is quite widespread among the new European citizens, as younger generations socialize in the context of EU membership, identification as European should become more ingrained. Moreover, in terms of the contents of European identity, this is conceived predominantly in civic terms in both the East and West of Europe, the inclusion of new member states apparently not challenging this notion, as some authors anticipated it would. We can therefore conclude that, even though it may seem identification as Europeans has been slightly diluted by enlargement, the viability of a long-term common European identity as rooted in civic belonging has not been threatened.

Secondly, I contributed to the theoretical debate surrounding the concept and operationalization of European identity in empirical research. In these terms, my research demonstrates the importance of testable hypotheses rooted in solid theoretical frameworks. Applying the social identity theory model to European identification between East and West, facilitates our understanding of post-enlargement European identity, taking into account as it does the difference between identifying as European and with Europe, two dimensions which do not necessarily correspond, as the case of new European citizens illustrates.

Finally, with this thesis I have explored the role of interests *and* identities as determinants in the formation of EU support, a framework largely overlooked within scholarship on Central and Eastern Europe, which focuses primarily on ideological and utilitarian factors. The changing character of utilitarian considerations in the new member states indicates a convergence in the ways attitudes towards the EU are structured, away from those models which focused on the differential impact of post-communist transitions. Moreover, the increased significance of the affective factor highlights the necessity of taking into account the great extent to which EU attitudes in these new member states are based on such stable and affective factors, and not only utilitarian calculations. This is unsurprising when we consider that the “return to Europe” discourse contained a strong affective element, and European identity appears to become ever more important in the expanded political community of the EU.

As mentioned previously, the findings of my research should be interpreted in the light of some limitations. Most importantly, the analysis presented in this thesis is based on cross-sectional data. This means I cannot provide a definitive account of the changes which might occur at the individual level of attitudes and identity-formation. Rather, I focus on comparisons between individuals at different points in time. A more satisfactory account of individual-level processes of identity and attitude formation could be provided through the analysis of panel data which were not available for my study. Moreover, the issue of causality is particularly controversial in relation to the link between individual identities and support for the EU. It is possible that people who feel more positive about the EU tend to more readily acknowledge a European identity, reversing the assumed causality. This point is very significant and I do not try to make an argument about it one way or another, however, I do argue that there is an important relationship between identity and EU support, especially in times of economic crisis.

3. Directions for further research

A decade ago, immediately following the CEE-10 accessions, a division across Europe was very apparent; the disparity between East and West, between new and old member states was a prominent feature in both scholarly analyses of European politics and media discourse. A decade later, however, these “new” member states are no longer so new: five out of ten CEE member states have already adopted the euro as their currency; a Pole (Donald Tusk) has been appointed President of the European Council; and several of the CEE-10 countries have successfully held the Council Presidency, in some cases during the most tumultuous periods of the crisis, reinforcing their institutional integration in the EU. While differences in economic development persist, the economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s shifted the focus of attention from the new and presumed different countries of Central and Eastern Europe, to the periphery of the old member states. A new division has emerged: South against North, creditors vs. debtors, a division laden with assumptions about differences relating to political culture. Issues of identity and solidarity remain at the heart of the current conflicts within the EU, and could become even more salient if they continue to be exploited by Eurosceptic parties.

Thus, in addition to the economic and political ramifications, the crisis has also been a crisis of trust. As Tsoukalis has phrased it, the crisis caused “a serious loss of trust between countries, extending all the way from governments to citizens, while ugly national stereotypes resurfaced” (2014, 18). It has therefore painfully underlined the fragility of European identity, while at the same time highlighting its absolute necessity as a basis for solidarity in an economically unbalanced Union. While a decade ago concern centered on the possibility that Eastern enlargement might dilute European identity, the economic problems of the late 2000s have demonstrated that the most substantial threats can come from within the core elements of the EU setup, such as the Eurozone (Epstein and Jacoby 2014). The crisis revealed major weaknesses within European integration, including the way in which the EU seems to be “fair-weather” business for many citizens, especially in the core member states. It has been predicted that the rise of aggressive Euroscepticism and reactionary nationalism will “make or break” the Union over 2015 (Fischer 2014), therefore future studies will need to address the issue of European identification, and examine to what extent national identities can be politicized against the EU in times of economic difficulty. More recent data and more adequate research instruments—such as panel data, as mentioned

previously– which will enable more satisfactory tracing of European identity change processes are needed to address these issues.

In conclusion, the research I present in this thesis contributes to a better understanding of both European identity among elites and ordinary citizens within the enlarged EU, and of the factors that may help explain European identification. It is, however, unlikely to close investigation into a subject which, by its very nature, is complex, multidimensional and certainly difficult to assess. The impact of the economic crisis on elite and public opinion over recent years will require a renewed approach to the subject: it is therefore inevitable that further studies will be needed to ratify, where appropriate, the trends and processes described in this thesis.

Resumen en español

1. Introducción

Con la quinta oleada de la ampliación de la Unión Europea (UE) hacia el Este de Europa (2004/2007), se logró un cambio histórico excepcional. La extensión de la ciudadanía europea a millones de nuevos ciudadanos en Europa Central y Oriental (PECO) marcó una reunificación *de facto* del continente, después de décadas de separación en dos bloques políticos antagónicos. Fruto de ello es la existencia de una ciudadanía europea que incluye a más de quinientos millones de personas y que se extiende por la mayor parte de Europa Occidental y Oriental. Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista de la cohesión de la Unión Europea como comunidad política, esta evolución ha suscitado importantes interrogantes con respecto a las lealtades políticas subyacentes ¿Se traduce esta reunificación formal de los europeos en la existencia de una *identidad europea* común en toda la UE, o, más bien, ésta se ha diluido con la expansión de la Unión hacia el Este? La presente tesis doctoral aborda estas preguntas por medio de un estudio comparativo de la opinión pública individual y las orientaciones de las élites en los países de Europa Central y del Este (PECO), como nuevos estados miembros, y los antiguos estados miembros de la UE.

2. Identidad, ampliación e integración europea

El tema de las lealtades políticas lleva siendo un elemento central en el estudio de la integración europea desde los inicios mismos del proyecto europeo. Ya los documentos fundacionales de la Unión Europea anticipaban la aparición de una "solidaridad de hecho" (Declaración Schuman, 1950) en una "unión cada vez más estrecha entre los pueblos de Europa" (Preámbulo del Tratado Constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea Comunidad Económica, 1957) como el objetivo final del proceso de integración en Europa. También los primeros teóricos de la integración europea, como Karl Deutsch (1957) y Ernst Haas (1958), situaban el aspecto identitario en el centro de sus teorías. Sin embargo, mientras la integración europea siguió focalizada en el ámbito de la liberalización económica y la construcción del mercado común, el potencial de las identidades para generar actitudes tanto positivas, como negativas, fue obviado. Además, durante la mayor parte de su historia, la integración europea ha sido un proceso manejado casi en exclusiva por élites, con un relativamente pequeño grupo de élites burocráticas y políticas a la cabeza (Haller 2008). Este denominado "Euroelitismo" se caracteriza por un apoyo mucho más sustancial (si bien no del todo uniforme) al proceso de integración entre las élites frente al mayor desapego y escepticismo de la población en su conjunto (Best 2012). No obstante, con el paso del

tiempo, la naturaleza del proyecto europeo ha cambiado sustancialmente y lenta aunque progresivamente los ciudadanos han venido ganando una mayor influencia en el proceso de toma de decisiones. Esto es especialmente cierto durante las últimas dos décadas cuando la presencia de un *demos europeo*, enraizado en la existencia de una identidad política europea, se ha convertido en el tema de los debates populares y en objeto de interés académico entre los estudiosos de la política europea. Este cambio, en gran medida, se debe al hecho de que los procesos simultáneos de *ampliación* y *profundización de la integración* cambiaron los límites internos y externos de Europa, contribuyendo a la politización del proceso y a un mayor alcance de la integración europea (Hooghe y Marks 2009).

Todo este conjunto de procesos establecieron las bases para la institucionalización de una entidad política europea y ampliaron el alcance de la integración que, a su vez, subrayó la cuestión de la legitimidad política y la lealtad de los ciudadanos. El Tratado de Maastricht (1992) estableció la existencia de la Unión Europea con una moneda común y una ciudadanía europea supranacional, lo que implicaba una *profundización* importante de los procesos de integración. Al crear la ciudadanía de la Unión, el Tratado completó el sistema político europeo emergente demarcando su *demos*, y complementando por tanto, su correspondiente comunidad política, además de añadir un carácter más claramente social y político al proceso supranacional basado hasta ese momento principalmente en la integración económica (Eichenberg y Dalton 2007, 132; Habermas 2012, 61). Sin embargo, la extensión del ámbito de influencia de las políticas europeas más allá del mercado común también politizó la integración europea, activando su potencial para la polarización de las identidades políticas en la UE y provocando debates en cuanto a su legitimidad democrática (Beetham y Lord de 1998; Scheuer 2005; Cerutti y Lucarelli 2008; Fuchs 2011a; Lucarelli 2011). La respuesta a la cuestión de la legitimidad popular en la UE fue la promoción por parte de las instituciones europeas de la UE de una nueva idea de ciudadanía y de Europa como una nueva identidad política (Bruter 2005, 73). Tal objetivo ha sido perseguido principalmente a través de la difusión de elementos simbólicos¹⁰⁴ (Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005) y la promoción de valores comunes¹⁰⁵ cuyo objetivo era el fortalecimiento de los sentimientos compartidos

¹⁰⁴ El Tratado Constitucional (TC) incluyó un reconocimiento oficial de la bandera europea, el himno, el lema de la UE —“Unidos en la diversidad”—, y el día de Europa. Tras la paralización del procesos de ratificación del TC estas menciones no se han incluido en el texto de la consiguiente Tratado de Lisboa (2007), sin embargo, las instituciones europeas siguen utilizándolos.

¹⁰⁵ En 1973 en la cumbre de Copenhague, se aprobó la “Declaración sobre la identidad europea”, señalando a los principios de la democracia representativa, el Estado de derecho, la justicia social, el respeto de los derechos humanos, así como las instituciones y políticas del mercado común como su valores subyacentes (Strath 2002).

entre los pueblos de Europa, como base necesaria para los afectos de pertenencia a Europa y la solidaridad en el seno de la comunidad.

El otro proceso que contribuyó al aumento de la relevancia de la identidad europea fue la ampliación hacia el Este de la UE. La incorporación de diez países poscomunistas como nuevos miembros de la UE motivó una reflexión sobre las fronteras de la Unión Europea y los límites de su *ampliación*. La subyacente identidad común era esencial para el proceso de ampliación, ya que la inclusión de los países post-comunistas de Europa Central y Oriental (PECO) fue en gran medida justificada por motivos de identidad común, normas y valores compartidos (Schimmelfennig 2001; Sjursen 2002). Después de las revoluciones pacíficas del 1989, que liberaron a esta parte del continente de la dominación soviética, había una sensación de “deber de parentesco” hacia el Este de Europa en Europa occidental, lo que hizo que la ampliación pareciera casi inevitable (Sjursen 2006). En los estados candidatos a la adhesión, por otra parte, la percepción predominante era que los PECO siempre han sido parte de Europa y que ahora necesitaban “volver” a ella después de casi medio siglo de separación política y económica del resto de Europa (Grabbe y Hughes 1999; Brusis 2001; Bat 2002). En este sentido, en los países candidatos las élites políticas de todo el espectro ideológico hablaban de una necesidad histórica de tal “regreso a Europa”, que implicaba un retorno a la normalidad (Copsey 2013) y una fuerte identificación con los valores y las normas occidentales, que en buena medida habían inspirado los cambios post-1989 (Schimmelfennig 2003). Había, por tanto, una clara motivación afectiva para la adhesión de la UE sobre la base de una identidad compartida y cierto sentimiento de la inevitabilidad histórica de la reunificación del continente, en ambos lados del proceso.

Al mismo tiempo, algunos de los debates académicos y en los medios de comunicación se centraron en el potencial impacto negativo de la ampliación sobre la cohesión de la comunidad política europea y su identidad emergente (Weiss 2003; Fuchs y Klingeman 2006; Katzenstein y Checkel 2009; Thomassen y Back 2009; Risse 2010). La principal preocupación era que la ampliación hacia el Este podría contribuir a diluir la tenue identidad europea existente entonces, ya que casi se duplicaba el número de estados miembros y los nuevos países estaban significativamente menos desarrollados económicamente y tenían un historial democrático más corto en comparación con los miembros anteriores. Por otra parte, se anticipaban también importantes diferencias en términos de valores y actitudes. Como apuntan Mau y Verwiebe,

la inclusión de miembros adicionales plantea la cuestión de la medida en que estos nuevos miembros se ajustan a la percepción social y cultural que la UE tiene de sí misma, y si el resultado no es una mayor discrepancia entre los valores propagados por la UE y los valores de los países miembros, obstruyendo así la integración (2010, 330, traducción propia).

Por lo tanto, la identidad común subyacente era, al menos, cuestionable para algunos observadores de la ampliación. Por otra parte, también hubo un sentimiento de cierta desilusión con la UE en los países candidatos, debido a la falta de entusiasmo hacia su adhesión por parte de los miembros establecidos de la UE (McLaren 2006, 156). Las difíciles y prolongadas negociaciones políticas sobre la adhesión, la postura firme sobre la condicionalidad de la UE en el proceso y la decisión de imponer una serie de restricciones en los derechos de los nuevos ciudadanos de la UE (la más importante—períodos de transición de hasta siete años a la libre circulación del mercado de mano de obra), contribuyeron a una evaluación más sobria de los supuestos ideales respecto a la “vuelta a Europa”.

Por lo tanto, a pesar de la identidad compartida que subyacía al proceso de adhesión de los PECO, esta actitud poco entusiasta en algunos de los antiguos estados miembros acerca de la ampliación, traducida en unas condiciones específicas y a veces severas de adhesión, socavaron seriamente la posición y la percepción de los nuevos ciudadanos europeos como iguales en la comunidad. Por otra parte, dicha diferenciación se ha mantenido después de la adhesión, con los debates acerca de la conveniencia de la libre movilidad laboral de los trabajadores de los PECO¹⁰⁶ y la falta de voluntad política para incluir a algunos de estos países en el espacio Schengen¹⁰⁷.

Por lo tanto, mientras que la identidad compartida actuó como desencadenante fundamental de la ampliación hacia el Este, la inclusión de estos nuevos Estados miembros en la comunidad política europea no siempre fue sencilla, y a veces pareció que sólo les fue

¹⁰⁶ Este debate surgió en torno a la adhesión, en relación con el proyecto de Tratado Constitucional y la Directiva Bolkestein, en Francia, entre otros países occidentales. La figura del "fontanero polaco" representaba la amenaza de los trabajadores más baratos de Europa Central y Oriental (Wyrozumska 2007). Tras la adhesión, la amenaza percibida de los inmigrantes de Europa del Este, es decir, los nuevos ciudadanos europeos que se desplazan libremente en busca de trabajo en la UE, ha sido el tema clave para el surgimiento del euroescéptico UKIP en el Reino Unido (Sherwood 2014). Otro ejemplo fue la expulsión de los ciudadanos gitanos, en su mayoría provenientes de los PECO prometida por Nicolas Sarkozy en 2010 (Saltmarsh 2010).

¹⁰⁷ Las preocupaciones sobre las brechas al Estado de Derecho en Rumania y Bulgaria se han indicado como una razón para evitar que entren en el espacio Schengen. El ministro de inmigración holandés fue citado por *The New York Times* en 2011 por decir acerca de vetar la entrada de Bulgaria y Rumanía en Schengen: “Es una cuestión de confianza y la confianza de que nuestras fronteras exteriores colectivas estarán a salvo y seguras. Por el momento, está claro que todavía hay deficiencias significativas en el campo de la lucha contra la corrupción y la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada” (Castillo 2011).

otorgada una ciudadanía europea de segunda clase (Sojka 2009). Por otra parte, existía la preocupación de que la “identidad europea” existente antes de las ampliaciones hacia el Este, se hubiese diluido hasta el punto de que ninguna comunidad política europea significativa podría llegar a constituirse en esta UE ampliada. Sin embargo, tal efecto potencialmente divisivo sobre el futuro de una identidad política europea debe ser probado empíricamente, lo que nos lleva al objetivo de la presente tesis.

3. Objetivo y preguntas de investigación

Actualmente la idea de una identidad europea común constituye una preocupación central para la UE (Kohli 2000; Bruter 2005; Hooghe y Marks 2009; Risse 2010; Fuchs 2011a; Kaina y Karolewski 2013). Además, la crisis económica y financiera ha provocado importantes debates acerca de la solidaridad y legitimidad en la gobernanza transnacional en Europa, destacando aún más el papel funcional de la identificación con las instituciones políticas europeas (Fuchs 2011b), especialmente como un freno contra el descontento (Wessels, 2007). La pregunta que surge en este contexto es si la re-unificación de los europeos habría afectado a la posibilidad de una *identidad europea* común en toda la UE, y si realmente se puede observar algún impacto negativo de la ampliación hacia el Este en la identidad política europea, como se anticipó en algunos estudios (Weiss 2003; Fuchs y Klingeman 2006; Checkel y Katzenstein 2009; Thomassen y Back 2009; Mau y Verwiebe 2010). En este sentido, el objetivo de este estudio es investigar empíricamente la identificación europea en la UE ampliada, a través de un enfoque sobre las posibles diferencias entre los nuevos y los antiguos Estados miembros. Por lo tanto, podríamos plantear la pregunta básica de investigación como sigue:

La ampliación hacia el Este de la Unión Europea, ¿ha hecho imposible el surgimiento de una identidad política común europea?

A partir de aquí, el punto de partida en el presente estudio es la constatación de una contradicción sorprendente en cuanto a la cuestión de la identidad europea en los PECO. Por un lado, después de la caída del comunismo, la pertenencia a la UE recibía un apoyo generalizado y se constituía como parte integrante de los cambios políticos y económicos en estos países, como indicaba el lema de “vuelta a Europa”, proporcionando una base sólida para el apoyo a la Unión Europea. Por el otro lado, algunos de los estudios más recientes de la identidad europea, detectan un nivel generalmente más bajo de identificación europea en

los PECO (Kuhn 2012; Sanders et al 2012), pero no exploran las fuentes de tal diferencia. En este sentido, otro de los objetivos del presente trabajo es comprobar si se puede hablar de una brecha sustancial en términos de identificación europea entre los nuevos y los antiguos Estados miembros de la UE. Es por ello que la primera pregunta de investigación se puede formular de la siguiente manera:

PI. ¿Los nuevos ciudadanos europeos procedentes de los PECO tienen unos niveles más bajos de identidad europea en comparación con sus homólogos occidentales?

Con el fin de ofrecer una solución a la aparente contradicción señalada anteriormente, en el presente estudio adopto el marco de la teoría de la identidad social para explorar la identificación europea en la UE ampliada. Sobre la base de los hallazgos de los psicólogos sociales, podemos distinguir entre dos procesos que son fundamentales para la formación de las identidades sociales: el proceso *cognitivo* (basado en la similitud percibida), lo que denota la “identificación como europeo”; y su desarrollo *afectivo* (basado en la distinción positiva), que se refiere a la “identificación con Europa”. El análisis empírico de las dos dimensiones de la identidad europea revela que mientras que los ciudadanos de los PECO se perciben a sí mismos como europeos en menor medida que los ciudadanos europeos occidentales, su apego a Europa está profundamente asentado. En este sentido, aquí nos proponemos explicar esta diferencia persistente.

Para comprender plenamente las consecuencias políticas de la identidad europea no es suficiente, en cualquier caso, tomar en consideración sólo su fuerza relativa, estabilidad y sus determinantes. También debemos explorar sus significados subjetivos (Huddy 2001; Huddy 2013); es decir, establecer a quien se percibe como incluido en / excluido de la comunidad de los europeos. Los estudiosos de la política europea han argumentado a favor de una identidad basada en los valores de “patriotismo constitucional” en la UE (Delanty 2000; Habermas 2001; Habermas 2012), que apunta a un concepto predominantemente cívico de pertenencia. Sin embargo, al evaluar los efectos de las ampliaciones hacia el Este sobre la identidad europea, algunos autores sugieren que los ciudadanos de los PECO podrían presentar una oposición más fuerte a tal idea cosmopolita de la ciudadanía que conlleva una identidad europea basada en instituciones supranacionales (Weiss 2003; Thomassen y Back 2009), dando así más importancia a la ascendencia (Liebich 2010) y a la religión como elementos constitutivos de la comunidad política (Checkel y Katzenstein 2009, 14; Risse 2010). Por lo tanto, con el fin de verificar estas hipótesis y explorar aún más

el impacto de la ampliación hacia el Este sobre las perspectivas de una identidad europea común, también debemos explorar sus significados socialmente construidos (contenidos), teniendo en cuenta la influencia de los diferentes contextos políticos nacionales y la de los líderes políticos. Es por ello que la segunda pregunta de investigación se presenta de la siguiente manera:

***P2.** ¿Hay alguna diferencia en la forma en que los nuevos ciudadanos europeos procedentes de Europa Central y del Este conceptualizan la identidad europea, en comparación con sus homólogos occidentales?*

Por último, desde el punto de vista del marco más amplio de los sistemas políticos, la existencia de una identidad compartida garantiza que los miembros de la comunidad política sigan apoyándola, incluso cuando sus resultados pueden no siempre ser de su beneficio (Easton 1979). En consecuencia, la identidad compartida tiene un alto valor funcional para un sistema político y el desarrollo de una identidad europea es crucial para la existencia de un apoyo estable a la UE y su legitimidad política (Lucarelli 2011; Fuchs 2011a). Por lo tanto, los factores afectivos deben constituir un componente clave en la formación de apoyo político en los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE. Sin embargo, hasta ahora el foco en la investigación empírica comparativa sobre las actitudes europeas en los PECO, tanto como países candidatos, así como después de la ampliación, ya como estados miembros, ha estado centrado en los factores utilitarios e ideológicos en relación con el apoyo a la integración europea (Tucker, Pacek y Berinsky 2002; Caplanova, Orviska, y Hudson 2004; Tverdova y Anderson 2004; Guerra 2013a). Así pues, en relación con las *consecuencias* de la identificación europea sobre el apoyo de la UE, debemos contestar a la siguiente pregunta:

***P3.** ¿Cuál es el papel de los factores afectivos en la conformación del apoyo a la UE en los nuevos estados miembros de Europa central y oriental?*

Esta última pregunta se analiza en una perspectiva comparativa, inmediatamente después de la adhesión (2004) y después de la crisis económica y financiera de los años 2008-2012, que ha dejado una profunda huella en la percepción pública de la UE (2012). La hipótesis básica es que las dificultades económicas y políticas experimentadas por la UE podrían socavar el “apoyo incondicional” a la adhesión (una imagen positiva general de la UE), una dimensión clave de apoyo a la UE en Europa Central y del Este antes de la adhesión (Guerra de 2013, 143). En este sentido, se argumenta que alrededor de una década después

de la primera ampliación hacia el Este, dada la percepción de los problemas de la economía europea y con la cuestión de la solidaridad como el principal reto para el futuro, la importancia de los factores más estables y afectivos debe ser re-evaluada.

4. Contribución a la investigación actual

Esta tesis tiene como objetivo contribuir al debate académico en tres aspectos principales. En primer lugar, se presenta un análisis multidimensional del estado de la identificación europea y se aborda la cuestión de la viabilidad de una identidad europea en la UE ampliada. En segundo lugar, la tesis contribuye al debate teórico sobre el concepto y la operacionalización de la identidad europea en la investigación empírica. Por último, se explora el papel de los determinantes afectivos en la conformación del apoyo a la UE, un tanto obviados en los estudios sobre las actitudes en los PECO.

Como se ha planteado, la primera contribución radica en la consideración de la evidencia empírica sobre el estado de la identidad europea en la UE ampliada, y el análisis de los determinantes de las diferencias que se observan en este sentido entre el Este y el Oeste de Europa. Este tema se enmarca dentro de un cambio más amplio en el ámbito de investigación sobre la integración europea hacia cuestiones de creación de comunidad política después del Tratado de Maastricht, así como una renovada consideración de los factores afectivos como determinantes de apoyo a la UE (Hooghe y Marks 2004; Bruter 2005; Risse 2010; Fligstein, Polyakova y Sandholtz 2012; Cram 2012). En particular, el estudio del papel de la identidad en la UE se encuadra dentro de una progresiva politización de la opinión pública sobre las políticas europeas (Hooghe y Marks 2008; Börzel y Risse 2009), que se produjo en el contexto de los referéndums sobre los tratados¹⁰⁸, así como en otros aspectos de las políticas europeas como la introducción de la moneda común o la ampliación hacia el Este de Europa¹⁰⁹ (Checkel y Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010). La Unión

¹⁰⁸ La opinión pública nacional ha dejado su huella en la política europea cuando el Tratado de Maastricht ha sido rechazado en el referéndum de Dinamarca (1992), cuando el Tratado de Niza ha sido rechazado por los irlandeses (2001), y sobre todo cuando el Tratado Constitucional (TC) fue derrotado en la referendos en Francia y los Países Bajos (2005), con lo que el proceso de aprobación del TC se paralizaba y los líderes europeos lo abandonaban en favor de una solución menos politizada de un nuevo tratado. Más recientemente, hemos sido testigos del rechazo del Tratado de Lisboa en Irlanda (2008), que luego fue aprobado en un segundo referéndum con algunas concesiones para abordar las preocupaciones expresadas por la opinión pública danesa.

¹⁰⁹ El rechazo de la moneda común en Suecia y Dinamarca, así como los debates sobre las consecuencias de la libre movilidad laboral después de la ampliación hacia el Este en Francia y Gran Bretaña son sólo algunos ejemplos de importantes debates políticos nacionales en las que se han cuestionado políticas europeas específicas.

Europea se creó como un proyecto de integración económica, impulsado por una élite y con un papel muy limitado de los ciudadanos de a pie. Esto fue especialmente significativo en las primeras fases de integración, durante la era del “consenso permisivo” (Lindberg y Scheingold 1970), cuando los ciudadanos mantuvieron un apoyo pasivo generalizado y más bien poco interesado en la política y en los aspectos técnicos de la integración europea. De acuerdo con ello, inicialmente la integración europea se percibió (y se estudió) como un tema de relaciones internacionales y, por lo tanto, externo a las políticas nacionales. En consecuencia, el proceso de politización de la integración europea post-Maastricht dió lugar a la desaparición de ese *consenso permisivo* entre la opinión pública europea y a un debate público cada vez más visible sobre las políticas y los tratados de la UE, denominado como *disenso restrictivo* (Hooghe y Marks 2005). Este protagonismo creciente de la opinión pública no ha ido acompañado, sin embargo, por la evolución de una mayor representación política a nivel europeo. El papel del Parlamento Europeo—elegido directamente desde 1979—, sigue siendo limitado si se compara con los parlamentos nacionales y las elecciones europeas siguen constituyendo unos procesos electorales de segundo orden¹¹⁰. No obstante, poco a poco, la política de la UE dejó de ser un problema externo de las relaciones internacionales y se convirtió en parte del conflicto político interno. Este proceso ha llegado a su punto culminante en el contexto de la crisis económica de finales de la primera década del siglo XXI, y en la actualidad no cabe duda de que las actitudes de los ciudadanos claramente “dan forma y limitan al proceso de integración europea” (Gabel 1998, 333).

En términos teóricos, el presente estudio se inscribe en el marco de un giro constructivista en el estudio de la UE (Schimmelfennig 2014), que coincidió con la aparición de los debates más amplios en relación con “el regreso de la cultura y la identidad” en las relaciones internacionales (Lapid y Kratochwil 1996; Checkel 2005) y la creciente popularidad de las perspectivas constructivistas en las ciencias sociales en general. Los enfoques constructivistas en el estudio de la UE se basan en la noción de que las ideas e identidades sociales son importantes para la integración europea (Parsons 2003). Su hipótesis principal es que las estructuras ideacionales e intersubjetivas como identidades colectivas, la cultura, los valores y las normas determinan las preferencias y las interacciones

¹¹⁰ Las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo (PE) se han caracterizado como “elecciones de segundo orden” debido a las siguientes características: en comparación con las elecciones nacionales (de primer orden), la participación en las elecciones europeas es significativamente inferior; los partidos más pequeños y de protesta tienden a tener mejores resultados mientras que los partidos gobernantes suelen sufrir pérdidas en las elecciones al PE (Reif y Schmitt, 1980).

político-sociales y que estas últimas no se pueden explicar considerando sólo los factores utilitarios (Schimmelfennig 2014, 35). Por lo tanto, esta tesis se enmarca en una perspectiva constructivista social ya que su supuesto básico es que no sólo los intereses, sino también las identidades sociales constituyen factores explicativos relevantes para el comportamiento político (Risse 2010). En este sentido, la adopción de la teoría de la identidad social para explorar la identidad europea como forma de adhesión a la UE constituye una configuración teórica complementaria, ya que suministra un marco para formular hipótesis empíricas respecto a la identificación europea, mientras que comparte con los constructivistas sociales la premisa de que las identidades se construyen socialmente, y que su significado es en gran medida dependiente del contexto (Mols y Haslam 2008, 446). Al tener en cuenta la identidad europea desde el punto de vista de la teoría de la identidad social, somos capaces de entender cómo, mientras que no hay diferencias en la estructura general de las actitudes de la UE en los PECO, todavía podemos esperar encontrar diferencias relevantes en términos de identificación europea si se tiene en cuenta cómo se conforman las identidades desde el punto de vista teórico y, más si cabe, si se consideran las especificidades propias de la ampliación hacia el Este.

La segunda contribución relevante está relacionada con el punto anterior, pues el presente proyecto de investigación proporciona un ejemplo empírico de cómo una operacionalización más cuidadosa del concepto de identidad europea puede contribuir a una mejor comprensión de la dinámica de la integración europea. La investigación de la identidad ha ido en aumento en las ciencias sociales desde hace varias décadas (Fearon 1999; Huddy 2001; Triandafyllidou y Wodak 2003; Abdelal et al., 2006). También en la Ciencia Política los estudiosos han incorporado la identidad como una de las categorías analíticas centrales, reconociendo el hecho de que no sólo de la elección racional, sino también los procesos psicológicos de identificación de grupo, pueden ofrecer un punto de vista relevante para entender el comportamiento político (Smith 2004). Como señala Bruter (2005), las identidades políticas constituyen uno de los elementos más importantes de la autopercepción de los individuos y determinan en gran medida sus creencias, actitudes y comportamientos (2005, 3). Sin embargo, los estudios sobre la integración europea a menudo han fusionado diferentes tipos de actitudes (identidad, apoyo, confianza) y de comportamientos políticos (voto en los referendos y elecciones al PE) bajo un denominador común de “apoyo de la UE”. Además, incluso cuando la identidad europea se analiza como una dimensión separada, la mayoría de los estudios no discernen adecuadamente sus diferentes elementos (Díez

Medrano 2010). En este sentido, este trabajo ofrece una consideración más cuidadosa de la identidad europea y de sus elementos. Tal y como se reflejan en las orientaciones individuales de la opinión pública y de las élites, las diferencias entre los nuevos y antiguos Estados miembros halladas confirman la importancia de este enfoque multidimensional.

Por último, desde el punto de vista de los sistemas políticos, las identidades colectivas constituyen una fuente fundamental de la legitimidad de las comunidades políticas (Easton 1975; Easton 1979). Así, y especialmente desde la década de los noventa (Duchesne 2010), los estudiosos de la Unión Europea se han venido interesando cada vez más por las cuestiones de identificación política en Europa¹¹¹. El punto de partida de mi análisis de los determinantes y las consecuencias de la identidad europea es la suposición de que ésta constituye una dimensión fundamental del conjunto más amplio de actitudes europeas (Scheuer 2005; Boomgaarden et al 2011). Por otra parte, la identidad ha sido reconocida como una dimensión explicativa básica en el campo de la sociología política de la UE y un factor explicativo importante de apoyo de los ciudadanos a la UE (Hooghe y Marks 2009; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, y De Vreese 2013). Mi contribución en estos términos es demostrar que las actitudes de los europeos en los PECO no sólo están determinadas por consideraciones utilitarias relacionadas con los beneficios percibidos o anticipados, sino también, y en gran medida, por los procesos de identificación con Europa.

5. Diseño de la investigación, metodología y datos

En términos de diseño de la investigación, este estudio constituye una investigación comparativa de la identidad europea como una realidad socio-política enraizada en las orientaciones individuales de los ciudadanos y de las élites en los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE. Varios elementos deben aclararse aquí como las consideraciones metodológicas relativas a la exploración empírica de las identidades sociales, el ámbito geográfico del análisis, el período de tiempo que abarca el estudio, así como los métodos concretos y los datos utilizados en dicho análisis.

En primer lugar, hay una cuestión metodológica importante que se debe abordar inicialmente. Los desafíos que nos presenta el objetivo de teorizar la identidad política europea se multiplican por los obstáculos encontrados cuando tratamos de verificar

¹¹¹ Véase, por ejemplo el trabajo de Díez Medrano y Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2001; Carey 2002; Citrin y Sides 2004; Bruter 2005; McLaren 2006; Checkel y Katzenstein 2009; Thiel 2011.

empíricamente su existencia y sus consecuencias para el comportamiento político. Las identidades políticas constituyen fenómenos sociales complejos que son difíciles de observar directamente, y los intentos de medición cuantitativos de la identidad se han llevado la peor parte de la crítica. Como han hecho notar Kaina y Karolewski, “el desarrollo actual de la investigación empírica cuantitativa sobre la identidad colectiva europea sigue siendo insatisfactorio debido a la escasez de datos estandarizados, longitudinales, fiables y válidos, así como de unos métodos adecuados de medición” (2013, 18). Por lo tanto, al no disponer de instrumentos de investigación adecuados, muy a menudo los resultados de diferentes estudios ofrecen evidencia empírica poco fiable que conduce a conclusiones contradictorias con respecto a la existencia y al carácter de la identidad europea. Algunos autores sugieren incluso que, “en pocas áreas es el cuestionario de tan dudosa utilidad, como en el ámbito de los valores y los significados culturales” (Smith 1992, 57). Sin embargo, como señala Bruter, si asumimos que debemos descartar esfuerzos cuantitativos para medir la identidad sobre la base de que es algo que se experimenta y no es fácil expresar, y por lo tanto, constituye “un prisionero del lenguaje”, también habría que descartar cualquier enfoque cualitativo por la misma razón (Bruter 2013, 25). Por lo tanto, en el presente estudio, si bien tomamos nota de las limitaciones de preguntas de las encuestas transnacionales, se adopta un enfoque cuantitativo comparativo para el estudio de la identidad europea como la herramienta más adecuada para los objetivos propuestos.

El tema de esta investigación versa sobre *los nuevos estados miembros de Europa Central y del Este de la UE (PECO)*, un grupo de diez países que se definen a partir de su experiencia de dominación socialista después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, su asociación con el bloque del Este durante la época de la Guerra Fría, y los procesos de la revolución y transición de los años 1980 y 1990 que concluyeron en la adhesión a la UE. Sin embargo, si bien hay legados históricos significativos que estos países comparten, así como una experiencia más reciente de profundos cambios económicos, políticos y sociales, los nuevos Estados miembros son también muy heterogéneos entre ellos. Existen diferencias importantes en sus historias y organizaciones políticas previas a la imposición de regímenes socialistas y durante la época comunista que constituyen legados importantes y fuentes de diferencias en el desarrollo institucional y económico de hoy en día. Existe un importante corpus de literatura exploratoria de las causas y consecuencias de estas diferencias (Linz y Stepan, 1996; Offe 1996; Vachudová 2005; Ramet 2010), cuyo resumen va más allá del alcance de esta introducción. Sin embargo, algunas de las diferencias más relevantes que

siguen ejerciendo influencia en el carácter social, político y cultural de estos países incluyen sus luchas nacionalistas, la relación con los imperios históricos, la presencia o ausencia de la condición de Estado antes de 1989, el carácter de los sistemas socialistas impuestos, la presencia y el carácter de la oposición comunista, y el método de transición adoptado después de 1989. Por otra parte, también hay mucha heterogeneidad entre los PECO en términos de sus trayectorias y desempeño económico y político a partir de 1989, así como en los procesos de adhesión y su actuación como miembros de la UE, tal y como se discute en el capítulo 3 (Henderson 1999; Mikkel y Pridham 2004; Bat y Wolczuk 2013; White, Batt, y Lewis 2013).

Por lo tanto, el objetivo no es tratar a los PECO conjuntamente como los “nuevos estados miembros de la UE” bajo la asunción de que se trata de un grupo homogéneo. Más bien, el elemento que conecta estos diez países es su condición de recién llegados a la UE y la situación de sus ciudadanos como “los nuevos ciudadanos europeos”, lo que permite el análisis de la identificación europea desde una perspectiva renovada en términos de los procesos de constitución de la identidad europea. Por lo tanto, cada vez que cuando nos referimos a “los nuevos estados miembros de la UE”, se trata de los diez países post-comunistas de Europa Central y del Este, nuevos estados miembros de Europa que ingresaron en la UE entre 2004 y 2007.

Esto nos lleva al otro tema que debe ser aclarado aquí, el *periodo de tiempo* que abarca este estudio. La “ampliación hacia el Este” de la UE, bien podría referirse a todo el proceso de ampliación de la UE hacia el Este del continente, es decir, sus ampliaciones de 2004 y 2007, así como la adhesión más reciente de Croacia en 2013. Sin embargo, este estudio se ocupa de los datos relativos a la opinión pública y las percepciones de la élite de los años 2007 y 2009, así como las encuestas de opinión pública, que cubren el período de 2004 hasta 2012, un plazo que excluye la consideración de Croacia como miembro de la UE. Sin embargo, para simplificar, nos referimos a la adhesión a la UE de los diez nuevos países de Europa Central y Oriental en 2004 y 2007 como la “ampliación al Este” de la UE.

En cuanto al *método*, la necesidad de identificar y explicar el carácter contextual de las actitudes individuales de la UE se ha reconocido cada vez más en la investigación de la Ciencia Política en los últimos años (Steenbergen y Jones 2002; Stegmüller 2013). El diseño metodológico más extendido en los estudios comparativos cuantitativos sobre la

formación de actitudes de la UE más recientes ha sido la adopción de modelos jerárquicos¹¹², pues se trata de la herramienta más apropiada para analizar los datos anidados como son los estudios transnacionales de opinión pública (Steenbergen y Jones 2002). Por otra parte, este enfoque permite una exploración adecuada de la potencial heterogeneidad causal entre grupos, en este caso, entre los antiguos y nuevos Estados miembros de la UE. La mayoría de los estudios que se ocupan de los nuevos Estados miembros se centran en los datos de la región en exclusiva y desarrollan modelos específicos para los PECO centrándose en el legado de las transiciones de los noventa (Cichowski 2000; Tucker, Pacek y Berinsky 2002; Tverdova y Anderson, 2004). Sin embargo, como observan Garry y Tilley (2009), este enfoque “hace imposible una explicación de la formación de actitudes que pueden ser elaborados y probado para toda la UE recién ampliada” (Garry y Tilley 2009, 538).

Como apuntan Steenbergen y Jones (2002), el objetivo del análisis multinivel es formular un modelo explicativo de una variable dependiente en el nivel más bajo de análisis (en este caso, la identificación individual con Europa y como europeo), teniendo en cuenta la información de más niveles de análisis (en este caso, las actitudes individuales y características del contexto que varían según el país). En consecuencia, los modelos jerárquicos nos permiten construir modelos explicativos más robustos que incluyen información de todos los niveles pertinentes de la sociedad, así como dar cuenta de la heterogeneidad causal por medio de interacciones entre estos diferentes niveles (Steenbergen y Jones 2002, 219).

En estos términos, y teniendo en cuenta que el enfoque de este estudio es comparativo (el objetivo es explorar las posibles diferencias y convergencias entre nuevos y antiguos Estados miembros de la UE), los modelos jerárquicos que incorporan todos los países de la UE son los que mejor se adaptan a estos objetivos. Esta perspectiva nos permite dar cuenta de la naturaleza anidada de los datos (individuos anidados dentro de los países), así como evaluar de una manera estadísticamente más fiable la influencia de las variables contextuales, sobre todo, la influencia del contexto de los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE, verificando si el efecto de una variable de nivel individual (nivel 1) varía en función del nivel de los países (nivel 2), para comprobar si existe heterogeneidad causal entre los dos grupos de países.

¹¹² Los supuestos subyacentes de los modelos jerárquicos aplicados en este estudio se discuten en detalle en las secciones de diseño de la investigación de los capítulos 4-6.

Esta tesis hace uso de dos fuentes de datos principales. El conjunto de datos *IntUne* constituye la principal fuente de datos analizados en los capítulos 4 y 5, en los que se exploran los determinantes y el contenido de la identidad europea. Estos datos fueron obtenidos en el marco del proyecto IntUne. El proyecto incluye dos oleadas de encuesta de opinión pública y de élite, con trabajo de campo en el 2007 y el 2009. El conjunto de datos incluye cuestionarios paralelos para las élites y la opinión pública en 18 países de la UE y explora diferentes aspectos de las percepciones acerca de la ciudadanía y la identidad de la Unión Europea ampliada, en una perspectiva comparada de élite/opinión pública. La encuesta de opinión pública IntUne incluye muestras representativas para los países participantes. La encuesta IntUne para las élites incluye diputados nacionales (con número relevante de *frontbenchers*), élites económicas (directivos de las principales empresas), directivos de los medios de comunicación más importantes de cada país, y dirigentes de los principales sindicatos¹¹³. A pesar de la gran cantidad de análisis cuantitativos sobre las actitudes hacia los procesos de integración europea—principalmente en base a los datos del Eurobarómetro (Citrin y Sides 2004b; Bruter 2005; Green 2007; Duchesne y Frogner 2008; McLaren 2006; Fligstein 2008; Fuchs 2011b)—, los datos para una investigación comparada de las élites y ciudadanos son mucho más difíciles de obtener, especialmente en el contexto de la UE post-2004 (para una excepción, véase algunos estudios en base al proyecto IntUne como, entre otros, los estudios de Jerez-Mir, Real-Dato, y Vázquez-García [2009, 2010], y los libros editados por Conti, Cotta y Tavares [2011] y Best, Lengyel y Verzichelli [2012]). Por lo tanto, mientras que los datos utilizados en partes de la tesis limitan el alcance del análisis a un punto de tiempo específico, ofrecen una perspectiva privilegiada para un análisis comparativo de la identidad europea después de la ampliación hacia el Este y permiten comparar los niveles de la identidad europea así como sus determinantes y contenidos entre las élites y la opinión pública de los nuevos y los antiguos países miembros.

La segunda fuente de datos son los estudios del *Eurobarómetro* (EB), que ofrecen una base de datos de gran valor para el estudio de las actitudes europeas a través del tiempo, en todos los Estados miembros, así como en los países candidatos. Los estudios del Eurobarómetro se utilizan como principal fuente de datos en el capítulo 6, para comparar las actitudes antes y después de la crisis. También se presentan estos datos en el capítulo 4, para

¹¹³ Los países incluidos en el estudio, así como la composición de las muestras se describen en los anexos.

comprobar si algunos de los patrones observados en los datos IntUne son perceptibles cuando se analizan las tendencias de actitudes a través del tiempo.

6. Resumen de los capítulos

La tesis se estructura en seis capítulos y unas conclusiones finales. En el *primer capítulo* se formula el concepto de identidad política europea y los supuestos sobre sus procesos subyacentes que guían este proyecto de investigación. La operacionalización de la identidad europea se lleva a cabo sobre la base de la teoría de la identidad social, las teorías de la legitimidad política y los estudios previos de identificación europea, desgranando así la identidad política europea como un concepto multidimensional. En el capítulo se discuten los procesos subyacentes a la conformación de las identidades desde el punto de vista de la psicología social, así como su posible contenido y la relación con las identidades nacionales y el papel de las élites nacionales en el proceso de formación de la identidad. El principal argumento es que debemos tener en cuenta, al menos, tres aspectos de la identificación política supranacional en la UE ampliada: identificación como europeo (identidad *cognitiva*) y que se basa en la similitud percibida; la identificación con Europa (aspecto *afectivo*) que puede desarrollarse por una tendencia psicológica natural hacia la distinción social positiva; y los *criterios* para la pertenencia europea (contenido de la identidad europea). Los criterios de pertenencia a la comunidad política europea se construyen socialmente y, por lo tanto, dependen del contexto y de la influencia de las élites nacionales. En base a los debates en los estudios sobre nacionalismo, los elementos que denotan la pertenencia europea pueden dividirse en dos conceptualizaciones básicas de la identidad europea: una noción cívica más abierta de europeidad y un concepto de ser europeo con base étnica y más excluyente. El capítulo se cierra con la formulación del concepto de identidad europea como una identidad política multidimensional, que guía este estudio.

En el *capítulo 2*, se amplía nuestra comprensión de los procesos de identificación en la UE mediante la exploración de sus consecuencias para las actitudes europeas, así como de los factores determinantes de la identificación europea individual. Más concretamente, se explora la pregunta de los factores que contribuyen a que los ciudadanos tengan una visión más favorable de la integración europea y se identifiquen como parte de la comunidad política europea. En primer lugar, se revisan los enfoques más importantes sobre los determinantes de las actitudes hacia la UE en general (utilitarista, de atajos cognitivos, socialización, factores afectivos, para resumen ver tabla 2.1), y el lugar de la identidad dentro

de estos enfoques como variable *explicativa*. Consecuentemente, se discuten los determinantes específicos de la identificación europea, y la identidad europea como una variable *a explicar*. El capítulo se cierra con la formulación de un modelo teórico de los determinantes de la identidad que incluye recursos, la experiencia y las actitudes (para resumir ver tabla 2.2).

El objetivo del *capítulo 3* es contextualizar la identidad política europea en los nuevos estados miembros de la UE de Europa Central y Oriental mediante la discusión de los supuestos y los resultados de la ampliación hacia el Este. Por lo tanto, aquí se discuten los debates normativos sobre la identidad europea que surgieron a raíz de la ampliación al Este y se presenta la evidencia empírica existente sobre la naturaleza del apoyo de la UE y de la identidad política europea en los PECO, así como se exploran las posibles diferencias y puntos de convergencia entre éstos y los antiguos miembros de la UE en este sentido. Se cierra el capítulo evaluando las posibles diferencias que pudieran surgir en la aplicación del modelo general de los determinantes de la identidad europea a los PECO. La discusión que se presenta en este capítulo constituye, pues, la base de un modelo integral de la identidad europea y apoyo entre Este y Occidente de la UE, que tiene en cuenta la influencia de las identidades políticas. En la sección final del capítulo 3, se articulan las hipótesis de investigación con respecto a los determinantes, los contenidos y consecuencias de la identidad política europea, entre el Este y el Oeste de la UE.

En cuanto a las diferencias entre los nuevos y los antiguos Estados miembros, los ciudadanos de los PECO han tenido mucho menos tiempo para desarrollar su identificación con Europa como comunidad política. Para ellos, ser ciudadanos de la Unión ha sido una posibilidad sólo desde los noventa, y una realidad durante algo más que una década. Por otra parte, cuando se convirtió en una posibilidad, la adhesión a la UE se presentó por parte de las élites en términos de una promesa de mejora y modernización económica, facilitando por tanto la identificación *afectiva* (basada en la distinción positiva). Sin embargo, la identificación en términos de identificación *cognitiva*, basada en la experiencia y la socialización política puede resultar más difícil y laboriosa. Como se explica en el capítulo 2, el cambio intergeneracional de valores se produce cada vez que la experiencia formativa de las cohortes más jóvenes es sustancialmente diferente de la que dió forma a las identidades y los valores de las generaciones anteriores. En este sentido, podríamos esperar que estos procesos constituyan la diferencia más importante en comparación con los antiguos Estados

miembros, que han tomado como algo natural la pertenencia a la UE por mucho más tiempo. De allí que las dos primeras hipótesis de trabajo sean:

H.1 No hay diferencia en los niveles de la identidad europea afectiva entre los antiguos y los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE.

H.2 Los niveles de identidad europea cognitiva son más bajos en los nuevos Estados miembros, en comparación con los antiguos Estados miembros de la UE.

Por otra parte, no sólo se anticipan niveles más bajos de identificación europea cognitiva en los PECO, sino también esperamos que la identidad europea aparezca desigualmente distribuida entre los diferentes grupos de edad. Por lo tanto, se anticipa que las personas más jóvenes en los nuevos Estados miembros, especialmente aquellos que han sido socializados post-1989, deben adoptar una identificación europea con mayor facilidad, puesto que han sido socializados cuando la integración europea ya ha sido considerada como una parte necesaria de las transiciones de los 1990s y la ciudadanía europea y sus beneficios están normalizándose poco a poco. A partir de aquí, se formula la siguiente hipótesis acerca del efecto de la edad:

H.3 Hay un efecto de interacción entre la edad y la identificación europea cognitiva en Europa Central y Oriental, los ciudadanos de edad avanzada en los nuevos Estados miembros se identifican como europeos en menor medida que los más jóvenes en estos países.

En segundo lugar, este estudio avanza un argumento teórico en cuanto a la conceptualización y operacionalización de la identidad europea. El caso de los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE refuerza el argumento a favor de un *enfoque multidimensional* hacia el concepto de identidad política europea. En este sentido, se espera que los *determinantes* de la identidad europea, como se discutió en el capítulo 2, también sean diferentes en términos de los procesos afectivos y cognitivos que subyacen la identidad social. Podemos distinguir entre los recursos, experiencias y actitudes como factores principales para la formación de la identidad europea. El impacto de estos factores a nivel individual se espera que refleje las asunciones básicas del modelo de identidad social. Por lo tanto, la expectativa básica en este aspecto se puede resumir como sigue:

H.4 Los determinantes de las diferentes dimensiones de la identidad política europea reflejan el modelo de la teoría de la identidad social. La identidad europea afectiva

es influenciada en mayor medida por las percepciones positivas de la UE mientras que la identidad europea cognitiva por factores relacionados con los recursos y la experiencia de la UE.

En cuanto a los *contenidos* de la identidad europea, como se argumenta en el capítulo 1, podemos distinguir entre dos conceptualizaciones básicas de la identidad europea, en base a los debates en los estudios de nacionalismo: una noción cívica más abierta de ser europeo y un concepto más exclusivo delimitado en mayor medida por el componente étnico y religioso de ser europeo. Teniendo en cuenta que la identidad europea ha sido fomentada por las instituciones de la UE como una pertenencia política en lugar de una identidad “dura” basada en la cultura y la ascendencia, la hipótesis respecto a su naturaleza cívica predominante se formula de la siguiente manera:

H.5 *La identidad europea se concibe fundamentalmente en términos cívicos tanto en los nuevos como en los antiguos Estados miembros de la UE.*

Sin embargo, los criterios para ser miembro de la comunidad política europea se construyen socialmente y, por lo tanto, dependen en gran medida del contexto. Aunque la diferente experiencia histórica de los PECO podría influir en la manera en que se formula la pertenencia supranacional en estos países, hay que verificar este supuesto en base a datos empíricos. Por ello, el objetivo es contrastar empíricamente los argumentos esgrimidos por algunos estudiosos que anticipaban un efecto negativo de la ampliación sobre el concepto cívico de la identidad europea apuntando que la ascendencia y la religión jugarían un papel más importante en la manera en que la identidad europea se delimita en los nuevos Estados miembros. Así pues:

H.6 *En los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE de Europa Central y Oriental se da más importancia al origen (haber nacido en Europa y tener padres europeos) como un elemento que delimita la identidad europea, que en los antiguos países miembros.*

H.7 *En los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE de Europa Central y Oriental se da más importancia a la religión (ser cristiano) como un elemento que delimita la identidad europea, que en los antiguos países miembros.*

En cuanto a las *consecuencias* de las identidades, en la última parte del análisis empírico, se explora su importancia para el apoyo a la UE. Como se ha argumentado en el capítulo 2, las actitudes individuales hacia la UE pueden explicarse en gran medida por

cálculos racionales de coste/beneficio acerca de la integración, la influencia del contexto nacional (el discurso de las élites políticas y los medios de comunicación, percepción de las instituciones), así como los efectos de socialización. En estudios más recientes, identidades nacionales y europeas han sido reconocidos como importantes factores para el apoyo a la UE, al menos en la misma medida como las consideraciones utilitarias. Este supuesto se comprueba para en el caso de los PECO testando la siguiente hipótesis:

H.8 Las consideraciones utilitarias constituyen un predictor más fuerte de las percepciones positivas de la UE en los nuevos Estados miembros.

H.9 Las identidades constituyen un predictor de la percepción positiva de la UE, al menos igualmente importante que los intereses, en los antiguos y los nuevos Estados miembros.

Por otra parte, en el último capítulo, también se verifica como estos procesos han cambiado con la crisis económica. En concreto, se sostiene que cuando la imagen positiva de la UE en términos de beneficios económicos y una gobernanza eficaz de la crisis ha sido socavada, la identidad europea se convierte en el factor más importante para explicar la percepción positiva de la UE. Así:

H.10 El efecto de la identidad europea como predictor de la percepción positiva de la UE es mayor después de la crisis.

En los capítulos que siguen se someten a juicio las hipótesis anteriores a través de los modelos de regresión logística multinivel. Teniendo en cuenta la importancia de las élites en el proceso de integración europea, en el análisis se consideran las percepciones de ambos tipos de actores en la política europea y se verifican las hipótesis anteriores para ambos grupos, las élites (a) y la opinión pública (b). Como se discute en el capítulo 2, existe una brecha significativa entre la élite y la opinión pública en el grado de identificación europea, que se debe a los efectos de la movilización cognitiva amplificada por la socialización en las instituciones internacionales y los mayores contactos transnacionales. En este sentido, y mi expectativa básica es que las élites deben ser más homogéneas entre el Este y el Oeste de Europa.

El capítulo 4 ofrece una un análisis empírico del estado de la identidad europea tras la ampliación de la UE hacia el Este. La primera parte se centra en el análisis descriptivo de los dos aspectos de la identificación europea: su dimensión afectiva y el elemento

cognitivo. Con este fin, se analizan los datos de los distintos países y se comparan nuevos países de la CEE con los antiguos Estados miembros, su opinión pública y las élites. En la segunda parte del capítulo, se desarrolla un análisis explicativo y se exploran los factores determinantes de la identidad europea ya que se trata de descubrir las fuentes de los niveles diferenciales de identificación europea entre el Este y el Oeste de Europa. Se testan las hipótesis 1-4 en modelos de regresión logística multinivel separados para la dimensión afectiva y el aspecto cognitivo de la identidad europea.

Los diferentes significados de la identidad europea se exploran en el *capítulo 5*. Aquí, el objetivo del análisis es examinar los contenidos percibidos de una identidad europea común y verificar las diferencias entre el Oriente y Occidente europeos al respecto testando las hipótesis 5-7. Al igual que en el capítulo anterior, nuestra atención se centra en la comparación entre las percepciones de las élites y ciudadanos de los PECO y los antiguos países miembros de la UE. En primer lugar, se explora la evidencia empírica existente sobre el contenido de la identidad europea, analizando sus diferentes elementos delimitadores en un análisis descriptivo. Estos elementos se distribuyen en dos conceptualizaciones diferentes de la identidad europea: una concepción de la identidad inclusiva, voluntarista, y basada en los valores cívicos (aquí se incluye los elementos normativos, participativos, lingüísticos y voluntaristas), y otra más excluyente, basada en la pertenencia étnica y religiosa (tener padres europeos, haber nacido en Europa y ser cristiano). En la segunda parte del capítulo, se desarrolla un conjunto de modelos explicativos (regresión logística multinivel) sobre la importancia de los distintos elementos de identidad en Europa, con el fin de verificar si en realidad hay alguna diferencia en los significados de la identidad europea entre los nuevos y antiguos Estados miembros. Además, se indaga en el vínculo entre la construcción de la identidad nacional por parte de la élite y las actitudes de la opinión pública.

En *el capítulo 6*, se analiza la importancia de las identidades políticas como determinantes de las actitudes hacia la UE, en comparación con los factores utilitarios, antes y después de la crisis económica y financiera que estalló a partir del 2008. En este capítulo se argumenta que casi diez años después de la primera ampliación al Este, y dada la percepción de empeoramiento de los resultados de la economía europea y la cuestión de la solidaridad como el principal reto del futuro, la importancia de los factores más estables, de tipo afectivo debe ser re-evaluada.

En primer lugar, sobre la base del modelo integral de formación de la actitud de la UE que tiene en cuenta la influencia de las identidades políticas y los factores utilitaristas, se formulan las hipótesis (hipótesis 8-10) teniendo en cuenta el impacto de la crisis. En consecuencia, se describe la influencia de la coyuntura de crisis económica sobre la identidad europea y el apoyo a la UE. En la parte empírica del capítulo, el modelo teórico propuesto se testa sobre las percepciones de la UE en los PECO inmediatamente después de la adhesión (2004) y después de que la crisis económica haya dejado su huella en la opinión pública (2012). Posteriormente, el mismo modelo se aplica al conjunto de la UE-27 y se verifica el impacto diferencial de intereses e identidades entre Oriente y Occidente. Finalmente, se discuten los resultados empíricos centrándose en la importancia de las identidades políticas como un elemento clave en la estructuración de las actitudes europeas, y el cambiante carácter del factor utilitarista en los nuevos Estados miembros.

7. Conclusiones finales

La ampliación hacia el Este de la UE constituye una reunificación simbólica del continente europeo después de décadas de separación en dos bloques políticos opuestos. Tal desplazamiento de las fronteras de la UE hacia el Este plantea cuestiones importantes respecto a su cohesión como comunidad política. Mientras que el proceso de ampliación se ha justificado en gran medida en términos de una identidad compartida o incluso un “deber de parentesco” del Oeste hacia el Este de Europa, algunos de los debates académicos y en los medios de comunicación se centraron en su efecto negativo, anticipando tal impacto sobre la cohesión de la comunidad política europea y su identidad emergente. ¿Se traduce la reunificación de Europa a través de la adhesión de países post-comunistas del centro y Este de Europa a la UE en la presencia de una común *identidad europea* en toda la UE? O, más bien, ¿se ha diluido con esta expansión la comunidad política europea? El objetivo de la presente tesis doctoral ha consistido en abordar esta cuestión de gran relevancia por medio de una investigación comparativa de las orientaciones individuales de los ciudadanos de a pie y de las élites.

En el estudio la identificación Europea se conceptualiza como una realidad socio-política multidimensional arraigada en las percepciones individuales y la influencia de los recursos, la experiencia y las actitudes. Sobre la base de investigaciones anteriores y el marco teórico de la teoría de la identidad social se sostiene que la identidad europea debe ser abordada mediante el análisis de sus dimensiones cognitiva y afectiva, ya que los dos tienen

diferentes causas subyacentes. El aspecto afectivo de la identificación Europea se refiere a la "identificación con Europa" y, potencialmente, puede venir motivada por una tendencia psicológica natural hacia distinción social positiva. La dimensión *cognitiva* de la identidad, por su parte, se refiere a la autopercepción como parte de la comunidad europea y denota la "identificación como europeo" basado en la similitud percibida. Por otra parte, a fin de evaluar las consecuencias de actitud y de comportamiento de la identidad europea necesitamos también explorar los *significados* que delimitan la pertenencia a Europa. Desde esta perspectiva, los elementos que denotan pertenencia europea puedan encajarse en dos conceptualizaciones básicas basadas en los debates de los estudios sobre nacionalismo: una noción abierta y cívica de la europeidad anclada en elementos normativos, lingüísticas y participativos, y un concepto étnico excluyente de ser europeo, enraizado en la ascendencia y la religión. Estos criterios se construyen socialmente y, por lo tanto, en gran medida dependen del contexto y de la influencia de los discursos de las élites nacionales.

Desde tal perspectiva multidimensional hay varias conclusiones esenciales en base a los resultados de la investigación que se presenta en esta tesis doctoral, relativas a los determinantes, contenido y consecuencias de la identidad europea. En lo que sigue, se discuten los detalles de estos hallazgos, sus implicaciones para el debate más amplio con respecto a la identidad europea en la UE, así como algunas cuestiones que van más allá del alcance de la tesis y deben ser respondidas en futuras investigaciones.

La tabla 8.2 resume las principales conclusiones de esta tesis doctoral. Puede afirmarse que las hipótesis acerca de las diferencias entre los nuevos y los antiguos países miembros de la UE relativas a la existencia y los determinantes de la identidad europea son confirmadas para el caso de la opinión pública, y rechazadas para las élites, mientras que las hipótesis sobre la diferencia de contenido de esta identificación son rechazadas para la opinión pública y se confirman para el caso de las élites. Esto indica que los patrones de diferenciación Este-Oeste se distribuyen de manera desigual entre los dos actores analizados. Por otro lado, una vez que se controla por los efectos de cómo se construye la identidad nacional en diferentes contextos nacionales, podemos afirmar que los ciudadanos enmarcan su identidad europea en los mismos términos en los Estados miembros antiguos y nuevos, sobre todo como una pertenencia ciudadana. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, los nuevos ciudadanos de la UE son menos propensos a percibirse a sí mismos como europeos, una diferencia que se desencadena por la auto-percepción más baja como europeos que hallamos entre las generaciones mayores, y que puede ser explicada por el proceso más corto

de socialización como miembros plenos de la comunidad. La élites, por el contrario, tienden a identificarse con Europa y como europeos en la misma medida en ambos grupos de países, pero aquí surge la diferencia en el contenido de dicha identificación, al detectarse cómo las élites de los nuevos Estados miembros tienden a valorar más la religión y la ascendencia como elementos de identificación europea, incluso cuando se controla por todas las explicaciones alternativas de tal diferencia.

Mirando más en detalle los resultados, mi primera pregunta de investigación se refiere a la posibilidad de que la identidad europea entre los nuevos ciudadanos europeos sea más baja. Si bien sabemos relativamente poco acerca de lo que determina la identificación europea en los nuevos estados miembros de Europa Central y Oriental, los estudios anteriores identifican un nivel generalmente más bajo de identificación como europeos entre los ciudadanos de estos países. Sin embargo, este estudio sostiene que la identidad europea en su aspecto afectivo debe ser tan fuerte como en los antiguos países de la UE, ya que después de la caída del comunismo hubo un amplio apoyo a la idea de la "vuelta a Europa". Este lema, popularizado por las élites de los países candidatos, implicó un retorno a la normalidad y la aceptación de los valores e instituciones occidentales, por lo que debería proporcionar una base sólida para el apego y el apoyo a la UE. En este caso, la necesidad de aplicar un enfoque de dos dimensiones de la identidad europea queda claro ya que estas observaciones sugieren que no debemos esperar ninguna diferencia en cuanto a la identificación *con* Europa (afectiva) (H1), pero los nuevos ciudadanos europeos podrían ser menos propensos a identificarse *como* europeos (cognitiva) (H2), debido a una socialización mucho más corta en la UE. La evidencia empírica presentada en el capítulo 4, sugiere que, efectivamente, el apego a Europa (identidad *afectiva*) entre los ciudadanos de a pie de los PECO está tan profundamente arraigada como lo está en el Oeste (H1a confirmada), pero los ciudadanos europeos del Este tienden a tener unos niveles más bajos de la identidad europea *cognitiva* que los europeos occidentales (H2a confirmada).

Tabla 8.2 Sumario de hipótesis

Temario teórico	Hipótesis	Opinión pública (A)	Elites (B)
Afectiva y cognitiva: Identidad europea entre Este y Occidente de la UE (capítulo 4)			
<i>Hipótesis 1: La identidad europea afectiva</i>	H.1 No hay diferencia en los niveles de la identidad europea afectiva entre los antiguos y los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE.	Confirmada	Confirmada
<i>Hipótesis 2: La identidad europea cognitiva</i>	H.2 Los niveles de identidad europea cognitiva son más bajos en los nuevos Estados miembros en comparación con los antiguos Estados miembros de la UE.	Confirmada	Rechazada
<i>Hipótesis 3: Efecto de la socialización</i>	H.3 Hay un efecto de interacción entre la edad y la identificación europea cognitiva en Europa Central y Oriental, los ciudadanos de edad avanzada en los nuevos Estados miembros se identifican como europeos en menor medida que los más jóvenes en estos países.	Confirmada	Rechazada
<i>Hipótesis 4: Factores determinantes de la identidad europea</i>	H.4 Los determinantes de las diferentes dimensiones de la identidad política europea reflejan el modelo de teoría de la identidad social. La identidad europea afectiva es influenciada en mayor medida por las percepciones positivas de la UE mientras que la identidad europea cognitiva por factores relacionados con los recursos y la experiencia de la UE.	Confirmada	Rechazada
Cívica o étnica: Contenido de la identidad europea entre Este y Occidente de la UE (capítulo 5)			
<i>Hipótesis 5: Contenido de la identidad europea</i>	H.5 La identidad europea se concibe fundamentalmente en términos cívicos tanto en los nuevos como en los antiguos Estados miembros de la UE.	Confirmada	Confirmada
<i>Hipótesis 6: La importancia de la ascendencia</i>	H.6 En los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE de Europa Central y Oriental se da más importancia al origen (haber nacido en Europa y tener padres europeos) como un elemento que delimita la identidad europea, que en los antiguos países miembros.	Rechazada	Confirmada
<i>Hipótesis 7: La importancia de la religión</i>	H.7 En los nuevos Estados miembros de la UE de Europa Central y Oriental se da más importancia a la religión (ser cristiano) como un elemento que delimita la identidad europea, que en los antiguos países miembros.	Rechazada	Confirmada
Identidades o intereses: Consecuencias de la identidad europea entre Este y Occidente de la UE (capítulo 6)			
<i>Hipótesis 8: Factor utilitarista</i>	H.8 Las consideraciones utilitarias constituyen un predictor más fuerte de las percepciones positivas de la UE en los nuevos Estados miembros.	Confirmada	n / d
<i>Hipótesis 9: La identidad como un determinante del apoyo a la UE</i>	H.9 Las identidades constituyen un predictor de la percepción positiva de la UE al menos igualmente importante que los intereses, en los antiguos y los nuevos Estados miembros.	Confirmada	n / d
<i>Hipótesis 10: El impacto de la crisis</i>	H.10 El efecto de la identidad europea como predictor de la percepción positiva de la UE es mayor después de la crisis.	Confirmada	n / d

El análisis de los determinantes de identificación descubre las causas de dicha diferencia. En línea con los argumentos sobre los procesos de socialización primaria y el cambio intergeneracional de valores (H3), parece que hay un efecto de interacción significativa entre la edad y la identificación como europeo en los PECO. Personas más jóvenes en los nuevos Estados miembros tienen las mismas probabilidades de identificarse como europeos como los más jóvenes en el Occidente mientras que las personas mayores tienden a considerarse europeos en menor medida que los jóvenes en estos nuevos países miembros (H3b confirmada). Por el contrario, no se observa un efecto similar en los otros estados miembros de la UE, donde el efecto de la edad es generalmente positivo para la identificación europea. Las teorías de la socialización política indican que las identidades políticas se forman como parte de los procesos de socialización primaria en edades tempranas. Por ello, con el paso del tiempo, a medida que más y más ciudadanos más jóvenes del Este siguen socializándose como parte de la comunidad política europea, la brecha en la identificación cognitiva debe desaparecer. Este proceso de socialización, combinado con el hecho de que los europeos orientales están indiscutiblemente unidos al "proyecto europeo", podría dar pie a una identidad cognitiva más profundamente asentado como el caso de los ciudadanos de a pie de Europa Occidental.

En lo que se refiere a la identidad europea de las élites, la principal conclusión es que debido a los efectos de la movilización cognitiva y una mayor exposición a la socialización europea, las élites políticas, económicas, sindicales, y de los medios son muy similares en los nuevos y los antiguos Estados miembros. Por lo tanto, las élites en los antiguos y nuevos Estados miembros serían igualmente propensas a identificarse con Europa (H1b confirmada), y, en contraste con el caso de los ciudadanos comunes, también se identifican como europeas en la misma medida (H2b rechazada). Por otra parte, la homogeneidad de las élites se confirma, ya que no se observó ningún efecto de la edad sobre su identificación en la comunidad europea (H3b rechazada). Por lo tanto, en estos términos las élites parecen construir su identidad europea de la misma manera que los ciudadanos de a pie en el Occidente, donde no encontramos ningún impacto negativo de la edad y la identidad afectiva y cognitiva parecen ir de la mano.

Por último, también se testa empíricamente la distinción teórica entre los aspectos afectivos y cognitivos de la identidad europea, como se propuso en el comienzo de esta tesis doctoral. La expectativa básica es que los determinantes relacionados con la experiencia y los recursos van a tener un mayor impacto en la identidad cognitiva (ya que ésta se basa en

la similitud percibida), mientras que las evaluaciones positivas de la UE deben influir en mayor medida en la identidad afectiva (basada en la distinción positiva) (H4). El análisis confirma que, efectivamente, para el caso de los ciudadanos de a pie, los efectos estimados de los determinantes de la identidad europea parecen encajar con el modelo teórico propuesto (H4a confirmada), mientras que esta suposición es rechazada para las élites (H4b rechazada). Esto está en consonancia con las conclusiones anteriores: puesto que la identificación afectiva y cognitiva entre las élites tienden a ser bastante altas debido a los fuertes efectos de la movilización cognitiva y la socialización, esta distinción teórica tiene menos relevancia para una parte tan homogénea de la sociedad.

La segunda pregunta que plantea este estudio se refiere a la diferencia entre Oriente y Occidente en los *contenidos* de la identidad europea, es decir, sus significados socialmente construidos. La expectativa básica de nuestro análisis es que la identidad europea se concibe fundamentalmente en términos cívicos (H5); sin embargo, también se verifican las suposiciones con respecto a una mayor prominencia de la ascendencia (H6) y la religión (H7) como elementos de identidad europea en los nuevos Estados miembros. La principal conclusión que se puede extraer del análisis empírico es que, en general, observamos más diferencias entre Oriente y Occidente entre las élites, mientras que los ciudadanos comunes parecen ser bastante similares en cuanto a sus percepciones de lo que significa ser europeo. Más específicamente, los resultados indican que, en general, las élites y la opinión pública hacen hincapié en mucha mayor medida en una pertenencia europea en base a elementos cívicos (H.5a y H5b confirmadas). Esto revela la idea prevalente de la UE como una comunidad basada en valores cívicos, sostenida en casi igual medida por las élites y el público de todos los estados miembros de la UE. Mientras que los factores normativos y lingüísticos son ampliamente aceptados como los elementos más importantes que definen pertenencia a Europa, nos encontramos con una gran variación en el elemento participativo (ejercicio de los derechos de los ciudadanos para la opinión pública, y participar en las elecciones al PE para las élites), siendo su importancia especialmente baja para las élites de los PECO. Este último hallazgo podría indicar el efecto de una socialización más corta en las instituciones europeas. Por último, tanto las élites y ciudadanos en los nuevos Estados miembros tienden a enfatizar más la idea de que en realidad sentirse europeo es clave para ser europeo. Esta observación confirma, por lo demás, que para los nuevos ciudadanos europeos, la identidad europea es en mayor medida una cuestión de autopercepción, que para sus homólogos occidentales.

La identificación europea se formula principalmente en términos cívicos. Sin embargo, sus contenidos específicos en gran medida dependen del país. En cuanto a los elementos que pueden ser etiquetados como étnicos, la principal conclusión es que el factor religioso (ser cristiano) es considerado como el elemento menos importante para definir la pertenencia a Europa. Por otra parte, para el ciudadano medio, en contra de las expectativas iniciales, no hay diferencia entre el Este y el Occidente de la UE con respecto a la idea de si ser cristiano es importante para ser europeo (H7a rechazada). Por lo tanto, a pesar de la diversificación resultante de la ampliación al Este de la UE, la identidad política europea está siendo formulada como una idea normativa y secular por ciudadanos comunes en toda Europa, lo que contradice la afirmación de que la ampliación “traería la religión de vuelta” al proceso de construcción de la identidad europea. Además, una vez que se controla por los efectos de formulación de la identidad nacional por parte de la élite, la diferencia también deja de ser significativa para la consideración de los elementos relativos a la ascendencia: tener padres europeos y haber nacido en Europa.

En resumen, en línea con los supuestos teóricos acerca de cómo el contenido de las identidades nacionales afecta el contenido de la identidad europea, los hallazgos sugieren que los ciudadanos tienden a considerar la identidad europea en términos étnicos en los países donde las élites hacen hincapié en este concepto de base más étnica de la identidad nacional, y en los países donde la religión y el lenguaje están politizadas como marcadores de pertenencia nacional. En consecuencia, debemos rechazar la hipótesis de que los elementos relacionados con la ascendencia (tener padres europeos y haber nacido en Europa) son más importantes para los ciudadanos de los nuevos Estados miembros (H6a rechazada), ya que la importancia de estos factores está claramente ligada a la manera en que las élites construyen la identidad nacional en los diferentes estados miembros de la UE. Para las élites, por otro lado, los resultados de este estudio sugieren que existe de hecho una diferencia entre Oriente y Occidente, y las élites de los nuevos estados miembros hacen un mayor hincapié en el factor religioso (H.7b confirmada), así como tienden a valorar más el elemento de la ascendencia como relevante para pertenecer a Europa (H6b confirmada). Por lo tanto, la importancia de los elementos étnicos, religiosos y lingüísticos de identificación europea parece estar fuertemente condicionada por la forma en que las élites construyen identidades en toda Europa. La consideración de elementos religiosos o relativos a la ascendencia como relevantes para la pertenencia nacional podría extenderse a la identidad europea y fomentar

una construcción mucho más excluyente que el proyecto post-nacional de base cívica fomentado por los estudiosos y las élites europeas.

Por último, se exploran las *consecuencias* de la identidad europea para el apoyo a la UE. En el capítulo 6, se analiza la cuestión del impacto de intereses e identidades en la percepción de la UE. En cuanto a las consideraciones utilitarias, las expectativas positivas de futuro (el argumento de los “ganadores de la transición”) tienen un mayor impacto positivo en los nuevos Estados miembros aunque sólo inmediatamente después de la adhesión, mientras que el factor económico se vuelve más relevante en los PECO después de la crisis. Por ende, mientras que en general las consideraciones utilitarias tienen un mayor impacto en la percepción positiva de la UE en los nuevos Estados miembros (H8 confirmada), su carácter cambia con el tiempo: inicialmente los ciudadanos que se pueden considerar como ganadores de la transición/integración son significativamente más favorables en su percepción de la UE que sus homólogos en los países occidentales (se verifica así la asunción de los modelos de apoyo que se basaban en el impacto de los efectos de las transiciones), mientras que después de la crisis económica, el impacto de una asociación más directa de la UE con la prosperidad es más fuerte en estos nuevos países miembros. Esta evidencia sugiere que los modelos basados en las referencias a los cambios posteriores a 1989 podrían estar perdiendo su aplicabilidad una década después de la adhesión. En lo que se refiere a los factores afectivos, la identidad europea es, de hecho, el predictor más fuerte de apoyo de la UE (H9 confirmada). Por último, en términos del efecto diferencial de la identidad antes y después de la crisis, la comparación entre los dos modelos indica el efecto más pronunciado de la dimensión afectiva de la identidad europea en 2012, lo que presupone que en tiempos de dificultades económicas el apego afectivo a la UE se convierte en un factor más relevante para explicar el apoyo en la UE ampliada (H10 confirmada).

Como se sostiene en la introducción, esta tesis pretende contribuir al debate académico en tres aspectos principales. En primer lugar, al abordar la identidad europea como un concepto multidimensional, proporciona una buena base para responder a la cuestión de la viabilidad de una identidad europea en la UE ampliada. Esta cuestión es especialmente relevante en la actual Unión Europea donde una identificación política común es clave para un apoyo continuo a la integración europea, sobre todo en tiempos de dificultades económicas, como la crisis de finales de los años 2000. Mientras que los ciudadanos basan sus actitudes en gran medida en cálculos racionales de coste/beneficio de

la integración, estudios recientes muestran que los factores afectivos pueden constituir factores explicativos incluso más importantes. Los resultados de este estudio confirman esta observación, tanto para los nuevos como antiguos Estados miembros de la UE. Como ya se ha señalado en la introducción, este es el resultado de la ampliación del ámbito de aplicación política europea más allá del mercado común, que ha politizado la integración europea y ha activado el potencial de las lealtades políticas. En estos términos, sobre todo los análisis más recientes, resaltan la importancia de factores *afectivos/identitarios* en investigación de la opinión pública de la UE. Este estudio, por lo tanto, contribuye a una mejor comprensión las diferencias entre Oriente y Occidente en este sentido.

Los resultados de la investigación presentada en esta tesis indican además que los niveles más bajos de identificación como europeos entre los ciudadanos de los PECO no se deben a una lealtad nacional más fuerte como resultado de la recientemente recuperada independencia o una oposición inherente a la pertenencia supranacional. Más bien, la razón principal de esto es que los ciudadanos de los PECO aún no han interiorizado su autopercepción como europeos en la misma medida que sus homólogos occidentales debido a su socialización más corta como miembros de la comunidad política europea. Por lo tanto, mientras que el apego a Europa y su percepción positiva son bastante generalizados entre los nuevos ciudadanos europeos, las generaciones más jóvenes que se socializan en el contexto de la adhesión a la UE deben ir encontrando la identificación como europeo cada vez más natural. Por otra parte, también en cuanto a los contenidos de la identidad europea, la misma se concibe en términos predominantemente cívicos en el Este y Oeste de Europa, y la inclusión de los nuevos Estados miembros no parece haber alterado esta base cívica de identificación europea, como anticipaban algunos autores. Por lo tanto, podemos concluir que a pesar de que pueda parecer que la identificación como europeos se ha diluido un poco con la ampliación, la viabilidad de una identidad europea común a más largo plazo no se ha socavado.

En segundo lugar, el estudio contribuye al debate teórico sobre el concepto de la identidad europea aplicada a la investigación empírica. En estos términos, la investigación presentada en esta tesis demuestra la importancia de unas hipótesis comprobables arraigadas en marcos teóricos sólidos. La aplicación del modelo de la teoría de la identidad social a la identificación europea entre el Este y el Oeste de Europa ofrece una manera más adecuada para comprender la identidad europea tras la ampliación, ya que tiene en cuenta la diferencia

entre la identificación como europeo y con Europa, dos dimensiones que no necesariamente deben coincidir, como nos indica el ejemplo de los nuevos ciudadanos europeos.

Finalmente, esta tesis explora conjuntamente el papel de *los intereses y las identidades* como determinantes de la formación de apoyo de la UE, un marco que ha sido por lo general pasado por alto en los estudios sobre las actitudes europeas en los PECO, centrados hasta ahora principalmente en los factores ideológicos y utilitarios. El carácter cambiante de la consideración utilitarista en los nuevos Estados miembros indica una convergencia en los procesos de formación de las actitudes hacia la UE, lejos de los modelos que se centraron en el impacto de las transiciones post-socialistas. Por otra parte, la creciente importancia de los factores afectivos indica la necesidad de tener en cuenta que las actitudes de la UE en estos nuevos Estados miembros están también en gran medida basadas en estos factores estables y afectivos, y no sólo en cálculos utilitarios. Esto no es sorprendente si tenemos en cuenta que el discurso de “la vuelta a Europa” implicaba un fuerte componente afectivo, y en general, la identidad europea parece ser cada vez más importante en la comunidad política de la UE.

Hace una década, inmediatamente después de la adhesión de los PECO, la división en Europa parecía ser muy clara. La UE se había ampliado recientemente y la división entre el Este y el Occidente, los nuevos y antiguos Estados miembros, resultaba muy evidente tanto en análisis académicos de la política europea, así como en el discurso mediático. Una década más tarde, sin embargo, estos “nuevos” Estados miembros, ya no resultan tan “nuevos” para la UE. Cinco de los diez de estos países ya han adoptado el euro como su moneda, un polaco (Donald Tusk) ha sido nombrado como Presidente del Consejo Europeo, mientras que varios de los PECO han ostentado con éxito la Presidencia del Consejo Europeo, en algunos casos, en periodos muy tumultuosos durante la crisis. Por otra parte, la crisis económica y financiera de fin de 2000 cambió el foco de atención de los nuevos y presumiblemente diferentes países de Europa Central y Oriental, hacia la periferia de los antiguos Estados miembros. Una nueva división emerge: Sur contra el Norte, los acreedores contra los deudores, fuertemente basada en los supuestos sobre las diferencias relacionadas con la cultura política. Las cuestiones de identidad y solidaridad permanecen en el centro de los conflictos actuales en la UE, y son cada vez más explotados por los partidos euroescépticos.

Así, además de los acontecimientos económicos y políticos, la crisis económica ha supuesto también una crisis de confianza. Como apunta Tsoukalis (2014), la crisis provocó “una grave pérdida de confianza entre los países, que se extiende desde los gobiernos a los ciudadanos, mientras que los estereotipos nacionales resurgen” (2014, 18). Por ello, la crisis ha subrayado la fragilidad de la identidad europea, al tiempo que ha destacado su absoluta necesidad como base para la solidaridad en una Unión económica cada vez más desequilibrada en lo económico. Mientras que hace una década la preocupación era que la ampliación hacia el este podría diluir la identidad europea, parece que los problemas económicos de finales de los años 2000 demostraron que las amenazas más importantes pueden venir desde dentro de los elementos básicos de la configuración de la UE, tales como la zona euro. La crisis destapó importantes debilidades de la integración europea, entre ellas, cómo la UE parece ser un idea aceptable sólo en los buenos tiempos para muchos ciudadanos de los antiguos Estados miembros. A principios de 2015 se prevé que la subida del euroescepticismo agresivo y del nacionalismo reaccionario pongan sobre la mesa más que nunca la disyuntiva entre “hacer o deshacer” la Unión en el próximo año (Fischer 2014). Por lo tanto, los estudios futuros tendrán que responder a la pregunta de cuán débil es la identificación europea, y en qué medida las identidades nacionales pueden ser politizadas con éxito en contra de la UE.

Para concluir, creemos haber contribuido a una mejor comprensión de la identidad europea en la UE ampliada (tanto entre las élites como los ciudadanos de a pie), así como de los factores que pueden ayudar a explicar la identificación Europea. Es, sin embargo, poco probable cerrar la investigación sobre un tema que, por su naturaleza, es complejo, multidimensional y ciertamente difícil de evaluar. El impacto de la crisis en la percepción de las élites y la opinión pública en los últimos años requiere de un enfoque renovado de la materia, teniendo en cuenta los desarrollos más recientes por lo que es inevitable que los estudios futuros que puedan trabajar con datos más recientes y mejores instrumentos de investigación—sobre todo en términos de posibles estudios de panel, para poder dar cuenta de una manera más apropiada de los cambios identitarios—permitan verificar la hipótesis de socialización más adecuadamente, para ratificar, en su caso, las tendencias y los procesos descritos en esta tesis.

Annexes

Annex 1. Overview of variables used in the analysis (IntUne)

Studies used in the analysis

IntUne 2007 & 2009 Public Opinion survey

IntUne 2007 & 2009 Elite survey

Table 9.1 Question wording and variable operationalization for regressions with IntUne data

Dependent variable (IntUne)		
European identity	<i>Affective European identity</i>	<p><i>Public opinion</i></p> <p>Q. People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached (1), somewhat attached (1), not very attached (0) or not at all attached (0) to Europe?</p>
		<p><i>Elites</i></p> <p>Q. People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached (1), somewhat attached (0), not very attached (0) or not at all attached (0) to European Union?</p>
	<i>Cognitive European identity</i>	<p><i>Public opinion/Elites</i></p> <p>Q. Do you see yourself as...? (NATIONALITY) only (0), (NATIONALITY) and European (1), European and (NATIONALITY) (1), European only (1)¹¹⁴</p>
	<i>Content of European identity</i>	<p><i>Public opinion/Elites</i></p> <p>People differ in what they think it means to be a European. In your view, how important is each of the following? Very important (1), somewhat important (1), not very important, not at all important.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. to be born in Europe b. to have European parents c. to be Christian d. to respect the European Union's laws and institutions e. to feel European f. to participate in EU elections (elite survey¹¹⁵), to exercise citizens' rights (public opinion survey) g. to master a European language

¹¹⁴ This item is included only in the 2009 wave of the elite survey.

¹¹⁵ This item is included only in the 2009 wave of the elite survey.

Independent variables (IntUne)

Controls

Sex (Ref. Woman)	Male (0), Female (1)
Age	<i>Elite</i> Age categories: 22-34 (1), 35-44 (2), 45-54 (3), 55-64 (4), 65+ (5) <i>Public opinion</i> Age categories: 16-24 (1), 25-34 (2), 35-44 (3), 45-54 (4), 55-64 (5), 65+ (6)
Religion	Q. What is your religion, or don't you have one? Catholic (1), Orthodox (2), Protestant (3), Other religion (Other Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Hindu) (4), No religion (Atheist, agnostic, non-believer) (5)
Religion dummy (Ref. Christian)	Q. What is your religion, or don't you have one? Catholic (1), Orthodox (1), Protestant (1), other Christian (1), Jewish (0), Muslim (0), Sikh (0), Buddhist (0),
Ideology	Q. In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right, and 5 means neither left nor right?

Resources

Occupation	(Only public opinion)
Elite type (Ref. Political)	(Only elites) Political (1), Economic (0), Trade Union (0), Media (0)
Education	(Only public opinion) Q. Completed education: No education (1), primary education (2), basic secondary (3), secondary with vocational qualifications (4), secondary with A-level qualifications (5), University (6)
Political interest	(Only public opinion) Q. How much interest do you generally have in politics? None at all (1), Not very much (2), some (3), A lot (4).

Experience

EU Knowledge	(Only public opinion) Q. Can you tell me which of the following countries are members of the European Union? The Netherlands, Malta, Croatia Q. How many member states are there in the European Union nowadays? (Scale) The index adds the number of correct answer (0-4)
Visit other EU countries	(Only public opinion) Q. How many times have you visited another EU country in the last 12 months? Has not visited (1), Once (2), Twice (3) Three times (4) 4 times (5), 5 times or more (6)
Lived EU	Q. Have you ever lived in another EU country? No (0), Yes (1)

Attitudes

<i>Evaluative</i>	Membership benefits	<p><i>Elites</i></p> <p>Q. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? Has benefited (1), Has not benefited (0)</p> <p>(only for the elites)</p> <p><i>Public opinion</i></p> <p>Q. And what about of people like you? Have people like you on balance benefited or not from (OUR COUNTRY)'s EU membership? Has benefited (1), Has not benefited (0)</p>
	European trust	<p><i>Elites</i></p> <p>Index of trust in National Parliament and trust in National Government. Q. How much you personally trust each of the following institutions to usually make the right decisions? No trust at all (0) Complete trust (10)</p> <p><i>Public opinion</i></p> <p>The difference between European and national trust, from -10 (no trust in the EU, complete trust in national institutions) to +10 (complete trust in the EU and no trust in national government and parliament). Index of trust in National Parliament and trust in National Government. Q. How much you personally trust each of the following institutions to usually make the right decisions? No trust at all (0) Complete trust (10).</p>
<i>Affective</i>	National identity	<p>Q. People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached (4), somewhat attached (3), not very attached (2) or not at all attached (1) to (OUR COUNTRY)?</p>
	Ethnic national identity	<p><i>Public opinion</i></p> <p>Index of three variables (Cronbach's alpha=0.73): Q. People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). In your view, how important is each of the following to be (NATIONALITY)? To be a Christian, to be born in (OUR COUNTRY), to have (NATIONALITY) parents.</p> <p>Not at all important (1), Somewhat important (2), Not very important (3), Very important (4).</p>

Annex 2. Sample composition, IntUne data

Table 9.2 Sample composition, Public opinion, IntUne dataset

Country	2007	2009
Austria	1002	503
Belgium	1004	1001
Denmark	1000	1002
France	1007	1004
Germany	1000	1000
United Kingdom	1000	1000
Greece	1000	1000
Italy	1012	1002
Portugal	1000	1002
Spain	1002	1000
Bulgaria	1005	1007
Czech Republic	n/d	n/d
Estonia	1000	1000
Hungary	1002	1000
Lithuania	n/d	n/d
Poland	999	1000
Slovakia	1082	1044
Slovenia	1018	1028

Table 9.3 Sample composition, Elites, IntUne dataset

Country	2007			2009			
	Economic	Political	Total	Political	Media	Trade Unions	Total
Austria	35	81	116	51	37	31	119
Belgium	44	80	124	69	25	15	109
Denmark	40	60	100	44	4	3	51
France	43	81	124	68	38	18	124
Germany	43	80	123	79	35	24	138
United Kingdom	21	50	71	80	25	5	110
Greece	36	90	126	41	15	18	74
Italy	42	84	126	70	35	15	120
Portugal	40	80	120	68	36	16	120
Spain	55	94	149	81	46	21	148
Bulgaria	45	83	128	76	48	16	140
Czech Republic	42	80	122	44	35	16	95
Estonia	40	72	112	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d
Hungary	42	80	122	72	35	15	122
Lithuania	40	80	120	70	35	18	123
Poland	42	80	122	85	35	15	135
Slovakia	40	80	120	70	35	15	120
Slovenia	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d	n/d

Annex 3. Eurobarometer data overview

Studies used in the analyses:

Eurobarometer 62.0 (Autumn 2004)

Eurobarometer 77.3 (Autumn 2012)

Table 9.4 Question wording and variable operationalization of the Eurobarometer data

Dependent variable	
EU image	Q: In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive (5) fairly positive (4) neutral (3) fairly negative (2) or very negative (1) image.
Independent variables	
Individual-level	
<i>Domestic proxies</i>	
National political trust	Trust in national institution: an index variable of trust in national government and trust in national parliament. Q. Please tell me whether you: Tend to trust (1) Tend not to trust (0) Don't know (0).
Satisfaction with national democracy	Q. On the whole, are you very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied (2) or not at all satisfied (1) with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?
<i>Normative preferences</i>	
EU= peace	Q. What does the EU mean to you personally: Peace. Mentioned (1) Not mentioned (0)
EU= democracy	Q. What does the EU mean to you personally: Democracy. Mentioned (1) Not mentioned (0)
<i>Utilitarian perceptions</i>	
Personal expectations	Q. What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better (1), worse (0) or the same (0), when it comes to...? Index of: life in general, financial situation of household, personal job situation.
EU= economic prosperity	Q. What does the EU mean to you personally: Economic prosperity. Mentioned (1) Not mentioned (0)

Political identities

National identity	Q. Please tell me how attached you feel to... Our country. Very attached (4) Fairly attached (3) Not very attached (2) Not at all attached (1). Don't know (.)
EU= loss of cultural identity	Q. What does the EU mean to you personally: Loss of cultural identity. Mentioned (1) Not mentioned (0)

European identity

(Cognitive)	Q. In the near future, do you see yourself as...? Nationality only (0) National and European (1) European and National (1) European only (1) None, refusal, Don't know (.).
(Affective)	Q. Please tell me how attached you feel to... Europe/European Union ¹¹⁶ . Very attached (4) Fairly attached (3) Not very attached (2) Not at all attached (1). Don't know (.)

¹¹⁶EB 62.0 question wording: Europe. EB 77.3 question wording: European Union.

Annex 4. Contextual data

Table 9.5 Contextual data used in regression analyses

Country-level variables	
CEE New member states	Dummy variables which indicates those Central and Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007
Christianity	Aggregated measure of religious identification from the Intune 2007/2009 dataset
Foreign population	Foreign population as share of population. Source: Eurostat.
GDP growth	Volumes, percent change over previous year. Source: Eurostat.
GDP	GDP per capita in PPS, EU27=100. Source: Eurostat.
Net fiscal transfers	Operating budgetary balances as percentage of GNI. Source: European Commission Directorate-General for the Budget. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/index.htm
Unemployment	Unemployment rate, mean for a given year. Source: Eurostat.
Elite positions	
Affective identity	Share of elites who are attached to the EU in a given country. Source: IntUne Elite survey
National identity	Share of elites who indicate that a given element is important for national identity. Source: IntUne Elite survey

Annex 5. Summary of variables

Table 9.6 Summary of variables in regressions, chapter 4 (Public opinion, IntUne 2007/2009)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable					
Cognitive European identity	27955	0,60	0,49	0	1
Affective European identity	28163	0,66	0,47	0	1
Independent variables					
Individual level					
Age	28473	3,84	1,61	1	6
Sex (Ref: Woman)	28680	0,55	0,50	0	1
Catholic	27710	0,50	0,50	0	1
Orthodox	27710	0,14	0,35	0	1
Protestant	27710	0,12	0,32	0	1
Other	27710	0,08	0,27	0	1
<i>No religion</i>	27710	0,17	0,37	0	1
Ideology	26231	6,01	2,40	1	11
Self-employed	28362	0,10	0,30	0	1
Employee	28362	0,09	0,28	0	1
<i>Manual worker</i>	28362	0,37	0,48	0	1
Without paid job	28362	0,45	0,50	0	1
<i>None/basic primary</i>	27305	0,12	0,33	0	1
Basic secondary	27305	0,15	0,36	0	1
Vocational	27305	0,24	0,43	0	1
A-levels	27305	0,22	0,41	0	1
University	27305	0,26	0,44	0	1
Interest in politics	28595	2,58	0,94	1	4
EU Knowledge	28389	2,74	1,04	1	5
EU visit	28349	1,04	1,53	0	5
More trust in EU than national	27260	0,39	2,26	-10	10
EU benefits - personal	28642	0,46	0,50	0	1
National identity	28586	3,47	0,73	1	4
National identity (Ethnic)	28613	2,82	0,87	1	4
Country level					
EU Fiscal transfers	29	0,67	1,03	-.49	3.1
Unemployment	29	8,18	2,71	3,8	17,9
Christian	29	0,73	0,17	0,29	0,95
Elites - Affective EU identity	29	0,86	0,10	0,51	0,98

Table 9.7 Summary of variables in regressions, chapter 4 (Elite, IntUne 2007/2009)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable					
Affective European identity	3822	0,38	0,49	0	1
Cognitive European identity	1813	0,90	0,30	0	1
Independent variables					
Individual level					
Age	3802	3,11	1,05	1	5
Sex (Ref. Woman)	3867	0,21	0,41	0	1
Catholic	3674	0,43	0,50	0	1
Orthodox	3674	0,11	0,31	0	1
Protestant	3674	0,10	0,30	0	1
Other religion	3674	0,05	0,22	0	1
<i>No religion</i>	3674	0,31	0,46	0	1
Ideology	3701	5,11	2,31	0	10
Elite (Political)	3873	0,62	0,49	0	1
Lived in the EU	3852	0,26	0,44	0	1
Contact with European institutions	3833	3,23	1,24	1	5
Trust EU	3844	5,68	1,89	0	10
Country benefit	3770	0,95	0,22	0	1
National identity	3848	3,67	0,61	1	4
Country level					
EU Fiscal transfers	33	0,93	1,34	-.49	5.61

Table 9.8 Summary of variables in regressions, chapter 5 (Public opinion, IntUne 2007/2009)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable					
For being European it is important to:					
Be Christian	27908	0,42	0,49	0	1
Be born in Europe	27999	0,65	0,48	0	1
Have European parents	27853	0,60	0,49	0	1
Respect EU laws and institutions	28062	0,91	0,29	0	1
Feel European	27984	0,80	0,40	0	1
Exercise citizen's rights	27754	0,72	0,45	0	1
Speak a European language	28194	0,89	0,31	0	1
Independent variables					
Individual level					
Age	28473	3,84	1,61	1	6
Sex (Ref: Woman)	28680	0,55	0,50	0	1
Religion (Ref: Christian)	28668	0,73	0,44	0	1
Ideology	26231	6,01	2,40	1	11
<i>None/basic primary</i>	27305	0,12	0,33	0	1
Basic secondary	27305	0,15	0,36	0	1
Vocational	27305	0,24	0,43	0	1
A-levels	27305	0,22	0,41	0	1
University	27305	0,26	0,44	0	1
Interest in politics	28595	2,58	0,94	1	4
EU Knowledge	28389	2,74	1,04	1	5
EU visit	28349	1,04	1,53	0	5
More trust in EU than national	27260	0,39	2,26	-10	10
EU benefits - personal	28642	0,46	0,50	0	1
National identity	28586	3,47	0,73	1	4
Country level					
Foreign population %	29	5,88	4,12		
Christian	29	0,73	0,17		
Elite positions					
National identity - Christian	29	0,31	0,17		
National identity - Born	29	0,51	0,16		
National identity - Parents	29	0,57	0,20		
National identity - Law	29	0,94	0,05		
National identity - Feel	29	0,89	0,10		
National identity - Rights	29	0,80	0,13		
National identity - Language	29	0,94	0,06		

Table 9.9 Summary of variables in regressions, chapter 5 (Elite, IntUne 2007/2009)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable					
Be Christian	3800	0,27	0,44	0	1
Be born in Europe	3811	0,48	0,50	0	1
Have European parents	3807	0,47	0,50	0	1
Respect EU laws and institutions	3815	0,93	0,26	0	1
Feel European	3808	0,93	0,25	0	1
Speak a European language	3808	0,93	0,25	0	1
Exercise citizen's rights	1821	0,77	0,42	0	1
Independent variables					
Individual level					
Age	3802	3,11	1,05	1	5
Sex (Ref: Woman)	3867	0,21	0,41	0	1
Religion (Ref: Christian)	3674	0,67	0,47	0	1
Ideology	3701	5,11	2,31	0	10
Elite (Political)	3873	0,62	0,49	0	1
Lived in the EU	3852	0,26	0,44	0	1
Trust EU	3844	5,68	1,89	0	10
Country benefit	3770	0,95	0,22	0	1
National identity	3848	3,67	0,61	1	4
Country level					
Foreign population	33	5,48	4,17	0,13	17,60

Table 9.10 Summary of variables in regressions, chapter 6 (Public opinion, EB 2004 & 2012)

Variable	2004 (EB 62.0)			2012 (EB 77.3)			Min	Max
	Obs.	Mean	Std.Dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.		
Dependent variable								
EU image	21533	3,44	0,95	23113	3,01	0,94	1	5
Independent variables								
Individual level								
Age	21533	3,81	1,61	23113	3,93	1,60	1	6
Sex (Ref.: Woman)	21533	0,55	0,50	23113	0,54	0,50	0	1
Habitat (Ref.: Village)	21533	0,36	0,48	23113	0,35	0,48	0	1
National trust	21533	0,43	0,46	23113	0,31	0,43	0	1
National democracy	21533	2,56	0,83	23113	2,40	0,86	1	4
EU=peace	21533	0,39	0,49	23113	0,26	0,44	0	1
EU=democracy	21533	0,28	0,45	23113	0,20	0,40	0	1
House person	21533	0,09	0,29	23113	0,06	0,24	0	1
Student	21533	0,04	0,20	23113	0,04	0,19	0	1
Unemployed	21533	0,07	0,26	23113	0,10	0,29	0	1
Retired	21533	0,28	0,45	23113	0,30	0,46	0	1
Farmer	21533	0,01	0,12	23113	0,01	0,11	0	1
Self-employed	21533	0,06	0,24	23113	0,06	0,24	0	1
Managers	21533	0,12	0,32	23113	0,11	0,31	0	1
Other white collar	21533	0,18	0,38	23113	0,19	0,39	0	1
Manual worker	21533	0,14	0,35	23113	0,13	0,34	0	1
Education <15	21533	0,23	0,42	23113	0,18	0,39	0	1
Education >15	21533	0,43	0,50	23113	0,46	0,50	0	1
Education >20	21533	0,34	0,47	23113	0,36	0,48	0	1
Personal expectations	21533	0,25	0,35	23113	0,17	0,32	0	1
EU= prosperity	21533	0,29	0,46	23113	0,13	0,34	0	1
National	21533	3,56	0,63	23113	3,51	0,65	1	4
EU=loss of identity	21533	0,14	0,35	23113	0,12	0,33	0	1
European (Cognitive)	21533	0,56	0,50	23113	0,58	0,49	0	1
European (Affective)	21533	2,84	0,85	23113	2,40	0,85	1	4
Country level								
GDP growth	27	4,05	2,04	27	-0,11	2,39		
Net fiscal transfers	27	0,47	0,85	27	1,26	1,82		

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