

The dispossessed Palestinians ...

Where do they come from ?

District	Depopulated Towns & Villages	Dispossessed 1948	Population 2000
Acre	30	47,038	386,735
Ramleh	64	97,405	935,215
Bayan	31	19,502	127,832
Beersheba	88	90,507	390,231
Gaza	46	79,947	321,365
Haifa	99	121,196	796,365
Hebron	16	29,904	149,935
Jaffa	23	123,227	805,610
Jerusalem	39	97,900	638,769
Jenin	6	4,083	26,116
Nazareth	5	8,746	37,090
Safad	78	32,248	340,729
Tiberias	26	28,872	188,285
Tulkarm	18	11,233	71,944
Total	531	805,087	5,248,185

The dispossessed are 85% of the people of the land that became Israel ...

After 50 years of dispossession, where are the Palestinian refugees today?

Place of refuge	All Population (2000)	of which : Refugees
Palestine 1948 (Israel)	1,012,347	(250,000 internal)
Gaza Strip	1,066,707	813,370
West Bank	1,093,429	693,286
Jordan	2,472,301	1,849,666
Lebanon	455,824	433,270
Syria	494,301	472,473
Egypt	31,805	42,974
South Arabia	291,778	291,778
Kuwait	40,031	35,499
Other Gulf	112,116	112,116
Iraq, Libya	78,984	78,984
Other Arab Countries	5,887	5,887
The Americas	216,196	183,767
Other Countries	275,303	234,008
Total	8,270,500	5,348,185

Denial of the Right of Return is perpetuation of Ethnic Cleansing which is a War Crime.

Two thirds of the Palestinians are refugees not allowed to return home, because they are not Jews. Meanwhile, the Jewish population is pouring in daily...

Where is their land ?

Category	Sq. km
Pre-1948 Jewish-controlled Land	1,682
Remaining Palestinians Land	1,682 (more than half confiscated)
Expelled Palestinians Land	17,000
Total Israel	20,364

That is, 92% of the land that became Israel ...

Why did they leave ?

Reason	Localities
Expulsion by Jewish forces	122
Military assault by Jewish troops	270
Fear of Jewish attack	58
or of being caught in the fighting	46
Influence of fall of neighbouring town	12
Psychological warfare	6
Abandonment on Arab orders	94
Unknown	51
Total	531

That is, 90% were attacked by Jewish forces ...

... and terrorized by massacres at :


Village/Town	Date
al Abhasiyya	04-05-48
Ahu Shusha	14-03-48
Ayn az Zaytun	02-05-48
Balad ash Sheikh	23-04-48
Bayt Daraz	21-05-48
Beer Sheba	21-10-48
Burayr	12-05-48
al Dawayima	29-10-48
Dayr Yassin	09-04-48
Eilaboun	29-10-48
Haifa	21-04-48
Hawawisa	23-04-48
Husayniyya	21-04-48
Ijzim	24-07-48
Ischul	28-10-48
Jih	29-10-48
al Kabri	21-05-48
al Khisas	18-12-47, 25-5-48
Khilyhayza	12-05-48
Layda	10-07-48
Majd al Kurum	29-10-48
Mansura al Khayt	18-01-48
Nasir ad Din, Khirbet	12-04-48
Qazaza	09-07-48, 19-12-47
Qisarya	15-02-48
Sa sa	30-10-48
Salfaf	29-10-48
Sabiha	30-10-48
Arab al Sammiyya	30-10-48
al Tantoura	21-05-48
al Tira (Haifa)	16-07-48
al Wara al-Sawla	18-04-48
Wadi Ara	27-02-48

Also at: Abu Zureyk, Awlam, Azazma and Attaiqa (Negera), Dayr of Assad, Bira, Hut, Siba, Tei Gecer, Umm al Shauf and Hula (Lebanon).

When did they leave ?

Period	No of Localities	No of Refugees
While under the protection of the British Mandate (before Israel was created)	213	413,794 (52%)
During 1948 War	264	339,272 (42%)
After signing the Armistice Agreements * including unknown dates	54*	52,001 (5%)
Total	531	805,067 (100%)

More than half of the refugees were expelled by Jewish forces before Israel was created on Palestinian land...



La cultura Cívica en las Ciudades Palestinas

TESIS DOCTORAL

Civic Culture in Palestinian Cities


A comparative study between Hebron and Bethlehem

BILAL AWAD SALAMEH

Dirigida por

Dr. FRANCISCO JOSÉ CARMONA

A Palestinian Village, 1890





UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología

La Cultura Cívica en las Ciudades Palestinas

“Civic Culture in Palestinian Cities:
A comparative Study between Hebron and Bethlehem”

TESIS DOCTORAL PRESENTADA POR:
BILAL AWAD ABDUL-MUNEIM SALAMEH

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Contemporánea

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“Civic Culture in Palestinian Cities:
A comparative Study between Hebron and Bethlehem”

Tesis presentada para aspirar al grado de doctor por
Don. Bilal Awad Abdul-Muneim Salameh, dirigida por el
Dr. Don. Francisco José Carmona

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Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología
Departamento de Sociología

El Dr. Francisco José Carmona, Profesor Titular de Sociología de la Universidad de Granada, como director de la tesis presentada para aspirar al grado de doctor por Don. Bilal Awad Abdul-Muneim Salameh.

HACE CONSTAR

Que la Tesis titulada: “La Cultura Cívica en las Ciudades Palestinas” realizada por el citado doctorando, reúne las condiciones científicas y académicas necesarias para su presentación.

Granada, 2011

Fdo. Dr. Don FRANCISCO JOSÉ CARMONA

DEDICATION

***To the Lovers of Freedom.
To Awad Kidar,
I dedicate this research***

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Granada, Spain
2011

Bilal A. Salameh

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La cultura Cívica en la Ciudad de Palestina: Comparación entre las ciudades de Belén y Hebrón

Introducción

Toda sociedad tiene su propia cultura que representa la totalidad de los estilos de vida y formas de vida cotidiana que son compartidas por los individuos (Barakat, 2000). La importancia de la cultura reside en el hecho de que se trata de una herramienta adecuada para pasar por alto las diferentes tendencias naturales de la interpretación de la naturaleza humana, ya que todos los comportamientos tienen significados sociales (Kosh, 2007:10). Existe un conjunto de conocimientos adquiridos y acumulados a partir de las experiencias, a partir de normas, leyes, creencias, valores, actitudes, planteamientos, significados, símbolos, rango social, religión, noción de tiempo y lugar, roles, relaciones sociales y de poder que influyen en los vínculos que los individuos y los grupos mantienen entre sí dentro de una determinada sociedad (Smith, 2000; Meisel, 1974). Cuando tratamos con fenómenos sociales o políticos, éstos no se toman como algo que se da a un nivel superior, sino como parte de un todo homogéneo que es el sistema social.

La cultura va más allá de las actitudes de los individuos hacia los políticos y las instituciones políticas; es moldeada a partir de sentimientos y percepciones complejas derivados de la familia, el trabajo, la fábrica y de la cultura popular; de este modo, la cultura se parece a un discurso que la gente tiene que interpretar y utilizar (Street, 1994). A su vez, la cultura formula los comportamientos y actitudes tanto sociales como políticas, debido a que reflejan ciertas expectativas determinadas por la misma.

En consecuencia, no es posible estudiar el fenómeno concreto de cultura política aislándolo de la sociedad y su cultura (Abrash, 1998:52). Así pues, este concepto de cultura cívica o de cultura política, a la luz del análisis funcional de ambos, es una parte de la cultura en su sentido general; se transforma en un grupo de valores y códigos políticos, sociales y cívicos, lo que la distingue de los demás y la vincula con los patrones de pensamiento que se derivan de la cultura.

Como venimos diciendo, el concepto de cultura política representa un conjunto de valores, creencias, opiniones y sentimientos relacionados con el sistema político (Almond y Verba, 1963). En el nivel cognitivo, define, clarifica o pregunta acerca de las reglas del juego político, mientras que en el aspecto normativo, clarifica la justificación o la negación de la Autoridad por parte de los principales actores tales como las instituciones cívicas y oficiales o los partidos políticos incluidos en la misma autoridad (Smelser y Baltes, 2001, Vol 6:11640) .

Esto ocurre en el momento en que la cultura cívica hace hincapié en la estabilidad y respaldada la democracia, especialmente cuando las posiciones y las prácticas democráticas se han unido y están trabajando de forma paralela con un patrón no democrático (Almond, 2001:1862). Se considera que las personas de acuerdo con la democracia son ciudadanos que tienen derechos y están sujetos al sistema (Almond y Verba, 1963).

Lo que distingue la cultura cívica no es su dirección y sus leyes sino su participación y su diversidad natural. En una cultura cívica, el papel de los participantes se convierte en parte y está en paralelo con el papel de los individuos sometidos políticamente como expresión de un modelo equilibrado; también encarna la idea de recepción pasiva y obediencia a la autoridad política. Además desempeña el papel limitado que une al individuo con los grupos tradicionales no políticos, como la familia y la iglesia. La confianza social y las obligaciones principales hacia el sistema y la nación desempeñan un papel de apaciguamiento en los conflictos y divisiones (Diamond, 1994:24). Todo lo anteriormente mencionado nos muestra las posibilidades de tener una cultura cívica, junto con lo que significa en relación con la estabilidad del sistema en todo el mundo, independientemente de lo democrático que sea.

Otro concepto que está relacionado con el tema de la cultura cívica, es el concepto de las virtudes y actitudes cívicas cuyas raíces se remontan a la Teoría de la República en el sentido del deber cívico y que aparece sistemáticamente en las elecciones. Se compone de tres aspectos: el miedo a la corrupción, el miedo a la dependencia y el miedo a la independencia y la libertad. La auto-independencia significa buscar la independencia en el interior con la posibilidad de juzgarse a sí mismos, mientras que las virtudes cívicas miran hacia afuera y hacen todo aquello que es bueno para el bien común (Dagger, 1997). Dado que el ciudadano es el tema principal de la política, él / ella tiene que demostrar la obediencia política y el cumplimiento con el sistema, además del conocimiento generalizado de todos los miembros, tanto de sus derechos civiles, como de sus derechos políticos y económicos que muestren a un buen ciudadano que observa el sistema y que a su vez es observado por el sistema respetando sus libertades naturales, cívicas y éticas.

Desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX ha aumentado el interés en la república cívica por parte de académicos y políticos conductistas (Almond y Verba, 1963,1989; Seligson y Muller, 1987). Almond y Verba en su estudio, llegaron a la conclusión de que la eficacia de la democracia depende de la sujeción, la participación competitiva, la confianza social, y la cooperación social. De igual modo, Putnam (1993) llegó a la misma conclusión, el legado cultural constituye los valores culturales y las actitudes cívicas. En consecuencia, debemos ver la sociedad en relación a dos aspectos principales:

Primero, el que se refiere a la sociedad o el órgano político que tiene que ver con todo lo que es política, incluidos los partidos políticos, la composición y las actitudes sobre la

base de lo que son fuerzas eficaces e influyentes en la esfera política, las leyes y su naturaleza, la administración, la toma de conciencia, las actitudes hacia los políticos y los gobiernos y la evaluación del sistema.

Segundo, Es el Consejo de Administración Civil el que incluye las actitudes cívicas hacia la sociedad y su administración, el voluntariado y la participación en actividades cívicas; desde el momento en que las fuerzas de la sociedad civil se encuentran a mitad de camino entre el cuerpo social (los individuos) y el órgano político (el estado), la sociedad civil es considerada la principal defensora de los derechos de las personas en caso de que éstos fueran violados por el estado. Por otra parte, se considera la incubadora práctica e intelectual de las manifestaciones cívicas que defienden los derechos humanos y de la mujer y que fortalecen la democracia como un sistema de vida social y político. Esto resulta similar cuando los partidos políticos formulan su visión sobre la base de la naturaleza de la sociedad y lo traducen a través de su contribución a su establecimiento.

Al examinar el mundo árabe en general y la realidad palestina en particular, en relación a lo que se afirma en la introducción, Miari (2003) indica que el interés en esas cuestiones de la cultura cívica y política y la transformación democrática en el entorno académico e intelectual es débil, escasa o completamente inexistente.

En su análisis, Al-Azar (1996:45) llega a la conclusión de que la realidad árabe carece de diversas cualidades de la noción de democracia. La cultura árabe en general dedica una cierta pauta de comportamiento que enfatiza en los valores de la obediencia, la lealtad, la confianza y el apoyo tanto del grupo como de la familia; además de esto, es muy importante tomar en cuenta que no hay separación entre religión y estado. En relación al sistema político, éste sigue siendo personalista y gira en torno al carácter del líder en términos de toma de decisiones, mientras que otras opiniones no son escuchadas, de hecho, se les restringe y asedia, esto lleva a que se pase por alto al ciudadano y sus derechos sean violados. Sin embargo, añade que la cultura árabe se compone de valores basados en la solidaridad social, la constancia, la autoestima, la lealtad, la modestia y la cooperación. Estos valores tienden a resolver las disputas de manera amistosa y en última instancia no se contradicen con la estabilidad de un sistema democrático.

La realidad palestina coincide con la conclusión anterior, ya que tiene unas características particulares que difieren de otros estados árabes. Esto es así porque la realidad palestina se encuentra aún bajo el yugo de la ocupación y además los territorios palestinos están divididos en ciudades y aldeas separadas geográficamente, junto con la inexistencia de un estado nacional que carece de soberanía sobre sus territorios. También influye la inexperiencia política del sistema de partidos, pues esta experiencia se remonta apenas a un siglo atrás. Además, existen instituciones cívicas históricamente activas que existían antes de la creación de la Autoridad Nacional después de firmar el Acuerdo de Oslo entre la Organización de Liberación de Palestina [OLP] y el gobierno israelí. No

existe tampoco ninguna estructura económica y de haberla, esta está relacionada con la dependencia y la asociación del mercado palestino con el mercado israelí.

No es sólo la frágil realidad palestina y en asociación con el estado de caos que está profundamente arraigado en su cultura y sus manifestaciones en el sistema político, los aspectos jurídicos y su aplicación y la fragilidad económica, lo que nos preocupa en el cumplimiento de los requisitos y condiciones del proceso de transformación democrática. Sino también, que este caos ha impuesto un estado específico de contradicciones y actitudes cognitivas hacia las cuestiones políticas y sociales; tanto la sociedad palestina como sus dirigentes, buscan y aspiran a construir un estado y un sistema democrático a través de un discurso político o de encuestas de opinión (Kassis, 1999; Miari, 2003); sin embargo, la realidad política en la sociedad palestina se contradice y se opone a esta cuestión en términos de la Autoridad y sus prácticas y su enfoque no democrático en términos del crecimiento de la oposición política islámica; esto convierte en defensores de la democracia a un limitado grupo incapaz de mejorar el proceso de transformación democrática y de construcción de una sociedad civil.

En consecuencia, la presente investigación aspira a estudiar la cultura cívica dentro de la sociedad palestina; esta cultura cívica la entendemos como "el conjunto de valores, de hábitos, de costumbres y de actividades políticas, sociales y culturales, que el individuo posee y que practica debido a que todo ello en conjunto facilita su existencia e inclusión en un grupo de población que le garantiza de por sí ese estado de pertenencia al mismo, el reconocimiento de derechos y deberes, y sus actitudes hacia la vida, la sociedad y sus fuerzas políticas y sociales".

El motivo por el que el investigador ha elegido esta materia se debe a la naturaleza presente estado de la cuestión a la luz de las caídas y los fracasos políticos, las complicaciones políticas y las crisis de organización sufridas como consecuencia de las condiciones políticas y económicas que los territorios palestinos han sufrido como resultado de la ocupación. Esta crisis estructural ha irrumpido en las fuerzas políticas y organizaciones de la sociedad civil que son los representantes del proceso de transformación democrática y de cambio cultural; esta batalla no es menos importante que la batalla de la resistencia ante la ocupación y de sus políticas desde que la especificidad de la realidad palestina requiere un proceso lógico de interacción entre las cuestiones nacionales y las cuestiones cívicas, sociales y democráticas, para convertir este proceso de interacción en uno de los mecanismos de desarrollo de la realidad social.

Por consiguiente, consideramos que es imprescindible comprender la naturaleza del interior de la sociedad palestina a nivel regional pero no por comparación con otros estados ni para probar o refutar una teoría. Se trata de una comprensión del fenómeno sobre la base de la comprensión científica de la misma sobre el terreno. Nuestra elección del tema de investigación y la investigación sobre la población se debe a lo siguiente:

- La naturaleza de las consecuencias sociales, económicas y políticas del crecimiento de la sociedad palestina es un caso único debido al hecho de que todavía está bajo el yugo de la ocupación; a consecuencia de esta circunstancia, el pueblo palestino tiene que pagar un alto precio, ya que afecta de forma directa a la naturaleza de su cultura, estructura económica y política, por lo que el proceso de transformación democrático y el cambio cultural sólo puede entenderse teniendo en cuenta todo lo anterior mencionado.
- La existencia de estos obstáculos y la nueva forma del estado que carece de soberanía, entorpece el desarrollo del proceso político, de la naturaleza de las instituciones y el aparato conectado al estado.
- Los presupuestos del estado recién nacido y de las actuales ONG están obligados por los estados donantes y no por los ingresos de los ciudadanos.
- La falta de autoridad y de soberanía sobre varios territorios obstruye su puesta en marcha y la aplicación de la ley.

En cuanto a las razones por las que se eligieron las ciudades de Hebrón y Belén como bases de la investigación sobre la población, citamos, además de las ya mencionadas, que:

- Ambas son ciudades palestinas que viven en un estado de aislamiento la una de la otra, lo que aumenta la intensidad de localismo. También la naturaleza de las culturas en estas dos ciudades se distingue por ser regional, y están vinculadas con el contexto histórico del que las ciudades han sido testigo. Además, no hay ninguna otra ciudad central que sirva de referencia cultural. En consecuencia, no podemos imaginar una pura cultura cívica lejos de la ciudad dentro del marco sociológico que incluye la forma de vida y el modelo económico que armonice con ella.
- La existencia de un estado de conflicto en cuanto a la identidad de la ciudad de Hebrón, a la luz de su importancia tanto para los musulmanes como para los judíos, si bien no existe una identidad en conflicto Belén.
- La existencia de una diversidad cultural regional (ciudad, pueblo, campo) y la diversidad religiosa (musulmanes, cristianos) en un pequeño lugar geográfico en la ciudad de Belén, mientras que es esto mismo resulta inexistente en la ciudad de Hebrón.

La importancia del estudio se debe al hecho de que la sociedad palestina está siendo testigo del nacimiento de un reciente nuevo estado en una muy difícil situación, por lo cual es imprescindible entender la cultura cívica en los territorios palestinos ya que la naturaleza de estas diferencias contribuye a la presentación de políticas y estrategias que contribuyen a apoyar el proceso de participación cívica, social y política de transformación.

El investigador medirá la cultura cívica a través de los siguientes indicadores de " el apoyo a la democracia, la participación cívica y política, el imperio de la ley, la tolerancia, la aceptación del pluralismo, el respeto del hombre y la mujer, los derechos políticos y económicos, el secularismo, y las actitudes de los ciudadanos hacia la gobierno".

La investigación tratará de responder a preguntas a través de análisis teóricos sobre el terreno, apoyados por los resultados. Las preguntas son:

- ¿Cuáles son las manifestaciones y la forma de la cultura cívica en la población investigada?
- ¿Cuál es la importancia de una ciudad a la cultura cívica?
- ¿Cuál es la naturaleza de la cultura cívica en la estructura de la cultura palestina?
- ¿Cuál es la relación entre los partidos políticos y la democracia?
- ¿Cuál es la forma de cultura cívica en la moderna clase media?
- ¿Existe alguna diferencia en las características de la cultura cívica entre las ciudades de Hebrón y Belén?

Con el fin de cumplir la meta de la investigación, el investigador va a debatir varias cuestiones conceptuales relacionadas con el concepto de cultura cívica en el mundo luego pedirá prestado todo aquello que puede pedirse prestado para ser aplicado a la realidad palestina. El tema de investigación será analizado sobre la base de los siguientes aspectos:

El alcance y la definición del concepto de cultura cívica

El concepto de cultura cívica es uno de los conceptos que preocupan a los estudiosos de la sociología y la política tanto en el mundo occidental como en el árabe debido a su estrecha asociación con la democracia (Muller y Seligson, 1994; Miari, 2003) y la naturaleza del sistema político. A pesar del creciente interés en este concepto, sigue siendo débil (Chilton, 1988) debido a la norma de presuposiciones sobre la naturaleza y la función de la democracia que consideran que el modelo de la cultura democrática occidental es superior, y esto hace que sea obligatorio en ir a otros pueblos para acompañarles a emularlo.

El primer intento fue puesto en marcha por Almond y Verba (1963) en su libro *Cultura Cívica* y sirve de referente hasta el día de hoy; se basaba en una comprensión del proceso y de la democracia cultural dentro del sistema político y su relación de ésta con

él y viceversa. A pesar de las diferencias sistemáticas y las herramientas de medición con las que se trató de identificar el concepto, aún está sumido en el misterio. Se ha tratado también como un modelo internacional de comparación entre las nacionalidades en cuanto a su naturaleza cultural. Después el concepto se volvió politizado y susceptible a la desviación. Czudnowski (1968: 878) considera que el problema en este asunto reside en el significado dado a los resultados ya que los investigadores en los aspectos de las comparaciones entre las nacionalidades deben tener en cuenta las equivalencias pues existen dos recursos básicos para las diferencias en la información establecida sobre las nacionalidades:

- Las diferencias culturales en relación con la naturaleza como el idioma, la educación, la religión, el grado de apertura y la claridad de los puntos de vista personales.
- Las diferencias culturales en la naturaleza política.

Con el fin de identificar el concepto de la cultura cívica debemos revisar la investigación y los estudios que han tratado el tema desde diferentes aspectos. El libro de *La cultura cívica* (Almond y Verba, 1963) examinó una de las cuestiones importantes de la sociología de posguerra, que era ¿por qué la democracia sobrevivió en el período entreguerras en Gran Bretaña y América, mientras que se derrumbó en el continente europeo? Los autores indicaron que un sistema democrático independiente requiere de una política equilibrada de la cultura (cultura cívica), que una tendencias y actitudes activas y pasivas.

Después de más de cuatro décadas, el libro de Almond y Verba sigue siendo un hito en la investigación científica, ya que ambos autores no sólo presentan una prueba teórica de su tesis sino que también allanaron el camino para que otros pudieran probar, modificar o rechazar sus hipótesis. Esto es lo que los siguientes autores que estudiamos (Thompson, Ellis y Wildavsky, 1990:247-258) han hecho. Ambos señalaron las deficiencias y las erróneas generalizaciones de los casos analizados en el libro. Además del impacto que el libro causó, mantuvo aún su supremacía y continuó siendo un modelo en todo el mundo para todos aquellos interesados en la sociología y la política, tanto para los que se oponen al estudio como para los que lo apoyan (Ben-Dor, 1977; Docherty, Goodlad y Paddison, 2001; Reese y Rosenfeld, 2002; Seyd y Whiteley, 2002; Lo, Bettinger y Fan, 2004; Paden, 2005; Tessler y Gao, 2005; Cox y Reese, 2006 ; Baxter, 2008; Klicperova-Baker & Feierabe, 2008; Wang y Liu , 2008; Baek, 2009; Poire, 2009).

El estudio de la población se llevó a cabo en cinco estados: Italia, Mexico, Alemania, Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña; a fin de explicar la relación entre tres variables básicas. La variable independiente, que sería la estructura social. La variable intermedia, que sería la cultura política: las virtudes cívicas o de la cultura cívica. Y la variable dependiente, que sería la estabilidad de la democracia. Su estudio explica que existen tres grandes

tipos de cultura política: parroquial, sujeto, y participante, que se resumirían como a continuación lo hacemos:

"Un participante se supone que debe estar al tanto y a la vez informar sobre el sistema político, tanto en sus aspectos políticos como en los gubernamentales. Un sujeto tiende a ser cognitivamente orientado principalmente a la salida de parte del gobierno: el ejecutivo, la burocracia, y el poder judicial. El parroquial tiende a ignorar, o a ser sólo vagamente consciente, del sistema político en todos sus aspectos" (Almond y Verba, 1963:79).

En cuanto a su definición de cultura política ellos la consideran como “la orientación política... las actitudes hacia el sistema político y sus diversas partes, y las actitudes hacia el papel de la autorregulación en el sistema” (Almond y Verba, 1963:13), y lo mismo para Seymour Lipset (1960) quien lo definió como “una particular distribución de la actitud política, los sentimientos, la información y las habilidades” (Gibbins, 1990:7). La pregunta sigue siendo ¿qué quieren decir Almond y Verba con su concepto de cultura cívica? Para ellos “la cultura cívica y pluralista se basa en la comunicación y la persuasión, una cultura de consenso en una diversidad, una cultura que permite el cambio, pero lo modera” (Almond y Verba, 1963: 8), lo que se plantea como un conjunto de actitudes específicas que son cruciales para el éxito de la democracia moderna; otros términos socio-psicológicos sinónimos incluyen lo cognitivo (conocimiento), lo afectivo (sentimiento), y evaluación (valores). Sólo la cultura cívica mezcla y equilibra de los elementos de tal forma que la democracia estable y eficaz se puede mantenerse, la mezcla apropiada aquí está en mezclar la cultura del sujeto y el participante combinando la confianza y una fuerte deferencia a la autoridad con una positiva actitud con respecto a los bienes de la participación activa "(Gibbins, 1990:7).

El estudio estimuló diversas críticas que llevaron a una relectura de su concepto original en su publicación de 1989; la revisión del concepto de cultura política lleva a una reducción en el análisis psicológico de sus matices ya que la cultura cívica es un subtipo de la cultura política. Es posible resumir las principales críticas de Almond y Verba de la siguiente manera:

- Los autores escasamente definen la cultura política (Lijphart, 1980).
- No justifican las razones por las que eligieron esos estados concretos (Lijphart, 1980).
- El estudio de Almond y Verba analiza la cultura cívica como una variable independiente, mientras que se analiza la estabilidad democrática como una variable dependiente, ya que no es necesariamente una relación de causa (Pateman, 1980).

- Se utiliza el concepto angloamericano de democracia como un punto de referencia para evaluar los sistemas políticos (Wiatr, 1980).
- El estudio no muestra las raíces históricas de la cultura política de los estados estudiados y evita el análisis estratificado (Wiatr, 1980).
- En su análisis, ambos autores adoptan implícitamente la visión de la clase media en la evaluación de la materia política de la sociedad y no presta atención a las clases pobres (Wiatr, 1980).
- Adoptan el análisis estructural funcional en su interpretación de la población estudiada en el marco de esta realidad que no cambia, por lo que esto contribuyó a clasificarlos como conservadores (Thompson, Ellis y Wildavsky, 1990).
- Algunos consideran que el concepto de cultura política está estrechamente relacionado con los estudios llamados de carácter nacional, y su asociación con los estados coloniales que imponían el uso de la democracia en los países del tercer mundo, pero que no funcionó. Luego hubo un cuestionamiento sobre la base cultural para la democracia (Kosh, 2007).
- El concepto de cultura política es superior al concepto de cultura cívica, ya que éste último fue capaz, como una especie de urbanidad y cortesía, de interpretar las manifestaciones sociales y políticas, pero el concepto de cultura cívica va mucho más allá de eso.

El estudio de estos autores hace hincapié en la conducta política individual sobre la base de tres criterios: cognitivo, afectivo y de evaluación, que constituyen los tres aspectos en el debate sobre el concepto de la cultura en general, lo que ha empujado a Chilton (1988:425) a criticar el concepto basado en los componentes de la cultura. El añade una nueva dimensión a Lowell Dittmer (1977:566) que define la cultura política como “un sistema de símbolos políticos, que están bien amuebladas en el sistema global; también hemos de considerarlo en términos de comunicación política. Así, el concepto ha sido trasladado fuera de la definición individual y de la asociación de símbolos políticos (discurso político) y el intercambio de ellos a través de contactos con otros. Chilton (1988:427) añade que la cultura simbólica se basa en una justificación, descripción o contemplación de las formas de interacción cultural; lo que nos permite inferir que Chilton restablece el valor de todo lo que es cultural, ya que identifica el comportamiento político y rechaza la conexión con la conducta política individual.

En un estudio pionero, Putnam (1993) analiza la relación entre el desarrollo social y económico por un lado, y la cultura cívica por otro, en Italia. El autor analiza la distribución geográfica de la cultura cívica. Encontró que ésta está presente en la parte norte de Italia, mientras que está ausente en el lado sur a través de su análisis de las raíces

históricas de la cultura cívica. Finalmente llegó a la conclusión de que la democracia es más fuerte si se construye sobre la base de la reciprocidad social, la confianza y la participación cívica. El autor encontró que el legado cultural de las regiones tiene una relación directa y una poderosa influencia en la calidad de los incipientes gobiernos (Rice y Feldman, 1997:1144). Para Putnam el capital social, se mide en términos de participación de la sociedad civil como un indicador clave de una ciudadanía democrática (Seligson, 2002: 283). Y considera que “la participación en organizaciones cívicas inculca habilidades de cooperación” (Putnam, 1993:90).

En su definición de cultura cívica utilizó varios conceptos como “tradicición cívica, cultura política, participación cívica, virtudes de reimpresión”, sin embargo, el concepto básico en su estudio es el de “normas de reciprocidad y redes de compromiso cívico” (Putnam, 1993:167).

Sobre el estudio de Putnam (1993) podemos concluir que fue considerado el primero de su clase en este campo en términos de:

- Clarificación de la relación entre el desarrollo económico y social y la cultura cívica.
- Análisis del fenómeno sobre la base de su acumulación histórica y de su contexto social.
- Clarificación de las diferencias internas en la cultura cívica en el norte y el sur de Italia.

Lo más importante es que pudo desviar la pista de la investigación en el ámbito de la cultura cívica de la comparación entre las nacionalidades a una comparación dentro del mismo estado como una unidad para el análisis.

En el mismo ámbito de aplicación del anterior trabajo citado de Almond y Verba, Robert Inglehart establece un vínculo explícito entre un conjunto de actitudes a nivel micro, denominados como cultura política, y el macro-nivel variable del tipo de régimen. En concreto, Inglehart muestra que los intentos de una forma particular de cultura política, la cultura cívica, está fuertemente ligada a la aparición y la estabilidad de la democracia. Él encuentra una relación causal directa entre lo que él llama el síndrome de la cultura cívica y la democracia. Estas tres variables - confianza interpersonal, apoyo de un cambio revolucionario, y satisfacción con la vida- conforman un “amplio síndrome de actitudes relacionadas ... [que] muestran una impresionante estabilidad con el tiempo.” “La satisfacción vital, la satisfacción política, la confianza interpersonal y el apoyo a la actual orden social tienden a ir todos juntos. Todos constituyen un síndrome de actitudes positivas hacia el mundo en el que uno vive” (Seligson, 2002:273-274).

El estudio referente de Inglehart y Welzel (2003) indica que el desarrollo económico ha aumentado el nivel de confianza y satisfacción con la vida y, por consiguiente, influye

en la actitud de los ciudadanos hacia la democracia. Inglehart y Norris (2002) midieron la cultura cívica en su estudio a través de tres indicadores: los valores políticos y sociales, las actitudes hacia los líderes políticos y, por último, los derechos de la mujer. En su examen de la teoría de Huntington sobre el conflicto de civilizaciones entre Occidente y los estados árabes e islámicos, el enfatizó la validez de esta teoría.

Huntington, citado en Miari (2003:20) tiende a relacionar la cultura democrática y el crecimiento económico, ya que un cambio y el crecimiento de la economía se refleja dramáticamente en los valores sociales que influyen en que producen cambios que afectan a la estructura de clases en la sociedad, principalmente el crecimiento y el aumento de la civilizada clase media que tiende a adoptar los valores democráticos. Mientras que esto depende del tipo de la clase media ya que Hilal (2006A) concluyó que existen dos tipos de clase media en la sociedad palestina: secular y conservadora.

El estudio de Daniel Elazar reveló que existen subculturas políticas americanas después de que ejecutó un estudio intensivo de la cultura política de cada estado. En su trabajo fue subrayada la importancia de la diversidad cultural y su significación. El autor clasificó tres tipos de cultura política en los Estados Unidos: individualista, moralista y tradicionalista (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:233), y esto confirma que hay subculturas y, en consecuencia, que las culturas cívicas locales se basan en la diversidad histórica y el contexto que la región experimenta.

La cultura cívica local se refiere a una comunidad local, ya que es indicativo de los modelos o las formas de vida pública. Cada comunidad representa una cultura cívica, que históricamente se formó y trabaja en la formación de la dirección del sistema político y social. Esta cultura cívica local no sólo determina la naturaleza de los problemas y las soluciones a las que se enfrenta la comunidad, sino que también impone una visión conjunta del pasado, el presente y el futuro. Funciona en la formación de todo (Reese y Rosenfeld, 2002) en términos de estructura social, religiosa y política y cívica, y los resultados políticos y cívicos representados por los partidos, las sociedades civiles y la naturaleza de la élite en la comunidad local.

Riley y Fernández (2006) llevaron a cabo un estudio comparativo de España e Italia durante el régimen de Franco y el fascismo en Italia. Sobre la base de la cuestión de la relación entre la autonomía cívica y la participación política, hallaron que la política del régimen fascista italiano había creado y sentado las bases para la participación política más que el de la dictadura de Franco, ya que fue capaz de fusionar las instituciones civiles dentro de los partidos políticos. Los investigadores encontraron que el partido fascista no estaba a favor de impulsar la participación política a través de modelos de comportamiento político a través de lo cual fue capaz de hacerse con el control y dominar (hegemonías) instituciones civiles incluidas incluso las religiosas. En cambio, el régimen

de Franco no lo consiguió. Uniendo a esto las concesiones que obtuvo de las instituciones religiosas.

Machacek (2003) hace referencia a la importancia del pluralismo religioso en el sur de California hacia la creación de una cultura cívica basada en el respeto de los demás ya que el diálogo entre los diferentes grupos religiosos en el campo ha permitido tener una cultura cívica, que se distingue por normas específicas y directrices, en particular la ley de civilidad religiosa. La participación de los diferentes grupos religiosos en la vida cívica conduce a un aumento en la cultura religiosa de la civilidad. Cookson (2005) define la cultura cívica como “la esfera pública en la que los ciudadanos comparten ideas y donde las diferencias de puntos de vista son respetados, y los ciudadanos están comprometidos con un estado de consenso”.

En el caso palestino, el concepto de cultura política en la sociedad palestina ha sido examinado a través de indicadores prácticos y teóricos de la democracia, a partir de la democracia, de los derechos de la mujer y de la confianza en organizaciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales (Miari, 2003) y a través de otro estudio (Kassis, 1999), que está cerca de la esencia y el contenido del nuestro, cuyo objeto es el de la transformación democrática y la civilidad de la sociedad palestina.

Así pues, la cultura cívica obviamente tiene algunos valores que mantienen una relación con la sociedad civil, como la idea compartida de la participación política y social, y de alguna manera podemos ver que hay una conexión entre la cultura cívica y la esfera pública, como un ámbito común que se puede compartir. De cualquier manera, consideramos que la cultura cívica está subrayando la cultura en términos generales, y en las propias culturas en el interior de la sociedad, podemos decir que hay culturas cívicas en la dimensión de lo plural que ofrecen muchos patrones de diversidad entre las personas, por lo que no podemos considerar que la cultura cívica homogeneidad entre sus ciudadanos, incluso en el espíritu de las virtudes cívicas sugiere compromisos comunes a los procedimientos de la democracia. De acuerdo a lo discutido anteriormente, podemos resumirse cinco dimensiones relacionadas con la cultura cívica: el conocimiento de la sociedad, la lealtad, la ciudadanía, la participación, y la tradición, para todas las sociedades, pero la gente no siempre actúa del mismo modo o tiene la capacidad para hacerlo.

Por otra parte los estudios se han centrado en abordar el concepto a la luz de una serie de aspectos; principalmente las virtudes cívicas, el liberalismo cívico, la tolerancia, la confianza y la autonomía, la participación cívica, el capital social, el compromiso cívico, la participación cívica, el liberalismo cívico, la implicación ciudadana, la tradición cívica, cultura política, participación cívica, virtudes de republicación.

Nos damos cuenta a partir de todo lo anteriormente expuesto, de lo profundamente arraigados que están los estudios que hemos mencionado, junto con las múltiples diferencias que hallamos en los resultados de los mismo, que expresan en su contenido, el aspecto en el que el investigador quiere centrarse; en consecuencia éste es el punto de partida, la especificación de la función, el concepto y el objetivo que el investigador desea poner de relieve en el presente estudio. De acuerdo con ello vamos a avanzar hacia una especificación del concepto de cultura cívica en el contexto de esta investigación.

Especificación y medición del concepto de cultura cívica

El concepto de cultura cívica es demasiado amplio y difícil de medir, ¿cómo podemos medir la cultura cívica? Esta cuestión es la cuestión más importante en la investigación ya que el uso histórico de la cultura cívica sirve de puente en la comprensión de las diferencias y semejanzas en los planos internacional, nacional y de los estados, pero muy pocos estudios de investigación tratan el tema en el plano interno de las ciudades (Cox y Reese, 2006). Con el fin de facilitar el proceso de diseño y construcción de instrumentos de medición del concepto de cultura cívica, tenemos que confiar en los estudios e investigaciones aplicados en los planos internacional y regional a fin de clarificar los indicadores utilizados para medir este concepto. Además, tenemos que trabajar en el diseño de una herramienta de medición que se adapte a la población en estudio.

Las primeras bases de la teoría de la cultura cívica se vincularon con estudios de Inglehart (1988, 1990 *apud* Wang y Lui, 2008:3), que dieron por sentado que las instituciones democráticas se han inclinado a tener éxito porque se han visto influidas por la fortaleza de las posiciones hacia la democracia. Inglehart utilizó en su estudio una escala de 12 preguntas divididas en dos diferentes valores: Primero, los valores materialistas, que él entiendo como un énfasis en la economía y el cuerpo de seguridad. En cuanto a los valores posmaterialistas, él autor entiendo éstos como la libre expresión y la calidad de vida.

Rice y Feldman (1997:1145) resumió los indicadores que el estudio de Putnam (1993) utilizó para medir la civilidad:

Participación Cívica: Los ciudadanos en una cultura cívica, está interesados en los asuntos públicos y en participar en política. Como miembros virtuosos de la sociedad, que sienten la obligación de promover activamente el bien público, que se define como algo más que la suma de intereses individuales. Para estar seguros, los intereses privados todavía conforman muchas de sus actitudes y motivan e gran medida su comportamiento, pero perciben su propio interés de manera general, abarcando a menudo los intereses de otros en su comunidad.

La igualdad política: Los ciudadanos se tratan unos a otros como ciudadanos como iguales en una cultura cívica. Ellos está unidos entre sí por relaciones horizontales de

reciprocidad y cooperación, no por relaciones verticales de autoridad y de dependencia” (Putnam, 1993, 88). Pueden existir desigualdades en la riqueza pero éstas no perturban el compromiso fundamental hacia la igualdad que configura el comportamiento individual.

La tolerancia: Una cultura cívica se caracteriza por los ciudadanos que se respetan y confían entre sí. La diversidad de ideas y estilos de vida suelen ser toleradas, incluso alentadas. El interés propio en esta comunidad se modifica y atenúa gracias al fuerte sentido de la cortesía y la confianza entre las personas.

Estructuras sociales de la cooperación: Las organizaciones abundan en una cultura cívica, de los sindicatos a los clubes de ajedrez, y de los partidos políticos a los equipos deportivos de barrio. Los ciudadanos son miembros activos de muchos grupos, que les exponen a una variedad de ideas y les enseñan los beneficios de la cooperación y la confianza interpersonal. Obviamente muy pocos, si acaso, son los individuos que incorporan completamente todos estos componentes de un ciudadano cívico. Sin embargo, algunas personas los encarnan más que otros. Lo mismo puede decirse de las sociedades; algunas sociedades se acercan más a un ideal de cultura cívica que otras.

Pasamos ahora a la difícil tarea de medir empíricamente la medida en que las sociedades civiles.

Siguiendo las características cívicas de Putnam (Tessler y Gao, 2005) para la comprensión de la cultura cívica en el Oriente Medio, se utilizan cuatro indicadores para medir los valores cívicos: 1. Tolerancia 2. Creencia en la igualdad de género en la vida social 3. Interés político 4. La participación cívica.

Para indicar la igualdad Rice y Arnett (2001:41) emplearon el porcentaje de maestros de escuelas públicas que eran hombres, el porcentaje de los legisladores estatales que eran mujeres, el número de grupos de derechos civiles por habitante, y una medida de la desigualdad de los ingresos. Y por último, el compromiso cívico fue estimado a través de la circulación del periódico per cápita, los libros de la biblioteca pública per cápita, y la mejora de las comunidades y grupos de filantropía per cápita.

En un estudio minucioso sobre la transformación democrática y la civilidad de la sociedad civil en Palestina, Kassis (1999) adoptó una serie de cualidades cívicas en la sociedad palestina en su estudio de las instituciones de la sociedad civil y su papel en la civilización y la propagación de la cultura cívica en la sociedad palestina. Para este autor las principales cualidades son: el diálogo, el pluralismo, la tolerancia, la competencia entre las organizaciones de la sociedad civil y la autoridad y la institucionalización de la sociedad civil: la libertad de prensa, los sindicatos, las universidades independientes, los centros de investigación, el sentido de ciudadanía, los derechos de la mujer, el papel de la ley, la participación política y social voluntaria y la práctica de la democracia. En su definición de la noción de cultura política, el estudio de Miari (2003) dividió la

herramienta de su investigación en dos partes: la primera parte incluía preguntas para medir las actitudes de los palestinos en su apoyo hacia la democracia, a los derechos de la mujer, y a la confianza en las instituciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales tanto teóricas como prácticas.

De acuerdo con todo lo señalado podemos resumir los indicadores utilizados para medir la cultura cívica, adoptados en esta investigación, de la siguiente manera:

- El apoyo a la democracia: hay una relación entre el grado de civilidad de la sociedad y su apoyo a la democracia, la investigación también trata de comprender la naturaleza de la democracia que el ciudadano desea tener.
- La participación cívica y política: se relaciona con la confianza, el voluntariado, la participación en actividades sociales y políticas que expresan el grado de compromiso individual en las cuestiones sociales en torno al ciudadano/a.
- El Estado de Derecho: no es posible entender la vida cívica y el nivel de civilización que ha alcanzado el estado fuera de la norma de la ley que es considerada como el valor más seguro del grado de civilidad. Debido a que el caso palestino se basa en la puesta en práctica de habituales leyes tribales, hemos decidido abordar también esa cuestión.
- La tolerancia: existe un estado de consenso sobre la importancia de este indicador en el grado de civilización de la sociedad, que incluye la tolerancia religiosa y social y la disparidad de puntos de vista.
- La aceptación del pluralismo: incluye el pluralismo religioso, político y social.
- El respeto de los derechos de la mujer y los derechos sociales, políticos y económicos: lo que se considera un hito en la civilidad y la urbanización de la sociedad y el grado de justicia en la sociedad.
- La laicidad: es la separación entre religión y estado y todo lo heredado tradicionalmente, ya que expresa el nivel de racionalidad en la sociedad.
- Las actitudes de los ciudadanos hacia la representación de la autoridad con respecto al apoyo o la oposición del sistema y el alcance de su capacidad para influir en la toma de decisiones políticas.

La investigación se basará en las teorías, la literatura y las escalas que se utilizaron en la investigación sobre el cuestionario, a partir de ahí se desarrollarán y diseñarán herramientas para la recopilación de datos de investigación de la población.

El investigador no pretende que estos indicadores midan satisfactoriamente la cultura cívica, per parte de la consideración de éstos como indicadores significativos en la

comprensión del proceso de transformación ciudadana que ha logrado la población estudiada. Los recursos utilizados se mencionarán más adelante.

La dimensión de la investigación

Ahora, para explicar el alcance de la investigación con la intención de comprender la cultura cívica en la sociedad palestina, la investigación se basa en cuatro dimensiones, lo que nos llevará a una mejor explicación de la realidad palestina. Por consiguiente, el tema de investigación será analizado siguiendo los siguientes aspectos:

Primero. Ciudad y cultura Cívica: sitio cívico y la ausencia de ciudad

Cuando hablamos de cultura cívica es imprescindible aclarar su relación con la ciudad no sólo como una derivación lingüística de ésta, pues sólo la ciudad puede considerarse la incubadora y promotora de la cultura cívica. Es el lugar donde se encuentran las sedes judiciales, las instituciones legislativas y ejecutivas, las oficinas, órganos e instituciones de la sociedad civil, la sede de la vida política, y el centro de operaciones de los dirigentes políticos, sociales y religiosos. Es la división de clase de los sectores sociales; es la cultura común, pues tiene las universidades, los cafés, los cines y los teatros. Hay cambio social y movilidad social en la ciudad (Barakat, 2000). La formación de la clase depende de la medida del crecimiento de la ciudad, especialmente la clase media que promueve la iniciativa del cambio, el progreso y la modernidad. Es el principal defensor de la democracia y del secularismo (Hilal, 2006).

En resumen, es el espacio político general, empezando por el estado y terminando con los movimientos y los partidos políticos. Aristóteles considera la ciudad “el caldo de cultivo de la ciudadanía” ya que es el lugar o el emplazamiento a través del cual se desarrolla la misma. Parece que el urbanismo se ha convertido en un estilo de vida para los habitantes del mundo. La ciudad es suficientemente grande y diversificada en sus componentes, opciones y propuestas, mientras que el ámbito rural no puede serlo (Dagger, 1997: 155), ya que se distingue por ser conservador e introvertido.

En su explicación de la relación entre la ciudad y la *cultura ciudadana*, Hanson (1986: 110) afirma que lo que históricamente rodea a la cultura cívica son las formas populares, las expectativas del público, la distribución de la fuerza y la responsabilidad. Para la clasificación analítica de la cultura cívica, Hanson depende de estos cuatro elementos enunciados. Por otro lado, la divide en tres tipos: en primer lugar, explotadora y paternal, ya que la cultura cívica es la herencia de una élite con una hegemonía centralizada en un pequeño grupo; dentro de este tipo que domina la sociedad, tenemos

por ejemplo la política, los bancos o los medios de comunicación. Segundo: los consumidores y los servicios, aquí es donde mejor se manifiesta la heterogeneidad en términos de divisiones geográficas y demográficas de la sociedad y la pluralidad de los servicios que satisfacen sus necesidades, las filiaciones religiosas y el nivel de sus ingresos, sin olvidar, que los poderes económicos, culturales y políticos también promueven este pluralismo. Tercero: las instituciones comunitarias que destacan el bien común en su discurso popular. Este tercer tipo se nutre a través de la cooperación y el consenso y construye instituciones influyentes en las políticas y la sociedad hacia la realización del bien común, como las instituciones gubernamentales y de la sociedad civil. Estas expresiones a la luz de su dimensión cultural, constituyen la cultura común y la subcultura en su interpretación, las prácticas y la formación de los patrones de la cultura cívica en una sociedad concreta o cualquier otra.

En el mismo contexto, (Bronswijk, Doevendan, Vmeets y Verbeke, 2002:14) hacen hincapié en el espacio cívico o público como uno de los enfoques en la ciudad, ya que es una importante condición previa y fundamental para el desarrollo de la cultura cívica; al tiempo que se produce el desarrollo de la ciudad y la vida que en ella acontece, disminuye la solidaridad social, por lo que será necesario la creación de redes sociales y el establecimiento de instituciones y centros cívicos. En cuanto a otros aspectos que se mencionan, los autores citados afirman que el crecimiento y el desarrollo de la vida cívica constituye la referencia cultural que hace que la cultura de la ciudad controle las zonas rurales en términos de vinculación de la vida humana con la imagen, el paisaje y con la cultura y estilos de vida propios de la ciudad, con todo lo que implica el hecho de vivir dentro de ella. Por otra parte, Faricy y Hoyman (2007) estudian aquello que gira en torno a un tema principal que plantearía la siguiente cuestión: ¿Es el crecimiento de la ciudad el resultado de la clase social o es creado como consecuencia de la política de redes sociales? Ellos llegan a la conclusión de que la red de la política cultural de las universidades y la interacción con el sector de los académicos y los titulares universitarios, son los que allanan el camino para el crecimiento económico, ya que la apertura y la diversidad en la cultura local ayuda a encontrar oportunidades y opciones para el desarrollo económico.

En un discurso sobre el estado de la movilidad en las ciudades de América (Dagger, 1997:162) menciona que la siguiente cita expresa su estilo de vida, “Moverse es la norma”, que es considerado el corazón de la cultura americana, donde la confianza se desvanece debido al cambio de residencia en relación con el medio ambiente circundante, por lo que se pierden los vínculos sociales y la participación en las elecciones disminuye. A cambio, la ciudadanía crece fuera del vínculo con un lugar o personas; y este vínculo es dirigido hacia la patria (de origen). Este estado de movilidad desarrolla una propensión individualista e independiente.

Usando los dispositivos de análisis mencionados en la comprensión y el análisis de la sociedad palestina, es difícil para nosotros entender claramente a la sociedad palestina o aplicarlos a los grupos palestinos ya que estos instrumentos no sólo son diferentes en su estructura social y cultural, sino que también se diferencian en la realidad y la formación de la estructura y clase económica y la naturaleza de la élite política y social, que es totalmente diferente a la de la realidad palestina. Lo que distingue a los grupos palestinos es la falta de continuidad geográfica, por lo tanto, esto se traduce en una dificultad en el movimiento, los desplazamientos y el transporte entre las ciudades palestinas. Esto es el reflejo de la política israelí en el control de la circulación de los residentes palestinos. (Oficina Central Palestina de Estadísticas, junio de 2006). Como resultado de la débil estructura económica y el desplazamiento y la desintegración de la sociedad palestina a raíz de la guerra del 1948 y la inmigración de la burguesía inversora palestina a otros estados, es su crecimiento como capital extranjero en los estados vecinos como Jordania, Siria, Líbano, los estados del Golfo, que han tenido como consecuencia el retraso de la economía de mercado palestina. A ello hay que añadir el estado de dependencia de la economía israelí (Hilal, 2006A). A parte de estos movimientos nuevos grupos palestinos se establecieron en Cisjordania y la franja de Gaza, los que fueron llamados campos de refugiados, donde la mayoría de sus habitantes eran campesinos. Ellos emigraron de sus tierras y sus pueblos como resultado de la guerra y se establecieron cerca de las ciudades. En este contexto, es imposible que se produzcan ciudades estado, ya que no existe un Estado, en primer lugar, ni existen estados centrales como en el caso de Europa y América. El resultado de ello es la ausencia de una referencia cultural y cívica como una función principal para la ciudad ya que en el sentido histórico ninguna ciudad, con sus valores, estilo de vida moderno y cultural, se han formado en la sociedad palestina.

Sin embargo, las culturas locales de las ciudades palestinos sí se desarrollaron; pero fueron influenciados por contextos históricos, profesionales, políticos y sociales particulares, siempre de forma aislada entre ellas. Ello conllevó al surgimiento de un complicado entramado de disputas y conflictos entre lo local y lo nacional. Ahora bien, esto no limita para que exista una cultura común en la sociedad palestina que lleva en sus repliegues valores patriarcales y autoritarios en términos de edad, sexo, y de obediencia. (Al-Azar, 1996; Barakat, 2000; Miari, 2003). Es decir, que a cambio podemos encontrar los valores de la concesión, la pertenencia, la solidaridad social y la solución amistosa de los conflictos (Al-Azar, 1996).

Estas circunstancias produjeron algo contrario a lo que había pasado en Occidente, las ciudades palestinas se han caracterizado por la hegemonía de la cultura del ámbito rural sobre las ciudades palestinas de un modo u otro; existió una influencia de la élite política y social como reflejo de sus orígenes rurales, de los campesinos y los refugiados (Khadir, 2003). Esto de todas formas no es decisivo, ya que varía entre las unas ciudades palestinas y otras. También difiere la naturaleza de las actuales élites históricas que se

han desarrollado dentro de un contexto histórico y social diferente. Por ejemplo, el patrón cultural común en Nablus y Hebrón está controlado por la familia y la lealtad de afiliación. Las instituciones cívicas, e incluso los políticos se ven influidos por su estructura tradicional y conservadora. Ramallah y Belén, se distinguen por tener un patrón cultural relativamente abierto ya que la naturaleza de la élite política y social y la clase media son más cristalizada y reflejan, en general, el sabor cívico que está más cerca de la forma de vida civil. Esto no significa que la influencia de la familia esté ausente, pero la influencia es menor en favor de los partidos políticos primero y, en segundo lugar, de la sociedad civil.

En cuanto a las universidades, teniendo en cuenta que la ciudad las acoge, de acuerdo a nuestra comprensión sólo representan el espacio público para la deliberación de ideas y valores de una forma racional. Son un marco multilateral liberal en el que hay un estado de diálogo y de respeto hacia la opinión de los demás. Por ejemplo, la mayoría de los dirigentes y los políticos, culturales y civiles de élite en Belén son graduados de la Universidad de Belén (Salameh, 2006). La universidad desempeña un papel importante al proporcionar a los palestinos del ámbito rural dirigentes educados social y políticamente, sin embargo, el principal punto aquí, es que la estructura de las universidades palestinas es diferente en términos de personal académico y administrativo. En una comparación rápida de las universidades palestinas en la zona de Cisjordania, se observa que el personal académico en la Universidad de Birzeit en Ramala, está representado más por miembros pro izquierda o liberales. Mientras que la mayoría del personal académico en la Universidad de Belén está formado por miembros de corte liberal, incluidos los miembros más religiosos. En lo que respecta a Hebrón, éstos están más cerca de los conservadores o religiosos; vale la pena mencionar que la Universidad de Hebrón se estableció por primera vez sobre los cimientos de que iba a ser un instituto para el estudio de la sharia islámica.

En cuanto a la moderna clase media de las ciudades palestinas, podemos decir que crece en un relativo aislamiento y con una fuerte conciencia de su papel en la sociedad, ya que su discurso y sus prácticas desempeñan un papel importante a la hora de impulsar la rueda del progreso y la racionalización de la autoridad. A pesar del hecho de que los orígenes del movimiento nacional de los dirigentes pertenecían a la clase media (Khadir, 2003), el papel de esta clase ha disminuido tras el Acuerdo de Oslo en favor de los dirigentes y la élite de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina [ANP] en virtud de su establecimiento (Hilal, 2006). Este estudio concluye que existe un estado de confusión y caos en la identidad de la clase media, en su discurso y en su enfoque hacia la construcción de una sociedad política y civil, extendiéndose desde el secularismo y la democracia liberal, hasta una clase media con un enfoque religioso que se encuentra en algún lugar entre el extremismo y la flexibilidad; esta clase no tuvo conciencia de sí misma y de la importancia de su papel en la sociedad, con la excepción de la clase media

en la ciudad de Ramallah, ya que esta clase moderna es la más destacada y activa en el ciudad; ciudad, que por otra parte, es considerada como la más pequeña de las ciudades palestinas.

En resumen, podemos afirmar que para comprender la cultura cívica en la sociedad palestina, el acercamiento debe realizarse a través de la comprensión de sus componentes básicos, como son las organizaciones sociales civiles y los partidos políticos y sus culturas, pues éstas son las fuerzas fundamentales en la comprensión de la conciencia cívica y la acción política. Esta fuerza no puede ser practicada directamente en la esfera política, por lo que debe ser identificada dentro de la estructura social y cultural de la sociedad.

Segundo. La cultura cívica palestina: negación de la política en la práctica cultural

Las definiciones que establecen el concepto son muchas y muy diversas, existen más de 160 definiciones (Abed Al-Gani, 2006; Kosh, 2007) y todas ellas difieren entre sí. Wisteman (1967) considera que el enfoque sobre la cultura consiste en un aspecto cognitivo relacionado con el conocimiento del mundo materialista y social, las creencias, los valores relacionados con las actitudes, además de los códigos, los símbolos, las significaciones y los rituales en la dimensión cognitiva. Por otra parte, Lipset. S define la sociología de la cultura como “un estudio de los fenómenos y los sistemas políticos a la luz de la política social y cultural en la estructura de la sociedad” (Abrash, 1998:51).

Basándonos en lo anteriormente citado, no podemos concluir que la cultura cívica está solamente fundamentada en los fenómenos políticos de las ciencias políticas, pues estos fenómenos están estrechamente relacionados con la estructura y la cultura de la sociedad. Por ejemplo, el inicio y el surgimiento de la sociedad civil fue el resultado de la influencia de la fuerza social sobre la esfera política. No podemos estudiar un fenómeno social lejos de su dimensión social y cultural, y centrar la atención sólo en sus efectos políticos.

Para reafirmar lo anterior, damos un ejemplo cultural en relación a los derechos de la mujer americana en su nombramiento para las elecciones presidenciales. La ley liberal americana no impide su candidatura, pero existe una relación con la naturaleza de los valores culturales, las normas sociales, las expectativas de la sociedad, que finalmente impiden que una mujer alcance el nivel de la toma de decisiones políticas (Woshinsky, 1995: 9-16). Del mismo modo, los tres modelos (participante, súbdito y parroquial) de Almond y Verba (1963) coinciden con su propia estructura. Es decir, la cultura parroquial se asocia con una estructura tradicional no centralizada. La cultura del súbdito es la misma que la estructura autoritaria central. La cultura de los participantes, sin embargo, tiene que ver con una estructura democrática. Estas culturas están influenciadas por la

cultura común y no pueden ser comprendidas sin hacer referencia a sus fuentes originales.

La realidad cultural en el tercer mundo como dijo Abrash (1998:64), tiene su propia vida privada que sólo puede entenderse en referencia a su contexto social y cultural. El pluralismo de partidos en los países del tercer mundo, la violencia social y la autoridad política no pueden entenderse dentro del marco de las teorías de Ciencias Políticas en relación con esta cuestión, pero puede ser entendido en base a la estructura de la mentalidad árabe, ya que la relaciones de parentesco, las creencias religiosas y los sedimentos psicológicos y mentales de estas sociedades dan a todo ello un significado político específico. La tribu, la confesión y la religión tienen más presencia e impacto que la autoridad. El líder simbólico tiene una influencia que es igual a la influencia y el impacto de las instituciones y de la ley.

En el mismo sentido, Al-Azar (1996:48) añade que la cultura política “no es sólo un legado del pasado de cualquier pueblo, es una estructura geológica y con restos de varias clases y diferentes etapas históricas y eventos sociales”. La cultura política palestina es el resultado de una composición que se remonta al Imperio Otomano, su sistema político y sus reformas legales en su estado final; es una mezcla de las políticas y las leyes británicas, jordanas y egipcias. Se trata de una influencia directa de la ocupación y sus desafíos, como la identidad cultural y religiosa. Por ejemplo, esto mismo se puede ver en la cultura política en la India, la cual se remonta a las costumbres y tradiciones antes y durante la etapa de colonialismo y los impactos de Gandhi en la fase de resistencia del colonialismo, aquí no podemos entender la realidad sin profundizar en la estructura cultural e intelectual, pues sólo tendríamos una comprensión científicamente sesgada de la sociedad.

Haciendo un análisis y clasificación de los trabajos de investigación de los sociólogos y los estudiosos árabes en la composición cultural e intelectual y la composición del valor social y político, encontramos que la cultura árabe se caracteriza por ser paternal y centralizada. Es también gradual y se basa en la distinción y separación de acuerdo con la edad y el sexo. También está basada en una absoluta obediencia y lealtad a la tribu, al grupo y al vecindario, creándose un estado de egoísmo. En la misma línea, la sociedad también está dominada por un valor absoluto que está influenciado por la religión y que reclama el regreso al pasado y la reactivación del Califato. Además existe una dependencia del grupo, ya que es una cultura de racionalización y valores compulsivos. En cambio, posee los valores de la filantropía, la solidaridad, la benevolencia, la tolerancia, la ética, la cooperación, la tenacidad y la ayuda (Sharabi, 1992:59-66; Barakat, 2000: 641-642; Al-Azar, 1996:45). De todo lo mencionado se desprende claramente que de una u otra manera, los valores democráticos están ausentes en la sociedad árabe.

La realidad palestina difiere ligeramente de lo anteriormente mencionado. Eso no significa que exista un aislamiento intelectual y cultural del mundo árabe, sin embargo la práctica social y política que experimenta le da su carácter distintivo. La sociedad palestina se distingue por su pluralismo (religioso, político y social), sin tener una plataforma democrática y laica. En el plano religioso, Palestina es considerada la tierra de las tres religiones monoteístas, algo que enriquece la experiencia y la existencia histórica de ese lugar debido a la existencia de una plataforma basada en el respeto y la tolerancia de los demás, lejos sólo del judaísmo de identidad sionista (Tamari, 2005); políticamente refleja la experiencia de la organización para la liberación palestina [OLP] que optó por el pluralismo partidario de las facciones de resistencia. Sin embargo, la diferencia de opiniones no se realizó democráticamente; teniendo esto en cuenta, se puede entender el estado de lucha interna entre el movimiento de Hamas y el de Fatah por llevar el antiguo control de la Franja de Gaza. A esto podemos añadir que socialmente todavía hay una carencia del enfoque de género, a pesar de los cambios que han tenido lugar sobre la posición de la mujer palestina como consecuencia de la voluntad de un gran sector de ellas por recibir educación universitaria, pero esto no resulta suficiente.

Debido a los enfrentamientos diarios con la ocupación israelí, ha emergido una tendencia general en la sociedad palestina que está siendo apoyada por la población en general, tanto de izquierdas, de derechas, como por las facciones y líderes islámicos, y también por una parte de los intelectuales laicos; se reclama la celebración de la herencia cultural, el folclore, las costumbres y las tradiciones que constituyen una parte importante de la identidad del pueblo palestino. Esto se debe al hecho de que la ocupación está vinculada con una característica de desarraigo que amenaza la existencia del pueblo y su identidad cultural. En consecuencia, la sociedad se agarró rápidamente a las costumbres y tradiciones como expresión de defensa de su existencia. El Islam político representado por el movimiento Hamas, ha encontrado una salida a través de la cual puede influir en el total de los valores sociales y las costumbres, por considerarse como una referencia ética y religiosa en la sociedad.

Así pues, la religión islámica constituye una referencia en las cuestiones políticas y sociales, ya que está en el corazón de la trama social ejerciendo una fuerte influencia sobre el nivel de religiosidad popular, o a través de instituciones de la sociedad civil o de los partidos políticos representados por el partido más grande y de mayor influencia en la sociedad, el movimiento Hamas. A pesar del hecho de que el sistema básico palestino es un sistema de democracia laica, no se puede separar la religión de la política en las medidas jurídicas y sociales como las leyes y los tribunales, ya que resulta indiscutible decir que la religión en la sociedad palestina está vinculada con la realidad y la vida cotidiana.

En cuanto a la familia y su papel en la sociedad palestina, sigue representando una referencia fundamental en la toma de decisiones. Es uno de los más importantes aspectos

de las manifestaciones políticas, religiosas y sociales que animan y respaldan a sus miembros en momentos de necesidad o de apoyo. Si esto tiene que ver con el rango social, la familia contribuye a la producción de una clase media (Hilal, 2006). En cuanto al poder y la influencia, la familia apoya su candidato en las elecciones legislativas y locales. Socialmente constituye un escudo protector para sus miembros en caso de peligro o amenaza. Legalmente, la ley tribal representa una de las ramas principales de las leyes que llega a soluciones en conflictos sociales o incluso en la política.

Al-Azar (1996:67) considera que la ley tribal tiene sus propósitos y sus causas históricas, la ausencia del Estado y de legislación nacional durante un largo periodo de tiempo han contribuido a la mejora y extensión de la ley tribal en el terreno de lo judicial. Se consideró como una solución favorable a la luz de la situación de inconformidad con las autoridades públicas. Esta ley se aplica a todas las cuestiones civiles, éticas, penales, y en ocasiones, incluso a cuestiones políticas.

Por otro lado, la Autoridad Palestina no estableció ni unificó las culturas locales en la sociedad palestina, por ello cada ciudad por sí sola siguió políticas diferentes. Las instituciones de la autoridad judicial, legislativas y ejecutivas impregnaron el estilo de vida y la manera de pensar de las ciudades palestinas de acuerdo con lo que se adaptaba a su cultura y sus valores locales. La ley electoral palestina es el mejor ejemplo jurídico que no hace hincapié en la creación de una ciudadanía basada en la pertenencia patriótica, sino en lugares residenciales y en la localización del ciudadano, pues se basa en el lugar de residencia, por lo que cualquier persona que cambie su domicilio no podrá votar en la nueva ciudad de residencia, aunque se hubiese trasladado a ella más de diez años atrás.

Sin embargo, el análisis anterior no significa que no exista una estructura cultural con indicadores democráticos, seculares y racionales en la sociedad palestina, ya que hay una propensión secular pluralista democrática y laica que se ha expresado en numerosas ocasiones y en los medios al nivel de la élite o del público.

Tercero. La sociedad civil y la cultura cívica: la ambigüedad de la definición y la confusión en la aplicación

El concepto de cultura cívica en esta investigación trata de beneficiarse de los estudios e investigaciones previas que abordan el concepto en un intento de medirlo. Se trata sobre todo de centrarse en la confianza recíproca entre los ciudadanos y el Estado, los derechos sociales y económicos, la organización de las relaciones sociales entre los ciudadanos dentro de un marco legal donde los derechos de todos son asegurados, la participación y la interacción en el contexto social, político y de las actividades económicas, así como las actitudes políticas de las personas. Todos estos aspectos constituyen un componente básico de la cultura, ya que no solo son la referencia para el pensamiento, el

comportamiento, el estilo de vida en general y generan lo que la gente quiere, sino también, forman y estimulan el proceso político (Street, 1994:96).

La noción básica del concepto de confianza mutua y los derechos civiles, económicos y políticos la encontramos en los trabajos pioneros de los postulantes del contrato social o en la esencia de la literatura de la sociedad civil entendida por Hobbes: la sociedad políticamente organizada a través de un estado que se basa en la noción de la contractualidad. En cuanto a John Locke, significa la existencia de una sociedad organizada políticamente en un país que instituye, legaliza e interpreta la ley natural. En cuanto a Jean Jacques Rousseau, la sociedad es la soberana y esta es capaz de la formación de la voluntad general. Por otro lado, Hegel hace una división teórica entre la familia y el estado, la sociedad civil está en el centro y al mismo tiempo separada entre ellos. Tocqueville en su libro en (1835) destaca el papel activo de las organizaciones civiles en el marco del Estado en su sentido estricto. En cuanto a la teoría marxista, la sociedad civil es sólo una sociedad burguesa que se sitúa a mitad de camino entre el mercado y la estructura superior de la sociedad, considerando esto, induce al debilitamiento de las características de los conflictos de clase (Dagger, 1997; Deakin, 2001)

Hay tres dimensiones en la cultura política para entender la relación entre la cultura y el sistema político. En primer lugar en el análisis del funcionalismo, la cultura política atribuye conformidad y valor a la hora de determinar el papel que explica el comportamiento político, lo que Durkheim considera la cultura (valores y normas), son el hecho social que conectan la sociedad; siguiendo el mismo paradigma, Almond y Verba (1963,1989) exploran las precondiciones culturales en un gobierno estable y eficaz, según su trabajo, se supone que toda cultura llevaría camino a la cultura cívica en estas precondiciones. La segunda dimensión: el marxismo tradicional, no se centró directamente en la cultura política, pues esta era estudiada como parte de la superestructura de la sociedad, la cultura (normas y valores) como un reflejo de la relación económica. La tercera dimensión, representada por Gramsci, consideraba que la cultura no es neutral ni inmediatamente determinada por la economía o la clase social, pero es una respuesta a la “relación actual de fuerza” como fin de la hegemonía en la sociedad (Gibbins, 1990:4-5).

De lo anterior, vemos que hay diferencias esenciales en el contenido de la comprensión de la sociedad civil - como núcleo de las virtudes cívicas- y cultura cívica. Como conceptos, han sido desarrollados en diferentes contextos históricos, comprobados en el mundo occidental durante más de cuatro siglos. Lo que realmente nos preocupa aquí no es la introducción de definiciones teóricas y sus interpretaciones, pues ya vemos que existen diferentes nociones para entender la dimensión del concepto. Debido a su estrecha asociación en la actualidad, con la teoría democrática liberal (Kassis, 1999) lo que nos interesa es llegar a neutralizar estos conceptos. En la actualidad, existe un

vínculo entre la democracia y la sociedad civil y cultura cívica en términos de refuerzo de la naturaleza no violenta de la vida política, social y cultural. La comprensión de la cultura cívica y su cumplimiento no se realiza solamente en base a un sentido cívico fuera de los ámbitos político y social, hay que ser testigo de las condiciones económicas de la sociedad, la naturaleza y la calidad de las élites políticas y sociales en una sociedad dada.

Cuando tratamos la sociedad civil fuera de estas definiciones, entonces entendemos la función que viene a medio camino entre los individuos y el Estado. La Interacción con las instituciones de la sociedad civil se realiza desde el aspecto funcional como una expresión de los intereses y las aspiraciones de las categorías sociales y los grupos pertenecientes a los mismos. El contexto general en el que nos situamos es el espacio de las actividades sociales y la participación, el voluntariado, la difusión de la cultura, de los derechos civiles y sus valores, así como de la democracia y los derechos humanos, la lucha contra la corrupción y la defensa de los sectores más oprimidos. También nos interesa su capacidad de promover y proteger el interés público. Mediante el perfeccionamiento de la civilidad y el bien público (Dagger, 1997:199; Kassis, 1999), expresan lo que es ciudadano en términos de pensamiento y comportamiento. Norton (1993:214) afirma que la sociedad civil expresa varias virtudes cívicas, ya que es un estado de civilidad, sin la cual la sociedad estaría integrada en una lucha entre los grupos, lleva en sus pliegues el valor de la disposición de las personas que ocupan diferentes posiciones políticas y sociales, a expresar sus puntos de vista sobre una cultura cívica que está vinculado con el grado de desarrollo de la sociedad.

El voluntariado como valor y práctica, por ejemplo, es una pura actividad social y no de carácter político, ya que la responsabilidad de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil es para implantar y mejorar este valor debido a su importancia en la vinculación de la vida personal del individuo con la vida pública. Se les enseña a trabajar juntos por el bien público (Dagger, 1997:200), esto se entrelaza de alguna forma con el estudio de Putnam (1993), en el cual se centró en la comprensión de la cultura política a través de su debate sobre el capital social, la sociedad civil y cultura cívica. Esta integración entre estas áreas fue llamada “Civicness”; hace hincapié en el plano psicológico y los aspectos normativos que preparan a la población para ser productores económica y socialmente cooperantes, y políticamente democráticos. Por lo tanto, es posible que haya una cultura cívica basada en una sociedad civil próspera.

Para comprender la cultura cívica en la sociedad palestina, era necesario abordar por un lado, la relación que vincula a la cultura cívica con la sociedad civil y la democracia y por otro lado, hay que tener en cuenta que esta relación constituye un caso único en la historia de la mundo árabe, pues la aparición y la labor de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil existente antes de la creación y la formación del gobierno (Abu Amro, 1995; Al-Azar, 1996; Abrash, 2006). Esto no significa que se hayan establecido fuera del contexto de la política palestina, pero eran una ampliación de las facciones de la

OLP; este estado de anexión estructural provocó una crisis institucional en la labor y el desempeño de estas instituciones, que de una u otra forma fueron influenciados por las fallas de la institucionalización en el estado de la OLP y su discurso ha imitado un poco la visión de democracia de las facciones políticas (Al-Azar, 1996).

Históricamente, se entiende que la sociedad civil y las organizaciones no gubernamentales han constituido la columna vertebral de la sociedad; han desempeñado un importante papel de apoyo en el ámbito agrícola, social, académico, cultural y económico. Siempre han significado lo que se llama la economía de la resistencia, la concienciación civil, social y política, además del desarrollo del espíritu de voluntariado y trabajo social (Salim, 1999).

Tras los Acuerdos de Oslo (1993) y el establecimiento de una semi-entidad política, hubo un estado de fricciones y enfrentamientos en ciertas ocasiones entre la recién creada Autoridad y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, lo que Barghouthi (1994), predijo como el futuro de la relación entre la Autoridad y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, en base a esto, enunció ciertos riesgos en cinco puntos: En primer lugar, el peligro de coacción por parte de la autoridad. Segundo: la centralización excesiva en términos de creación de sindicatos de trabajo bajo la supervisión de la Autoridad. Tercero: la marginación y el monopolio de los recursos por parte de la Autoridad a fin de fortalecer la misma. Cuarto: hacer fracasar; las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se verían influenciadas por la política de financiación externa. Por último: Su fracaso en términos de su incapacidad para prever los desafíos de esta etapa, ya que seguía manteniéndose la ocupación y se encontraban en una fase de construcción democrática nacional.

El estado de debilidad de la Autoridad Nacional como entidad y la inestabilidad de las condiciones políticas representadas durante el desarrollo de la Segunda Intifada de Al Aqsa (2000), han contribuido de una u otra manera a las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, ofreciéndoles independencia por un lado, y por el otro, ayudándoles a evitar toda rivalidad que las destruyese.

Frente a las instituciones civiles, se crearon sociedades de beneficencia y de socorro, dominadas por una centralidad de la familia en su interacción con las necesidades de la sociedad. Encontramos que en la sociedad palestina históricamente existieron sociedades de beneficencia basadas en la familia, cuyo tamaño e impacto sobre la sociedad difieren de una zona a otra. Por ejemplo, en Hebrón, la propagación y el campo de influencia de las instituciones (*Dawawin*), resulta ser igual de fuerte e influyentes que las instituciones de la sociedad civil o incluso que los partidos políticos y la Autoridad.

Cuarto: Partidos Políticos Palestinos, Cultura Cívica: Contexto Democrático y Caos en la Práctica

Bro (1998:355) define a los partidos políticos como “organizaciones políticas relativamente estables, que movilizan su base con el fin de participar directamente en el ejercicio de la autoridad política en el ámbito nacional o local.” Los partidos políticos son un grupo de personas: líderes, activistas, el promedio de miembros que interactúan juntos sobre la base de una visión conjunta, pero cuyos participantes pueden diferir entre sí. Dentro de los cuales, los líderes suelen alcanzar más fama que otros y lograr privilegios administrativos o financieros (p.361).

Uslaner y Conley (2003) indican que los partidos políticos se desarrollaron en relación a la democracia y no pueden sobrevivir sin ella, a su vez, los partidos influyen en la forma de la democracia y la estabilidad del sistema. Son considerados la base del vínculo entre el desarrollo político y el público. Johnston (2005) subraya que la democracia requiere ser fuerte, estable y capaz de representar a los ciudadanos. Además, debe ser capaz de proporcionar oportunidades, de modo que esté cualificada para ofrecer bienes públicos. Para que esto suceda, los partidos aspiran a imponerse a sí mismos como los representantes de los habitantes, del proyecto de la sociedad o de los temas más importantes. Persuaden a los miembros de su plataforma y entran en competencia con otros partidos políticos, incluso llegan a enfrentamientos con los sindicatos o las instituciones religiosas (Bro, 1998:355).

El partido representa la participación y crea las condiciones para activar la función de los participantes y de sus miembros: aspira a desarrollar y mejorar el espíritu del voluntariado, ya que ser miembro de un partido, requiere del trabajo voluntario (Uslaner y Conley, 2003; Johnston, 2005:4). En el sistema democrático, los aspectos del trabajo sobre la movilización a favor de los candidatos para las elecciones locales o en el nivel del estado, son cuidadosamente seleccionados.

Cabe mencionar que los grandes y poderosos partidos políticos no son juzgados por las virtudes cívicas, sino sólo por su éxito en las elecciones. Johnston (2005:5-7) señala que los partidos políticos mantienen la estabilidad y el desarrollo de la democracia a través de: la competencia entre partidos, la organización dentro de sus instituciones, los clubes y las instituciones de beneficencia que influyen en la movilización de personas y las instituciones para las elecciones, y por último, la rendición de cuentas de sus actividades.

Lo que nos preocupa aquí es el hecho de que los partidos políticos desempeñan un papel importante en la cristalización de una cultura política y esto podría ocurrir tanto en un sistema democrático como en un sistema autoritario. Desde un aspecto funcional, las partes se encuentran en su lucha por representar a la sociedad, por el trabajo para la

formación de la voluntad general y la opinión pública a través de sus plataformas y visiones hacia los temas de interés público. Bro (1998) considera que los valores y posiciones particulares de un partido político influyen en cierta medida en el patrón de vida de sus miembros, ya que la ideología adoptada por ellos difiere según sean miembros de un partido u otro.

En Palestina, las interacciones sociales o las cuestiones de política interna no constituyen la razón principal para la formación de los partidos políticos. En cambio, es la ocupación la que representa el terreno común para la creación de estos partidos y facciones. Aunque las partes palestinas están diversificadas en relación con el pensamiento y la ideología, el movimiento Fatah no adopta ninguna ideología y sigue en su vida política el pragmatismo como un eslogan que se ejecuta en su política y sus posiciones sociales. Por otra parte, el movimiento Hamas adopta la religión islámica en su plataforma, y la naturaleza de la sociedad religiosa que lucha por la construcción. En cuanto a los partidos de izquierda (Frente Popular, Frente Democrático, Partido del Pueblo) adoptan la ideología marxista leninista o maoísta. Por último, las partes que se han formado recientemente tras los Acuerdos de Oslo, (Mubadara, FIDA, Tercera Vía), constituyen meramente una parte más del espectro de facciones políticas que podemos encontrar en Palestina, pero sin tener entre sus objetivos una fuerte resistencia contra la ocupación ni en sus programas sociales.

Este pluralismo intelectual y político conforma las bases fundamentales en la cultura cívica palestina. Además, los partidos palestinos han contribuido a la estructuración de las posiciones políticas y actitudes de sus miembros en armonía con la actitud ideológica aprobada por el partido o facción. Esto se lleva a cabo a través de la pertenencia a las partes o por medio del voluntariado en las instituciones de la sociedad civil pertenecientes a estos partidos. Constituyen un aspecto significativo a la hora de comprender la política pluralista de la sociedad palestina. Se ha llegado a un punto en el que la sociedad palestina está enorgullecida de esta pluralidad, ya que esta representa un avanzado estado democrático. Esto es cierto por un lado, pero por otro lado, Al-Azar (1996:51) indica que el pluralismo no es una condición previa para la democracia, sino que, es la cultura democrática la condición previa para el pluralismo. Así mismo, la condición necesaria para la democracia es la existencia de un Estado central resultando imposible en su ausencia. Ahora bien, por supuesto el pluralismo político en la sociedad palestina continuará, pues este principio ha sido aceptado por los partidos políticos.

Estamos de acuerdo con Al-Azar, sin embargo, a vista de lo que ha sucedido en la lucha interna entre Fatah y Hamás, se muestra como una prueba de que en Palestina existe todavía un pluralismo que manifiesta una cierta fragilidad y falta de democracia, no sólo en los mecanismos de las elecciones, sino también como reflejo del contenido de las luchas que se daban a nivel de la calle. Lo que ha ocurrido requiere de una lectura cultural y científica de la cultura política en la estructura de los partidos palestinos, el

cambio no solo ha de llegar a los representantes políticos, sino que, y principalmente, a las personas y al público en general.

Hemos mencionado anteriormente que en la ciudad y en la dirección de la cultura cívica, el legado del ámbito rural eminentemente patriarcal, resulta hegemónico para la formación de una cultura de la ciudad. Queremos usar esta declaración para aclarar la composición y la labor de las facciones políticas, especialmente de los liderazgos más influyentes. Será utilizado para aplicarlo a la formación de los partidos políticos y de la OLP en particular. Para nosotros, la cultura rural reflejaría, en el sentido sociológico, el grado más alto de una pirámide que representase la jerarquía en la toma de decisiones, en este sentido, la cultura rural representa la dimensión paterna en las relaciones de esta pirámide. Este ranking de la posición social, refleja la gran importancia de la gestión de las relaciones internas dentro de una familia o en su relación con otras familias. La incorporación a la familia se logra en función del respeto y la subordinación a los superiores.

Creemos que la hegemonía de la cultura rural no llegó directamente a la ciudad en el sentido de un espacio público, sino en la dimensión de la élite, los partidos e instituciones que se manifestaron como fuerzas eficaces e influyentes sobre la sociedad palestina. Sabemos que todos los partidos políticos palestinos, tanto los de izquierda como los de derecha, habían sido influenciados por un modelo basado en la centralidad del partido, especialmente el modelo de partido centralista de la antigua Unión Soviética. Esta estructura coincide con la cultura rural en la estructuración de la ciudad palestina, de hecho, trabajó por la “domesticación” de otras culturas que no armonizar con ella. Si nos fijamos en la estructura interna que controla y regula las posiciones y decisiones del partido, podemos observar que se encuentra más cerca de un patrón que no armoniza con la cultura democrática. Los partidos no se transformaron totalmente en instituciones en el sentido sociológico, sino que su acción giraba en torno a un líder o jefe. En este contexto, el intelectual orgánico de los miembros, en el sentido de Gramsci, estuvo ausente en la lucha de liberación nacional, las decisiones de las filas de la parte superior del partido vinculaban directamente a los grados inferiores, el arma de fuego en varias ocasiones fue la brújula de la liberación nacional y no el pensamiento y la cultura democrática progresiva. Esto condujo a la propagación de un estado de caos y al pluralismo que algunos entienden como un estado de democracia.

En cuanto a la OLP, ya que es la única forma a través de la cual podemos entender el futuro estado, es el hogar de los palestinos dondequiera que él / ella esté. Se formuló como un imaginario social que expresaba el estado de pérdida de la tierra de origen y el estado de ensueño tanto en el exilio como en el hogar. Es la portadora fundamental de las facciones de acción nacional y el único representante legítimo del pueblo palestino como algunos prefieren llamar. En definitiva, La OLP se manifiesta como la cultura política común de la mayor parte de las culturas políticas, su experiencia se refleja en la

impotencia de la cultura en la práctica de la política y el funcionamiento de las diferencias internas. Los escaños fueron distribuidos en base a la reconciliación y las cuotas de representación según el tamaño de las facciones. La cultura de cuotas se ha transformado en una máscara comercial que no tiene nada que ver con la cultura intelectual o la política, el concepto de lealtad se ha impuesto en la miseria de la política, en base a esto, el partido afiliado recibe su parte de la distribuidora de cuotas que es movimiento Fatah. Si no hay obediencia, no habrá una cuota de la facción contraria. Esto fue traducido en un estado de divisiones dentro de las facciones o los estados de boicot y el rechazo a la Organización, debido a que su estructura era autoritaria, centralizada y no aceptaba una visión diferente de la que tenía.

En consecuencia, la cultura política palestina y la democracia palestina reflejan la crisis del cuerpo político representado por su cultura política, de acuerdo con esto, los partidos están sufriendo una crisis estructural por la ausencia de un estado de institucionalización.

Enfoque de investigación

El investigador utilizará en el presente de la investigación descriptiva y analítica los enfoques cuantitativos y cualitativos, ya que ambos de estos enfoques se consideran los más adecuados enfoques de investigación para estudiar la cultura cívica en la ciudad de Palestina: Una comparativa entre Hebrón y Belén, ambos enfoques son los más conveniente para cumplir los objetivos del estudio, ya que ambos trabajan en la descripción de hechos relativos a las posiciones tal como están o describir lo que ya existe y la recogida de datos y la información que más tarde sería clasificada, organizada y cuantitativa, sino que también debe interpretarse en consecuencia con el fin para llegar a una comprensión de la relación entre el fenómeno y sus diferentes factores conveniente utilizar herramientas de investigación.

Investigaciones de Población y Muestra

La investigación consistirá en la población de todos los ciudadanos en los distritos de Hebrón y Belén, para el año 2009/2010.

La investigación consistirá en la muestra (400) los ciudadanos en los distritos de Hebrón y Belén, con un intervalo de confianza del nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ de la población. A los efectos de la investigación, la muestra se elegirá en el modo aleatorio estratificado. Por otro lado, la investigación hará una entrevista 14 de la líder representante de (los partidos políticos, sociedad civil y religiosa)

Método y herramientas de recogida de datos

La presente investigación se utilizarán:

- Cuestionario: El enfoque global de la encuesta por muestreo, a través de cuestionario entregará sobre la población de investigación para examinar la orientación del ciudadano hacia la cultura cívica.
- Entrevista: con la Representante de la clase media (activa en organizaciones de la sociedad civil, dirigentes políticos ...). Para medir la cultura cívica de los palestinos de la Elite.
- Análisis de contenido de los documentos pertenecientes a partidos políticos y programáticos para distinguir orientación ideológica hacia el Estado y la Democracia.

El investigador va a desarrollar un cuestionario que constará de dos secciones principales: la primera sección constará de los datos generales acerca de la variable de estudio independiente con respecto a los ciudadanos como: sexo, edad, condición social, de cualificación educativa, la relación con la fuerza de trabajo, el nivel de la fe , partido de afiliación y organización cívica, lugar de residencia, ingresos, etc .. La segunda sección consiste en una escala para medir la cultura cívica en relación con los indicadores que se ha mencionado anteriormente.

Validez de los instrumentos de investigación

El investigador se comprobará la validez de la herramienta de estudio mediante la revisión a un grupo de árbitros especializados y de expertos que harán algunas observaciones sobre la herramienta. Basado en sus observaciones la versión definitiva de la herramienta de estudio se llevará a su forma, la validez de la herramienta será verificada por el cálculo de la matriz de correlación de los ítems con el total grado de utilización de la herramienta de correlación de Pearson y el análisis factorial con el fin de examinar su coherencia interna y que colectivamente medida la cultura cívica en Hebrón y Belén, a la luz del marco teórico en que la herramienta de estudio se basa en.

Fiabilidad de la herramienta de investigación

El investigador verificar la fiabilidad de la herramienta de estudio mediante el examen de la coherencia interna de la herramienta junto con sus diferentes dimensiones y el grado total mediante el cálculo a través de Alpha de Cronbach experimental muestra compuesta de 40 ciudadanos.

Análisis Estadístico

Tras la recogida de datos del estudio, el investigador revisará en preparación para la transformación en el equipo, sino que se asigne a determinados números de ellos, es decir la transformación de respuestas verbales en los números para llevar a cabo los procedimientos estadísticos para los datos que tendrá lugar a través de la obtención de números, porcentajes, medios y desviaciones estándar. Las hipótesis serán examinadas a nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ mediante las siguientes pruebas estadísticas: prueba una forma de análisis de varianza, Tukey, de Correlación de Pearson, regresión normalizado, Alpha de Cronbach, utilizando el paquete estadístico SPSS.

El espejo de la cultura de una ciudad en sus residentes:

Un estudio comparativo entre Hebrón y Belén

El estudio de la cultura de la ciudad se considera una forma de estudio reciente incluida en el área de la comprensión de la diversificación cultural dentro de una misma sociedad. Las interacciones humanas diarias reflejan ciertos patrones culturales que se convierten en parte integral de la vida de la gente y de su carácter. Aquellos interesados en los estudios palestinos modernos que versan sobre la sociedad palestina pueden ver la singularidad de las experiencias de las ciudades palestinas en los planos social y político. Su singularidad supone, en cierto modo, aislamiento. Esto ha llevado a la contribución de la experiencia histórica de las ciudades palestinas. La naturaleza de la élite social en ellas ha desempeñado un papel importante en la formación del carácter de la ciudad; algo que lo distingue del resto de otras ciudades palestinas. La imagen de las ciudades palestinas y la naturaleza de la cultura dominante en éstas es diferente, no sólo cuantitativamente sino también cualitativamente. Estas características dan lugar a un modelo que no coincide con los de otras ciudades palestinas. La cultura de la ciudad de Ramallah es diferente de la de Naplusa, y la cultura de Hebrón es diferente de la de Belén. Así lo indicaron Salim Tamari, en sus estudios sobre ciudades palestinas modernas antes de 1948 (2002, 2005), y Lisa Taraki en sus estudios sobre ciudades palestinas contemporáneas (2004; 2006; 2008). Ambos habían mostrado una nueva dimensión en la comprensión de la sociedad palestina sobre la base de un estado de singularidad impuesto por el contexto del desarrollo de la ciudad y el estado de la actividad social y económica en la misma.

Consideramos significativa una revisión de la historia social de la población estudiada (Belén y Hebrón) para la comprensión de los gustos de la sociedad y las actitudes cívicas de sus habitantes. La comparación entre las dos ciudades refleja un estado de disimilitud en el nivel de patrón cultural y de la intelectualidad social de la ciudad, los cuales se han formado en función de las interacciones de los ciudadanos y la forma en la que éstos contemplan su ciudad; algo que, más tarde, da lugar a un estado de aislamiento que conforma la identidad, el patrón y los comportamientos de los ciudadanos, y que los distingue de los demás habitantes de otras ciudades.

Este aspecto requiere una investigación sobre la naturaleza de la diferencia y la diversidad de la cultura cívica del sur de Cisjordania. La singularidad de cada una será revisada y resumida; en especial, las disimilitudes y diferencias en la naturaleza de la estructura cultural y la élite social en términos de su influencia y principios. Dado que carecemos de los datos necesarios acerca de los temas que tenemos por objetivo presentar, dependeremos de una serie de estadísticas seleccionadas a partir del Censo de 2007 (Oficina Central de Estadística Palestina, 2009A, B), junto con otros datos tomados de la Comisión Central Electoral Palestina y de distintos ayuntamientos en materia de

elecciones legislativas (2006) y municipales (2005). Por otra parte, los resultados generales de la investigación explican las diferencias en las estructuras sociales y económicas de las dos ciudades que llevan a sus habitantes a adoptar posiciones sociales y políticas que obedecen a su estructura social.

En la misma tierra pero con diferente estructura social

La experiencia de Hebrón se considera de alguna manera diferente ya que no estuvo expuesta a los cambios radicales y las características a los que la ciudad de Belén fue sometida a partir del impacto de las reformas otomanas en los años veinte que, de una u otra manera, allanaron el camino para el estado de la diversidad cultural y la actividad de los medios de comunicación en los años cuarenta del siglo pasado. También se prolongó como consecuencia de un estado de diversidad religiosa cristiana y musulmana que se unió a su experiencia común y a los incidentes de limpieza étnico de 1948, los cuales cambiaron la demografía de la población de la ciudad. Esto también guarda relación con la importancia local e internacional de la ciudad y el consenso implícito sobre la identidad cristiana de la misma. Estos elementos no están presentes en la experiencia histórica de la ciudad de Hebrón, que convirtió el centro de la ciudad en un estado que guarda más relación en la homogeneidad cultural con los pueblos de sus alrededores. Se puede decir que forman más una extensión de campo más que un modelo. Esta singularidad ha hecho posible que el estado de sostenibilidad cultural y social continúe y que esté representado por los patrones culturales adoptados por los habitantes o en el nivel de su élite social en el centro de la ciudad o en los pueblos de los alrededores, y que su influencia haya continuado ejerciéndose hasta el presente siglo.

El estado de movilidad cultural y social de la ciudad es relativamente estable en comparación al de Belén en el siglo XX. Ni siquiera la ola de refugiados en el año 1948 dio lugar a un estado de desafíos culturales en la ciudad de Hebrón ya que los refugiados palestinos se asentaron fuera del centro de la ciudad como en el caso de los campos de refugiados de Aroub y Fawwar; en consecuencia, la ciudad no ha conocido un estado de interacción cultural mutua entre sus campos y campamentos.

La importancia histórica de la ciudad de Hebrón tiene su raíz en sus aspectos económicos y comerciales en los siglos XVIII y XIX, ya que se consideraba un centro importante para las rutas internas y su localización era a su vez punto neurálgico para las concentraciones de los beduinos del sur. Por otra parte se la consideraba un centro agrícola. Sin embargo, la escasez de tierras para cultivar dentro de ella favoreció la inversión en ganadería. Ésta constituye hoy en Hebrón el (30%) de la cría de ganado total en la Cisjordania, lo cual explica la coexistencia de modelos económicos diferentes en un área social. La ciudad fue incapaz de lograr un modelo económico representado por

el predominio del crecimiento comercial, en el que destacaron las ciudades más que el campo, en lo que respecta a la separación entre los sectores agrícola y comercial (Taraki, 2006). Esto evitó la concentración de la élite empresarial y de terratenientes de la ciudad. En consecuencia, estos sectores, y la élite misma, no ejercían su influencia o poder sobre las actitudes que los habitantes de la ciudad podría adoptar y que los diferenciaría de los valores rurales. En cambio, Hebrón es diferente de Belén, debido al hecho de que los recaudadores de impuestos en el período otomano eran de las aldeas circundantes, mientras que los señores feudales en Belén no eran oriundos de la zona.

La característica fundamental que ha contribuido a la significación histórica de la ciudad de Hebrón sobre las áreas rurales circundantes es el hecho de que supervisaba los lugares sagrados que consistían en algunos santuarios y lugares místicos y la Mezquita de Abraham (Salameh y Da'na, 2006A). Esto explica por qué tantos místicos y pobres se sentían atraídos en ir hacia ella. También se incluye el proceso de división y distribución de las funciones relativas a la custodia y mantenimiento de la mezquita de Abraham entre las familias de Hebrón. La supervisión de los ingresos de los lugares sagrados constituyó una forma de ingresos para varias familias. Por el contrario, no se notó influencia alguna de la ciudad en las zonas rurales. En consecuencia, Hebrón no representó un centro urbano/ civil de referencia para el sur de Cisjordania. La identidad de la ciudad se formó y modeló sobre patrones conservadores y tradicionales, por lo que su reputación y custodia constituyó un sistema de comportamiento social y cultural para los habitantes de la ciudad que aún siguen bajo la influencia de éste.

En cuanto a sus zonas rurales, especialmente Dura, se consideraba que desempeñaban el papel del centro principal para la región del sur, donde los nobles practicaban sus poderes sociales y económicos (en los siglos XVIII y XIX), convirtiéndose en el señor feudal de los recaudadores de impuestos de los pueblos de los alrededores y el amo de la gente de la montaña de acuerdo con Tamari (2005). Esto quedaba representado a través de su monopolio e influencia en las normas de la familia, en la resolución de conflictos, en los enfrentamientos familiares, y en la partición de poderes y tierras. El dominio y el papel de estas familias y esta élite continuaron incluso durante la época del Mandato Británico y la Era Jordana hasta que surgió una élite paralela a partir de las familias de la ciudad de Hebrón, principalmente la familia Ja'bari representada por el jeque Mohammed Ja'bari y el poder e influencia de éste durante la época del Mandato Británico y el Gobierno Jordano.

Cabe señalar a este respecto que, tras el paso de más de un siglo y la categorización de la élite de las familias en Dura y Hebrón con respecto a su influencia en el nivel local y nacional, el camino estaba pavimentado para que tuvieran un capital económico, por lo tanto, tenían una influencia cultural, incluso al nivel de poseer un capital nacional. Este poder ha contribuido al apoyo y creación de una élite dentro de la misma familia que gracias a su poder económico y al capital social fue capaz de producir una élite social y

política altamente cualificada. Por ejemplo, Yasser Amro, Nabil Amro, Younis Amor, tienen influencias en el ámbito educativo y político a nivel nacional, mientras que las familias Ja'bari y Natsheh tienen mayor participación en el aparato administrativo, municipal y militar en la ciudad de Hebrón. Éstos unidos a la familia Qawasmi; el ya fallecido Fahd Qawasmi disfrutó de un capital nacional gracias a su relación con el Movimiento Fatah, lo que allanó el camino para que Sahar Qawasmi estuviera en la lista de Fatah en el plano nacional dentro del Consejo Legislativo en el año 2006. Hay que añadir también a Khalid Qawasmi, que es el actual ministro de Gobierno Local. Y habría que señalar a este respecto que la mayoría de los dirigentes de Fatah se concentran en las áreas rurales, mientras que los líderes de los movimientos islámicos ejercen su influencia tanto en las zonas rurales como en la ciudad.

Si ésta es la situación en Hebrón, difiere por tanto cualitativa y cuantitativamente de la de Belén. El régimen otomano había dado sucesivamente una formación económica y social en Palestina en la que el sector económico estaba mezclado con la tiranía política dentro de un marco de referencia cultural que pertenecía a la Edad Media. Belén compartió a su vez este legado cultural. Esto se reflejó principalmente en la política de “turquinización” que destituyó la lengua árabe de los departamentos oficiales y sustituyó ésta por la lengua turca. Asimismo situó representantes turcos en las principales oficinas públicas. Esto también se observó de forma clara en el sistema de impuestos aplicados los agricultores y en la ausencia de libertades políticas, la opresión política, y el encarcelamiento de los nacionalistas y los pan-arabistas. Todo ello continuó hasta la primera década del siglo XX con la publicación de la Ley de Libertades Limitadas (1908) y facilitó la existencia de un nuevo clima político, económico y social para la reactivación del movimiento palestino tanto a nivel nacional como cultural (Musallam, 2002). La ciudad fue testigo de un estado de prosperidad y riqueza gracias a los valores religiosos cristianos. Aquí radica la importancia del acceso a la ciudad a los mercados occidentales, unido a la presencia de visitantes, turistas y peregrinos y la interacción de éstos con los ciudadanos locales en un nivel mucho mayor que el de la ciudad de Hebrón, que sufre un estado de aislamiento. Esta accesibilidad y apertura han contribuido a marcar la experiencia social, cultural y administrativa de Belén; algo que le falta a la ciudad de Hebrón.

Un modelo de producción agrícola, basado en el modelo feudal de producción, dominó en la ciudad junto con la producción y el comercio de artesanía relacionada con el turismo religioso, que se comercializaba dentro de la ciudad o en el extranjero, en lugares como América Latina, la India, o Europa a comienzos del siglo XX. De este modo la ciudad de Belén y su extensión a Beit Jala y Beit Sahour representa la realidad de las zonas rurales pero con una cultura civil y urbana (Tamari, 2005:49), debido a la existencia y el papel de los misioneros y los conventos, que establecieron varias escuelas privadas, y el desarrollo de la educación. En consecuencia, la ciudad se distinguió por su

carácter cultural en las primeras etapas del siglo pasado hasta los últimos tiempos de la era británica. Esto tuvo una gran influencia en la vida de los habitantes de Belén en relación con su visión abierta de otro estilo de vida asociado a los valores de la ciudad. Y todo ello se reflejó en la naturaleza de los sistemas administrativos de la ciudad y en su patrón relativamente abierto de vida civilizada.

El sistema "*Mila*" y las concesiones extranjeras en la época otomana constituyeron una característica importante que enfluía sobre habitantes de la ciudad; las concesiones habían abierto nuevas oportunidades para expandir los horizontes de los cristianos palestinos en relación con los viajes al extranjero y la posibilidad de trabajar en el comercio internacional, lo que generaba grandes beneficios a través del establecimiento de concesiones comerciales con los europeos. Los cristianos fueron capaces de establecer una red de intercambio comercial en Europa y Latinoamérica gracias a su dominio de lenguas extranjeras y de los medios del comercio moderno, lo que llevaría a la aparición de un nuevo sector social y económico. Algunas de las familias cristianas que fueron famosas por el comercio en ese momento serían: Dabdoub, Ja'ara, Jaser, y Handal (Instituto Árabe para la Educación, 2001).

A pesar del hecho de que la presencia británica desfigurara y obstruyera el desarrollo y el crecimiento natural de las ciudades palestinas, en general, encontramos que la ciudad de Belén en gran medida prosperó debido a la concentración de un gran número de tropas situadas en ella; lo que supuso el renacer y la reactivación de varias profesiones. Por otra parte, los británicos se interesaron por la beatificación de la ciudad y la rehabilitación de una infraestructura que contribuyera a la apertura de mercados y a la construcción de hospitales y hoteles de la era británica (Bannoura, 1982:91; Instituto Árabe para la Educación, 2001:48).

La característica básica de la ciudad está marcada por dos aspectos. Primero, por el aspecto administrativo, y segundo, por el aspecto comercial. La mayoría de los puestos administrativos, jurídicos y puestos de servicio adjudicados durante el Mandato Británico, la administración de Jordania y la ocupación israelí, fueron concedidos a palestinos cristianos. El (40%) de los puestos administrativos de alto y medio nivel, tales como directivos, traductores o asesores, estuvieron limitados a palestinos cristianos (Instituto Árabe para la Educación, 2001:45). Por otra parte, los principales monumentos religiosos cristianos de la ciudad fueron destacados, lo que significó una reactivación de ciertas profesiones, ocupaciones y del comercio y el sector turístico.

A diferencia de la ciudad de Hebrón, la ciudad de Belén se caracteriza por la presencia, a principios del siglo XX, de personalidades de raigambre en el centro histórico de la ciudad, debido a la emigración hacia el exterior. Esta población que salía se concentraba fuera de los límites de la ciudad en lo que se llamó la zona rural oriental (*zona Ta'amra*), en la que se asentaron los beduinos. En lugar del modo tradicional de

formación de la ciudad en nueve barrios, se dio paralelamente una activación de un movimiento activo de nacionalistas y comunistas, principalmente en los años cuarenta del siglo XX: Issa Khoury, Basil Cáseda, Yohanna Khalil Dakarat (Musallam, 2002), eran residentes en los mismos barrios y vivieron la etapa de apoyo nacional y panarabista, lo que condujo a la subida de la izquierda, movimiento nacional panarabista en Belén (Musallam, 2008) en contraposición a los movimientos religiosos de Hebrón, que estaban asociados con las élites de Jerusalén.

En cuanto al estado de la actividad cultural, educativa y de los medios, nos damos cuenta de que Hebrón no fue testigo de dicha actividad en los años cuarenta del siglo pasado; época que Yunis Amro (1987) denomina como el período oscuro en la historia de las ciudades palestinas. Sin embargo, sí creemos que el sistema de Kuttabs (escuelas coránicas) y la educación religiosa ejercieron el control académico en la ciudad y en los pueblos vecinos. Las élites en Hebrón solían mandar más adelante a sus hijos a Al-Azhar en Egipto para que continuaran sus estudios superiores (Salameh y Da'na, 2006A:29). En los años cincuenta y sesenta, ninguno de los hebronitas locales ocupó una posición en la docencia. Los que ocuparon los puestos vinieron de fuera de la ciudad (Taraki, 2006:46). Esto confirma la importancia de la enseñanza en la creación de un nuevo clima y de condiciones civilizadas que históricamente faltaron en el sistema educativo en Hebrón. Además, el retraso de la ciudad en la creación de élites desde la clase media moderna reforzaría la estructura tradicional de la naturaleza de las élites sociales y políticas hasta nuestra época contemporánea. En cuanto a la primera universidad en la ciudad, la Universidad de Hebrón, decir que se estableció en (1971) como representación de un instituto donde se enseñara la Sharia islámica, lo que dio a la universidad un carácter religioso y tradicional e influyó en los poderes de los movimientos estudiantiles que adoptaron la ideología islámica hasta nuestros días.

En cambio, la ciudad de Belén fue testigo de una revolución en la información y en el movimiento cultural debido al establecimiento de imprentas, y revistas religiosas y culturales de circulación nacional. Asimismo, ayudó al crecimiento de los movimientos nacionales y panarabistas que solían aclamar en ese momento la unidad de la Gran Siria (Musallam, 2008) como culminación de la propagación de las escuelas latinas, católicas y armenias en el siglo XIX (Qdah, 2007). Esto influyó en gran medida en los patrones de vida y las formas de pensar de esta élite. Como consecuencia de ello se produjo un acercamiento hacia la civilización y la modernización y la adopción de consignas seculares y panarabistas que llevaron a la aparición de las élites nacionales cuyos orígenes estaban tanto en familias cristianas como musulmanas con dimensiones seculares y panarabistas.

La ciudad de Belén comenzó a establecer escuelas extranjeras y nacionales en una fase temprana de la historia, especialmente escuelas de educación primaria y secundaria. Para las etapas superiores, los estudiantes solían ir a Jerusalén o Beirut. Vale la pena

señalar que las oportunidades educativas eran mucho más accesibles para los cristianos que para los musulmanes de la ciudad y sus alrededores. Esto explica el crecimiento de una generación de cristianos nacionales bien formados. En cuanto a los musulmanes, con excepción de los ricos, fueron menos afortunados que los cristianos ya que el sistema académico de la época otomana dependía en gran medida del *Kuttab* (escuela coránica) que se distinguía por su sencillez.

El evento cultural más importante en la historia de la ciudad fue la creación de la Universidad de Belén en 1973, con la intención de ofrecer servicio a toda la sociedad palestina (musulmanes y cristianos), de todas las concentraciones geográficas (ciudad, pueblo, campo) y de cualquier género. El secreto de su excelencia es el espacio público que ofrece la universidad; el clima cultural se basa en dos reglas básicas:

Primera: El escenario de la universidad se considera principal punto de inflexión en la vida de los estudiantes. La universidad prepara el clima escolar y académico para el alumno, que vive su vida universitaria fuera de la interferencia de los padres, teniendo en cuenta la disponibilidad de una relativa independencia en las decisiones de los estudiantes dentro del campus. Además, aplica un excelente enfoque tanto en la enseñanza como en el aprendizaje. Existen varias universidades e instituciones palestinas que siguen su estilo docente y sus directrices pedagógicas. En lo que respecta a la Universidad de Belén, ésta se inclina más hacia una educación basada en el diálogo y en la enseñanza cooperativa colectiva a fin de proporcionar un terreno fértil para el intercambio de culturas y para reducir las diferencias, marcadas por la conciencia y la realización, entre las diversas regiones culturales que caracterizan a la sociedad palestina.

Segundo: La multiplicidad de los símbolos religiosos y culturales en el campus proporcionan un terreno fértil para presentarse a los demás teniendo en cuenta la ubicación geográfica (ciudad, pueblo o campo), la religión (cristiana y musulmana) y el género. Este espacio se crea con un deseo de adaptación y de acogida al otro; lo que significa que en la universidad existen formas de vida y creencias sociales que conviven juntas y se toleran unas a otras en un entorno social y académico.

Rafiq Khoury (2001) en su testimonio personal, hace hincapié en que la Universidad de Belén es un espacio para la cooperación cultural común que ayuda a acercar los puntos de vista musulmán y cristiano. Él acusa al sistema educativo, en las etapas de primaria y secundaria, de crear desorientación social, lo que impedirá cualquier intento de cohesión en la sociedad.

Todo lo comentado falta en la Universidad de Hebrón ya que su equipo académico está más cerca de un enfoque conservador y tradicional, mientras los equipos académicos restantes, incluida la administración de Belén, son mayoritariamente liberales en su

enfoque, sobre todo en las tendencias que se refieren a la forma de vida, las actitudes hacia las mujeres y el sistema político democrático.

Estos antecedentes académicos, el ambiente cultural y las fuerzas políticas de la ciudad, junto con sus actitudes, se consideran más cerca del modelo moderno civilizado, lo cual explica el control de los movimientos estudiantiles de izquierda en el pasado y los movimientos seculares en los órganos de gobierno estudiantil en la actualidad. Vale la pena señalar que un número significativo de los antiguos estudiantes participantes en estos movimientos juega un papel importante y de liderazgo en la actualidad, independientemente de su condición social o económica. Entre éstos podríamos citar a Issa Qaraqí, miembro del Consejo Legislativo, o a Mahmud Fanoun, miembro del Comité Central del Frente Popular. Partiendo de aquí podríamos afirmar que la Universidad de Belén contribuye positivamente a la creación y formulación de ciertas actitudes en sus graduados de la clase media, que concordarían con actitudes más modernas de las que propugna por su parte la Universidad de Hebrón.

Modelo de ciudad tolerante *versus* modelo tradicional

El lector atento e interesado en la historia social y política de las dos ciudades puede entender mejor la gran diferencia que existe entre los patrones de las dos ciudades; los distintos usos y costumbres de sus habitantes. Ello tiene causas e importancia sociales, entre ellas las políticas, que se acumularon desde la experiencia. La estructura social y sus formas están en el corazón de Hebrón. Su medio rural también la incluye en la consideración de que Hebrón es una de las ciudades que cuenta con una red de muy fuertes vínculos basados en la sangre y en las relaciones de parentela. Es por eso que su extensión se encuentra en su medio rural. En consecuencia, la familia constituye un centro y un peso de apoyo social y económico para sus miembros, es un valor indispensable. De acuerdo con el patrón en las relaciones de clan, se considera como un sistema social que determina el equilibrio de fuerzas externas en las familias o que podría ser una concesión a la desigualdad por razones de género o generación. Esto explica por qué se tiene en cuenta la referencia a la familia para los jeques de la Montaña de Hebrón en la región meridional de Cisjordania.

En cuanto al modelo de ciudad, Taraki (2006:44) indica los puntos de vista de uno de los viajeros occidentales en relación con la hostilidad, la agresividad y el fanatismo de Hebrón en el siglo XIX hacia los extranjeros, en comparación con otras ciudades. El viajero se refiere al hecho de que la ciudad fue marginada en términos de inversión estatal de la que sí fueron testigo otras ciudades costeras, ello unido a su escaso contacto con europeos y las mínimas posibilidades de acoger peregrinos, o de que alguna institución extranjera o cristiana viniera y se quedara en la ciudad. Estamos totalmente de acuerdo con el investigador en este sentido. Sin embargo, nos gustaría analizar esto de

una forma que mostrara las causas estructurales y políticas. Es cierto que la escasa posibilidad de tener cualquier institución cristiana, extranjera o palestina, asentada en la ciudad, le ha privado, en particular, de acoger la pluralidad en sus modos de vida. En consecuencia, una visión tolerante sobre el otro se ha ido acumulando como resultado de los contactos diarios y no sobre la base del modelo tradicional que está positivamente asociado con los extranjeros. Esto en sí mismo lo consideramos importante porque es lo que la ciudad de Hebrón había realmente experimentado a principios del siglo XX en términos de diversidad en las religiones. El cristianismo, el islam y el judaísmo han contribuido, de una manera u otra, a la creación de un estado de tolerancia entre las religiones, especialmente entre judaísmo e islam, unidos por las relaciones tradicionales con los barrios *muktars* (dirigentes de pueblo) y las religiones dentro de ellos. La ciudad fue testigo de un estado de coexistencia pacífica y comercial. En realidad, existen muchos casos que dan testimonio de habitantes de la ciudad y de familias ejemplares por su tolerancia y protección de los palestinos judíos (árabes judíos) antes del comienzo del proyecto sionista. Este punto fue subrayado por el escritor sionista Abishar (1970:43-44), así como en las novelas del escritor árabe judío Isaac Shami, que era un residente de Hebrón, y que recurrió a varios musulmanes de Hebrón para que sus familias, conservadoras y religiosas, le proporcionaran protección (Tamari, 2005:226-244).

Sin embargo, esta situación cesó a partir de 1929, implantándose un estado de boicot en la historia de la ciudad desde los sangrientos enfrentamientos y las luchas entre palestinos y judíos, que acabaron con la muerte de sesenta de éstos; acontecimiento que constituiría un nuevo punto de inflexión en las relaciones entre palestinos y judíos; lo cual contribuiría a la formación de una imagen radical de sus residentes palestinos junto con su reputación conservadora.

Para que podamos entender esto de una manera científica, no debemos dejarnos llevar por generalizaciones relacionadas sólo con la estructura social de Hebrón. Observamos que la tendencia radical en la ciudad de Hebrón se refiere al proyecto sionista de crecimiento en ese entonces y a sus consecuencias debido a la aprehensión de la sociedad palestina de que influyera en sus ciudades y pueblos. Esto condujo a violentas repercusiones y reacciones sobre todo en Jerusalén, Safd y Hebrón. Unido a esto, varios judíos árabes, especialmente en Hebrón, comenzaron a abrazar la identidad sionista. Sin embargo, ¿por qué se mantiene este estado en la actualidad? El estudio israelí titulado "Etnocracia y radicalismo religioso" (Yiftachel y Roded, 2008) hace hincapié en la relación entre la política de urbanización llevada a cabo por la ocupación colonial israelí, en las políticas de discriminación racial y en la explotación existente en las tres ciudades del profeta Abraham (Jerusalén, Neguev, y Hebrón). Además, parece que el objetivo es crear un discurso religioso sobre las ciudades santas del profeta Abraham ya que existe una relación con el crecimiento de los movimientos religiosos de los judíos en las tres ciudades citadas. Esto coincide con el auge de los movimientos palestinos de religión

islámica que son diferentes en su discurso radical, de conformidad con la ciudad y la política colonial adoptada en cada una de las tres ciudades donde Hebrón estaba al frente.

El carácter sagrado y el simbolismo del lugar tomado por los palestinos como un proyecto nacional se ve reforzado por un discurso religioso que afectó exclusivamente a Jerusalén y a Hebrón y que excluyó a otras ciudades palestinas con el fin de crear un contradiscurso frente al de los movimientos religiosos israelíes en relación a las dos ciudades, consideradas como representaciones de la identidad nacional y religiosa por ambas partes.

Esto explica históricamente la propagación de los movimientos islámicos (Hizb Tahrir - Partido de la Liberación- Los Hermanos Musulmanes, la Yihad Islámica o Movimiento Hamas) en Hebrón, no sólo recientemente, también en las elecciones del Consejo Legislativo de 2006, en el que Hamas consiguió ganar todas las sedes de las LC y muchos consejos locales, ya que la santidad, el simbolismo y la identidad de la ciudad, comenzó con el inicio del proyecto sionista de la ocupación de Palestina. Esto explica la difusión histórica de los movimientos religiosos de Hebrón, siendo el más famoso de ellos el Partido de Liberación Islámica, que se caracteriza por la posición fundamentalista antidemocrática, antiseular y antimodernizante, ya que considera democracia, secularismo y modernidad como instrumentos occidentales usados para infiltrarse culturalmente en el mundo islámico. Mientras, los primeros brotes de los movimientos políticos en Belén tuvieron una dimensión nacional y secular, que incluía elementos musulmanes y cristianos con su estructura; los cristianos jugaron un papel líder y pionero en la formación de estos movimientos.

Por otra parte, no hubo un discurso que expresara la lucha por la identidad de la ciudad de Belén; de hecho, hubo un consenso sobre la mundialidad de la ciudad a la luz de su importancia religiosa para los cristianos del mundo que sirviera como forma de establecer vínculos con los países occidentales. Los líderes políticos, laicos e islámicos, hicieron hincapié en la importancia de la historia de la ciudad ya que es la cuna y lugar de nacimiento de Jesucristo; en otras palabras, Belén es la "ciudad de paz"; este título constituye una perspectiva social de la imagen de la ciudad en las mentes y las prácticas de sus ciudadanos. Se expresa en el hecho de que la primera resistencia popular pacífica partió de Belén, especialmente de Beit Sahour, que fue famosa en la primera Intifada (1987) precisamente por su desobediencia civil (Shomali, 1991). Las iglesias locales con sus instituciones, las instituciones civiles y nacionales mostraron su gran apoyo a los objetivos de la resistencia pacífica. A pesar del hecho de que este movimiento no se experimentó en los primeros pasos de la segunda Intifada (2000), que se caracterizó por ser un movimiento militar, hemos visto el papel del movimiento de solidaridad internacional con el pueblo palestino y la forma en la que ha sido apoyado en varias ocasiones. Esto sucedió principalmente en el asedio a la iglesia de la Natividad y el asedio al Presidente Arafat en su complejo de Ramallah en Abril de 2002. Los

movimientos de activistas por la paz estaban en manos de un grupo de jóvenes en el Centro de Información Alternativa en Belén; luego reaparecieron de nuevo en 2004, principalmente en las manifestaciones pacíficas lideradas por palestinos y grupos activos internacionales en la zona de "Mi'sara Sharqia"; zona hoy en día en cooperación con el Centro de Acercamiento entre Pueblos en Beít Sahour. Esta experiencia y su cultura se considera parte de la herencia y el carácter de la ciudad de Belén. Las organizaciones sociales palestinas han allanado el camino para esta actividad durante un período de tres décadas de experiencia y actuación.

En cuanto al papel de la élite, vemos su realización en el "Proyecto Belén 2000"; uno de sus propósitos fue el de lograr la demolición de la antigua cárcel de la Plaza de la Natividad, utilizada por los británicos y las autoridades jordanas e israelíes; todo con la intención de eliminar un símbolo que se contradecía con la imagen de la ciudad. Esto explica el papel de la élite que trata de preservar la imagen de la ciudad tal y como ellos la imaginan. El centro que se construyó en el lugar de la antigua cárcel fue llamado "Centro de la Paz".

Vemos que estamos ante dos fotografías contradictorias. La historia política de Hebrón se basaba en una referencia fundamental, que era el conflicto sobre la identidad de la ciudad y su dimensión religiosa en un entorno tradicional y conservador a partir principalmente de las familias. Las familias de Hebrón siguen dominando la escena política y social con sus actividades, lo que condujo a un estado de radicalismo que ni cualitativa ni cuantitativamente podemos encontrar en Belén. De este modo contribuyó a dar forma a su ambiente político y social más como un trabajo administrativo e institucional dentro del marco de un discurso secular o un discurso liberal que se inclina por la dimensión nacional.

Los barrios de la ciudad y formación de la municipalidad: Variable e invariable

Barrios (Harat en árabe) es una palabra que se utiliza para describir una zona residencial de vecinos; representa una identidad social para aquellos que viven dentro de ellos en las ciudades palestinas. Es una tradición que está profundamente arraigada en la mentalidad basada en divisiones de la familia, según el caso de Hebrón, o de acuerdo a la división de denominación en Belén. El barrio se convirtió en un sistema de comportamiento y de normas para los ciudadanos de la ciudad y también en órgano para la toma de decisiones. El difunto Musallam Ayyoub apuntaba en su diarios que, "El Consejo Municipal de Belén está compuesto por miembros, o "Mukhtars", de estos nueve barrios después de que los sirios fueran agrupados en un barrio separado. Los miembros contribuían a gestionar los asuntos de la ciudad junto con los asuntos de sus propios barrios. La situación se mantuvo sin cambios hasta la emisión de la primera constitución

en 1876, tras las reformas estructurales del régimen otomano central. Según esta publicación, los gobiernos locales y los consejos municipales se formaron para llevar los asuntos de los estados y provincias de forma descentralizada. Por otra parte, los comités locales confesionales se formaron para estar a cargo de la secta (denominaciones) y controlar sus actividades diarias, la vida social y cultural (Musallam, 2002). Los barrios estuvieron representados por sus "Makhateers" en el consejo municipal hasta 1948. Tras la Nakbah, dos nuevos miembros fueron añadidos al consejo, uno para los refugiados y el otro para el Ta'amrah; la ley que rige a los miembros del municipio fue llamada "Status Quo", es decir, "sistema estable", lo que significa que el alcalde es un cristiano. Si el alcalde pertenece al Patriarcado Latino, el siguiente miembro electo deberá pertenecer a los ortodoxos griegos o viceversa.

Éste es el contexto en el que se aprobó la creación histórica del Consejo Municipal de Belén. La cuestión que ponemos sobre la mesa es: ¿Se produjo algún cambio esencial en la estructura del consejo?

Para responder a esta pregunta, vamos a centrarnos en las elecciones para los consejos municipales de 2005. Nos damos cuenta de que la ley básica no ha cambiado, con lo que el alcalde resultaba ser cristiano. Sin embargo, el número de los miembros del consejo subió a 15, sobre la base de que la cuota de cristianos era de 8 miembros, y la de musulmanes, 7 miembros. La representación de los cristianos es por tanto de un (51%). Las elecciones no se basaron en una competición entre vecindarios, sino que partía de la base de que existía una competición o enfrentamiento entre facciones políticas. También debía haber listas independientes. Los resultados de las elecciones eran importantes ya que existía una gran diversidad entre los miembros del consejo, por sus orígenes geográficos, políticos o religiosos. Además, existía una importante presencia de nombres que pertenecían a las familias que representaban a los barrios de la ciudad, por ejemplo, la familia Shokeh (musulmanes de Fatah antes y del Partido Popular ahora; el otro está afiliada a Hamas), la familia Hremi, que solía residir en el barrio de Fawaghra (musulmanes, Iniciativa Nacional), la familia Batarseh del barrio de Tarajmeh (cristianos, Frente Popular), la familia Bandak del barrio de Anatra (cristianos, Fatah), la familia Saadeh (cristianos, Frente Popular). Además, hubo figuras cuyos orígenes provenían de familias de Hebrón como los Natsheh y los Safi (musulmanes, Hamás) y los miembros de Ta'amreh (musulmanes, Yihad Islámica). También hay representación de los los refugiados de la zona de Jerusalén a cargo de los Saadeh (musulmanes, Hamas). Esto subraya el grado de integración de los refugiados palestinos en la ciudad y la medida en que la ciudad fue capaz de absorber a sus residentes refugiados que emigraron de sus aldeas en 1948 y 1967. Ellos formaron una nueva élite en la sociedad de Belén.

En una rápida mirada sobre las elecciones del consejo legislativo, nos damos cuenta de que se determinó el tamaño de la representación de la ciudad en cuatro miembros, siempre que dos fueran musulmanes y los otros dos miembros fueran cristianos, de

acuerdo a la Ley de Elecciones Palestinas a nivel de los distritos. A pesar del pequeño tamaño de la población cristiana, que no excede el (35%) del distrito, la cuota electoral los considera en igualdad de condiciones; el Movimiento Fatah consiguió lograr las dos plazas para la cuota cristiana mientras que el movimiento Hamas ganó los dos puestos para los contingentes musulmanes; uno de los elegidos para el puesto era originario de Ta'amra y recibió el mayor número de votos mientras que el otro era un refugiado del campamento de Aida. En el plano de la representación del distrito, en las listas de partido a nivel de los territorios palestinos, tres representantes ganaron por distrito del que provenían: campamento de Deheisha, campamento de Aida y ciudad de Beit Sahour (Comisión Electoral Central Palestina, 2010).

Podemos observar, por lo mencionado anteriormente, que la mayoría de los miembros del consejo local son de izquierda; en el Consejo Legislativo, la mitad de ellos pertenecían a la tendencia secular y dos a la tendencia islámica. En cuanto a los ganadores a nivel nacional, la mayoría eran de la tendencia secular frente a un representante islamista, lo que explica la formación variada, en general, de las actitudes de los residentes del distrito a través de la naturaleza de las figuras que eligió; en consecuencia, la naturaleza de la élite se inclinaba más hacia la cultura cívica con actitudes civilizadas y un discurso nacionalista secular. Esta cultura consiguió acomodar una tendencia a la diversificación y la disimilitud y logró gestionarla sobre la base de una unión a la tierra. Esto dio la oportunidad a estratos sociales de diferentes orígenes geográficos de jugar un papel influyente en la toma de decisiones con respecto a la realidad y el futuro de la ciudad. La presencia en el consejo municipal de miembros de Hebrón o de origen refugiado confirma el grado de integración de los distintos orígenes en la vida de la ciudad, mientras que el municipio de Hebrón carece de esta diversa composición en los miembros del consejo municipal.

También se observa que en la historia de la ciudad de Belén, a los tres campamentos de la ciudad se les dio un papel distintivo, nacional y cultural, a nivel de su participación activa en la lucha y la resistencia en los años ochenta del siglo pasado hasta el momento presente. Su rica experiencia fue capaz de presentar a una élite nacional y social que jugó su papel activo y su influencia tanto a nivel de distrito como a nivel nacional. Además, los líderes de partido izquierdista más prominentes y seculares se concentraron en él. La participación del campamento Deheisha en las actividades nacionales, sociales y políticas se considera como un caso de excelencia, ya que incluye movimientos políticos activos e instituciones sociales y culturales, cuyas actividades igualan a las de las ciudades de Belén y Beit Sahour. Además, la presencia de figuras prominentes de este campamento es clara en el plano político del distrito desde que Mohammad Taha es el Secretario General del movimiento Fatah y miembro de su Consejo General Revolucionario, quien vive en el campamento. Majid Faraj es Jefe de Inteligencia Pública en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza. Ismail Fararjah es Jefe de Inteligencia en la actualidad y anteriormente fue

vicegobernador. En lo que respecta al plano social, existe un comité de partido y personalidades nacionales que contribuyen a resolver los conflictos familiares y de organización. Ellos constituyen una alternativa a los jeques del clan, que son comunes en el distrito del campo este, o a la familia de “jeques” en el distrito de Hebrón.

Por lo tanto podemos concluir que los refugiados de la ciudad de Belén fueron capaces de integrarse históricamente en la ciudad, social, cultural y políticamente, por razones que se relacionan con la cercanía de su ubicación al corazón de la ciudad, donde decidieron establecerse, y por otras razones que se relacionan más con la hospitalidad y la cálida acogida que los habitantes de Belén ofrecieron a los refugiados. La integración de éstos, principalmente a nivel nacional, que ayudó a crear e introducir nuevas élites nacionales, influyó considerablemente en la vida de los habitantes de Belén. Todos estos factores contribuyeron a la formación de conceptos y valores derivados de la alabanza que los campos de refugiados hacían de los valores del centro de la ciudad, ya que éste último se considera un modelo civilizado.

En cuanto a la representación del distrito a nivel ministerial, se advierte que existe una tradición dentro de la formación del gabinete palestino en relación con el Ministro de Turismo y Arqueología; tradición que establece que él o ella debe ser cristiano y residente en Belén, ya que es la ciudad palestina más activa en turismo. Esta tradición se convirtió en un nuevo "status quo" con respecto a los gabinetes palestinos. Incluso cuando Hamas ganó las elecciones a los consejos legislativos en 2006, se aprobó esta medida y se nombró a Maher Abu Aita como Ministro de Turismo, cargo que fue ocupado anteriormente por Mitri Abu Aita, ambos provenientes de la misma familia en Beit Sahour. La actual Ministra de Turismo es Khlood Daibes; ella está en la lista de Salam Fayyad, de Tercera Vía.

Por su parte, la ciudad de Hebrón resulta ser todo lo contrario a Belén, no sólo en términos de estructura religiosa o política, en los que constituye una referencia, sino también sobre la base familiar. La estructura de los partidos políticos en Hebrón se construye sobre unos cimientos más familiares que en el caso de Belén, ya que el tamaño de las familias de Hebrón es mayor que el de las familias de Belén. Esta situación llevó al control de la imagen familiar en las posiciones administrativas, organizativas y militares en el centro del distrito. A pesar del hecho de que no hay elecciones a nivel del consejo municipal, las familias de Hebrón estaban representadas en dicho órgano por las autoridades en ese momento. La Autoridad Palestina ha nombrado recientemente a los alcaldes de Hebrón. Primero nombró a Mustafa Natsheh y actualmente ha nombrado Khalid Asilah, afiliado al movimiento Fatah, y de quien señalamos tomó parte en la lista nacional en las elecciones municipales de 1976. Él quedó segundo después de Qawasmí Fahd, quien ocupó el cargo entonces. Parece que la Autoridad tuvo que ver con el resultado de las elecciones de 1976, con un acuerdo de "status quo" en la cuestión de los nombramientos hasta que se hiciera viable celebrar elecciones en el futuro.

En cuanto a las elecciones del Consejo Legislativo, se decidió que el distrito estaría representado por nueve miembros. El Movimiento Hamas era fácilmente capaz de ganar los nueve puestos en ellas, con los siguientes representantes: Basim Zughayer, Qafisheh Hatem, Qadi Samir, Azzam Salhab, Tal Mohammad, Ragoub Nayef, Mutlaq Mohammad, Nizar Ramadán, y Aziz Dweik como el presidente del Consejo Legislativo; llama la atención que dos tercios de ellos son de la ciudad de Hebrón y el tercio restante es de Dura, Sourif, y éstos lugares son considerados segundos en términos de localización de los puntos más activos y colaboradores de Hamás. En cuanto a los representantes de Hebrón en el nivel de las listas de políticos, quien ganó fue Sahar Qawasmi, del Movimiento Fatah.

Simplemente con una ojeada podemos saber que no hay una élite influyente de origen refugiado en el distrito de Hebrón en las elecciones de 2006 o en el nivel de liderazgo de los partidos políticos para los pueblos en los que nos estamos centrando ahora. Sin embargo, en el pasado estaban representados por Mohammad Hourani, del campamento de Fawwar, en nombre de Fatah, lo que refleja de forma explícita el estado de aislamiento y la marginación que experimentan los campos de Hebrón no sólo en la últimas elecciones, sino también históricamente hablando. Las divisiones geográficas (ciudadanos, campesinos, refugiados) son más intensas y sorprendentes en Hebrón frente a Belén. Los refugiados fueron privados de su posibilidad de integración e influencia en la toma de decisiones. Esto explica algunas de las tendencias conservadoras en los campos de Hebrón en comparación con la apertura que muestran los campamentos de refugiados de la ciudad de Belén, que son testigos de una mayor presencia en el movimiento nacional de izquierda, frente a su contrapartida en la ciudad de Hebrón.

En una comparación rápida de la magnitud de la participación política en los distritos, encontramos que el porcentaje de participación de los ciudadanos en las elecciones presidenciales de 2005 en Hebrón fue de un (58%), mientras que el porcentaje alcanzado en Belén fue mucho más alto, un (74%). Creemos que esto fue debido bien al hecho de que el movimiento Hamas no participó en ellas, o bien por el boicot de las elecciones a cargo del Partido de Liberación Islámica. En cuanto a las elecciones a los Consejos Legislativos de 2006, el porcentaje de Belén fue ligeramente superior al de Hebrón: (74.3%) y (70.4%) respectivamente. Si el porcentaje de participación en los territorios palestinos fue del (77%) (Comisión Electoral Central de 2010), se observa que en Belén no hubo ningún tipo de boicot que debiera ser considerado de importancia por parte de los partidos islámicos. El porcentaje se mantuvo estable mientras que se incrementó en un 12% en la ciudad de Hebrón. El aspecto más notable en el nivel de los dos distritos es que el porcentaje de apoyo a la elección de los partidos de izquierda, como el Frente Popular y la Lista Badil, fue mucho mayor en Belén que en Hebrón.

Para resumir lo anterior, observamos que la naturaleza de la formación de los barrios tradicionales "*Harat*", ya sea sobre una base familiar o religiosa, aún existe. Los partidos

políticos han adoptado la actitud de que sus candidatos deben tener diferentes orígenes (pueblo, ciudad, campo, musulmán, cristiano) para cumplir con la diversidad de la sociedad. Esto se refleja en las listas de los candidatos de los partidos políticos, bien sean sobre la base de los consejos municipales o los consejos legislativos. Sin embargo, vemos una diferencia en términos de diversidad entre las dos ciudades en esos orígenes. Éstos son más evidentes en Belén que en Hebrón. La estructura y el funcionamiento de los partidos también son diferentes entre los dos distritos, incluso cuando pertenecen a una misma facción política. Además, tanto el papel como la influencia de las élites de origen refugiado están mayormente representados y son más influyentes en Belén; no sólo a nivel de distrito, sino también a nivel de los territorios palestinos.

Instituciones de Acción Cívica: entre la tradición y la modernidad

El trabajo y el rendimiento las instituciones civiles/cívicas se consideran como una imagen que refleja el contenido de la estructura social, cultural y política en la que se desarrollan, a través de la naturaleza de las actividades que llevan a cabo y que supervisan; en consecuencia, podemos medir en cierto modo el sentido cívico a través de ellas.

El fenómeno de la propagación de instituciones civiles en los territorios palestinos es considerado una de las características con que la sociedad palestina fue capaz de establecerse con anterioridad a la instauración del Estado Central. En consecuencia, la experiencia institucional en Palestina se asoció con la singularidad y la personalidad de sus instituciones civiles y con la experiencia histórica por la que atravesó. La naturaleza de las actividades fue diferente debido a la distinta visión, objetivos y naturaleza de sus funciones. Por lo tanto, encontramos instituciones de beneficencia, de asistencia, instituciones dedicadas a los jóvenes, a las mujeres, a la maternidad, a la investigación o a la agricultura.

La ciudad de Hebrón se caracteriza, además de lo expuesto con anterioridad, por las estructuras y las organizaciones del clan y la vida tribal, de tal manera que no es posible decir que este nuevo marco institucional se convirtiera en un rasgo destacado en el espacio de las relaciones sociales del centro de la ciudad y del campo.

La familia en Hebrón participa en diferentes actividades: en apoyo familiar o de solidaridad, en comités relacionados con el apoyo social y la seguridad sanitaria o en ayuda financiera a miembros de la familia. Este sistema de acción fue llamado Instituciones de parentesco "*Dawawin*", muy comunes en Hebrón, y que se distribuyen en función del número de las familias. Las figuras más notables y destacadas en una determinada familia participan en el establecimiento de su "*Diwan*" Este lugar constituye una referencia para la toma de decisiones relacionadas con el destino de la familia, es

también un lugar donde todos sus miembros se reúnen en las ocasiones de festividad o dolencia. También discuten allí los problemas internos de la familia o sus relaciones con otras familias en general. Esta forma de institución familiar no existe en Belén, ni siquiera en su zona rural oriental, famosa por las influyentes familias que allí se establecen.

La historia de la creación de organizaciones sociales civiles en Hebrón adoptó la forma tradicional en su modo de actuar; también se caracterizó por su práctica de la beneficencia y de ayuda de naturaleza religiosa, desde sus inicios en los años sesenta hasta el día de hoy. Están representadas por la Asociación de la Hermandad Musulmana, la Asociación de la Hermandad Musulmana de Mujeres Jóvenes y otras asociaciones más. Éste es un ejemplo de humilde organización en comparación con la situación en Belén. La historia de las organizaciones de trabajo se remonta como mínimo a los años cincuenta y sesenta del siglo pasado. Están representadas por la iglesia, asociaciones de beneficencia y asociaciones de mujeres; más tarde, en los años cincuenta, se establecieron asociaciones nacionales y seculares, como el Club Ortodoxo Árabe, la Unión de Mujeres Árabes y el Centro de Actividades Femeninas.

Parece que la historia, la experiencia y la atmósfera de esta experiencia tiene un gran impacto en la naturaleza y el trabajo de las instituciones en la actualidad. Si establecemos una comparación entre los dos distritos, hallamos que el porcentaje de asociaciones en el distrito de Belén, por persona, es de una institución por cada 1961 habitantes. Mientras que en el distrito de Hebrón nos encontramos con una institución por cada 5990 habitantes. En cuanto a la naturaleza de la labor de estas instituciones, observamos que el porcentaje de las instituciones tradicionales de caridad en Belén es del (24%) en relación al número total de instituciones, en comparación con el (36.9%) que hallamos en el distrito de Hebrón (Ministerio del Interior Palestino, 2009); las cifras, en relación a las instituciones que atienden a los jóvenes o se dedican a actividades como el teatro, la cultura, la salud y la ecología, son muy cercanas en ambos distritos, a pesar del hecho de que la población de Hebrón es cinco veces mayor que la de Belén.

En cuanto a la excelencia de algunas instituciones en la ciudad de Belén en términos de actividades y objetivos, nos encontramos con instituciones que trabajan en acercar las visiones musulmana y cristiana. Éstas están representadas por: Centro de Diálogo entre Civilizaciones, e instituciones que proclaman la resistencia pacífica como el Centro para el Acercamiento entre Pueblos. Hay instituciones que reclaman como solución la creación de un estado en Palestina y que estarían representadas por el Centro de Información Alternativa, que está formado por activistas políticos israelíes y palestinos. No encontramos ninguna institución con objetivos similares en el distrito de Hebrón, ya que el entorno social allí no puede producir o acoger dichos organismos. Además de todas las citadas existen también varias instituciones que operan en el ámbito de lo social, la investigación, el desarrollo agrícola y el desarrollo cultural en ambos distritos. Los

objetivos de estas instituciones son los de difundir los conceptos de democracia y de derechos humanos, junto con la ampliación de la actividad de la mujer. Lo que hace que Belén sea diferente, en contrapartida con Hebrón, es la naturaleza de sus equipos administrativos y de organización, ya que en Belén éstos poseen una experiencia profunda y de mayor calado, como parte de la historia de la ciudad; algo que aún falta en el equipo administrativo en Hebrón.

En cuanto a la representación de instituciones internacionales, Belén ha experimentado su presencia desde principios del siglo XX. La llegada de turistas, peregrinos y voluntarios extranjeros al lugar ha modificado la estructura y el funcionamiento de las instituciones que acogen sus proyectos o la naturaleza de los proyectos que son ofrecidos por los estados europeos; todo esto unido al movimiento de integración y interacción entre los residentes locales y los voluntarios extranjeros que vienen en solidaridad con el pueblo palestino. Esto refleja en sí mismo las diversas opciones en relación con los modos de vida y de pensamiento que pueden faltar en la realidad en la ciudad. Esta experiencia ha contribuido de una manera u otra a absorber la presencia y la disponibilidad del extranjero como una parte esencial de la realidad y la reputación de la ciudad. Junto a todo esto, citar también la presencia de los voluntarios internacionales que muestran su solidaridad con el pueblo palestino sobre todo al comienzo de la Primera Intifada popular y su intensificación en la Segunda Intifada.

La primera interacción de contacto cercano con organizaciones internacionales fue en el año 1997, con la misión internacional llamada "Presencia Internacional Temporal en Hebrón", resultado del acuerdo político entre las partes palestina e israelí sobre la ciudad de Hebrón. Los bandos implicados en la misión internacional insistieron en que parte de sus empleados fueran de origen árabe y poseyeran nacionalidades europeas, exigiendo la presencia del Movimiento Cristiano por la Paz en el corazón de la ciudad para documentar posibles casos de violación de los derechos de los palestinos.

Se nota que la experiencia de los residentes de Hebrón con las organizaciones internacionales es relativamente reciente en comparación con Belén y, en consecuencia, refleja el período de tiempo limitado del que dispusieron ellos para la comprensión del otro, del "extranjero", en una realidad social tradicional, junto con una política israelí de asedio que privó a la ciudad de poder vivir la apertura otras experiencias y patrones. La imagen de las instituciones extranjeras se observa con ojos que sospechan y dudan realmente sobre su presencia y su papel. El ejemplo más evidente de esta situación fue el estado de alerta popular que tuvo lugar en la ciudad de Hebrón el 14 de Marzo de 2006 tras la detención de palestinos a manos de soldados israelíes en la prisión de Jericó. Se suponía que debían estar bajo protección británica y estadounidense. Estos incidentes irritaron tanto a los residentes de Hebrón, que llegaron a exigir la expulsión de la ciudad de todos los extranjeros, especialmente estadounidenses e ingleses. Esto hizo que las

fuerzas (TIPH) aplicaran y pusieran en práctica un proyecto integral para aclarar el papel y la importancia de su función en el desarrollo de la ciudad.

Por otro lado, Belén constituía un centro turístico importante para los extranjeros que trabajaban en la ciudad de Hebrón debido a las diferentes ofertas que les proporcionaba ésta ciudad (restaurantes, bares y una vida relativamente liberal). En consecuencia, esta población venía a Belén en busca de alojamiento y entretenimiento en los fines de semana. Además, las organizaciones que supervisaban los campamentos internacionales de jóvenes desempeñaban sus funciones en Belén y no en Hebrón.

La mujer y el espacio público

Taraki (2006:42) considera el género como una de las características del lugar, ya que el papel, el estatus, los gustos, la moda y las actividades de la mujer tienen su importancia en relación con la naturaleza de la estructura social que la rodea, pues refleja, en general, el temperamento, la propensión y las actitudes de los habitantes de la ciudad. El investigadora destaca que Hebrón no presentó una élite femenina en el último siglo en comparación con las ciudades de Ramallah o Naplus. Esta conclusión es correcta. Como se mencionó anteriormente, la estructura de la organización en Hebrón está más cerca del sistema patriarcal, en el cual hay espacios reducidos para las mujeres, su libertad, sus derechos y su papel. La actividad de las mujeres en el distrito de Hebrón se limitaba históricamente a actividades de caridad. Su acción no tuvo un papel pionero o destacado en lo que respecta a un movimiento de mujeres. Ha sido así incluso en las etapas más recientes de nuestra época.

La experiencia de Belén es algo similar a la experiencia de Hebrón, en relación a la ausencia de mujeres en la élite del siglo pasado. A pesar de la presencia de las asociaciones de mujeres en los años veinte y cuarenta, éstas se caracterizan por ser asociaciones caritativas. Sus actividades se relacionaban con las instituciones jerosolimitanas y más tarde con las élites, instituciones, y partidos de Ramallah, especialmente con el comienzo de la Primera Intifada. Sin embargo, la presencia de la mujer en eventos y actividades sociales es más evidente que en Hebrón, donde el medio social conservador no proporciona un entorno apropiado para que las mujeres desarrollen otro tipo de actividades.

Por el contrario, observamos claras diferencias en cuanto a la naturaleza del atuendo de la mujer en Belén. Está más asociado con la vida moderna y es más liberal. En relación a la interacción, las escuelas privadas incluyen tanto a chicos como a chicas en todas las etapas preuniversitarias. En cuanto a los estudiantes de otras escuelas que no admiten alumnos de ambos sexos, éstos experimentarán clases mixtas en el ámbito universitario. Encontramos con que hay más limitaciones para las mujeres en Hebrón que

en Belén. Hebrón, por ejemplo, se distingue porque las mujeres llevan velo (hiyab) y pañuelo en general. No existen escuelas que fomenten las clases mixtas. El único lugar donde no hay separación entre hombres y mujeres estudiantes es la universidad aunque todavía experimenta un estado de separación entre ambos, especialmente en los asientos. En consecuencia, podemos decir que Belén ofrece un espacio social basado en una mezcla entre sexos, mayor del que la ciudad de Hebrón proporciona.

Estas actitudes reflejan las diferencias con respecto a la posición y el papel de la mujer en los dos distritos sobre la base de la naturaleza de las costumbres y tradiciones en cuanto a la función tradicional de la madre en la casa y al servicio de su familia. También tiene que ver con la naturaleza del espacio social, que absorbe el papel y la moda de la mujer en una imagen u otra.

Conclusión

Resulta claro para nosotros el alcance de las diferencias y disparidades entre Belén y Hebrón, ya que sus formaciones sociales y políticas y su contexto histórico y social tienen una singularidad especial según el lugar y la experiencia vivida en cada región. En consecuencia, la estructura social y su continuación en sus rasgos, sus características y sus valores, se asocian con la ciudad, su cultura o su imagen en la mentalidad social de sus residentes; nos encontramos con que Belén ha desempeñado un papel activo civilizado en el nivel de la provincia con respecto a la preservación de los valores de la tolerancia, la diversidad, el respeto del otro y el conocimiento del entorno. También se caracteriza por la amplitud de miras que da cabida a nuevos elementos en su composición política, social y administrativa. Por su parte, Hebrón fue incapaz de hacerlo debido a la carga de su experiencia histórica y ese estado de semi cierre en sus valores y modos de vida asociados a su reputación religiosa y conservadora. Junto con esto el conflicto palestino-israelí sobre la identidad de la ciudad le ha privado de ese estado de diversidad experimentado por la ciudad de Belén.

Nuestra comparación de las dos ciudades no tiene la pretensión de proclamar que la ciudad de Belén es mejor que la de Hebrón, en términos de dominación de espíritu o de tendencia de vida ciudadana, representada por los valores y los comportamientos asociados con la vida moderna; de hecho, tratamos de aclarar cómo la experiencia histórica y la matriz de los valores que la ciudad adopta influye en el comportamiento y los valores de sus habitantes actualmente. Es por eso que utilizamos algunas cifras estadísticas al establecer la comparación. Nuestro objetivo era aclarar estas cifras y porcentajes, puesto que están profundamente conectados con la entidad cultural y el valor de ambas ciudades. Y nos encontramos con que la ciudad de Belén está más conectada,

cualitativa y cuantitativamente, con la vida de las ciudades modernas palestinas, que la ciudad de Hebrón.

Ahora vamos a revisar los resultados de la investigación principal, ya que, como vamos a comprobar, refuerzan los resultados del análisis anterior y acentúan el estado de disparidad y las diferencias en las actitudes que tienen que ver con la cultura cívica, empezando por la visión de su ciudad y siguiendo con el sistema político y su evaluación y el status de la mujer y sus derechos. Para revisar los resultados de una manera sencilla primero haremos un repaso general a los resultados de los principales campos logrados por el investigador que esto suscribe. Después examinaremos las diferencias en los temas del resumen de la investigación, en relación la gobernación, que es el principal objetivo de esta investigación

Una comparación analítica entre Belén y Hebrón

Después de la revisión y discusión de los resultados de la investigación en general en la región meridional de la Cisjordania, junto con la comparación del investigador realizada entre estos resultados y los resultados de las encuestas de opinión y de anteriores estudios que haciendo referencia a la naturaleza, las posiciones y las actitudes de los ciudadanos hacia la cultura cívica, avalaban los resultados propios de nuestro estudio, encontramos que la muestra de investigación poseía actitudes cívicas en todas las dimensiones. Al mismo tiempo, hubo algunas diferencias en ciertas ocasiones que llegaron al nivel de contradicciones en las respuestas de los ciudadanos. Con el fin de comprender las razones de estas referencias y su relación con la materia objeto de la investigación, vamos a pasar ahora a una comparación de esos resultados en el nivel de los dos distritos para verificar si existen diferencias entre ellos, lo que en principio es el objetivo de la investigación actual, que gira sobre una hipótesis de base, concretamente: ¿Existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en las dimensiones de la cultura cívica entre Belén y Hebrón?

Antes de empezar a revisar la comparación entre las dos ciudades, hay que indicar algunas cuestiones científicas que se relacionan con el mecanismo y la tecnología de análisis de los resultados de la investigación. Éstas son:

El investigador verificó la distribución natural de las respuestas de la muestra de investigación mediante una prueba homogénea sobre la base de Kruskal-Wallis, y la mayoría de las preguntas del cuestionario demostraron que no hubo una distribución normal entre Belén y Hebrón, según el test. No hubo homogeneidad entre las respuestas.

La escala One Way Anova fue adoptada en la mayoría de las comparaciones, ya que es más preciso que el T-test, en lo que se refiere al gran tamaño de la población investigada, sin embargo, sus resultados eran muy parecidos. Junto a esto el investigador adoptó la distribución Chi-cuadrado para algunos párrafos en los que convenía.

Las preguntas de la investigación se han tratado como si fueran positivas o negativas. Los valores de elección de las preguntas con valores negativos no fueron transformados de acuerdo con la investigación temática. Esto se hizo así para el cálculo del grado de la media como unidad, que es más científico. Puesto que no basta con un análisis de una dimensión de la cultura cívica como un grado total, discutiremos también las diferencias dentro de cada dimensión de la cultura cívica entre las dos ciudades. Las frases que llevan códigos especiales, como negativo o positivo, se remitirán al final de cada tabla.

Los valores de los promedios utilizados se usarán de la siguiente manera: los promedios entre (1 y 2.33) se consideran de poco valor, los promedios medios (2.34 y 3.67) como promedios medios, y los promedios entre (3.68 y 5), como los más altos. El

valor máximo fue dividido respecto al valor mínimo de más de 3, como sigue: $5-1 = 4 / 3 = 1.33$.

Las posiciones y actitudes de la clase media en las dos sociedades se revisarán y cotejarán con los resultados de la investigación a través de las entrevistas llevadas a cabo por el investigador.

Los resultados de la tabla serán revisados y entonces pondremos en marcha el proceso de análisis y comparación.

Dimensiones de la cultura cívica

En la comparación general de las dimensiones de la cultura cívica, los resultados de las tablas nº (49 y 50) muestran 6 diferencias estadísticas en 10 dimensiones. Vale la pena mencionar una vez más que sólo respecto a estas dos tablas en particular, el aumento o la disminución del promedio no tiene ningún significado, por ejemplo, cuando señalamos: Las diferencias estuvieron a favor de Belén; esto no quiere decir que sea más propicio a las manifestaciones o a la cultura cívica o a su inexistencia. Esto se retrasará hasta que cada dimensión se trate por separado. A continuación vamos a indicar si las diferencias se encontraban en las preguntas negativas o positivas. Por ejemplo, si decimos que las diferencias estadísticas están a favor de Hebrón, en las cuestiones negativas, esto significaría que las actitudes de los ciudadanos estaban más a favor de los valores no cívicos, y si decimos que las diferencias estadísticas están a favor de Belén en las cuestiones positivas, esto significaría que Belén es más propicia a los valores cívicos de lo que es Hebrón.

Los resultados en las tablas anteriores nº (49 y 50) muestran que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en las siguientes dimensiones: Evaluación del sistema político en la Cisjordania, donde el nivel de $\alpha = 0.001$, que es inferior a 0,05, las diferencias están en favor de la Gobernación de Hebrón, la evaluación es de tamaño medio con un promedio de (2.79), al mismo resultado el grado total de la evaluación del sistema político en la dimensión de la Franja de Gaza, con una media de (2.69), para la confianza en la realización de las instituciones formales y cívicas y los dirigentes, hay diferencias estadísticamente a favor de la Gobernación de Hebrón, el grado confianza es medio, con una media de (3.20).

Por otra parte, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en la dimensión de tolerancia, las diferencias están a favor de la gobernación de Belén; el grado de tolerancia es medio, con un promedio de (3.51). Encontramos los mismos resultados en el sistema multipartidista; las diferencias están a favor Gobernación de Belén, el grado total fue medio, con un promedio de (3.59). Mientras que no hay diferencias estadísticamente

significativas en las siguientes dimensiones: la democracia, el sistema secular, la mujer y los derechos humanos, y por último la dimensión de la participación cívica y política.

Dimensión democrática

La democracia es considerada como uno de los aspectos fundamentales en la comprensión de la naturaleza de los sistemas políticos en el mundo, junto con el grado de cercanía o distancia del estado de la práctica de la democracia y en consecuencia, de la cultura cívica. En este sentido se hicieron una serie de preguntas en la muestra de investigación a fin de encontrar en las respuestas el grado de apoyo a las prácticas democráticas o no democráticas de acuerdo a la gobernación. Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de la democracia de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA, como se muestra en las tablas n° (51 y 52).

Los resultados en las tablas n° (51 y 52) indican que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en las siguientes oraciones negativas de acuerdo a la gobernación: “D28. La Autoridad Palestina debería prohibir cualquier actividad o protesta en contra de ella,” “D29. El gobierno de Hannyah debería prohibir cualquier actividad o protesta en contra suya”, “D30. Si supuestamente el Consejo Legislativo elegido abandonara su confianza en el gobierno, ¿estarías a favor de la continuidad del gobierno?”, “D31. ¿Está usted de acuerdo con el cierre de la organización civil Hamas por cuenta de la Autoridad Palestina en Cisjordania?”, “D36. La democracia es un sistema ateo que no debe ser utilizado”, “D39. ¿Cuál es su nivel de apoyo al uso de la fuerza para derrocar cualquier gobierno palestino electo, si usted pensara que es malo desde su propio punto de vista?; las diferencias están a favor de la Gobernación de Hebrón; los promedios de Hebrón son superiores a los de Belén; su área de distribución se sitúan entre baja y media, como se muestra en la tabla n° 52. Por otra parte, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: “D34. A pesar de sus puntos débiles, la democracia es la mejor manera de gobernar”, “D35. La democracia es el derecho a elegir lo que es bueno para mí y para el pueblo en general”, “D37. El sistema democrático es el sistema más adecuado para el estado palestino”, y por último, “D38. Las elecciones democráticas son el medio para resolver los problemas entre los partidos políticos”. Las diferencias están a favor de la Gobernación de Belén, el promedio de estas frases se sitúa entre medio y alto.

Los resultados de las tablas indican que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en 8 párrafos de 13. Se observa que todas las frases negativas fueron para Hebrón, es decir, Hebrón apoya más las prácticas no democráticas que Belén. Esto se explica por los promedios que varían de bajo a medio. A cambio, encontramos

diferencias estadísticas significativas en las preguntas positivas. Éstas están a favor de Belén y aparecen en los resultados de las tablas anteriores. Se hace hincapié en que Belén apoya más las prácticas y valores democráticos que Hebrón, teniendo en cuenta que el promedio de Belén osciló entre medio y alto. Esto indica que la muestra presenta las actitudes no democráticas como bajas, mientras que las actitudes democráticas serían medias y altas, donde Belén se distinguiría sobre Hebrón, como se demuestra en la tabla nº (53).

Sistema Político

Para identificar las diferencias en el sistema político adecuado en Palestina de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza el test Chi-Square. La tabla nº (53) muestra los resultados.

La tabla nº (53) muestra que hay diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las actitudes hacia el sistema político adecuado en Palestina de acuerdo a la gobernación; las diferencias están a favor de la Gobernación de Belén, donde un (71.1%) de los ciudadanos de Belén apoyan “un sistema parlamentario en el que nacionalistas, la izquierda, y los partidos políticos islámicos compitan en las elecciones y en el gobierno”, frente al 54,5% que lo apoya en Hebrón. También un (30.3%) de la muestra de Hebrón apoya “un sistema gobernado por la ley islámica en la que no haya partidos políticos o elecciones”.

Hemos preferido discutir y comparar las actitudes de muestra en las tablas nº (51 y 52), que miden las actitudes de los ciudadanos hacia algunos valores y prácticas democráticas siguiendo una revisión de las actitudes de muestra hacia la naturaleza del sistema político que favorece, como se muestra en la tabla nº (53). Allí se indica que dos tercios del distrito de Belén apoyan contar con un sistema democrático en el que todas las facciones políticas participen (islámica, nacional, laica y de izquierda), mientras que un 45,5% en Hebrón apoya sistemas políticos que no armonizan con el sistema político democrático, ya que los partidos islámicos, especialmente en Hebrón, tienen más influencia que el resto de los demás partidos políticos. A.F., médico en Hebrón y miembro de la “Hizb uTahrir” (Partido de Liberación Islámica) señaló: “Yo no creo en la democracia ya que el musulmán tiene que cumplir con las sentencias religiosas y la jurisprudencia”. Y añade: “Creo en el pluralismo político basado en el Islam”. Mientras que el ingeniero Qasim Awad, de Belén, cree: “en el sistema democrático que se distingue por su integración de todo el espectro político, social y religioso”. Nidal Abu Akir(2010) expresa el tipo de sociedad con la que sueña de la siguiente manera: “Yo creo en una sociedad civil democrática que observe las libertades y los derechos humanos, el respeto de la distribución de los poderes, el imperio de la ley, el respeto del poder

judicial, la lucha contra la corrupción, y prefiero tener una sociedad socialista”. Nabil Mughrabi(2010), profesor universitario en la Universidad de Hebrón, dice: “Quiero una sociedad civilizada y una sociedad democrática; La Sharia islámica y nuestra historia árabe e islámica es uno de los recursos para la legislación”. Musa Ajwa (2010), académico y político, añade: “Quiero una sociedad secular y democrática en Palestina, donde los derechos de las religiones y de los partidos políticos junto con los derechos de los sectores marginados sean respetados en la sociedad”.

Nos damos cuenta, por lo anteriormente expuesto, que existe un estado de variación en las posiciones de la clase media en ambos distritos ya que no hay consistencia ideológica entre ellos con respecto al sistema político que necesitan y, en consecuencia, con respecto a las actitudes cívicas en la vida cotidiana. Yo tiendo a poner de relieve una cuestión que está relacionada con la élite religiosa en Belén, y es que creo que es más flexible que la de Hebrón, aun cuando sus posiciones hacia la naturaleza del sistema político religioso coincidan; sin embargo, la naturaleza de la variación política y religiosa en la ciudad de Belén necesita un discurso más flexible para armonizar con ese estado de apertura que experimenta la ciudad. Aunque puede que me equivoque en esto. Este debería ser quizá un tema para estudiar con profundidad.

En el plano de los ciudadanos, las respuestas de Hebrón nos explican que hay una estructura religiosa o de partidos políticos que adoptan una clara ideología religiosa más que en Belén. Un porcentaje del (19%) de la muestra Hebrón de acuerdo muestra que: “D36. La democracia es un sistema ateo que no debería utilizarse”; frente a solamente a un (4,5%) de los habitantes de Belén que están de acuerdo con esta afirmación. Un porcentaje del (65,5%) de los habitantes de Belén está de acuerdo con que: “D37. El sistema democrático es el sistema más idóneo para el estado palestino”; frente a un (49,5%). Está claro para nosotros que hay actitudes democráticas en ambas gobernaciones, pero los porcentajes de apoyo a las manifestaciones de la democracia en Belén superan con creces a sus homólogos en Hebrón. Además, existe una estructura tradicional, que no armoniza con los sistemas modernos, lo cual es evidente en la elección de la clase de sistemas políticos con referencia religiosa que contradice los requisitos de un sistema democrático.

En cuando a la posición de los dirigentes políticos frente la democracia y el pluralismo, esto es digno de mención: la atención sobre las cuestiones políticas y la forma de hacer frente a la ocupación ha distinguido todas las posiciones adoptadas por las facciones nacionales e islámicas (como se mencionó anteriormente en el capítulo dos). A esto se unen posturas que tienen que ver con aspectos sociales sensibles que requieren el fortalecimiento de la democracia y una crítica clara y elocuente a la labor de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil para el desarrollo y la mejora de su actuación.

A pesar de los desacuerdos entre las facciones nacionales e islámicas en las posiciones políticas e ideológicas y en la estructura organizativa, sus posturas, con excepción del Partido de Liberación Islámica, se unifican en lo que respecta a la adopción del principio democrático, algunas de manera más o menos extensa. En la entrevista con Musa Ajwa, uno de los dirigentes de Al Fatah en el distrito de Hebrón, éste aclaró que: “El pluralismo político es uno de los ejes básicos de los que depende la sociedad palestina en la construcción de un Estado moderno. Por lo tanto, tenemos que consolidar el pluralismo y organizarnos por medios democráticos”. Asimismo, añadió que: “Debe haber un proceso de cambio con respecto a las normas que el partido o facción apruebe, para no aislarse de las necesidades y aspiraciones de la sociedad” (Mussa Ajwa, 2010).

En cuanto a la postura del movimiento islámico, Nizar Ramadan, el representante de Hamas en Hebrón y miembro del parlamento palestino, hizo un comentario sobre el pluralismo y la democracia diciendo que significa “el reconocimiento del derecho al desacuerdo, que se remonta al derecho del pluralismo en la doctrina política y la aceptación del otro, incluso si se tratara de una opinión o punto de vista que no coincide con el de la opinión pública”. Y añadió que: “El pluralismo tiene niveles que están determinados por el interés de seguridad y puede ser el interés de la humanidad en general y que ello, en lo que concierne a la religión en cuestión no hay ninguna objeción a tener más de un partido político dentro del estado islámico” (Nizar Ramadan, 2010).

Mahmoud Fanoun, representante del Frente Popular en Belén, señaló que: “La teoría del pluralismo político es un enfoque teórico que mira la vida social sobre la base de la variación política, filosófica, ideológica y de valores. El pluralismo político significa variedad de marcos ideológicos en las prácticas sociales y políticas”. Fanoun también señaló “que el pluralismo político es un componente básico y esencial que allana el camino para la democracia ya que constituye su columna vertebral, algo que nos falta en estos días” (Mahmoud Fanoun, 2010).

Además de lo mencionado anteriormente, nos damos cuenta de que las facciones nacionales dirigen sus elecciones internas de la manera más democrática posible para nombrar a los dirigentes de esos partidos, incluso cuando las elecciones no pueden efectuarse con regularidad debido a la presencia de la ocupación. Las discusiones internas políticas se llevan a cabo de tal manera que al final votan sobre posturas políticas particulares sobre una cuestión controvertida. El asunto no termina allí sino que se extiende hasta tocar diferentes posturas sociales y sindicales.

El movimiento islámico más fuerte en Cisjordania, está en Hebrón no en Belén, y su posición jurídica deriva de las posturas de otros movimientos islámicos, especialmente los de Jordania, Egipto, Sudán y Túnez. El movimiento Hamas, cuyas posturas jurídicas se inspiran en el Grupo de Hermandad Islámica de Jordania y Egipto, rechaza la concepción occidental de la democracia en su forma y contenido. Esta oposición se hace

sobre la base de que la democracia es un concepto secular occidental en el que la legislación se basa en los seres humanos, por lo que es incompatible con el Islam, en que la legislación se basa en el Libro de Alá (el Corán).

A partir de un frente político claro, los islamistas aceptan el principio de la democracia y el pluralismo político frente al establecimiento del gobierno islámico, ya que esto les proporcionaría la oportunidad para funcionar y para lograr labores de propagación. Pero, ellos están obligados a aplicar la ley islámica cuando estén en el gobierno. Luego ellos permitirían el pluralismo de partidos sólo en el marco de la ideología islámica.

Por otro lado, el Partido de Liberación Islámica, que se estableció en 1953, es considerado uno de los partidos políticos que se opone absolutamente a la democracia. Consideran ésta como una cuestión de infidelidad y apostasía y como un acto que imita a Occidente a ciegas (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010). Su mentalidad está todavía unida a los conceptos islámicos cuyos orígenes se remontan a los días del Profeta Mahoma, es decir, a hace más de trece siglos. Ellos se niegan a tratar con cualquier producto de la civilización, tales como las elecciones y el pluralismo intelectual. Luchan contra él y piden a la gente que lo bloqueen y lo denuncien. Este es el enfoque que ellos generalmente siguen en el mundo árabe y el panorama no es diferente en el distrito de Hebrón, donde se encuentran en la mayoría de los lugares, las universidades e incluso los círculos nacionales y las actividades de la sociedad civil, con el propósito de convertir y atraer nuevos miembros a su ideología. Utilizan las mezquitas como escenarios y espacios públicos para acercar a la gente a su ideología y aprueban el dictamen jurídico que prohíbe que las personas tengan que ver con elecciones o con organizaciones extranjeras (Zallum, n.d).

El Partido de Liberación Islámica es uno de los primeros partidos que tienen gran impacto en la orientación de la sociedad en el distrito de Hebrón. Practican su poder a través del uso de la religión y de posturas extremistas que disuaden a la gente de comportarse de una manera que sea incompatible con sus formas. Ellos no luchan para conseguir sus intereses, no tienen programas para resistir a la ocupación, ya que trabajan para reclamar el Islam por medios pacíficos. Tampoco adoptan posturas violentas frente a la autoridad o la sociedad, basándose en su creencia de que deben imitar el modo de vida del Profeta. En otras palabras, el Islam no aprueba la lucha como postura, salvo después del establecimiento del estado islámico en Al-Madina. Es por eso que esperan la venida del califa, el establecimiento del estado y entonces usar la violencia y la lucha. Este es el sistema intelectual que organiza sus ideas y sus comportamientos, lo que hace que la autoridad haga la vista gorda sobre ellos y evite molestarlos. Su base se ha expandido, especialmente en Hebrón. Ahora controlan más de 25 de las 40 mezquitas, y publican un periódico titulado *Al-Wa'y;y* (La Conciencia), a través del cual se dirigen a la población y ofrecen opinión jurídica y la postura del partido sobre cualquier cuestión o evento. Esto

permite un contacto constante con su base populista, asimilando información tanto la base como el público.

Para comprender la evaluación de la muestra de investigación del sistema político actual, vamos a revisar sus actitudes hacia la actuación del gobierno palestino con el fin de poder identificar su evaluación del sistema. Como resultado de la división política entre los dos gobiernos de la Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza, se evaluó cada uno por separado, como se muestra en las tablas n° (54 – 57).

Dimensión de la evaluación del sistema político en Cisjordania

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de la evaluación del sistema político en Cisjordania de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA, como se muestra en las tablas n° (54 y 55).

Los resultados en las tablas (54 y 55) indican que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en la evaluación del gobierno de Al Fatah en Cisjordania de acuerdo con la gobernación. Las diferencias en la mayoría de las oraciones son las siguientes: “E41. La Autoridad Palestina lucha contra la corrupción y el nepotismo”, “E42. El gobierno garantiza la libertad para los medios locales y no los incrimina en el caso de que se opongan a la Autoridad; “E43. El gobierno contribuye a proporcionar seguridad a los ciudadanos.; E44. El gobierno contribuye a la aplicación de las leyes sobre todos, sin distinciones; E45. El gobierno respeta y se atiene a los derechos humanos; E46. El gobierno ofrece servicios a los ciudadanos con independencia de su afiliación política o religiosa; “E47. El gobierno muestra profesionalidad en su composición ; E48. El gobierno respeta el derecho de los ciudadanos a expresar su punto de vista; E49. El gobierno respeta la libertad de pensamiento y de creencia”, “E52. El gobierno se hace del todo responsable, independientemente del lugar, el rango, o el cargo, si se viola la ley”, “E53. Hay separación entre los poderes legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial; y “el grado total de la evaluación del sistema político en Cisjordania”; Todas las diferencias están a favor de la gobernación de Hebrón, la media del grado total de Hebrón es de (2.79), mientras que la media del grado total de Belén es de (2.52), como se muestra en la tabla n° (55). Por otro lado, no hay diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$, en las siguientes oraciones: “E50. El gobierno respeta el derecho de oposición política en sus formas pacíficas”, “E51. El gobierno garantiza la independencia del poder judicial”.

Dimensión de la evaluación del sistema político en la Franja de Gaza

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de la evaluación del sistema político en la Franja de Gaza según la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA, como se muestra en las tablas nº (56 y 57).

Los mismos resultados que encontramos en la evaluación de gobierno de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza, tablas nº (56 y 57), indican que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en la evaluación de gobierno de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza de acuerdo a la gobernación; las diferencias en la mayoría de las oraciones son las siguientes: “E41b. La Autoridad Palestina lucha contra la corrupción y el nepotismo”; “E42b. El gobierno garantiza la libertad para los medios locales y no los incrimina en el caso de que se opongan a la Autoridad”; “E43b. El gobierno contribuye a proporcionar seguridad a los ciudadanos.; E44b. El gobierno contribuye a la aplicación de las leyes sobre todos, sin distinciones; E45b. El gobierno respeta y se atiene a los derechos humanos; E46b. El gobierno ofrece servicios a los ciudadanos con independencia de su afiliación política o religiosa; E47b. El gobierno muestra profesionalidad en su composición; E48b. El gobierno respeta el derecho de los ciudadanos a expresar su punto de vista; E49b. El gobierno respeta la libertad de pensamiento y de creencia”; E50b. El gobierno respeta el derecho de la oposición política en sus formas pacíficas. E51b. El gobierno garantiza la independencia del poder judicial. “E52b. El gobierno se hace del todo responsable, independientemente del lugar, el rango, o el cargo, si se viola la ley”, “E53b. Hay separación entre los poderes legislativo, ejecutivo y judicial; y “grado total de la evaluación del sistema político en Franja de Gaza .Todas las diferencias están a favor de la gobernación de Hebrón, la media del grado total de Hebrón es de (2.69), mientras que la media del grado total de Belén es de (2.37), como se muestra la tabla nº (57). Por otro lado, no hay diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$, en la siguiente frase: E46b. “EL gobierno ofrece servicios a los ciudadanos sin importar su afiliación política o religiosa”.

Es evidente para nosotros, a partir de las tablas nº (54 a la 57), que la muestra de investigación enfatiza la actuación negativa de la Autoridad en todos los niveles (la observación y el respeto de los derechos humanos, la democracia, la separación de poderes) como se muestra en las tablas anteriores. El grado de evaluación de la actuación fue bajo; esto tiene que ver con las condiciones políticas y económicas que la cuestión palestina lleva consigo junto con la incapacidad de la Autoridad para mejorar la situación. Además está la influencia del estado de división entre los dos los gobiernos electos en Gaza y Cisjordania. Esto ha influido negativamente en las actitudes de la muestra de investigación. Por otra parte, el aparato de seguridad lleva a cabo flagrantes violaciones de los derechos humanos con la política de “cerrar bocas” que la policía practica, lo cual se contradice con el enfoque democrático. Bajo el pretexto de que miembros de Hamas podrían dar un golpe en Cisjordania para derrocar a Fatah, como ocurrió en Gaza, varios

palestinos fueron encarcelados sin cargos evidentes y se utilizó la tortura contra varios miembros del movimiento Hamas en las cárceles del movimiento Fatah. Varios empleados fueron suspendidos o expulsados de trabajo sobre la base de su afiliación o su apoyo del movimiento Hamas. Esto fue documentado por varias instituciones dedicadas a vigilar el cumplimiento de los derechos humanos, principalmente el Comité Palestino Independiente para los Derechos Humanos; esta situación controla el clima general de las ciudades palestinas en Cisjordania después de 2008.

Sin embargo lo que es interesante en los resultados y su relación con el objeto de la investigación es que, a pesar del hecho de que el grado de evaluación fue medio en todos los párrafos que se incluyeron en la dimensión de la evaluación del sistema político en Gaza y la Cisjordania, las diferencias estuvieron a favor de Hebrón, en las dos dimensiones, es decir, la evaluación de los dos sistemas en Hebrón alcanzó un grado superior a Belén, como lo demuestra promedio. A pesar de la centralización del liderazgo y de la base de Hamas en Cisjordania, esto no ha influido en el proceso de evaluación en Hebrón; tendemos a explicar esto por la naturaleza de la cultura política en Hebrón, que está más cerca de la congregación y de una cultura sumisa ya que las actitudes de las personas o sus posiciones religiosas no influyeron en el proceso de evaluación. Parecía como si la evaluación de Hebrón del gobierno de Gaza fuera mejor que su evaluación del gobierno de Cisjordania. Esto de hecho no ocurrió; lo que también podría estar relacionado con la naturaleza de la estructura de la familia central en Hebrón. Algunas grandes familias en Hebrón son muy influyentes y pertenecen a partidos políticos. Por ejemplo, podemos encontrar un clan que ha liderado y que tiene también influencia tanto en el movimiento Al Fatah como en Hamas. La familia “Rjoub” en la ciudad de Dura, en Hebrón, es considerada una de las familias con mayor influencia en esa zona. El hijo de la familia, Nayif Rjoub, es uno de los principales líderes del movimiento Hamas en Hebrón, siendo miembro del Consejo Legislativo en 2006; por su parte, Jibril Rjoub es uno de los líderes del movimiento Al Fatah, fundador de la Seguridad Preventiva en Cisjordania y su ex director. Actualmente es miembro del Parlamento Palestino y Ministro de Deportes. Por lo tanto, nos damos cuenta de que la dimensión de la familia podría tener que ver con esto; miembros del mismo clan son miembros activos tanto en las instituciones de Hamas y como en las de Al Fatah. Esta última apreciación apoya el hecho de que las detenciones políticas del movimiento Hamas por la Autoridad Palestina en Cisjordania fueron menores en Hebrón en comparación a Belén. Los representantes de las familias en el distrito de Hebrón fueron invitados a reunirse con el gobernador y los jefes del aparato de seguridad. Se había acordado que los miembros de la familia que pertenecen al movimiento Hamas debían ser controlados en lugar de ser arrestados y esto es realmente lo que había ocurrido.

En cuanto al estado de división en Gaza, la mayoría del pueblo palestino la rechaza, tanto en Gaza como en Cisjordania. Hubo consenso en las entrevistas que hice con

miembros de la clase media en los dos distritos. Sin embargo, esto no influyó en la presencia de algunos de los inconvenientes y de críticas al sistema político palestino. Resultó evidente en la posición de (N.A.F.), que es activista en instituciones cívicas. Ella cree que: “el sistema político no pertenece a la ley y el orden sino que está controlado por la influencia del clan y el favoritismo”. Sin embargo, Mahmoud Fanoun difiere del testimonio citado, considerando el sistema político palestino como: “un sistema bajo la ocupación con liderazgos divididos, que no construye una base económica, que resulta incapaz de organizar las condiciones sociales y jurídicas de forma que exprese los intereses del pueblo palestino, y que además muestra su incapacidad para abordar la cuestión nacional, en relación al conflicto árabe-israelí”. Fanoun comenta irónicamente lo sucedido en Gaza, al mismo tiempo que critica duramente a Hamas y Al Fatah diciendo: “Hamas y Fatah diferían en la división de autoridad y poderes tras las elecciones de 2006; los dos partidos no fueron capaces de ponerse de acuerdo en esto. Así, ambos dividieron al país, formando dos naciones; una de Hamas en Gaza y la otra de Fatah en Cisjordania. Esta división ha hecho mucho daño a la sociedad palestina”; Esta posición expresa el estado de control político en las calles palestinas, tanto para ambos movimientos en una clara ausencia de otros partidos políticos o, de hecho, en su incapacidad para influir en las decisiones políticas, ya sea en Gaza o en Cisjordania.

Ahora nos movemos para hacer frente a la dimensión del sistema secular como uno de los principales componentes de la cultura palestina cívica considerando la religión islámica como parte y componente básico de la identidad nacional; nos dimos cuenta de que es esencial para estudiar las actitudes de la muestra de investigación en las cuestiones relacionadas con la religión y su relación con el sistema político; creemos que esta dimensión es distinta según las diferencias sociales y culturales del individuo, junto con la diferencia de la cultura cívica en la que el individuo viva.

Dimensión del sistema secular

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión del sistema secular de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA, como se muestra en las tablas nº (58 y 59).

Las tablas nº (58 y 59) muestran que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en las siguientes oraciones negativas de acuerdo a la gobernación: “S56. El gobierno religioso es el mejor sistema para proteger los derechos del individuo; “S59. Los políticos que no son religiosos no son adecuados para dirigir la sociedad”; “S61. Apoyo partidos políticos que adoptaron un programa religioso” y “S62. El conflicto político en Palestina es sólo por motivos religiosos”. Las diferencias están a favor de la Gobernación de Hebrón. Los promedios de Hebrón son superiores a los de

Belén; son de tipo medio, como lo muestra la tabla nº(59). Por otra parte, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: “S55. El sistema secular garantiza los derechos del individuo”; “S57. Las figuras religiosas no deberían influir en la opinión de la gente durante las campañas electorales”; “S58. Los líderes religiosos no deben influir en las decisiones del gobierno o el futuro del pueblo”, y finalmente: “S60. Religión y política deben separarse porque la política tiene que ver con la justicia, no con la verdad”. Las diferencias están a favor de la Gobernación de Belén; el promedio de estas frases está entre medio y alto, como se muestra en la tabla nº (59).

En cuanto al estado de disparidad y diferencia en la naturaleza del sistema político que es apoyado por la muestra de investigación, el mismo resultado apareció en la dimensión secular que se basa en una base determinada, que es la separación entre religión y estado o en la restricción de la interferencia del “clero o personas religiosas” en la vida pública o en la política en particular. Las respuestas de Belén no coincidieron con las de Hebrón, como lo demuestra la tabla nº(59). También hallamos que Hebrón fue más favorable a la interferencia del clero en la vida política que en el caso de Belén. Este último se caracteriza por ser más partidarios de la separación entre política y religión. Un porcentaje del (51%) en Hebrón apoyó la siguiente declaración: “S56. El gobierno religioso es el mejor sistema para proteger los derechos del individuo” en comparación con el (34%) en Belén. Un porcentaje del (57.5%) en Hebrón apoyó la declaración: “S62. El conflicto político en Palestina es sólo de índole religiosa”; en comparación con el (33%) en Belén. Estos resultados y los porcentajes refuerzan los datos previamente analizados. Esto nos anima a formular una declaración que indica que el papel y la influencia de la religión es importante y esencial en la vida de los ciudadanos de Hebrón más que en la vida de los ciudadanos de Belén, junto con la estructura tradicional y conservadora de la ciudad. Este punto se ve confirmado por el porcentaje de miembros adscritos a instituciones religiosas. El número de los miembros unidos a instituciones religiosas en Hebrón alcanza el (30.5%), en comparación con el (18%) en Belén. Esto se debe a razones de interés social que tienen que ver con la ciudad y sus residentes, como ya se ha mencionado en relación con el conflicto sobre la identidad de la ciudad experimentada por la ciudad de Hebrón.

En cuanto a las posiciones de la clase media, también son diferentes. Vamos a dar algunas respuestas. A. F. comentó lo siguiente: “La separación de la religión del estado es un credo que conduce a la aparición del capitalismo, lo que se contradice con la doctrina de los musulmanes ya que el origen en el funcionamiento de la vida de los musulmanes está en la base de las resoluciones de la “Sharia”, que derivan de la religión. Si la religión está separada del Estado, a continuación, nuestra doctrina se convierte en otra”. En cuanto al doctor Nabil Mughrabi, se niega a la separación de la religión del estado explicando que : “Los estados se crearon para organizar la vida de las personas

mientras que la religión vino a estructurar a las personas”. Ibrahim Sawalha, quien simpatiza con la izquierda, apoya esto cuando dice: “Sí al estado para la sociedad; la religión debe seguirse, pero hay libertad en el seguimiento de la religión y desconexión con la política”. Estas son las tres respuestas de la clase media en Hebrón; sus respuestas reflejan sus diferencias en el empleo de la religión en la vida pública y el Estado; las respuestas son reflejo de los individuos; la mayoría son oponentes al liberalismo y muestran rechazo por la izquierda pero no directamente, lo que confirma que el discurso y la práctica de los partidos políticos difiere de una ciudad a otra. Varios dirigentes de los partidos políticos de izquierda practican labores religiosas en el distrito de Hebrón, pero la situación es diferente en Belén. Esto se evidencia en la posición de Mahmoud Fanoun cuando comentó: “Sí, yo estoy con la separación de la religión del Estado para lo siguiente: 1. El sistema permite que los grupos de la sociedad convivan libremente sin ningún tipo de restricciones .2. Porque la religión está representada por un conjunto de grupos y sectas contradictorias; cada secta piensa que sus opiniones representan la verdadera religión. 3. Nuestra sociedad incluye al cristianismo, con sus distintas denominaciones, junto con varias sectas del Islam representadas por partidos que se contradicen. De este modo, las religiones son incapaces de expresarse de una manera científica. 4. Cuando Europa separó la religión del Estado, y el sistema político se liberó de la supremacía de la religión, el desarrollo y la prosperidad florecieron”. Qasim Awad difiere de la última proposición y dice: “No estoy de acuerdo con la separación entre la religión y la sociedad ya que es una parte de nuestra vida y necesitamos un sistema político que derive de sus valores”

Como ya se destacó anteriormente, hay un estado de diversidad ideológica dentro de la clase media en sus actitudes hacia la religión, la vida y la naturaleza del sistema político que aspiramos a construir. Creemos que el discurso en Belén es más flexible y liberal que en el ciudad de Hebrón.

Ahora vamos a revisar la columna vertebral de cualquier estado cuando su cultura cívica está más cerca del modelo moderno y civilizado; esto es, la ley. Dado que el caso palestino es único debido al hecho de que está en el proceso de formación de su Estado en condiciones muy difíciles, la ocupación constituye uno de los obstáculos frente al proceso de transformación de la sociedad. Así, en la gestión de los asuntos de la vida cotidiana, la sociedad recurre a lo que se llama “Urf Ashairi”; un Derecho consuetudinario tribal o de clan, que se considera un elemento básico del tejido social con respecto de su cobertura de los siguientes aspectos o cuestiones.

Dimensión del papel de la ley

Para identificar las diferencias en el papel de la ley según la dimensión de la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA, como se muestra en las tablas n° (60 y 61).

Los resultados en las tablas n° (60 y 61) muestran que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes oraciones negativas de acuerdo a la gobernación: "L68. La Autoridad Palestina es una autoridad para algunas personas, no es la Ley ", donde el nivel α es inferior a 0.05, las diferencias son a favor de Belén, el grado de acuerdo es medio, con una media de (3.64), en comparación con Hebrón, que tiene un promedio de (3.34). Lo mismo con las oraciones que dicen: "L70. La Autoridad Palestina no ha funcionado en la aplicación de la ley civil y ser independiente "; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el grado de acuerdo es medio, con una media de (3.40).

Por otra parte, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: "L63. En lugar de la Ley Tribal, el Código Civil es el único medio para hacer justicia frente a los individuos"; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el grado de acuerdo es alto, con una media de (3.90). "L64. Los tribunales están capacitados para recibir y atender las denuncias y los casos relativos a los ciudadanos"; las diferencias están a favor de Hebrón; el grado de acuerdo es medio, con una media de (3.48). "L67. La Ley tribal protege a las personas y sus derechos cuando la ley cívica no es independiente o durante la ausencia del Gobierno y del Estado"; las diferencias están a favor de Hebrón; el grado de acuerdo es medio, con una media 3.37; y finalmente: "L71. La aplicación de la ley cívica en la sociedad es mejor que la aplicación de ley de la tribu "; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el grado de acuerdo es alto, con una media de (3.72).

Nos damos cuenta, sobre lo anteriormente mencionado, que el grado de apoyo del papel de la ley y la restricción de la interferencia de la ley del clan es mayor en Belén que en Hebrón. Este es un resultado natural, ya que "Yabal al Jalil" (La montaña de Hebrón) sus "*sheikhs*" (jefes) constituyen una referencia básica en la ley de la tribu y las soluciones en Cisjordania. Esto es lo que domina la vida de la ciudad en su organización y en la solución de sus problemas. Un porcentaje del (71%) en Belén respaldó la declaración: "L63. En lugar de la Ley Tribal, el Código Civil es el único medio para hacer justicia frente a los individuos", comparado con (66%) en Hebrón. Un porcentaje del 56,5% en Belén criticó a la Autoridad Palestina, ya que: "L68. La Autoridad Palestina es la autoridad de algunas personas; no es la Ley", comparado con (48.5%) en Hebrón. Vemos que la mayoría de la muestra de investigación rechaza la ley tribal y apoya la aplicación de la ley civil; sin embargo, esto no está relacionado sólo con las actitudes de los individuos sino también con la estructura social y la decisión política. Por ejemplo,

un notario pide a dos ciudadanos un contrato tribal para demostrar que ya no están en desacuerdo con el fin de cancelar el caso presentado ante el tribunal. Este caso se extiende por todo el territorio palestino, incluidas Belén y Hebrón. El ciudadano se encuentra ante una elección de compromiso frente a la familia a fin de sentirse seguros o de no pertenecer a las instituciones familiares; por lo que el individuo pierde sus derechos. Un porcentaje del (64.5%) en Hebrón indican que ellos pertenecían a las instituciones familiares, frente a un (46%) en Belén. Vale la pena mencionar que el grado de institucionalización de la familia en Hebrón es mayor que en Belén, como representan claramente los consejos de familia "*Dawawin*", que se expanden por Hebrón, pero que no existen en el Belén del mismo modo.

La Autoridad Palestina dedica al asunto de la familia/clan una gran atención debido a su capacidad para influir en la vida de las personas. Por eso se estableció una sección en el Ministerio del Interior Palestino bajo el nombre de "Administración General del Clan y Asuntos de Reconciliación". Su actividad se concentra en la región sur de Hebrón. Llevan a cabo reuniones periódicas con los representantes de los clanes y las familias. En general el pueblo celebra la función de los clanes y su actuación de mantener la seguridad en las regiones palestinas. La oficina regional tiene por objeto activar el papel de los notables del clan en Hebrón, Belén y Jericó. La Autoridad considera que "los clanes ocupan un lugar especial en la resolución de conflictos y en el fortalecimiento de los conceptos de estabilidad, seguridad y afabilidad, codo con codo con la ley general y la función del aparato de seguridad". Y no se limita a esto; de hecho, las figuras de reconciliación en Hebrón demandan del Ministerio del Interior que "esencialmente provean de fondos financieros a las figuras representantes notables en materia de reconciliación" (Agencia Ma'an, 2010).

De acuerdo con estos datos, la policía palestina es incapaz de resolver cualquier conflicto sin referirse al clan de "jeques", especialmente en Hebrón. Con el fin de aclarar y arrojar algo de luz sobre las posiciones de los jeques del clan, mostraremos una entrevista con dos de los jeques/jefes de dos grandes familias de Hebrón: Fathi Iwiwi y Naji Abu Sninah, en la que se habla sobre la naturaleza de su trabajo y su importancia en la solución de enfrentamientos en la zona desde su propio punto de vista. Iwiwi dice: "Si hubiera una Autoridad en el pleno sentido de la palabra, las cosas no habrían llegado a esto ... Sin embargo, no existe tal autoridad. Es por ello que en Hebrón nosotros mismos resolvemos nuestros problemas". La Autoridad es incapaz de protegerse a sí misma y al pueblo como resultado de las condiciones políticas que experimentan los territorios palestinos, junto con las medidas de la ocupación israelí que contribuyen a la propagación de cierto caos. En un intento de controlar lo que ellos llaman un caos creciente, Iwiwi, Jabari, Abu Sninah y otros líderes locales intervinieron para llenar el vacío y ocuparse de los delitos de homicidio, robo y disputas por la tierra. Su influencia se deriva de las normas tradicionales del clan y los sentimientos en la sociedad palestina, ya que cientos

de familiares pueden pedirles apoyo y solidaridad si los necesitan. Iwiwi añade: "Puedo hacer una llamada de teléfono y en media hora quinientas personas vendrán de inmediato". Añadió que cuando las fuerzas de la Autoridad Palestina entraron en Hebrón por primera vez hace 13 años, fueron lo suficientemente fuertes como para imponer la ley y el orden, pero con el paso del tiempo, perdieron el poder del que solían disfrutar. También añade que "la situación es cada vez peor. Si los líderes de la reconciliación y el clan desaparecieran de Cisjordania, habría peleas y disputas entre los ciudadanos". El trabajo de Iwiwi no sólo se limita a Hebrón. Él ayuda a llegar a acuerdos de reconciliación en los delitos que de homicidio en Naplus, al norte de Cisjordania.

Sheikh Naji Mustafa Abu Snainah añadió que recientemente intervino en una disputa sobre cuatro "fiddans" de terreno en Belén. Cada rival buscó la ayuda de un experto jurídico para validar su derecho a poseer la tierra. Es posible que esta diferencia pudiera acabar en un conflicto violento. Él añadió, en relación a las condiciones experimentadas en Hebrón que: "la falta de seguridad en Hebrón lleva a la gente a armarse; la situación llegó al punto de que algunas familias dejaban de comer para poder así comprar y almacenar armas".

En cuanto al precedente del que Hebrón fue testigo cuando hubo un ataque a la comisaría de policía en Hebrón, en noviembre de 2008, decir que éste fue el resultado de una disputa entre un policía y un miembro de la familia Jabari. El enfrentamiento se agravó y acabó con la muerte de este último. Después los miembros de la familia Jabari atacaron la estación de policía en Hebrón con armas de fuego y secuestraron a 15 policías, dispararon 6, que sufrieron lesiones en las piernas, y además prendieron fuego a 16 vehículos de la brigada. Los funcionarios de seguridad dijeron que eran del todo incapaces de frenar la violencia cuando se enfrentan a la influencia y el poder del clan. Un hombre de la policía palestina, que pidió que su nombre permaneciera en el anonimato, dijo: "Yo trabajo para la Autoridad por mi cuenta y yo pago mi factura de teléfono", y agregó que las restricciones a los movimientos de la policía palestina son enormes en el centro de la ciudad de Hebrón, donde el ejército israelí se despliega en torno a varios asentamientos judíos. Tras el estallido de la última Intifada Palestina en 2000, las fuerzas israelíes patrullaron toda la ciudad y sólo permitieron a la Autoridad Palestina desplegar tropas de seguridad palestinas no armadas. Él continuó diciendo: "un oficial de seguridad sin armas no puede detener a un traficante de drogas ya que, en primer lugar, no puede protegerse a sí mismo".

En cuanto a la posición de la familia, Arif Jabari, antiguo gobernador de Hebrón y ministro sin cartera acusó a la policía palestina de cometer un "acto detestable" por un uso excesivo de la fuerza. Jabari dijo, "el incidente es muy simple: un joven tuvo un accidente de tráfico y tuvo una disputa verbal con un oficial de policía; fue provocativo en su discurso, por lo que el policía pidió un gran número de refuerzos; y no hay necesidad de este estado de alerta. Añadió: "abrieron fuego de forma imprudente e

irracional". El asunto es grave y la acción es detestable; hubo que ingresar heridos en el hospital; esto no debería pasar". Él dio un consejo a los dirigentes de los departamentos de seguridad: "les dije que deberían utilizar su inteligencia y que hay que ganarse el apoyo de la gente y no convertirla en tu enemigo".

Este es un ejemplo de la naturaleza de la estructura de clanes en los territorios palestinos que se diferencia de una ciudad a otra en su poder e influencia. En general, todos los miembros de la clase media están de acuerdo sobre el papel negativo de los clanes, ya que existe una especie de fanatismo tribal. A pesar del papel de los clanes en la resolución de los conflictos, éstos obstaculizan la aplicación de la ley. Mahmoud Fanoun explica que la familia tiene un papel muy negativo en sí misma puesto que acarrear guerras tribales: "No hay papel positivo para ellos, nunca oído hablar de una familia que contribuyera a la creación de infraestructura, pero escuchamos un montón de quejas de la gente acerca de algunas familias y esto acaba en la violación de derechos de pequeñas familias.

Pasamos ahora a examinar un tema diferente que es la dimensión de la tolerancia religiosa, social y política, tal y como muestran las tablas (62 y 63).

Dimensión de Tolerancia

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de la tolerancia de acuerdo a la gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA, como se muestra en las tablas nº (62 y 63).

Los resultados en las tablas nº (62 y 63) muestran que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en los siguientes enunciados negativos según la gobernación: "T80. Me sentí incómodo por la práctica de rituales religiosos como Azán (llamada a la oración) y el toque de campanas", donde el nivel $\alpha = 0,000$, las diferencias son a favor de Belén, el grado de acuerdo es bajo, con una media de 2.32, y también hay diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en los siguientes enunciados positivos según la gobernación: "T74. Un buen vecino es bueno, independientemente de su religión"; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el grado de acuerdo es alto, con una media de (4.56). En general, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en el grado total de tolerancia; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el grado de acuerdo es medio, con una media de 3,51.

Sobre la base de los datos antes mencionados, para nosotros resulta claro que la muestra de investigación posee un alto grado de tolerancia, que fue mayor en Belén que en Hebrón. Los resultados confirmaron el análisis teórico de la segunda unidad. Es una

característica general que se vincula con la sociedad palestina a pesar de la presencia de diferencias a favor de Belén.

Vale la pena señalar los resultados de esta tabla con respecto a la declaración: "T80. Me sentí incómodo por la práctica de rituales religiosos como Azán (llamada a la oración) y el toque de campanas"; el porcentaje fue del (14.7%) en Belén frente al (4%) en Hebrón. A pesar del hecho de que el grado calculado es bajo, como lo demuestra la media en Belén de (2.23) frente al (1.60) en Hebrón. Tratamos ofrecer una mayor aclaración a las razones de tales respuestas. Nos enteramos de que una tasa del 30% del total de cristianos en Belén está de acuerdo con, frente al (4%) de apoyo de los residentes de Hebrón. Estas diferencias se deben a la religión cristiana en Belén, mientras que se refiere a los residentes de Hebrón.

A pesar del hecho de que nuestro tema aquí no tiene que ver con la religión, es importante aclarar esto para no llegar a malentendidos. Los cristianos en Beit Sahour han pedido a los musulmanes que la recitación del Corán no debe oírse por los altavoces en la preparación para la llamada a la oración (*Azan*). Hubo un acuerdo sobre esto. Los musulmanes mostraron tolerancia y comprendieron la solicitud de los cristianos. Esto es lo que realmente sucedió. Podemos ver el resultado final y ésta es la tolerancia mostrada por la muestra de la investigación.

Ahora vamos a discutir un tema fundamental relacionado con la mitad de la sociedad palestina: la mujer. La cuestión de la mujer se discutirá en el apartado "La dimensión de la mujer y los derechos humanos" con el fin de medir las posiciones y actitudes de la muestra de investigación sobre el tema de la mujer y los derechos políticos, sociales, culturales y educativos.

La dimensión de la mujer y los derechos humanos

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de la mujer y los derechos humanos de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA. Las tablas n° (64 y 65) muestran los resultados.

Los resultados en las tablas n° (64 y 65) indican que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en las siguientes oraciones negativas de acuerdo a la gobernación: "HR82. Las mujeres no deben involucrarse en la política o la economía y deben dejar eso al hombre"; "HR86. El nivel que la mujer ha alcanzado en la sociedad se considera satisfactorio", "HR91. Matar basándose en el honor femenino es aceptado religiosamente" "HR92. Una persona puede matar si el honor femenino ha sido violado", y "HR96. En general, la educación es más importante para los niños que para las niñas"; las diferencias están a favor de Hebrón; los promedios de

Hebrón son superiores a los de Belén, que oscilan entre bajos y medios, como se muestra en la tabla nº(65).

Por otra parte, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: "HR84. ¿Aceptas a una mujer en posiciones de liderazgo, incluyendo el cargo de presidente del Estado?", "HR87. La mujer tiene derecho a tomar libremente decisiones que afectan su vida diaria", "HR88. La toma de decisiones dentro de la familia debe contar con la participación de las mujeres", "HR89. Una esposa, hija o hermana, no debe ser golpeada bajo ningún concepto dentro de la familia", "HR93. Yo creo que una mujer tiene los mismos derechos que los hombres cuando se trata de educación, trabajo, libertad al viajar o al elegir un marido", y finalmente,"HR95. Creo que la ley civil tiene mayor capacidad para hacer justicia a las mujeres que cualquier otro sistema fuera de ésta"; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el promedio de estas frases está entre medio y alto, como muestra la tabla nº (65).

Los resultados de las tablas anteriores, nº (64 y 65), indican que existen diferencias y desigualdades en materia de derechos humanos y en particular sobre la mujer. Estas diferencias reflejan las dimensiones estructurales relacionadas con el papel y el lugar de la mujer en la sociedad y la forma de cómo lidiar con eso y cuáles son sus derechos básicos. Los promedios de Belén son mucho mayores con respecto al apoyo a las mujeres y los derechos humanos que los promedios del distrito de Hebrón. Esto hacía referencia al tema de las mujeres y el espacio público. Los siguientes porcentajes corroboran nuestro análisis. Un porcentaje del (53%) en Belén está de acuerdo con la declaración: "HR84. ¿Aceptas a una mujer en posiciones de liderazgo, incluyendo el cargo de presidente del Estado?", frente al (29%) de Hebrón. También hemos encontrado que las diferencias no son sólo a nivel del distrito, sino también a nivel de género en los dos distritos. Un porcentaje del (45%) del número total de varones en Belén está de acuerdo con esta afirmación, mientras que llega al (61%) del número total de mujeres. En el caso de Hebrón, la tasa de aprobación de esto en los hombres fue de un (23.9%), frente al (35%) entre el número total mujeres. Por otra parte, un porcentaje del (60.5%) en Belén se negó a la declaración "HR92. Una persona puede matar si el honor femenino ha sido violado" frente al (33%) en Hebrón. También el (79.5)% en Belén negó la declaración que dice: "HR96. En general, la educación es más importante para los niños que para las niñas", frente al n 66% a nivel de género en la provincia dos. Un porcentaje del (68%) del número total de varones en Belén negó este último enunciado, frente a un porcentaje del 91% del número total de mujeres. En el caso de Hebrón, la tasa de aprobación de esto en los hombres fue de un (58.5%) frente al (72.8%) en el número total de mujeres- Podemos concluir de lo anteriormente mencionado que hay una posición liberada en Belén hacia la mujer, que es apoyada por el centro de la ciudad, las instituciones y sus figuras. Sin embargo, esto no existe en Hebrón. Los anteriores índices de varones en

Belén indican que son más conscientes y están dispuestos a aceptar el papel y los derechos de las mujeres más que los hombres en Hebrón. Esto dio una imagen diferente sobre la posición de las mujeres y la comprensión de sus derechos frente a lo que ocurre con las mujeres de la ciudad de Hebrón.

Nabil Mughrabi añade, "las oportunidades para la educación de la mujer en Hebrón son mejores que las oportunidades de empleo para éstas en la zona de Hebrón"; el papel de la mujer es mucho menor que en otros lugares sobre todo en el ámbito del empleo, y también a la hora de consultar su opinión sobre cuestiones relacionadas con ella en particular.

La historia siguiente es una muestra de lo que mencionamos anteriormente; tiene que ver con la experiencia de la mujer palestina en las elecciones municipales: la primera etapa de las elecciones municipales se inició en Cisjordania y Gaza, e incluía 36 distritos electorales que abarcaban todas las gobernaciones de los territorios palestinos. Comenzaron en la Cisjordania el 24 de Octubre de 2004 y finalizaron el 23 de Diciembre del 2004.

El municipio de Halhul, en el distrito de Hebrón, fue una de las regiones que fueron elegidas para formar parte de la primera etapa de las elecciones municipales. De hecho se hizo en la fecha mencionada. Las facciones palestinas y las personas jurídicas trabajaron en la activación de los comités de los medios de comunicación y los programas sociales presentados por los candidatos. Se presentaron listas de partidos y listas independientes, garantizando la representación de las mujeres candidatas.

De acuerdo con el sistema de cuotas de mujeres, cualquier institución, organización, partido o municipio debe tener representación de hombres y mujeres por lo menos en un (20%) de cada sexo. En realidad las mujeres estaban representadas por un (20%) del consejo de administración del municipio. Y una mujer fue capaz de ganar superando con mucho la mayoría de los votos. A pesar de ello, su victoria no contó porque se consideró que no podría ganar la mayoría de los votos. Por lo tanto, sólo dos, en lugar de tres mujeres, se convirtieron en miembros del consejo de administración, ya que se interpretó la ley como que afirmaba que las mujeres deberían tener sólo una representación del 20%. Este asunto provocó la ira de algunas organizaciones y el debate continúa acerca de la concesión al tercer miembro del derecho de representación ya que fue capaz de ganar por medio de la elección, lo que llevó a un debate sobre la comprensión de la ley y los mecanismos de su aplicación (Salameh & Da 'na, 2006A:86).

Esto indica no sólo la estructura masculina de la sociedad, sino también la debilidad de la estructura institucional en Hebrón. Por otra parte está la falta de solidez en los movimientos de mujeres en la sociedad palestina, puesto que Iman Shalaldah, que trabaja a favor de los derechos de la mujer en Hebrón, dice: "estamos trabajando para elevar el

nivel de conciencia de la sociedad sobre la importancia del papel de la mujer en la sociedad, especialmente en Hebrón, que es la ciudad palestina más conservadora de Cisjordania". Esto coincide con "la gran caída del papel del movimiento de mujeres sobre todo después de la fundación de la Autoridad, que minimiza el papel de las mujeres en la labor de las instituciones a favor de la acción popular como sucedió en la Primera Intifada. "

Dimensión de la participación cívica y política

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de la participación cívica y política de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA. Las tablas nº (66 y 67) muestran los resultados.

Los resultados en las tablas nº (66 y 67) muestran que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: "P99. Asisto a reuniones políticas ", "P100. ¿Ha protestado oficialmente por las políticas municipales con el fin de cambiar algo que no es de su interés o la gente de la zona ", y finalmente, "P104. Participo en protestas". Las diferencias están a favor de Hebrón; el promedio de estas frases está entre medio y bajo, como muestra la tabla nº (67).

En general, podemos leer, en la tabla nº (67), que el grado de participación política y social es bajo y medio, como muestran los promedios. Es interesante ver las diferencias en 3 párrafos de 12 en favor de los miembros de Hebrón, es decir, Hebrón se caracteriza por asistir a reuniones políticas, lo que es natural, sobre todo si sabemos que el (38.7%) de la muestra en Hebrón pertenecía a partidos políticos frente al (33.3%). Si nos fijamos, por ejemplo, en los apartados como "¿lee el periódico?" no hubo diferencias; nos encontramos con que un porcentaje de (52%) en Belén lee el periódico siempre o muchas veces, comparado con el (44%) de Hebrón. En cuanto a "¿ofreces ayuda cuando otros te lo solicitan?", un porcentaje del (46.5%) en Belén responde "siempre" y "con frecuencia" frente a un (31%) en Hebrón.

Creemos que la razón de esta diferencia está relacionada con la familia y la estructura política de Hebrón que la distingue de Belén en estar centralizada y al incluir las actividades de partido y de institución dentro de la familia o de un marco político central en comparación con la descentralización en Belén. Esto explica la singularidad de Hebrón en las manifestaciones callejeras organizadas por los partidos políticos islámicos, especialmente por motivos religiosos. En los últimos años Hebrón fue testigo de un considerable número de manifestaciones pacíficas que pedían la instauración del Califato y que fueron organizadas por el Partido de la Liberación Islámica.

En cuanto a la protesta contra las políticas municipales en aras de la mejora de las condiciones de vida en Hebrón, se dan más en Hebrón que en Belén. La razón podría deberse al hecho de que los residentes de Hebrón sufren más restricciones a nivel de infraestructura, como en electricidad, calles, alcantarillado, agua, etc., que en Belén. El informe del Censo indica que la situación de la infraestructura en Belén es mucho mejor que en Hebrón (Oficina Central Palestina de Estadística, 2009A y B).

Pasamos ahora a una dimensión importante de la cultura cívica, que es la confianza en el estado, las instituciones y los líderes. Vemos que este aspecto está relacionado con los resultados de la dimensión de evaluación de la actuación del gobierno, que tratamos antes.

Dimensión de la confianza en la actuación de instituciones formales y cívicas y en los líderes

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión de confianza en las actuaciones de las instituciones formales y cívicas, y la dimensión de los líderes, de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA. Las tablas nº (68 y 69) muestran los resultados.

Las tablas nº (66 y 67) muestran que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: "TRUST110. Policía palestina", TRUST111. Miembros de los parlamentos legislativos", "TRUST112. Líderes religiosos", "TRUST113. Políticos", "TRUST114. Fuerzas de seguridad" y, por último, "TRUST115. Actuación del Consejo Legislativo". Las diferencias están a favor de Hebrón; el promedio de estas frases es medio, como muestra la tabla nº67. Si bien hay diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0,05$ en la siguiente oración afirmativa según la gobernación "TRUST109. El Presidente de la Autoridad Palestina (Abo Mazen)". Las diferencias están a favor de Belén; la media de estas frases son de tamaño medio, como se muestra en la tabla nº69.

Hay una característica general en los resultados de la tabla nº (69) de las respuestas de la muestra de investigación, que sería: el grado de confianza cae si se dirige hacia una institución o una persona vinculada con la política, y se eleva cuando la cuestión está relacionada con una actividad o asunto civil.

En el plano de las diferencias estadísticas, éstas se mostraron a favor de Hebrón, lo que confirma los resultados de la evaluación de la gobernación de los gobiernos de Hamas y Al Fatah, que se mostraron a favor de Hebrón también. Esto refuerza nuestra impresión de que la estructura de Hebrón, independientemente de la actitud ideológica adoptada por el individuo, está más cerca del apoyo al sistema político,

independientemente del hecho de que el individuo adopte la ideología del Estado o se oponga a ella.

Es una cultura que refuerza la estabilidad del sistema político, algo que ya señalaron Almond y Verba (1960). En cuanto a Belén, los resultados de la investigación muestran que existe una posición más crítica que en el caso de Hebrón, ya sea a nivel de la evaluación del sistema político de Hamas, Fatah o de los gobiernos, o en relación al bajo grado de confianza. Esto también está documentado por los resultados de la tabla anterior. En cuanto a la confianza en el clero (líderes religiosos), el índice de confianza fue mayor entre las muestras de Hebrón que entre las de Belén. Fue de (49.5%) y (32%) respectivamente. Un porcentaje del (34.5%) en Hebrón respondió que confiaban en el presidente Abu Mazen, frente aun porcentaje del (23%) de confianza en Belén.

Podemos concluir de lo anteriormente mencionado que Hebrón está más cerca del predominio de una dimensión de una; esto es natural en un ambiente conservador y tradicional en comparación con el caso de Belén; dicha actitud niega múltiples puntos de vista y formas de vida. Esto nos lleva a revisar la última dimensión de la cultura cívica que es la dimensión del pluralismo o el sistema multipartidista.

Dimensión del sistema multipartidista

Para identificar las diferencias en la dimensión del sistema multipartidista de acuerdo con la Gobernación, el investigador utiliza One Way ANOVA. Las tablas nº (70 y 71) muestran los resultados.

Los resultados de las tablas nº(70 y 71) indican que existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes oraciones negativas de acuerdo a la gobernación: "M125. Mis relaciones con otros se basan en la afiliación religiosa" y "M130. La religión y la identidad sectaria son la base de mis creencias y de mi comportamiento". Las diferencias están a favor de Hebrón; los promedios en Hebrón son superiores a los de Belén; su grado es medio, como se muestra en la tabla nº (71).

Por otra parte, existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el nivel de $\alpha = 0.05$ en las siguientes frases positivas según la Gobernación: " M123. El sistema de coexistencia multirreligiosa se encuentra en una buena situación dentro de la sociedad palestina", "M124. Yo respeto las opiniones que son diferentes a las mías, independientemente de que sean desde un punto de vista político, cultural o religioso", "M126. La diversidad y el sistema político multipartidista es algo positivo", "M127. La coexistencia de múltiples religiones (cristiana y musulmana) en Palestina ha contribuido a la tolerancia", "M128. A pesar de que diferentes puntos de vista podrían confundirme,

aún así me gustan y prefiero escucharlos", y finalmente, "M129. La identidad nacional para mí es la incubadora de cualquier tipo de diversidad"; las diferencias están a favor de Belén; el promedio de estas frases está entre medio y alto, como muestra la tabla nº (71).

Los resultados de la tabla nº(71) muestran que las diferencias estuvieron a favor de Belén. Es claro para nosotros desde los promedios y porcentajes como el (87%) de Belén en comparación con el (76%) de Hebrón en relación con la siguiente declaración: "M124. respeto las opiniones que son diferentes a las mías, independientemente de que sean desde un punto de vista político, cultural o religioso". Un porcentaje del (82.5%), frente al (57.5%) de Hebrón está de acuerdo con que: " La presencia religiosa (cristiana y musulmana) en Palestina ha contribuido a la tolerancia". "Un porcentaje de (29.5%) en Belén y del (48.5%) en Hebrón está de acuerdo con la declaración: " M130. La religión y la identidad sectaria son la base de mis creencias y de mi comportamiento".

Nidal Abu Akir apoya el pluralismo en la sociedad palestina, ya que, "la sociedad se compone de clases, grupos y sectores y es múltiple en el plano cultural e ideológico, en el plano de las religiones y necesariamente cuando estas estructuras sociales, económicas y económico se expresan a través de partidos o movimientos. El papel de la ley contribuye positivamente a esta diversidad lo que ayuda a la movilidad social y el desarrollo de la sociedad. Iman Shalaldah añade: "el secreto que está detrás del desarrollo de los pueblos y de las sociedades, es su capacidad para asimilar la diversidad y la pluralidad dentro de la misma sociedad; esto lleva a la construcción de una sociedad democrática".

La pluralidad religiosa, social y política y el estado de interacción diaria que se experimenta en Belén han contribuido, de una manera u otra, a crear un buen estado de salud en su pluralismo, basado en el respeto al otro y a su punto de vista. Esto es lo que se echa de menos en la experiencia histórica de Hebrón, además de las condiciones políticas que impidieron su desarrollo y la introducción en la ciudad de experiencias diferentes durante más de un siglo.

Como se trata de la última dimensión de la cultura cívica, podemos hacer una generalización sobre la base de los resultados de la investigación. Éstos están muy estrechamente relacionados con la estructura social, cultural, conservadora y tradicional de Hebrón. Todas las declaraciones negativas (prácticas no democráticas en contradicción con los derechos humanos y los derechos de las mujeres, etc.) que miden la cultura cívica, fueron más apoyadas en Hebrón que en Belén, incluida la pluralidad.

¿Cómo imaginan los residentes la imagen de la ciudad?

En este sentido, vamos a revisar varios aspectos que creemos son importantes y que están directamente relacionados con los diferentes patrones de vida de social, cultural,

religiosa y política de los residentes en ambas ciudades. Este aspecto se considera complementario a lo que ya fue analizado en los capítulos anteriores. Para cumplir con esto, vamos a dividirlo en varios temas que se complementan entre sí. Hemos optado por esto con la intención de lograr una muestra clara de pensamientos.

La identidad de la ciudad

En muestra de la investigación de Belén y Hebrón se planteó esta pregunta con el fin de observar cómo los ciudadanos se ven a sí mismos ya que esto también es importante en relación a sus comportamientos, que implícitamente tienen que ver con la reputación de la ciudad. Anteriormente hemos hablado de cómo la notoriedad del distrito de Hebrón impide a sus residentes seguir ciertos comportamientos que son incompatibles con su reputación. De lo contrario, éstos serían interpretados como un insulto a la ciudad que alberga la tumba del patriarca Abraham. Para ello, hemos adoptado la distribución Chi-Square como se muestra en la tabla nº (72).

A pesar de la presencia de diferencias estadísticamente significativas que demuestran nuestra proposición, esta no se tendrá en cuenta ya que es considerada una columna de la tabla que incluye un porcentaje inferior al (5%). Basta indicar aquí los porcentajes más importantes que dan una impresión general sobre la perspectiva de los ciudadanos acerca de su propia ciudad. La mitad de los residentes de Hebrón, en un índice del (50%), ven que su ciudad es conservadora en su forma de vida, mientras que el (30.5%) mencionó que era tradicional. Cuando sumamos los dos porcentajes obtenemos que un (80.5%) de los residentes de la ciudad ven ésta como tradicional y conservadora. Estos porcentajes reflejan cómo la conciencia de los estereotipos individuales se construye sobre la forma, la naturaleza y los requisitos de vida en esa ciudad, de una u otra forma, para que armonice con su perspectiva de ciudad. Esto viene con la interpretación de que la imposición de conductas, valores y de la moda debe estar vinculada con esta imagen conservadora. Aunque el (12%) mencionó que Hebrón es tolerante, vemos que la ciudad está más cerca de un estereotipo que se aproxima más a un patrón más cercano a la religión que a un patrón de vida cívica. Esto también se aplica a Belén. La tabla de resultados confirma que la imagen de Belén se diferencia cualitativamente y cuantitativamente de lo que se ha mencionado anteriormente sobre Hebrón. Las opciones están más distribuidas. A pesar de esto, vemos que el porcentaje de los que mencionaron que su ciudad era abierta y liberada en el modo de vida fue de un (40%). Si a esto añadimos el porcentaje de aquéllos que la consideraban tolerante, el porcentaje total sería del (58%). Esta visión de la ciudad construye los patrones y valores que deben armonizar con el imaginario social que se formó como los ciudadanos creían. En consecuencia, habrá un gran espacio en Hebrón que desee estar más cerca de la pauta de la vida cívica. Esto es lo que queríamos señalar sobre la importancia de tener una referencia civil y moderna en el corazón de Belén; algo que echa de menos la ciudad de Hebrón.

La identidad individual

El análisis anterior también se conecta con una cuestión sobre la definición de la persona de su identidad y de cómo definir ésta. La muestra de investigación pedía que los participantes se presentasen de acuerdo con siete opciones para priorizarlas según su importancia. El número 1 es la más importante y el número (7), la menos importante (anexo número 12). Hallamos que uno de los resultados más importantes de esta tabla es la armonía entre las dos ciudades en la importancia de la identidad individual al presentarse. También se observa que hay diferencias esenciales entre Belén y Hebrón en especial con respecto a la identidad religiosa. Un porcentaje del (28.8%) en Hebrón eligió primero la religión en comparación con (4.1%) de Belén. La identidad árabe fue elegida por un (18.1%) en Belén y un (12.5%) en Hebrón. La identidad palestina por un (17.5%) en Belén y un (14%) en Hebrón. Aquí vemos la importancia de la religión en la presentación de uno mismo de acuerdo según los residentes de Hebrón o de Belén. Sin embargo, podemos decir que la religión en Belén está más cerca de la religión cívica de lo que está en Hebrón. También descubrimos que la nacionalidad y la identidad árabe palestina es la identidad más importante en la presentación del yo en la ciudad de Belén.

En cuanto a la identidad política, es como hemos hecho antes: no posee ninguna importancia entre las dos partes puesto que esto refleja el estado escasa fuerza en cuanto a la afiliación a un partido político. Belén evaluó la actuación de los partidos políticos, en general, como negativa, en un índice del (80.3%) en comparación con el (69%) en Hebrón.

Condiciones sociales

Las condiciones sociales y políticas, junto con las costumbres y las tradiciones, controlan la sociedad palestina en general, uniendo a esto el estado de aislamiento de las ciudades palestinas. Esto ha impedido la creación de un estado de movilidad social y cultural que ha hecho que la experiencia de las ciudades palestinas sea única, como resultado de sus condiciones y de la élite, tal y como se mencionó anteriormente. Ahora vamos a revisar algunos de los párrafos de las cuestiones que apoyan las actitudes conservadoras y tradicionales en la ciudad de Hebrón, más que en Belén, en el nivel del ciudadano. Un porcentaje del (18%) en Belén está de acuerdo con la siguiente declaración: "La obediencia ciega es uno de los mejores medios para crear un buen ciudadano", frente al (38%) en Hebrón. Costumbres y tradiciones: "tenemos que aferrarnos a las costumbres y a las tradiciones";(48.5%) en Belén frente al (59%) en Hebrón. En la educación: "Animo a mis hijos a ser independientes en sus decisiones, lejos de mi propio punto de vista"; un porcentaje del (71.5%) en Belén estuvo de acuerdo con esto, frente al (66%) en Hebrón; Vida cívica: "Los teatros y los cines desempeñan un

papel positivo en el desarrollo de la cultura cívica y social; yo estoy a favor de tenerlos en la ciudad." Un porcentaje del (64.5%) en Belén, frente al (48%) en Hebrón, estaba de acuerdo con esto. La toma de decisiones: "Yo apoyo el sistema de pirámide en la toma de decisiones"; un porcentaje del (47%) en Belén, frente al (68%) en Hebrón, estaba de acuerdo con esto.

Necesidades sociales

¿Qué quiere la sociedad, si se le da a ésta la oportunidad de tomar una decisión? Ésta es la pregunta que se dirigía a la muestra de investigación para ver las prioridades de los proyectos que la Autoridad Nacional Palestina debe cumplir. Refleja las necesidades implícitas de los individuos, su forma de pensar y su patrón de vida. La tabla nº (73) nos aclara las respuestas de los ciudadanos.

Notamos que la mayoría de los residentes de Hebrón prefieren en primer término que la Autoridad se centre en el problema del desempleo con una tasa de respuesta del (32.2%); en segundo lugar, los proyectos económicos con un (15.2%). En cuanto a Belén, la primera opción fue la de la reforma de los partidos políticos (22%), el desempleo estaría en segundo lugar (15.2%). Un porcentaje del (10.5%) en Belén eligió la justicia social frente a un (8.1%) en Hebrón. A pesar de las prioridades de la vida y de las condiciones económicas que rodean a la sociedad palestina, la mayoría de la muestra de Belén dio prioridad a la reforma de los partidos políticos. La mayoría de las respuestas en Hebrón se concentraron en el aspecto económico. La distribución de las respuestas de la muestra Belén fue interesante. Reflejaba la actitud del estado de diversidad que afecta a la vida cívica en ese distrito, frente al caso tan distinto de Hebrón.

Conclusión Final

Tras una revisión de los resultados de la investigación, donde se han mostrado todas las comparaciones en los aspectos y las manifestaciones de las actitudes cívicas entre Belén y Hebrón, podemos afirmar lo siguiente:

- La estructura de Hebrón es conservadora y carece de diversidad política, cultural y religiosa. Está apoyada por una gobernación conservadora y tradicional que se basa y se desarrolla en un contexto histórico y político que ha contribuido a la cristalización de la identidad de los residentes de forma paralela a la reputación de la ciudad, en comparación con el estado de relativa apertura y diversidad de la ciudad de Belén en la que se da la presencia de una referencia civilizada moderna en el centro de la ciudad, lo que ha contribuido a la difusión de conceptos, valores y comportamientos asociados con la vida de la ciudad más que los del campo.

- El discurso de la élite, las instituciones y los líderes de la acción civil y política en Belén está más cerca del discurso moderno que se asocia con la imagen de la ciudad abierta al mundo, en comparación con el discurso tradicional religioso que controla las instituciones cívicas y políticas en Hebrón y que hizo del centro de la ciudad una extensión de la cultura y los valores del campo.

- Los tipos y las variaciones en la experiencia de los refugiados palestinos en Belén difieren de los de Hebrón. En Belén los refugiados están más integrados en la vida de la ciudad y están más influenciados por sus valores, ya que se situaron en el corazón de la misma ciudad. Así se deduce del poder y la influencia que posee la élite de los refugiados para tomar decisiones políticas y sociales en la vida de Belén, mucho más que en el caso de Hebrón.

- La educación y la experiencia histórica se consideran aspectos importantes en la ampliación de opciones, modos de vida y apertura de miras de aquellos que poseen grados académicos. Hay que destacar que Belén es la primera ciudad palestina que inició la inversión en este sentido. Esto se refleja en las estadísticas que indican el bajo nivel de analfabetismo, el número de licenciados y el tamaño de la clase media moderna; características que se manifiestan mucho más en Belén que en Hebrón.

- El porcentaje de la brecha entre la educación de hombres y mujeres en Belén es pequeño en comparación a Hebrón, del mismo modo que el porcentaje de su representación en las ocupaciones de la clase media moderna.

- No hubo diferencias notables entre el campo, el campamento y la ciudad de Belén en el nivel de trabajo, educación, tamaño de la familia, y el tamaño de la clase media, como en el caso de Hebrón. Esto significa que en Belén hay una diversidad y una ampliación de

experiencia, junto con una mayor interacción entre los habitantes; mucho más que en Hebrón.

- La disparidad en la estructura social y cultural de las dos ciudades se manifestó a través de las diferencias y divergencias con respecto a las actitudes y posiciones de las dos ciudades hacia los valores cívicos y otras dimensiones (democracia, derechos humanos, laicismo, pluralismo y tolerancia). El porcentaje de apoyo de las manifestaciones positivas de la cultura cívica en Belén superó al de Hebrón. Allí encontramos mayor apoyo a actitudes y valores de manifestaciones negativas y de valores incivilizados.

- Lo mismo se deduce de las opciones cívicas, del patrón y estilo de vida relativamente abierto, de las universidades y las escuelas mixtas, de los restaurantes mixtos, los bares, y los gustos cívicos que podemos encontrar en Belén pero no Hebrón.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

Every society has its own culture which represents the entire life styles and everyday ways of life that are shared by individuals. (Barakat, 2000). The significance of culture lies in the fact that it is an appropriate tool to overlook the different natural trends of interpretations of the natural human behaviors since they all have social meanings (Kosh, 2007:10) It is a set of accumulated and acquired knowledge from experiences, norms, laws, beliefs, values, attitudes, approaches, meanings, symbols, social rank, religion, notion of time and place, roles, social relationships and power ties which mutually influence the individuals and groups within a certain society (Smith, 2000; Meisel, 1974). When we deal with social or political phenomena, they are not addressed as superior but as part of this entire Social System.

Culture exceeds people's attitudes towards politicians and political institutions; it is molded out of complex feelings and perceptions derived from family, work, religion, factory and from the popular culture; culture looks like a discourse that the people have to interpret and use (Street, 1994). In return, culture formulates the social and political behaviors and attitudes since they reflect certain expectations determined by the culture.

Consequently, it is not feasible to study this phenomenon in isolation from the society and its culture (Abrash, 1998:52). Thus, the concept of civic culture or political culture in light of the functional analysis of both is a part of culture in its general sense; it is transformed into a group of political, social and civic values and codes distinguishing it from others and linking it with the patterns of thought that are derived from culture.

The concept of political culture represents a set of values, beliefs, views, and feelings related to the political system (Almond & Verba, 1963). At the cognitive level, it defines, clarifies or inquires about the rules of the political game whereas the normative aspect clarifies the justification or denial of the Authority by the main players like official or civic organizations or political parties inside it (Smelser & Baltes, 2001, Vol6:11640).

This comes at a time when the civic culture emphasizes the stable or backed democracy, especially when the democratic positions and practices are united and are working parallel with a non democratic pattern (Almond, 2001:1862), It considers that people according to democracy are citizens who have rights and they are subject to the system (Almond & Verba, 1963).

What makes civic culture distinguished is not its direction and laws but its participation and its natural diversity. In a civic culture, the role of the participants becomes part and parallel with the role of the politically subjected individuals as an expression of a balanced pattern; it also embodies the passive acceptance and allegiance to the political authority. In addition there is the limited role which links the individual with the nonpolitical traditional groups like family and church. The social confidence and the main obligations towards the system and the nation play a calming role in conflicts and divisions (Diamond, 1994:24).The abovementioned indicates to us the prospect of

having a civic culture along with what it signifies in relation to the stability of the system all over the world regardless of how democratic they.

Another concept that is linked with the topic of civic culture is the concept of civic virtues and civic attitudes whose roots go back to the Republican Theory which back then meant civic duty which systematically appears in elections. It consists of three aspects: Fear from corruption, fear from dependence and independence and liberty. Self – Independence means looking deep inside so that they would judge themselves whereas the civic virtues mean looking outside and doing whatever is good towards the Common Good (Dagger, 1997). Since the citizen is the subject matter of politics, he/she has to show political obedience and compliance with the system besides the people’s mutual knowledge of the civic, political and economic rights of a good citizen who observes the system and the system in return observes the citizen’s natural, civic and ethical freedoms.

Interest in civic republic by behaviorist and political scholars has increased (Almond & Verba,1963,1989; Seligson & Muller,1987). Both Almond and Verba concluded in their study that effective democracy depends on subjection, competitive participation, social trust, and social cooperation. Putnam (1993) arrived at the same conclusion; Cultural legacy constitutes the cultural values and civic attitudes. Accordingly, we should view the society in terms of two major aspects:

First: it concerns the Political Body or society which has to do with all that is political including political parties, composition and attitudes on the grounds that they are effective and influential forces in the political field, laws and their nature, administration, awareness, individual political attitudes toward the system and governments and assessment of the system.

Second: It is the Civil Body which includes civic attitudes towards the society and its administration, volunteerism, and participation in civic activities; since the forces of the civil society are located half way between the social body (individuals) and political body (state), they are considered the primary defenders of individuals’ rights in the event that they were violated by the state. On the other hand, it is considered the intellectual and practical incubator of the civic manifestations that defend human and woman rights and strengthen democracy as a social and political system of life. It is similar to the approach of the political parties which formulate their vision based on the nature of the society and translate them through their contribution to its establishment.

When reviewing the Arab world in general and the Palestinian reality in particular based on what was stated in the introduction, Miari (2003) indicates that the interest in such issues of the civic and political culture and democratic transformation by the academic milieu and intellectuals is weak, rare or completely absent.

In his analysis, Al-Azar (1996:45) concludes that the Arab reality lacks several qualities of the concept of democracy. The Arabic culture in general dedicates a certain behavioral pattern that stresses the values of obedience and allegiance and reliance and support from the group and family; there is also no separation between religion and state. As for the political system , it is still individualistic and revolves around the character of the leader in terms of decision making while the other opinion does not exist; in fact, it is

very restricted and besieged; the citizen is overlooked and his rights are violated. In return, he adds that the Arabic culture consists of values of social solidarity, steadfastness, self esteem, loyalty, modesty and cooperation. It tends to solve disputes amicably since the last value does not contradict with the stability of the democratic system.

The Palestinian reality coincides with the above conclusion since it has a special entity that differs from other Arab states. It is because the Palestinian reality is still under the yoke of occupation; moreover, the Palestinian territories are divided into geographically separated cities and villages besides the absence of a national state and its sovereignty over the Palestinian territories; it is also the recent political experience of the political system not as parties since party experience goes back to almost one century. In addition, there are historically active civic institutions which existed prior to the establishment of the National Authority following the Oslo Agreement signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] and the Israeli government. There is also no economic structure and this correlated with the dependence and association of the Palestinian market with the Israeli market.

It is not the concern of the fragile Palestinian reality and its association with the state of chaos which is deeply rooted in the Palestinian culture and its manifestations in the political system and its culture, the legal aspects and their application and the fragile economic dimensions, to meet the requirements and stipulations of the process of democratic transformation. This chaos has imposed a state of cognitive contradictions and attitudes toward political and social issues; both the Palestinian society and the leadership seek and aspire to build a state and a democratic system through political discourse or opinion polls (Kassis, 1999; Miari, 2003); however, the political reality in the Palestinian society contradicts and opposes such a matter in terms of the Authority practices and their nondemocratic approach or in terms of the growth of the political Islamic opposition; this makes advocates of democracy a very limited group incapable of enhancing the process of democratic transformation and the building of a civil society.

Accordingly, the present research aspires to study the civic culture inside the Palestinian society; this civic culture means, “The set of values, habits, customs, political, social and cultural activities which the individual holds and practices since they facilitate his/her existence in a population cluster to guarantee a state of belongingness, recognition of rights and duties, and his attitudes towards life, society and its political and social forces.”

The reason behind the researcher choice of this subject matter is due to the nature of the present stage in light of the fallbacks and failures of political and social complications and organizational crises incurred as a result of the political and economic conditions which the Palestinians Territories have been undergoing as a result of occupation. This structural crisis has stormed the political forces and civil society organizations which are the representatives of the process of democratic transformation and cultural change; this battle is no less important than the battle of resistance of occupation and its policies since the specificity of the Palestinian reality requires a logical process of interaction between the national tasks and the democratic, societal and civil tasks to make this process of interaction as one of the mechanisms of development of the social reality.

Consequently, we find it imperative to understand the nature of the internal Palestinian society at the regional level and not by comparing it with other states nor to prove or disprove a theory. It is an understanding of the phenomenon which based on the scientific understanding of it on the ground.

Why Palestine, and the selection criteria?

Our choice of the research topic and the research population is due to the following:

- The nature of the social, economic and political growth of the Palestinian society is a unique case due to the fact that it is still under the yoke of occupation; such a life has its made Palestinians pay a high price since it had impacted the nature of its cultural, economic and political structure; thus, the process of democratic transformation and cultural change can only be understood by taking into consideration all of the above mentioned.
- The existence of a stumbling and modern form statehood which lacks sovereignty obstructs the development of the political process and the nature of institutions and the apparatus linked to it.
- The budgets of both the newly born state and the existing NGO's are bound by the donor states and not by the citizens' revenues.
- The Authority lacks sovereignty over several territories and this obstructs the implementation and the rule of the law.

As for the reasons why we chose Hebron and Bethlehem cities as the research population, they are in addition to the abovementioned :

- Palestinian cities are living in a state of isolation from one another, and this increases the intensity of localism. Also the nature of cultures in these two cities is distinguished by being regional, and it is linked with the historical contexts the cities' had witnessed. In addition, there is not any central city which represents a cultural reference. Consequently, we cannot imagine a pure civic culture away from the city within the sociological framework including the way of life and the economic pattern that harmonizes with it.
- The presence of a state of conflict regarding the city identity in Hebron in light of its significance to both Muslims and Jews while there is no identity conflict in Bethlehem.
- There is regional cultural diversity (city, village and camp) and religious diversity (Muslims, Christians) in a small geographical spot in Bethlehem city while this is nonexistent in Hebron city.

The characteristics of the city

Bethlehem City	Hebron City
<p>Liberal The center of the city (Nativity Church and Omer mosque). There is no conflict state regarding the identity of the city. Elite and politicians discourse regarding the city is international. Education system (traditional, Secularism). National Movement (Christians and Muslim) Active Civil society organization. Civic life</p>	<p>Conservative. Center of city is (Abraham Mosque). Conflict state regarding the identity of the city. Elite and politicians discourse regarding the city is religious. Education system (Traditional, Religious) Historically exist religious movement as shield defense of scared of the place(Judaism and Islamic). Active Kinship organization. Traditional life.</p>

The significance of the research

The significance of the research is due to the fact that the Palestinian society is witnessing a state of delivery of a newly born state in very hard situation ; thus, it is imperative to understand the civic culture in the Palestinian regions since the nature of these differences contributes towards putting forward policies and strategies which would assist in supporting the process of civic, social and political transformation.

The researcher will measure the civic culture through the following indicators “support of democracy, civic and political participation, rule of The Law, tolerance, acceptance of pluralism, respect of human and woman social, political and economic rights, Secularism, citizens attitudes toward the government .”

Keys Questions

The research will attempt to answer main questions through theoretical analyses supported by field results. The questions are:

- What are the manifestations and shape of the civic culture in the research population?
- What is the significance of a city to civic culture?
- What is the nature of the civic culture in the structure of the Palestinian culture?

- What is the relationship between the political parties and democracy?
- What is the form of civic culture in the modern middle class?
- Is there any statistically significant differences in the features of civic culture between Bethlehem and Hebron cities?

In order to fulfill the goal of the research, the researcher will discuss several conceptual issues relating to the concept of civic culture on the world level then borrow what is borrowable to apply to the Palestinian reality. The research subject matter will be analyzed based on the following aspects:

The Scope and Definition of Civic culture concept

The concept of civic culture is one of the concepts that preoccupied scholars of sociology and politics in both the western and Arab worlds due to its close association with democracy (Muller&Seligson,1994; Miari, 2003), and the nature of the political system. In spite of the growing interest in this concept, it is still weak due to the standard presuppositions of the nature and function of democracy which consider that the model of the Western democratic culture is superior (Chilton, 1988), and this makes it obligatory on other peoples to go along with and emulate it.

The first Attempt starting was launched by Almond and Verba (1963) in their book *Civic Culture* until present day; it was based on an understanding of the process and cultural democracy inside the political system and its relationship with it and vice versa. In spite of the systematic differences and measuring tools which tried to identify the concept, it is still engulfed in mystery. It has been dealt with as an international model of comparison among nationalities in terms of their cultural nature. Then the concept became politicized and susceptible to deviation. Czudnowski (1968:878) considers that the problem in this regard is in the meaning given to the outcome since researchers in aspects of comparisons among nationalities have to take into consideration the equivalences for there are two basic resources for the differences in the established information out of the nationalities:

- Differences relating to the cultural nature like language, education, religion, degree of openness and clarity of personal views.
- Cultural Differences in the political nature.

In order to identify the concept of the civic culture, we must review the research and studies that had dealt with it from different aspects. The book of *Civic Culture* by Almond and Verba (1963) discussed one of the important questions of post war sociology; it is why did democracy survive in the period between the two wars in Britain and America while it collapsed in the European continent; they indicated that an independent democratic system requires a culture of balanced policy (civic culture) which joins active and passive trends and attitudes.

After four decades and more, the book remains a landmark in scientific research since both Almond and Verba did not only present a proof to their theoretical thesis but it also paved the way for others to test, edit or reject their hypotheses. This is what Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990:247-258) had done; they pointed out the gaps and wrong generalizations of the cases discussed in the book. In addition to the impact of the book, it had remained in supremacy and continued to be a model all over the world to all of those who are interested in sociology and politics, those who oppose the study or those who support it (Ben-Dor, 1977; Docherty, Goodlad & Paddison, 2001; Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002; Seyd & Whiteley, 2002; Lo, Bettinger & Fan, 2004; Paden, 2005; Tessler & Gao, 2005; Cox & Reese, 2006; Baxter, 2008; Klicperova-Baker & Feierabe, 2008; Wang & Liu, 2008; Baek, 2009; Poire, 2009).

The study population consisted of five states, “Italy, Mexico, Germany, United States and Great Britain” in order to explain the relationship between three basic variables. The independent variable is the social structure. The intermediate variable is the political culture: the civic virtues or the civic culture. The dependent variable is the stability of democracy. Their study explained that there are three broad types of political culture: Parochial, Subject, and Participant. They were summarized as follows:

“A participant is assumed to be aware of and informed about the political system in both its governmental and political aspects. A Subject tends to be cognitively oriented primarily to the output side of government: the executive, bureaucracy, and judiciary. The parochial tends to be unaware, or only dimly aware, of the political system in all its aspects” (Almond & Verba, 1963:79).

Regarding to their definition to political culture they regarded as “specifically political orientation...attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system (Almond & Verba, 1963:13), and the same to Seymour Lipset (1960) he defined it as “a particular distribution of political attitude, feeling, information and skills” (Gibbins, 1990:7). The question remains what did Almond and Verba mean by their concept of civic culture? They meant “the civic culture is pluralistic and based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permits change but moderates it” (Almond & Verba, 1963:8). which referred to as a set of specific attitudes which are crucial to the success of modern democracy, other synonymous socio-psychological terms include cognitive (knowledge), affective (feeling), and evaluative (values). Only civic culture blend and balances the elements in such way that stable and effective democracy can be maintained, the blend appropriate here being mix of subject and participant culture combining trust and a strong deference to authority with a positive attitude to the goods of active participation” (Gibbins, 1990:7).

The study stimulated several criticisms which lead to a rereading of their concept in their publication in (1989); the review of the concept of political culture lead to an reduction in the psychological analysis of its overtones since civic culture is a subtype of

political culture. It is possible to summarize the main criticisms of Almond and Verba as follows:

- They barely defined political culture (Lijphart, 1980).
- They did not justify the reasons why they chose those specific states (Lijphart, 1980).
- Almond and Verba's study discusses civic culture as an independent variable while it discusses the democratic stability as a dependent variable since it is not necessarily a cause relationship (Pateman, 1980).
- They used the Anglo American concept of democracy as a yardstick to evaluate political systems (Wiatr, 1980).
- The study did not show the historical roots of the political culture of the studied states and it avoided stratified analysis (Wiatr, 1980).
- In their analysis, they implicitly adopted visions of the middle class in the evaluation of the political policy of the society and did not pay attention to poor classes (Wiatr, 1980).
- They had adopted the structural functional analysis in their interpretation of the studied population within the framework that this reality does not change; so this contributed to classifying them as conservative (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990).
- Some considered that the concept of political culture is closely related to the studies called (National Character) and its association with the colonial states which imposed the use of democracy on the third world, but it did not work out. Then there was a questioning about the cultural basis for democracy (Kosh, 2007).
- The concept of political culture is superior to the concept of civic culture since the latter was able, as a kind of politeness and courtesy, to interpret the social and political manifestations, but the concept of civic culture was greater than that.

Their study stresses the individual political behavior based on three approaches: cognitive, Affective and evaluative. They constitute the three aspects in the discussion of the concept of culture in general; this has pushed Chilton (1988:425) to criticize the concept based on the components of culture; he adds a new dimension to Lowell Dittmer (1977:566) who defined political culture as “ a system of political symbols; this well furnished in the comprehensive system; we have also to consider it in terms of political communication.” Thus the concept has been moved away from an individual definition and association of political symbols (political discourse) and exchange of them through

contacts with others. Chilton (1988:427) adds that symbolic culture is based on a justification, description or contemplation of ways of cultural interaction; we infer here that Chilton reinstates the value of all what is cultural since it identifies the political behavior and rejects bridging it into the individual political behavior.

In a pioneering study, Putnam (1993) discusses the relationship between the social and economic development and the civic culture in Italy; he discusses the geographical distribution of civic culture; he found out that it is present in the northern side of Italy while it is absent in the southern side through his analysis of the historical roots of civic culture; he concluded that democracy is stronger if built on the basis of social reciprocity, confidence and civic engagement, he found that the cultural legacy of the regions had a direct and powerful bearing on the quality of the fledgling governments (Rice & Feldman,1997:1144), for Putnam's social capital, he measured in terms of civil society participation as a key indicator of a democratic citizenry (Seligson, 2002:283). And he regards Participation “in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation” (Putnam, 1993: 90).

In his definition of civic culture, he used several concepts like “civic tradition, political culture, civic involvement, republication virtues”, however, the basic concept in his study is “norms of reciprocity and network of civic engagement” (Putnam,1993:167).

And we can conclude Putnam’s study (1993) was considered the first of its kind in this field in terms of :

- Clarification of the relationship between the economic, social development and the civic culture.
- The phenomenon was analyzed based on its historical accumulation and its social context.
- Clarification of internal differences in civic culture in north and south of Italy.

Most importantly, it was able to divert the track of research in the area of civic culture from a comparison among nationalities to a comparison inside the same state as a unit for analysis.

On the same scope of Almond and Verba, Robert Inglehart makes an explicit link between an aggregation of micro-level attitudes, denominated as political culture, and the macro-level variable of regime type, Specifically, Inglehart attempts to show that a particular form of political culture, civic culture, is strongly linked to the emergence and stability of democracy. He finds a direct causal connection between what he calls the civic culture syndrome and democracy, these three variables-interpersonal trust, support for revolutionary change, and life satisfaction-form a “broad syndrome of related attitudes... [that] show impressive stability over time.” “Life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing social order all tend to go together. They constitute a syndrome of positive attitudes toward the world one lives in” (Seligson, 2002:273-274).

On deferent Study Inglehart and Welzel (2003) indicated that economic development had increased the level of trust and satisfaction with life; consequently, it influences the

attitude of citizens towards democracy. Norris and Inglehart (2002) measured civic culture in their study using three indicators: political and social values, attitudes toward political leaders and finally women rights. In their examination of Huntington Theory on the conflict of civilizations between Western, Arab and Islamic states, he emphasized the validity of this theory.

Huntington (cited in Miari 2003: 20) tends to link between democratic culture and economic growth since a change and growth in the economy is dramatically reflected in influencing social values which produce changes that touch the class structure in the society mainly the growth and increase of the civilized middle class which tends to adopt democratic values; whereas, this depends on the kind of the middle class since Hilal (2006A) found out that there are two types of middle class in the Palestinian society : secular and conservative.

Daniel Elazar's study revealed that there are American political subcultures after he implemented an intensive study of the political culture of every state; cultural diversity and its significance were highlighted. He classified political culture in the United States into three types: individualistic, moralistic, traditionalistic (Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990:233), and this confirms that there are subcultures and consequently local civic cultures based on the diversity of historical and social context which the region experiences.

Local civic culture refers to a local community since it is indicative of general models or ways of public life. Every community embodies a civic culture which was historically formed and works on directing and forming the political and social system. This local civic culture also determines the nature of the problems and solutions that face the community; it also imposes a joint vision of the past, present and future. It works on the formation of everything (Reese & Rosenfeld, 2002) in terms of the social, religious and political structure and its civic and political outcomes represented in the parties, civil societies and the nature of the elite in the local community.

Riley and Fernandez (2006) conducted a comparative study of Spain and Italy during the regime of Franco and Fascism in Italy. Based on the question of the relationship between the civic autonomy and political participation, they found out that the policy of the Italian Fascist regime had created and laid the ground for political participation more than that of Franco's dictatorship since it was able to merge the civil organizations inside the political parties. Researchers found out that the fascist party was not in favor of encouraging political participation through models of political behavior through which it was able to gain control and dominate (Hegemonies) civil organizations including religious ones. In contrast, Franco's regime failed to do so. This was in addition to the concessions it obtained from religious organizations.

Machacek (2003) refers to the importance of religious pluralism in the south of California state towards creating a civil culture based on respect of the other since dialogue between the different religious groups in the general field made it possible to have a civic culture that is distinguished by specific rules and guidelines particularly the law of religious civility. The engagement of different religious groups in the civic life leads to an increase in the culture of religious civility. Cookson (2005) defines Civic

Culture as “ the public sphere in which citizens share thoughts and differences of view points are respected, and citizens are committed to a state of consensus.”

At the Palestinian level, the concept of political culture in the Palestinian society was tested through theoretical and practical indicators of democracy, regarding democracy, women rights and trust in governmental and non governmental organizations (Miari, 2003), and another study by Kassis (1999) which is close to the essence and content of our study which is democratic transformation and civility of the Palestinian society.

Moreover studies have concentrated on addressing the concept in light of a number of aspects mainly: (civic virtues, civic liberalism, tolerance, trust and autonomy, civic Engagement, social capital, civic commitment, civic engagement, civic liberalism, civic participation, civic tradition, political culture, civic involvement, republication virtues).

Thus, civic culture obviously bears some values that makes a relationship to civil society, as shared idea of political and social participation, and somehow we can find there is a connection between civic culture and public sphere, as a common sphere that can be share and competence, any way, we regard civic culture is underscoring culture in general, and in the same cultures inside the society, here we can say there is civic cultures in the dimension of plural that give many patterns of diversity among the people, for that cant regard the civic culture presuppose homogeneity among its citizens, even in the spirit of civic virtues suggest shared commitments to procedures of democracy . According to what discussed above, we can summarized five dimension related to civic culture, Knowledge about the society, Loyalty , citizenship , participation, and tradition, for all societies, but people don't always act the same or has abilities to do so.

We notice from the abovementioned the deeply rooted and multiple differences in the outcomes of the above mentioned studies that they express in content the aspect which the researcher wants to focus on; consequently, it is the starting point, the specification of the function, concept and target the researcher wishes to study and highlight in the research. Accordingly, I will move forward towards a Specifying of the concept of civic culture within the context of this research.

Specifying and Measurement of Civic Culture Concept

The concept of civic culture is so broad and difficult to measure; how can we measure civic culture? This question is the most significant question in the research since the historical use of civic culture was bridged in the understanding of the differences and similarities at the international, national and states level but very few studies and research dealt with the topic at the internal level of the cities (Cox & Reese, 2006). In order to facilitate the process of design and construction of a tools for measurement of the concept of civic culture, we have to rely on studies and research at the international and regional levels in order to clarify the indicators that where used to measure this concept. Moreover, we have to work on the design of a measurement tool that suits the study population.

The early foundations for the theory of civic culture were linked with Inglehart studies (1988, 1990) (as cited in Wang & Lui, 2008:3); he took it for granted that the democratic institutions were inclined to succeed because they were influenced by the strength of positions towards democracy. He used in his study a scale of 12 questions divided into two different values: First: Materialistic values; he meant by them an emphasis on economy and body security. As for Post materialistic values, he meant by them self-expression and quality of life.

Rice and Feldman (1997:1145) summarized the indicators that Putnam's study (1993) used to measure Civicism:

Civic Engagement: Citizens in a civic culture are interested in public affairs and participate in politics. As virtuous members of society, they feel an obligation to actively promote the public good, which they define as more than the aggregate of individual interests. To be sure, private interests still shape many of their attitudes and motivate much of their behavior, but they perceive self-interest broadly, often encompassing the interests of others in their community.

Political Equality: Citizens treat each other as equals in a civic culture. They are "bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency" (Putnam 1993:88). Inequalities in affluence may exist, but they do not disturb the fundamental commitment to equality that shapes individual behavior.

Tolerance: A civic culture is marked by citizens who respect and trust one another. Diversity of ideas and lifestyles is usually tolerated, even encouraged. Self-interest in this community is modified and mitigated by the strong sense of courtesy and trust between individuals.

Social Structures of Cooperation: Organizations abound in a civic culture, from labor unions to chess clubs, and from political parties to neighborhood sports teams. Citizens are active members of many groups, exposing them to a variety of ideas and teaching them the rewards of cooperation and interpersonal trust. Obviously very few, if any, individuals embody completely all of the above components of a civic citizen. But some individuals embody more than others. The same is true of societies; some societies more closely resemble an ideal civic culture than others..

Following Putnam's civic characteristics, Tessler and Gao (2005) for their understanding civic culture in the Middle East, they used four indicators to measure Civic Values: 1. Tolerance 2. Belief in equality in social gender 3. Political interest 4. Civic participation.

To indicate equality, Rice and Arnett (2001:41) employed the percentage of public school teachers who were men, the percentage of state legislators who were women, the number of civil rights groups per capita, and a measure of income inequality. And lastly,

civic engagement was estimated using newspaper circulation per capita, public library books per capita, and community improvement and philanthropy groups per capita.

In a close study on the democratic transformation and civicism of the civil society in Palestine, Kassis (1999) adopted a number of civic qualities in the Palestinian society in his study of the civil society organizations and their role in civilization and the spread of civic culture in the Palestinian society. The main qualities are: dialogue, pluralism, tolerance, competition between the civil society organizations and the Authority, institutionalization of the civil society: free press, unions, independent universities, Research centers, sense of citizenship, woman rights, rule of the Law, voluntary political and social participation and practice of democracy. In its definition of the concept of political culture, Miari's study (2003) divided the tool of his research into two parts ; first part included questions measuring Palestinians attitudes toward support of democracy, woman rights, confidence in governmental and nongovernmental institutions both theoretical and practical.

Accordingly, we can summarize the indicators used to measure civic culture and were adopted in this research as follows:

- **Support of Democracy:** There is a relationship between the degree of civility of society and its support of democracy; the research also seeks to understand the nature of the democracy the citizen desires to have.
- **Civic and Political participation:** It is related to confidence, voluntarism, engagement in social and political activities which express the extent of individual commitment to societal issues surrounding him/her
- **Rule of The Law:** It is not possible to understand the civic life and level of civilization which the state had reached away from the rule of the law which is considered the safety value of the degree of civility; since the Palestinian case is experiencing customary (tribal) law , it will also be addressed.
- **Tolerance:** There is a state of consensus regarding the significance of this indicator on the degree of civilization of the society; it includes religious and social tolerance and disparity of views.
- **Acceptance of Pluralism:** It includes religious, political and social pluralism.
- **Respect of human and woman's social, political and economic rights;** this is considered a milestone in the civility and urbanization of the society and the degree of justice in society.
- **Secularism:** It is the separation between religion and state and all that is traditionally inherited since it expresses the level of rationality in the society.
- **Citizens Attitudes toward Authority** performance with regard to support or opposition of the system and the extent of its ability to influence political decision making.

The research relied on theories, literature and scales which were used in the researches like questionnaire, then developed and designed the tools of data collection.

The researcher does not claim that these indicators satisfactorily measure civic culture but they are significant indicators in the understanding of the process of civic transformation which the study population has achieved.

The Dimensions of the Research

Now, to explain the scope of the research regarding to understand civic culture in the Palestinian society, the researcher relies on four dimensions, which will give better explanation to the Palestinian reality and research's topic. The research subject matter will be analyzed based on the following aspects:

First : City and Civic Culture; Civic Siege and Absence of City

When we discuss civic culture it is imperative to clarify its relationship with the city not as a linguistic derivation from it only since the city is considered the incubator and developer of the civic culture. It is the place where there are the state judicial, legislative and executive institutions, offices and apparatuses, civil society organizations, and the headquarters of the political, social and religious leaderships. It is the class division of the social sectors; it is the common culture since it has the universities, cafes, cinemas and theatres. There is social change and social mobility in the city (Barakat, 2000). The class formation depends on the extent of growth of the city especially the middle class which lifts the banner of change, progress and modernity. It is the primary defender of democracy and secularism (Hilal, 2006A).

In brief, it is the general political sphere starting from the state and ending with the political movements and parties. Aristotle has considered the city “ The breeding ground of citizenship” since it is the location or setting through which citizenship is developed. It seems that urbanism has become a life style for the inhabitants of the world. The city is big and diversified enough in its components, options and propositions whereas the village cannot do so (Dagger, 1997:155) since it is distinguished by being conservative and introvert.

In his explanation of the relationship between the city and the civic culture, Hanson (1986:110) states that what historically surrounds the civic culture are the folkways, public expectations, distribution of force and responsibility. He depended in this on his analysis of the classification of the civic culture in the center cities. He divided them into three types: First: Exploitative and paternal since the civic culture is the inheritance of an elite centralized hegemony of a small group. There are several models that dominate the society like politics, banks and media. Second: Consumer and services oriented. It is the pluralism in terms of plurality of services and the geographical divisions of the society, religious affiliations, and income distribution. It also has pluralism in economic, cultural and political powers. Third: Communitarian institutions which stress common good in its

popular discourse. It flourishes through cooperation and consensus and builds influential institutions in the policies and the society towards a fulfillment of the common good like governmental institutions and civil society organizations. These expressions in light of their cultural dimension constitute the common culture and the subculture in their interpretation, practices and formation of the patterns of civic culture in a given society or another.

By the same context, (Bronswijk, Doevendan, Vmeets & Verbeke, 2002:14) emphasize the Civic or Public Sphere as one of the approaches towards city since it is a significant and basic precondition to the development of the civic culture; along with the development of the city and the city life, the social solidarity decreases, so there would be a need for social networking and the establishment of civic centers and institutions. As for the other aspect that they mention, it states that the growth and development of the civic life constitutes cultural reference making the city culture in control of the countryside in terms of linking the human life with the image, landscape and form of city, and with its culture and life styles with what is required with the terms of living inside it. On the other hand, Faricy and Hoyman (2007) study which revolves on one main subject which is – Is the growth of the city the outcome of the creative class or as a result of the political culture network? – they concludes that the political culture network of universities and interaction and the sector of academicians and holders of university degrees are the ones who pave the way for economic growth since openness and diversity in the local culture help to find opportunities and options towards economic development.

In an address of the state of mobility in the American cities Dagger (1997:162) mentions that the following quotation expresses their life style , “ It is Norms to move” which is considered the heart of the American culture where confidence withers away due to the change of the residency in relation to surrounding environment, so social ties are lost, and participation in elections decreases. In return, citizenship grows away from association with a place or people; it would be directed towards the country (home). This state of mobility develops individualistic and independent propensity.

Using the above mentioned analytical devices in understanding and analyzing the Palestinian society, it is difficult for us to clearly understand the Palestinian society or I tend to use Palestinian clusters since these tools are not only different in their social and cultural structure, but also they differ in the reality and formation of the economic and class structure and the nature of the political and social elite is totally different from the Palestinian reality. What distinguishes the Palestinian clusters is the absence of geographical continuity; consequently, it results in difficulty in movement, commuting and transportation between Palestinian cities. This reflects the Israeli policy in controlling the movement of Palestinian residents (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, June 2006). As a result of the weak economic structure and the displacement and break up of the Palestinian society following the (1948) war and the immigration of the Palestinian Bourgeois and Compradors to other states, their growth as a foreign capital in neighboring states like Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gulf states lead to the backwardness of the Palestinian market and economy. This was in addition to the state of dependence on the Israeli economy (Hilal, 2006A). Furthermore, new Palestinian clusters were established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; they were called Refugee Camps the

majority of their residents were originally peasants. They fled from their lands and villages as a result of the war and settled near the cities. This background is incapable of producing state cities since there is not a state in the first place nor are there central states as the case in Europe and America. The outcome of this is the absence of a cultural and civic reference as a main function for the city since in the historical sense no cities with their values, modern and cultural style of life were formed in the Palestinian society.

In return, local cultures for the Palestinian clusters and cities were developed; they were influenced by the historical, vocational, political and social context that the Palestinian cities and villages had undergone and in isolation from one another. This led to a rise of complicated disputes and conflicts between the local and the national. This does not mean that there is not a common culture in the Palestinian society which carries within its folds gradual patriarchal and authoritarian values in terms of age, gender, and values of obedience (Al-Azar, 1996; Barakat, 2000; Miari, 2003). In return for values of giving, belongingness, social solidarity and amicable solution of conflicts (Al-Azar, 1996).

This background produced something that is the opposite to what the west had passed through. The Palestinian clusters were characterized by the hegemony of the countryside culture over the Palestinian cities in one way or another; it was influenced by the political and social elite as a reflection of their rural origins- peasants and refugees (Khadir, 2003). This is not decisive since it varies among Palestinian cities. Also the nature of the existing historical elites which developed within a different historical and social context differed. The common cultural pattern in Nablus and Hebron is controlled by family and affiliation allegiance. The civic organizations and even the political ones are influenced by its traditional and conservative structure. Ramallah and Bethlehem are distinguished for having a relatively open cultural pattern since the nature of the political and social elite and the middle class are more crystallized and they reflect in general the civic taste which is closest to the civil way of life. This does not mean that the family influence is absent but it is lesser in favor of the political parties first and the civil society organizations second.

As for the universities taking into consideration that the city hosts them, they according to our understanding represent the only public sphere for deliberation of thoughts and values in a rational manner. They are a multilateral liberal framework in which a state of polarization, dialogue and respect of the others view take place. For example, the majority of the leaderships and the political, cultural and civil elite in Bethlehem are graduates from Bethlehem University (Salameh, 2006A). The university played a significant role in providing the Palestinian countryside with educated social and political leaderships; however, the main point here is that the structure of the Palestinian universities is different in terms of academic and administrative cadre. In a quick comparison of the Palestinian universities in the middle area of the West Bank, we notice that the academic cadre in Birzeit University in Ramallah are leftists, pro leftist, or liberal while the majority of the academic cadre in Bethlehem University are liberals even the most religious ones. As for Hebron, they are closer to conservatives or religious; it is worth mentioning that Hebron University was first established on the grounds that it would be an institute for the study of Islamic "*Sharia*" (law).

As for the modern middle class in the Palestinian cities, it grows in isolation of its awareness of its role in the society since its address and practices play a significant role in pushing the wheel of progress and the rationalization of authority. In spite of the fact that the origins of the national movement leaders are from the middle class (Khadir, 2003), the role of this class subsided following the Oslo Agreement in favor of the leaderships and the elite of the Palestinian National Authority [PNA] under establishment. Hilal's study (2006A) concludes that there is a state of confusion and chaos in the identity of the middle class in its discourse and approach toward the building of a civil and political society ranging from secularism and liberal democracy in return for the middle class with a religious approach that is located somewhere between extremism and flexibility; this class did not realize itself and the significance of its role in the society with the exception of the middle class in Ramallah city since this modern class is the most salient and active in the city which is considered the smallest city of the Palestinian clusters.

To sum up, we can state that in order to understand the civic culture in the Palestinian society, it has to be through an understanding of its basic components like civil society organizations and political parties and their cultures since fundamental forces in the understanding of the civic and political action. This force might not be directly practiced in the political sphere, so it can be identified inside the social and cultural structure of the Palestinian society.

Second: Palestinian Civic Culture; Denial of the Political in the Cultural Practice

Definitions stated under the concept of culture differ; although it has more than 160 definitions (Abed Al-Gani, 2006; Kosh,2007). Wisteman (1967) sees that the approach towards culture consists of a cognitive aspect related to the knowledge of the materialistic and social world, beliefs, values associated with attitudes in addition to the codes, symbols, significances and rituals in the cognitive dimension. On the other hand, Lipset. S., defines sociology of culture as, "a study of the phenomena and political systems in light of the common social and cultural structure in the society." (Abrash, 1998:51) .

Based on the abovementioned, we cannot summarize civic culture of political phenomena in Political sciences only since these phenomena are closely associated with structure and culture of the society. For example, the start and emergence of the civil society was as a result of the influence of the social force on the political sphere. We cannot study a social phenomenon away from its social and cultural dimensions and only focus on its political impacts.

To reaffirm the abovementioned, we give a cultural example relating to the rights of the American woman in nominating herself for presidential elections; the liberal American law does not prevent her nomination but it has to do with the nature of the cultural values, the social norms, and the societal expectations that prevent a woman from reaching the stage of political decision making (Woshinsky, 1995:9-16). In the same, the three models (Participant, Subject and Parochial) for Almond and Verba (1963) coincide with its own cultural structure; the parochial culture is associated with a traditional non centralized structure. Subjection culture is the same as the central authoritarian structure.

The participant culture, however, deals with a democratic structure. These cultures are influenced by the common culture and they cannot be comprehended without referring them to their original sources.

The cultural reality in the third world as stated by (Abrash, 2008:64) has its own privacy that can only be understood by referring it to its social and cultural context. Party pluralism in the third world states, social violence and political authority cannot be understood within the framework of theories of Political Science related to this issue, but it can be understood in the structure of the Arab mentality since the kinship relationships, religious beliefs and the psychological and mental deposits of these societies give a political significance. The tribe, denomination and religion have more presence and impact than the authority. The symbolic leader has an influence that is equal to the influence and impact of institutions and the law.

By the same context, Al-Azar (1996:48) adds that the political culture “ is not only a legacy from the past of any people; it is a geological structure with remains and classes consisting of several stages and different historical and social events.” The Palestinian political culture is the outcome of a composition that is dated to Ottoman empire, its political system and legal reforms at its final stages; it is a mixture British, Jordanian and Egyptian laws and politics. It is a direct influence of occupation and its challenges like the cultural and religious identities. The political culture in India goes back to the customs and traditions before and during the colonialism stage and the impacts of Gandhi at the stage of resistance of colonialism. Here we cannot understand the reality without going deep into the cultural and intellectual structure so that we would have a scientific understanding of the society.

In an analysis and classification of the studies and research papers of sociologists and Arab scholars on the cultural and intellectual composition and the composition of the social and political value, we found out that the Arab culture is characterized by being paternal and centralized. It is also gradual and it is based on distinction and separation in accordance with age and gender; it is also based on absolute obedience and allegiance to the tribe, group and neighborhood creating a state of selfishness. The society is also dominated by an absolute value that is influenced by religion which calls for a return to the past and revival of the Caliphate. In addition, there is dependence on the group since it is a culture of rationalization and compulsive values. In return, it has values of philanthropy, solidarity, benevolence, tolerance, ethics, cooperation, steadfastness and aid...” (Sharabi, 1992:59-66; Al-Azar, 1996:45; Barakat, 2000:641-642) it becomes clear from the above mentioned that the democratic values are absent in the Arab society in one way or another.

The Palestinian reality differs slightly from the abovementioned; it does not mean an intellectual and cultural isolation from the Arab World since the social and political experience it experienced gives it its distinctiveness. The Palestinian society is distinguished for its pluralism (religion, political and social) without having a democratic and secular platform. On the religious level, Palestine is considered the land of the three monotheistic religions which enriched the experience and the historical existence due to the existence of a platform based on respect and tolerance of the other away from Judaism as a Zionist identity (Tamari, 2005); politically it reflected the experience of

PLO towards opting for party pluralism of the resistance factions. However, the difference in views and platforms was not conducted democratically; last of which is the state of infighting between Hamas movement and Fatah movement which lead to the former's control of Gaza Strip. Socially, it still lacks the woman element in spite of the changes that had taken place on the position of the Palestinian women as a result of the desire of a large sector of them to receive university education. This however is not enough.

Due to the daily confrontations with the Israeli occupation, a general trend in the Palestinian society has emerged and it is supported by Palestinians in general and the leftist, rightist and Islamic leaderships and factions including a part of the secular intellectuals; it calls for holding fast to the cultural legacy, folklore, customs and traditions which constitute a significant part of the identity of the Palestinian people. This is due to the fact that occupation is linked with an uprooting characteristic that threatens the existence of the people and its cultural identity. Consequently, the society held fast to the customs and traditions as an expression of defense of its existence. The political Islam represented by Hamas movement has found an outlet through which it can influence the total social values and customs by considering it a religious and ethical reference in the society.

Islamic religion constitutes a reference in the political and social issues since it is in the heart of the social fabric exercising its influences on the level of popular religion or through civil society organizations or the political parties represented by the largest in size and influence on the society which is Hamas movement. In spite of the fact that the Palestinian basic system is a secular democratic one, it could not separate religion from politics in the legal and social measures like laws and courts since religion in the Palestinian society is linked with the reality and everyday life of the society.

As for family and its role in the Palestinian society, it still represents reference in decision making; it is one of the most important aspects of the political, religious and social manifestations which support and back its member in times of need or support . If this has to do with the social rank, the family contributes towards the production of a middle class (Hilal, 2006A). As for power and influence , the family backs its nominee in the legislative and local elections. Socially, it constitutes a protective shield for its member in case of danger or threat. Legally, the tribal law represents one of the main branches of laws that reaches solutions in social disputes or even in politics.

Al-Azar (1996:67) considers the tribal law as having its purposes and historical causes; the absence of the state and the national law over long periods had contributed to the enhancement and spread of the tribal law in judiciary and arbitration; it was considered as a favorable solution in light of the state of repugnance from the public authorities; this law is applied to all civil, ethical, criminal and sometimes political issues.

On the other side, the Palestinian Authority did not establish and unify the local cultures in the Palestinian society; it followed different policies in every city alone. The judiciary, legislative and executive institutions of the authority pervaded the life style and way of thinking of the Palestinian cities in accordance with what suits their culture and values. The best legal example that stresses the non creation of a citizenship based on

patriotic belongingness but on locations and residential clusters is the Palestinian elections law; it is based on the place of residence so any person who changed his domicile cannot vote in the new city of domicile even if he moved to it more than ten years ago.

The previous analysis does not mean there is no cultural structure with democratic or secular and rational indicators in the Palestinian society since there is a pluralistic democratic secular propensity expressed on several occasions and means on the level of the elite or the public.

Third: Civil Society and Civic Culture; Ambiguity of Definition and Confusion in Implementation

The concept of civic culture in this research attempts to benefit from previous studies and research which addressed the concept in an attempt to measure it. It is mainly reciprocal confidence between the citizens and the state, civic, social and economic rights, organization of the social relationships between the citizens within a legal framework where the rights of all are secured, participation and interaction into the social, political and economic activities, and political attitudes of people; all of these aspects constitute a basic component of culture since they are the reference for thought, behavior and life style in general; it generates what people want and it forms and stimulates the political process (Street, 1994:96).

The basic notion for the concept of reciprocal trust and the civil, economic and political rights refers to the pioneering works of the proponents of the social contract or in the essence of the civil society literature which Hobbes meant by it: The politically organized society through a state which is based on the notion of contractility. As for John Locke, he means an existence of a politically organized society in a country that organizes, legalizes and interprets the natural law. As for Jean Jacques Rousseau, the society is the sovereign and the society is capable of the formation of the general will. Hegel makes a theoretical division between a family and a state; the civil society comes in the middle and it separates between them at the same time. Tocqueville in his book in (1835) stresses the role of active civil organizations within the framework of the state in its narrow meaning. Whereas, classical Marxists see that the civil society is only a Bourgeois society which comes midway between the market and the superior structure of the society. It works on weakening the characteristics of class conflict (Dagger,1997; Deakin, 2001)

For the political culture there are three dimensions of understanding of the relationship between the political/civic culture, culture and the political system, First: it is the functionalism: an analysis of the political culture attributes to the value of conformity and determination of its role in the explanation of political behavior, thus Durkheim regarded culture (values and norms) as types of social fact, which join the society together. For the same paradigm, Almond and Verba (1963,1989) explore the cultural preconditions for stable and effective government, for their work was an assumption that all culture road would lead to civic culture. The second dimension: traditional Marxism

didn't focused directly on the political culture; they were studied as a part of the superstructure of the society, which culture (Norms and Values) are regarded as a reflection of the economic relations. The third dimension, represented by Gramsci, considered that the culture is not immediately natural nor is it determined by economy or social class, but it is a response to "current relations of force" as hegemony order in the society (Gibbins,1990:4-5).

From the abovementioned, we notice that there are essential differences in the content of understanding the civil society – as core of civic virtues-. or political and civic culture As concepts, they rose and developed within different historical contexts tested by the West over four centuries. What really concerns us here is not to introduce theoretical definitions and their interpretations, that one conception has deferent dimension of understand it. On the other hand, working to neutralization of the concepts due to its association at present with the democratic liberal theory (Kassis, 1999). At present, there is a link between democracy and civil society and civic culture in terms of reinforcement of the non violent nature of the political, social, and cultural conflict. An understanding of the civic culture and its fulfillment does not take place due to a civic sense only away from the political, social, and economic conditions witnessed by the society and the nature and quality of the political and social elites in the society.

When we are dealing with the civil society away from definitions, we mean by it the functional role which comes mid way between the individuals and the state. Interaction with the civil society organizations is carried out from the functional aspect as an expression of the interests and aspirations of the social categories and the groups belonging to them. The general context is the place for the societal activities and participation, volunteerism, spread of civil culture and its values like democracy and human rights, fight against corruption, and defense of the oppressed sectors. It is also capable of promoting and protecting public interest. Through enhancement of civility and the public good (Dagger, 1997:199). Kassis (1999) expresses what is civic in terms of thought and behavior. Norton,(1993:214) states that the civil society expresses several civic virtues since it is a state of civility without which the society would consist of fighting groups; it carries within its folds the value of readiness of the individuals to hold different political and social views expressing a civic culture that is linked with the extent of development of the society.

Volunteerism as a value and practice for example is a pure social activity and not a political one since the responsibility of the civil society organizations is to implant and enhance this value due to its significance in linking the personal life of the individual with the public life. It teaches them to work together for the public good (Dagger, 1997: 200); this intersects some how with Putnam (1993) study where he focused on an understanding of the political culture through his discussion of the social capital, civil society and civic culture. This integration in the areas was called Civicness; it stresses the psychological and normative aspects which prepare the people to be economically producers, socially cooperators, and politically democratic. Thus, it is possible to have a civic culture that is based on a prosperous civil society.

In order to tackle the civic culture in the Palestinian society, there was a need to address the relationship that links the civic culture on one hand with the civil society and

democracy on the other hand because this relationship constitutes a unique case in the history of the Arab world since the start, emergence and work of the civil societies organizations existed before the establishment and formation of the government (Abu Amro, 1995; Al-Azar, 1996; Abrash, 2006A). This does not signify that they were established outside the Palestinian political context, but they were a fundamental expansion of the PLO factions; this state of annexation caused a structural and institutional crisis in the work and performance of these institutions; they in one way or another were influenced by the flaws of the state of institutionalization in the PLO and its discourse has somewhat imitated the democracy of the national action factions. (Al-Azar, 1996).

Historically, the civil society and nongovernmental organizations were known to be the backbone of the society; they carried huge burdens and provided agricultural, social, academic, cultural and economic services. They provided what is called the policy of resistance economy, civil, societal and political awareness in addition to the development of the spirit of volunteerism and societal work (Salim, 1999).

Following Oslo Accord (1993) and the establishment of a semi political entity, there was a state of frictions sometimes and confrontations on other occasions between the newly established Authority and the civil society organizations; this made Barghouthi (1994) predict the future of the relationship between the Authority and the civil society organizations; he mentioned the risks in five points: First the danger of coaptation by the authority. Second: over-centralization and perhaps comprehensiveness in terms of creating centralized unions working under the supervision of the Authority. Third: marginalization and monopoly of resources by the Authority in order to strengthen itself. Fourth: Derailing ;the civil society organizations would be influenced by policy of external funding. Finally: Its failure in terms of its inability to foresee the challenges of the stage since there is still occupation or the stage of national democratic building.

The state of weakness in the National Authority as an entity and the unstable political conditions represented in the breakout of the Second Aqsa Intifada (2000) have helped in one way or another to provide the civil society organizations with independence on one hand and in helping them to avoid any fierce rivalry which would destroy them on the other hand.

Opposite to civil organizations, charitable and relief societies were established; they were dominated by centralism, family in their interaction with the needs of the society. For example, it was historically found that there were charitable and family societies in the Palestinian society; the size and impact of these societies differed from one area to another. In Hebron, the extent of spread and influence of the (*Dawawin*) institutions is equal to the strength and influence of the civil society organizations or even the political parties and the Authority.

Fourth: Palestinian Political Parties and Civic Culture; Democratic Contexts and Chaos in Practice

Bro (1998:355) defines political parties as “relatively stable political organizations that mobilize its base in order to directly participate in the exercise of the political authority on the national or local level.” The political parties are a group of individuals: Leaders, activists, average members who interact together on the basis of a joint vision; the members differ among themselves. Leaders attain fame more than others; some have financial or administrative privileges while the party belongs to a certain thought or a firm ideology. This applies to the political parties that adopted Marxism (p.361); this distinguishes them from political and social movements that have no harmony in thought but agreement on general issues that concern everybody and those who join them.

Both Uslaner and Conley (2003) indicate that political parties were developed in relation to democracy and cannot survive without it; the competing parties influence the form of democracy and the stability of the system. They are considered the basic link between political development and the public. Johnston (2005) stresses that democracy requires having strong, stable and capable parties to represent citizens. Besides, it should be capable of providing options so that it would be qualified to control the public good. In order for this to happen, the parties aspire to impose themselves as representatives of the inhabitants, a societal project or a big issue. It persuades people of its platform and enters into a competition with other political parties and it also clashes with syndicates or religious institutions (Bro, 1998:355).

The party embodies participation and creates organizations to activate the role of the participants and its members; they develop and enhance the spirit of volunteerism since a membership in a party is volunteer work (Uslaner & Conley, 2003; Johnston, 2005:4). In democratic systems, parties work on mobilization in favor of candidates for local elections or at the level of the state; they are carefully selected.

It is worth mentioning that the big and powerful political parties are not judged by civic virtues only but by their success in the elections. Johnston (2005:5-7) points out that political parties preserve a stability and development of democracy through: competition among parties, organization inside its institutions, clubs, and charitable organizations, mobilization that influences individuals and institutions for the elections and finally Accountability in judgment and opposition. It is also in the way citizens support parties not only as civic values but also in sustaining parties.

We are concerned here in the fact that political parties play a significant role in crystallizing a political culture and this might be close to a democratic system or a comprehensive authoritative system. From a functional aspect, the parties in their struggle to represent the society, work on the formation of the general will and the public opinion through its platforms and visions toward issues of public concern. Bro (1998) considers that party life through party values and positions provided to the members constitute a different life pattern from that of other political parties since the ideology adopted by the party differs from one party to another.

For Palestine, the social or internal policy issues did not constitute a main reason behind the formation of Palestinian parties. The occupation however constituted a common ground for the establishment of parties and factions. Although the Palestinian parties are diversified in relation to thought and ideology, Fatah movement does not adopt any specific ideology and it follows in its political life pragmatism as a slogan that runs its political and social positions. Hamas movement adopts Islamic religion in its plans, platforms, and the nature of the religious society it is fighting for building. As for the leftist parties (popular front, Democratic front, People's Party) they adopt Marxist ideology Leninist or Maoist . As for the parties that were recently formed following Oslo Agreement, (Mubadara, FIDA, Third Way), they are social parties with no resistance goals against the occupation as much as its social programs.

This intellectual and political pluralism formed fundamental bases in the Palestinian civic culture. In addition, the Palestinian parties contributed to the crystallization of political positions and attitudes of its members in harmony with Ideological attitude adopted by the party or faction. This takes place through direct membership in the parties or through volunteering in civil society organizations belonging to these parties. They constitute a significant aspect in the understanding of the politically pluralistic Palestinian society. it reached to the level that the Palestinian society bragged about them since this represented an advanced democratic state. This is true on one hand, but on the other hand, Al-Azar (1996:51) indicates that pluralism is not a precondition for democracy. It is the democratic culture that is a precondition for pluralism. In return, the precondition for democracy is the existence of a central state and not in its absence. For sure, political pluralism in the Palestinian society will continue since the political factions have accepted it in principle.

I do agree with the abovementioned of Al-Azar; however, the embodiment of what had happened in the infighting between Fatah and Hamas is a proof that Palestinian pluralism is also a proof on the fragility and absence of democracy not only as elections mechanism but also as a reflection of the content of the struggle which is the representation of the Palestinian street. It is as a mechanism and principle in managing differences in sound ways. What has happened requires a cultural and scientific reading of the political culture in the structure of the Palestinian parties; change has to reach the political representatives of the people first and the public first and foremost.

We have mentioned earlier in our address of city and civic culture that there is rural hegemony as a culture over the city; we preferred to elaborate on this statement here since it serves in clarifying the composition and work of the political factions especially influential leaderships. We will use it in applying it on the formation of the political parties and the formation of the PLO. The rural culture reflects in the sociological sense the gradual, pyramid and paternal dimensions in the relationships. Ranking in the social position reflects the great significance in running internal relationships within a family or in its relationship with other families. It has embodiment and respect in fact subjection to superiors. We do believe that the hegemony of the countryside did not reach the city as a public space and directly here but as elite, parties, and organizations as effective and influential forces in the Palestinian society. We already know that all the Palestinian political parties as national liberation movements from the most leftist to the extremist

right had been influenced by the central parties especially the central model of the party in the former Soviet Union. This structure coincided with the rural structure in the Palestinian society; in fact, it worked on taming other cultures that do not harmonize with it. If we look at the internal structure which controls and governs the positions and decisions of the party, we would find them closer to the central pattern which does not harmonize with the democratic culture. The parties did not totally complete its transformation into institutions in the sociological sense in action but revolved around one leader and chief. Within this context, the intellectual cultural member in the Gramsci sense was absent in the battle of national liberation; the decisions of those in the upper ranks were binding to those in the lower ranks; the gun in several occasions was the compass of the national liberation and not the thought and the progressive democratic culture. This led to the spread of a state of chaos and pluralism which some understood as a state of democracy and pluralism.

As for the PLO, since it is the only way through which we can understand the coming state, it is the home of the Palestinian wherever he/her was. It was drawn as a social imagination that expresses the state of the lost home land and the state dream in exile and at home. It is the fundamental incubator of the national action factions and the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people as some prefer to call. The PLO expresses the common political culture of the total bulk of political cultures; its experience was reflected by the helplessness of the culture in the practice of policy and running of internal differences. Seats in it were distributed on the basis of reconciliation and shares for the representation of the size of the factions. The culture of shares has been transformed into a commercial mask that has nothing to do with the culture, the intellectual or the policy; the concept of allegiance in it has exposed the wretchedness of politics; the affiliating party receives its share from the distributor of shares which is Fatah movement. If there is no allegiance, there will not be a share for the opposing faction. This was translated by the state of divisions inside the factions or the states of boycott and rejection of the PLO due to the fact that its structure is authoritative, centralized and does not absorb a different view than what it has.

Consequently, the Palestinian political culture and Palestinian democracy reflect the crisis of the political body represented by its political culture according to the parties which are suffering from a structural crisis in the absence of a state of institutionalization. This is what we wanted to mention prior to the analysis of the structure of the Palestinian factions as shown in formal documents.

CHAPTER TWO: PALESTINE; THE DIMENSIONS OF THE RESEARCH

Palestine; The dimensions of the Research

Introduction

Before tackling the address of this chapter, it is worth noting in this regard that it is pointless to study the civic culture and its features in isolation from the political, historical, cultural and economic conditions that the Palestinian society has been undergoing over a period of last century until this present moment. The ethnic cleansing in (1948) had devastating effects on the Palestinian society and its cultural, social and economic characteristics. The Palestinian society as shall be explained later on did not only lose its land and wealth, but it also lost the most important civilized and civic cities and concentrations along with their institutions and their elite. Historically, these constituted the most important centers which attracted the investments of the early Palestinian Bourgeois and the excessive numbers of labor that exceeded the requirements of agricultural produce in the Palestinian villages; on the other hand, it influenced all the aspect of the everyday lives of the Palestinians in the presence of the occupation and the way they adapted and dealt with it.

This lead to the rise of the Israeli state at the expense of the occupation of the Palestinian coastal cities (Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Lod, Ramallah) which were the most developed economically, socially, culturally and politically. This has also resulted in the partition of the city of Jerusalem into two halves. The social and economical formation of the Palestinian society was shattered into pieces. This coincided with a cease in the growth of mountainous cities (inland cities), and a recession in the agricultural work, marginalization of the West Bank cities following annexation to Jordan and Gaza Strip to the Egyptian regime. The displacement movement to the West Bank and Gaza Strip in (1948) lead to challenges and problems that surfaced before the residential clusters and cities which absorbed about (70%) of the refugees; the manifestations were: demographic it is represented in the refugee camps which emerged as slums near the Palestinian cities and town, economic; it is represented in the size of unemployment and social which is expressed in terms of a cultural and value perspective of the Palestinian refugees who were originally from the Palestinian villages; most refugees from the coastal cities went to Syria and Lebanon.

Some inland cities like Nablus and Hebron were marginally vibrant in the period from (1948-1967) as a result of the existence of the middle class sector. A sector of the new middle class from the coastal cities came to inland cities like Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jerusalem; they brought with them new civic behaviors and professional skills which contributed to the reinforcement of the civic features of some cities; however, the entire attention of the Jordanian government focused on the transformation of Amman city into

a political, administrative and commercial metropolis; this was at the expense of the Palestinian cities which were excluded from this policy.

The Palestinian society was exposed to a stage of disintegration and fragmentation for the second time following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the year (1967). This led to a new wave of immigration towards the Eastern Bank (Jordan) and other Arab states; this immigration has inflicted damage on all social categories; it deprived the society of significant professional and economic potentials. In addition, the occupation imposed a military policy on the residential clusters both civilized and rural in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; this was manifested in the following practices: siege policies, isolated and separated between Gaza strip and west Bank, cutting off roads between cities, villages and camps especially with the start of the First Intifada in (1987), confiscation of Palestinian territory and building of Israeli settlements on their confiscated lands. This has practically stopped Palestinian cities from carrying out any expansions, and it also annexed the Palestinian market and infrastructure making it fully dependent on the Israeli market.

The year (1993) constituted a new turning point in the development of the Palestinian society since following the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority [PNA], some Palestinian cities had witnessed a state of stability; governmental institutions, political parties and civil society organizations were active in building and developing the Palestinian society on all social, economic, political and cultural levels. This was on the assumption that this was a historic moment for the Palestinian society towards the establishment of a democratic state on its land. Indeed, few changes in the value and cultural structure of the Palestinian were felt on the ground along with the emergence of some level of civic life in some Palestinian cities mainly Ramallah and Gaza cities; a segment of the middle class was active, and it contributed towards the civilization of the society and defending the liberty life, in addition to the concentration of civil and governmental institutions in it.

The situation however did not last long since in light of the breakdown of the Palestinian Israeli negotiations, the Second Intifada broke out in (2000) when all the manifestations of sovereignty in the Palestinian society were destroyed and ruined; cities were sealed and besieged; they were turned into isolated cantons. This has negatively influenced the achievements of the Palestinian society on the educational, cultural, social and civic aspects that were fulfilled during the stage of political stability.

This is a quick and concentrated review of the historical context of the Palestinian society; the researcher finds that it is important to mention this in order to facilitate his address of this chapter of the research; there will be focus on four main aspects:

First Aspect: City and Civic culture

In our address of this chapter, we are dealing with city and civility on the consideration that the latter is the spirit and content of the former. The civic state differs from one city to other since there is not a single model; they are diversified (Barakat, 2000: 237) whether this is at the level of one state or when it goes beyond that when it is compared with other states.

Al-Khoury (1980:110) indicates that the word city (*Madina*) in Arabic is derived from the root (*Dan*) which means a judge or a governor since a city is the place where the rule and the judiciary are taken care of. In contrast, Hourani's study (1991) analyzes the emergence and development of cities when the countryside produces a surplus in agricultural produce while the inhabitants of the city become preoccupied in trading with goods and other services needed by the society. Halim Barakat (2000) summarizes this by indicating that the city besides being the center of governance, influence and power, it is also the local and international trade center, the educational and cultural center, center for worship, center for administrations, center for arts, industries and professions and occupations; accordingly, the city is defined by the nature of its functions which constitutes a center for economic, social, political, cultural, administrative and recreational activities and not by its size. It is the place where there are the ruling, professional and intellectual classes along with lawyers, politicians, business people and industrialists and manufacturers. It has diversity and sub branching in the different neighborhoods; all of this helps to shape a developed civilized culture which constitutes the common culture.

On the other hand, Mercier (2009) study addresses the significance of urbanization in the Arab world; the researcher considers the market as a common sphere . It is considered the common place where transactions take place on a rational and neutral basis since there is a common ground for sectarian and religious interaction; it is also a place where the countryside meets with the city; differences based on gender or class are reduced; this operation leads to a state of cultural exchange and friction with the other where all differences melt; Potter, D.(1968:101) was eager to consider the market as “ the only secular institution with excellence in the Near East” (Mercier, 2009:13).

In his address of the subject of cities, the historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 A.C.) considers city inhabitants (*Ahl Alhadar*) as the ones who inhabit it; consequently, the researcher can indicate that any one who dwells in a city is characterized by specific qualities, manifestations and style of life. He indicates the following manifestations for these inhabitants, “They have cooperation in food more than in what is needed and they have plenty of nutrition, clothes and decoration”...“ Some of them have a handicraft while others become merchants. In terms of mechanisms of social and political control, they are in cities: “If any aggression inflicted on anyone, it is

stopped by rulers and the state.” As for belongingness, city dwellers belong to their home country due to the interaction in civilization and disappearance of zeal and fervor.” (Ibn Khaldun, 1984:165-166). Thus, we are facing an advanced state of interaction, livelihood, traditions and a vision of life that is different from what is common in the villages and Bedouin communities who hold opposite qualities and manifestations at least from a theoretical point of view.

However the raised question in this regard is how and why did Arab cities were established? There were several attempts to categorize Arab and Islamic cities according to their establishment. Barakat (2000:238) points out that there are Islamic cities, commercial cities and agricultural cities. Salim Tamari (2005) classifies Palestinian cities into internal cities and coastal cities; Fuad Al-Khoury (1980:110-114) classifies cities into five kinds:

- Cities located on trade routes and caravans like (Palmyra, Petra, Mecca) along with Jaffa and Haifa in Palestine pre 1948.
- Religious Shrines cities: They are cities that are not subject to the control of the state like (Najaf, Karbala, Al- Madina) in addition to Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem.
- Feudalist cities: They are an expansion to the authority of state and are located in the plains like (Homs, Hama, Tripoli, Mussel) in addition to Hebron, Nablus and coastal areas.
- Border cities which were targeted in wars like (Baghdad, Cairo) and in Jerusalem in Palestine.
- Producing Industrial cities like (Kuwait, Doha Abu Dhabi) and on the handicrafts level in Hebron and Nablus.

Arab cities in general are diversified and have striking differences in terms of foundation and establishment. Consequently, these factors have left an impact on the formation of the pattern of common culture in the cities making them more diversified and more different from one another. Cairo city is not Alexandria, Granada is not Barcelona, Ramallah is not Bethlehem. We fully realize that the cultural pattern in general in every state is characterized by specific qualities that distinguish it from the rest of other states socially, culturally or politically. However, we cannot be certain to say that there is one pattern which distinguishes Italy, Britain or United States as the study of both (Almond & Verba, 1963) mentions. The differences are in degree rather than in kind. The city cultural differences become clearer inside the state itself more than when it is compared to other states (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990).

- Palestinian City: Between The Past and The Present*

The main characteristic in addressing the Arab cities is the existence of patterns and divisions the researcher presume are binary: civil vs. rural, open cities vs. closed cities, modern cities vs. traditional cities, slums vs. rich neighborhoods; this was reflected on the city itself. Some cities if not all were characterized of having a dual city old city and new city. This adds to the difference and significance in terms of the social and cultural aspects as it is related to the way and style of life. In addition, states are characterized by the dominance of one or two central cities (Barakat, 2000:244). This dominance is not due to large population, but it is due to the city monopoly of cultural, political and economic services and activities (Hilal, 2006A).

The old neighborhoods or the old city in Palestine are distinguished for having neighborhoods that were historically formed on the basis of profession, family, sectarianism or religion and this is linked with family production (Murrad, 1996). For instance, Bethlehem is divided into nine main neighborhoods, eight are inhabited by Palestinian Christians while the ninth neighborhood is inhabited by Palestinian Muslims. While Hebron has eight quarters attachment to family names or to handicraft. It seems that these neighborhoods were living in isolation from other neighborhoods or quarters in relation to social organization and all the services needed by the neighborhood inhabitants. On the other hand, Tamari (2002) refers these divisions especially those regarding the neighborhoods which are linked with religion to British Mandate in Palestine since Jerusalem city was not known previously by the Jewish, Christian or Muslim quarters.

What is significant in this context is the association between the concept of city with the sociology concept of modernization and the resulting style of life which is in harmony with the social classes and sectors living in the city along with their role and level of awareness. Tamari's study (2005) reflects this aspect especially when it deals with the Jerusalemite modernization witnessed by the city in the late Ottoman period in Palestine and during the British Mandate era since they are the resultant of the interaction of the Palestinian social classes as an authentic part of its legacy, culture, and introduction of the Arab cities especially those situated on the coast to the global market.

Tamari addresses Palestinian cities in pre British Mandate era under two basic terms: Culture of mountainous (inland) cities which is the culture of the Palestinian countryside as opposed to Culture of the coastal cities; the latter are the trade outlet for the local economies and the geographical internal areas. This has lead to the rise of a traders class

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and middle class as a result of the economic composition open to the world through marine trade. The resulting economic composition has brought about with it new culture and values linked with the class dimension of the classes that play a main role in it, especially in Jaffa and Acre cities (Tamari, 2005:20). The inland cities like Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron remained as important cities for tourism especially for pilgrims coming from Europe via Jaffa seaport and Arab states during that period.

In a study by the Turkish historian Ayyub Oziphraan (as cited in Tamari , 2005:21) on the Mediterranean cities especially Beirut, he viewed it as key elements manufacturing modernity and crystallizing local nationalities. He refers the process of modernization to the “local religious and cultural dimensions and not due to economic reasons”; the traders class were able bring about modern administrative reforms reflected in the viability of municipal councils of these cities due to the absence of the nobles class and the traditional artisans clusters. He excludes Damascus –and Tamari excludes Jerusalem pre British mandate -in which there were both nobles class and the traditional artisans clusters. Oziphraan explains why Modernistic approach and modernity in Beirut for example won but failed in Damascus; this somewhat can be apply on Hebron city during these days, if we searching the elements of the social structure regarding to the formation of the municipality staff members of Hebron city, the universities, and chamber of commerce and industry, we can notice, they are still controlled and dominated by empowered families and notables, it is worthy to mention here that the PNA refused to make elections to the Hebron municipality since (1996) until this moment to avoid the confrontation with the families and traditional leaders . While it did twice or more in other cities such as; Bethlehem, Ramallah. In Bethlehem, historically-during the ottoman, British, Jordanian, and Israeli Occupation- the neighborhoods became behavioral and corporal governing patterns for the city inhabitants in making decisions. Bethlehem Municipal Council is made up of leaders “*Mukhtars*” of the nine neighborhoods. this Status quo didn’t changed too much following the establishment of the PNA, the PNA increased the municipality’s members to 15, eight of them should be Christians.

Both Nasir and Dobar (1982:70) differ with the above mentioned ; they see that the Lebanese Bourgeois with its Christian majority was able to monopolize the commercial sector during the French Mandate and this helped in the formation of a capitalist sector centered in cities especially Beirut. Al-Sharif (1985:16) points out that the role of the vigorous movement on the commercial level had helped in the growth of commercial cities more than in coastal cities in Palestine (Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre) ; it had helped to reinforce the positions of the comprador bourgeois which used to play the role of mediator between the European companies and the local market; they were the ones who were responsible for the task of adaptation of the local produce to meet the European market specifications at the end of Ottoman era . The majority of this sector were from

Christian and Jewish families who monopolized the international trade (Sholsh, 1978:208-217). While Muslims won land property (Murrad, 1996:117).

By the same token , Bethlehem city was distinguished from other inland cities due to the fact that it was open to the external world as a result of the Ottoman reforms in the late nineteenth century, influence of the nature of administrative and occupational organization and the large expanse that the professional and commercial along with the missionaries were able to introduce patterns and behaviors of an open life style through civil, religious, educational and vocational organizations in spite of the existence of social and political sectors which consist of eminent Palestinian Muslim and Christian figures. On the other hand, Ramallah was distinguished for having Christians and the absence of influence of notables sector on the entire everyday life of the citizens or at least to a large extent. This explains why Ramallah is distinguished for its modern manifestations, cultural activity and the presence of a secular middle class which most Palestinian cities in Gaza Strip and West Bank do not possess or gain it after the establishment of PNA (Taraki, 2004). As for the commercial cities of Nablus and Hebron, the familial, notables and dignitaries remained as the power that controls the commercial activity while the administration of the municipalities continued to be run in the traditional and familial manner until this present day.

Back to the Palestinian coastal cities Jaffa, Haifa and Acre – in the beginning of the twentieth century-, they were the most open, modernized modernistic and secular through its association with the international and local commercial movement. Jaffa for example was able to gain abundant wealth that it invested into fruitful and productive projects which lead to the emergence of consumption extravagance. It is reflected in the construction of very luxurious mansions, possession of luxurious cars, spread of theatres, nightclubs, cinemas in addition to spread of printing press, newspapers and magazines. Political, national and socialist parties were formed and labor unions as well (Seikaly, 2003; Tamari, 2005). It was also distinguished for its modern city life which is linked with emerging structural class which is concentrated in the city and linking of its commercial ties with the internal cities (Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron...etc). This has formed a center and an example that structurally and essentially contradicts with the culture of the internal cities which are distinguished for their conservative and traditional culture. This reached the extent of having enmity with the coastal cities; this is content of Tamari's research (2005) titled Mountain Against the Sea.

This enmity was caused by the state of exploitation which linked the feudalistic economic relationship between the feudalists and the comprador sector on one hand and the peasants on the other. The history of Palestine over the period of Turkish regime indicates that the feudalists were foreigners and not Palestinians (Abdallah, 1989) in spite of the presence at some stages of a Palestinian sector due to the fact that they were linked by interests with the foreign governments which came to the region; however, the termination of this relationship, which is based on exploitation and aggression and coincided with the disintegration of the semi capitalist economic structure as a result to

the Palestinian Nakba in the year (1948), will carry with it this relationship of cultural social details based on distinction until present day. There is still distinction between the urban dweller, villager and refugee (Muhammad, 2002; Tamari, 2005; Hilal, 2006A) On the other side, the coastal cities symbolized the culture of illumination, openness, modernity, secularism and liberation which were feared by internal mountainous cities dwellers since this is a corrupt culture completely away from the Palestinian culture; this was embodied in a state of enmity and hatred until it reached the sea as a symbolism to the locus through which values and new culture come through. This is what Tamari (2005:17) meant by Sad Resistance enforced by strict religious ethics that stopped the people under a formal orders by Islamic and National Action factions from going out for a walk or taking a swim in the sea of Gaza Strip during the First Intifada (1987-1992) and the Second Intifada (2000).

The researcher thinks that the real loss of the Palestinian people was not only in the ethnic cleansing war in (1948) and it was not a loss of Palestinian land or the massacres committed against the Palestinian people's right to existence and survival only , but it was also in the loss of the modernity and the central cities situated on the edge of the Mediterranean and their significance in the natural development of the development and modernization of the Palestinian society (Muhammad, 2002:67). The occupation did not only assault the identity, land and Palestinian individual but also assassinated its future and the terms and requirements for its natural cultural, social and economic growth.

It is noticeable that the movement of immigration of the entire social categories of the Palestinian refugees in (1948) lead to different outcomes according to location; the refugees of coastal cities Haifa, Acre and Jaffa in general departed from Palestine and went specifically to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Refugees from the middle region of Jerusalem and its surroundings resorted to the West Bank; Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho and Jordan. As for those in the south of historical Palestine, they went to Hebron, while Khamaisi (2006:4) indicates that some who left Lod, Ramlah and Jaffa took refuge in the city of Ramallah (see Appendix No.1). Regarding to the integration process of the Palestinian refugees it was different according to the hosting city, for example, we can notice that the refugee camps in Bethlehem and Ramallah somehow are located in the center of the city, which helped and facilitated the integration process (culturally, socially and politically) for the refugees and even participating in formulation the culture of city. But for Hebron, the experience was different, since the refugee camps located out side of the central city, which created a case of social and cultural gap between them, still exist until these days.

Taraki's study (2004:93) indicates the significance of the role of the middle class which historically contributed to the modernization of Ramallah city as a result of the Christian immigration from Ramallah during the past century to north America. This contributed to the civilization of the city as a result of the money orders which its citizens, living abroad, transferred to it. She considers on the other hand that both Ramallah and Gaza where the two cities out of all the cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that were mostly influenced by immigration of refugees to them. However, the largest cities in the West Bank (Hebron and Nablus) did not receive many refugees.

What makes Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jerusalem to a certain extent distinguished is the arrival of the civilized middle class of Christians in the year (1948) to Ramallah mainly and Jerusalem and Bethlehem marginally; most of these Christians were from the coastal cities Ramlah, Lod, and Jaffa. This modern sector of refugees contributed to the formation of the basic nucleus of the modern middle class in Ramallah as wholesalers, shop owners, government employees, teachers and specialists.

What distinguishes the historical period between (1948-1967) of the Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the total absence of geographical continuity between them; the emerging Israeli occupation had occupied (70%) of historical Palestine; it annexed the West Bank to the Jordanian regime while Gaza Strip was annexed to Egypt. Palestinians lost their central cities and failed to build modern central cities in the two regions; they continued to depend on the main cities in both Egypt and Jordan (Khamaisi, 2006:2). This stage came to an end following the Israeli occupation of the remaining parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in (1967). The Israeli occupation authorities have tightened their grip on the Palestinian cities, villages and camps following the year (1967). It founded a new approach which is to have geographical continuity between them but with borders.

Following the outbreak of the popular Intifada in (1987 until 1993), the occupation increased its restrictions on the movement of inhabitants between the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; it worked on shrinking and restricting the development of the Palestinian cities and villages; this control influenced the economic condition and reduced the institutionalization of the society through harassment and pursuit of national, civil and nongovernmental Organization. This also coincided with the rise and development of Israeli settlements at the expense of the Palestinian lands through confiscation. These settlements devoured tens of thousands of dunums of the Palestinian territories. It has besieged the Palestinian cities by settlements terminating any prospect of any expansion and development of the Palestinian cities. If we look now to the geographical map of Bethlehem city for example, it is surrounded by Efrat and Toqoa settlements to the south of green zones to the east; it continues to reach Ma'aleh Adumim settlement which is linked with Jerusalem, Gilo settlement stretches to (60) Road which separates between Bethlehem and Hebron. In addition, the separation wall and Har Homa settlement (Abu Ghnaim Mountain) complete the settler ring around Bethlehem, the result of this policy, Bethlehem become as a victim of the occupation project which it is the "Greater Jerusalem", and we can say that Bethlehem is experiencing spatial demolishing as a results of occupation's policies.

Oslo agreement signed by the Palestinian liberation organization [PLO] and the Israeli government on 13th of September, 1993 is considered a new chapter in the partition of the Palestinian territories and the disintegration of the potentials for state building or construction of a national economy on small geographical spots making it more appalling than the apartheid policies practiced in South Africa (See Appendix No.2). The Palestinian territories were divided into three areas: Area (A) form (18%) of the Palestinian territories; they are under the control of the Palestinian Authority in terms of civil issues and security control to a certain extent. Areas (B) constitute (22%)

of the Palestinian lands; security control is the responsibility of the occupation authorities while the civil affairs are the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority. Areas (C) constitute (60%) of the Palestinian territories in addition to the illegal settlements on the occupied Palestinian territories in (1967) (See Appendix No.3), this area is under the total control of the occupation (Khamaisi, 2006:4). As for Hebron since it is special case, it was divided into two areas according to Hebron Protocol/Accords in (1997); Area (H-1) under the Palestinian responsibility and (H-2) which it is under the Israeli occupation control. This procedure of division somehow prevented to apply or to enforcement the law by Palestinian Authority, for instance, if someone committed a crime in Areas (B, C) or (H-2), which are under the control of Occupation, prior coordination between the Palestinian police and the Israeli occupation is required so that the Palestinian forces could enter those areas, which takes a lot of time for the implementation of law.

In addition, Israel Occupation implemented different policies in the Palestinian cities; it followed a policy of Judization of Jerusalem and Hebron through imposing unjust measures and procedures. For example in order for somebody from Jerusalem to construct a house, he/she can only do so after licenses were issued by the Occupation Authorities; in most cases this was unattainable. In Hebron divided Abraham Mosque into two part; synagogue for Jewish and Mosque for Muslims in (1996) and confiscated Palestinian houses in order to built Israelis' settlements. Since the two cities symbolize the holiness of Judaism (Swisa, 2003).

The growth of Israeli settlement trebled as it was before Oslo agreement. And so as a results of high rate of settlements expansion most of them become as largest cities such as; Ma'aleh Adumim and Modi'in Illit, the continued construction in the settlement during the negotiation time (1994-2000) created facts on ground which will increase the charge of the final agreement, and probably even prevent it. for instance, Jerusalem experienced enormous construction around the city contributed in cutting the part of East Jerusalem off from the west Bank and this will prevent the possibility of ever establishing a "Palestinian state" in which East Jerusalem is its capital.

Based on the fact that the geopolitical status quo of Jerusalem was postponed to the final status peace talks!?, the Palestinian political leadership temporarily chose Ramallah and Gaza cities! to establish governmental institutions, ministries and public institutions. This is due to the absence of any geographical continuity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; these cities were like central nuclei and capitals to both of them until the issue of Jerusalem is tackled in the final peace talks?.

The result of this decision, all of governmental and public/civic institutions concentrated in Ramallah city during the period (1995-2000), that helped to flourish the city life with it's options, services and opportunity that can offer to the citizens. Because of that, Ramallah could attracted all of the sectors in West Bank to live in Ramallah including; students, workers, middle class, political and social elite, which helped together with the local middle class to represent a good model to central modern city, surfaced in it's activities of; civic and cultural organizations, woman centers, political

parties, theaters, coffee shops (to elite and public), restaurants, and clubs. The high rate of internal immigration to Ramallah decreased the traditional social ties, this predisposed “Unbeknown Phenomena” within the citizens, all of this aspects contributed to the elaboration of modernist ethos, which there is no city in the Palestinian clusters has, this push Taraki (2008:7) to affirm that Ramallah “is the undisputed political, culture and social center of West Bank, including Jerusalem” for it’s “outlook and life style”.

In (1996) The Palestinian Authority lunched project “Bethlehem 2000” in order to prepare the city for the celebration of the millennium commemoration the advent of Christianity, the aim of the project was to achieve (a) Urban renovation -the street leading to Nativity Church, street illuminated, painted the shops, renovated old houses- (b) Development of the tourism and preparation of religious, cultural and artistic events, (c) And built the Peace Center which supposed to be focus point for dialogue between the people. The life started to be more open, social, cultural and artistic activities implemented, the life style start to change forward modern life.

However, this situation did not last long, the second Intifada broke out in (2000) after the broke-down the Palestinian Israeli negotiation. When all the manifestations of sovereignty in the Palestinian society were destroyed and ruined; cities were invaded, destroyed and besieged. Ramallah suffered and still from systemically procedure of concentrated regimen of sieges, Bethlehem stopped here project when Israelis tanks demolished the houses and the streets in the city in April (2002). This has influenced negatively the achievement on cultural and social aspects that Bethlehem was fulfilled during the political stability.

Through control of all aspects of daily life of Palestinians, the Israeli occupation prevented them from having any development and expansion of central cities. This prevented Palestinians from undergoing a state of cultural or social integration. It in fact lead to the rise and strengthening of the local trends (localism) in those small cities which are living in semi isolation away from other Palestinian cities and regions even if they were only (5 or 10) kilometers away from one another.

This coincided with the Israeli harassment of the Palestinian cities mainly Jerusalem and Hebron; they witnessed a campaign of harassments like: closing civil society organizations in the old city in Jerusalem and Hebron, imposing a curfew all year long as the case of old city in Hebron, initiating a colonialist construction movement by the Israeli government in an attempt to carry out a process of Judization the city of Jerusalem, not allowed to any Palestinian to enter Jerusalem without permission, and finally built separate wall surrounding all of Palestinian’s cities (Brooks et al., 2005). This procedures decreased after the broke out of Second Intifada (2000) which has pushed several inhabitants of the middle class and the rich class to depart from the old city in Hebron leaving behind the poor class because it was really difficult for this class to move out of the old city; thus, it was described as the bottom of the city (culture of poverty) which is reflected in the educational, economic, occupational and cultural level of this sector.

Khadir's study (2003) refer the spread of the phenomenon of Political Islam in the Palestinian's cities, villages and camps amidst the poor -started in first Intifada (1987) and separated in the second Intifada (2000)- to the economic conditions influencing its residents. The extend of Political Islam in the society lead to the spread of conservative and conventional values and norms which in essence are contradictory to those of civic life. We agree with the final outcome of the analysis while differs in the reasons behind the spread of this phenomenon; this condition applies to the Arab countries in general but it varies in the Palestinian society since the spread of Political Islam coincided with the retreat and deterioration of the nationalist, patriotic and leftist parties, and this lead to a state of interstice which Political Islam was able to refill.

- The conflict on identity of the city

The studies of the Israeli researcher Yiftachel reflect the Israeli colonialist and discriminatory policy of persecution and deprivation of the Palestinians of their rights to live in the West Bank or inside "Israel". On the other hand, his study (Yiftachel & Roded, 2008) analyzes the relationship between the ethnocracy and religious radicalism; the two researchers stress the relationship between the policy of urbanization by the Israeli colonialist and the racial discrimination and exploitation policies on one hand and the creation of a holy discourse around the Abraham three cities (Jerusalem, Hebron and Negev) and its relationship with the growth of the religious Jewish movements in the three cities on the other hand. This has also coincided with the rise of different Palestinian religious Islamist movements that differ in their radical discourse towards the city and the colonialist policy applied in the three cities; this reaction came as the Palestinian inhabitants lost their political, civil, cultural and national rights and this also contradicts with the general frame which "Israel" wanted to have in terms of building of a "civic nation".

This process of sacred spaces is not separate from the power of the Israeli Occupation since these sacred centers are not only thoughts and symbols but also an ethical boycott by which they deny the rights of others. The spread of Political Islam in Hebron comes as a result of the Israeli exploitation, persecution and violence against the Palestinians, and it comes concurrent with the religious Jewish discourse regarding the significance and sacredness of the city; this, in return, lead to the rise of a radical Islamist movement against the take over and usurp of the city.

The holiness and symbolism of the place in the eyes of Palestinians is a nationalistic scheme backed by religious discourse; it had only reached Jerusalem and Hebron but it excluded the other Palestinian cities in order to create an opposite discourse to that of the Israeli religious movements regarding the two cities since they both represent the national and religious identity to both sides.

This explains the historical spread of Islamic movements ;Hizb Tahrir (Islamic Libration Party), Jihad Islami(Islamic Jihad), Ikhwan Muslimin(Islamic Brotherhood),

and later on, Hamas Movement in Hebron. It is not only recently when Hamas was able to dominate all the seats in the elections of the Legislative council and in most local councils in (2005-2006). The sacredness, symbolism and identity of Hebron started historically with the start of the Zionist scheme to occupy Palestine, in the year (1929) registered the first bloody confrontation between the Palestinian and Jewish settlers. From that time until present day, all of political parties, notables, families, and charitable organizations Stress and confirm the significant of the city to Muslims. This historically explains the rise of the religious movements in Hebron while the national and secular movements in Bethlehem and Ramallah.

The conflict on identity of the city has witnessed considerable differences; there was not any discourse expressing the state of struggle on identity in Bethlehem city for instance; on the contrary, there was an agreement on the universality of the city in light of its significance to the Christians of the world and in considering it as an outlet to establish ties with the western countries. The secular and Islamic political leaderships including the local elite have historically emphasized the significance of the city considering that it is the birth place of Jesus Christ. In contrast, Hebron city witnessed the early stages of conflict over identity. It also witnessed a state of colonialist and settlers attack by religious Israelis in the mid sixties expressed by a strict religious discourse based on the sacredness of the city and its Jewish religious significance as the city of prophet Abraham. It also witnessed an increase of tension and friction in the discourse of the different religious Jewish movements over the city. This coincided with the colonialist policy which aimed at the Judization of the city and emptying it of its Palestinian residents as it was expressed by policies: in (1983) The Israelis occupation took over Osama Bin Munqith school and converted to be as religious school for the settlers- as the same for 'An-Nahdha, Al-Fayha', Tareq Bin Ziyad schools used as a military camp in the second Intifada-, confiscating Palestinian houses in old city, one settler killed (29) Palestinian in Al-Ibrahimi Mosque while they were praying in (1994), closure of the central market adjacent to the Abraham Mosque in the late of nineteenth, Siege and preventing the Palestinian to enter Alshohada street(2000-2005), settlers throwing stones and attacking the Palestinian and their houses in Tal Romida and old city started in (2000-untill now), curfew all year long in (2002-2004) it was around (745 days), closed the universities of Hebron and Palestine Polytechnic for eight months in January 14, 2003, and so the results, deprivation the Palestinians of their minimum civil, political, cultural and national rights.

On the other side , the Palestinians established and developed the Islamic discourse expressing the significance of the city of Abraham to Muslims. They expressed this through delivering political speeches, Manifestos, and holding special religious ceremonies and festivals commemorating Prophet Abraham (Ibrahim), for example, Hebron is well known with it's delivering the soup of the prophet Abraham (*shorbit el Nabi Ibrahim*) on poor/ rich people, specially in Friday days until this moment. And all of the National and Islamic parties during the two Intifada used religious slogans in their Manifestos. They are calling the people as grandchildren of the prophet Ibrahim (Abraham). This played a functional role in terms of empowering the Palestinians and regenerating their feelings so as to preserve unity in the confrontation and resistance of

the Zionist scheme. On the other hand, it linked the present with the past. This discourse depicted the pattern of the cultural and religious life style in the city; it also identified the kind of behavior that fits with the conservative reputation of the city since any behavior that contradicts with its reputation is considered a violation and disrespect to Prophet Abraham (*Ibrahim*).

As for the old city in Hebron, it witnessed in the (1993-2004) a large scale campaign of displacement of Palestinians out of the old town by both middle and rich classes in light of the Israeli occupation policy of siege and strangulation against the Arab residents. On the other hand, the poor sectors remained since they were unable to move out; this contributed to the reinforcement of the poverty culture in it. This status quo constituted a rich soil for the spread of Islamic movements in it. According to Max Weber analysis, “ Those poor and persecuted people are in need of a savior out of their bitter reality. The Islamic movements represented a safe heaven and salvation for them; whereas, the rich sectors and leaders of secular and communist parties were not in need for any savior, but they wished to gain legitimacy to their status, so these sectors exploited the religious discourse to stress their place and legitimacy.

The policies of the Israeli occupation army directed at the residents of Hebron and the old city in particular have created a number of sociological controversies about the Israeli measures in the old city and their impact on the social, intellectual and economic life and the nature of its formation and development, with regard to:

1. The policy of Judaization that Hebron was subjected to and the state of constant siege, which hampered the intellectual and cultural interaction of the city residents and other Palestinian cities, which left traces and gaps between the mentality of the Hebron residents and the other cities, as a result of the stagnation of the ideas held by the residents of the city and the absence of other ideas and lifestyles due to the lack of enlightenment and interaction.
2. Closure of the main market in the old city deprived the residents of Hebron of a public space in which the residents of cities and villagers gather for commercial and social, and even the intellectual, exchange. So, the targeting of the market was in fact targeting of the public space in the city, which formed a center in which all interacted economically, socially and culturally.

- Public Sphere: Traditional or Modern

In light of the ideological and political field struggle of Fatah and Hamas movements to dominate the Public Sphere in the Palestinian society, this started in the first Intifada and after the establishment of PNA, the concern of Fatah was to stay in power. Thus, Hilal (2006B) considers that the secular discourse of Fatah movement as well as the PNA had subsided in this competition; also the use of the religious slogans

to dominate the public spirit of the Palestinian people had subsided. The Palestinian society considers the public religion as a fundamental component of its identity. In the absence of other active political parties on the Palestinian arena in addition to the state of political and administrative corruption of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas movement achieved a landslide victory in the legislative council elections and in most local and municipal councils in the Palestinian cities and villages in (2005-2006).

On the other hand, due to the daily confrontations with the Israeli occupation, a general trend in the Palestinian society has emerged and it is supported by Palestinians in general and the leftist, rightist and Islamic leaderships and factions including a part of the secular intellectuals in the first Intifada (1987-1993); it calls for holding fast to the cultural legacy, folklore, customs and traditions which constitute a significant part of the identity of the Palestinian people. This is due to the fact that occupation is linked with an uprooting characteristic that threatens the existence of the people and its cultural identity. Consequently, the society held fast to the customs and traditions as an expression of defense of its existence. The political Islam represented by Hamas movement has found an outlet through which it can influence the total social values and customs by considering it a religious and ethical reference in the society.

Islamic religion constitutes a reference in the political and social issues since it is in the heart of the social fabric exercising its influences on the level of popular religion or through civil society organizations or the political parties. In spite of the fact that the Palestinian basic system is a secular democratic one, it could not separate religion from politics in the legal and social measures like laws and courts since religion in the Palestinian society is linked with the reality and everyday life of the society.

As for family and its role in the Palestinian society, it still represents reference in decision making; it is one of the most important aspects of the political, religious and social manifestations which support and back its member in times of need or support. If this has to do with the social rank, the family contributes towards the production of a middle class (Hilal, 2006A). As for power and influence, the family backs its nominee in the legislative and local elections. Socially, it constitutes a protective shield for its member in case of danger or threat. Legally, the tribal law represents one of the main branches of laws that reaches solutions in social disputes or even in politics.

On the other side, the Palestinian Authority did not establish and unify the local cultures in the Palestinian society; it followed different policies in every city alone. The judiciary, legislative and executive institutions of the authority pervaded the life style and way of thinking of the Palestinian cities in accordance with what suits their culture and values. The best legal example that stresses the non creation of a citizenship based on patriotic belongingness but on locations and residential clusters is the Palestinian elections law; it is based on the place of residence so any person who changed his/her domicile cannot vote in the new city of domicile even if he/she moved to it more than ten years ago.

It is worth noting in the Palestinian society that size of the middle class in the Palestinian camps is close to the percentage of the middle class in the cities. It constituted (22.3%) in cities, (22.1%) in camps, while it is (14%) in countryside (Hilal,2006a: 299). This supports Al-Qutub's study (1989) which stresses that the close habitation location of the refugees who come from rural origins has helped in their modernization. We do believe here that the fact that a camp is close to the city or in fact in its heart has established a relationship with the cultural and social change of the camp inhabitants and the state of mutual exchange of culture with the city dwellers. This applies to Bethlehem city camps and the fact that they are situated in the city center beside their original homes in the surroundings of Jerusalem city and in the middle of Palestine. However, the camps of Hebron city were formed and developed outside city center; they are surrounded by some Hebron villages and the majority are rural of the south of historical Palestine before (1948).

Final comments

It worthy to affirm that the transformation process toward civic city with it's life style as "new/ modern city" in Palestinian context cannot be understandable away of the political situation, basically the Israeli Occupation polices toward Palestine as spaces or citizens. Thus we can say that the absence of city formation in the Palestinian society as well as nonexistence of a central city together with the absence of any geographical continuity also coincide with Israelis polices regarding spatial demolition, plus the possibility of any expansion of Palestinian cities, have lead to the formation of separate cities with it's local cultures, these reasons prevented Palestinian from moving forward towards civilization and modernization their cities and it's culture.

As for the class formation of the Palestinian society especially the modern middle class in the Palestinian cities and the role it plays in the modernization of urban behavior and its address which is based on liberalism and democracy at least from a theoretical perspective and the fact that some are following a critical approach towards the Authority since it represents the public interests although the Palestinian middle class is divided between the conservative and the secular, one of its main characteristics is the weak formation of its cultural capital due to the weak modernistic formation in these regions; this contradicts with the size of the modern middle class in Ramallah and Birreh which are the smallest of the Palestinian cities; the percentage of its existence is (46%) and (45%) respectively while the size of the middle class in Bethlehem is (29%). As for Hebron which is the largest Palestinian city in the West Bank, its percentage is (17%) while the percentage of the crafters (petit Bourgeois class) forms 31.5% of the Palestinian cities. It is the second largest city in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after Nablus city (32%) (Hilal,2006A: 295-297).

For the connectivity between Palestinian governorates survey, mid June 2006, indicates that "the biggest number of Israeli occupation forces permanent checkpoints, placed on roads used by vehicles traveling between Palestinian towns, totaled three. The

checkpoints were centered on roads linking the northern West Bank towns of Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarem, and Nablus and central West Bank towns of Ramallah and Jericho; as well as the roads linking southern West Bank towns such as Bethlehem and Hebron with Ramallah and Jericho in center of the West Bank. According to results, the largest number of temporary military checkpoints on roads traveled by vehicles connecting Palestinian towns was five; they were erected on the roads linking the southern West Bank towns of Bethlehem and Hebron with Ramallah in the center. The mean of the longest time commuters spend waiting on checkpoints located in Ramallah and Al Bireh governorate reached approximately (77) minutes; on the other hand, the mean of the shortest recorded time reached (25) minutes in the same governorate. The mean of the shortest time for waiting at a military checkpoint on governorates level was recorded in Qalqilia and Bethlehem governorates at (6) minutes” (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, June, 2006: 8).

Thus we can say that the absence of city formation in the Palestinian society and nonexistence of a central city together with the absence of any geographical continuity , have lead to the formation of separate cities and this prevented them from moving forward towards civilization and modernization.

Second Aspect: Critical Analysis of the Palestinian Society; Cultural and Social Structure

In the western discussions regarding the Arab societies in terms of their cultural and social structure and the political aspects regarding the formation of the political and economic structure and formation of a state, the classical Orientalism has become accustomed to associating the Islamic and Arab societies in general with backwardness, despotism, tyranny and submissiveness, etc..(Kedouri, 1994) People's of the Third World are the submissive people before the regimes and states. However, the Iranian Revolution has reinstated the stolen dignity and role of the people in the social and political action (Sadowski, 1993). The Western Sociology claims that the Arab society lacks the independent bourgeois social institutions which broke the grip of feudalism on the western societies. According to this attitude Turner considers that the oriental society lacks independent cities, independent Bourgeois class, rationale Bureaucracy, legal accountability and private ownership which represent and embody the Bourgeois culture. It is marked by the absence of a civil society that is the absence of network of intermediary institutions between the individual and the state (Turner, 1984).

These views and other similar ones look to the world from a centralized cultural perspective of the west considering that the cultural, political and economic patterns which do not match the western perspectives are not models. The Indian and Iranian cases, the democratic and parliamentary reforms in Jordan are striking examples of the western prejudice under the pretext that they have not yet made any significant advance towards building a democratic society especially India. On the other hand, an understanding and examination of the eastern society out of its colonial context which the region had experienced leads to a damage and confusion of both vision and analysis. We see, or view and evaluate or experience and system as in the way the colonizer wants us to see or view it. The purport of this research does not allow us to prolong our discussion and elaboration of this aspect in spite of its significance.

Back to our topic which is the cultural and social structure and pattern in the Palestinian society. What do we mean by the cultural structure and pattern? They are the projections, values, rules, and life styles which run lives in societies according to what is common and customary (Barakat, 2000). In order to apply this on the Palestinian society from a general outlook, we see that its cultural formation is a mixture of qualities of an open and conservative society at the same time (Abu Amro, 1995:48). i.e. it still holds fast to its valuable, ethical and traditional cultural heritage which preserves its existence. It is also open in a manner that it seeks to change, develop and shape a different model from those prevailing in the Arab countries at least from the discourse perspective. We can say that there is a social value commonly known in sociology as "Unanimity" or "conscience collective"; this mechanism constitutes the legitimacy which organizes the

work of the Palestinian society and constitutes its references in evaluation and decision making, or even in case of any compromise with the Israeli occupation.

The Palestinian society is distinguished by its modern characteristics like: Pluralism, tolerance, civil and political participation, respect of the other, freedom of beliefs; the majority support of the democratic system (Abu Amro, 1995; Al-Azar1996; Barakat, 2000; Miari, 2003; Abrash, 2006A). Miari presupposes that there are factors which had lead to the development of democracy among the Palestinian public; they are (Miari, 2001:50-71):

- Palestinian political pluralism in the field and in the formation of PLO.
- Religious pluralism experience in Palestine which contributes to the renunciation of bigotry and supported respect of others.
- Experience of the First Intifada(Uprising) in terms of political and social elite and way of decentralized administration.
- Israeli political and parliamentary experience.
- Palestinian introduction to Arab democratic models as the case in Jordan.

The researcher here chooses to disagree with Miari in this respect concerning the fourth point which is the Israeli experience and its impact on the development of democracy in the Palestinian society. The Israeli political system is marked by corruption and bribery; therefore, we can also say that the corruption in the PNA is also influenced by the Israeli experience. I do believe that what Miari means here has to do with the psychology of persecuted humans and its relationship with the occupier/oppressor with regards to sentimental contradiction. The former views with admiration the qualities of the occupation and its life style, but at the same time it believes that the thing that made the occupation reach this stage of development was at the expense of the wealth of the occupied (Jaber & Salameh, 2003).

In return, the Palestinian society is distinguished by some peculiarities that make it a conservative one. Abu Amro (1995:49-53) provides the most important qualities which characterize the Palestinian society:

- Affiliation Allegiance: The affiliation allegiance plays a significant and determining role in identifying the social and political options faced by the individual in the society. In spite of the fact that the political affiliations broke through the affiliation allegiances, they are still significant in the individuals affiliation. What reinforces these narrow affiliations is the inability to achieve a national integration demographically, geographically, politically, culturally and psychologically.
- Family Allegiances: vertical relations (tribal, clan and curia allegiances) constitute a significant basis in the social, political and cultural life. It obstructs the

development of the civil society and modernization of the Palestinian society. Although these relations had carried out a civil role in the absence of a national authority or its security establishments and apparatuses in post Oslo – in the First Intifada (1987) and Aqsa Intifada (2000)- , these allegiances preserved the level of civilization and constituted a deterring shield against serious and dangerous violations; they also played a role in solving disputes and preventing the disintegration and deterioration of the social system.

- **Factional Allegiances:** Party allegiances coincided with the rise and establishment of the Palestinian factions who are taking part in the resistance; this was reflected in the formation of the PLO. On several occasions, the interest of the faction was put before that of the society and at its own expense. In spite of the fact that the factional allegiance played a role in easing and reducing the intensity of family allegiances, it had several drawbacks. For example, a large sector of experts, professionals and activists in civil society in the Palestinian society were not allowed to take part or play an active role just because they did not belong to any political parties or factions. According to this trend, this sector lost its qualification to take part in the effective policy making. Due to the fact that these categories were not exploited properly, the process of development of the Palestinian civil society was impaired and obstructed.
- **Religious Allegiance:** The majority of the Palestinian society are Muslims. Although Christians are a minority, they enjoy large scale influences politically, economically, socially and culturally. In spite of the inherited religious allegiance, national allegiance remains prevalent to both Muslims and Christians. The presence of an intellectual secular and leftist trend to which several Muslims and Christians adhere to has helped to enhance the process of integration into the society. This has contributed to the strengthening of the culture, language, and common social, national and political values. Besides, the absence of Christians in all Palestinian cities, villages and camps did not help into having an interaction with them and integration into the society for example as the case in Hebron city.
- **Class Structure:** The political, social and cultural changes which the Palestinian society had historically gone through had influenced their natural growth as the case in other peoples of the world. Consequently, authentic and clear characteristics of social classes have not prevailed in it as a result of the fragmentation of the Palestinian society following the Nakba in (1948) in addition to the absence of a national authority. Moreover, the prerequisites of resistance and struggle have prevailed over other forms of social and class struggle. Change has taken place regarding the class structure and relationships in the Palestinian society; the role and influence of the traditional higher class have been reduced in favor of a new middle class and labor class. In spite of the large expanse of the middle and labors classes, there is still a gap in terms of division

of political and economic resources. However, the labor and peasants do not enjoy a political representation or influence inside the structures of the National Authority.

- **Population Divisions (Distributions):** Palestinian population growth was tied to three basic obstacles according to my point of view. First: it was linked with the existing social and cultural structure which was based on cultural and economic differences between city and village residents since there is a social and cultural gap with regard to different life styles. Second, it is linked with the deepening gap between city residents, village dwellers and later on Palestinian refugee camps by the Occupation authorities; this had obstructed the geographic and cultural interaction between them as a result of the imposed policy of siege on all residential clusters. Finally: it is linked with the emergence of the Palestinian Authority since most of the financial, administrative and political resources available for the Palestinian people were linked with the inhabitants of the central part of the West Bank especially Ramallah city at the expense of small cities, villages and camps especially in the southern parts of the West Bank.
- **Women:** The Palestinian woman has made long strides in the area of social liberation and national political action. The Palestinian woman preserves the family in harsh conditions that the Palestinian society is running through. However, there is still a large gap between man and woman since the current conditions and the group of values which are prevalent in the Palestinian society do not provide for equality between man and woman nor do the political organizations and national institutions attach any importance to the woman in order to enable her to reinforce her role in the society which is based on a comprehensive and chauvinist vision.

These abovementioned features are basic components for the Palestinian social and cultural identity. In order to analyze the traditional state which the Palestinian society is undergoing, we bring into attention the fourth model for cultural behavior in order to encounter cultural hazards like being exposed to occupation as the case is in Palestine. Tomas Meyer (as cited in Muller 2005:87) as saying, “ The reaction is in the affirmation of the old; it will be used as a shield against the foreigner who completely and drastically barged into their lives. These challenges are transformed into objectives; they stress that during this heated defense of their cultural legacy and their collective stance, the cultural identity in this regard becomes questionable. This is what the researcher inclined to interpret in the area of qualities of the Palestinian traditional identity; we speak here about Hebron; it is well known that this city is the most conservative of all Palestinian cities and it is has Israelis’ settlement erected right into its central heart. We will elaborate more on this later.

Regarding the structure of the Arabic mentality, Tahir Labib (1992) points out that within the context of Arab and Islamic development, there was an implicit agreement shaping the laws and rules in the evaluation of the affairs, theories or even the religious and social positions which were called Paradigm; “it means : the matrix of concepts and principles that are linked in the mind or discourse with an implicit or explicit image.” Through it, “the work of the parts –humans- takes place through structural solidarity or functional compensation for one another.” Therefore, there is a state of legal unanimity on what life has to be or any violation to what is already agreed upon in the cultural, social and religious structure which is called dissent from the group which eventually had lead to outcast and rejection. In several cases, fighting the movement which calls for change or violation of what is already agreed upon is what is historically called, “Sedition” as in some statements, “ *Sedition is fiercer than killing*” Thus, Labib explains that the history of the Arab World is only an accumulation of tyranny and submission-tyranny on part of rule and control of the rulers over the people and imposition of blind obedience on part of their people- or imperial interference in his recipes for building a state model that complies with the interests of the west within a mechanism of the world functional division.

Rebellion against what is agreed upon means insurgence and rejection of the society, group, and the functional and implicit unanimity of the group. Within the same context, the structure of the Palestinian society is not far from this analysis since it sanctifies consensus, and it rejects dispute even if it were right? This is what we can realize in making a swift round of satellite channels to look and listen to the discourse of the different political forces in the Palestinian society which often reflects a state of implicit war that is aimed at supremacy and control through exploitation of concepts like “ Higher National Interest, Public Interest” Such concepts according to Herbert Marcuse in his book “One Dimensional Man, 1964” are only an effective tool to besiege the other and deter him. The other in this case is the opposing party through crippling and paralyzing it in order to frame them into the discourse of the authority or the authority of the ruling party. In this context we wish to ask who represents the higher national interest? What are they? Who decided them? The strongest!. Or it will be the majority which represents the public will of the people according to Jean Jacques Rousseau.

Based on this we can analytically understand but not logically the decision why the PNA wishes since the implementation of the Oslo agreement in September (1993) until late (2000) to put forward a strategy to develop the Palestinian society culturally and socially. This requires the contribution of several diverse, different and progressive parties and others within the frame of this process. This means giving up several powers and concessions by the PNA based on the fact that its strength was supplied from the existing traditional structure. It has come into harmony but it did not work on changing the society since it does not wish to face the traditional structure of the society along with

its forces- religious, social and traditional forces. In this context, the Michel Foucault concept regarding the existing structure of the authority in the parts (individual, group, social and cultural discourse) which the regime and its symbols obtain its strength and legitimacy even its supremacy on top of the political or social hierarchy. Therefore, The PNA has worked on precipitating the traditional social and cultural structure in the daily practice of the citizen “clan force and tribal laws, society laws like Civil Affairs, labor laws, control over laws of print and distribution.” Thus we can say briefly that the Palestinian society is controlled by the fever of unanimity and rejection of change.

This aspect is not only linked with internal social and cultural formation of the Palestinian society within the context of historical change but it has also developed as a result of facing the occupation since the traditional and conservative characteristic of the Palestinian society (cities, villages and camps) had desperately tried to regain stolen lands and authority on their own occupied land. This makes us understand that the clan formation and its laws came as a result of the absence of national forces and authority and the civil law ; the only option was to envelope themselves into the cultural and social self along with its drawbacks in order to preserve their identity. This condition presumes beforehand a state of unanimity rather than discord. Accordingly, the qualitative pluralism rather than shares was rejected although it existed as a result of shares division. For example, we have the formation of the PLO. This came at the expense of the value concept called “**National Consensus**” or “**Higher National Interest**” to convince or in fact intimidate any party that tries to depart from the paradigm of the Palestinian society. Therefore, all the Palestinian institutional formations are derived from the PLO and its establishments, civil organizations even the Authority and the political parties were implicitly in unanimous agreement on shares and understandings rather than on diversity which leads to a state of real democracy.

If we want to put forward historical plans for those attempts, we would find them deeply rooted in the experience of the first popular Intifada in (1987) since it was a new way and a new will in running the conflict with the occupier on one hand and organization of the society and its institutions and provision of services in an effective, positive, mobilized way based on even implicitly the right to have different, diverse and pluralism in political and social views and visions on the other hand. Based on the supposition that civil society Organizations and popular institutions are a direct reflection of the make up of parties from a functional and structural aspect, we see that several of the traditional values like ‘obedience and submission to the elderly regardless of the fact whether they are right or wrong in their decision, holding fast to customs and traditions, woman status, solidarity and surety, popular participation etc.. had all experienced a revolutionary state and change at the social and cultural level of the Palestinian society. Change was in favor of the crushed sectors by the value of liberation on all aspects. The Palestinian society was able to develop the basis of the civil society and activate them in

a creative and innovative manner. This stage contradicts the previous analysis at the beginning of this aspect since there is a mixture of models in the Palestinian case; it tests submission and at the same time it has rebellion; it is conservative and liberal. Abrash (2006A) indicates that the political, social and cultural institutions in the Palestinian society were built prior to the establishment and development of the state and this is a rare instance in history; therefore, this state constitutes a stimulating and encouraging factor towards the development and growth of the civil society in order to guarantee the existence of interactions in the cultural and social values that would necessarily lead to democratic transformation if properly used and exploited.

Unfortunately, neither the civil condition nor the PNA had invested into this legacy following its arrival as an outcome of the agreements signed between the PLO and Israel. Following September (1993) Oslo Agreement, a historical turning point in the life of the Palestinian society took place not only on the political level but also on the level of cultural and social values and on the leading sector with all what it represents of interests that harmonize with the state of political reconciliation (Bishara, 2007); therefore, there was a break in the promises made to the field leaderships which have long dreamt of being represented in decision making. Within this framework which is the outcome of the political agreements, the nongovernmental organizations or civil organizations did not find the role that they were supposed to play which is to defend the crushed and persecuted sectors. They instead isolated themselves from the main political stream and were content with running of its sessions and workshops in ivory towers which are only open to the elite. Thus it had experienced a state of marginalization and containment in several occasions; this is the reason behind the retreat on part of women movements, students' movements, political parties, youth sector and civil society Organizations. If we go on with our analysis to the Second Intifada (2000) in terms of the change features in the structure of the society – away from the political analysis in spite of its significance - we realize that the nature and quality of the social sector and its cultural, social and mobilization backgrounds were not the same ones which constituted a social incubator in the first Intifada. In the first Intifada all the sectors(women, men, children, youth and the elderly) had roles in the national and social activities; these roles were the behavioral rules, cultural, ethical and moral task as a result of the daily network and interaction; it was a healthy and progressive climate that guaranteed sustainability as for the second Intifada, “Independence”, it was limited to an armed sector and group ; this meant a marginalization of all those who are not able to resist or does not want armed resistance. The only way open to them was to take part in funeral processions and watch news in a revolutionary manner surveying satellite channels in search for breaking news!!!

This culture reinforces fatalist and metaphysical cultures; they are necessarily the outcome of the marginalization of large sectors of the Palestinian people in addition to security chaos which was created by some armed groups and flagrant violations of human

rights due to the absence of a national framework and progressive culture making the depoliticized gun like an outlawed phenomenon in numerous instances (Jaber & Salameh, 2003).

Third Aspect: Elements of the Civil Society

Abrash (2006A) indicates that the spaces in the political sphere in the Arab World in terms of conceptual uses of some expression have increased. For example, Democracy, Civil Society, NGOs ...etc) this was not limited to this; we find that several thinkers and scholars subject these vocabularies and model them in the lingual dictionary along with its different derivations like “*Democratization*” to the extent that the word “proposal” became an Arab lexicon for the word “*Mashru*” (project). This is all as a result of the close association with the international and regional influences within the frame work of imposing a well defined Paradigm. To be fair with the terms, Abrash indicates that the wrong and fault are not in the terms themselves but in those who import them as if they were a political and social tool that had grown in an environment close to the Arab reality. This is not true because the conditions and requirements of the structure of the European Bourgeois society and its historical development were catalysts in preparing a rich environment for the rise of this society as an independent political and economic entity away from the state?

This objective of this aspect is not to present a theoretical frame regarding the civil society concept as much as it is essential to find qualitative and quantitative scales. The civil society is a mysterious theoretical concept that differs and is explained according to the reader’s background, researcher or school he/she belongs to.

Some literature (Diamond, 1996) stress the association between the process of democratic transformation and the free market considering that the western liberalism had won; consequently, Diamond declares the association between pluralism and towards heading in the direction market in the civil society. This is what pushes the German philosopher Hegel to consider that the civil society had developed as a means to protect individual rights, and it is used as a means to guarantee the freedom of those with privileges in the economic, social and cultural areas. It is the same reason that pushed Marx to consider the civil society as a Society of Bourgeois since the former does not develop by itself without the Bourgeois (Shoiedler, 1997:10).

Along this thought, the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci developed the concept of civil society as tool of ideological and cultural domination, and it is the field in which the conflict between the laborers and the capitalists takes place. In return, Habermas adds in his argument regarding the social sphere that in spite of the fact that the civil society emerges with the rise of capitalism, it soon develops into a popular entity rather than an

economic one. It is described as an area for exchange of goods and social action. (Shoiedler, 1997:11) Within the same context, we cannot introduce the term into social and economic environments that grew and developed as opposed to the western world.

Before embarking on the diagnosis of the third aspect and comparing it with the Palestinian condition, we ask some questions that raised a state of argument in the milieu of intellectuals and Arab scholars of politics and sociology: What is the civil society? What form are we talking about? What are its components? In order to stress this point, we bring in Azmi Bishara's intervention regarding Abu Amro's book (1995) about the existence of a partitioned Palestinian society(West Bank, Gaza Strip, 1948 Palestinians) or in neighboring states (Jordan, Syria, Lebanon) considering that the historical tracks for it are also partitioned and different. Therefore, about what model of a society are talking about? By the same token which civil society are talking about and what are its institutions? And which theory or ideology are we examining?

Away from this state of debate, we can suppose that there is a Palestinian society at least in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; thus, there are civil society Organizations and non governmental institutions we are not going in this context to give a judgment on this trend or its opposite? .

Abrash and Bishara are talking about two core issues:

First: What is the appropriate formula or definition for the civil society and its components?

Second: What is the theoretical or ideological framework for the diagnosis?

In order to tackle the two aspects, we narrate a definition of the civil society using a different formula based on a group of Arab scholars of politics and sociology in order to be able to know about what we are talking about and what we want to reach ? According to Sa'ad Din Ibrahim (1995) the civil society is made up of “ non governmental elements or organizations like political parties, labor unions, and syndicates” . Those elements do not include the membership inherited by the individual, “ considering him a member of a family, religion or class.” As for the sociologist Burhan Ghalion (1992: 109), he includes those inherited organizations which Ibrahim excludes from his definition. We say for the sake of more clarification “family, clan and religious societies.” As for Muhammad Abed Al-Jabiri (1993:5), he sees the civil society as a “society in which the relations between its members are based on democracy,” He defines “Democracy as the relationship between the governor, governed, people and state as the case in Europe and North America. The relationship is based on exchange of authority based on party competition within the frame of respecting political citizenship rights in particular.

Within the context of our discussion of the previous definitions, we see that the civil society is by far larger than equating it with nongovernmental organizations as viewed by Sa'ad Din Ibrahim; they constitute all the organizations that are outside the framework of the state. The organizations, religious and family clubs, market forces, engineers unions, business men, and students movements etc.." might come under it. They work as pressure groups and intermediary groups between the individuals on one hand and the state on the other hand. It is like a functional condition that is carried out within a society structure. We cannot leave out or eliminate the traditional parties of the NGOs from the components of the civil society not in their defense but the aim is see the Arab reality through Arab eyes.

Therefore, we diagnose the reality according to its needs and components and we match the definition based on this view which is away from putting a ready made western model. This is what Abrash means by saying, (Adaptation "*Tabi'ah*") of the term i.e. not to empty it from its cultural and social content along its several significances and giving it dimensions that are close and appropriate to the Arabic environment. We see that many have taken the term as a ready model from a different environment and tried to draw it closer to the Arabic reality and that of the Palestinians' and this is where the researcher disagrees with them.

What goes on our diagnosis of the civil society also applies on the democracy. Which democracy do we mean? Is it elections? It focuses on it from a formality aspect as the case in America and it neglects the economic and social rights or neglects its social content and the fairness of distribution of wealth and neglects political liberties as well. We are not here to argue as much as the track of analysis dictates on us. Otherwise, there is no need for writing from the first place. Therefore: Can we say that there is democracy in Sweden, and Switzerland but there is not in France? Can we make a comparison by saying that Denmark's democracy is better than Italy's. what I want to reach and convey is that the refusal of the disrespect of the historical and cultural privacy as what is happening now by Compradors of Globalization Intellectuals. They seek to provide us with a previously tailor made model. The outcome of Globalization has touched the structure of the Palestinian society, its political and social elites, even the civil society organizations and their outcomes in the large scale war which it wages in order to impose its democracy; however, it does not respect both the Arab person and his experience; why then the ready made models??.

Now we go back to the civil society and its organizations from the elitist to the most traditional. We will discuss them in our Palestinian reality from the dimension of its independence from the cultural aspect and more importantly the financial one. We notice that the organizations, religious and family clubs are components of the ingredients of the civil society and their cultural and ideological reference is entirely local with the exception of some.

This is not what I aspire to discuss – they depend in their culture and work on the following cultural diagnostic aspects: authoritarian, central, pyramid, narrow religious and family allegiances, lacks the element of women) From the financial aspect, it is self financed. It can receive funds without preconditions; thus, the nature of their work and programs are their reference and not another party. The more important aspect is that it has a popular incubator backing it and it is capable of mobilizing its elements at a high speed.

Administratively, there are representative elections of the representatives of the traditional organizations in several occasion or by recommendations due to the absence of any competing nominees.

In the Palestinian society, these traditional organizations are historically present, but they have retreated on several occasions; in fact, they were exploited and remodeled within the framework of party action of the Palestinian national action factions which had reduced their effect and this lead to the draw back of its authority in return for the authority of the political organizations. This analysis applies to the First Intifada (1987). In spite of the fact that the Occupation had repeatedly tried to reinforce some of these traditional organizations, we can say that the Palestinian political organizations were able to absorb those traditional organizations in favor of national action; we can also say that they succeeded in this in one way or another.

This situation did not last for a long time; soon these organizations restarted their activities and nurtured themselves following the implementation of the agreements between the PLO and Tel Aviv government. As we mentioned earlier, the National Authority did not contain these organizations nor did they employ them in favor of the limitations of the manifestations of the civil society. In fact, on several occasions, they encouraged customary and tribal norms in solving disputes to civil law- This is a positive manifestation if it was carried out under the supervision of law?- Consequently, it kept all what was traditional within the society and within the traditional elements of those organizations. In return, this is considered a withdrawal in national action factions especially the Palestinian Left as it is considered the one that had called most for democracy at least from the theoretical aspect. Another aspect is the reinforcement of these organizations and dissemination of its culture on the popular level. It did not have the ability to create a political or social alternative. This has lead to its total isolation form the Palestinian street and the engines of the social and political action in the society. Another part escaped towards work in NGOs. In return, religious movements have strengthened especially Hamas movement. We will discuss the political factions and their relationship with democracy later.

On the other hand, we find the NGOs or the Elite organizations which are active and efficient in humanitarian, rights, development, and civil culture fields. They are run by

figures affiliated to the Palestinian left; they have increased greatly and in a controversial manner following the political reconciliation. This phenomenon was called “Cultural Shops” because of high demand on them; even the policy of funds and support has increased. Main funders are like World Bank, European Commission, American Institutions; all of these have directed policies towards funding these organizations to the level that several critics including the researcher said, “ It is true that these organization are non governmental in light of their relationship with the PNA. However, they are governmental in their relationship with the donors”. We do see that some NGOs submit and remodel their agenda, programs and activities to match these programs which the donor states prepare or approve. To be fair, there are many of these NGOs who are still committed to a national agenda; however, the extent of spread of these “respectable” organizations is still limited and lacks popular support.

The democratic state and elections are not up to the required form as a result of absence of self monitoring and monitoring from the specialized authorities. Its culture is that of a progressive elite, but not in a manner that complies with the popular culture and its general perception according to the Italian thinker Gramsci. It also refrained from carrying a political agenda and it understood its role from the social aspect only. This has also increased their isolation and withdrawal.

Out of the two pictures, we find that the Palestinian society is still carrying within its folds its cultural and social structure and values like “tolerance, respect of the other, pluralism, individual and groups rights” even in the traditional organizations which are carrying out a functional role for the civil society organizations. Moreover, NGOs work on the development and awareness of the society.

Thus we can say that the civil society organizations contribute to the civilization of the Palestinian life, but this effort as we mentioned above is not up to what is needed and expected. The following is what is required to suit the civil life of the Palestinians that we aspire to achieve:

- All civil society organizations including the political factions and the PNA realize that we are still under occupation; therefore, the conditions and requirements for the civil, political, cultural mobilizing action have to be suited to the stage and its requirements.
- Reinforcement of the national factions and renewal of their vision and quality of their programs or even establishment of new factions and movements. Experience has shown that the stronger the factions were the more active and efficient became the civil society organizations and the more expanded becomes the size of popular participation in it and vice versa.

- A reconciliation and a vision is reached in order to be in harmony with the determiners of the civil society between the traditional civil society organizations or the elitist and the situational, civil and tribal law. All their functions have to pour into the rule of respect of the law and the achievement of social peace under a legally well defined surveillance and monitor.
- Deepening of democratic values and understanding them within their larger scope and not reducing and underestimating them by elections in spite of their significance ,but this should not be at the expense of social justice.
- Civil society organizations have to realize their political and social role together without the control of one over the other. The mission of the organizations of the civil society is also to have a progressive cultural supremacy in order to reach the top of the leadership scale; then it has to present a progressive vision of the reality; otherwise, it might be understood as being within the framework of functional adaptation in the support of the authority or the state. It will not achieve the change it aspires to have nor will its programs have the representational form of the citizens' interests behind the desks.

Fourth Aspect : Democratic Experience

When dealing with the fourth aspect, we face a huge difficulty not in dealing with it as much as what other impacts and variables might impose on the analysis especially in light of the external variables that influence it on one hand and the relatively recent experience at least from the political and legal aspect and what is associated with it on the other hand. We can presume that the Palestinian society is a pluralistic one with a general culture and a popularity whose bases are in the participation of all elements of the society and what applies on the general also applies on the private.

This is what has drawn up the nature of the Palestinian life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for long periods in the twentieth and twenty first centuries. However, how can we evaluate the democratic experience in Palestine at least in the last quarter of the previous century until this present moment away from the structural changes that had shaped and formed the Palestinian society until this present moment. What follows are a group of the features that marked the previous period:

First: We would like to point out in this respect that the PLO and its social, political and cultural institutions were administratively and organizationally run on the basis of pluralism and shares rather than on the basis of a democratic electoral representation (Shbib, 1997).The PLO terms of reference and basic organizer are basically different from the reference of the authority and the parliament. Accordingly, the problem of

understanding of roles has emerged. Also the inability to hold elections for the PLO has marginalized its role relatively.

Second: The PLO was frozen and a substitute under occupation was created which is the Palestinian Parliament; this body has come to represent the people in the Palestinian territories which are under the powers of the PNA; in return, the PLO was frozen and marginalized and even the Palestinian entities that were not under the control and influence of the authority or in the neighboring states end up had the same fate. It was a step and an attempt to make the Palestinian Parliament the Palestinian reference rather than the PLO.

Third: We previously said that the political and social agreements between the PLO and Occupation authorities constituted a turning point not only politically but also socially, culturally and economically; it even touched the fine details of the Palestinian life and lead to the emergence of an elite that meets the requirements of the political stage. (Bishara, 2007)

Fourth: What concerns us here is that the preamble of the agreement (Oslo 1993, Gaza Jericho Autonomy Agreement 1994, Agreement on Gaza and West Bank in 1995) and their political and economic protocols and addendums represented a basic reference and an administrative, economic and political organizer not only in the relationship of the Palestinian society with the State of Tel Aviv but also at the level of the individual Palestinian management of his social, political, economic, cultural and ecological life...(Khaldi, 1997) i.e. the Palestinian Parliament cannot issue any laws or projects that may contradict with the occupation and its interests or might contradict with those agreements; this in one way or another has remodeled the Palestinian life, its democracy and movement to harmonize with the interest of the occupation rather than with that of the Palestinian society. This lead to the emergence of new, influential and rejectionist sectors and forces in the Palestinian society; it lead to the emergence of political Islam phenomenon in the Palestinian society represented by Hamas Movement, this was clear in the Palestinian election that conducted in 25th of January 2006, which constituted the overwhelming majority of the seats of the Palestinian parliament(see Appendix No.4).

Fifth: PLO factions which were not linked to the agreements especially the leftist ones lost the ability to manage the conflict in the new way and form imposed on it as a result of the political settlement; it also stood helpless before the questions and needs raised by the society; this also lead to a drop in its supporters especially in the last elections.

Sixth: The Civil Society Organizations were politically isolated and are focusing on a new agenda completely detached from the reality and requirement for development since the funders determined the nature of the activities and programs so their programs were not based on the priorities and needs of the local society.

Seventh: It is the most important failure on all political settlements between the PLO and Tel Aviv Government; it proved that the Occupation imposed a de facto condition on the Palestinians; therefore, there were not any negotiations as much as Israel was employing the factor of time in serving its own projects and plans.

Eighth: Besiege of the Palestinian people and its entire political forces economically, geographically, politically, and financially.

Ninth: The financial, administrative and political corruption in the National Authority and its formal and non-formal institutions.

Tenth: Violations of freedom of the press and human rights (Jamal, 1999) and spread of a state of security chaos, absence of law and besiege of its presumed sovereignty.

Eleventh: Abject poverty and desperate social, residential, and economic conditions for the Palestinian individual. Unemployment has devoured the Palestinian society.

Twelfth: Seclusion of Palestinian cities making them small nonviable and fragmented cantons as a result of the besiege policy imposed on the cities, villages and camps. This has led to the obstruction of growth and development of the cultural and social life in the cities. Consequently, the occupation has disfigured the features of modernization which started to appear before the Second Intifada in (2000) like theaters, cinemas, public spaces, cultural clubs and cafes which started to spread in the Palestinian cities.

Thirteenth: Isolation and shrinking of the middle class due to what this class means in the society in order to build a pluralistic, open and democratic society (Hilal, 2006A).

Before all these influences and diagnosis, we find that the Palestinian society is crippled and besieged and influenced by the internal policies which resulted from the occupation. It also faced international and Middle Eastern dictations and orders which a group from the Palestinian society and the National Authority harmonized with. In light of this, the Palestinian society found itself before an astounding state of divisions as a result of influences in the region reflected by the state of polarization by Fatah and Hamas movements. As for the Leftist movement and the Independents, their existence had not any influence anymore.

In an attempt to redistribute the relationships of the political forces, Fatah movement represented the ruling party of the state while Hamas represented the Palestinian opposition. The internal and external conditions were prepared for a quick division of the Palestinian society into two strong trends on the Palestinian arena. This meant two different and contradictory programs for political and social action that would make them wind up in a state of rivalry as to what had happened in Gaza.

The results of the legislative elections in (2006) constituted a striking turning point in the general public will of the Palestinian society. Hamas became the representative of the general public will of the people and not Fatah. This was like a blow to Fatah, Israel and the United States of America. Its manifestations appeared in Fatah's refusal to handover the new government to security apparatus and ministries which were believed to be dominant. Israel was quick in justifying the policy of siege and hunger of the Palestinian people. When Hamas movement won the elections it was met by an American, European and International boycott; thus, the option of the Palestinian people and its democracy were not respected.

Before all these implications, Hamas found itself in a political predicament since it now represents the Palestinians and leads them; it does not have a political program for the current stage nor was it prepared for such work and position. It cannot have the security powers through which it can impose its sovereignty. As a result of the refusal of the former government represented by Fatah movement to interact with it or to have a unified national government in the beginning and refusal to lift its control over the security apparatus, tension heightened in the Gaza Strip as a result of the rivaling and contradictory Palestinian positions. This was expressed in internal fighting between the two movements. With the interference of the Arab countries mainly Saudi Arabia, there was a call for the two parties to come to Mecca in order to hold a national dialogue the outcome of which was a national government for all the factions of the national and Islamic action with the exception of Islamic Jihad. This agreement did not have clear distinct grounds nor did it discourse the basic issues and crucial points upon which differences happened; it did not take long for the agreement to hit a stumbling block during the recent incidents.

We do infer that the Palestinian formal democracy (elections) was confined by political restrictions dictated by Israel and imposed on the political forces of the society; therefore, we cannot evaluate the practices of the factions whether those of Fatah or Hamas or their violations of the democratic process away from their relationships and contradictions with the Occupation. Consequently, what had happened in Gaza is:

- A main outcome of the occupation and its policies, the different views of the two rivaling movements regarding the political programs suitable to face the occupation policy, management of struggle, organization of the daily life of citizens and spread of law and order.
- The huge over crowdedness of the population in Gaza is the result of the Occupation policies. When we talk about Gaza Strip we have to speak about an overcrowded huge refugee camp (Bishara, 2007). According to experimental psychologists and socio-psychologists this state constitutes a small specific laboratory for the means of living and the understanding of options in a manner

that leads to the emergence of a state of violence and aggressiveness; this is an international phenomenon.

As for the factional projects, they were clearly expressed by Fatah Palestine Television and Hamas Al-Aqsa Television; the media were used for factional projects forgetting the greater national project. In addition, both made accusations of one another; they accused one another of treason and were very offensive. This led the Palestinian citizen to feel bored of all of this since it negatively touched the Palestinian dream. In return the information that the citizen received from both parties proved that there was a drastic failure on both sides and a factional disposition on both parties to take the authority and organize the society. The only solution is not in fighting and management of military disputes. Democracy is not a way to manage differences but it is also the citizens' social, civil and economic rights. Therefore, the Palestinian question is not the property of one faction without the other; both have to realize that the general will is represented by the people and the people alone make decisions.

As for the rest of the civil and economic rights, we notice that the marginal spaces of free expression and economic and social rights of the citizen, have decreased noticeably following Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000). This is what we can infer from the huge size of unemployment among citizens and new graduates; the spread of the abject poverty phenomenon especially in Gaza Strip, financial and administrative corruption, absolute dependence on the Israeli market, violations of citizens without a fair trial; all of this represents the greatest concern of the Palestinian citizen and urgent rights that need to be seriously and effectively addressed. This can only happen with a Palestinian to Palestinian reconciliation.

It is an absolute truth that there would not be any improvement of conditions as long as there is Occupation; Israel will not give the Palestinian people their rights at least at the present stage. Therefore, reliance on Israel and on pits and pieces does not go under the interest of the Palestinian people.

What is required from Palestinians is to preserve themselves, the citizens and his rights. Inability to attain the right at the present stage does not mean that we have to submit and make concessions to the scales of international and regional states. What is needed is a comprehensive dialogue that works toward the interest of the citizen first and foremost.

- Democracy in the Palestinian Political Culture

The issues of institutional building and the form of the proposed political system upon which the mechanisms of the work of the ruling institution are determined constitute a central point in the discussion regarding the democratic formation through a discussion of facilitations and obstacles to this transformation. The political system undoubtedly determines the components of the political institutions which are considered the system through which the Authority performs its function in an organized society as that of a state. It should also be realized that there are different types of democracy and jurisdictional differences regarding its indicators; however, the different practices of these kinds are the criteria considering that practice leads to a group of implications which are classified within the research of Democratic Affiliation or departure from them.

The existence of a political and legal system is essential for democracy building; this shall guarantee that when decisions are made, they are done out of responsibility and accountability; elections have to be approved as basis for a responsible choice that guarantees the rights and liberties of citizens and provides political and economic protection for the society in general.

Investigation into the history of the Palestinian reality requires research into the extent of democracy of decision making institutions over the stages of the contemporary history of Palestine; we mean here specifically the national and Islamic factions and their view of democracy.

- Contemporary Palestinian Political Movements and Parties

The rise of contemporary Palestinian political movements and parties, Fatah Movement (1965), Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (1967), Democratic Front For the Liberation of Palestine (1969), Palestine People's Party descending from Communist Party which was reinstated in (1992), Islamic Jihad Movement (1985), Hamas Movement (1987) consecutively, constituted a notification that marked the transfer of the Palestinian question from the Arab Agenda to the Palestinian Agenda; it was also a declaration of the re-insurgence of the Palestinian nationalism. This time it was in the hand of political parties and movements which were the byproduct of the independence rebellions stage which overwhelmed the third world and succeeded in expelling the western colonization and construction of its independent political entities.

The contemporary secular Palestinian political movements and parties - Fatah Movement Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine, Democratic Front For the Liberation of Palestine, Palestine People's Party and other secular Palestinian movements

which are less spread and less influential in the political decision and popular influence, have represented the only political forces in the building of the contemporary Palestinian political sphere whether from the aspect of leadership and program or from the perspective of large influence in the midst of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, in the Diaspora, amidst the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and its popular and professional institutions. During the mid eighties, the Islamic Jihad Movement was the first religious organization in the Occupied territories which started direct action against the Israeli Occupation in the name of Islam; it was followed by Hamas with the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in December 1987 (Shomali, 2008).

The emergence of Hamas Movement and Islamic Jihad Movement is considered the most prominent expression of transformation of traditional Islam in Palestine into a struggling (resistance) Islam. It used to depend on the theory of “ gradual dissemination” of Islamic thoughts and practices in all life aspects and awaits the establishment of an Islamic State which will put an end to the long strife in Palestine and reinstate Palestine to its true owners within hours into an Islam which is involved into direct contact between the Palestinian people and the Israeli occupation. What hastened this transformation are the implications of the spread of the regenerated Islamic thought which calls for the direct participation in the political action in return for the previous traditional theory of gradual and qualification which was common in the Islamic thought in Palestine. Also it was influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Palestinian Intifada in (1987) which clearly defined the position of the Islamic movement especially Hamas Movement in direct participation for fear it might be isolated from the revolting Palestinian popular movement (Hroub, 2000).

The Palestinian political sphere was no longer confined to the secular Palestinian political movements following the mid eighties. The Islamic Movement has strongly entered the Palestinian movement through the Intifada door. It became an important component especially after the Muslim Brothers Movement which brought forward Hamas Movement transferred its activity which was originally focused on fighting the secular approach of the PLO and stop the influence of the national parties and movements in the Palestinian street (Al-Sharif, 1995: 360) to direct its activities and practices against the Israeli Occupation.

In light of the formation of a new Palestinian political sphere marked by more pluralism than the previous stage, the Palestinian political culture was divided into the duality of secularism and religion; the political court was run by different tools. The newly rising pluralism did not lose time and started to concert main effort on the national aspect as a priority which exceeds the ideological one. The objective of this station is to focus on the general features of democratic culture in the political culture of the contemporary secular and Muslim Palestinian political movements and parties.

- Secular Trends: Fatah Movement, Popular Front, Democratic Front, People's Party

The formal thesis of democracy for the Palestinian secular trend was influenced by the theory of national liberation; it was also influenced by the Marxist literature regarding the concept of democracy in the stage of national liberation and the concept of democracy in establishing a revolutionary party. The propositions which the secular current presented in the democratic field did not exceed proposing the slogan of a democratic state in Palestine as one of the political solutions to the Palestinian question and the issue of Jewish presence in Palestine ; then; it adopted the concept of centralized democracy as one of the principles for building and organizing the political party at the stage of national liberation (Shomali, 2008).

Fatah movement is considered the first contemporary Palestinian organization that presents a vision to the concept of the democratic state in Palestine. It is also worth noticing that the group of national liberation which transformed into the Jordanian Communist Party to the Palestinian Communist Party to finally turn into Palestine People's Party. Fatah Movement has brought forward the slogan of the democratic state as a solution for the Palestinian cause before the Palestinian communists agreed on the UN Partition resolution in (1947).

The concept of the democratic state in Palestine goes back in the thoughts of Fatah Movement to its formal documents in which it started to formulate in the early sixties ; they were formulated in the Movement's First Conference in (1964) and the Second Conference in (1968). It was finalized following a number of modifications and adjustments in its Third Conference in (1971); the thirteenth article under Aims of Fatah Movement states," the aim of the Palestinian struggle is to establish a sovereign Palestinian democratic state on all the soil of Palestine in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the citizens on the basis of justice and equality without any discrimination in race, religion or faith while the fourteenth article emphasized that , "The Palestinian society in future shall be a progressive society that safeguards human rights and guarantees public liberties to all citizens (Abrash, 2008).

In (1969), Fatah expressed its vision of the concept of a democratic state at a clearer and more tangible manner when a statement issued by it pointed out, " the aim of the Palestinian people is to establish a democratic Palestinian state in which all the citizens Muslims, Christians and Jews enjoy equal rights regardless of religion, color, language and race. In (1970), Fatah movement clarified its vision of the concept of equal rights in the democratic state when it indicated, " the democratic state is a multiracial state without the supremacy of any of them on the other and in which all Jews, Christians, and Muslims enjoy full civil rights." (Abrash, 2006B)

In its determination of the concept of right of citizenship in the democratic state, Fatah movement clearly states that all Jews, Christians and Muslims residing in Palestine or departed from it shall have the right to a Palestinian citizenship; this identification as it is clarified gives the right to all travelling Palestinians to return to Palestine as full pledged citizens. It also gives this right to Jews residing currently in Palestine or to those who remain in Palestine when the democratic state is established provided that they give up their Zionist creed. Salah Khalaf one of the prominent leaderships in Fatah movement stressed that the Palestinian citizenship shall not be limited to progressive Jews who are anti Zionism, but it shall also include those who express their readiness to give up racial ideology As for Yasser Arafat, he linked between the concept of democratic state and rejection of racism when he called, in his speech addressing the United Nations in 1974, for a struggle against all forms of direct and convincing discrimination including discrimination which those who embrace Judaism are suffering from. In his address, he also called for coexistence between Muslims, Christians, and Jews in a democratic state in which justice and equality prevail (Shomali, 2008).

Fatah movement ruled out any social content for its national objectives and looked at the social issue including the democratic issue as deferred issues; it concluded that the content of the Palestinian revolutionary Movement is a compulsory one rather than arbitrary. It expresses itself through the struggle for existence rather than a struggle for a specific social principle; it is survival of the fittest or its elimination . In this struggle , social battles disappear, for the Zionist movement wants land rather than inhabitants; it will not allow for the strengthening of any class of Arabs in Palestine; therefore, the fate of the battle will be different from what it was in other countries. It also considered that liberation and return are aims in the interest of all and it is inappropriate to go into a byzantine debate about the social image of our homeland following liberation.(Al-Sharif, 1995: 121)

The Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine thinks that the meaning of Palestinian Democratic State is free life of Palestinians regardless of religion or race; this is inevitable because every Jew who lives in Palestine following the end of the battle shall have his/her equal rights with the rest of residents in Palestine from other faiths.

The Popular Front objected to having the slogan of the democratic State to be a way for the establishment of a dual nationality state. By the same token, it also rejected having a democratic state which is anti Jewish for the mere fact that they are Jews or annihilate them or throw them into the sea. It saw that the true democratic solution would include a solution to the Judaism questions through linking the Palestinian revolution and its aims with the aims of building a socialist democratic society since such a society alone provides potentials for economic, and social liberation to all its citizens; it is also capable through the Marxist principles of providing solutions for the problems of poverty, backwardness, persecution, and exploitation which this homeland suffers from including

the issue of minorities (Popular Front, 1992:96). Following liberation, Jews will also practice their full rights the same as others in a socialist democratic society.

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine saw that the democratic state in Palestine is: Popular Democratic State in which Arabs and Jews live without any distinction and against all forms of class and national persecution, and it shall also give the Arabs and the Jews the right in the development of the national culture for each. The Democratic Front also considered that the achievement of this is linked with the establishment of a socialist society in Palestine that gets rid of the racist and reactionary approach towards the Jews in the Arab culture and vice versa.

Although the Democratic front also opposed the notion that the Democratic State in Palestine has a dual nationality because it contradicts the proletariat and democratic approach in solving the Jewish question; however, the Democratic Front was distinctive in stressing the Jews rights in developing their own national culture. This emphasis lays the foundation for an outlet to the perception of the concept of national rights of Jews in Palestine as opposed to Fatah movement and Popular Front approaches who called for cooperation between the Arabs and Jews on the basis of citizenship concept without any recognition of any Jewish national rights in Palestine (Shomali, 2008).

As for the People's Party the heir of the Communist movement in Palestine, it had made a qualitative shift of adopting the concept of Democratic State in Palestine on Marxist , national and proletariat bases as expressed the National Liberation League to adopting a new political vision based on the principle of right to self determination to both Palestinian and Israeli peoples and on the basis of two states for two peoples. The slogan of Democratic State in Palestine now only represents a part of its old ideological and political legacy.

Although the communist Palestinians gave up the concept of one democratic state in Palestine , they still stress their call for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the basis of socialist thought; they parallel linked between establishment of an independent Palestinian state and achievement of democracy, social justice and socialism (Palestinian People's Party, 1998:14).

Before the signing of the Oslo agreement between PLO and Israel, the concept of democracy was linked in the political culture of Popular Front, Democratic Front and Palestinian Communists with the socialist concept or the socialist democracy concept. The Political culture viewed these liberal and democratic movements and parties as capitalist democracy nothing more and nothing less.

The Palestinian Left- Popular Front, Democratic Front and People's Party – linked between the concept of national revolution and concept of democratic revolution; this link took place through the identification of the nature of the stage which the Palestinian

people are undergoing considering that it is the stage of national and democratic liberation with a socialist horizon; the content of a democratic national revolution is based on termination of both Zionist colonization and previous feudal relationships. This, consequently, paves the way for the socialist stages under the leadership of the labor class and its political party. The Palestinian left looked at the revolutionary labor party as the organizational tool used to achieve the democratic and national objectives and to lead the revolution until fulfils its socialist end. The organizational tool of the Palestinian left was defined as a fixed and rigid organization tightly built and run by the principle of centralized democracy , group leadership, criticism, and self criticism. The centralized democracy was viewed as the moving force of the rigid organization and the unity of thought and action; it is the basic principle as it appeared in the official documents of the Palestinian Leftist parties : it is to build the revolutionary party and organize its internal relationships; it is based on the full awareness discipline and the minority commitment to the view of the majority, the commitment of the lower bodies to the decisions of the higher bodies and it enhances the initiative inside the party as long as these initiatives are not contradictory to the party policy and they have to comply with the decisions of the higher political bodies while the party bodies are united through election from base to top (Shomali, 2008).

The political and geographical complications surrounding the work of the Palestinian parties and domination of underground action especially in the Occupied Palestinian territories have lead to discontinuity in convening of conferences of the political parties for the parties, so the principle of elections was suspended and the centralized democracy was transformed into a firm centralization that was anti individual initiatives and the rights of the minorities; the parties' leaderships were transformed into Charismatic leaderships that were not subject to criticism, accountability and elections.

The Oslo Agreement in (1993) raised a number of new challenges in the political Culture of the secular Palestinian political movements and parties especially when the Agreement throw on the table new tasks which differ in many aspects from the old political tasks, mainly the mechanisms, rules and forms of the PNA structures, form of regime and nature of economy; these tasks forced the secular Palestinian political movements and parties and their political culture to embark on a new stage.

The Palestinian People's Party was more influenced than other secular parties by the basic outcomes that came as a result of the establishment of a new national authority in The Palestinian Territories. It was also more influenced than others by the international developments which lead to the fall of the socialist system and transformation of the Soviet Union from a socialist state to a state that follows the path of political liberalism and market economy; this influence has reflected on a reconsideration of the principle of centralized democracy and replaced it by the concept of “ Expanded Democracy”.

Communists justify this by the fact that centralized democracy lead to centralization in implementation and restrictions on individual and minority freedoms inside the party.

However, the party did not abandon the concept of Centralized Democracy when it stressed in its third convention that, “ The People’s party is organized according to the democratic basis in a manner that guarantees balance between freedom of discussion and expression and commitment to party decisions.

In its sixth convention in (2000) , the Popular Front insisted on the principle of centralized democracy; it reaffirmed it as the main principle for the construction and organization of the party in spite of its call and emphasis on the significance of democratic regeneration as a central task for organizational development through reinforcement of views and thoughts inside the party and through incorporation of the view of the party base and reactivation of the role of members in drawing up the party policies effectively and efficiently. The Popular Front justified its emphasis on the principle of centralized democracy by stating, “ the stage which the Palestinian people are undergoing is still a stage of national liberation which requires a striving party to fulfill the basic objectives of the Palestinian people which are still unfulfilled. Post Oslo events came to stress this historical fact and to add a new complication to the struggle without changing its nature.

The Democratic Front too stressed the significance of centralized democracy in its documents issued by the third National Conference in (1998). It justified that by stating that, “ national liberation strife still represents the decisive element in the entire revolutionary process; Struggle in Palestine is a struggle for land and not for inhabitants. However, it criticized in the same conference the prevalence of a strict type of centralization which restricts decision making to the upper bodies and called for the spread of more democracy in the internal political relationships and reduction of centralization in decision making (Democratic Front, 1998:153)

Fatah Movement, had held its sixth conference and didn’t stop in its previous stages to discuss the principle of centralized democracy which it had officially adopted in its Third Conference in (1971). The minutes of the 23 Session of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah Movement which was convened in Ramallah in February (2004) indicate a new political turn towards bypassing the concept of centralized democracy while the Revolutionary Council pointed out,” the aim of Fatah’s Movement is to establish an independent Palestinian state whose constitution states having political pluralism, rule of law and order, respect of basic freedoms, human rights, peaceful exchange of authority, and separation between the three authorities Legislative, Judicial and Executive. (Fatah Movement, 2004:25). This promises that Fatah will be transformed into a liberal party or movement which is less disciplined by the principle of centralized democracy. Due to the fact that Fatah Movement is the owner of Oslo Agreement and later on the Authority

ruling party, it was natural that its discourse in the democratic field would become inclined towards liberal democracy which is the democratic form that complies with the rules of organization and structure of a political policy adopting the system of market economy. Besides, Oslo Agreement stated previously in some of its scripts that the path to the building of the Palestinian Authority passes through the principle of general elections which is the basic principle in the principles of liberal democracy.

In one way or another, the political discourse of the Palestinian leftist parties was influenced by liberal vocabulary and concepts in the area of building of political authority which is a natural outcome of the failure of the programs of the Palestinian Left in achieving the national democratic program along with its socialist dimensions. It is worth noticing that the emergence of liberal democracy concepts in the discourse of the Leftist parties following the rise of the Palestinian Authority was not accompanied by an adoption of the theory of market economy or departure from the socialist path in the organization and building of the Palestinian economy.

The Palestinian People's Party expressed in its documents presented at the Third General Conference in (1998) a clear inclination towards concepts of liberal democracy in the field of the political life stressing that the central mission is : Establishment of an Institutions State which guarantees political pluralism, separation of authorities, rights of political and professional organizations, freedom of expression , personal freedoms, peaceful exchange of authority and holding of periodic elections. In the area of economics, the People's Party considered that the basic mission is to build a national economy that possesses the internal growth components, guarantees disengagement and dependency on Israel and achieves high growth rates. In order to fulfill this, the Party indicated that, " it is crucial to redistribute income in favor of the poor categories and direct the largest portion of the budget to development, combat unemployment, raise standard of living and subject the administrative body of the Authority to popular monitoring.

The Democratic Front in its third conference in (1998) called for : respect of political pluralism, right of political forces in public organization without any restrictions, respect independence of civil society, free press and media, guarantee freedom of opinion and expression and meeting, independence of Judicial system in accordance to the principle of separation of authorities to guarantee integrity of the judiciary. It linked this with its call for building a national, productive and independent economy through rejection of Paris Economic Agreement which greatly harms the national economy and the interests of the majority of the sectors and classes of the Palestinian people. It also considered that building the elements of economic independence and elimination of unemployment can never be fulfilled without salvation from occupation and unjust agreements.

As for the Popular Front, its discourse was open to liberal democracy concepts; it was basically linked with the need to contribute to putting forward the political rules and measures to prevent the transformation of the Palestinian Authority into a replica of the dictatorial Arab regimes more than to being linked with an essential change in the nature of Popular Front understanding of democracy; its understanding of democracy has remained influenced by its communist legacy and it continued to view democracy as a political- economic-social-liberal project that replaces colonization, remains of feudalism, and capitalism. According to the theoretical document issued by the sixth conference in (2000), it considered it a historical project for the future as a political, social, economic, cultural, striving project contrary to the belligerent and helpless thought of the Right; it is a liberal national , social, democratic and anti capitalist project linked with a large scale popular democracy which reflects the views, interests and rights of the Palestinian people.

- Religious Movements: Islamic Jihad and Hamas

The relationship between Islam and Democracy is considered one of the most complicated problems that faced the Islamic vision in general and the religious movements in particular. The problem stems from the fact that Democracy belongs to the positivism thought while Islam represents a group of rules that work together to organize the relationship between humans according to religious references in which man and his thoughts represent a secondary value that is meaningless outside the framework of obedience to the Divine Will and its representatives.

The above problem generated a discrepancy in the Islamic discourse in tackling the topic of democracy; this discrepancy was reflected in three major views:

First: A Reconciliatory view which sees that Islam did not acknowledge democracy but also encouraged it since it has the ability to achieve justice and balance in the society which is eventually a synonym to the concept of “Shura” (Consultation) in Islam.

Second: An Opposing view which views the relationship between Democracy and Islam as contradictory and aggressive since Islam is a divine system and Democracy is a human creation which is lacking not only because it is human (manmade) but because it is a western outcome in the context of the materialistic western civilization which is contradictory to Islam that balances between what is spiritual and what is materialistic.

Third: A view that sees the relationship between Islam and Democracy as any relation between it and any new concepts, systems and innovations in the human civilization (Abu Amro, 1995:93).

Within the general ideological framework, contemporary Palestinian political Islamic movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad reject the democracy concept in general and western democracy in particular. This rejection is based on the fact that democracy is secular western concept in legislation which is based on humans; thus, it does not harmonize with Islam which relies on the Book of God (Quran) in legislation.

Within the concrete framework, the issue of democracy in the Palestinian political Islamic vision is a new issue and it was only tackled in the responses of the Islamic Movement to the accusations directed to it by Palestinian secular trends indicating that they were reactionary, racist and fanatic. Moreover, the majority of the responses come in defense of good wills and the humane, national, and ethical character of the role of the Islamic movements in the Palestinian national struggle and building a new society and not an expression of a political and intellectual effort previously prepared in the discourse of the democratic issue.

The concept of (*Shura*) "Consultation" in Islam has provided the basis for Palestinian political Islam due to the fact that it does not intercourse with the democratic thought in the field of internal Palestinian policy considering that democracy and human rights find their bases in the concept of "*Shura*" in Islam.

In light of the above mentioned, Hamas Movement and Islamic Jihad inside Palestine take a flexible stance towards the issue of democracy; in fact, they express their commitment to some concepts of democracy to address complicated issues at the national level. It is worth noting that Hamas and Islamic Jihad especially the latter coordinate their actions even following the establishment of the PNA according to the formula of underground action and the organization is built on tight and sealed basis; they did not transform into popular political organizations as the case with some Palestinian secular parties and movements.

The agreement of Hamas movement on the principle of discrepancy and coexistence within the national stage was also expressed by the official spokesperson of Hamas Ibrahim Ghosheh in (1991) when he stated, " Hamas does not want to remain out of the circle; it wants to be in the midst of the Palestinian political factions regardless of the political and ideological differences. Hamas believes that democracy and the majority in the Palestinian National Council are responsible for putting an end to the internal differences. Article 27 : Hamas Charter indicates that the movement adopts the concept of pluralism within the general national framework. Article (27) states that: PLO is the closest to us and we are currently cooperating with it, but when it adopts Islam then we are its soldiers. In his defense of the freedom of speech and views inside the Islamic Movement , Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, says, " We are not a dictatorial movement, but we are a struggling (Jihad) movement that makes its decisions by Shura (consultation) i.e. the Islamic Movement allows pluralism of opinions on the basis of commitment to decisions

issued by the movement Leadership (Hroub, 2000). It is more like the concept of centralized democracy adopted by the Palestinian secular parties especially the Marxist parties

Within the framework of identification of the Islamic position towards the issue of democracy it exceeds the level of immediate responses which the Palestinian Islamic movement upon accusing it of being antidemocratic, Jamal Mansour one of the leaders of Hamas Movement indicates, "We should not consider all the manifestations and forms of democracy as one package either you take it or leave it. Due to the branching of the general meaning of Democracy, its numerous theories, its different types and systems, different purposes and attempts to apply it on societies with different social and historical components, it makes the question of determination of a fixed and accurate democratic type an unpractical matter (Shomali, 2008).

This position reflects a specific attitude by the Palestinian Political Islam towards benefit from the human achievements in the issue of democracy especially in the issues not addressed by Islam itself but on the rule of the Islamic ruling system. The attitude tends to use the spirit of Islam in the democratic application so that the Palestinian society in particular and the Arab society in general do not live in a contradiction between their belief, public life and politics.

It is clear based on this that the concept of pluralism within the national context has represented the main element in the understanding of the democracy concept according to the contemporary Palestinian political parties and movements whether the secular or the Islamic; this is the element that exceeded other elements for clear political and national reasons.

It also becomes clear that the concept of democracy according to the Palestinian political movements and parties has intertwined with the concept of revolutionary democracy; these movements and parties did not tend to produce the concept for democracy as a political context which governs the relationship between the members of the society; However, this understanding started to appear gradually following the rise of the Palestinian Authority among the majority of the Palestinian secular parties; it also started to appear in the midst of the Islamic trend especially Hamas movement for practical and national reasons and not an expression of a final political approach towards democracy as a form of construction and organization of the regime and the government.

CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL HISTORY FOR BOTH CITIES

Social History for both cities

Introduction

Following a review of all the theoretical dimensions and analytical interventions which all pour into our subject and which were discussed in the theoretical introduction and second chapter, we move further to review the civil composition in terms of its demographic, economic, social and cultural dimensions of the Research population (Hebron city and Bethlehem City).

Perhaps it is worth while mentioning that in spite of the interaction of the historical stages of the two cities in the context of the social and cultural development of the Palestinian society, the researcher reviewed and analyzed both cities separately in order to avoid any confusion or mystification. It might be possible that there are some information which were repeated in the preview of the history of the two cities although both have different histories that refer to the privacy of their reality and context in which each had passed through on one hand and in order to emphasize some analytical interventions by the researcher on the other hand.

Thus we move now to review the main cultural and historical features in an attempt to review the basic feature for both cities.

Hebron : Geography and Social History

Hebron (Khalil Al Rahman in Arabic, Hevron in Hebrew) is one of the oldest cities in Palestine; its religious and corporal significance for both Muslims and Jews come from the fact that Prophet Abraham settled in it. Based on this, comes the bone of contentions which is the implicit and explicit struggle based on identity of the city for both parties due to what Abraham Mosque represents to both Muslims and Jews; it is centrally located in the old city (Yiftachel & Roded, 2008).

The city is located to the south of Bethlehem city and it is (35km) away from Jerusalem and (1000) meters above sea level. Similar to other Middle Eastern cities, Hebron has an old city surrounded by newly built neighborhoods. What makes the phenomenon of abandonment of the old city is the occupation policies which aim at emptying the city of its original Palestinian inhabitants. This comes in light of the religious Jews interest in the city; there are currently (400) Israeli settlers living in the heart of the old city and there are more than one thousand soldiers guarding them against the 35 thousand Palestinians living in the city (Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, 2009).

There are (93) residential clusters in the governorate (Palestinian Bureau of Census, 2008) Mainly: Halhul, Yatta, Dahriya, Beit Ummar, Bani Niaim, Beit Ula, Beit Kahil, Ithna, Sa'ir, Shiyoukh, Sourif, Kharas, Dura, Jab'a, Tarqumia, etc. There are also two clusters for the Palestinian refugees as a result of the Palestinian Nakba in (1948); they established Aroub and Fawar Camps. What makes Palestinian refugees in Hebron Governorate different from other refugees in the other governorates is that the camps were established outside city limits since both camps are 10km away from the center of the city.

As for the old city, it is divided into eight quarters Sheikh Ali Baka, Bab Zawiya, Qazazin, Aqaba, Haram, Qitun, Masharqa, Akrad.

Origin of the City of Hebron

Historians unanimously agree that Hebron is one of the oldest Palestinian cities as its beginning was associated with the first Semitic migrations that set out from the Arabian Peninsula in successive historical periods that started from 4000 to 1500 BC and moved in the direction of Mesopotamia and the Fertile Crescent. The city flourished and developed at that time and the Arab Canaanites who settled down and called the Hebron area "Arba'," which is an originally Canaanite term that referred to a person called "Arba'," who was the father of the chief of the powerful giants (Al-Dabbagh, 1988:48). The Canaanites named the place "Habroon" or "Habrii", meaning union and power (Al-Hanbali, 1973:35).

The history of Habroon was linked to the name of Prophet Abraham, who settled in the area with his wife Sarah and his nephew Lot from the city of Ur in Iraq. After Abraham and his companions traveled to different places, they settled down in Habroon in about (1900 BC).

As a result of the draught that inflicted Palestine in 1656 BC, Jacob and his descendents left for Egypt and settled there. These descendents were enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, which led them to constantly think of immigrating until they moved out of Egypt in (1350 BC). They crossed the Nile and entered the Sinai desert, where they went astray for 40 years, during which they lived as Bedouins in the desert. Moses sent some of his companions to investigate the conditions in Habroon and neighboring areas. At that time Habroon was living a period of progress and economic development. Upon the return of the companions, they presented to Moses a description of the city conditions. If we go back to the texts of the Bible (the Old Testament), we find that it emphasizes how much the giant Anakim was proud of his country.

The city was occupied by Yoshe' Bin Noon, who led the Jews after Moses during the period (119-1180 BC). Even though the city was destroyed during the resistance of Anakim, the Canaanite Arabs clung to their land continuing their traditional activity of agriculture. The Israeli texts state that the sons of Israel did not enjoy stability as there was constant confrontation between the Canaanites and the Jews until the reign of King David, who managed to establish the kingdom of Judea in (923 BC) after he killed Goliath, the king of the Palestinians and made Habroon capital for the nucleus of the state for seven and a half years. Habroon remained attached to the Jewish kingdom until 586 BC, when the Chaldeans led by Nebuchadnezzar were able to destroy their kingdom and force them into exile to the Iraqi city of Babel (Amro, 1987:18).

Palestine, including Hebron, remained under the rule of the Chaldeans until the beginning of the Persian Immigration to Palestine before the Christian era, when the Persian king Cyrus allowed the return of the Jews to Palestine despite the resistance of the population to this return. In the year 63 BC, sovereignty was transferred to the Romans. The famous Roman king Herodotus maintained good relations with the Jews of the region. This king left several ruins that still exist; among which is the exterior wall of the Ibrahimi Mosque (Al-Dabbagh, 1988:583-623).

Hebron during the Islamic Era

The Islamic conquest set off from the Arabian Peninsula towards Greater Syria, including the southern part of Palestine. The conquest process was oriented towards the spread of the word of Islam. Muslims tried to drive away the "yoke" of the Byzantine occupation from the city of Abraham. Prophet Muhammad said that anyone who cannot visit my grave can visit the grave of my father Abraham. The city was conquered in (636 AD) and Muslim Arabs gave the area the name "city of Khalil Al-Rahman" (Allah's friend). Arab tribes settled down in Hebron, especially that the city was totally destroyed on the hands of the Persian invaders in (614 AD). Hebron remained under the Muslim Arab rule until 1099, when it was occupied by the Crusaders (Al-Hanbali, 1973:82).

Hebron was affected by the crusades' invasion and continued unrest and turmoil characterized the state of affairs in the city. As for city's outstanding landmark Abraham's Haram Ash-sharif (the Honorable Ibrahimi Sanctuary), a part of it was transformed by the Crusaders to a church, another part to military barracks and another part to sanctuary belonging to one of the monks.

During the crusaders' rule, Muslims tried their utmost to restore the sovereignty to the rest of Palestine (to Muslim Arab sovereignty). They prepared a campaign that set off from Ashkelon in (1107), and they were on the verge of capturing the city had it not been for Baldwin, king of Jerusalem, who was able to drive the Muslims back to Ashkelon.

The city was liberated after the battle of Hittin in 1187 under the leadership of Saladin, who restored the conditions of the Abrahimi Mosque and destroyed all the Christian landmarks that were introduced by the Crusaders (Al-Dabbagh, 1988).

Hebron during the Mamluk Era

The city of Hebron undoubtedly witnessed the most prosperous period during the Mamluk era in the 13th century. The great majority of the old buildings, ruins and mosques that exist today were the products of that era. So far the city has not witnessed any historical discontinuity. The Mamluks showed interest in the city as they wanted to settle in it. They provided sources of water through reservoirs and public drinking fountains. They also introduced the foundation of (Tikiyat Ibrahim, or al-Simat), which served free meals for visitors of the city. To achieve that, a number of Waqfs (religious endowments) were dedicated for that purpose. We can detect the significance of Hebron through the recurrent visits made by the Mamluk sultans to the city, among them were "Al-Dhaher Peepers," "Qatibay," and "Al-Naser Bin Qalawun" (Amro, 1987).

Hebron during the Ottoman Rule

After the defeat of the Mamluks at the battle of Marj Bin Dabiq in (1517), the Ottoman Turks took over all the parts of Greater Syria and Hebron was administratively annexed to the Sanjak (district) of Jerusalem. The Ottomans modernized the architectural establishments of the Abrahimi Mosque by bringing skilled laborers from Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire followed the steps of the previous Muslim empires, with regard to endowment of land and villages for the benefit of Hebron. Moreover, it exempted the residents of Hebron from paying taxes in all kinds to enhance its economic development. During the French invasion of Egypt and Syria in (1797), the economic conditions of the city flourished, especially after the invading forces besieged the Palestinian coast, which made Hebron become one of the trade centers that were formed during that time. (Al-Aaref, 1986:180).

Hebron emerged on the political arena during the Egyptian campaign led by Ibrahim Pasha to occupy Greater Syria. Hebron rebelled against the Egyptian army due to their efforts to disarm the peasants of the city and because they tried to collect taxes from the people of the city. The residents made a sudden raid against the Egyptian battalions in the city and killed about 200 soldiers of the Egyptian army (Al-Dabbagh, 1988).

On the arena of events one of the clan and tribal feudal lords in the Hebron mountain named Abdul-Rahman 'Amro emerged to complain against the taxes that the Egyptians

asked from the Hebronites. Moreover, the Egyptian campaign attempted to hit the big clan and feudal lords. The Ottoman government also nurtured that orientation in the inhabitants of Hebron in order to unsettle the tranquility of Ibrahim Pasha's army (Amro, 1987).

After the crushing of the revolts of the two villages of Zeeta and Deer Al-Ghsoon by Ibrahim Pasha, the leaders of those movements (fighting Ibrahim Pasha) took refuge to the Hebron region, whose residents provided protection to those leaders. That stand pushed Ibrahim Pasha to advance towards Hebron. When he was sure that the Hebron residents insisted on refusing to pay allegiance to him, Ibrahim Pasha advanced with his army on June 24, 1834, and clashed with the residents for three hours of confrontation, which ended by the defeat of the Hebron residents. He punished the city residents by desecrating the city at the hands of the troops. The result of those events was the killing of about (600 city) residents and a similar number of captives, who were taken to Egypt (Al-Dabbagh, 1988:125).

After the decline of the Egyptian presence in Greater Syria in (1840), Hebron was entrusted to Abdul-Rahman 'Amro, who acted as a deputy governor of the region and remained in that position until 1859, when he rebelled against the Ottomans. The rebellion was crushed and he and his brother Salamah were arrested and exiled to the Greek Rhodes Island. A Turkish deputy governor was appointed for Hebron (Al-Dabbagh, 1988:21).

History of Hebron in the 20th Century

The First World War is considered to be the climax of the colonialist orientations of Britain and France toward the possessions of the Ottoman government (Turkish), which entered the war in supporting Germany. Following the recurrent victories of The British over the Turkish army in Gaza, the residents of Hebron felt that the battle would move to the city, so they made the necessary preparations for that. After the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Hebron, the city lived in chaos for 15 days. A group of the Hebron personalities made contacts with the British troops in Beersheba asking them to enter the city and occupy it without resistance. People faced that act with opposition and dissatisfaction. They burned all the Turkish army provisions warehouses to prevent the British army from benefiting from them (Jbarah, Falah, Alnatsha & Baydon, 1987:144).

Following the occupation of the whole of Palestine, Britain issued the Balfour declaration, which gave the Jews the right to establish a homeland for them in Palestine. This declaration was met with wide resistance throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. Hebron participated in these protests by riotous demonstrations and total rejection of the declaration and the British policy. Consequently, the British authority deported a group of

young men, who sent telegraphic messages of protestation against the British policy to the World Peace Conference on December 12, 1918. Representatives from Hebron participated in the General Syrian Conference, held in Damascus on June 2, 1919, which called for the Greater Syrian Union (Syria, Lebanon and Palestine). (Jbarah and et al, 1987).

The Hebron residents participated in all the national uprisings since the beginning of the British occupation of Palestine in (1917) and participated in all of political Palestinian conferences. Their role was distinguished in the seventh conference held in June 1928 and in the events of the Buraq revolt in (1929). The Hebron residents resisted the selling and taking over of the land to the Jews by setting up a committee which aimed at curbing the process of land loss and fighting against brokers, intermediaries and land sellers. The committee also called for boycotting these land sellers religiously and socially (Jbarah and et al, 1987:144).

After the conflict intensified between the people on one hand and the British government and Zionist movement on the other and when it reached its zenith at the famous six-month strike in (1936) that was called for and organized by the Palestinians, revolutionary committees were set up in Hebron, which took a distinctive stand when the Hebron Municipality declared participation in the strike. It was the first municipality on the level of Palestine as a whole that declared strike. The residents of Hebron actively participated in the military Intifada that extended from the end of the (1936 strike to 1939). Rebels organized themselves into revolutionary cells, each of which consisted of 5-6 members. They also set up a revolutionary committee for the defense of Jerusalem. The revolutionaries in the Hebron region carried out the military operations against Britain. Not only did they defend their land against the British Mandate but also organized the daily affairs of the residents. (Al-Dabbagh, 1988:129).

Hebron after World War Two

After World war two, Hebron, with the rest of the Palestine, participated in the defense of the Arab character of Palestine and resisted UN Resolution 181 that called for the partition of Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish, on 29 November, 1947. The resolution was considered then incompatible with the simplest Arab demands. The Hebron region participated with the other Palestinian regions in opposing and resisting Britain. They confronted the British military patrols and vehicles and organized themselves in the city and villages (Jbarah and et al, 1987: 158). The Hebron region fighters actively participated in the ongoing fighting in the settlement areas in Kfar Etsion. Fierce battles took place in which the settlers suffered a large number of casualties and tens were captured by the fighters (Jbarah and et al, 1987:165).

As a result of the British withdrawal, a Jordanian military unit and an Iraqi one came to Hebron. On May 20, 1949, the Egyptian forces entered Hebron and the two forces competed over the control of the city. The Egyptian army quickly called upon the notables in the city of Hebron on June 17, 1948 and the general Egyptian command was appointed the military governor for Hebron, Bethlehem and Beersheba. Saleh Al-Majali, of a Jordanian nationality, was named the military governor of the region on July 4, 1948. Those disputes led to the division of the residents, one part of whom declared their allegiance to Jordan and the other to the Egyptian forces, which led to conflicts between different families (Falah, 1984).

King Abdallah I, the then King of Jordan, attempted to annex the remaining territory to Jordan. To achieve the annexation, he convened a Palestinian-Jordanian conference on October 1, 1948. The participants agreed to call for the Jordanian-Palestinian unity. The conference was attended by 200 personalities from Hebron, headed by Sheikh Muhammad Ali Al-Ja'bari. Some called for the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan and they succeeded in that despite a call by national personalities for the establishment of the Palestinian state.

Hebron, like the other central and eastern Palestinian cities which were not occupied by Israel in 1948, remained under the Jordanian sovereignty as part of what was later to be called the West Bank.

Hebron under Occupation

Despite the fact that the number of Jewish sect in Hebron in 1929 did not exceed (2.7%) of the Arab population (Falah, 1984:64), and no Jew remained in the city after the massacre that took place in the same year (Abishar, 1970), the goals of the political Israeli policies after 1967 became clear in the Judaization of the city and exercising control over Ibrahim's Sanctuary, despite the holiness of the Mosque for Muslims, establishing settlements, and occupying Arab houses and setting up settlement points in several areas inside the city and its surroundings (Hebron Municipality, 2009).

Since 1967, Hebron has been threatened by a number of stages in the Judaization strategies, all of which aimed at create a demographic reality that enhances the Jewish presence in the city and its vicinity:

First: Establishment of the Kiryat Arba' suburb in 1970, as a settlement nucleus outside the city.

Second: Appropriation of some buildings inside the city and changing them into Jewish housing quarters.

Third: Work on geographical continuity between the quarters inside the city and linking them with Kiryat Arba' suburb (Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, 2009).

This was preceded by establishing a theological school for Jews in Hebron that would take up to (103) students. The continuous visits of the settlers to the Ibrahimi Mosque encouraged the insistence on transforming a part of Ibrahim's Mosque into a room for Jewish prayers. The Arab residents objected to what they viewed as an act of insult against their religion. And in September 1968, the Minister of Religions supported the idea of establishing a synagogue inside the mosque opposite from the *Minbar* (pulpit) so that Israeli settlers could pray any time they wished. This decision is considered to be the first step in creating a Jewish geographical reality in the center of the city (Falah, 1984 : 68-69). A synagogue was established and followed by changing the shape of the area around the mosque, constructing new paths for Jewish worshippers. During the process of constructing the new path, residents resented the fact that a stone entrance that dates back to the 12th Century was destroyed (Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, 2009).

On May 9, 1979 the Dabbayah (Beit Hadasah) building was taken over by the Jewish settlers. Despite the military authority condemnation of this operation, it did nothing to evacuate the settlers but it protected them and the Mayor of Hebron could not do anything except making protestations (Falah, 1984:70).

The point of departure for the Judaization of Hebron occurred in February (1980), when the Israeli government approved the living of Jews in the center of the city. This Israeli government decision was accompanied with imposing a curfew on the city for several weeks, which damaged to the city socially and economically. As for the settlers of the city center and Kiryat Arba', they were exempted from the curfew orders and they roamed through the city with total freedom.

Following the Dabbayah operation which was carried out by the "*Fedayeen*" (commandos) on April 24, 1980, and which resulted in the killing and injuring of several settlers, the Israeli government used the operation as a pretext to issue an order to expel three of the Hebron personalities after a few hours following the operation, who were Fahd Al-Qawasmeh (Mayor of Hebron), Muhammad Milhem (Mayor of Halhoul) and Rajab Bayyoodh At-Tamimi (Religious Judge/ Magistrate of Hebron). The Dabbayah building was turned into a military base. Israeli bulldozers destroyed a number of buildings around the incident location, taking advantage of the absence and fear of the local residents, who were under curfew and were not able to confront them in such circumstances.

It is worth mentioning here that Fahd Al-Qawasmeh, the Mayor of Hebron, and Muhammad Milhem, the Mayor of Halhul, were democratically elected by the residents of Hebron in (1976). Their deportation meant the expelling and encircling the democratic

experience that the residents opted for since the common practice was that the mayors were appointed by the Israeli authority. Besides, the Israeli authority established strong ties with the chiefs "*mukhtar*" and family elders (leaders) as a means of enhancing clan and family relations, which dominated the intellectual and social mentality of the Hebron citizens. What supports this point was the attempt to establish of village unions/associations in the 1980s, headed by the chiefs as an embryonic form for the concept of autonomy, in which the civil society and its needs were to be ruled by the families and traditional figures, with unlimited financial and military support from the Israeli government and army (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A).

On July 7, 1983 The Israelis took over Osama Bin Munqith school, which is located in the heart of Hebron and drove away (700) Arab students from the intermediate school. They also seized the central bus station as a reaction to the killing of a settler from Kiryat Arba', which was taken as a convincing reason for seizing the school and the surrounding area. This was followed by dissolving the elected city council by a military order number 1063, and the authority appointed an Israeli mayor, who was working as the custodian of the absentee properties (Hebron Rehabilitation Committee, 2009).

Following those unprecedented events, the Jewish settlers committed acts of violence and torture, among which were placing bombs in the yards of Arab schools, uprooting electricity posts, destroying five homes in the old city, and burning cars, buses and the central vegetables market. The most dangerous act was the incident of the attack with machine guns made against the University of Hebron, in which three students were killed and a number were wounded. It was revealed later on that the perpetrators of that operation belonged to a terrorist Jewish cell that had been working against the Arab population in the occupied territories for years (Falah, 1984:76).

The centers of research and studies and human rights organizations recorded hundreds of attacks carried out by the settlers. Not only did the army and border police overlook the attacks committed against the Arabs by the settlers but they also took part in those attacks. They also committed their own attacks against the Arab population under false pretexts. The most notorious attacks in Hebron was the one committed on February 25, 1994, by a Jewish physician called Baruch Goldstein, one of the Kiryat Arba' settlers. He fired at the Palestinians while praying in Ibrahim's Mosque and instantly killed 29 Arabs. The year 1994 was the bloodiest for the residents of Hebron, when 63 residents of the Hebron Governorate were killed. (Al-Haq, 1995; B'TSELEM, 2009).

Education in Hebron

The Husainiyyeh School was the first school established during the Mamluk era in the reign of the Sultan Naser Bin Hasan (1354-1361). Then, two other schools were established, Al-Qaymariyyah School and Al-Fakhriyyah School, which remained until the Turkish era. Four schools were established during the Turkish era. Until the beginning of the 20th century, there were four schools in Hebron. They had 387 students in the year 1903. Moreover, there was one private Jewish school that had 40 students and another private Christian school that had 32 students. In the villages of the Hebron region, several schools were established. The Halhuol School was established during the Mamluk era and continued functioning till the Turkish rule. During the same period in which schools were established during the Mamluk era, three other schools were established in the Hebron villages. Besides, there were the "*katatiib*" (elementary schools), which were spread in the city suburbs and many villages, where students received their education at the hands of Sheikhs and religious men, who taught student reading and writing, with a focus on the Holy Qur'an (Al-Dabbagh, 1988:12).

During the British Mandate on Palestine (1917-1948), the educational philosophy changed since it originated from the framework of the goals of the mandate government, which aimed at preparing educated individuals to assume some government posts.

During the mandate, a number of schools were established, and other existing schools were expanded. The total number of students in (1934) was (900) male and female students (Al-Dabbagh, 1988: 163). Until the 1942-1943 year (See Table No.(1)), there were five government and six private schools in Hebron. As for the schools in the Hebron villages, there were 10 during the year 1930-1931. However, during the Jordanian rule (1949-1967), education developed and school education included three stages: elementary, intermediate and secondary and the duration of schooling was (12) years. The number of schools was (27), with an enrollment of 5617 male and female students. A hundred and forty-six teachers worked in those schools (File of Department of Revival of Islamic Heritage). The number of the UNRWA schools in Hebron and the governorate villages was 21 for both sexes. Until 1967, the number of school male and female students in the Hebron region was (24,454) and during the (1984-1985) year, the number of schools was (155, 46) of which were in the city of Hebron and 109 in the governorate villages. During the same year, the number of students was (55,404) and that of teachers (1660). AS for the UNRWA sector, during the same year, the number of schools was (85-86) and that of students was 6,022 (Education Files, 1949-1984).

Table No.(1): Numbers of students in the city of Hebron during the 1942-1943 year and ratio to the numbers of boys and girls who were in the education age category (5-15)

<i>School Type</i>	<i>Number</i>
Government school male students	1,189
Government school female students	579
Private school male students	750
Private school female students	148
Hebron school male students	1,939
Hebron school female students	727
Boys in the education age category	3,150
Girls in the education age category	2,950
Ratio of students to number of boys who are in the education age category in Hebron	60%
Ratio of students to number of girls who are in the education age category in Hebron	25%

* SOURCE: The Government of Palestine, Education Directorate in Palestine, 1942-1943 Survey.

With regard to the relation of education to the subject of the present research, we notice that the historical status of Hebron has added a religious character to the quality and performance of education in the governorate. The educational authority constituted a somehow hindering side to the development of the communal mentality in the City of Hebron due to the absence of an independent Arab Palestinian curriculum on one hand and the dominance of the conservative and traditional climate in the social life on the other. The majority of the social and political elites that were historically dominant, and whose roots extended to aristocratic origins, pushed for the education of their children more than did for other citizens. At the beginning of the 20th century, they sent their children to theologically-oriented schools such as Al-Azhar in Egypt. And after their return, important and sensitive positions were prepared for them, which helped in the formation of a political class with a conservative religious orientation/inclination and its own concerns, orientations and interests that did not come close to or communicate with the tastes and needs of the rest of the inhabitants. Those leaderships enhanced the power of tribalism and religious courts over any other civil laws. The impact and supremacy of those elites are still extending in some forms through the dominance of the tribal, clan-oriented mentality rather than law. Those leaders prevented the opening of cinemas and theaters and facilities for exhibits for books that were not compatible, as they viewed it, with the conservative mentality of the Hebronites, considering these acts breaking Islamic morality and the conservatism of the city (Salameh & Dan'na, 2006A).

Population

The population of Hebron was (16,577) in (1922), of whom the Jews constituted (2.6%). In 1945, the Arab population was estimated at 24,560. Table (2) presents the population increase.

Table (2): Population Increase from (1838 to1985)

Year	Population	Year	Population
1838	10,000	1945	24,560
1851	11,500	1952	35,983
1875	17,000	1961	37,867
1881	10,000	1967	38,091
1992	16,577	1985	20,000
1931	17,531	--	--

* SOURCE: Palestinian National Center for Information

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics(June,2008A) the population in the district is 551,129, and according to the Temporary International Presence in Hebron [TIPH], the population of the governorate at present is approximately 150,000, the majority of whom are Muslims. There is a group of (500) settlers, living in five settlement centers in the city center "Beit Romano, Beit As-Sittah, Ad-Dabooyah or Beit Hadasah, Abraham Afino, Tal Ar-Rumeidah", in addition to (7000) Jewish settlers living in settlements (Kiryat Arba', Kharsina, Hagay, Ma'oon, Sousya, Karmel, Karmi Tsoor, Giv'at Havoot, Bani Saghir, Beit Yatir, Sham'ah, Tinah, Eshkelot, Sinsanah, Teelem, Adorah, Ngahoot, 'Atna'il). (TIPH, 2009)

Economic and Social Structure in Hebron

The Ottoman rule left to Palestine an economic and social structure that combines economic feudalism and political despotism within a cultural frame of reference that belongs to the Middle Ages. Hebron received its lot from this heavy legacy, whose main manifestations were found in:

Turkishization policy which took away the Arabic language from the official departments and replaced it with the Turkish language and assigned the key public positions in state to the Turks.

The Absence of political freedoms, political oppression and imprisoning pan-Arabists and nationalists, which continued till the first decade of the 20th century, when the limited freedom law was issued in (1908). Therefore, the clan and tribal mentality was fixed and consolidated, with regard to the division of Hebron into power areas owned by families in Hebron. This in turn led to the strengthening of familial affiliations in the absence of legal and social security that guarantees the rights of individuals.

The nature of the economic reality of that period made the production low, due to the taxes and "*khawat*" (money paid by force) collected from residents. Hebron depended on two main productive economic sectors, namely agriculture and industry and two service sectors, namely trade and tourism (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A).

With regard to the agricultural sector, the arable land in the Hebron region is (328,500) dunums (1000 square meters), (94%) of which is unirrigated land and (6%) irrigated. Arable land constitutes (19%) of the arable land in the West Bank. The city is well known for growing field crops, fruitful trees and agricultural crops such as grapes, olive trees and almonds. Agriculture constitutes one of the most important crafts practiced by the residents. (306,810) dunums were arable land in (1985).(Abd Al-Rahman, 1990:266-270)

With regard to livestock, Hebron had more than 30% of livestock in the West Bank in 1985, such as goats and sheep.

Hebron is considered to be the largest industrial area in the West Bank. The most important industries are: (leather industries, shoes and their requirements, skin dying and handbags), marble industry, home furniture, metal platform scales, textile industry, plastics, and tourist industries.

As for the tourism sector, which flourished due to the presence of Ibrahim's Mosque and a number of tombs and religious and historical shrines, its role has diminished since the Israeli occupation in 1967. Tens of stores and shops as well as factories that sell and manufacture tourist products were closed. (Al-Dabbagh, 1988).

We notice from the above that the economic and social structure in the Hebron Governorate was affected a lot by the nature of the external forces caused by foreign occupations, which in turn led to intellectual, social, cultural and economic symptoms that still affect the social climates to continue being a relatively conservative one compared with other governorates.

We see that foreign policies of the ruling authorities in Palestine, such as the Ottomans, British Mandate, Jordanian regime, and Israeli occupation, have created a state of political, social and legal separation between the citizens on one hand and the rules and governments on the other. In other words, they have created a social gap and hampered construction and its historical context on the following levels.

First: the natural development for the Palestinian intellectual and social identity in general and that of the Hebron Governorate in particular. This pushed everyone into social retreat and self-isolation instead of keeping abreast of the innovations of the period and keeping up with them. There also emerged a regional identity instead of the national identity and affiliation to the tribe and clan instead of affiliation to the homeland as an expression of social "incubator" in which the individual enjoys protection and social security instead of dealing with foreign courts as anyone who dealt with them was considered a collaborator and suffered social and religious deprivation for his dealing with occupying authorities rather than a nationalist authority.

Second: The policies of the Israeli occupation army directed at the residents of Hebron and the old city in particular have created a number of sociological controversies about the Israeli measures in the old city and their impact on the social, intellectual and economic life and the nature of its formation and development, with regard to:

The policy of Judaization that Hebron was subjected to and the state of constant siege, which hampered the intellectual and cultural interaction of the city residents and other Palestinian cities, which left traces and gaps between the mentality of the Hebron residents and the other cities, as a result of the stagnation of the ideas held by the residents of the city and the absence of other ideas and lifestyles due to the lack of enlightenment and interaction.

Closure of the main market in the old city deprived the residents of Hebron of a public space in which the residents of cities and villagers gather for commercial and social, and even the intellectual, exchange. So, the targeting of the market was in fact targeting of the public space in the city, which formed a center in which all interacted economically, socially and culturally.

The Judaization of the old city through oppressive measures and occupation policies, such as closing the market, seizing homes and stores, and imposing continuous curfews on the Palestinian residents. All of these actions led many middle class residents to leave the old city and live in new quarters adjacent to Hebron or move to live outside the governorate, e.g., Ramallah and Bethlehem. Those who were poor and could not afford moving out, namely the poor and families stayed in the old city. From this poor section of the Hebronites, political Islam and conservative political currents emerged. These political current provided assistance to the poor on various levels. Thus, the people of Hebron were intellectually influenced by the ideas and beliefs of these conservative religious currents (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A:25).

These factors had an impact on the structure of Hebron's civic life. These factors have undoubtedly characterized Hebron and distinguished its local community in ways different than other Palestinian cities, with the exception of Jerusalem, which underwent a similar process of influence caused by the occupation. Thus, we can understand the reasons why allegiance to family and religion than in other Palestinian cities.

Social Life in Hebron

What distinguishes Hebron from the other Palestinian cities is the influence of tribal and clan relations in all aspects of daily affairs. Hebronites' attachment to their family and clan is pretty strong. This attachment increased and became stronger during the years of the Israeli occupation because it was considered a refuge for the individuals with regard to security and safety. It was also considered a refuge from the economic and social reality which was pretty harsh. The tribal and familial life reflected itself on the public life and left its mark on it in the governmental sphere, the organizations of the civil society, and political parties. Although an individual's educational qualifications and experience are taken into account when considered for a job in the governmental sphere; nevertheless, this individual's family affiliation provides the job candidate with a superior advantage (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A).

With regard to the organizations of the civil society, the tribal relations had impact on them as regards inequality and lack of equal opportunities. Relatives are pushed to become members so that they can vote for their influential relative in this or that organization. Moreover, kinship relations also play a role in the political affiliation of individuals.

Historically, the strength of family relations dates back to the weakness of the Ottoman State at the end of the 19th century, when the region became an arena for events, chaos and revolutions. These events in turn weakened the powers of the state. Clan chiefs were able to impose their power over their clans or towns and villages. These chiefs self-appointed themselves as judges settling differences between people. The Ottoman Empire often used to depend on them in imposing its official domination in their areas of influence. This included Hebron. The impact of family relations extends to our present time.

This state of affairs continued even during the British Mandate, which used traditional notables in tightening its control over the Palestinian society and granted this elite sect of Palestine a number of privileges and powers that did not conflict with Britain's interests. This empowered these local strong men in their sphere of influence even further. These conditions did not change much during the Jordanian rule of the West Bank, and continued to be strengthened well into the period of the Israeli occupation after 1967. There was an attempt to bypass the national and political rights of the Palestinian people by setting up the village unions in the 1980s as a form of autonomy that was administered by those familial and traditional elites. However, this attempt failed as the people opposed this policy.

Following the signing of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 and the entry of the PNA into some of the Palestinian areas, the PNA established some Palestinian

organizations that have direct contact with the demands of the population. That was the first historic opportunity for the Palestinians to govern themselves. Although there was no mechanism of enforcement of the law in the Palestinian territories (Hebron included), due to various reasons that includes familial and tribal affiliations; nevertheless, there were courts of law that attempted to make a difference.

In an effort to detail the obstacles that stand in the way of enforcing law in Palestine, Judge Abdul- Ghani Al-Uwaiwi notes that the obstacles that impede enforcing law in Hebron are varied due to different reasons and motivations as illustrated by the following points:

Nature of the familial and tribal mentality in the Hebron Governorate due to the historical context that it experienced, which was previously mentioned.

The Hebron Governorate is the last Palestinian territory that the PNA took over after the Hebron Protocol in (1997). It exercised its power over it in a later stage since the Al-Aqsa Intifada started in (2000), and a three-year period was not adequate for establishing a legal authority or social order (Salameh & Da'na, 2006B).

The Palestinian territories were divided into several areas as far as the security and administrative power was concerned. Security and administrative in area (A) is under the Palestinian authority. In areas (B), security control is under the Israeli authority while administrative affairs are under the Palestinian control. In areas (C) both security and administrative control is under the Israeli authority. This hindered the enforcement of a unified order in all of the territories, besides the absence of security powers for the enforcement of law. For example, if someone committed a crime in areas (B or C), which are under the control of the Israelis, prior coordination between the Palestinians and Israelis is required so that Palestinian forces could enter those areas, which takes a lot of time for the implementation and execution of law.

As for Hebron, it was divided into two areas according to the (1997) Hebron Protocol: Area H1 and H2 which will be described later on.

The instability of the PNA and the weakness of its capabilities, as there is only one court and one judge for 150,000 citizens in the Hebron Governorate.

The periods of the first Intifada (1987-1993) and the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000) are characterized by a state of turmoil in which there has been an almost total absence of the executive and legal authorities, especially during the second Intifada. Due to the fact that when the first Intifada took place, there was no PNA, and administrative responsibilities were in the hands of the Israeli military. During that time, people used to solve their differences through family relations. This, of course, deepened the importance of family

and tribal. Despite the criticisms pointed at this sometime-legally-incompetent tribal institution, it did fill a legal and executive vacuum.

A number of important major facts about the Hebron Governorate can be concluded from the above. It is a city with a historical, political and religious depth. These aspects shaped much of the current social interaction, customs and traditions and created a kind of pride among the city citizens throughout history. Their city and region emerged as one of the oldest in the world and the civilizations that developed in it left their historical marks through historical and religious ruins and landmarks. For example, Ibrahim's Mosque, which is one of the historical and spiritual landmarks of the region, has attracted pilgrims to it from neighboring and far-away regions. These landmarks provided the desire of the kingdoms that controlled it to offer gifts to the city and those in charge of these landmarks. Consequently, relations between the citizens and those kingdoms were consolidated so much so that the former fiercely defended the rulers who were generous to the city. That was what happened when Ibrahim Pasha, the leader of the military campaign against Syria in the first quarter of the 19th century, attempted to occupy the city and subjecting it to the Egyptian rule. As the city housed the remains of a number of the prophets and their wives, relations between the city dwellers and the remains of those prophets throughout history were consolidated. They looked at the matter from two angles, one that deepens the citizens' spiritual and religious outlook and another that the role of the pilgrims and the gifts offered by the rulers to the holy sites enhanced the material affiliation to them. The holy sites became a source of living for the city dwellers, and consequently, their spiritual belief and the material benefit motivated them to adhere to the place and defend it in the face of external invasions. Their spiritual belief enhanced the conviction that this is an Arab and Islamic city and strengthened their rejection of the Zionist movement and Israeli occupation. On the other hand, the distribution of gifts could have created conflict among the city individuals and families in the attempt to get the biggest share. Therefore, there must have been a social contract, though unwritten, between the families for the assignment of duties among them inside Ibrahim's Mosque. Consequently, this matter consolidated the familial and tribal importance inside the city. This spirit was based on understanding, the division of labor and the culture of "united against any invaders". The tribal relations, with all their original conventions and traditions, have survived until today.

The income method that was prevalent in the Hebron Governorate until the middle of the late century was that of a feudal style, which by necessity had an impact on the intellectual life and people's social and cultural lifestyle. It also encouraged the presence of tribal affiliation and its control over the political, cultural and social life. For instance, in the villages surrounding Hebron some families took hold of most of the land, with the support of the Ottoman government which granted them some of the state-owned land and facilitated for some of take over the affairs of poor villages, the lands, and the people

who lived on them. These families were deputized to collect taxes from the peasants and ensure their continuity. (Al-Dabbagh, 1988).

As for the city, it was a commercial center for the villages that surrounded it, which made it easy for some tradesmen to own the land of the peasants who were not able to pay their debts.

Commercial and handicraft life in the city center necessitated the establishment of schools in the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern age, which later contributed towards the development of the educational system with regard to an increase in the number of schools and enrolled students to the extent that illiteracy diminished and the great majority of the six-year-old children joined schools and received education. In (1978) Hebron University and the Polytechnic Institute were established. In (1999), the institute was transformed into the University of Palestine Polytechnic. In the 1990s a branch of Al-Quds Open University was opened in Hebron as well.

It is worth mentioning that the number of female students enrolled in schools and universities in the Hebron Governorate is equal to that of male students. This is shown in Table (3). This, of course, which does not create irregularity in the educational process with regard to the education for both genders, both of which have the opportunity to equally participate at the social and political levels.

Table (3): Education under the PNA (1998)

Directorate	UNRWA				Government				Grand Total			
	Total	Mixed	Male	Female	Total	Mixed	Male	Female	Total	Mixed	Male	Female
Hebron	9	1	6	2	150	14	69	67	251	102	78	71
<i>Southern Hebron</i>	9	2	4	3	108	25	40	43	180	89	44	47

* SOURCE: Palestinian National Center for Information.

Enhancing education (for all levels) is essential at this point in time and in the future for the establishment and progress of democracy. This is due to the fact that democracy flourishes in the context of a culture rich with education, science and free flow of knowledge. Democracy does not prosper in the dominance and presence of a great deal of ignorance and illiteracy. Illiteracy represents an obstacle in the face of development, creating individuals incapable of modernization, and incapable of coping with the various complexities attached to development in its different shapes. The spread of illiteracy in any society makes this society dependent on those individuals who are capable of making decisions to develop this society.

Mousa Ajweh, Dean of Students at Hebron University, says that the number of female students has constantly increased over the past years and surpassed the number of male students. He also notes that girls major mostly in the Faculties of Arts and Education. We in turn notice that there is still a gap of inequality in education based on

gender with regard to specializations for girls at Hebron University. Moreover, women's roles in the Hebron Governorate are still fundamentally linked that of traditional female roles as housewives, whose duties are limited to raising children and secondary professional and financial assistance. As for the number of male students compared with females, we notice that opportunity is available for males more than for females to study abroad, or outside of the Governorate. This is explained by the gap that exists between the numbers of males and females at the local universities, in favor of females at present (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A).

I can definitely say that the standard of education in the Hebron Governorate is on the rise, which is considered one of the most essential constituents of democracy in the long run. It will lead to change as it will provide social alternatives for young generations. This, in turn, can contribute in one way or another to enhance democracy in the future, taking into account the possibility of introducing specializations at the universities that bear directly on the societal and civil issues such as democracy and human rights. This would certainly support the pillars of democracy and the establishment of a strong societal base comprised of participation instead of limiting it to societal elitist classes. (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A:37)

General Political Setting/State of Affairs

The PNA assumed power in 1994 in accordance with the Declaration of Principles Accords (also known as Oslo Accords). The first Palestinian government was established in (1994), and its formation was approved after the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, which took place on January 20, 1996.

Prior to (1996), the Palestinian people had never formed an executive government in modern times that practiced its duties on Palestinian lands. The Palestinian government was developed under constricting conditions of sovereignty as Israeli occupation forces were in control of the great majority of the Palestinian territories until the middle of (1996). After the Israeli withdrawal in (1996), the majority of the Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza became came under the direct control of the PNA, with the exception of East Jerusalem and the old city of Hebron, in addition to most of the Palestinian villages located in areas B and C according to the definition of the transition agreement.

During the phase of Palestinian authority's incomplete sovereignty, there emerged contradictions between Palestinian nationalists and Islamist on one hand and the PNA on the other. These conflicts were a result of political and ideological differences. However, they never reached violent conflicts except in exceptional and rare cases. The political

commitment and rationality of Palestinian political parties were essential factors in holding the differences from materializing into a Palestinian civil war.

The period of the Palestinian authority's incomplete sovereignty control was characterized by:

"... continuation of the suffering of the Palestinian security departments from multiplicity and interference in their powers in the context of the absence of laws that govern their work, define their functions and organizing them as one of the tools of judicial control as they should be for the sake of the prevalence of law. In the context of the absence of laws, people continued to complain and suffer from the misuse of power that touches on their basic rights and freedoms by members of these departments. These are evidenced by the complaints handled by human right organizations. Examples of this misuse include arbitrary imprisonment, torture, beating and insults, besides threatening, false accusations, imprisonment without trial, unjustified political imprisonment and others. Some leading cadre in the Palestinian security departments admitted these facts and explained them as individual accountable mistakes. Furthermore, the absence of laws makes the security agent take the decision on the basis what his discretion in each case." (Arab Thought Forum, 1999:29)

Some of the practices of security departments have created controversy among the citizens. These practices were violations that touched on the life and freedoms of some citizens, the multiplicity of these departments, the vagueness of their functions, their occasional overreaching of the functions of the courts and their overlooking of the prevailing laws. This is in addition to the duties entrusted to them in the field of security coordination with the Israeli side, which does not gain the approval of the Palestinian public. This period was characterized by the acute disagreement between the prominent leaders of the security departments and main leaders in the Fatah movement. This was topped by the accusations exchanged between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the security departments regarding the assassination of some persons in mysterious conditions and what accompanied that of imprisonment of leaders in the Hamas leadership, its military arm Al-Qassam Brigades and several supporters. (Arab Thought Forum, 1999:29)

Human Palestinian human rights organizations, among which were Al-Haq Organization and the Independent Palestinian Authority, collectively or individually issued several statements about one of those cases.

Despite the transfer of the cities to the Palestinian authority sovereignty at that time, control over the roads and freedom of movement between the cities and the population congregations remained under the authority of the Israeli occupation. The occupation authority could close the "gates" of (entrances to) the Palestinian cities and population

congregations and turn them into big prisons. Movement between the Palestinian territories and the outside world continued to be under direct Israeli control over all the border entries. The state of affairs remained as such until the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in (2000), which was ignited as a result of the Israel's refusal to recognize the demands of the Palestinian authority, and its retreat from the implementation of its commitments agreed upon the agreements signed with the PLO and its neglect of international law.

As a result of the Intifada, the Israeli occupation forces carried out incursions into the PNA areas in the West Bank and imposed direct military occupation again. They also imprisoned thousands of the Palestinian political leaders and detained them in various detention camps, assassinated hundreds of the leaders, cadres and members of the nationalist and Islamic movements and destroyed hundreds of homes. Consequently, the conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, with their cities, villages and camps, went back to what they were before the handing over to the PNA the incomplete sovereignty over the Palestinian territories(Salameh & Da'na, 2006A).

The Special Case of Hebron and its Political Condition in the Occupied Territories

Hebron was the last city from West Bank in which the Israeli army was partially redeployed. According to the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron, which was signed by the Palestinian and Israeli sides in 1977, the city was divided into two parts, Area H1 which was similar to what was done in other West Bank cities and was under the Palestinian security and administrative control. Area H2 (See Appendix No. 5), which was within the responsibilities and powers of the Israeli public order and internal security, and Israel would continue its responsibility for the internal security of the Israelis (See Hebron Protocol, Appendix 6).

As a part of the security arrangements made for the areas that are adjacent to the areas under the Israeli control, there were joint patrols in the area, which is the most populated area. A simple scrutiny of the Protocol reveals that the Israeli occupation forces did not leave, but kept over more than (30,000) citizens in the old city within the direct control of Israel. The joint patrols in the street and main roads in the cities and the keeping of many of the governorate villages within area (C), which is directly controlled by the occupation forces. Despite the understanding of principles agreement between the PLO and the Israel, the occupation authority issued military orders to seize or own land and to ban construction and renovation work in the old city, in addition to environmental standards the Hebron region. The number of martyrs in the governorate during the first Intifada (1987-1993) was about (360) and during the second Intifada (2000) until May 13, 2008,

(328) martyrs, the majority of whom were unarmed (Palestinian National Authority, 2008).

Although the articles of the Hebron agreement (Hebron Protocol) stated that life in the old city should go back to being normal, through opening the central vegetables market and restoring life to traffic movement on the (Street of Martyrs, which is located in the old city), Israel did not adhere to the articles of the agreement, nor did it reopen the central vegetables market. Neither did they open the Street of Martyrs, which made daily life harder for the two sectors of the city (H1 & H2), which were actually divided. This affected the course of economic life and hundreds of stores closed due to the imposition of curfews in the old city. The city of Hebron turned into a violated city after the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Quarters were bombed by rockets, missiles and internationally prohibited weapons. The city was totally closed, roads between the city and its villages were blocked and curfews were imposed for (45) days from the start of the Intifada to November 14, 2000. The number of curfew days from the start of the Intifada to the end of (2003) was about (742) days. (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A)

These events led to cases of starvation, severe economic suffering and assassination of many Palestinian gunmen and unarmed citizens. The occupation forces left the door wide open for the settlers to severely punish the Arab residents living close to the settlement surrounding the city and villages or at the hands of the settlers of the settlement centers in the old city.

Hebron University and University of Palestine Polytechnic were closed by military decree from January 14, 2003 to August 15, 2003.(International Palestinian youth league) The occupation forces seized Palestinian elementary and intermediate schools and turned them into military camps (Osama Bib Munqeth, 'An-Nahdha, Al-Fayha', Tareq Bin Ziyad). The reports by the human right organizations reflected the stark violations of human rights in the Hebron region committed by the occupation forces. Following are some of the statements mentioned in the reports:

- Closures and curfews, especially in the old city and Hebron in general, which lasted for over two months.
- Arresting on the basis of freedom of party and ideological affiliation.
- Individual and collective punishment.
- Destroying homes.
- Closing universities, schools and educational institutions and fierce attack against them.

- Seizing schools and turning them into military barracks.
- Murdering without trial.
- Administrative detention.
- The soldiers did not punish the settlers who attack the Arab citizens; they rather helped them in their attacks.
- Harming people's dignity and constantly insulting them through crucifying them, undressing them, and asking them to stand facing a wall with their hands up for long hours, without reason.
- Taking over buildings and homes, restricting the freedom of the residents, damaging the possessions and furniture and insulting their residents.
- Firing shots from all kinds of weapons at the homes, buildings, streets and killing and wounding the unarmed people (Salameh& Da'na, 2006A).

Bethlehem : Geography and Social History

Bethlehem City is the city of Peace and the cradle of Jesus Christ; these words are very common whenever the name Bethlehem city is mentioned; it is deeply rooted in history; it is known worldwide as the birth place of Jesus Christ; this has won her a social, political, cultural and intellectual rank not only at the local level but also internationally.

Bethlehem is situated on two plateaus each is about (750) meters above sea level; the first plateau overlooks the Nativity Church from the north while the second plateau extends from the north to the south. From this side, old neighborhoods had spread due to the fact that there was no space inside the borders of the old city (Al-Ali, 1990; Mutstafa, 1990); the city comes in the middle of the road between Jerusalem and Hebron. Together with Beit Jala and Beit Sahour, Bethlehem constitutes three residential cluster although they are only one kilometer apart.

The residential areas in Bethlehem governorate are (45) residential clusters. (Palestinian Bureau of Census, June 2008A) Mainly: Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Allar, Artas, Beit Fajjar, Housan, Al-Khadir, Wadi Foukin, Nahaleen, Arab Sawahreh, Arab Ibn Obeid, Arab Ta'amreh, and Arab Rashaida" There are also clusters of Palestinian refugees (internally displaced persons) who immigrated from their villages and cities in 1948 and now live in Dehisha, Aida and Azza camps.

As for the old city, it is divided into nine main neighborhoods; eight are inhabited by Palestinian Christians while the ninth neighborhood is inhabited by Palestinian Muslims. As for the houses, they are built like military quarters or barracks very close to each other. This was imposed by the history of the region and the several wars and colonization it had experienced.

Origin of the City of Bethlehem

There is no information about the city of Bethlehem in pre historical period except for the part that relates to its religious aspect based on the narration of the Old Testament. Research and modern excavations indicate that life existed in the city prior to (5000 B.C) (Arab Educational Institute, 2001). Therefore, the largest portion of information is largely linked with the events that had taken place in the entire region.

Some scientific resources and the Old Testament mention that the foremost tribe that ever trod foot on the land of Palestine was the Canaanites who came from the Arab Peninsula; they were also known by several names like Jobsites, Hittis, and Amorites.

These tribes had built their cities and surrounded them with walls to protect them from wars and invasions then. These cities are (Al-Ali,1990)

- Beit Lahama City: it is Bethlehem and it was known by different names in the Old Testament like Efrata which meant fertility.
- Or Salem City: It is current Jerusalem,; the name means city of peace god for the Canaanites.
- Hebron or Qiryat Arba City: it is current Hebron which means the friend; it relates to Prophet Abraham; the name” Khalil Ar Rahman” was given to the city during the times of Islamic conquests.
- Samira City: it is currently called Nablus.

As for the history of the city, it is associated with what happened in both Hebron and Jerusalem due to the fact that it is situated between both and its geopolitical location. The first time the Old Testament mentioned Bethlehem was in relation to Abraham’s progeny. Abraham passed by Hebron city and bought a piece of land for forty shekels so as to bury his wife in it. Later , he was buried near his wife and a temple for worship was built on top of both graves. Abraham enjoys a special place in the hearts of both Jews and Muslims as mentioned above. In (1300 B.C.), Jacob son of Isaac son of Abraham travelled from Hebron city to the north. While they passed by Bethlehem, his wife died and he buried her in a place currently a shrine called “Bilal Ibn Rabah Mosque” but the Jews called it Rachel’s Tomb after Rachel’s name.

The birth of Jesus Christ in the year (6 B.C.) is the most outstanding historic event (Jaqaman, 2000). It will play a historical role in the region. Three hundred years following the birth of Jesus Christ, Christianity was adopted by the Roman Empire as the religion of the state after Emperor Constantine embraced Christianity; this event had influenced the building of Christian churches and temples. Helen, Constantine’s mother helped to build the Nativity Church in Bethlehem in (326 A.C.)

Bethlehem in the First Islamic Era

Bethlehem remained under the Persian regime for a short period of skirmishes between the Persians and Byzantines; this lead to the occupation of Bethlehem in (614A.C.). As for the real invasion of the Holy Land, it was in (638 A.C.) when the Muslim Arab armies invaded the Holy Land in order to reopen Jerusalem; however, the Archbishop of Jerusalem who expressed his desire to hand over the city without any war or bloodshed on condition that Caliph Omar Ibn Al-Khattab , second Orthodox Caliph

following Prophet Muhammad May God's Peace and Prayer be Upon him arrive to the city and indeed the city was handed over to him.

This Caliph was well known for his justice and tolerance; he even met with Patriarch Sophranus in Mount of Olive few days following the conquest of the city. He made a covenant with the Patriarch which was later called the Omar Covenant (Bannoura,1982 :120); the following is its text:

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Beneficent.

This is what the slave of Allah, Omar Ibn .Al-Khattab, the Amir of the believers, has offered the people of Illyaa'(Jerusalem) of security granting them Amaan (protection) for themselves, their money, their churches, their children, their lowly and their innocent, and the remainder of their people.

Their churches are not to be taken, nor are they to be destroyed, nor are they to be degraded or belittled, neither are their crosses or their money, and they are not to be forced to change their religion, nor is any one of them to be harmed.

No Jews are to live with them in Illyaa'(Jerusalem) and it is required of the people of Illyaa' to pay the Jizya(toll tax), like the people of the cities. It is also required of them to remove the Romans from the land; and whoever amongst the people of Illyaa' that wishes to depart with their money together with the Romans, leaving their trading goods and children behind, then they selves, their trading goods and their children are secure until they reach their destination.

Upon what is in this book is the word of Allah, the covenant of His Messenger, of the Khulafaa' and of the believers if they (the people of Illyaa') gave what was required of them of Jizya (toll tax).

The witnesses upon this were Khalid Ibn Al-Walid, 'Amr Ibn al-'As, Abdur Rahman bin Awf and Muawiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan. Written and passed on the 15th year (after Hijrah) (Wikipedia.2009)

In return for this covenant giving Christians safety and free worship, a mosque was built near every church; this explains why there are two mosques in Jerusalem and Bethlehem both are called Omar Ibn Al-Khattab Mosque.

I can conclude from the covenant that it dealt tolerantly with the Palestinian Christians ; it also attempted to run the affairs and issues regarding the life of its inhabitants who belong to different faiths. Caliph Omar stressed free practice of Christian faith and rituals. Some see (Bannoura, 1982) in that period Christians were not forced to embrace Islam for the same reason; these values will later on influence the overall way of life and treatment of Palestinian Christians based on this covenant.

Hamami in his interpretation of the covenant saw that the Christians had rights that were fulfilled as follows(Sabella, Abu Aid, & Hamami, 1997:135):

First: Security was gained at the personal and economic levels when Omar Ibn Khattab mentioned in the covenant” let them secure themselves and their money”.

Second: Religious freedom with regard to beliefs and worship practices indicated in the Caliph’s speech,” Security for their churches and crosses... nor are they forced to give up their faiths.”

Third: Right to self defense and prevent any harm against them.

Fourth: Free movement whenever they desire and want.

Mu’awiya Ibn Sufian (661-680A.C.) had given Christians more freedom in working for the state; many Christians held high ranks and positions in the Caliph’s court; for example, there was Al- Akhtal who was an Arab Christian court poet and Abu Qadis Yohanna Al-Damashqi who was one of the counselor’s of Caliph Abdel Malik (Arab Educational Institute, 2001).

This life of understanding and peacefulness did not last long in the city since the covenant was not followed by those who came after Omar Ibn Al-Khattab. During the Umayyad period at the time of Caliph Marwan the Second (744-750A.C.), he was angry with the Christians and ordered the destruction of some Christian cities and villages including monasteries and churches (Bannoura, 1982). This was due to political differences and stances between the Christians and the Caliph regarding disputes with the Byzantine Empire.

Following the Abbasids accession to the throne and the transfer of Caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad in (750A.C.) open dialogue between the three monotheistic religions was unleashed. This civilized dialogue made the Islamic Arab civilization open to ancient Greek sciences and philosophies which the Oriental Christians mastered (Musallam, 2007) ; there was also a reciprocal influence between the spiritual Christian conventions and the Islamic spirituals “Mysticism”(Arab Educational Institute, 2001).

Arabization of the Christian religion has spread with the emergence of Islam; they translated religious books from Greek and Syriac into Arabic. The religious and literary works constituted a large portion at the Abbasid period. The process of translation lead to the unification of the Eastern Christian denominations who insisted more than others on their Arab affiliation and belongingness to this nation” (Arab Educational Institute, 2001).

In general, we can say that the state of harmony and peace between the Muslims and the Christians was unstable in spite of the fact that many stages in the first Islamic era

emphasized the state of full harmony between the two sides; the last stage was in the era of Caliph Harun Al-Rashid – Abbasid period. Bernard Hakim who was sent in a delegation by the Pope in Rome in (865 A.C.) to Jerusalem, stressed that, “ Muslims and Christians were in complete harmony and security” (Bannoura, 1982).

However, the final stage of the First Islamic regime over the Holy places was an era of persecution and oppression; Christians were forced to wear special colors to distinguish them from others. During the reign of the third Fatimid Egyptian Caliph Al-Hakim Bi Amr Allah,” Christians were persecuted, tortured and some of their churches were set on fire (Jaqaman,1984). The Fatimid’s last era witnessed disputes and disturbances at the social level internally and disorder with the Turkish Seljuk externally. The latter were able to defeat the Fatimid and takeover Palestine in (1071A.C.) and the Christians at that time were extremely tortured and persecuted. When the French monk Paul the Hermit came to visit the Holy Land, he saw the very bad condition of the Christians, so he conveyed what he saw to the Pope and the European countries in order to instigate them to wage a war against the Muslims in the Holy Land (Bannoura, 1982).

The Crusades

The Crusades constituted a new chapter in the history of the Holy Land. Based on the persecution and despotic rule over the Christians, the Europeans were furious. The European society was a feudalist regime lost in violence and fighting on the borders; they turned this violence towards foreigners. The call of the Pope Urban II for waging a war received unanimous support. They took over Bethlehem and the city witnessed a horrible massacre among the local inhabitants who were mostly Muslims; they also included Jews and Eastern Christians (Jaqaman, 1984).

As for the causes for the campaign , there were different views and positions regarding their interpretation. Some think that they came to salvage the holy places from the hands of the Muslims. There is another view that considered the objective of the campaign as for economic and commercial reasons. The feudalists indignation was discharged under the religious pretext. Others believe that there was a real desire to reunite the church following the split in (1054 A.C.) (Bannoura, 1982). I believe that the real reason for the campaign was the start of what is called colonization on all military, economic, intellectual and cultural levels.

The issue of varying views regarding this campaign is not only between Muslims and Christians since the Crusaders imposed a temporary control of the Latin Catholic Church over the Greek Orthodox Church supported by the states and governments that took part in the war. (Odeh, 1998)

As for the state of Bethlehem during the Crusaders occupation, its religious and political value had increased. Christian pilgrims started to come to the Nativity Church and internal businesses prospered. Muslims only came to visit Bethlehem for they were expelled and prevented from living in it. At that time, the city population increased and every Bethlehemite family became specialized in a specific profession like spinning, weaving and embroidery. This was not only confined to Christians since one of the pilgrims who was contemporary to that period mentioned that there were Jewish families who lived and worked in the city (Arab Educational Institute, 2001).

Return of Arabs Through Saladin Ayubi Campaign

Disputes and wars continued on the borders of the Holy Land between the Muslim Arab armies and the Crusaders which resulted in the defeat of the latter following the victory of Saladin in Hittin Battle in (1187A.C.) and takeover of the city. He then headed towards Jerusalem to free it. Before he waged the war, he sent a letter to Crusaders' dignitaries and notables who were stationed in the city that read, " I respect the holy city of Jerusalem; I do not want to desecrate it with bloodshed; I advise you to leave the city; I pledge to compensate you for your money by money and lands." When his request was denied, he said, " He did not grant them the good terms he had given to others and the holy city had to be entered by force the same as the Crusaders did (88) years ago." Crusaders leaderships insisted on going on and called for negotiations; Saladin refused at first and he was threatened that all captives would be killed and the Aqsa Mosque would be demolished." He finally agreed to negotiate surrender terms (Jaqaman, 1984:176)

Saladin showed a lot of tolerance with the Crusaders; his position was moderate towards the Christian presence in Bethlehem; in fact, Eastern Christians welcomed him because they suffered a lot from the Crusaders; the Greek Orthodox were again in charge of the Latin Catholic Church in the city; he also contributed in the renovation of the church from the donations of Christian pilgrims (Bannoura, 1982)

In the midst of the thirteenth century until the fifteenth century , the Mamlukes ruled over the Holy Lands; that epoch was marked by economic recession; holy cities like (Bethlehem and Jerusalem) were only viewed as a source of income for the state. (Arab Educational Institute, 2001:26).

Turkish Era

In (1516), the Ottomans occupied both Bethlehem and Jerusalem; the Turkish era represented a fresh start for tolerance reflected in the goodness and privileges for Christians in Palestine. The Christians and Jews enjoyed special privileges that improved their economic, commercial and social levels. For example, Christians were granted the right to own lands for this was forbidden in the past (Shokeh, 2000). New laws were introduced regarding charitable societies, foreign concessions in trade and tax exemption.

In return, Christians paid Jizya (toll tax) and observed law and order in return for having self autonomy and independence in the civil, judicial and educational administration. Also the Ottoman state protected them and their property in accordance with an agreement which is named “Ahl Thima” Non Muslims or Nizam Milal”. Khalil Shokeh in his book (2000:19) quotes the Ottoman historian, Mustafa Naim who describes their conditions as follows:

- For the sake of preserving the army and the state, this requires funds.
- Funds received from subjects.
- In order for the subjects in the states to have a prosperous life and to produce, there should be justice.
- Without the state, government and army there would not be any justice.

“*Nizam Milal*” (Religious Groupings) has in general expanded the rights and privileges of the Christians in addition to the privileges enjoyed by the foreign state in Palestine. This would later play a role in disintegration of the regime and transform it into a feudal economy that nourishes on bribery and paying-off; this would necessarily reflect on the nature of the Palestinians’ reality in terms of cultural, social, and economic structure and on the Bethlehemites’ reality in particular.

In “*Nizam Milal*” the Latin Church was not granted this privilege due to the disturbing memory of the Crusaders campaigns; Any preservation or interference on part of the Latin church was considered as pro Western (Bannoura, 1982) In return, for this fear, France secretly supported Franciscan priests and churches while Britain backed Protestants and Jews. Minorities were treated as a means to exploit the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. In the midst of this situation, the minorities’ rights became negotiable and purchasable. On the other hand, Russia, Britain and Germany competed in expanding their influences in the Holy Land (Arab Educational Institute, 2001:27).

The Western states exploited the privileges system in order to obtain privileges in trade, sponsorship of main religious ceremonies. (Arab Educational Institute, 2001:28). These competitions and disputes were at alternate success and became more ferocious

between the Greek Orthodox and Latin Catholic over property of the Holy places. Each party exploited its ties with the Ottoman Empire so Latin Catholics took Nativity Church in Bethlehem in (1756 A.C). (Bannoura, 1982). A year later the Greek controlled most of the church with the approval of the Turkish Sultan. In (1810A.C). the Armenians took over the northern side of the church (Al-Ali, 1990). This led to the outbreak of dispute among Christian denominations. This dispute led to the interference of the Turkish Sultan to solve the dispute and to prevent the fighting. He also issued a law upon the approval of the concerned denominations to specify the ownership and rights of every denomination called "*Status Quo*". It was agreed that the external key of the church remains in the custody of a Muslim guard; this agreement in spite of its simplicity would form the awareness and practice of citizens in organizing the civil life and its political corporal rituals including those social and religious practices till this present time.

History of Bethlehem in the Twentieth Century

Following the First World War and the withdrawal of Turkey from Palestine, the Allies (Britain, France and Italy) took over Palestine and the Allies leaders entered Bethlehem on 11 December 1917 marking an end to Turkish persecution (Bannoura, 1982:85) and a start of a new history of injustice and inequality by Britain and its allies.

Palestinians dealt with the British Mandate with caution and suspicion after the latter broke its promises of independence for the Arabs prior the World War. Its culmination was when Britain made a promise to the Jews to establish a national homeland for them in Palestine as mentioned earlier.

What's important in this respect is that Britain preserved the legal and social legacy and Civil Affairs laws especially those prevalent at the Turkish era which was marked by confessionalism, religious groups law and minorities. This explains the reason behind the emergence of different social and economic systems among them. Hebron city is generally characterized for being controlled by clans. Any businesses were dealt through government officials and representatives and notables of families while in Bethlehem, it was confessionalism and interaction took place through denominations.

Most administrative, legal and service vacancies during the British Mandate- from the British Mandate to the Jordanian Administration to the Israeli Occupation and even the PNA were held by Palestinian Christians. (Arab Educational Institute,2001:45). There was determination to keep and highlight the Christian religious landmarks in the city of Bethlehem. This is due to that fact that Christians master several languages and this gave them an advantage in running their positions. This is also due to nature of their own educational system which we will discuss later on.

In spite of the fact that the British presence had impeded and obstructed the natural development of the Palestinian cities in general, we still find that Bethlehem city in particular as indicated by (Bannoura, 1982:91; Arab Educational Institute, 2001:48) had economically prospered because the British had mobilized large number of armies and this called for the creation and reactivation of several professions. For example, Britain paid attention to the beautification of the city and rehabilitation of its infra structure; it opened new markets and built new hospitals and hotels during its mandate period.

On the other hand the city witnessed a revolution in the cultural and media movement for printing presses were opened and several national, cultural and religious magazines were published. (Musallam, 2008) Also patriotic and national movements which used to call then for the unity of Greater Syria (Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon) had emerged. (Musallam, 2002:20) It is worthwhile mentioning that the nature and kind of political and social movements in Bethlehem were characterized by being secular and nationalistic while the political movements in Hebron were distinguished for being religious and nationalistic.

The year (1948) constituted a turning new point in the history of the Palestinian society especially in light of the Israeli occupation of large portions of geographical Palestine and was backed by the diplomatic and military support of Britain. What is worth mentioning is that as a result of this occupation Palestinian cities and villages were destroyed in (1948); hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee to cities and villages in the West Bank which later became under the sovereignty of the Jordanian Authorities and to Gaza and neighboring countries. West Bank cities especially Bethlehem received tens of thousands of Palestinian displaced refugees and evacuees.

As for the administration of the Jordanian Government , it worked on the development and prosperity of the Jordanian Eastern Bank at the expense of the Palestinian West Bank. The Jordanian government neglected East Jerusalem city and Bethlehem city. Palestinian investors were given privileges to invest in Jordan; it put forward laws and discouraging investment steps in the Palestinian side. Similar to Hebron city, Jordan worked on connecting the economy and the political and economic decisions with the upper class in the society. As for the lower and middle sectors in the Palestinian society in general, they did not welcome the Jordanian presence and that coincided with the time when King Abdullah the First was assassinated in (1951) after which the Kingdom was handed over to King Hussein (Arab Educational Institute, 2001:50).

Following the (1967) war and occupation of Israelis of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip, the West Bank including Bethlehem was under the control of the Israeli occupation authorities. The condition of the city did not change in terms of structure except for the fact that Israel controlled movement of tourism and consequently development was once again in favor of the ruling state.

In light of the Israeli occupation, national, patriotic and leftist movements which consisted of both Muslims and Christians became stronger in their resistance of occupation. What makes Bethlehem different from other Palestinian cities in terms of resistance of occupation is that it created a developed approach of civil insubordination against the Occupation in the Popular Intifada in (1987). The Palestinian cities in general were marked for their popular resistance, strikes, marches and demonstrations which were different form of self defense against the violations of occupation. What is worth mentioning is that Bethlehem city in particular had developed a negative assault form of resistance which was reflected in their refusal to pay taxes to Israeli occupation and tearing of Israeli Identification cards by the citizens. This act lead to the rage of the occupation so it confiscated home furniture and possessions in response so as to eliminate this phenomenon (Shomali, 1991)

Several Palestinian national organizations adopted the cause including those institutions belonging to the church. In fact, facts and figures stress that the local churches showed a strong backing and support to the objectives of the Intifada which were peaceful and just. This was also clear in the appointment of the first Arab Palestinian patriarch of the Latin Patriarchate Michel Sabbah from Nazareth. This was followed by the Greek Bishopric and Anglicans in appointing Palestinian Arab presidents and officials. This does not indicate that religion was exploited in political activities. In fact, the Palestinian secular factions and the leftist in particular had Christian members. One year after the outbreak of the popular Intifada in (1987), Islamic resistance movement Hamas was established. This added an extra dimension to the Intifada; this movement calls for the establishment of an Islamic Sate in Palestine and placing Christians once again under the system of “*Mila*” (Religious Grouping) and considering them second degree citizens (Arab Educational Institute, 2001).

Oslo Accord (1993) signed between the PLO and Israel constituted a political turning point in the lives of citizens. Palestinians attached hopes on this agreement that it would bring them their stolen rights; however, conditions did not change but got worse. The newly born Palestinian Authority and its limited influences made it fall short of achieving the peoples rights. Besides, unemployment and poverty spread more in the Palestinian society.

Growth of Residential Areas

Aside from the quick increase in population at the beginning of the twentieth century in Bethlehem, the weight and influence of the several changed as well. The ottoman regime was used to work according to “*Milal*” system likewise researchers and western countries did the same; residential clusters were dealt with individually and according to denomination. The following tables no.(4 and 5) show this:

Table No.(4). Show increasing the populations in Bethlehem regarding to religion

Denomination	Year 1948		Year 1989	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Latin	3625	31.00	2934	16.3
Roman Orthodox	2900	24.8	2133	11.9
Syrian	1700	14.5	902	5.0
Roman Catholic	161	1.4	With Latin	/
Protestant	250	2.1	89	0.05
Others	160	1.4	680	3.7
Muslims	2900	24.8	10773	59.9
Total	11696	100.00	17991	100.0

* Dabdoub, Julia(1998).In order not to forget: Palestinian Popular Life Especially The Bethlehemite. Bethlehem.

Table No.(5). Show increasing the populations in Bethlehem regarding to religion

Year	Population	Christians
1596	1435	1390 96.9%
1800	1500	1450 96.7%
1880	4750	4165 87.7%
1922	6658	5838 87.7%
1931	7320	5588 76.3%
1946	9140	6490 71.0 %
1952	19155	5785 30.2 %
1961	22453	6779 30.2 %
1966	24789	7484 30.2 %
1967	20462	6405 31.3 %
1997	31984	9595 30 %

* Mustafa, Walid (1999) “ Population of Bethlehem on the Eve of the Year 2000 ”, Al-Liqa’ Journal, Jérusalem, 13.27-40.

Perhaps we can confidently presume that the extra ordinary large percentage of the increase in the residential clusters has come from compulsory and foreign immigration. The city population has increased between (1922-1948) naturally while we notice that the number has almost doubled following (1948) This is due to what is already known to everybody which is the immigration of the Palestinian refugees from their cities and villages (1948) as a result of the compulsory immigration by which the Israeli occupation

forces brought about through massacres and forcing Palestinians to flee in search for protection.

As a result of the economic and social conditions of the past century and coinciding with improvement of international transportation, several youth from Bethlehem immigrated to the two Americas. It is believed that the first immigration was initiated by Handal Family who left the city in 1854 to sell their Holy land products like mother of pearl, olive wood handicrafts and embroidery at an International exhibition in Washington (Musallam, 2002).

Mustafa(1990: 35) points that the city population had increased at an average of (3.5%) as a natural increase. On the other hand, the immigration of rural areas inhabitants between (1949-1967) had also increased the city population. Following (1967) war it is noticed that the city population dropped by about (3000 citizens); this was due to the war and immigration movement. As a result of the census carried out by the Israeli Authorities, it had dealt with those who were present at their living place during the war period as citizens. Others who did not fall in this category were prevented from returning to Palestine (Mustafa, 1999).

Table No. (6) Shows the population in Bethlehem:

<i>Area</i>	<i>Number of population</i>
Bethlehem	29.927
Aida Camp	4. 534
Azza Camp	2.025
Deheisha Camp	12.045

*Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics(June.2008B) Press Release On the Demographic Characteristics of Palestinian Refugees on World Day For Refugees

In general, the population of Bethlehem Governorate is about (176.515) thousand according to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics(June.2008A)

The total area of Bethlehem Governorate is now (575)km² (Mustaf,1990); thousands of dunums of its lands were confiscated for the erection of walls for Israeli settlements (Har Homa, Lands of Al-Khader and Artas villages)

Bethlehem Neighborhoods and City Formation

The twentieth century witnessed an activity in the construction and formation of the Palestinian cities as a result of the events that the area had undergone. Bethlehem is one of the cities that preserved two different shapes of architecture the same as Hebron. There is the one side that relates to the old city built by the citizen in honor of the city itself (City Neighborhoods) and buildings in these neighborhoods are almost glued together; there is a backyard to every house with its small windows which indicate that they were like fortifications against the wars and invasions that took place in the region. As for the new neighborhoods which expanded to the north of the city, they have new concrete buildings.

Every neighborhood has a distinct character of the denomination that owns it. Each is also known by the professions of its inhabitants like “Tarajma Neighborhood” whose inhabitants had historically worked in translation and tourism. These places or neighborhoods expressed themselves as quarters and we are more inclined to call them Denominations Clusters who concentrated in one area and neighborhood. They are later called “*Harat*”(neighborhoods) after the families’ names who lived in them.

Ayub Musallam points in his diaries: “ These neighborhoods became behavioral and corporal governing patterns for the city inhabitants in making decisions. Bethlehem Municipal Council is made up of members or Mukhtars of the nine neighborhoods after the Syrians gathered in one neighborhood.”

Following (1948), the population of Bethlehem increased in light of the increasing number of the Palestinian refugees who flee from their lands and their houses and villages were destroyed. As for the issue of representation, it concerned legal and public personalities in those neighborhoods; this was the trend followed during the British Mandate in appointing members of the Municipal Council of Bethlehem. They had added two members from the Ta’amreh - which their roots were Bedouin- to the council and the Jordanian government did the same. This had lead to a deepening of the political and social behavior based on appointment according to denomination and faith rather than on democratic elections and nomination.

Even following the establishment of the PNA, it was not possible to make modifications on the denominations’ mentality and it tried to unite them through dealing with old land customary laws including appointment and religious quota system.

As for the names of neighborhoods we mention:

- Farahiya : It is inhabited by families: Mousa, Musallam, Ghanem, Salameh, Makhlouf, Khasan, Kattan, Qama

- Najajra: It is inhabited by families: Jaqaman, Anastas, Hazboun, Handal
- Tarajmeh: The forefathers of this neighborhood came with the Hermit of St Jerome; some came during the time of Crusade war from Italy and other places.
- Anatreh : It is inhabited by families: Frejj, Qanawati, Bandak
- Hrizat: Hazin Batu
- Arman: Their number is small compared with inhabitants of other neighborhoods; they embrace Armenian faith.
- Qawawsa: Andoni, Qawas, Thaljah, Juha, the forefather of this neighborhood is from nearby town of Taqua; he came with his wife in 1952 and settled in Bethlehem. As for Juha family, its forefather came from Romania and as a result of kinship with the Qawawsa neighborhood, he became part of that neighborhood.
- Fawaghra: Khatib family; its forefather came from Sourif village- Hebron to Fagour village south of Bethlehem then to Bethlehem city; Hreimi family ; it is also mentioned that families in this neighborhood had Kurdistan origins; the majority came with Saladin during the Crusades wars and settled in the neighborhood.
- Syrian: Its inhabitants came at the start of the twentieth century and settled there. Their immigration increased during the First World War period. Some settled in Jerusalem and others came to Bethlehem and formed their own denomination and community with two branches Orthodox with a priest, school and society and the other Latin with a church, school and guest house.

As for the relations between the neighborhoods, they were characterized by religious denominations. The neighborhoods united before the enemy. Ayub Musallam mentions in his diaries that there were some incidents that had happened with Sheik Qamari (during the Turkish era) ; he was the governor of Bethlehem city. The neighborhoods united with one another and called for the oust of the governor. They received assistance from Fawaghreh neighborhood and some Ta'amreh who were Muslims to support them; in deed, the governor was removed.

At first there was not a municipality in Bethlehem, the administrative, social and cultural affairs were run by *Makhateers* (leaders) and dignitaries from every neighborhood; *Makhateers* from different neighborhoods coordinated their views regarding the society.

This situation continued in the traditional way in running the affairs until the year (1876). Midhat Basha issued the first Constitution for the state(Ayub Musallam Diaries). Following the structural reforms in the Ottoman central system and by virtue of this declaration, local governments and municipal councils were formed to organize the affairs of the states and provinces in a decentralized manner. Besides, confessional local councils were formed to hold responsibility for their denomination and run their daily social and cultural affairs (Musallam, 2002).

Ayub Musallam indicates that the first municipal committee was established in (1872) and it consisted of seven members appointed by the government. Later on an eighth member was added to the committee after the increase in population. After the Syrian Neighborhood was established, the number of the municipality council members became nine including the president; the process of appointments continued during the Turkish, British and Jordanian periods.

Following the Nakba in (1948), the Jordanian government made a decision to appoint two extra members on the council to represent the refugees and Ta'amra clans. Thus, the number became eleven members. Following (1967) and the occupation of the West Bank, an order was issued pertaining that election had to be held regarding these two members rather than appointment as the case with the other members.

As for the citizens representation in the municipal council, the Farahia and Najajra neighborhoods were represented by three seats since they were the largest then. In the appointment process, the Farahia received two seats while the Najajra took one seat and vice versa. As for Hrizat, it remained represented in the elections until (1993); it was represented then by Joudeh Hrizat. After that date, it was not represented on the council due to its small size and the rest of the neighborhoods had one seat each. (Salameh, 2006A)

As for the elections, competition between the families was high. But this competition was solved in the houses of Makhateers and rationale and wise people of the neighborhood. Joudeh Murqus points out that the nature of relationships between the different denominations was relatively stable. In (1960), there were elections and a member from Fawagreh neighborhood Salih Kanan received 150 votes higher than the head of the block Ayub Musallam. Reality contradicts this ; since Salih Kanaan won the highest number by 150 votes, why wasn't he given the right to be the mayor of Bethlehem Municipality since relationships were based on good citizenship and not denominations (Salameh, 2006A).

The "Status quo" explains the abovementioned (This is a system that prevailed in the late times of the Ottoman period until present day). Social norms and conventions decided that the one who becomes a mayor has to be Christian. Supported by Ayub

Musallam, indicates that it was customary in the city that the mayor has to be from the Latin denomination or Greek Orthodox denomination while the Deputy has to be from the latter denomination if the mayor is from the former and vice versa. He goes on to explain, “ right from the beginning the largest percentage of the city population was for the Christians about (95%); however, following the Nakba in (1948) and immigration of the Christians, the percentage of the Christians changed and became about (35%) of the total population of the city”. This is due to the fact that this elite group continued to run the city from the seventies until this present day and there were not any changes in its formation. This reflects on the nature of the municipality policies, activities and programs (Salameh, 2006A).

We notice that since the administrative and structural formation of the city, social activity inside it was based on the system of different denominations and faiths. This started in (1894) when the municipal councils were banned during the Ottoman period; however, Bethlehem had a different arrangement due to the sensitivity and viability of the location from a religious and touristic aspect. In spite of this we do see that the nature of the way affairs were run was traditional and it was characterized by coordination and cooperation at the time of the *Makhateers*; it was marked by the character of denominations and this was legalized under an administrative and political formation since the Ottoman approval of the municipal committee and the appointments approved by the political regimes at consecutive periods.

Whenever there was a dispute between the members, the British, Jordanian and Israeli government would interfere, freeze the membership of those disputing members, fire them and appoint new members especially at the stage of the Israeli occupation; this lead not only to a deepening of the sectarian crack but also the religious one (Muslim, Christian). It also strengthened divisions between the different sects of Christians and Muslims as well. The mayor had to be Latin while the Deputy had to be Orthodox in light of the size of the denomination in the city.

Thus we see that the Latin denomination has influenced greatly the life of the inhabitants through its several institutions, convents and monasteries , priests and means of education through its several schools like:

Terra Sancta School for Boys and Girls: It is run by Saint Joseph nuns . There is also Elementary School for Girls. Catholic Action Club has a large building that hosts a cinema theatre and cafeteria..

Therefore, the social and cultural movement at that period between the Ottoman occupation until the sixties was greatly influenced by this denomination; it had its great influence on the media, cultural and social movements towards the entire every day life of the citizens in the city.

Following the arrival of the National Authority in (1995) and its administrative, political and social control of the city of Bethlehem, it inherited the traditional role of the municipality members in appointments or formal elections which were conducted during the Israeli Occupation. Ties were established between the PLO and some members and mayors of municipalities like Elias Freij who was closely affiliated to the PLO before the arrival of the PNA. In (2006) elections, the PNA declared that (15) members be elected to for the Municipal Council provided that (8) of them are Christians.

By this way, the role of denominations was reinforced once again and the social and political relationships were marked by these dimensions even the legal one. Solving problems between opponents for example was reached at family and denomination levels first and a truce was reached. If this did not work out, the case was put before a court.

Social, Cultural and Economic Structure in Bethlehem

Similar to Hebron and other Palestinian cities, the Ottoman regime had left its impact on the economic and social formation. The major public service positions were limited to Turkish elements and it also appeared in the system of tax commitment on part of the peasants. This condition has continued until the first decade of the twentieth century with the issue of the limited freedoms law in (1908); this law paved the way for new political , social and economic climates for the resurgence of the national and Palestinian movement. We depend in this chapter on diaries of Ayub Musallam in the late period of the Ottoman regime until the beginnings of eighties of the past century; he narrates a story that happened during the First World War and the state of alert that prevailed in the city. This called for the conscription of the largest number of peasants the same as their other fellow Palestinians to participate in the war; “ Consequently, Bethlehem lost a group of its young men who joined the army in addition those who opposed conscription were either suppressed or jailed. This notion which Ayub Musallam raises has social and economic dimensions at the level of:

1. First: Evacuation of the youth generation from Bethlehem citizens since some went to conscription and others immigrated. This is the proof to the increase in immigration at that time.
2. Those who opposed the decision had to circumvent it in several ways like:
 - Some youth in the aristocratic families paid a sum of money so that they will not be conscripted.
 - In return, those who did not have the money like the farmers, tended to offer olive trees as fire wood used for the army needs and wood for building rail roads in the country.

Ayub Musallam indicates that the ones who made an agreement with the authorities had cut olive trees and other kinds of trees and offered them to the authorities according to the agreement. Ayub Musallam sees that this had left a negative effect on the agricultural sector in Bethlehem especially on Olive trees. These trees and their produce constituted the main source of living for its owners. We understand from this context the nature of poverty and illiteracy in the social structure (regarding education and culture) and deterioration of agriculture at that time. Ayub Musallam points out that Ibrahim Basha killed many of the rebels and opponents to the authorities from the Fawaghre youth. He ordered the uprooting of trees in the region especially in Deheisha area then (now called Deheisha Refugee camp) and other site in order to expose and besiege the rebels in their hideouts in the woods and orchards.

It is narrated that some rebels were students who studied abroad and returned to Bethlehem following completion of their studies. He also recalls that the Ottoman authorities executed a rebel in Manger Square for alleged instigation against the authorities. From here we find the start of the action and influence of educated people and the outline of the map of development and cultural intellectual renaissance which had taken place during the Mandate period.

The industrial sector (especially tourist handcrafts-souvenirs) does not differ since the nature of the economic reality at that time was low due to taxes and bribes which were paid by the citizens. Based on this, the immigrations which were linked with the bad economic and political conditions had started especially to travel to the two Americas for trade in Holy Land products (ornaments, mother of pearl, rosaries, etc..) Many of the immigrants abroad had succeeded in improving their economic conditions; this led to an advanced social activity in the twenties of the past century which had led to changes on the level of construction and expansion of the city and its shape. In addition, there was a cultural movement which was reflected in press, poetry and magazines which were published. Iskandar Khoury was famous for rebellious and national poetry and literature. Others like Issa Bandak and Ayub Musallam were also famous.

Consequently, we find at that time new characteristics in the process of social movement on the national and cultural levels which we really miss nowadays. In addition, Bethlehem had a good share in education since a very long time; the first school was established in it more than 200 years due to the religious character that distinguishes the city and the existence of missionaries and convents which established several private schools, and development of education. Consequently, the city was distinguished for its cultural character in the early stages of the past century until the late times of the British era.

The Nakba (1948) is considered a new stage in the life of the citizens of Bethlehem since the influx of immigrants and Israeli expulsion of the Palestinians from their villages

and cities in 1948 had influenced the nature and shape of the city in the following aspects:

1. Demographically: the largest portion of the refugee were Muslims while a small portion were Christians who immigrated from villages in Jerusalem like Ein Karem; this marks the start of demographic distribution which started to change at that time.
2. The large size of refugees required the establishment and expansion of residential areas in that period; thus, the city borders were expanded in addition there was a political nationalist entity being developed in Bethlehem called Refugees Camps (Deheisha, Aida, Azza).

Following the withdrawal of the British Mandate, the Jordanian government took over until 1967; the economic and social conditions stayed the same at that time; nevertheless, levels of poverty were higher than they were under the British ruling; the period of the Jordanian rule was characterized as a period in which the educated and intellectuals of Bethlehem youth who were influenced by communist and nationalist parties were suppressed. Large numbers were arrested and imprisoned in Jafour Jail.

We notice that Bethlehem was generally characterized until the sixties and seventies by a state of openness, activity and cultural and social influence of several civilizations and cultures as a result of increase in education at that time. This activity was culminated in (1973) by the establishment of Bethlehem University which is considered the first university in Palestine. Ayub Musallam indicates , “ the original location of this university was a catholic convent run by foreign Franciscan priests and was supervised by the Pope in Rome. Several Christian countries in Europe and America supported this institution.” In spite of the fact that it was a Christian convent, it opened its doors to all students to study in it regardless of their religion. We will discuss this later on the role that the university had played in the cultural movement at the regional level in particular and the West Bank in general.

We have to bring to attention an important issue related to Bethlehem over its historical development which is the denomination character that shaped it. Residents are divided into denominations not only Christians and Muslims. But it concerns the denominations of the special religion. We mean her the division of the society into two religions and the division of Christianity into Latin, Orthodox, Syrian , etc.. denominations. Then the city was formed according to this; it was made up of introvert neighborhoods and social spaces. For example, the Syrian neighborhood was only for Syrians and so forth. When Ayub Musallam talks about Muslims, he divides them into refugees and Ta'amra.

This mentality was strengthened and precipitated by the Turkish rule in Palestine; we come across this in Ayub Musallam diaries. Its content reflects this formation in terms of division among religions and denominations. This mentality that is based on denominations is clear in its transactions and treatment. This is how Britain, Jordan and Israel treated and interacted with the city residents. This was clear through the quota allocations in positions in the municipal council. It is a must that the mayor has to be Latin while the Deputy has to be a Greek Orthodox; this is the status quo until present day. This formation continued unchanged in spite of addition of new elements from Ta'amreh and refugees in the forties of the previous century; it did not change in spite of the demographic, economic and social changes in Bethlehem. (Salameh, 2006A)

Social Classes

In addition to the wealth and the economic, social and traditional dimension, education at the beginning of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries constituted an important foundation for social, and economic distinction between the Bethlehemite citizens both Muslims and Christians. It also differed from one religion to another even within the same class. We will later on see in (Education topic) that Bethlehem started foundation of foreign and national schools at an early stage in history; they were numerous at that stage both elementary and secondary. At later stages students used to go to Jerusalem or Beirut; it is worth while mentioning that opportunities for education were available for Christians more than for Muslims in the city and its surroundings. This explains the increase in the generation of Christian educated nationals like (Issa Khoury, Basil Bankak, John Khalil Dakarat (Musallam, 2002) On the other hand there was a generation who were masters in foreign languages; French, German, and English (Arab Educational Institute, 2001) another generation excelled in vocational and commercial education.

As for Muslims who had little chances to education than Christians- with the exception of the wealthy class- were educated during the Ottoman period in Kuttab (School) which was distinguished for its simplicity.

The system of Mila and foreign concessions in the Ottoman era constituted an important character of the city inhabitants both negative and positive. “ on one hand it was positive for the coalitions and privileges for it provided an opportunity for expansion of the Christians horizon in terms of traveling abroad and working in international trade which brought forth huge profits. As for local Christians, they were given trade privileges from the Europeans like agencies and franchises. They were able to establish a huge commercial network in Europe due to their mastery of foreign languages and modern business techniques. This has lead to the development of a new economic and social

sector. Some of the Christian families who were famous in trade back then were the Dabdoub family, Ja'ar Family, Jasir Family and Handal Family.) (Arab Educational Institute, 2001)

As for the negative aspect, some denominations became vulnerable to manipulation by European countries. They were distanced from their Arab civilization and culture. For example, the Maronites joined the western camp and this explains their historical instability of relations with the Muslims since they were under great suspicion and doubt in the Turkish period. Talking about this influence does not mean that it lead to the elimination of identity or support of western countries in what might contradict the Palestinian questions. Other eastern denominations decided to affiliate themselves with the Arab nationalism and its interests. (Arab Educational Institute, 2001)

It is noticed that the Britons gave priority to Christians to hold average financial administrative positions like officials, translators and consultants as the case at the Ottoman period when Christians held about (40%) of the public service positions. Some believe that this integration of education and vocation had won the Christians a western life both in pattern and style. (Arab Educational Institute, 2001)

The traders sector of both Christians and Muslims included land owners or seeds traders- the majority were Christians with varying degrees of richness; the sector of land traders was linked with the change of ownership system at the Ottoman period and transferring it into a commodity; this had led to investment in the agricultural sector (Shokeh, 2002). Agricultural supremacy constituted an important scale in running the kind of social relations and the balance of powers.

Cultural and Educational Movement in Bethlehem

Education plays a cultural , civilized and progressive role in the lives of peoples who want to have glory and prosperous future. It also leads to a civilized and modern tendency in the life of the citizens. However, this depends basically on the quality and main components of education.

The Palestinian people in general have dealt with education as an extremely important issue since it is an outlet towards the improvement of the living and economic reality in the absence of a heavy economic sector due to political conditions. In particular, the reality of education in Bethlehem city has a special character compared with education and learning in the southern region of the West Bank (Bethlehem Governorate and Hebron).

As for the educational movement in Bethlehem, it has been especially associated with integration of Christian religious teachings with the early beginnings of the establishment of convents. The Convent of Franciscan Fathers is one example; it was established in the early beginnings of the twentieth century. Competition was very fierce between the Orthodox, Latin and other denominations to obtain privileges from the Ottoman state; convents, monasteries, churches and schools were built for every denomination. The following table no.(7) shows the schools and the supervising authorities in charge in Bethlehem Governorate.

TableNo.(7). Shows the schools and the supervising authorities in charge in Bethlehem Governorate.

<i>Location</i>	<i>Name of School</i>	<i>Type of School</i>	<i>Authority in charge</i>	<i>Numbers of students</i>		<i>Date of establishment</i>	<i>Date of License</i>
				Male	Female		
Bethlehem	Seminar Priests	Elementary	Armenian Patriarch	13	-	1601A.C.	1896A.C.
	Musalabeh	Secondary	Greek Orthodox	220	-	1708	1895
	Musalabeh	Elementary	Greek Orthodox	95	-	1890	1895
Beit Jala	Musalabeh	Elementary	Greek Orthodox	12	-	1776	1895
	Musalabeh	Elementary	Latin	50	-	1761	1895
	Musalabeh	Elementary	Latin	-	50	1761	1895
Beit Sahour	Musalabeh	Elementary	Greek Orthodox	-	60	1844	1895
	Musalabeh	Elementary	Greek Orthodox	165	-	1881	1895
	Musalabeh	Elementary	Latin	13	-	1761	1895
	Musalabeh	Elementary	Latin	-	0	1761	1895

* Qdah,Ahmad Hamid Ibrahim. (2007) Jerusalem Christians: A study in Light of Ottoman Documents. Beirut: Markix Dirasat Al Wihda AlArabia

** Shokeh ,Khalil. (2000) History of Bethlehem in the Ottoman Era 1517-1917. Bethlehem

*** Jaqaman,Hanna Abdallah Yousef (2000) A Tour in the History of Bethlehem and Jerusalem, volume4.Bethlehem

In addition there are Protestant and Russian schools, (1860) Lutheran School; it was developed in 1893 and became a Secondary School, Industrial School in (1863). In (1893) De La Salle Frères opened a school until (1973) and it was later on transformed into what is called Bethlehem University.

We notice that in the early beginnings Bethlehem witnessed an active movement in the establishment of schools which in their primary stages concentrated on Christians only, but in the middle of the twentieth century it started to admit and enroll both Muslims and Christians.

This educational movement and plurality has added rich contributions to the stages of building Bethlehem city in terms of modernity and diversity.

Nowadays, the number of schools in Bethlehem governorate is (143) schools distributes as follows 109 governmental, 7 UNRWA, 27 Private; number of students is (50099) males and females. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, June, 2008A)

In the city there are two universities Bethlehem University and Al Quds Open University; we will concentrate on the cultural and academic role of Bethlehem University in the area.

Bethlehem University

Bethlehem University is considered one of the distinguished Palestinian universities with regard to its educational system and academic staff. In light of attention to the educational aspects of public life in the city, there was an importance for having a university in the city. In deed Bethlehem University (First university in the governorate) was established on 1 October 1973. (Mustafa, 1990: 107) at Frères Secondary School Building.

The mission of Bethlehem University is to offer educational services in addition to expand the intellectual and cognitive understanding and to increase social and cultural awareness of the local communities benefiting from its services. Bethlehem University offers B.A. degrees in Arts Faculty (Arabic Language, English Language, Social Sciences, Sociology, Social Work) in addition to Humanities Department which offers cultural, political and religious services through faculty requirement course in Cultural Studies (until 2000), European languages, Fine Arts, Philosophy, Religious Studies(Catechetical) currently Islam and Christianity religions. (Bethlehem University, 2009)

The university offers the following specializations:

Business Administration: Accounting, Business Administration, Economics

Nursing Faculty: Nursing

Arts Faculty: Arabic Language, English Language, Social Sciences, Sociology, Social Work

Science Faculty: Chemistry, Physics, Biology, Mathematics,

Education Faculty: different specializations

Hotel Management Institute: Hotel Management

In addition an M.A. program was developed in Faculty of Business Administration called MICAD in Cooperation and Development.

The university is considered a political and cultural center in the local society due to the nature of the national and cultural activities that were conducted by students' movements which had lead the Israeli Occupation to target the university. The following table shows the kind of harassments that Bethlehem University suffered from during the eighties.

Table No.(8). Shows the kind of harassments that Bethlehem University suffered from during the eighties.

<i>Date</i> <i>D/M/Y</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Kind of Punishment</i>		
		<i>Closure</i>	<i>Checkpoints and Besiege</i>	<i>Fire shots and assault</i>
3/5/1979	4days	√		
6/1980	One month	√		
3/1982	One month	√		
2/11/1983	One month	√		
11/1/1984	0		√	
29/10/1984	0		√	
1/11/1984	4 days	√		
2/4/1985	0			√
21/4/1985	2 days	√		
20/5/1985	0		√	√
5/7/1985	0		√	
10/8/1985	0		√	
8/9/1985	0		√	
15/1/1986	5 days		√	
86-92	0			√
3/2001*	0			√

SOURCE: Mustafa, Walid (1990). Story of Bethlehem City. The Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Sciences. * Information from the researcher

When the First Intifada in (1987) started, students' movements activities significantly increased in Bethlehem University; this had necessarily made the Occupation target university cadre who were politically active. For example the percentage of detained students before the Intifada was 20% while it had risen to (70%) during the Intifada. In addition, the number of deportees who where involved in student action and politics had increased like Marwan Barghouthi former head of Birzeit student Senate and Hasan Abdel Jawad in Bethlehem University (Salameh, 2006B).

University and Pluralism: Indeed a Civil Environment

Bethlehem University was established to serve the Palestinian society both Muslims and Christians from all cultural and regional areas (city, village, camp) In light of the general space that BU offers on its campus, this university is so special. The cultural atmosphere is based on two main rules:

- First: the academic stage at the university is considered a main turning point in the life of the student; the university provides the educational, learning, and academic atmosphere for the student to live his/her university life away from interference of the family. It also provides the relative independence to the student in making decisions on campus. It is also distinguished in its ways of teaching and learning. There are several Palestinian universities and institutions that still depend on rote learning and monotonous lecturing. However, Bethlehem University is more inclined to teaching that is based on dialogue and collective learning; this provides a rich ground to exchange of culture and bridges the existing cultural gaps in the awareness and perception between the different numerous cultural areas which distinguish the Palestinian society.
- Second: The cultural and religious symbols are numerous on campus. This provides a rich atmosphere for knowing the different other in terms of location (city, village, camp), religion (Muslim, Christian) and gender. This space creates a desire for adaptation and assimilation of the other i.e. finding life styles and social beliefs that would coexist in peace and tolerance.

Rafiq Khoury (2001) stresses in his personal testimony that Bethlehem University is an arena for joint cultural cooperation which helps in bringing views of Muslims and Christians closer. He accuse the educational system at the elementary and secondary stages of social misguidance; this would constitute an obstacle before the integration of Christians into the society. He narrates a story of a Christian girl and another Muslim girl at their elementary and secondary academic lives. The former studied in a Christian school where the percentage of Muslim girls does not exceed (10%). As for the Muslim girl who lives in one of Hebron villages had never seen a Christian in her life prior to being admitted to Bethlehem University. By this, Khoury points out that Bethlehem University introduces students directly to the different and diverse reality.

The period between the seventies and the nineties in Bethlehem University was distinguished by giving, change and produce on all political, social, cultural and union levels. This is what we touch through the social, political and senate cadre which the university and its students movement had produced; it is represented by prominent leaders in decision making at our present time in addition to contribution in putting

forward political and union programs for Bethlehem region on the political level. There were many instances when the same person had political assignments as a political leader in the political faction and the tasks of student unions inside the walls of the university. (Salameh, 2006B)

On the other hand, we can be certain to say that Bethlehem University has provided the geographical places of villages with an open minded and well aware cadre of the requirements of social and political life.

Viable Integration Between Muslims and Christians

The examiner of the history of the Islamic Arabic civilization sees that the Islamic and Christian coexistence in the area was not only physical but it witnessed social interactions at the political, economic and cultural levels. (Salameh, 2006A) This relationship in our Palestinian society has strengthened and integrated into the overall interaction in the region, and this created a spirit of pluralistic and realistic behavior on the basis of respect of traditions and beliefs of one another.

In this context, the contribution of Christians through its churches, its schools, its hospitals, and other service institutions and their integration into national action and national movements had influenced the lives of thousands of citizens in Palestine in general and Bethlehem in particular.

Mattel Maghnam emphasizes the relationship between Muslims and Christians and its role in the national movement and in the reinforcement of the national identity. (Shabakat Amin, 2008) Besides, there are contributions in literature, vocations, administration, translation, theatre, cinema, and journalism. This intellectual movement has contributed in one way or another in drawing a civilized life.

Within the framework of explaining this viable integration, Sabella (1997) indicates that this relationship was based on several factors which had contributed to creating this integration.: Mainly:

- **Political Dimension:** Muslims and Christians encountered the same political experience with the Israeli Occupation. Both Muslims and Christians suffered from the Nakba in (1948). (35%) which is about (60) thousand Christians refugees experienced the agony of homelessness the same as other Palestinians. Christians have also contributed to struggle and resistance of occupation.
- **Religious Dimension:** the existence of the three monotheistic religions in Palestine and the coexistence of Muslims and Christians in Bethlehem in particular has generated a feeling of reciprocal acceptance of the other in the

context of different religious symbols. This feeling was not only reflected on coexistence side by side but also on other factors like the economic and educational conditions; Besides, the traditions and religious teachings of Islam and its leaders in relation to the people of the book and the Omar Pact have a great influence on the daily life which is based on the grounds of true recognition of the other.

As for some suspicions and disturbances between Christians and Muslims which had happened and are happening in Bethlehem even if they were related to families or land, we tend not to analyze them in light of their religious dimension (Muslim, Christian) as much as they are the end product of a traditional mentality possessing us; this mentality is always based on the principle of force rather than right. When a certain injustice is inflicted against a Christian or Muslim family, the subject matter is not whether it is a Christian or Muslim but it is our tribal mentality.

The Mirror of a City's Culture is its Residents: A comparative study of Hebron and Bethlehem *

The study of the culture of cities is considered a recent study in the area of comprehension of the cultural diversification inside the same society. The daily human interactions have reflected certain cultural patterns that became an integral part of the people's life and character. Those interested in modern Palestinian studies of the Palestinian society can see the uniqueness of the Palestinian cities experiences on the social and political levels. This uniqueness was more like isolation. This has led to the contribution of the historical experience of the Palestinian cities. The nature of the social elite in them played an important role in the formation of the city character which distinguishes it from the rest of other Palestinian cities. The image of the Palestinian cities and the nature of the dominant culture in it is not only different qualitatively but also quantitatively. These characteristics gave it a model that differed from those of other Palestinian cities. The culture of Ramallah city is different from that of Nablus, and that of Hebron is different from that of Bethlehem. This was indicated by Salim Tamari studies on modern Palestinian cities before 1948 (2002; 2005) and Lisa Taraki studies on contemporary Palestinian cities (2004; 2006; 2008). They had given a new dimension to the comprehension of the Palestinian society on the basis of a state of singularity imposed by the context of city development and the state of social and economic activity in it.

A review of the social history of the study population (Bethlehem and Hebron) is considered significant for the understanding of societal tastes and civic attitudes of its residents. The comparison between the two cities reflects a state of dissimilarity on the level of cultural pattern, social intellectuality of the city which were formed according to the interactions of citizens and the way they envisage their city; this, later on, constituted a state of solitary which formed the identity, pattern and behaviors of citizens which distinguish them from the other inhabitants of other cities.

This aspect represents an investigation into the nature of difference and diversity of the civic culture of the south of the West Bank. The uniqueness of each will be reviewed and summarized especially the dissimilarities and differences in the nature of the cultural structure and the nature of the social elite in terms of their influence and nature. Due to - the fact that we lack the necessary data about the topics we aim to present, we will depend on a number of statistics selected from the 2007 Census (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009A,B) also other data taken from the Central Elections-

* This part of the thesis has been published in *Idafat Journal* (Arab Journal of Sociology), Issue No.12,pp. 95-121, directed by Center for Arab Unity Studies. <http://www.caus.org.lb>.

- Commission Palestine and municipalities in relation to legislative (2006) and municipal elections (2005). Moreover, the basic outcomes of the research explain the differences in the social and economic structures of the two cities which lead its inhabitants to adopt social and political positions which complied with their social structure.

- Similar ground but different social structure

The Hebron experience is considered somehow different since it was not exposed to dramatic changes and characteristics which the city of Bethlehem had undergone starting from the impact of Ottoman reforms in the early twenties which paved the way in one way or another for the state of cultural and media activity in the forties of the past century. It also continued as a result of a state of religious Christian and Muslim diversity along their common experience and the cleansing incidents in 1948 which changed the demography of the population in the city. This is also associated with the local and international importance of the city and the implicit consensus on the Christian identity of the city. These aspects are lacking in the historical experience of the city of Hebron which made out of its city center a state which is more like cultural homogeneity with its surrounding villages. It may be said that it formed an extension to its countryside rather than a model. This uniqueness has made it possible for the state of cultural and social sustainability to continue and to be represented by the cultural patterns adopted by the inhabitants or at the level of its social elite in city center or its surrounding villages and its influence has continued to exist up to this present century.

The state of cultural and social mobility of the city is relatively stable compared to Bethlehem in the twentieth century; even the wave of refugees in the year (1948) did not create a state of cultural challenges to the city of Hebron since those Palestinian refugees settled outside the city center as the case in Aroub and Fawwar camps; consequently, the city did not witness a state of mutual cultural interaction between its countryside and camps.

The historical significance of the city of Hebron lies in its economic and commercial aspects in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries since it is considered an important center for internal routes and a central location for Bedouin concentrations from the south. Moreover, it is considered an agricultural center. However, the lack of agricultural lands inside it lead to investment in animal stock. The animal livestock in Hebron constitutes today (30%) of the animal livestock in the West Bank. This explains the coexistence of the different economic patterns in one social area. The city was unable to attract one economic pattern represented by the dominance of commercial growth which the countryside cities excel in with regard to separation between the agricultural and

commercial sectors (Taraki, 2006). This has led to the absence of concentration of the business elite and landlords in the city.

Consequently, the sectors and the elite did not constitute the influence and power in the city over the attitudes that the city dwellers might adopt and differentiate them from rural values; on the other hand, Hebron is different from Bethlehem in terms of the fact that tax collectors at the Ottoman period were from the surrounding villages while the feudalists in Bethlehem were not from the residents of the area.

The basic characteristic which contributed to the historical influence of the city of Hebron over the surrounding rural areas is the fact that it supervised the holy sites which consisted of some mystic sites, shrines and Abraham Mosque (Salameh and Da'na, 2006A). This explains why so many mystics and the poor were attracted to it. Also the process of division and distribution of roles among the Hebronite families concerning the custody and keeping of the Abraham Mosque. Supervision of the proceeds of the holy shrines constituted a form of income to several families. In contrast, no influence of the city was noticed in the rural areas; consequently, Hebron did not represent an urban/civil center and reference for the south of the West Bank. The city identity was formed and shaped into conservative and traditional patterns; thus, its reputation and custody constituted a behavioral, social and cultural system for the city citizens which are still influenced by it up till now.

As for its rural areas, especially Dura they were considered to play the role of the main center for the southern region where its notables practiced social and economic powers (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) making it the master of tax collectors from the surrounding villages and the master of the people of the Mountain according to Tamari (2005); this was represented by its monopoly and influence in curia norms, conflict resolutions, family feuds, and share of powers and lands. The dominance and role of the families and the elite continued even during the British Mandate era and the Jordanian era until a parallel elite emerged from the families of the city of Hebron mainly Ja'bari Family represented by *Sheikh* Mohammed Ja'bari and his powers and influences during the era of the British Mandate and Jordanian Government.

It is worth noting in this respect that after the passage of more than a century and the categorization of the elite of families in Dura and Hebron with regard to their influence on the local and national level; the way was paved for it to have an economic capital; therefore, it had a cultural influence; it is also on the level of having a national capital. This power contributed to the support and creation of an elite within the same family which thanks to its economic powers and social capital was able to produce highly qualified social and political elites. For example, Yasser Amro, Nabil Amro, Younis Amro have influences in the educational and political levels on the national level, while Ja'bari and Natsheh families were more involved in the administrative, municipal and

military apparatus in Hebron city. This is in addition to Qawasmi family; the late Fahd Qawasmi enjoyed a national capital thanks to his relationship with Fatah movement; this has paved the way for Sahar Qawasmi to be on Fatah list on the national level on the Legislative Council in (2006). Also there is Khalid Qawasmi who is the current minister of Local Government. It is also noticeable in this respect that most Fatah leaderships are focused in the rural areas while leaderships of Islamic movements have their influence both in the rural and city areas.

If this is the situation in Hebron, then it is different in quality and quantity from Bethlehem. The Ottoman regime had given forth an economic and social formation in Palestine in which the economic sector is mixed with the political tyranny within the framework of a cultural reference that belonged to the middle ages. Bethlehem had its share from this cultural legacy. It was reflected mainly in the policy of Turkishization which dismissed the Arabic language from the official departments and replaced with the Turkish language. It also appointed its Turkish elements in major public offices. This was also clear in the system of taxes on farmers and in the absence of political freedoms, political oppression, and imprisonment of nationalists and pan-Arabists . This continued until the first decade of the twentieth century with the publication of Limited freedoms law in (1908); it facilitated the existence of new political, economic and social climates for the revival of the Palestinian movement both nationally and culturally (Musallam, 2002). The city witnessed a state of prosperity and wealth thanks to its Christian religious value. Here lies the significance of the city access to western markets in addition to the visitors, tourists and pilgrims and their interaction with the city citizens at a very high level than that of Hebron which is suffering from a state of isolation. This accessibility and openness had contributed to draw Bethlehem into social, cultural and administrative experience which the city of Hebron lacked.

Based on the feudal form in production, an agricultural production pattern dominated the city alongside with handicrafts and commercial production which was connected with religious tourism, trade inside the city or abroad like Latin America, India, and Europe in the beginning of the twentieth century. And so The city of Bethlehem and it's extension to Beit Jala and Beit Sahour represent rural reality but with civil and urban culture (Tamari, 2005:49), Since the existence and the role of missionaries and convents which established several private schools, and development of education. Consequently, the city was distinguished for its cultural character in the early stages of the past century until the late times of the British era. This had a great influence on the lives of Bethlehemites in relation to their open view of the other or life style associated with city values. This was expressed in the nature of the administrative systems in the city and the relatively open civilized pattern of life.

The "*Mila system*" and foreign concessions in the Ottoman era constituted a significant characteristic of the city dwellers; the concessions had opened new

opportunities to expand the horizons of Palestinian Christians in relation to travel abroad and work in international trade which generates great profits through the establishment of trade concessions with Europeans; the Christians were able to establish a huge trade network in Europe and Latin America thanks to their mastery of foreign languages and means of modern trade; this led to the emergence of a new social and economic sector. Some of the Christian families that were famous for trade at that time are (Dabdoub, Ja'ara, Jaser, Handal) (Arab Educational Institute, 2001).

In spite of the fact that the British presence defaced and obstructed the development and natural growth of the Palestinian cities in general, we do find that Bethlehem city greatly flourished due to concentration of a large number of troops in the city; this required the revival and reactivation of several professions. Moreover, the British were interested in the beatification of the city and rehabilitation of the infra structure regarding the opening of markets, construction of hospitals and hotels in the British era (Bannoura, 1982:91; Arab Educational Institute, 2001:48).

The basic characteristic of the city was distinguished by two aspects: First, administratively and the other commercially. Most administrative, legal and service positions during the British Mandate, Jordanian Administration and Israeli Occupation were given to Palestinian Christians. (40%) of the high and middle ranking administrative positions like officials, translators, and consultants were limited to Palestinian Christians (Arab Educational Institute, 2001:45). Moreover, the main religious Christian landmarks of the city were highlighted; this meant a reactivation of professions, occupations, commerce and tourist sector.

Different from the city of Hebron, Bethlehem city was distinguished by the existence of traditional notables in the historical center of the city in the beginning of the twentieth century in light of emigration abroad. It focused outside the city limits by what is called the eastern rural area (*Ta'amra area*) of the city in which Bedouins are settled. Instead of the traditional form of formation of the city nine neighborhoods, it was paralleled by an activation of an active movement of the nationalists, and communists in the forties of the twentieth century mainly, Issa Khoury, Basil Bandak, Yohanna Khalil Dakarat (Musallam, 2002), who were residents of the same neighborhoods and lived the stage of national and pan Arab support; this led to the rise of the leftist, national and pan Arab movement in Bethlehem (Musallam, 2008), as opposed to religious movements in Hebron which were associated with Jerusalem elites.

As for the state of cultural, educational and media activity, we do notice that Hebron did not witness such an activity in the forties of the past century which Yunis Amro (1987) called as the dark period in the history of Palestinian cities. However, we do believe that the system of *Kuttabs* (Quran schools) and religious education were in control of academic state in the city and in the neighboring villages. The elites in Hebron

used to send their sons later on to Al-Azhar in Egypt to pursue their higher education (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A:29). At the time of the fifties and sixties, none of the local Hebronites occupied any educational position. They came from outside the city (Taraki, 2006:46). This confirms the significance of teaching in creating new civilized conditions and climates that were historically missing in the educational system in Hebron. Besides, the delay of the city in creating elites from the modern middle class would reinforce the traditional pattern of the nature of the social and political elites at our contemporary time. As for the first university in the city, it is Hebron University which was established in 1971 to represent an institute to teach Islamic "*Sharia*"; this had given the university a religious and traditional character and influence the powers of the students movements which adopt the Islamic ideologies up till present day.

In return, Bethlehem city witnessed a revolution in the information and cultural movement in relation to establishment of printing houses, religious, cultural and national magazines. It also lead to the growth of national and pan Arab movements which used to call at that time for the unity of Greater Syria (Musallam, 2008) as a culmination of the spread of the Latin, Catholic and Armenian schools in the late nineteenth century (Qdah, 2007). This had greatly influenced the life patterns and ways of thinking of this elite; consequently, it influenced their approach towards civilization and modernization and the adoption of secular and pan Arab slogans leading to the emergence of national elites from both Christian and Muslim families with pan Arab and secular dimensions.

The city of Bethlehem started to establish foreign and national schools at an early stage in history especially elementary and secondary stages. For upper stages, the students used to go to Jerusalem or Beirut. It is worth noting that the educational opportunities were available to Christians more than to Muslims in the city and its surrounding. This explains the growth of a generation of educated national Christians. As for the Muslims, with the exception of the rich, they were less fortunate than the Christians since the academic system at the Ottoman era depended greatly on the "*Kuttab*" – Quran School- which was distinguished for its simplicity.

As for the important cultural event in the city history, it was the establishment of Bethlehem University in (1973) for the service of the entire Palestinian society (Muslims and Christians), from all geographic concentrations (city, village, camp) and gender. The secret for its excellence is the public space which the university provides; the cultural climate is based on two basic rules:

First: The university stage is considered a main turning point in the life of students. The university prepares the educational and academic climate for the student to live his university life away from the interference of the parents regarding the availability of relative independence in the decisions of the student on campus. In addition, it has an excellent approach in teaching and learning. There are several Palestinian universities and

institutions which are still following the lecturing and banking type of pedagogy. As for Bethlehem University, it is more inclined towards education that is based on dialogue and collective cooperative teaching so as to provide a fertile soil for exchange of cultures and abridgment of gaps based on awareness and realization between the several cultural regions which characterize the Palestinian society.

Second: The multiplicity of the religious and cultural symbols on campus provide a fertile ground for being introduced to the others with regard to the geographical location (city, village, or camp), religion (Christian and Muslim) and gender. This space creates a desire to adapt and absorb the other. This means that there are ways of life and social beliefs that coexist together and tolerate one another in a social and academic setting.

This is lacking in Hebron University since the academic cadre in it is closer to the conservative and traditional approach while the majority of the academic cadre including the administrative one in Bethlehem are liberal in their approach especially in those trends that concern the way of life , attitudes toward women and the democratic political system.

This academic background, cultural environment and political forces in the city and their attitudes are considered closer to the civilized modern model; this explains the control of leftist student movements in the past and the secular movements at present over the students' senate. It is worth noting that a significant number of the former students movements play important and leading roles at present regardless of their social or economic background. They include Issa Qaraqi member of Legislative Council, Mahmoud Fanoun Member of Central Committee of the Popular Front and others. Thus we can make a presumption that Bethlehem University positively contributes to the creation and formulation of the attitudes of its graduates from the middle class with modern and civilized attitudes more than what Hebron University is contributing.

- Tolerant City Pattern vs. Traditional Pattern

The careful and close reader of the social and political history of the two cities can realize the extent of difference between the two in the patterns, ways and customs of their residents. This has social significances and causes including political ones that were accumulated from experience. The social structure and its forms are in the center of Hebron. Its countryside is also considered one of the cities that includes a network of strong ties based on blood and kinsfolk relations. That is why its extension for its' countryside. Consequently, the family constitutes a center and a weight for social and economic support of its members. It is an indispensable value. According to the pattern of clan relationships, it is considered as a social system that determines the balance of external forces among families or it could be a dedication of inequality based on gender

or age. This explains why it is considered the clan reference for the *Sheikhs* of Hebron Mountain in the southern region of the West Bank.

As for the pattern of the city, Taraki (2006:44) indicates the views of one of the western travelers regarding the hostility, aggressiveness and bigotry of Hebron in the nineteenth century towards the foreigners compared with other cities. The traveler referred this to the fact that the city was marginalized in terms of investment state that was witnessed by other coastal cities along with their rare contact with the Europeans and rare instances of having any pilgrim, foreign institution or Christian institution to come and stay in the city. We totally agree with the researcher in this regard. However, we would like to analyze this in a manner that has its structural and political causes; it is true that the rarity of having any foreign and Palestinian Christian institutions to exist in the city in particular has deprived it of having plurality in the way of life. Consequently, a tolerant view about the other has accumulated as a result of the daily contacts and not on the basis of the traditional pattern which is positively associated with foreigners. This in itself is considered important. This is what the city of Hebron had actually experienced at the beginning of the twentieth century in terms of diversity in religions; Christianity or Islam and Judaism contributed in one way or another to the creation of a state of tolerance among religions especially Judaism and Islam along side with traditional relationships with neighborhood "*Mukhtars*" (village officials) and faiths inside them. The city witnessed a state of peaceful and commercial coexistence. In fact there were many instances which bear witness to the city citizens and families for their tolerance and protection of the Palestinian Jew (Arab Jew) before the start of the Zionist project; this was emphasized by the Zionist writer Abishar (1970:43-44) as well as the novels of the Arab Jewish writer Ishaq Shami who was a resident of Hebron; he resorted to several Hebronite Muslims to provide him with protection from his conservative and religious family (Tamari, 2005: 226-244).

However, this situation did not continue since 1929 constituted a state of boycott in the history of the city since the bloody confrontations and clashes between the Palestinians and the Jews lead to the killing of (60) Jews, so it constituted a new turning point in the relationships between the Palestinians and the Jews. This had contributed to the formation of a radical image of its Palestinian residents in addition to its conservative reputation.

In order for us to understand this in a scientific manner, we must not be dragged behind generalizations only related to the social structure of Hebron. We view that the radical trend in the city of Hebron refers to the growing Zionist project back then and its consequences due to the apprehension of the Palestinian society that it would influence its cities and villages. This lead to violent repercussions and reactions mainly in Jerusalem, Safd and Hebron. In addition, several Arab Jews especially in Hebron started to embrace the Zionist identity. Nevertheless, why did this state last till our present time?

The Israeli study titled, “Ethnocracy and Religious Radicalism” (Yiftachel and Roded, 2008) on the three cities of Prophet Abraham (Jerusalem, Negev, and Hebron) stresses the relationship between the policy of urbanization by the Israeli colonial occupation, racial discrimination policies and exploitation in these cities. In addition, it aims to create a holy address about the cities of Prophet Abraham and its relationship with the growth of the religious Jewish movements in the three cities; this was in concurrence with the rise of Palestinian religious Islamic movements which are different in their radical address according to the city and the colonial policy adopted in each of the three cities where Hebron was in the front.

The sacredness and symbolism of the place by the Palestinians as a national project enhanced by a religious address touched only Jerusalem and Hebron and excluded other Palestinian cities in order to create a counter address of the Israeli religious movements on the two cities and considered them as representations of the national and religious identity for both parties.

This historically explains the spread of the Islamic movements (Hizb Tahrir – liberation Party- Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, Hamas Movement) in Hebron not only recently in the (2006) Legislative Council Elections in which Hamas was able to win all the seats of the LC and most local council. Since the holiness, symbolism and identity of the city historically began with the start of the Zionist project occupation of Palestine. This explains the historical spread of religious movements in Hebron most famous of which is the Islamic Liberation Party which is characterized by fundamentalist position that are anti democracy, anti secularism and anti modernization since it considers them as western tools used to culturally penetrate the Islamic world. Whereas the early beginnings of the political movements in Bethlehem had a national and secular dimension, so it included the Muslim and Christian elements with its frame; Christians played a leading and pioneering role in the formation of these movements.

On the other hand, there was not a discourse that expressed the struggle over the identity of Bethlehem city; in fact, there was a consensus on the worldliness of the city in light of its religious significance for the Christians of the world and an outlet to establish ties with western countries; political, secular and Islamic leaderships stressed over history the importance of the city since it is the cradle and birth place of Jesus Christ; in other words it is the “city of peace”; this title constitutes a social perspective of the city image in the minds and practices of its citizens. It is expressed in the fact that first peaceful popular resistance started from Bethlehem especially from Beit Sahour which was famous in the first Intifada (1987) for its civil disobedience (Shomali, 1991). The local churches with their institutions, civil and national institutions showed their great support of the goals of peaceful resistance. In spite of the fact that this movement was not witnessed in the early beginnings of the Second Intifada (2000) for it was characterized by being a military one, we saw the role of the international solidarity movement with the

Palestinian people and how it stood by its side on several occasions. This was mainly in the siege of the Nativity Church and the siege of President Arafat in his compound in Ramallah in April 2002. The movements of peace activists were run by a youth group in the Alternative Information Center in Bethlehem; then it reappeared after (2004) mainly in the peaceful demonstrations lead by Palestinian and international active groups at “Mi’sara Sharqia” area nowadays in cooperation with the Rapprochement Between Peoples Center in Beit Sahour. This experience and its culture is considered part of the legacy and character of the city of Bethlehem; the Palestinian societal organizations had paved the way for this activity over a period of three decades of experience and performance. As for the role of the elite, we see its embodiment in “Bethlehem 2000 Project” one of its projects was to demolish the old prison in the Nativity square which was used by the British, Jordanian and Israeli authorities so as to remove a symbol that contradicts with the images of the city; this explains the role of the elite which are trying to preserve the image of the city as they imagine it. The center that was built on the site of the old prison was called “Peace Center”.

We see that we are before two contradicting images. The political history of Hebron was based on a basic reference which is the conflict over the city identity and its religious dimension in a traditional and conservative environment that is mainly based on families and curia. The Hebronite families are still dominating the political and social sphere with its activities; this led to a state of radicalism with a quality and quantity that cannot be seen in Bethlehem; thus, it contributed to shape its political and social atmosphere more like the administrative and institutional work within the framework of a secular discourse or a liberal one that is inclined towards the national dimension.

- City Neighborhood and Formation of Municipality: Variable and Invariable

Neighborhoods (*Harat* in Arabic) is a word that is used to describe a neighboring residential area; it represents a social identity to those who live inside them in the Palestinian cities; it is a tradition that is deeply rooted in the mentality that is based on family divisions as the case in Hebron or according to denomination division in Bethlehem, the neighborhood became a behavioral and normative system for the city citizens and in decision making. The late Ayyoub Musallam indicates in his dairies that, “Bethlehem Municipal Council is made up of members or “*Mukhtars*” of these nine neighborhoods after the Syriac were grouped in one separate neighborhood.; the members contribute to run the affairs of the city along with its neighborhoods. The situation continued unchanged until the issuance of the first constitution in (1876) following the structural reforms in the Ottoman central regime. According to this publication, local governments and municipal councils were formed to run the affairs of the states and provinces in a decentralized manner. Moreover, local sectarian committees were formed

to be in charge of the sect (denominations) and run their daily, social and cultural life (Musallam, 2002); the neighborhoods were represented by their “*Makhateers*” in the municipal council until (1948). Following the Nakba, two new members were added to the council one for the refugees and the other for the Ta’amrah; the law that governed the municipality members was called “*Status Quo*” i.e. the “stable system” which signifies that the mayor is a Christian ; if the mayor belongs to the Latin Patriarchy, then his deputy must belong to the Greek Orthodox and vice versa.

This is the background that was adopted for the historical establishment of Bethlehem Municipality Council. The question on the table is : Did any essential changes in the council structure take place?

In order to answer this question, we will adopt the results of the elections for municipal councils (2005). We notice that the basic law did not change, so the mayor was a Christian. However, the number of the members of the council became 15 on the basis that the quota is (8) to Christians and (7) to Muslims. The representation of the Christians is (51%). The elections did not rely on the competition between the neighborhood, but it depended on the basis that there was competition between political factions. There should also be independent lists. The results of the elections were significant since there was a state of diversity of council members, geographic, political and religious origins. In addition, there was a presence of names of families that represented the city neighborhoods for example Shokeh family (Muslim Fatah formerly and People’s Party now, and the other is affiliated to Hamas) Hremi who used to reside in Fawaghra neighborhood (Muslim , National Initiative) Batarseh from Tarajmeh (Christian, Popular front) Bandak from Anatra Neighborhood (Christian, Fatah) Saadeh (Christian, Poular Front) . In addition , there were figures whose origins are from Hebronite families like Natsheh and Safi (Muslim, Hamas) and Ta’amreh members (Muslim, Islamic Jihad) Also from the refugees from Jerusalem Area represented by Saadeh (Muslim. Hamas). This stresses the extent of integration of the Palestinian refugees into the city and the extent the city was able to absorb its refugee residents who immigrated from their villages in (1948) and (1967); they formed a new elite in the Bethlehemite society.

In a quick look on the legislative council elections, we notice that it determined the size of representation of the city by four members provided that (2) are Muslims and (2) are Christians according to the Palestinian Elections Law at the level of the districts. In spite of the small size of the Christians which does not exceed (35%) of the district, the electoral quota considered them on equal footing; Fatah movement was able to allocate the two seats for the Christian quota while Hamas movement won the two seats for the Muslim quotas; one seat is originally from Ta’amra and he received the highest votes while the other is a refugee from Aida camp. On the level of district representation in the party lists on the level of the Palestinian clusters, three won from the district they come

from Deheisha camp, Aida camp and Beit Sahour (Central Elections Commission Palestine, 2006).

We notice from the above mentioned that the majority of the local council members are leftist; in the legislative council, half of them belonged to the secular trend and two to the Islamic trend. As for the winners on the national level, the majority were for the secular trend compared with one for the Islamists; this varied formation explains in general the attitudes of the district residents through the nature of the figures they elected; consequently, the nature of the elite was more inclined towards the civic culture and its civilized attitudes with a nationalistic secular discourse; this culture was capable of accommodating a trend of diversification and dissimilarity and it was able to manage it on the basis of a joint ground. This gave a chance for social strata from different geographical origins to play an influential role in decision making regarding the reality and future of the city; the presence of municipal council members from Hebronite or refugee origins confirms the extent of integration of those origins in the life of the city while Hebron Municipality lacks this diverse composition of the municipal council members.

It is also noticeable that in the history of the city of Bethlehem, the city three camps were given a distinctive national and cultural role in their active involvement on the struggle and resistance level in the eighties of the past century up till this present moment. Their rich experience was able to present national and social elite that enjoyed both the influence and the role on the district and national level. Besides, the most prominent leftist and secular party leadership were concentrated in it. The participation of Deheisha camp in the national, social and political activities is considered as a case of excellence since it included active political movements. Social and cultural institutions whose activities equal those of Bethlehem and Beit Sahour cities. In addition, the presence of prominent figures in it is clear on the political level in the district since the General Secretary of Fatah movement and member of its General Revolutionary Council is Mohammad Taha and lives in the camp, Majid Faraj Chief of Public Intelligence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Ismail Fararjah Head of Intelligence at present and a former deputy governor. On the social level, there are party committees and national figures who contribute to solve family and organization conflicts; they constitute an alternative to Clan "*Sheikhs*" which are common in the eastern countryside in the district or family chiefs "*Sheikh*" in Hebron district.

Thus we can conclude that the refugees of Bethlehem city were able to historically integrate into the city socially, culturally and politically for considerations that relate to the closeness of location to the city where they settled in the heart of the city, and others that relate to hospitality and warm welcome of the refugees by the Bethlehemites. The refugees integration mainly on the national level which helped to create and introduce new national elites contributed, lead and influenced the entire life of the residents of

Bethlehem; these factors contributed to the formation of concepts and values derived from the praise of the camps of the values of the city center since the latter is considered civilized model.

As for the representation of the district at the ministerial level, it is noticed that there is a tradition inside the formation of the Palestinian cabinet regarding minister of Tourism and Archeology that he/she must be a Christian and from the residents of Bethlehem since it is the most active Palestinian city in tourism. This tradition became a new “status quo” regarding the Palestinian cabinets. Even when Hamas won the legislative council elections in (2006), it adopted this approach and appointed Maher Abu Aita as Minister of Tourism which was previously occupied by Mitri Abu Aita, both come from the same family in Beit Sahour. At present Minister of Tourism is Khlood Daibes and she is on Salam Fayyad’s list of the Third Way.

In contrast, Hebron city is quite the opposite not only in terms of the religious or political structure since it constitutes a reference but also on family basis. The structure of the political parties in Hebron is based on family basis more than the case in Bethlehem since the size of families in Hebron is more than those in Bethlehem; this situation led to the control of the family image on the administrative, organizational and military positions in the center of the district. In spite of the fact that there are no elections at the level of the municipal council, the Hebronite families were represented in it by the Authorities at that time. The Palestinian Authority had recently appointed Hebron municipality mayors like Mustafa Natsheh formerly and Khalid Asilah currently and he is affiliated to Fatah Movement, noting that he took part in the national list in the municipal elections in (1976). He came second to the late Fahd Qawasmi who held the post then. It seems that the Authority deals with the outcome of the (1976) elections as a “status quo” arrangement in the issue of appointments until it becomes feasible to hold the elections in the future!

As for elections of the legislative council, it was decided that the district be represented by nine members. Hamas movement was easily able to win the nine seats for it, namely “Basim Zughayer, Hatem Qafisheh, Samir Qadi, Azzam Salhab, Mohammad Tal, Nayef Ragoub, Mohammad Mutlaq, Nizar Ramadan, and Aziz Dweik: the president of the Legislative Council”; it is noticeable that two third of them are from the city of Hebron and the remaining third is from Dura, Sourif, and these are considered second in terms of locations most active and supportive of Hamas. As for Hebron representatives on the level of political lists, Sahar Qawasmi from Fatah movement won.

By having a quick look we can find out that there is not an elite with influential refugee origins in Hebron district in (2006) elections or on the leadership level for the political parties which were focused in the villages now. However, in the past it was represented through Mohammad Hourani from Fawwar camp on behalf of Fatah; this

reflects explicitly the state of isolation and marginalization experienced by Hebron camps not only in the recent elections but also historically speaking. The geographic divisions (civil, farmer, refugee) are more intense and striking in Hebron compared to Bethlehem. The refugees were deprived of the prospect of integration and influence in decision making. This explains some of the conservative trends in Hebron camps compared to the openness of Bethlehem city refugee camps which are witnessing more presence in the national and leftist movement than in its counterpart the city of Hebron.

In a quick comparison of the size of political participation in the districts, we find that the percentage of citizens participation in the presidential elections 2005 in Hebron constituted (58%) while the percentage is a lot higher in Bethlehem reached (74%); I think this is due to the fact that Hamas movement did not take part in it or due to the boycott of the Islamic Liberation party of the elections (Central Elections Commission, 2005). As for the legislative council elections (2006), Bethlehem percentage was slightly higher than that of Hebron. The participation percentage was (74.3%) and (70.4%) consecutively. If the percentage of participation in the Palestinian clusters was (77%) (Central Elections Commission, 2006), it is noticed that there was not a boycott in Bethlehem of the Islamic parties for any consideration. The percentage remained stable while it increased by (12%) in Hebron city. The more noticeable aspect on the level of the two districts is that the percentage of support of the election of the leftist parties like Popular Front and Badil List in Bethlehem was a lot more than it was in Hebron.

In order to summarize the abovementioned, we notice that the nature of traditional formations neighborhoods "*Harat*" whether on the basis of families or denominations still exists. Since the political parties adopted an attitude that its candidates must have different origins (village, city, camp, Muslim, Christian) to comply with the diversity of the society. This reflected itself in the lists of the candidates of the political parties whether this was on the basis of the municipal or legislative councils. However, we see a difference in terms of diversity between the two cities in those origins. They are more noticeable in Bethlehem than in Hebron. The structure and performance of the parties are also different between the two districts even if it were from the same political faction. Besides both the role and influence of the elites with refugee origins are more represented in Bethlehem and more influential not only at the level of district, but also at the level of the Palestinian clusters.

- Civic Action Institutions: between Tradition and Modernization

The work and performance of civil/civic institutions are considered as an image that reflects the content of the social, cultural and political structure in which it is living through the nature of activities it adopts and supervises; accordingly, we can measure the civic taste through them.

The phenomenon of the spread of civil institutions in the Palestinian clusters is considered one of the characteristics which the Palestinian society was able to establish prior to the establishment of the central state. Consequently, the institutional experience in Palestine was associated with the singularity and personality of the civil institutions and the historical experience it passed through. The nature of the activities was different due to the vision, objectives, and nature of its activities. Thus, there were several charitable, relief, service, youth, women, motherhood, research, agriculture institutions.

The city of Hebron is characterized in addition to what was mentioned by the frameworks and organizations of the clan and tribal life in a way that it is not possible to say that this framing became a salient feature in the space of relationships in the city center and in its countryside.

The family in Hebron takes part in different activities like Family support and solidarity, committees relating to social and health security and financial support of family members, . This system action was traditionally called Family institution “*Dawain* in Arabic” (kinship organization), which are common in Hebron and they are spread according to the number of the families. The notable and prominent figures in a certain family participate in establishing its “*Diwan*”; this place constitutes a reference to making decisions related to the fate of the family; it is also a place where the family members meet on their happy and sad occasions. They also discuss in it the internal problems of the family or in relation to families in general; this form of family institution is lacking in Bethlehem even in its eastern rural side which is famous for its influential families “*Ta’amra area*”.

The history of the establishment of civil society organizations in Hebron adopted the traditional form in its action; it is also characterized by the charitable, relief and religious nature since its early beginnings in the sixties up till this present day. It is represented by the Muslim Brotherhood Association and Young Women Muslim Brotherhood Association and others. This is a humble example of the organizational work in Hebron compared with the situation in Bethlehem. The history of organizations work in the latter goes back to the sixties of the past century. It is represented by church, charitable and women associations; later national and secular associations were established like Arab Orthodox Club, Arab Women Union and Women Activity Center in the fifties.

It seems that the history, experience and environment of the experience have a great impact on the nature and work of institutions at present; if we make a comparison between the two districts, we will find that the percentage of the associations in Bethlehem district for every person is (one institution for every 1961 members) while we find that there is (one institution for every 5990 members) in Hebron district. As for the nature of the work of those institutions, we find that the percentage of traditional charitable institutions in Bethlehem is (24%) of the total size of institutions compared to (36.9%) in Hebron district (Palestinian Ministry of Interior, 2009); the numbers are almost close in youth institutions, theatre, cultural, health and ecology in both districts in spite of the fact that Hebron population is five times more than that of Bethlehem.

As for the excellence of some institutions in Bethlehem city in terms of activities and objectives, we find institutions that work on bringing Muslim and Christian views closer; they are represented by Dialogue Among Civilizations Center, and institutions which call for peaceful resistance like Center For Rapprochement Between People ; there are institutions which call for one state solution in Palestine represented by Alternative Information Center which is made up of political activists both Israeli and Palestinian. We do not find any institution with similar objectives in Hebron district since the Social environment in Hebron cannot produce such institutions or embrace them. In addition, there are several institutions which are active in the field of social, research, agricultural and cultural development in the two districts. The goals of these institutions are to spread democracy concepts and human rights along with women empowerment. What makes Bethlehem different from its counterpart is the nature of the administrative and organizational cadre in it since they have a deep and large scale experience as part of the city history which is lacking in the administrative cadre in Hebron.

As for the presence of international institutions, Bethlehem experienced this presence in the early beginnings of the twentieth century; the presence of tourists, pilgrims and foreign volunteers in it lead to the change of the pattern and performance of the institutions which embrace their projects or the nature of the projects offered to them by European states in addition to the integration and interaction with the local residents and foreign volunteers who come in solidarity with the Palestinian people. This reflects in itself the several options in relation to ways of thinking and life which might be missing in reality in the city; this experience has contributed in one way or another to absorb the presence and availability of the foreigner as an essential part of the reality and reputation of the city. Besides, there was the presence of the international volunteers to show solidarity with the Palestinian people especially at the beginning of the first popular Intifada and its intensification in the second Intifada.

The first interaction and close contact with international organizations was in the year (1997) with the international mission called “Temporary International Presence in Hebron [TIPH]” as a result of the political agreement between the Palestinian and Israeli

sides regarding the city of Hebron. The concerned parties with the international mission insisted that part of its employees come from Arab origins and carry European nationalities, in addition to the presence of the Christian Movement for Peace in the heart of the city to document cases of violation of Palestinian rights.

It is noticed that the experience of Hebron residents with international organizations is relatively new compared with Bethlehem; consequently, it reflects the limited period available for them in the limitation towards an understanding of the other “foreigner” in a social and traditional reality along with an Israeli siege policy that deprived the city of openness to the other living experiences and patterns. The image of the foreign institutions is viewed by suspicious and doubtful eyes about their presence and role. The most obvious example to this situation is the state of popular alert that had taken place in the city of Hebron on 14/3/2006 following the Israeli soldiers arrest of Palestinians from Jericho prison; they were supposed to be under British and American protection; these incidents annoyed the residents of Hebron in terms of their call for expulsion of all foreigners especially Americans and English; this made TIPH forces apply and implement a comprehensive project to clarify the role and the significance of the developmental role it carries out in the service of the city.

On the other side, Bethlehem city constituted a resort for the foreigners working in Hebron city because of the city options like restaurants, bars and the relative liberal life in it. Consequently, they came to Bethlehem as a place of accommodation, entertainment, or week end. In addition, organizations in Hebron which supervise international youth camps execute them in Bethlehem rather than in Hebron.

- Woman and Public Space

Taraki (2006:42) considers gender as one of the characteristics of the place since the role, status, tastes, fashion and activities of the woman have their significance regarding the nature of the social structure surrounding her; it reflects in general the temperament, propensity and attitudes of the city dwellers. The researcher stresses that Hebron did not put forward women elite over the past century compared with Ramallah and Nablus cities. This conclusion is correct. As mentioned above, the structure of the Hebronite execute is closer to the patriarchal system in which there are narrow spaces for women freedom, rights and role. Women activities were historically limited in Hebron district to charitable activities; they did not have a pioneering and prominent role on the level of women movement even in recent stages of our time.

Bethlehem experience is somewhat similar to Hebron experience in relation to the absence of Bethlehemite women elite in the past century. In spite of the presence of women associations in the twenties and forties, they were characterized by being

charitable. Their activities were associated with Jerusalemite institutions and later with elites, institutions and parties in Ramallah, Especially with the beginning of the First Intifada. However, the presence of woman in social occasions and activities is more obvious than it is in Hebron. Its conservative social milieu does not provide an incubator environment for women activities.

In contrast, we see clear differences in terms of the nature of women attire in Bethlehem; it is more associated with modern life and it is more liberal. As for interaction, the private schools include both boys and girls in all pre university stages. As for other schools which do not have students from both sexes, the students experience mixed classes at university level. Consequently, we find that there are limitations for women in Hebron more than in Bethlehem, Hebron for example, is distinguished by women wearing veil (*Hijab*) and scarf in general. There are no schools which encourage mixed classes. The only place where there is no separation between male and female students is the university which still experience a state of separation between both especially in seats. Consequently, we can say that Bethlehem provides a social space based on a mixing between the sexes more than what the city of Hebron provides.

These attitudes reflect the differences regarding the position and role of the woman in the two districts based on the nature of the customs and traditions in terms of the role of the traditional mother in the house and in the service of her family. It also concerns the nature of the social sphere which absorbs the role and fashion of the woman in this image or that.

Do statistics reflect this state of disparity?

Following our review of the main features of the images of the cities and their surroundings in which the historical, cultural and social experience helped to create a state of separate and unique character of the place, and how it was reflected on the living attitudes and daily life of the citizens, this state of disparity should express itself through attitudes and practices even with demographic, economic and educational characteristics. We do believe that it is connected with its cultural and social structure. In order to fulfill this, we will rely on the report of the final results of the 2009 Census carried out by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – District Report, in addition to statistics from other sources which will be referred to as needed.

First: Demographic Differences

Table no.(9) explains the demographic differences between the two cities ; I think that these differences are related to the differing views of the two cities on the concept of family life and standard of living even at the level of planning concerning the future of the family since it is part of its culture.

Table No.(9). Demography, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009A & B. Census -Final Results, Population Report.

Indicator	Bethlehem	Hebron
The percent of the population aged 0-14 years	39.3%	44.7%
From 15 to 64 years	54.9%	51.7%
Above 65 years	3.7%	2.6%
Median Age (Years)	19 years	16 years
Median age in first Married(Years)	Female 18/Male 24	Female 18/ Male 23
The average household size	5.4 persons	6.1 persons
Palestinians females 12 Years are Married	50.9%	53.7%
Palestinians 12 Years are divorced	0.6%	0.4%

We notice from the above table that there are demographic differences between Bethlehem and Hebron districts; we find that the level of fertility in Hebron is higher than that in Bethlehem; the percentage of children who are less than 14 years in Bethlehem is (39.3%) while in Hebron, it is (44.7%) especially when we know that the median age in Bethlehem is (19) years compared to (16) years in Hebron. These percentages reflect pride in children and the values of the rural extended family values and its size. On the other hand, the dependency ratio in Hebron is (91.5%) compared to (78.3%) in Bethlehem. This indicates that their extra burdens on the family; consequently, it reduces attitudes towards activities in entertainment. On the other hand, the number of children influences their future especially with regard to academic achievement. The census

results signified an inverse relationship between the number of children and academic level. As for (65) year age group and above, we find that its percentage in Bethlehem exceeds that of its counterpart Hebron respectively (3.7%) and (2.6%). we can speculate that the level of prosperity, medical care and health care available in Bethlehem is higher than that of Hebron.

As for the family size, the census results indicate that the average household size in Bethlehem governorate is (5.4) members per family while in Hebron it is (6.1) members; the families from the new middle class trend to have (3-5) children especially when it is more frequent in Bethlehem than in Hebron. If we compare the results of the census regarding the disparity between the city and rural areas, we find that the average household size in Bethlehem is (4.7) members compared to all cities which it (5.3). It is (5.7) in villages and (5.2) in camps; the percentage of children less than (14) years old in Bethlehem is (67.3%); consequently, Bethlehem center is characterized by being close to the preferred number for the modern life in cities in terms of the number of family members in it. As a result, they constitute a civil model of the household size. On the other hand, we find that the size of differences between the city center in Hebron and the surrounding concentrations is small; this makes us indicate that Hebron city is an extension of its countryside in terms of its family structure which is similar to its rural surrounding area; the average household size in Hebron city is (6) which is high especially when we know that the average household size in Hebron governorate is (6.1), in the rural (6.6), in camps (6.1). The number of children below (14) years in the city of Hebron alone is (88%) of the total size of its residents.

On the other side, the percentage of married females (12) years and above in Bethlehem reached (50.9%) opposed (53.7%). This refers to the significance of marriage and the attitudes of the conservative society for the girls marriage at an early time since the number of early marriage cases in Hebron is higher than those in Bethlehem. As for the divorce rate, we find that the percentage in Hebron is less than that in Bethlehem; this result harmonizes with the previous results in terms of divorce since the traditional concept contributes to the disintegration of the family since the propensity and pride in the family and its significance is more so the divorce rate in it must be less than any other city.

We can infer from the above figures that Hebron city is similar to its rural areas in terms of its family and clan dimension as a basic value and a source of pride in the huge number of children; this feature is associated with the traditional patriarchal society which explains the state of similarity between the city of Hebron and its villages. Thus, we say that the city of Hebron did not contribute to the introduction of a different image of its surrounding as regards the form, size and formation of the family as the case in Bethlehem city.

Second: Educational Characteristics

The importance of education lies in the fact that it serves as an access to identify social and cultural patterns and new life styles in the societies which the living reality might lack. Consequently and based on this, we saw that it is important to review this aspect in our comparison of the two cities Bethlehem and Hebron not only as statistical figures but also as an outcome of structural values which emphasize or deemphasize the significance of education and encourage it.

This is what we agree to in the outcome of the educational characteristics; the educational levels in Hebron are very low compared to Bethlehem; the former recorded the highest percentage of illiteracy and the lowest percentage of B.A. holders, Table no (10) show selective statistics.

Table No.(10). Education , Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009AB. Census Final Results, Population Report, Bethlehem and Hebron.

Indicators	Bethlehem	Hebron
Palestinians 10 years and over by Educational Attainment		
Illiterate	5.7%	%6.7%
Can Read and Write	13.2%	%14.8%
Secondary and below	69.3%	%68.8%
Associate Diploma	3.8%	%3.3%
Bachelor	6.8%	%5.6%
Higher Diploma and above	1.2%	%0.6%
Specialization		
First rank	18.8 % Business and Administration	23.4 % Humanities
Second rank	15.9 % Education Science	12.7% Business and Administration

The percentage of illiteracy out of the total population (15) years and above reached (6.8%) in Bethlehem and (8.3%) in Hebron; the census results also reflects the difference not only at the level of the two governorate but also at the level of geographic concentrations and gender. The differences in Bethlehem governorate were as follows: illiteracy rate among males was (3.7%) of the total number of males compared with (9.9%) of the illiterate females out of the total number of females. As for their distribution on the geographical level, the least was in the city (6%) rural (8.8%) and camps (7.1%) of the total population. We find that the illiteracy rate in the city is the least followed by the camps and then the rural. As for Hebron governorate, the percentage of illiterate males was (4.7%) of the total number of males and (12.1%) for illiterate females out of the total number of females. As for their geographical concentration, the least rate was in camps and it reached (6.3%) while in city (7.7%) and in the village, it was (13.2%). this feature is associated with the camps of the Palestinian

clusters in general since the camp residents consider education as a basic issue for the process of social mobility and the improvement of work opportunities; thus, their economic conditions would improve accordingly.

As for the differences between Bethlehem and Hebron camps, the results of the survey indicated that the percentage of illiteracy (15 years and above of the total population in Hebron camps reached (7.1%). as for its distribution according to gender, (3%) out the total population of males compared to (11.2%) out of the total population of females. As for camps in Bethlehem, the ratio of illiteracy was less than that of Hebron with a slight difference according to gender; the percentage of illiteracy reached (6.2%) with (3.3%) for males and (8.6%) for females. As for B.A. holders and above, their percentage was (9%) in Bethlehem camps compared to (5.8%) in Hebron camps (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008).

This result explains the difference in results not only on the level of the two governorate, but also on the level of their camps in relation to the importance of education in Bethlehem district; the camps also showed similarity in this value since employment stipulations are associated with higher educational levels. This propensity towards education is not only connected with single options but also with job market which is required by institutions and corporations in the governorate. The point I want to emphasize here is that camps in Bethlehem were influenced by Bethlehem city experience especially in the educational aspect and the level of attitudes towards education is higher than that of camps in Hebron; this means the availability of better opportunities to improve the social and cultural levels since education is associated with the level and way of thinking which is more associated with the pattern of civic and modern life along with the tastes that are associated with it.

The previous results reflect several differences on all of the above mentioned levels. All of them were in favor of Bethlehem; the most important result relates to the percentage of illiteracy. It is higher in the cities than in the camps in Hebron; this result explains several issues related to the size of the modern middle class which equals that of the camps and the cities especially if we realize that one of the main requirements of the modern middle class is the university degree. This result explains several issues mainly the existence of a relationship between the marriage mean which is slightly higher than the mean of education and number of child birth. It seems that Hebron district does not consider education as a basic and important issue as the case in Bethlehem due to several consideration the most important of which according to our belief is the fact that obtaining a job in Hebron does not require high educational levels especially in commercial areas and small businesses. Besides, the work in question relates to family businesses and companies. This is explained by the percentage of university degree holders since the first rank in Bethlehem was for Business Administration which reflects the market needs and the nature of institutions and students patterns; the students seek to

study modern sciences especially administrative and managerial branches while Social Sciences came first place in Hebron; this specialization is more associated with academic or service institutions.

The more significant aspect in this area is that groups of the modern middle class have an interest in educating their children both boys and girls; they are also keen on offering them the best education possible especially in private schools which use modern teaching methods in addition to the importance they attach to the teaching of foreign languages. The size of the middle class is larger and wider in Bethlehem than in Hebron.

Third : Economic Aspect

In this section, we will clarify the differences on the level of the most important economic activities and the nature of the professions in both cities. Table no. (11) explains the main economic activities. The percentage of their representation in Bethlehem is higher than that in Hebron. As previously mentioned, the basic feature is the presence of different kinds of coexisting economies sectors. In spite of the fact that the size of the commercial activities is the most salient in the two cities, they are different in other areas.

Table No.(11). Some Economic activity for Bethlehem and Hebron, selective, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009A & B.

Economic Activity	Bethlehem	Hebron
Wholesale, Retail Trade & Repairs	51.4%	57.3%
Manufacturing	19.6%	16.3%
Other Community, Social & Personal Service	8.6%	7.1%
Hotels and Restaurants	3.7%	2.8%
Agriculture, Farming of Cattle and other Animals	1.8%	3.4%

We notice from the above table that there is a disparity in the size of the commercial activities. What is interesting on both sides is the following; first is the tourism area since it is the basic feature for Bethlehem economy; the percentage of economic activities in the area of hotels reached (3.7%) compared to (2.8%). In spite of the fact that these percentages are not largely different, the winning percentage is in favor of Bethlehem especially if we are aware of the fact that the tourism sector in Bethlehem covers all the tourists and pilgrims who visit the Palestinian clusters. Hotel tourist check in figures indicate that (80%) of them checked in Bethlehem (Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, 2008).

On the other hand, activities related to agriculture, farming of cattle and other Animals were higher in Hebron; one third of the animal livestock in West Bank is concentrated in Hebron district; this relates to what we meant concerning the differences in the economic patterns and their involvement as being are more in favor of Bethlehem.

This is also supported by statistics of main professions according to the economically active since table no.(12) statistics reflect profession differences and considers them not only as work but also indicate class differences between the two cities.

Table No.(12). Main professions in Bethlehem and Hebron, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009AB. Census Final Results.

Main Occupation	Bethlehem			Hebron		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
New middle class jobs *	26.2%	58.7%	41.3%	21%	63.2%	36.8%
Services and Sales Workers	14%	86.5%	13.5%	17.6%	94.5%	5.5%
Skilled and not skilled Workers**	29.6%	96.2%	3.8%	33%	97.9%	2.1%
Crafts and Related Workers	26.6%	94.5%	5.5%	25.5%	96.5%	3.5%
Not sated***	3.6%	95.4%	4.6%	2.95%	87.1%	12.9 %
Total	100%			100%		
Type of locality						
Main Occupation	City	Rural	Camps	City	Rural	Camps
New middle class jobs *	69.2%	22.3%	8.5%	86.9%	8.1%	5%
Services and Sales Workers	68.4%	22.6%	8.9%	91.1%	6.2%	2.7%
Skilled and not skilled Workers**	61.8%	30.8%	7.4%	83.5%	14.7%	1.8%
Crafts and Related Workers	68.5%	25.5%	6%	89.1%	9.2%	1.7%
Not sated***	57%	36.1%	6.9%	85%	13.6%	1.4%

* New middle class jobs, includes: Legislators and Managers, Professionals, Technicians and Associate Professionals, and Clerks.

**Includes: Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers, Plant, Machine Operators and Assemblers and Elementary Occupations.

***Not Sated, maybe capitalism class or jobs from new middle class.

Table no. (12) statistics refer to the distributions of main occupation in Bethlehem and Hebron governorate according to gender and type of locality, the result in the above table shows that there high differences in main occupation according to locality and gender. According to representative of woman in labor class in Bethlehem is (15.8%) and (10.6%) in Hebron. Noting that this gaps according to ratio of labor forces according to gender is one of the characteristics of Palestinian society.

For the new middle Class, the size of it is more in Bethlehem than Hebron, they were respectively (26.2%) and (21%), the statistics indicate that the size of the gap in gender in Bethlehem is less than that in Hebron in relation to the jobs of the new middle class. The percentage of males was (58.9%) compared to (41.3%) female. As for Hebron, the percentage of males representation in it was (63.2%) and females (38.8%). More than half of the working women in Hebron governorate is concentrated in teaching profession at a percentage of (54%). As for Bethlehem, it is less by (38.9%) since it is a traditional profession that was always given to women. This gives the impression that Bethlehem environment reinforces and enhances women education more, and in their participation in work in different areas. We specifically know that professions of the middle class need an academic qualification higher than a Diploma; thus, we can say that this difference is due to the fact that Bethlehem encourages females to obtain scientific degrees and consequently compete for more work opportunities than in Hebron or a large percentage of degree holders in Hebron prefer homework at the expense of work outside home; the two reasons harmonize more with the features of the culture of the rural area rather than with that of the city.

As for the distribution of the professions according to religion, the percentage of activists from Christian reached (18.7%) of the total number of the Labor force in Bethlehem. As for the size of the modern middle class on the level of Palestinian Christians, they constitute a percentage of (31.1%) of the total size of modern middle class professions in Bethlehem. (31.1%) of them work in Services and Sales Workers, (22.5%) work in petite bourgeoisie and (6.4%) in the labor force. This a relatively high number in their representation in middle class professions. It reflects attitudes that are more linked with the city culture and role and the influence of this sector in the Bethlehemite society. It is an understandable percentage considering that the majority of private school students in Bethlehem are Christians; these schools provide to them with more privileges that are nonexistent in other schools.

Generally speaking, it is clear that differences in professions on the level of locality concentrations are very big in Hebron compared to Bethlehem. This gives an impression of the dominance of the workers in city concentrations over all professions available to them. I tend to refer this to the fact that it has a structural connection with the pattern of employment on family basis or work for family business as being clearly witnessed by Hebron institutions; consequently, the educational aspect in the city did not influence its rural.

Conclusion

It is clear to us the scope of differences and disparities between Bethlehem and Hebron since the social and political formations and the historical social context have a special uniqueness for the place and experience witnessed by the region; consequently, the association of this social structure and its continuation with features, characteristics and values are associated with the city, its culture or its image in the social mentality of its residents; we find out that Bethlehem played an active civilized role on the level of the governorate regarding the preservation of values of tolerance, diversity, respect of the other and knowledge of the surrounding; it is also characterized by the broadmindedness to accommodate new elements into its political, social and administrative composition. On the other hand, Hebron was unable to do so due to the heavy historical experience and the state of semi closure on its values and ways of life which are associated with its religious and conservative reputation. Besides, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict over the city identity has deprived it of the state of diversity experienced by Bethlehem city.

In our comparison of the two cities, we do not claim the Bethlehem is better than Hebron in terms of the dominance of the spirit and tendency of the city life which represented by values and behaviors associated with modern life; in fact, we tried to clarify how the historical experience and the value matrix which the city adopts influence the behaviors and values of its residents at present time. That is why we relied on some statistics that were used for comparison. Our aim was to clarify these figures and percentages. Since they are deeply connected with the cultural and value entity of both cities. We found out that Bethlehem city is more quantitatively and qualitatively connected with the life of modern cities on the Palestinian level more than the city of Hebron.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Methodology

This chapter presents; the methodology of the research, its population, the tools of data collection, the methods of verifying its validity and reliability, the procedures of the research and the statistical analysis.

Research Approach

The present research used the comparative methods; descriptive quantitative and qualitative approaches since both of them are considered to be the most suitable research approaches to study the civic culture in Palestinian cities: a comparative study between Hebron and Bethlehem; both approaches are the most convenient to fulfill the research objectives since both work on describing facts regarding positions as they stand or describing what is already existent and collection of data/information which would be later classified, organized and expressed quantitatively; they would also be interpreted accordingly in order to reach an understanding of the relationship between the phenomenon and its different factors using convenient research tools.

Research Population

The research population consists of all the Palestinians belong to the age group of (18) years and above, for the target population consists of all Palestinian households that usually reside in Hebron and Bethlehem governorates in 2009/2010. which includes 400 households (200 in Hebron and 200 in Bethlehem). The Bedouins, hotel guests and prisoners were excluded. on the other hand the researcher conducted 14 interviews with political and social leaders.

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame consisted of a master sample of enumeration areas (EAs) selected from the Population Housing and Establishment Census 2007. The master sample consists of area units of relatively equal size (number of households, about 150 housing units), and these units has been used as primary sampling units (PSUs).

Sample Design

The sample is a three stage stratified cluster systematic random sample.

Stratification

Three levels of stratification were made:

1. Stratification by governorates (Hebron and Bethlehem).
2. Stratification by gender.
3. Stratification by type of Locality which comprises: (urban, rural, and refugee camps).

Explanation of sampling chosen

- The sample was selected based on an electronic site specialized in the area of social research (www.surveysystem.com); the size of the sample was (400) individuals at an error level of (5%) distributed equally between the two governorates; it is a random stratified sample in accordance to residential concentration and gender.
- Reliance on divisions of Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics for the enumeration areas where each area equals (150) households unit (family).
- Selection of a random sample (using survey method) from the families in the selected enumeration areas in which (16) households were selected from each enumeration area.
- Selection of one individual from every household family; a male member is selected from a family and a female member is selected from the following family based on **Kish grid**.

Mechanism of work in the field

1. Random selection of enumeration area.
2. Proceed clockwise inside the enumeration area.
3. Count of neighboring families until (16) questionnaires are completed.
4. Families or individuals who refuse to cooperate or those who were not interviewed were not given questionnaires.
5. Use of Kish grid in order to select a family member randomly.
6. As for selection of members, a member is selected in a random manner using **Kish grid**.
7. A male family member is selected from the families whose number is odd in the enumeration area and a female member is selected from the families whose number is even in enumeration area.

Selection of households member

A family member from the age group of (18) years and above is from the selected family whether a male or female. The gender of the required member from each family is

determined according to the serial number of the family in the enumeration area, so in families who have an odd number a male is selected while in families who have an even number a female member is selected; a symbol (code) for the random table for the families was assigned according to the family serial number in the enumeration area.

The mechanism of households member selection is summed up in the following procedures:

1. The members of the age group (18) and higher from the kind of the required gender are counted as in table no. (14).
2. The list of the family members from required gender and the age group of (18) years and above are arranged according to the alphabets. If we want to select a male member from the family (18) years and above, the males are arranged according to alphabets.
3. The random numbers table will be used to select the member. Table No. (15) shows the selection of a male member from the males list. This is done through making a cross section between the column that represents the number of family members from the age group and from the required gender. The row which represents the code of the assigned random table for the family.

Example: to get better understanding; a family which consists of husband Khalil (42) years, wife Karima (38) years, the sons: mohamad (4) years, Marwan (13) years, and Samir (16) years, husband's father Abdallah (60) years, husband's brother Ahmed (19) years, Husband's aunt Khairia (40) years. If the family questionnaire number in the enumeration area is (7).

The family number in the enumeration area is (7); this means that a male member will be selected from the family. The random table code for the family is C. look to table no.(13)

Table No. (13). A coding of the random numbers, according to the Family serial form of the family in the area of the countdown.

<i>No. of the family in the countdown</i>	<i>The coding</i>
1	A
2	A
3	B1
4	B1
5	B2
6	B2
7	C
8	C
9	D
10	D
11	E1
12	E1
13	E2
14	E2
15	F
16	F

Counting and arrangement of the family members (18) years and above and those from the required gender.

Table No (14). Arranging family members by category required.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>The chosen</i>
Khalil (42 year)	3	
Abdallah (60 year)	1	
Ahmed (19 year)	2	√

Find the rank to the names of family members according to the alphabetical order of the letters (if the first letter is similar go to the second letter, and so on).

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Researcher Instructions

- Put a circle around the required gender above.
- Arrange members in the age group according to alphabets. If the first alphabet is similar move to the next letter in the name and so forth.
- Use the assigned random numbers table for the family to select a member according to what is required.
- Selection of the required member: a cross section between the number column (number of family members from the age group (18) years and above and from the required gender type) and the assigned row for the family C from the table of random numbers appearing in the bottom of this page.

Use The random numbers table to chose the individuals above (18) years, This is done through making a cross section between the column that represents the number of family members from the age group of 18 years and above and from the required gender. The row which represents the code of the assigned random table for the family.

Table No.(15). Shows the selection of households member.

More 6	5	4	3	2	1	
<i>Chose the person that his rank is</i>						<i>coding</i>
1	1	1	1	1	1	A
2	2	1	1	1	1	B1
2	2	2	1	1	1	B2
3	3	2	2	1	1	C
4	4	3	2	2	1	D
5	3	3	3	2	1	E1
5	5	4	3	2	1	E2
6	5	4	3	2	1	F

According to what mentioned above, the distribution of research sample as it is clear in table no.(16)

Table No. (16). Distribution of research sample according to Governorate and gender.

<i>Governorate</i>	<i>Households</i>	<i>Region</i>			<i>Gender</i>	
Bethlehem	200	City	Village	Camp	Male	Female
		117	59	24	100	100
Hebron	200	City	Village	Camp	Male	Female
		121	67	12	101	99
Total	400	238	126	36	201	199
Percent	100%	59.5%	31.5%	9%	50.25%	49.75%

Table no. (16) clarifies the distribution of the research sample according to the region and gender, including (59.5%) from city, (31.5%) from Village and (9%) from camp, for gender distribution according to sample it was (50.25%) male and (49.75%) female.

Data and Information

1) Data Entry

Following data collection, they were reviewed in preparation for data entry. They were recoded by transforming verbal responses into numerical values. In the positive and negative items, the responses:

- a. Strongly agree: was assigned the value (5), Agree: (4), Between : (3), Disagree: (2), and Strongly disagree: (1).

- b. Always: was assigned the value (5), Often: (4), Sometimes: (3), Rarely: (2), Never: (1).
- c. Strongly trust: was assigned the value (5), Trust: (4), Between : (3), I don't trust : (2), and Strongly I don't Trust : (1).

This means that as the frequency and mean increased towards (5), the research population's degree of civic culture increased and vice versa. Except some items were used in negative rank which the researcher will refer to in the discussion of the data. Data were analyzed statistically, calculating frequencies, percentages, means, and standard deviations. In addition, the following statistical tests were used: On Way Anova, Tucky, Kruskal-Wallis Test, Chi-Square, Cronbach Alpha, using SPSS program.

2) Information

Content analysis was used to analyze the information included in the interviews with middle class responses to the open questions. The researcher also extracted the values, meanings and stands from the words used by the sample. Moreover, the researcher compared the results the quantitative and qualitative information. This helped the researcher deduce the reasons and analyses based on the responses and understanding of the sample.

Research Limitations

In the light of the sensitive nature of the research, which addresses an issue that is surrounded by controversy among intellectuals, politicians and academics on one hand and on the levels of the community on the other, the researcher faced some problems during the research process, which can be summarized as follows.

First, there are no Palestinian previous researches and studies that address the topic of the present research.

Second, the nature of the study requires coverage of different periods so that it acquires closer comprehensiveness and objectivity instead of being influenced by temporary opinions that are subject to the effect of the political conditions surrounding the Palestinian territories.

Third, on the level of the field, the researcher see that some doubtless the research that has been conducted is highly sensitive for the research population and the way they dealt with researcher. The following comments can be made:

The nature of the political and social conditions in the Palestinian territories limited the cooperation of some of the Palestinian's households with the researcher.

The research was thought to be an attempt to create conciliation between Hamas and Fatah movement, regarding to state of conflict which led to separate the political administration of Gaza strip and Government in West Bank.

Some households were apprehensive of completing the questionnaire, which is due to the requirement that households should mention their names and ages regarding to the requirement of sampling chosen.

It was difficult to move inside the Palestinian territories, due to the measures imposed by the Israeli Occupation, which hampered the researcher freedom of movement, especially in the old city of Hebron.

The lack of cooperativeness and seriousness in completing the questionnaire on the part of some households forced the researcher to exclude some questionnaires during the data collection and choose another households members.

Method and Tools of Data/Information Collection

The present research used the approach of stratified sample, questionnaire and interview as tools for data collection (see Appendix No.7-A&B). The content analysis method for the interview with the middle class and to the formal documents of Palestinian political parties.

Based on literatures and researches in order to examine the civic culture in Palestinian cities, the researcher relies on some question of World Survey System, and then developed a questionnaire which consists of (12 sections).

The first has the demographic characteristics of the chosen sample like: gender, age, Governorate, Area of residence in city center or out of the center, place of residence, Working status, Profession, Religion, Level of education... ideological orientation...ect.

The second: includes questions that measure the extent of individual democracy from a theoretical and practical perspective.

The third: has the questions that evaluate the political system in the west Bank and Gaza Strip.

The fourth: the questions that measure the secular system.

The fifth: the questions that measure the rule of law and including some questions measure the tribal law .

The sixth : questions that measure the tolerance (social, religion , political, and cultural).

The seventh: consists of questions that measure the woman and human Rights.

The eighth: includes questions that measure the civic and political participation.

The ninth: has the questions that measure How Palestinian citizens Trust the performance of formal and non formal institutions and leaders.

The tenth: measures Multi party system (political, social, cultural and religion).

The eleventh: focusing on Social Ties and General Trend according to sample.

The final one : it has deferent type of questions related to(affiliation and Identity, needs, satisfaction of life , evaluation of political performance.

Validity of the Research Tool

The questionnaire was validated by being reviewed by a group of referees and expert arbitrators (see Appendix No.8), who provided some comments on the tool. These comments were incorporated into the final version of the questionnaire. On the other hand, the validity was also measured statistically by both factorial analysis and Pearson correlation in order to examine the internal consistency of the questionnaire items. Findings indicate that they all combined measured the civic culture in Palestinian City: Hebron and Bethlehem as a comparative study in light of the theoretical framework which the tool of study is based upon (see Appendix No. 9.1-10). Besides, the tool was pre-tested on fourteen households in Hebron and Bethlehem.

Reliability of the Research Tool

In regards to the questionnaire reliability, it was tested by calculating the internal consistency of the questionnaire using the Cronbach Alpha Formula, which was (0.85). This value indicate that the reliability is highly reliable. On the other hand the researcher tested the reliability for sub-scale to all dimension of civic culture (see Appendix No.10). The results with its different dimensions were reliable.

Research Procedures

The Localities in Bethlehem and Hebron Governorate by Type of Locality and Population were obtained from “Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics” in Palestine. This took place following coordination between the Institute represented by Hatem Qrareya: Statistical in Demography Department (Population Statistics), and the researcher in formal correspondence through the supervisor on the research.

The statistical, Mr. Hatem Qrareya facilitated my mission and designated a consulter of my research with Ahmed Attia : Program of governance and democracy, Nayef Abed :

Director of Department of the Samples and Methodologies. Following the completion of the questionnaire and sample design, the researcher completed the data collection from the households in Hebron and Bethlehem. The researcher also conducted 14 depth individual interviews with some Palestinian middle class. The data collected averaging more than one hours each, took place in the houses of the Palestinian citizens. This technique allowed the researcher to obtain comprehensive and triangulated information about the objective of the research.

The process of data collection was carried out in the period from 30th of June 2009 to 20th of February 2010. The target population families were very cooperative. Tables number (17-27) show below present the main characteristics of the research sample.

Table No. (17). Distribution of research sample according to work status.

<i>Work status</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Working	229	57.2
Not working	171	42.8
Total	400	100%

Table no.(17) clarifies the distribution of research sample according to work status, the majority (57.25%) of them are working, while (42.8%) not working.

Table No. (18). Distribution of research sample according to their age group.

<i>Age group</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Less 25 years	122	31
25 to 34 years	142	36
35 to 44 years	78	19.8
45 to 54 years	34	8.6
Above 55 years	18	4.6
Total	394*	100%

* 6 missing values.

Table no.(18) clarifies the distribution of research sample according to their age group, as the majority (36%) of them are in the age group 25 to 34 years, (31%) below 25 years, (19.8%) age group between 35 to 44 years, (8.6%) between 45 to 54 years, and (4.6%) in age group 55 years and above.

Table No. (19). Distribution of research sample by profession.

<i>Profession</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Government employee	64	16.1
Employed at the civic society institutions	43	10.8
Unskilled worker	25	6.3
Private section	96	24.1
House keeper	51	12.8
Farmer	7	1.8
Student	88	22.1
Unemployed	24	6
Total	398*	100%

* 2 Missing values.

Table no.(19) shows the distribution of research population according to profession, as the majority are (24.1%) private section, then (22.1%) are student, (16.1%) government employee, (12.8%) are house keeper, (10.8 %) employed in civic society organizations, (6.3%) unskilled worker, (6%) unemployed, (1.8%) are farmers.

Table No. (20). Distribution of research sample by social status.

<i>Social status</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Single	163	40.9
Married	230	57.6
Other	6	1.5
Total	399 *	100%

* 1 Missing value.

Table no.(20) clarifies the distribution of respondents by social status, the majority (57.6%) of them are married, compared of (40.9%) are single, while (1.5%) are in other cases.

Table No. (21). Distribution of research sample by academic qualification.

<i>Academic qualification</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Illiterate	19	4.8
Basic (elementary-preparatory)	41	10.3
Secondary	95	23.9
Diploma	59	14.9
Bachelor	157	39.5
Master and above	26	6.5
Total	397*	100%

* 3 Missing values.

Table no.(21) shows the distribution of respondents according to academic qualification, as (39.5%) of them are Bachelor holders,(23.9%) secondary,(14.9%) Diploma, (10.3%) in the basic (elementary-preparatory)level, (6.5%) have a Master degree and above, while (4.8%) are illiterate.

Table No. (22). Distribution of research sample by monthly salary.

<i>Monthly Salary</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Less than 300 JD	178	47.2
From 301 to 599 JD	135	35.8
From 600 to 899 JD	43	11.4
More than 900 JD	21	5.6
Total	377*	100%

* 23 missing values.

Table no.(22) shows the distribution of research sample according to monthly salary, as (47.2%) their Monthly Salary is less than 300 JD , (35.8%) of them are from 301 to 599 JD, (11.4%) between 600 to 899 JD, while(5.6%) of them have more than 900 JD.

Table No. (23). Distribution of research sample by ideological orientation.

<i>Ideological orientation</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Secular	124	31.9
Leftist	65	16.7
Islamic	200	51.4
Total	389*	100%

* 11 missing values.

Table no.(23) shows the distribution of research population according to ideological orientation, as (51.4%) their Ideological orientation is Islamic, (31.9%) are secular, while (16.7%) are leftist.

Table No. (24). Distribution of respondents by social class according to respondents.

<i>Social class</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Upper class	25	6.3
Middle class	324	81.6
lower class	48	12.1
Total	397*	100%

* 3 missing values.

Table no.(24) shows the distribution of research sample according to social class, as (81.6%) are from middle class, (12.1%) from lower class, while (6.3%) from Upper class.

Table No. (25). Distribution of research sample by belonging to civic organization.

<i>Belong to civic organization</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Yes	192	48
No	208	52
Total	400	100%

Table no.(25) clarifies the distribution of research population by belonging to civic organization, (52%) of them do not belong or affiliated to civic organization, while (48%) of them were belonging to civic organization.

Table No. (26). Distribution of research sample by religion according to respondents

<i>Religion</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Muslim	345	86.2
Christen	55	13.8
Total	400	100%

Table no.(26) shows the distribution of research sample according to religion, (86.2%) the majority are Muslim, while(13.8%) are Christen.

Table No. (27). Distribution of research sample by religious degree.

<i>Religious degree</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent %</i>
Very religious	178	45.2
Somewhat religious	167	42.4
Not religious	49	12.4
Total	394*	100%

* 6 Missing values.

Table no.(27) shows the distribution of respondents according to religious degree , (45.2%) are very religious, (42.4%) Somewhat religious, (12.4%) are not religious .

CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

Findings of the Research

Now we are going to review the results of the main research since as we are going to find out reinforce the results of the former analysis and stress the state of disparity and differences in attitudes relating civic culture starting from their view of their city then positions related to the political system and its evaluation, women status and rights. In order to review results in a simple manner, we will first have a general review of the main field results reached by the research then we will review the differences in the subjects of the research sample according to governorate which it is the main aim of this research.

The current research aimed at identifying the civic culture in Palestinian cities: A comparative study between Bethlehem and Hebron, from the point of view of Palestinian who are living in the two governorates. Taking into account that next results are represent the attitudes of both cities as research population, then later on the researcher will reviews and address the comparison between the two governorates.

The findings of the research show that that Palestinian attitudes degree toward the civic culture was medium. The mean was (2.96) out of (5), as it appeared in table no.(28):

Table No. (28). Numbers and Mean of total degree toward civic culture.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Total degree of civic culture's dimensions	400	2.96	0.25

What is the most important aspect (dimension) of civic culture according to research sample?

To identify the most important dimensions of civic culture, the researcher calculated the means, and standard deviation for the dimensions of civic culture, rank ordered on the basis of importance, as table no.(29) shows.

Table no.(29) clarifies the dimension of civic culture ranked in a descending order as follows: multi Party system (Social, political, religious), tolerance, the rule of law, human and woman Rights, how Palestinian citizens trust the performance of formal and civic institutions and leaders?, civic and political participation, supporting secular system, democracy, evaluation the performance of FATAH government in West Bank, and evaluation the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza Strip.

Table No.(29). Means and Standard Deviation for the Dimensions of civic culture. Rank ordered according to importance.

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
Multi Party System (Social, political, religious).	3.51	0.47
Tolerance .	3.45	0.43
The Rule of law .	3.45	0.38
Woman and Human Rights.	3.21	0.33
Trust the performance of formal and civic institutions, and leaders	3.09	0.64
Civic and political participation.	3.08	0.73
Secular System.	3.07	0.48
Democracy .	2.68	0.41
Evaluation the performance of FATAH government in West Bank.	2.66	0.82
Evaluation the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza Strip.	2.53	0.83
Total	2.96	0.25

The result of this table supports the theoretical analysis introduced in the second chapter in terms of the fact that the Palestinian society in general is characterized by tolerance and pluralism in the absence of a democratic reference for such diversity on the official level; it is worth noticing that both the democratic and secular dimensions were ranked lowest according to the attitudes of the research sample due to several considerations; first there is a state of controversy in the Palestinian society on the topic of democracy both as a concept and a practice. The religious for example supports party pluralism in the Palestinian society just on religious basis. This moves us to the second consideration; it is the secular dimension; they (Secularists) call for a separation of religion from the state in a society that grants religion an integral part in the shaping of its identity. Third , we carrying out this research on a heterogeneous sample. The previous analysis does not mean that there is no support for democracy or secularism by the research sample, but the total degree of the resulting mean of the democracy dimension scored lowest among all other dimensions which measure the civic culture in the Palestinian society. This urges us to identify the most important manifestations of the civic culture according to its dimensions; we will review the paragraphs of each dimension according to its significance according to the following question:

What is the most important features of civic culture according to it’s dimensions from the points of views of the research sample?.

The answer this question, frequencies, mean scores and standard deviation were used to identify the above question. For each dimensions of civic culture as it shown below.

Dimension of Multi Party System (Social, political, and religious).

To identify the features of Multi party system, the researcher calculated mean scores, standard deviation, and frequency, as it shown in table no.(30).

Table No. (30). Mean scores, standard deviation, and frequencies for multi party system(social, political, religious). Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
M124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views.	4.02	0.78	81.5%	13.7%	4.8%
M128. Although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them.	3.90	0.84	77.5%	14.7%	7.8%
M127. Multi religion coexistence (christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance.	3.83	0.87	70%	22%	8%
M129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	3.78	0.88	70%	21%	9%
M123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	3.65	0.99	63.8%	21.4%	14.8%
M126. Diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing.	3.38	1.09	50.2%	28%	21.8%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

Table no.(30) clarifies the features of multi party system, ranked in a descending order as follows; “I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views” whereat (81.5%) of research sample agree, and (77.5%) of them agree at the sentence that said: “although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them”, “multi religion coexistence(christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance” , “ national identity for me is the incubator for every diversity”, “religious, multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society”, while the sentence that said “diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing” was the last feature of multi party dimension.

These attitudes reflect a high degree of approval by the research sample toward religious, social and political pluralism in spite of the fact that the viewpoints heard by the sample subjects cause them to fall into a state of confusion; however, the majority prefer to hear them. It is worth noting that there is a drop in almost half of the sample members who support party pluralism; it is a general state in the Palestinian society which shows reservations toward party pluralism in the Palestinian society (Miari, 2001, 2003).

Malki (1995:50) refers this to the crisis that is facing Palestinian parties in the Palestinian society especially following the Oslo Agreement; the parties were characterized by absence of clear political platforms in addition to the retreat in their popularity. However, Miari (2003:46) sees that the reason is due to the reservation demonstrated by the Palestinian society toward pluralism since it reflects fragmentation from the perspective of the traditional Arab culture.

Some Palestinian writers (Kassis & Nakhlah, 2009:217-218) indicate that the law that regulates the formation and work of the Palestinian parties in the Palestinian constitution does not exist. The party action is mixed with revolutionary action ; the present political

parties in the Palestinian society are the same parties that were historically present over the past half decade. The Palestinian Authority has recognized them implicitly rather than legally, this lead to the continuation of the mechanism of portions among the existing political parties and factions. This provided a traditional exit to tackle or to exit from political crises. Since the work tasks for the sake of state building differ from the requirements of national liberation, several political parties were unable to transform their agenda to comply with new circumstances; this reflected negatively on the form of the crisis of the political parties. It lead to a plunge in their popularity; this was concurrent with the growth of the role of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas.

Dimension of Tolerance

The second dimension of civic culture according to research sample is the tolerance dimension, to clarify the most important features of this dimension, mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies were used to identify the above question. Table no. (31) presents the results.

Table No. (31). Mean scores, standard deviation, and frequencies for the dimension of tolerance .Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
T74.A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	4.48	0.72	94.2%	2.8%	3%
T81.I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	4.09	0.82	84.8%	10.4%	4.8%
T79.Palestinian society values are values that believe in pluralism and tolerance.	3.68	0.87	66%	24%	10%
T75.Most of the time, people help each other.	3.52	0.91	53.8%	36.4%	9.8%
T78.I believe people are good by nature.	3.50	0.91	53.8	33%	13.2%
T77.I am suspicious when dealing with people.	3.42	0.95	50.2%	33.8%	16%
T76.In general, most people can be trusted.	3.09	1.02	34.8%	40.4%	24.8%
T80.I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.	1.91	1.05	9.3%	10.4%	80.3%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

The results in table no.(31) explain the features of tolerance, ranked in a descending, the most important features of tolerance is “a good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion” whereat (94.2%) of research sample agree on this sentence, then followed by the sentence that said “I respect others’ social customs which are different from mine” (84.8%) agree for, while the less important feature of tolerance was “I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells” whereat (9.3%) of them felt disturbed by call for prayer and toll of bells .

We infer from the above mentioned that the research sample enjoy tolerance toward other religions and practice of rituals in addition to different customs practiced by other

groups. According to the evaluation of neighborhood relations, the majority (94.2%) agreed that the neighbor criteria are connected with the nature of the relationship he /she is established with his/her neighbors in terms of treatment and respect. It is not basically connected with religion. We do believe that this is due to the nonexistence of a stereotyped image about other religions as a religion rather than a disposition and behavior of this person which determines whether he is serious or not. These results harmonize with other studies (Salameh, 2007) in which a (72.6%) of the research sample supported the notion that the Islamic and Christian coexistence in Bethlehem contributed to the spread of tolerance among both followers of the two faiths. The close contact and location on a daily basis between the two help to bring views closer and achieve acceptance of the other regardless of religion or affiliation.

It is worth mentioning that the research results showed a mid way state of trust of others or take the initiative to help others when they need it; we believe that the nature of the social and political conditions witnessed by the Palestinian society following the formation of the Palestinian Authority lead to a drop in the level of confidence which characterized the Palestinian society in the first Intifada in addition to values like solidarity which play a significant role in the creation of impressions linked with the future of the individual and his family without the existence of a state of interest with issues and events that are happening around him. We will clarify this idea in our review of the research sample trust in civic and governmental institutions in the Palestinian society which confirm this.

Dimension of the Rule of law

The third dimension according to importance is the rule of law. To identify the features of the rule of law according the sample position, table no. (32) shows the results.

Table No. (32). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for the dimension of the rule of law .Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
L66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance of the tribal law.	3.81	0.90	67%	26%	7%
L63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals .	3.78	0.97	68.8%	20.2%	11%
L72. I support obeying the law.	3.74	1.06	66.5%	19.8%	13.8%
L71. To apply civic law in the society is better than tribal law.	3.61	0.92	59.6%	28.8%	10.8%
L68. The PA is an authority of some individuals, not the Law.	3.49	1.20	52.4%	24.8%	22.8%
L69. The PA helped to strengthen the Tribal Law.	3.40	0.91	48%	36.8%	14.2%
L64. Courts are qualified to receive and deal with complaints and cases relating to citizens.	3.38	0.93	51.3%	33.2%	15.5%
L70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent .	3.28	1.03	44.6%	32.4%	23%
L67. The Tribal Law protects the individuals and their rights when the Civic Law is not independent or during the absence of the Government and the state.	3.27	0.98	41.8%	37.4%	20.8%
L65. There is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought.	3.19	1.04	40.2%	33.2%	26.6%
L73. According to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions.	3.05	0.97	31.8%	41%	27.2%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree
 ** Mean out of 5 points.

The above table clarifies the features of the rule of law, ranked in a descending order as follows: “the independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance of the tribal law” whereat (67%) agree, then the sentence that says: “Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals” supported by population with (68.8%) percent. Whilst the less important of this dimension were “there is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought” with (40.2%) percent, and the sentence that says “according to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions” with (31.8%) percent. This results explains that PA didn’t worked hard on applying the civic law, in the opposite they helped to strengthen the tribal law as (48%) of population see that.

The abovementioned stresses the existence of an average degree may be it is less in the evaluation of the research sample of the performance and rule of the law in the preservation of both security and stability. The results are also similar in their evaluation of the clan (tribal) law

since it is unable to establish justice among citizens. I can stress here that the Palestinian National Authority did not exert enough effort to impose the rule of the law. The state of corruption, bribery and procrastination in legal procedures regarding citizens' interests create among the Palestinian society a state of distrust not only of the civil law but also in the tribal Customary Laws; only (31.8%) of the research sample considered that the judges are independent in their decisions; this percentage is considered very little.

Ideis (2007) stresses that the structure of the Palestinian Judiciary is fragile; there is a misunderstanding and confusion concerning the designation of tasks inside the military apparatus related with the Judicial Authorities. He adds that in spite of the increase in the number of judges and public prosecutors in the districts due to the lack they were suffering from, these appointments lacked clear professional criteria behind the process of appointments itself. The legislative authorities did not practice their role to approve the appointment of General Prosecutor as stated by the Palestinian law in article 107 of the amended law for the year 2005 where these authorities are limited to the President only. It is also noticeable that there is a state of disruption and fragility in the military judiciary regarding the large number of the military who violated the law and were not yet prosecuted.

In addition, there is stalemate, deadlock and interruption in lawsuits. There are several lawsuits that are pending and still seek a need solution for five years and more; they are frequently postponed ; thus, the plaintiff or the defendant will eventually become bored and consider it futile to leave work for several times just to hear that his case was postponed till further hearing and so forth; consequently, they stop appearing before court; three times of failure of presence by both parties before court would lead to a drop of the lawsuit automatically; this is the followed mechanism inside the judicial institution which lead to a state of frustration among the citizens. Some statistics indicate that only (10.5%) form citizens that has disputes go to courts and the judiciary (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, October and November 2009).

Other study indicates that (48.7%) agreed that the tribal law safeguards individual rights in the absence of a governing body. On the other hand, the research results indicated that there is a connection between the political activity of the individual and the support of the rule of the law. The results were in favor of the apolitical individuals. Researchers refer this to the structure of the political parties which are strongly connected with the chiefs of tribes and clans who in this capacity enjoy a significant social force that must be dealt with (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A:101).

This does not mean that the citizens prefer tribal law. About (67%) of the research sample stressed that the independence of the civil law is capable of providing protection to the individuals; consequently, it marginalizes and reduces the interference if the clan law. As a result this aspect signifies the importance of activation of the Judicial System in the first place by the Authority and the internal reformation of the system in the second place.

Dimension of Woman and Human Rights

The fourth dimension of civic culture is the woman and human rights. To identify this dimension according the research sample, Table no. (33) shows the results.

Table No. (33). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for the woman and human rights. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
HR88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	4.26	0.77	87.8%	9.2%	3%
HR93. I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband.	4.17	0.92	82.2%	12%	5.8%
HR89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family.	4.16	1.01	80.8%	11.2%	8%
HR87. The woman has the right to freely make decisions which touch her daily life.	3.96	0.96	74.2%	17.8%	8%
HR94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society.	3.47	0.94	47.8%	39%	12.2%
HR90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals.	3.44	1.08	51.4%	25.8%	22.8%
HR95. I believe that civil law is more capable to do justice to women than any other system out there.	3.28	1.01	43.8%	34.2%	22%
HR85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law.	3.12	1.22	45.6%	21%	33.4%
HR84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state.	3.11	1.25	41.3%	20.5%	38.2%
HR92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated.	2.91	1.40	40.3%	13%	46.8%
HR83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	2.79	1.14	31.2%	23%	45.8%
HR86. The level that the women has reached in the society is considered satisfactory.	2.73	1.17	27.2%	25%	47.8%
HR82. Woman should no involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	2.43	1.17	20%	15%	65%
HR91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously.	2.34	1.30	23.8%	10.2%	66%
HR96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls.	2.14	1.10	13.8%	13.8%	72.4%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

The results in table no. (33) explain the opinion of the population regarding the woman and human right, the features ranked in a descending order as follows, the sentence that says: “making decisions inside the family has to involve the women” is supported with (87.8%), then “I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband” with (82.8%), and

(80.8%) of the research sample sees “a wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family”. While the less importance feature is the sentence that says “killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously” with (23.8%) and “in general, education is the most important for boys than girls” supported by (13.8%) of research sample, and the findings showed the differences between male and female (see Appendix No. 11).

The results indicate a number of contradictions regarding the attitudes of the sample toward the issue of human rights in general and women rights in particular. As for the latter from a theoretical point of view, we find that the study sample support the educational and economic rights of women along with making decisions regarding her life on her own; they are also in favor of good treatment of women on a humanitarian basis that greatly respects her presence and entity. However, the percentage of support dropped to 41.3% in other issues relating to politics as allowing the woman to become a state president. The percentage of the belief in the right of the society to kill the woman on honor background also dropped. We also find that there no observance or disrespect of the human rights in the event that the individual was proved criminal.

The results of our research harmonize with Miari study (2003:51) since his results stress that the attitudes of the Palestinian society are semi stable from (1997 to 2003) regarding women rights. His study results also indicate that the percentage of support of women rights drops when it is concerned with her work outside home or political activity.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, October and November, 2009 announced in a press conference the primary results of a survey it carried out in November 2008, the main results of the research concerning women were as follows:

“Women have the right to decide about the issues that directly touch upon their life” with (94%) of the Palestinian agree, (67.9%) of them agree that “women are capable of running senior positions in the country”. On the other side, (53.2%) agree that “effective laws in Palestinian Territories do not discriminate between men and women”, and finally, (50.5%) agree that the “level of achievement of Palestinian women in the society is sufficient”.

We can clearly see the state of contradictions that is related to the nature of the changes that were witnessed by the Palestinian society in relation to the influence of the traditional legacy regarding the beliefs and values of the society on human and women rights. In contrast, we notice that there is a high percentage of support toward women education in the Palestinian society. This shows an important characteristic that might lead to a change in women status in the society; consequently, it lead to an acceptance of her role and presence in the political and economic sphere.

Dimension of How Palestinian Citizens trust the performance of formal and civic institutions, and leaders

The fifth dimension of civic culture is the trust of the performance of civic and formal institutions, and leaders. To identify it, table no. (34) shows the results.

Table No. (34). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for How Palestinian Citizens trust the performance of formal and civic institutions, and leaders dimension. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Trust*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>I don't trust*</i>
TRUST117. Palestinian Universities	3.70	0.92	65.8%	24.4%	9.8%
TRUST118. Palestinian Press	3.44	0.83	50.5%	40%	9.5%
TRUST121. Independent civic media	3.37	0.81	44.5%	44.5%	11%
TRUST119. Palestinian NGO's	3.36	0.81	44.2%	44.2%	11.5%
TRUST112. Religious leaders	3.19	1.06	40.8%	35.8%	23.4%
TRUST120. Former TV's	3.17	0.96	39.3%	44.3%	11.6%
TRUST122. Local authorities	3.12	0.83	33%	47%	20%
TRUST116. Palestinian Judiciary system	3.04	0.73	33.5%	41.5%	25%
TRUST110. Palestinian Police	2.98	1.14	34%	33.5%	32.5%
TRUST111. Legislative parliaments members	2.89	1.01	28.8%	37.2%	34%
TRUST115. The legislative Council performance	2.83	1.01	27.2%	36.3%	36.5%
TRUST113. Politicians	2.80	0.97	32.5%	39.5%	37%
TRUST114. Security forces	2.74	1.08	26%	32.2%	41.8%
TRUST109. The President of PA(Abu Mazen)	2.66	1.29	28.8%	22%	49.3%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly trust with trust, and I don't trust with I never trust.
 ** Mean out of 5 points.

Table no.(34) clarifies how research sample trust the performance of many institutions , and leaders, the following results explain those in a descending order, the most trusted institutions and leaders were “Palestinian universities” with percent (65.8%), then “Palestinian press” with (50.5%), and the “independent civic media” with (44.5%). While the following were the less trusted leaders and institutions, as the “politicians” were trusted only by (32.5%), then “security forces” with (26%), and the lowest trusted was the performance of the Palestinian president(Abu Mazen).

We can testify that the research sample has an average degree of trust in both governmental and civic institutions; the most dependable and reliable are the universities while the least is the performance of President Abu Mazen. The results of the table indicate that the degree of trust is less the closer it moves toward governmental institutions and politicians while it increases the closer to comes to civic institutions; it is a characteristic that is not connected with the research population only, but also with the confidence of the Palestinian public in the Palestinian Territories in general. The assessment of the Palestinian society of the role of civic institutions which are active in the civil aspects was positive based on the fact that it was already involved in the rendering of services even before the establishment of the Palestinian Authority; it was

able to win the confidence of the public. This is the reason why there is a continuation of trust in them more than in the political institutions since the former gained validity during the periods they rendered services while the Palestinian Authority failed to do so.

The statistics of The Palestinian Central Bureau (October and November 2009:10) indicate the support of the Palestinian society of the significance of the role of civil society organizations. A percentage of (97.3%) see that they play an active role in the society and it is characterized by financial integrity at a rate of (81.5%) and there is no corruption in it at a rate of (69.8%). Thus we see that the Palestinian public in general evaluates the performance of the civil society institutions in a more positive manner than the existing political institutions and parties.

Miari (2003:56; 2000:112) indicates that the drop in confidence and trust in political parties and ruling institutions is not limited to the Palestinian society, but it is a phenomenon connected with modern democracies as the case in Mexico. In spite of this, Miari adds that there is a decline in the confidence in the Palestinian society in the two surveys he carried out in (1997 and 2001). The percentage of support of President Abu Ammar(X president) Office declined from (61% to 51%) . This stresses in one way or another that the bad performance and the surrounding institutions in the unstable political conditions as the case in the last Intifada (2000) lead to the decline of confidence in them; this explains the drop in the confidence of the trust of President Abu Mazen by (28.8%) in the results of our research. In addition, it emphasizes that the relative stability in the citizens' trust of civic institutions is more than it is with governmental institutions. This might be due not to the general political situation relating to the occupation as much as it is related to the state of separation between the West Bank which is controlled by Fatah movement at present and Gaza Strip which is dominated by Hamas movement. Since the two movements were not able to share and distribute roles and tasks in the government following the (2006) Elections through democratic dialogue, it lead them to split the country; consequently, it stresses the decline in trust not only with in Fatah movement or the authority in the West Bank only, but also in Hamas movement and the nature of its political performance in the Gaza Strip which we will tackle later on.

On the other hand , Girbawi (2001) stresses that the confidence in the performance of institutions, related to institutions linked with the Palestinian Authority, declined as a result of the state of corruption in the governmental apparatus and their institutions along with the emergence of a beneficiary category that monopolizes resources and economic benefits as opposed to an increase in the size of the deprived and the impoverished.

Dimension of Civic and Political Participation

The dimension of civic and political participation was the sixth dimension of civic culture according to importance. To identify its features, table no. (35) shows the results.

Table No. (35). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for the dimension of civic and political participation. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Often*</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely*</i>
P106. Do you offer help to others (non relatives) when they need it?.	4.07	0.93	72.2%	23%	4.8%
P103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council.	3.59	1.49	61.4%	15.3%	23.3%
P97. Do you follow the political news	3.41	1.18	46.8%	29.8%	23.4%
P102. I read the news paper	3.40	1.16	48%	28.4%	23.6%
P101. I discuss social problems with other people and try to solve them	3.26	1.17	44.5%	29.2%	26.3%
P107. Do you participate in activities related to the improvement of living conditions in your area?	3.21	1.19	41%	30.8%	28.2%
P108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	3.15	1.08	38.8%	37.6%	23.6%
P105.How often Do you participate in the municipally elections .	3.07	1.61	46.2%	14%	29.8%
P98. I attend social and cultural seminars.	2.99	1.21	33.5%	34%	32.5%
P104. I participate in protests	2.53	1.33	24.5%	23.5%	52%
P99. I attend political meetings	2.34	1.27	19.8%	23%	57.2%
P100. Have you officially complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area.	2.06	1.09	10.5%	23.5%	66%

* The researcher merged the percent of always with often, and rarely with never.

** Mean out of 5 points.

The results in the above tables explains the most importance features of political and civic participation, ranked in a descending order as follows; the most important features was (70.2%) of research sample is often “offer help to others (non relatives) when they need it”, then (61.4%) of sample “participate in the Legislative Council” and (46.8%) “follow the political news”, the lowest activity that research sample do it, is “participating in protests” with (24.5%), then (19.8%) “attend political meetings”, and “complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area” with (10.5%).

The results of the research refer to an average level of the civic and political participation with the exception of two paragraphs; it is first related to civil activity which is the offering help to others (non relatives) when they need it. The second relates to the political activity regarding to participation in the Legislative Council Election ; the remaining paragraphs refer to a drop in the size of political and social participation of the research sample. This harmonizes with some Palestinian literature (Hilal, 1998; Miari, 2000, 2003) which indicate that the most common form of political participation in the

Palestinian society is the participation in the presidential and legislative elections. Statistics indicate that (77%) of the Palestinian society took part in the Legislative elections (2006) and Presidential elections (2005) with the exception of Jerusalem which has a special political privacy. However, we do see in the last paragraph a lack of popularity with regard to registration for elections which was recently called for by the Palestinian Elections Central Committee which indicated that the percentage of the registered voters was very little.

According the most important criteria for the selection of candidates in the recent presidential and legislative elections, a percentage of (24.4%) of the individuals indicated that the reason was political affiliation while (30.6%) was for fighting corruption; the majority of (45%) indicated that it was the competence of the candidate and other criteria. The statistics emphasize a decline in the voting on the basis of political affiliation; a percentage of (86.7%) of the same sample indicate that there is corruption inside the political factions. It is clear to us that the size of interest in political or legal issues is very low in the Palestinian society. A percentage of (35.7%) of the surveyed sample indicated that they were aware of the internal charters and programs of the political parties. This was faced by a disinterest in public issues by the public at a very low level. Only (25.8%) of the Palestinian society indicated that they were aware of the Palestinian Basic Law or even heard of it (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2009: 6-8).

In another research , the results indicated that the most important reasons that lead to the loss of Fatah movement in the (2006) Elections were as follows: a percentage of (33.2%) stated that the reason was the administrative corruption in the Palestinian Authority followed by disputes inside Fatah itself at a rate of (17.3%) then the marginalization of the popular base with (9.8%) and personal interest of candidates. (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A: 81).

The above mentioned results harmonize with our research; the results indicated a sharp drop in the political and civic participation on all levels that are naturally related to the political conditions which the Palestinian question passes through. Consequently, it is connected with the level of confidence in both the political institutions and politicians. We believe that this is linked with the decline of the political parties s a result of their weak performance on the streets; thus, it created a state of general frustration which influenced the political and social attitudes of the of the research population. By the same token, the individual's feeling about the spread of a state of corruption and chaos in the society lead him/her to resort to what is immediately surrounding him/her and nothing else.

Dimension of Secular System

To identify the seventh dimension of civic culture, table no. (36) shows the results to the features of secular system.

Table No. (36). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for Supporting Secular System. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
S57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns.	3.47	1.14	57.6%	19.6%	22.8%
S58. Religious leaders should not influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people.	3.41	1.14	53.4%	21.8%	24.8%
S62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	3.15	1.37	45.3%	19.2%	25.5%
S56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual.	3.15	1.27	48.5%	22%	35.5%
S55. The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals.	3.10	1.16	37.8%	28.6%	33.6%
S61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda	3.02	1.24	40.2%	23%	36.8%
S60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth.	2.88	1.25	33.8%	20%	46.2%
S59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society .	2.51	1.09	17%	27.8%	55.2%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

The results in tables no. (36) explain the most importance features of secular system, ranked in a descending order as follows, the most important features is; (57.6%) of research sample agree that “Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns”, then (53.4%) agree that the “Religious leaders should not influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people”. While (48.5%) agree that “Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual”, on the other hand (37.8%) supported the sentence that says: “The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals”, (55.2%) of sample refused the sentences that says “Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society” .

The results indicate that about two thirds of the sample size are aware of the importance of the absence of the influence of the clergy on electoral campaigns or their influence on decisions that relate to the Palestinian future; in fact, more than half of them accept nonreligious politicians who are competent enough to participate in decision making. In return , about half consider that the religious government has the capability to provide justice to the citizens.

In other study, Salameh and Da'na (2006A) explain the significance of the religious element in the overall particulars of the political and social life. The most important reason according to the research results that lead to the victory of Hamas movement in

(2006) elections were religious considerations since Hamas represents Islam. I believe that the religious element and its influence in the citizens' life differ from one area to another in the Palestinian territories. This is what we plan to tackle in our comparison between Hebron and Bethlehem.

Dimension of Democracy

Democracy is considered one of the basic aspects which distinguishes the civilization of societies from one another and how close their political system to the active and efficient civic culture in addition to the extent of citizens' support of it. In order to recognize the attitudes of the research sample toward democracy, the means and percentages of the features that measure this dimension was calculated; it is explained in table no. (37).

Table No. (37). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for the dimension of democracy. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
D35. Democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general.	3.83	0.98	73.8%	15.2%	11%
D38. Democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties.	3.65	1.07	66.5%	18.5%	15%
D34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	3.50	1.06	56.3%	25.2%	18.5%
D37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state .	3.49	1.08	57.5%	23.2%	19.3%
D40. Citizens should support government decisions even if they disagree with these decisions.	2.75	1.03	25.6%	29.8%	44.8%
D39. What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view.	2.71	1.22	29.3%	20.5%	50.3%
D30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	2.47	1.02	18.3%	18.2%	63.5%
D28. The Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it.	2.36	1.22	21.8%	12%	66.2%
D31. Are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank.	2.24	1.15	17.5%	9.5%	73%
D29. Hannyah,s Government should ban any activity or protest against it.	2.23	1.17	18.2%	9%	72.8%
D36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used	2.13	1.05	11.8%	13.2%	75%
D32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza.	1.86	0.92	7%	7.4%	85.6%
D33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	1.68	0.85	4.8%	7.2%	88%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

The results in the above table show the features of democratic dimension according to importance. ranked in a descending order, as we see , the most important features of democratic dimension is the sentence that says “democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general” with (73.8%) of sample agree, and (66.5%) of them

say that “democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties”, and the percent reduces to about half for the sentence that says “despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by” with (56.3%). This corresponds to the sentence that says “democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state”. While (44.8%) of the sample disagree with the sentence that says “Citizens should support government decisions even if they disagree with these decisions”. Regarding to “What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view” (25.3%) and (20.5%) of sample respectively agree and between to use the force, and too (18.3%) of sample agree with the sentence that says “under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government”, “the Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it” with (21.8%), “are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank” with (17.5%), “Hannayah’s Government should ban any activity or protest against it” with (18.2%), “democracy is an atheist system- should not be used” with (11.8%), “do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza?” with (7%), and finally (88%) of the sample disagree with sentence that says “do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it” .

In general, we see that about two thirds of the sample support democratic practices as a basic organizer of the political process; whereas, less than a third support the use of force to change the system if the authority adopts decisions that contradict with citizens’ attitudes. As for the remaining paragraphs which oppose the manifestations of the democratic system, the majority of the research sample rejected it while less than one fifth of the sample supported those nondemocratic procedures.

We can speculate that based on the above mentioned that the majority support democratic manifestations. However, the nature of the political experience, which the Palestinian question is passing through, and the Palestinian conflict prevented any stability in the process of democratic transformation. The pressures exert by Israel and the European states on the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah are so clear. The results of the recent elections which lead to the victory of Hamas were not accepted. Moreover, the Authority practices in carrying out violations of human rights especially those relating to freedom of demonstrations and free expression during the recent war against Gaza were also contributing factors. The Authority suppressed the peaceful demonstrations that were staged in solidarity with the Palestinian people in Gaza Strip. Moreover, there was an absence of an influential role of the opposition political parties to criticize the Authority. This enhanced the negative attitude toward the peace process in general and the issue of democracy in particular. The people’s indignation on the Authority and its corrupted figures gave a frustrating image to the people toward the present political regime ; this explains why a high percentage of the research sample refused to tolerate and be lenient with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it, at rate of (88%).

Studies and public opinion polls stress the extent of interest and support of democracy by the Palestinian public as a political system and organizer of the Palestinian public life in spite of the nondemocratic practices followed by the Palestinian government whether

in Gaza or the West Bank. This is the reason that encouraged the researcher to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authorities in Gaza Strip and West Bank separately to identify how the citizens evaluate the two governments according to different aspects.

Dimension of the evaluation of the performance of FATAH government in West Bank

To identify the features of evaluation the performance of FATAH government in West Bank dimension. Table no. (38) shows the results.

Table No. (38). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for Evaluation the performance of FATAH government in West Bank. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Disagree*</i>
E43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	2.96	1.16	34.8%	29.4%	35.8%
E51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	2.84	1.16	30.8%	29.4%	39.8%
E47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	2.79	1.14	28.5%	30%	41.5%
E49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	2.78	1.20	31.4%	27%	41.6%
E53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	2.78	1.13	29.2%	30%	40.8%
E41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	2.77	1.31	33.2%	21.8%	45%
E45. Government respects and observes human rights.	2.73	1.13	27%	31.5%	41.5%
E42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	2.67	1.13	28%	22.8%	49.2%
E48. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	2.50	1.14	22.2%	26%	51.8%
E50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	2.50	1.20	25.2%	21%	53.8%
E44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	2.47	1.12	19.5%	25%	56.5%
E46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	2.42	1.12	18.8%	24%	57.2%
E52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	2.40	1.12	19.8%	21.6%	58.6%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

Table no. (38) explains the evaluation of FATAH government, the most important sentences are; "government contributed to providing security to the citizen" with (34.8%), "government guarantees independence of judiciary" with (30.8%), and "There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities". On the other hand, the least important sentences are; "government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions" with (19.5%), "government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation" with (18.8%), and finally, "government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated" with (19.8%).

Tables no. (38 & 39) consist of a number of manifestations that measure the evaluation of performance of the Authority by the research sample for Fatah and Hamas governments since the assessment of the political systems is what concerns us rather than the two movements. By the way their evaluation is not similar too. In order to avoid repetition, we will comment on both together after we review table no. (39) as follows:

Dimension of the evaluation of the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza.

To identify the features of evaluation the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza Strip dimension. Table no. (39) shows the results.

Table No. (39). Mean scores, standard deviation and frequencies for the evaluation the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza. Ranked in a descending order.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean**</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Agree*</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
E41b. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	2.92	1.26	38.6%	22.6%	38.8%
E51b. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	2.71	1.11	24.3%	31.2%	59.5%
E53b. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	2.67	1.13	25.2%	27.8%	47%
E43b. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	2.65	1.18	24.8%	27.2%	48%
E47b. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	2.64	1.09	23%	28.2%	48.8%
E45b. Government respects and observes human rights.	2.53	1.16	23%	26.8%	50.2%
E52b. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	2.53	1.16	22.8%	24.2%	53%
E42b. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	2.52	1.16	23%	24.5%	52.5%
E49b. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	2.47	1.16	21.3%	24.4%	54.3%
E44b. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	2.38	1.11	17.8%	23%	59.2%
E50b. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	2.34	1.16	19.8%	20.8%	29.8%
E46b. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	2.32	1.14	16.5%	24%	59.5%
E48b. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	2.32	1.14	17%	23.5%	59.5%

* The researcher merged the percent of strongly agree with agree, and disagree with strongly disagree.

** Mean out of 5 points.

The results in the above table show the evaluation of HAMAS government, the most important sentences are; “Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism” with (38.6%), “government guarantees independence of judiciary” with (24.3%), and “there is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities” with (25.2%), on the other hand, the least important sentences are; “government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms” with (19.8%), “government respects the citizen’s right to express his/her point of view” with (17%).

We notice from the above mentioned that the evaluation of the research sample is less than one third. Acceptance of the majority of the questions was expressed by one fifth of the sample. The research sample consider the two governments as nondemocratic i.e. the research sample suspects the democracy, professionalism and performance of the two governments. This agrees in one way or another with the results of the study carried

out by (Miari, 2003) where half of the sample in his research agreed that the Palestinian Authority respects human rights or the right to peaceful protest against it. It is noticed in the results of our research that there is a state of decline in support of this aspect. We believe that this is linked to the state of political conflict between Hamas and Fatah governments which lead to the dominance of Hamas over the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of their failure to reach a compromise between presidential powers headed by Fatah and legislative council powers headed by Hamas. This urged the government in Gaza to tighten its grip on the citizens. This also lead to flagrant violations of human rights and a breach of the basic law in the three authorities along with a persecution of the opposition by the two parties.

The previous analysis harmonizes with the results of the Palestinian Central Bureau (March,2009) since (51%) evaluated Ramallah Authority as low level of transparency and its protection of democratic life is weak at a rate of (47.6%).

In spite of this we see that the majority of the research sample supports the democratic system as the best system for the Palestinians; this is very clear in the responses of the research sample to the following question: What is the appropriate political system for Palestinian?.

What is the appropriate political system for Palestinian ?

To identify the political system that Palestinian want it, the researcher used percents to answer the above question. Tables no. (40) shows below the results.

Table No. (40). Distribution of research sample by the kind of political system that the prefer.

<i>Political System</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
A parliamentary system in which nationalist, left-wing, and Islamic political parties all compete in elections.	62.8
A parliamentary system in which only Islamic political parties and factions compete in elections	5.8
A system with a strong president and military in which elections and competition among political parties are not important	8.9
A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections.	22.5

* 5 Missing values .

Table no. (40) shows that the majority of the research sample prefers a parliamentary system in which nationalist, left-wing, and Islamic political parties all compete in elections with percent (62.8%), but (22.5%) of them were supported “a system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections”, and (8.5%) of them prefer “a system with a strong president and military in which elections and competition among political parties are not important”. While (5.8%) of them prefer “a parliamentary system in which only Islamic political parties and factions compete in elections”.

What kind of projects that PA should bay intention to build based on the concern of citizens?.

To identify the kind of projects according to the research sample the researcher relies on percents to answer the above question. Table no. (41) shows the results.

Table No.(41). Distribution of the research sample according to the projects that they support to be build.

<i>Projects</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
Tackling unemployment	100	25.1
The fight against corruption and bribery	73	18.3
Economic projects	62	15.6
Reform of the civil and judicial systems	41	10.3
The reform of political parties	38	9.5
Social justice	37	9.3
Educational reform and the university	35	8.8
The fight against nepotism	12	3
Total	398*	100%

* 2 Missing values.

According to data reported in table no. (41) the most two important action that PA should do is to “tackle the unemployment” with percent (25.1%), and fighting against corruption and bribery with (18.3%), while the lowest are “educational reform and the university ” with (8.8%), and “fight against nepotism” with (3%).

It is clear from the above mentioned that the citizens’ attitudes and needs are not heading toward projects with dimensions related to civic life. The focus of the research sample was on the economic aspects, unemployment, fighting corruption and not for example social justice which stresses the first and tackles it.

How research sample rate the performance of the political parties?.

To identify the above question the researcher calculate the percent to answer it .Table no.(42) shows the results.

Table No.(42). Shows the number and percentage for rating the performance on political parties.

<i>performance of the political parties</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
Good	65	25.2
Bad	193	74.8
Total	258*	100

* 142 Missing Values.

Table no.(42) clarifies the rating of the performance of political party, the majority of the research population rate the performance of political party as bad, with (74.8%) percentage, while (25.2%) of them regarded as good. This proof that the Palestinian do not agree with performance of Palestinian political party.

How much do satisfied in your life?

To identify how much do the citizen satisfied in his/her life, the researcher used percents to answer the above question. Table no.(43) shows below the results.

Table No.(43). Distribution of the responses according to satisfaction in their life.

<i>Satisfied in life</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
Satisfied	101	25.3
Sort of	182	45.6
Not satisfied	116	29.1
Total	399*	100%

* 1 Missing Value.

Table no. (43) indicates that (45.6%) of research sample are sort of satisfied, (25.3%) satisfied, while (29.1%) are not satisfied.

Belonging and Affiliation

Do the citizens value their personal interests over the general interest?

To identify the above questions, percents and numbers used to answer the question. Table no. (44) clarifies the results.

Table No.(44). Shows number and percentage according to citizens value their personal interests over the general interest .

<i>personal interests over the general interests</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
Always	35	8.9
Sometimes	220	55.8
Never	139	35.3
Total	394*	100

* 6 Missing Values.

Table no.(44) shows that the majority of the sample do so sometimes with (55.8%), then (8.9%) of them always, on the other hand, (35.3%) of them response never.

I don't see the value of giving since no one is worthy of receiving.

To answer this question the researcher calculated the percents and numbers. Table no. (45) shows the results.

Table No.(45). Distribution of the sample according to the giving value .

<i>I don't see the value of giving since no one is worthy of receiving</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
Always	30	7.6
Sometimes	154	38.9
Never	212	53.5
Total	396	100%

* 4 Missing values.

Table no.(45) indicates that the majority of the sample refuse the statement that said "I don't see the value of giving since no one is worthy of receiving" with percentage (53.5%), while (38.9%) of them answer sometimes, on the other hand (7.6%) of them answer always.

Affiliation

To identify the affiliation of citizens the researcher used the follow questions; If you were asked to introduce yourself using the following choices and you were asked to prioritize them on a scale of 1 most important to 7 least important, how would you introduce yourself?. The results as in table no. (46).

Table No.(46). Mean scores and standard deviation, numbers were used to identify the affiliation and the identity.

<i>I.D</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Religion</i>	<i>Resident</i>	<i>Family</i>	<i>Arabic</i>	<i>Palestinian</i>	<i>Political party</i>
Mean	5.56	4.00	3.40	4.23	4.27	4.79	1.79
St. deviation	1.87	1.86	1.39	1.73	1.84	1.59	1.34

* 14 Missing Values .

** Mean out of 7.

Table no.(46) shows that the first name to the majority is the most important identity when they introducing their selves to others with means (5.56), while political party are the least important with mean (1.79) out of (7) . and the results show the multi identity that Palestinian in the south of west Bank has, which the first choice for them , the person then the Palestinian and Arabic identity ..ect.

To whom you seek if your rights were wronged?

To denitrify to whom that citizens depend on while they are facing a problem, the researcher ask the research sample the above question. Table no.(47) shows the results.

Table No. (47). Number and percentage, shows the body that the person seeks when his or here rights were wronged.

<i>To</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent%</i>
Family and tribe	123	30.8
Police	108	27.1
Other security forces	8	2
Human rights institutions	31	7.8
Powerful individuals	30	7.5
A lawyer	31	7.8
No one	68	17
Total	399*	100%

* One missing value.

Table no.(47) indicates the majority of the sample seek the family with (30.8%), while (27.1%) of sample prefer to seek the police. On the other hand (17%) don't seek anybody.

The above results are corresponding with the governance survey that Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics did in November - December 2008, which said that (42%) of population will seek the Palestinian courts. While (39.9%) will seek the clannish arbitration , but the remains prefer to ask the other.

The above statistics stress the research results in tables no. (32 & 34) which clarify to us the lack of trust in PA institutions mainly the police and their evaluation of the rule of the law. This comes within the context of absence of personal protection to individuals and the existence of a state of distrust in the present institutions. This lead to the public to search for a social protection in which the family and the clan constitute the parties which the individual resorts to in case his rights are violated at a percentage of (30.8%) while the research results indicated that (17%) of the research sample do not resort to any party; this implicitly reflects distrust in the options it offers them.

This is due to the tribal nature which contradicts with the civil aspect since the results show a tendency among the people toward the family authority then to the legislative authorities more than their tendency to the judiciary like lawyers and human rights institutions.

This question was provided in order to identify the scenarios which the citizen imagines concerning the nature of the pattern and image of city as he envisages it. The results show that one third of the study sample consider their city as conservative and traditional while a slight percentage consider it as open and liberated in its way of life.

The results of table no.(47) are corresponding also with Kassis study (1999:57), whereat the first choice that the citizen seeks is : family and clan with (38.1%) percent, the police which (29.4%), human rights institutions with (9.1%), Powerful individuals with (7.5%), no one with (6.7%), lawyer with 3%, other (3.4%), Other security forces with (2.7%).

What is the Identity of the city according to research sample?

In this question the researcher identify how citizens look and see their city, to answer the above question the researcher used numbers and percents, table no.(48) shows the results.

Table No.(48). Percents and numbers show the Identity of city according to the sample.

<i>ID of the City</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Conservative in its style of life	127	31.8
Traditional in its style of life	118	29.5
Tolerant in its style of life	60	15
Open in its style of life	76	19
Librated in its style of life	19	4.8
Total	400	100%

The results in table no.(48) clarifies the identity of the city according to the research sample, as the data reported that (31.8%) of sample sees that the identity of their city is Conservative, (29.5%) of sample regard it as Traditional, (15%) of the citizens see it as tolerant, (19%) regard it as open in it style of life, while only (4.8%) of the research sample regard their city as librated in its style of life.

This question was provided in order to identify the scenarios which the citizen imagines concerning the nature of the pattern and image of city as he envisages it. The results show that one third of the study sample consider their city as conservative and traditional while a slight percentage consider it as open and liberated in its way of life.

General Remark

Following the general review of the research population (Hebron and Bethlehem) concerning the civic culture, the results showed that there are manifestations which support civic culture represented by democracy, human rights, tolerance and pluralism. In contrast, we found out that the percentages and means contradict with the essence of civic culture especially those relating to human rights, woman, secularism and law. The researcher preferred to make a general review of those manifestations in the southern area since it constitutes one entity and since their social and cultural patterns are similar in one way or another. However, the performance and the behaviors are different besides their perspective of the way of life. This is what I proposed in the third chapter concerning the comparison I held between the two cities. It was based on a basic presupposition that the cultural pattern in the a city and the nature of the elite in it along with the values of its individuals are influenced by the stereotype and image of the city which prevents their behaviors and attitudes to cross the lines. This does not mean that there are no individual considerations as standard of living, academic achievement ...etc. which might influence the behaviors and attitudes of the individual in the governorate in which they live. However, these attitudes which exist in the absence of a civic and modern reference cannot be expressed by the individuals in the absence of a social environment that understands at least this behavior or that civil attitude.

We have stressed earlier that Bethlehem city is more distinguished than Hebron in several considerations. We adopted this assumption to be the basis to launch our study; we found out that the majority of the results stress to us the differences in the attitudes of the two cities toward civic and modern life; this will be clarified as following part of this chapter:

UCOMPARISON BETWEEN BETHLEHEM AND HEBRON

An analytical comparison between Bethlehem and Hebron

After a review and discussion of the research results in general in the southern region of the West Bank in addition the comparison the researcher held between these results and the results of previous opinion polls and studies that supported the research results themselves through which there was a reference to the nature, positions and attitudes of the citizens toward civic culture, we found out that the research sample possessed civic attitudes in all dimensions. At the same time, there were some differences in certain aspects that reached to the level of contradictions in the citizens' responses. In order to understand the reasons for these references and its relationship with the subject matter of the research, we will move now to a comparison of those results on the level of the two governorates to verify whether there are differences between them which in principle are the aim of this present research which revolves on one basic hypothesis namely: Are there statistical significant differences at the level of $\alpha=0.05$ in the dimensions of the civic culture between Bethlehem and Hebron governorates.

Before we start to review the comparison between the two governorates, we must indicate certain scientific matters that relate to the mechanism and technology of analysis of the research results, it is:

- a) The researcher verified the natural distribution of the responses of the research sample using a homogenous test based on Kruskal-Wallis Test; most of the questionnaire questions proved that there was not a normal distribution between Bethlehem and Hebron according to the test (see Appendix No.12). There was no homogeneity between the responses.
- b) One Way ANOVA scale was adopted in most comparisons since it is more accurate than T-test; this refers to the large size of the research population; however, their results were very close, besides the researcher adopted Chi- Square distribution for some paragraphs that suit it.
- c) The research questions were dealt with as they are as being positive or negative; the values of the question choices with the negative pattern were not converted according to the research subject matter. This was for the calculation of the degree of the mean as one unit since it is more scientific. Since we do not suffice with a discussion of one dimension of the civic culture as a total degree, we will also discuss the differences inside every dimension of the civic culture between the two governorates. The sentences which carry special codes as being negative or positive will be referred to towards the end of each table.
- d) The values of the used means will be used as follows: means between (1 to 2.33) will regard as little value, means between (2.34 to 3.67) as medium and between

- (3.68 to 5) as high (the maximum value was divided out of the minimum value over 3 as follows $(5-1=4/3=1.33)$).
- e) The positions and attitudes of the middle class in the two societies will be reviewed and linked with the results of the research through the interviews that were conducted by the researcher.
 - f) The results of the table will be reviewed then we will implement the process of analysis and comparison.

Dimensions of Civic Culture

In the general comparison of the dimensions of civic culture, the results of tables no. (49 & 50) found statistical differences in (6) dimensions out of (10). It is worth mentioning once more that concerning these two tables only in particular, the rise or the drop of the mean does not have any significance i.e. when we say : The differences were in favor of Bethlehem; it does not mean that it is more supportive of the manifestations or civic culture or their nonexistence; this will be delayed until each dimension is discussed alone. Then we will indicate whether the differences were in the negative or positive questions. For example, if we say that the statistical differences were in favor of Hebron in the negative questions, this would mean that the attitudes of the citizens were more supportive of non civic values; if we say that the statistical differences were in favor of Bethlehem in the positive questions, this would mean that Bethlehem is more supportive of civic values than it is with Hebron.

The findings in the tables no. (49 & 50) show that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following dimensions; Evaluation of political system in the West Bank, where α level = 0.001, which it is less than 0.05, the differences are in favor of Hebron Governorate, the evaluation is medium with mean (2.79), at the same result the total degree of evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip dimension, with mean (2.69), for Trust the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders, there are statistically differences in favor of Hebron Governorate, the trust degree are medium, with mean (3.20).

On the other hand, there are statistically significant differences in tolerance dimension, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem Governorates, the tolerance degree were medium, with mean (3.51), the same results in the Multi-party system, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem Governorate, the total degree were medium, with mean (3.59). While there aren't statistically significant differences at the following dimensions; Democracy, the Role of Law, Secular system, Woman and human rights, and finally the dimension of civic and political participation.

Table No. (49). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in the dimensions of Civic Culture due to the governorate.

<i>The degree for the dimensions of Civic Culture</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Democracy .	Between groups	0.239	1	0.239	1.415	0.235
	Within groups	67.098	398	0.169		
	Total	67.337	399	-		
Evaluation of political system in the West Bank.	Between groups	7.373	1	7.373	11.079	0.001
	Within groups	264.878	398	0.666		
	Total	272.251	399	-		
Evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip dimension.	Between groups	10.638	1	10.638	15.983	0.000
	Within groups	264.888	398	0.666		
	Total	275.525	399	-		
Secular system.	Between groups	0.541	1	0.541	2.347	0.126
	Within groups	91.804	398	0.231		
	Total	92.345	399	-		
The rule of law dimension.	Between groups	0.549	1	0.549	3.638	0.057
	Within groups	60.054	398	0.151		
	Total	60.603	399	-		
Tolerance.	Between groups	1.425	1	1.425	7.677	0.006
	Within groups	73.878	398	0.186		
	Total	75.303	399	-		
Woman and human rights dimension.	Between groups	0.026	1	0.026	0.230	0.631
	Within groups	44.204	398	0.111		
	Total	44.229	399	-		
Civic and political participation.	Between groups	0.365	1	0.365	0.672	0.413
	Within groups	21.119	398	0.543		
	Total	216.484	399	-		
Trust the performance of formal, and civic institution, and leaders .	Between groups	5.063	1	5.063	12.621	0.000
	Within groups	159.649	398	0.401		
	Total	164.712	399	-		
Multi-party system dimension.	Between groups	2.560	1	2.560	11.862	0.001
	Within groups	85.896	398	0.216		
	Total	88.456	399	-		
Total degree for the dimensions of Civic Culture.	Between groups	0.816	1	0.816	12.785	0.000
	Within groups	25.412	398	0.064		
	Total	26.228	399	-		

Table No. (50). Mean scores and standard deviation for the dimensions of Civic Culture according to governorate.

<i>The dimensions of Civic Culture</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean*</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Democratic .	Bethlehem	200	2.6592	0.40693
	Hebron	200	2.7081	0.41423
Evaluation of political system in the West Bank.	Bethlehem	200	2.5245	0.79089
	Hebron	200	2.7969	0.83997
Evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip.	Bethlehem	200	2.3735	0.74190
	Hebron	200	2.6996	0.88356
Secular system dimension.	Bethlehem	200	3.0421	0.41453
	Hebron	200	3.1157	0.53804
The rule of law.	Bethlehem	200	3.4914	0.34848
	Hebron	200	3.4174	0.42466
Tolerance.	Bethlehem	200	3.5194	0.40724
	Hebron	200	3.4000	0.45321
Woman and human rights dimension.	Bethlehem	200	3.2047	0.31072
	Hebron	200	3.2207	0.35437
Civic and political participation.	Bethlehem	200	3.0579	0.73944
	Hebron	200	3.1183	0.73434
Trust the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders .	Bethlehem	200	2.9793	0.66455
	Hebron	200	3.2043	0.60053
Multi-party system dimension.	Bethlehem	200	3.5938	0.43604
	Hebron	200	3.4338	0.49143
Total degree for the dimensions of Civic Culture	Bethlehem	200	2.9164	0.24135
	Hebron	200	3.0068	0.26353

* Mean out of 5 points

Democracy Dimension

Democracy is considered one of the basic aspects in the understanding of the nature of political systems in the world and the extent of closeness or distance of the state from the practice of democracy and consequently the civic culture. In this regard, a number of questions were made to the research sample to answer in order to see the extent of support of democratic or nondemocratic practices according to governorate. To identify the differences in Democracy dimension according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test, as it shown in tables No. (51 & 52).

The findings in the tables no. (51 & 52) indicate that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following negative sentences according to governorate: “D28. The Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it”, “D29. Hannyah’s Government should ban any activity or protest against it”, “D30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government”, “D31. Are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank”, “D36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used”, and “D39. What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view”, the differences are in favor of Hebron Governorate, the means of Hebron are higher than Bethlehem, their range between low and medium, as it shown in table no.(52). On the other hand, there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate : “D34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by”, “D35. Democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general”, “D37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state ”, and finally, “38. Democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties”, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem Governorate, the means of these sentences are ranging between medium and high.

The results of the tables indicate that there are statistical significant differences in (8) paragraphs out of (13); it is noticed that all the negative sentences were for Hebron i.e. Hebron is more supportive of nondemocratic practices than in Bethlehem. This is explained by the means which varied from low to medium. In return, we find significant statistical differences in the positive questions; they were in favor of Bethlehem and appear in the results of the tables no.(51 & 52). It emphasizes that Bethlehem is more supportive of democratic practices and values than in Hebron taking into consideration that the Bethlehem means ranged from medium to high. This indicates that the sample demonstrated nondemocratic attitudes that are low while the sample democratic attitudes were middle and high in which Bethlehem was more distinguished than Hebron as demonstrated in table no (52).

Table No. (51). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in democracy dimension due to the governorate.

<i>Democracy Dimension</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
D28. The Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it.	Between groups	8.410	1	8.410	5.720	0.017
	Within groups	585.180	398	1.470		
	Total	593.590	399	-		
D29. Hannyah's Government should ban any activity or protest against it.	Between groups	5.760	1	5.760	4.237	0.040
	Within groups	541.080	398	1.359		
	Total	546.840	399	-		
D30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	Between groups	3.803	1	3.803	3.639	0.057
	Within groups	415.895	398	1.045		
	Total	419.698	399	-		
D31. Are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank.	Between groups	2.250	1	2.250	1.678	0.196
	Within groups	533.660	398	1.341		
	Total	535.910	399	-		
D32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza.	Between groups	0.090	1	0.090	0.105	0.746
	Within groups	340.070	398	0.854		
	Total	340.160	399	-		
D33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	Between groups	1.323	1	1.323	1.827	0.177
	Within groups	288.075	398	0.724		
	Total	289.398	399	-		
D34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	Between groups	7.290	1	7.290	6.495	0.011
	Within groups	446.710	398	1.122		
	Total	454.000	399	-		
D35. Democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general.	Between groups	10.890	1	10.890	11.419	0.001
	Within groups	379.550	398	0.954		
	Total	390.440	399	-		
D36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used.	Between groups	16.000	1	16.000	15.028	0.000
	Within groups	423.750	398	1.065		
	Total	439.750	399	-		
D37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state.	Between groups	12.250	1	12.250	10.746	0.001
	Within groups	453.710	398	1.140		
	Total	465.960	399	-		
D38. Democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties.	Between groups	5.063	1	5.063	4.442	0.036
	Within groups	453.635	398	1.140		
	Total	458.698	399	-		
D39. What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view.	Between groups	27.563	1	27.563	19.166	0.000
	Within groups	572.375	398	1.438		
	Total	599.938	399	-		
D40. Citizens should support government decisions even if they disagreed with these decisions.	Between groups	2.723	1	2.723	2.539	0.112
	Within groups	426.775	398	1.072		
	Total	429.498	399	-		
Total degree of democracy dimension	Between groups	0.239	1	.239	1.415	0.235
	Within groups	67.098	398	.169		
	Total	67.337	399	-		

Table No. (52). Mean scores and standard deviation for the democracy dimension according to governorate.

<i>Democracy Dimension</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean*</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
D28. The Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it.	Bethlehem	200	2.21	1.123
	Hebron	200	2.50	1.296
D29. Hannyah's Government should ban any activity or protest against it.	Bethlehem	200	2.11	1.083
	Hebron	200	2.35	1.243
D30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	Bethlehem	200	2.38	1.015
	Hebron	200	2.57	1.030
D31. Are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank.	Bethlehem	200	2.31	1.188
	Hebron	200	2.16	1.127
D32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza.	Bethlehem	200	1.85	0.919
	Hebron	200	1.88	0.929
D33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	Bethlehem	200	1.62	0.761
	Hebron	200	1.74	0.932
D34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	Bethlehem	200	3.64	1.003
	Hebron	200	3.37	1.113
D35. Democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general.	Bethlehem	200	4.00	0.905
	Hebron	200	3.67	1.043
D36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used.	Bethlehem	200	1.93	0.795
	Hebron	200	2.33	1.223
D37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state .	Bethlehem	200	3.67	0.953
	Hebron	200	3.32	1.172
D38. Democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties.	Bethlehem	200	3.77	0.967
	Hebron	200	3.54	1.160
D39. What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view.	Bethlehem	200	2.45	1.133
	Hebron	200	2.98	1.262
D40. Citizens should support government decisions even if they disagreed with these decisions.	Bethlehem	200	2.67	1.019
	Hebron	200	2.83	1.052
Total degree of democracy dimension	Bethlehem	200	2.6592	0.40693
	Hebron	200	2.7081	0.41423

Please note: the sentences that carrying a code (D28, D29, D30, D31, D32, D33,D36, D39, D40) are **Negative** sentences. And the sentences that carrying a code (D34, D35,D37,D38) are **Positive**.

Political System

To identify the differences in the appropriate political system in Palestine according to the governorate, the researcher used (Chi-Square) test. Table no. (53) shows the results:

Table No. (53). Chi-Square test for the differences in political system according to governorate.

Governorate	Which one of the political system would be appropriate for the Palestinian				Total
	Democratic system	Islamic democracy	Strong leader	Islamic Sharia'	
Bethlehem	140 71.1%	5 2.5%	23 11.7%	29 14.7%	197 100%
Hebron	108 54.5%	18 9.1%	12 6.1%	60 30.3%	198 100%
Total	248 62.8%	23 5.8%	35 8.9%	89 22.5%	395 100%

Chi-Square= 25.729

D.F=3

Sig=0. 000

Tables no. (53) shows that there is statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha= 0.05$ in the attitudes toward the appropriate political system in Palestine according to governorate, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem Governorate, whereat (71.1%) of the citizen of Bethlehem support “a parliamentary system in which nationalist, left-wing, and Islamic political parties all compete in elections and government”, versus (54.5%) from Hebron support it, and too (30.3%) of Hebron sample support “A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections”.

We preferred to discuss and compare the sample attitudes in tables no. (51 & 52) which measured citizens' attitudes toward some democratic values and practices following a review of the sample attitudes toward the nature of the political system it favors as shown in table no. (53). It indicates that two thirds of Bethlehem district support having a democratic system in which all the political factions take part (Islamic, National, Secular and Leftist) while (45.5%) from Hebron support having political systems that do not harmonize with the democratic political system since Islamic parties especially in Hebron have more influence than the rest of the other political parties. (A.F.) a doctor from Hebron and a member of the “Hizb Tuhrii” (Islamic Liberation Party) indicated, “ I do not believe in democracy since the Muslim has to comply to religious rulings and jurisprudence.” He adds, “ I believe in political pluralism based on Islam”. While engineer Qasim Awad from Bethlehem believes, “ in the democratic system which is distinguished for its integration of all the political, social and religious spectrum.” Nidal abu Akir expresses the kind of society he dreams of as follows, “ I want a democratic civil society that observes freedoms and human rights, respect of distribution of authorities, rule of the law, respect of judiciary, fight of corruption and I prefer to have a socialist society.” Nabil Mughrabi a university lecturer at Hebron University says, “ I want a civilized society and a democratic one; Islamic *Sharia* and our Arab and Islamic

history are one of the resources for legislation.” Musa Ajwa an academician and politician adds, “ I want a democratic secular society in Palestine where the rights of the religions and political parties along with the rights of the marginalized sectors are respected in the society.”

We notice from the above mentioned that there is a state of variation in the positions of the middle class in both districts since there is no ideological consistency among them regarding the political system they require; consequently, it is toward the civic attitudes in the daily life. I tend to highlight an issue that is related to the religious elite in Bethlehem; I do believe that they are more flexible than those in Hebron even when their positions toward the nature of the religious political system are in agreement; however, the nature of the religious political variation in Bethlehem city is in need for more flexible address to harmonize with the state of civilized openness witnessed by the city. I cannot be certain here so it might be a theme for another in-depth study to this effect.

On the level of the citizens, Hebron responses explain to us that there is a religious structure or political parties that adopt a clear cut religious ideology more than in Bethlehem; a percentage of (19%) of Hebron sample agree that, “D36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used” as opposed to only (4.5%) of Bethlehem residents who agree to this too. A percentage of (65.5%) of Bethlehem residents agree that, the “D37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state ” compared to (49.5%). It is clear for us that there are democratic attitudes in the two governorate but the percentages of support for the manifestations of democracy in Bethlehem far exceed their counterparts in Hebron. In addition, there is a traditional structure that does not harmonize with modern systems; this is clear in their choice of the kind of political systems with religious reference which contradicts the requirements of a democratic system.

For the position of political leaders toward democracy and pluralism, It is worthy to mention: that the focus on the political issues and confronting the occupation has distinguished all the stands taken by the national and Islamic factions (as it mentioned previously in chapter two). This has been accompanied by stands that have to do with sensitive social aspects that call for the enhancement of democracy and a clear and stark criticism of the work of the civil society organizations and for developing and improving their performance.

Despite the disagreements between the national and Islamic factions in the political and ideological stands and in the organizational structure, their stands, except for the Islamic Liberation Party, unify with regard to the adoption of the democratic principle, some in an extensive or less extensive manner. In the interview with Musa Ajwa, one of FATAH leader in Hebron district, clarified that, “Political pluralism is one of the basic axes on which the Palestinian society depends in building a modern state. So, we have to consolidate pluralism and organize it by democratic means.” . He also added that, “There must be a process of change with regard to the standards that the party or faction approves so that it does not isolate itself from the needs and aspirations of society.”(Mussa Ajwa, 2010).

As for the stand of the Islamic movement, Nizar Ramadan, the Hamas representative in Hebron and Palestinian parliament member, commented on pluralism and democracy by saying that it means “acknowledgement of the right of disagreement, which goes back to the right of pluralism in the political doctrine and acceptance of the other even if it were an opinion or viewpoint that disagrees with public opinion.” He added that, “Pluralism has levels that are determined by the security interest and it may be the interest of humanity in general and that as far as religion is concerned there is no objection to having more than one political party within the Islamic state” (Nizar Ramadan, 2010).

Mahmoud Fanoun, representative of the PFLP in Bethlehem, noted that, “The theory of political pluralism is a theoretical approach that looks at social life on the basis of political, philosophical, ideological and value-laden variation. Political pluralism means variety of ideological frameworks in the social and political practices.” Fanoun also noted “that political pluralism is a basic and essential constituent that paves the way for democracy since it constitutes the backbone for democracy, which we are lacking for those days” (Mahmoud Fanoun, 2010).

Besides what was mentioned above, we notice that the national factions run their internal elections in a democratic way as much as they can to elect the leaders of those parties, even though elections may not be regular due to the presence of occupation. Internal political discussions take place so that in the end they vote on particular political stands on a controversial issue. The matter does not stop there but extends to touching on different societal and union stands.

The stronger Islamic movement in the West Bank is in Hebron not in Bethlehem, it derives its juristic stand from the stands of the other Islamic movements, especially those in Jordan, Egypt, the Sudan and Tunisia. The Hamas movement, whose juristic stands are inspired by the Islamic Brotherhood Group in Jordan and Egypt, rejects the western conception of democracy in form and content. This opposition is made on the basis that democracy is a secular western concept in which legislation is based on human beings, thus it is incompatible with Islam, in which legislation is based on Allah's Book (the Holy Qur'an).

Starting from a clear political front, the Islamists accept the principle of democracy and political pluralism before the establishment of the Islamic rule since it would provide them with the opportunity to function and to achieve missionary work. But, they are obligated to implement the Islamic law when they are in government. Then, they will allow party pluralism only within the framework of the Islamic ideology.

On the other side, with regard to the Islamic Liberation Party, which was established in 1953, it is considered one of the political parties that opposes democracy altogether. It views it as a matter of infidelity, apostasy and an act of imitating the west blindly (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010). Their mentality is still attached to Islamic concepts whose origins date back to the days of Prophet Muhammad, i.e., more than thirteen centuries ago. They refuse to deal with any product of civilization, such as elections and intellectual pluralism and fight against it and call upon people to blockade and denounce it. This is the approach that they generally follow in the Arab world and the picture is not any different

in the Hebron Governorate, where they are found in most places, universities and even national circles and activities of the civil society, for the purpose of converting and attracting new members to their ideology. They use the mosques as stages and public spaces to bringing people to their ideology and pass legal opinion that prohibits people from dealing with elections or foreign organizations (Zallum, n.d).

The Islamic liberation party is among the first parties that have impact on the orientation of the society in the Hebron Governorate. They practice their power through the use of religion and extremist stands that discourage people from behaving in a way that is incompatible with them. They do not adopt struggle and strife and they have no programs to resist occupation as they work for the call to Islam by peaceful means. Nor do they take violent stands on the authority or society, based on their belief that we should emulate the Prophet's mode of life. In other words, Islam did not adopt fighting as an approach except after the establishment of the Islamic state in Al-Madina. That is why they await the coming of the Caliph, the establishment of the state and then use violence and fighting. This is the intellectual system that organizes their ideas and behaviors, which made the authority turn a blind eye to them and avoid bothering them. Their base expanded, especially in Hebron. Now they control more than 25 of the 40 mosques, and publish a periodical entitled "*Al-Wa'y*" (The Consciousness), through which they address the populace and offer legal opinion and party stand on any issue or event. This allows constant contact with their populist base assimilating information to both their base and the public.

In order to understand the evaluation of the research sample of the present political system, we will review their attitudes toward the performance of the Palestinian government in order to be able to identify their evaluation of the system. As a result of the political division between the two governments of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we evaluated each separately as shown in tables no. (54 to 57)

Dimension of the evaluation of political system in the West Bank

To identify the differences in the dimension of the evaluation of political system in the West Bank according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test, as it shown in tables no. (54 & 55).

The results in the tables no.(54 and 55) indicate that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha= 0.05$ in the evaluation of FATAH government in West Bank according to governorate, the differences in most of the sentences that are following: “E41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.”, “E42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.”, “E43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.”, “E44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions”, “E45. Government respects and observes human rights”, “E46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation”, “E47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup”, “E48. Government respects the citizen’s right to express his/her point of view”, “E49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief”, “E52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated”, “E53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities” and “Total degree of the evaluation of political system in the West Bank”, all of the differences are in favor of Hebron Governorate, the mean of Total degree of Hebron is(2.79), while the mean of the total degree of Bethlehem is (2.52), as it shown in table no.(55).

On the other hand, there aren’t statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$, in the following sentences: “E50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms”, and “E51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary”.

Table No. (54). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in the evaluation of political system in the West Bank (FATAH) due to the governorate.

<i>Dimension of Evaluation the political system of FATAH</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
E41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	Between groups	23.523	1	23.523	14.083	0.000
	Within groups	664.775	398	1.670		
	Total	688.298	399	-		
E42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	Between groups	7.023	1	7.023	5.548	0.019
	Within groups	503.755	398	1.266		
	Total	510.778	399	-		
E43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	Between groups	7.563	1	7.563	5.627	0.018
	Within groups	534.875	398	1.344		
	Total	542.438	399	-		
E44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	Between groups	12.250	1	12.250	9.805	0.002
	Within groups	497.260	398	1.249		
	Total	509.510	399	-		
E45. Government respects and observes human rights.	Between groups	7.290	1	7.290	5.729	0.017
	Within groups	506.460	398	1.273		
	Total	513.750	399	-		
E46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	Between groups	6.760	1	6.760	5.395	0.021
	Within groups	498.680	398	1.253		
	Total	505.440	399	-		
E47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	Between groups	10.240	1	10.240	8.003	0.005
	Within groups	509.270	398	1.280		
	Total	519.510	399	-		
E48. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	Between groups	7.563	1	7.563	5.828	0.016
	Within groups	516.435	398	1.298		
	Total	523.998	399	-		
E49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	Between groups	7.563	1	7.563	5.302	0.022
	Within groups	567.635	398	1.426		
	Total	575.198	399	-		
E50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	Between groups	1.440	1	1.440	0.987	0.321
	Within groups	580.560	398	1.459		
	Total	582	399	-		
E51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	Between groups	2.890	1	2.890	2.135	0.145
	Within groups	538.870	398	1.354		
	Total	541.760	399	-		
E52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	Between groups	9.923	1	9.923	8.055	0.005
	Within groups	490.275	398	1.232		
	Total	500.198	399	-		
E53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	Between groups	2.250	1	2.250	1.737	0.188
	Within groups	515.500	398	1.295		
	Total	517.750	399	-		
Total degree of Evaluation of political system in the West Bank	Between groups	7.373	1	7.373	11.079	0.001
	Within groups	264.878	398	0.666		
	Total	272.251	399	-		

Table No. (55). Mean scores and standard deviation for the evaluation of political system in the West Bank according to governorate

<i>Dimension of Evaluation the political system of FATAH</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
E41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	Bethlehem	200	2.53	1.307
	Hebron	200	3.02	1.278
E42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	Bethlehem	200	2.54	1.079
	Hebron	200	2.80	1.169
E43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	Bethlehem	200	2.83	1.100
	Hebron	200	3.10	1.215
E44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	Bethlehem	200	2.29	1.049
	Hebron	200	2.64	1.182
E45. Government respects and observes human rights.	Bethlehem	200	2.59	1.062
	Hebron	200	2.86	1.191
E46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	Bethlehem	200	2.29	1.040
	Hebron	200	2.55	1.194
E47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	Bethlehem	200	2.63	1.114
	Hebron	200	2.95	1.148
E48. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	Bethlehem	200	2.37	1.085
	Hebron	200	2.64	1.191
E49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	Bethlehem	200	2.64	1.161
	Hebron	200	2.92	1.227
E50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	Bethlehem	200	2.44	1.180
	Hebron	200	2.56	1.235
E51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	Bethlehem	200	2.76	1.039
	Hebron	200	2.93	1.276
E52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	Bethlehem	200	2.25	1.025
	Hebron	200	2.56	1.189
E53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	Bethlehem	200	2.70	1.056
	Hebron	200	2.85	1.214
Total degree of Evaluation of political system in the West Bank	Bethlehem	200	2.5254	0.79089
	Hebron	200	2.7969	0.83997

Please note: all of sentences that carrying a code (E) are **positive** sentences.

Dimension of the evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip

To identify the differences in the dimension of the evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test, as it shown in tables no. (56 & 57).

The same results that we find in evaluation of FATAH government in West Bank, tables no. (56 and 57) indicate that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the evaluation of HAMAS government in Gaza Strip according to governorate, the differences in most of the sentences that are following: “E41b. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.”, “E42b. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.”, “E43b. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.”, “E44b. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions”, “E45b. Government respects and observes human rights”, “E47b. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup”, “E48b. Government respects the citizen’s right to express his/her point of view”, “E49b. Government respects freedom of thought and belief”, “E50b. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms”, “E51b. Government guarantees independence of judiciary”, “E52b. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated”, “E53b. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities” and “Total degree of the evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip”, all of the differences are in favor of Hebron Governorate, the mean of Total degree of Hebron is (2.69), while the mean of the total degree of Bethlehem is (2.37), as it shown in table no.(57).

On the other hand, there aren’t statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$, in the following sentence: “E46b. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation”.

Table No. (56). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in total degree of evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip dimension due to the governorate.

<i>Evaluation the political system of HAMAS</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
E41b. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	Between groups	39.690	1	39.690	26.605	0.000
	Within groups	593.750	398	1.492		
	Total	633.440	399	-		
E42b. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	Between groups	17.640	1	17.640	13.445	0.000
	Within groups	522.200	398	1.312		
	Total	539.840	399	-		
E43b. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	Between groups	6.760	1	6.760	4.849	0.028
	Within groups	554.830	398	1.394		
	Total	561.590	399	-		
E44b. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	Between groups	11.903	1	11.903	9.867	0.002
	Within groups	480.095	398	1.206		
	Total	491.998	399	-		
E45b. Government respects and observes human rights.	Between groups	10.563	1	10.563	7.917	0.005
	Within groups	531.015	398	1.334		
	Total	541.578	399	-		
E46b. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	Between groups	4	1	4	3.095	0.079
	Within groups	514.310	398	1.292		
	Total	318.310	399	-		
E47b. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	Between groups	11.223	1	11.223	9.643	0.002
	Within groups	463.215	398	1.164		
	Total	474.438	399	-		
E48b. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	Between groups	7.840	1	7.840	6.018	0.015
	Within groups	518.470	398	1.303		
	Total	526.310	399	-		
E49b. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	Between groups	6.250	1	6.250	4.629	0.032
	Within groups	537.390	398	1.350		
	Total	543.640	399	-		
E50b. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	Between groups	6.003	1	6.003	4.495	0.035
	Within groups	531.435	398	1.335		
	Total	537.438	399	-		
E51b. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	Between groups	8.703	1	8.703	7.051	0.008
	Within groups	491.235	398	1.234		
	Total	499.938	399	-		
E52b. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	Between groups	7.023	1	7.028	5.208	0.023
	Within groups	536.675	398	1.348		
	Total	543.698	399	-		
E53b. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	Between groups	15.210	1	15.210	12.061	0.001
	Within groups	501.900	398	1.261		
	Total	517.110	399	-		
Total degree of evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip	Between groups	10.638	1	10.638	15.983	0.000
	Within groups	264.888	398	0.666		
	Total	275.525	399	-		

Table No. (57). Mean scores and standard deviation for the evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip according to governorate.

<i>Evaluation the political system of HAMAS</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
E41b. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	Bethlehem	200	2.61	1.164
	Hebron	200	3.24	1.276
E42b. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	Bethlehem	200	2.31	0.999
	Hebron	200	2.73	1.275
E43b. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	Bethlehem	200	2.52	1.116
	Hebron	200	2.78	1.242
E44b. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	Bethlehem	200	2.21	1.038
	Hebron	200	2.55	1.155
E45b. Government respects and observes human rights.	Bethlehem	200	2.37	1.081
	Hebron	200	2.70	1.225
E46b. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	Bethlehem	200	2.22	1.060
	Hebron	200	2.42	1.208
E47b. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	Bethlehem	200	2.47	1.012
	Hebron	200	2.81	1.142
E48b. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	Bethlehem	200	2.18	1.044
	Hebron	200	2.46	1.231
E49b. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	Bethlehem	200	2.35	1.092
	Hebron	200	2.60	1.228
E50b. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	Bethlehem	200	2.22	1.036
	Hebron	200	2.46	1.263
E51b. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	Bethlehem	200	2.57	1.040
	Hebron	200	2.86	1.178
E52b. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	Bethlehem	200	2.40	1.089
	Hebron	200	2.66	1.230
E53b. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	Bethlehem	200	2.47	1.002
	Hebron	200	2.86	1.232
Total degree of evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip	Bethlehem	200	2.3735	0.74190
	Hebron	200	2.6996	0.88356

Please note: all of sentences that carrying a code (E) are **positive** sentences.

It is clear for us from tables no (54 to 57) that the research sample emphasize the negative performance of the Authority on all levels (observance and respect of human rights, democracy, separation of authorities) as shown in the above tables. The degree of assessment of the performance was low; this is connected with the political and economic conditions which the Palestinian question is undergoing along with the inability of the Authority to improve the situation; besides there is the influence of the state of division between the two elected governments in Gaza and the West Bank. This had negatively influenced the attitudes of the research sample. Moreover, the security apparatus carried out flagrant violations of human rights, the police practiced of sealing mouths policy which contradicts with democratic approach. Under the pretext that Hamas members might stage a coup in the West Bank to topple Fatah movement as what had happened in

Gaza, several Palestinians were jailed without evident charges and torture was used against several Hamas movement members in Fatah movement prisons. Several employees were either suspended or expelled from work on the basis of affiliation or support of Hamas movement. This was documented by several institutions concerned about human rights mainly the Palestinian Independent Committee For Human Rights; this general situation controlled the general climate of the Palestinian cities in the West Bank following 2008.

However what is interesting in the results and its connection with the subject of the research is that in spite of the fact that the degree of evaluation was middle in all the paragraphs which were included in the dimension of the evaluation of the political system in Gaza and the West Bank, the differences were in favor of Hebron in the two dimensions i.e. Hebron evaluation of the two systems was at a higher degree than Bethlehem as demonstrated by the means. In spite of the centralization of Hamas leaderships and base in the West Bank in Hebron, this did not influence the process of evaluation; we tend to explain this by the nature of the political culture in Hebron which is closer to parish and submissive culture since the people's attitudes or religious positions did not influence the process of evaluation. It seemed as if Hebron evaluation of Gaza government was better than its evaluation of West Bank government. This in fact did not happen; this might also be related to the nature of the central family structure in Hebron. Several large families in Hebron are very influential and belong to political parties. For example, we may find a clan that has leaderships that are influential in both Fatah and Hamas movements; Rgoub family in Dura city in Hebron is considered one of the families that are influential in Hebron area; the son of the family Nayif Rgoub is one of the main leaderships of Hamas movement in Hebron and he is a member of the Legislative Council in (2006) elections while his brother Jibril Rgoub one of Fatah movement leaderships is the founder of Preventive Security in the West Bank and its former director; he is a contemporary member of the Palestinian Parliament and Minister of Sports. Thus, we notice that the family dimension might have to do with this; the members of the same clan have active members both in Hamas and Fatah institutions. What supports the last view is that the state of political detentions of Hamas movement by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank was very little in Hebron compared to Bethlehem. The representatives of families in Hebron district were invited and met with the governor and the heads of the security apparatus. It was agreed that family members who belong to Hamas movement must be refrained and controlled instead of being arrested and this is really what had happened.

As for the state of division in Gaza, the majority of the Palestinian people reject it whether in Gaza or the West Bank; there was consensus in the interviews I made with members of the middle class in the two governorates. However, this did not influence the presence of some drawbacks and criticisms of the Palestinian political system; it is clear

in the position of (N.A.F.) who is active in civic institutions; she considered that, “ the political system does not belong to the law and order and it is controlled by clan influence and favoritism.” However, Mahmoud Fanoun differs from the above mentioned considering the Palestinian political system as, “ a system under occupation with divided leaderships, and not built on economic basis; it is also incapable of organizing the social and legal conditions in a manner that expresses the interests of the Palestinian people in addition to its inability to tackle the national issue which is connected with the Israeli Arab conflict.” He ironically comments on what had happened in Gaza and at the same time strongly criticizes both Hamas and Fatah movements as saying, “Hamas and Fatah differed in the division of authority and powers following the (2006) elections; the two parties were not able to agree on this. Thus, both split the country and formed two nations one for Hamas in Gaza and the other for Fatah in the West Bank. This division has greatly harmed the Palestinian society.” This position expresses the state of political control in the Palestinian street for both movements in a clear absence of other political parties or in fact its inability to influence the political decision whether in Gaza or in the West Bank.

Now we move to tackle the dimension of the secular system as one of the main components of the Palestinian civic culture considering Islamic religion as a part and basic component of the national identity; we found out that it is essential to investigate the attitudes of the research sample on issues regarding religion and its relationship with the political system; we do believe that this dimension differs according to the difference of the social and cultural differences of the individual in addition to the difference of the civic culture he/she is living in.

Dimension of the Secular System

To identify the differences in the dimension of secular system according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test, as it shown in tables no. (58 & 59).

Table No. (58). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in the dimension of secular system due to the governorate.

<i>Dimension of Secular System</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
S55. The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals.	Between groups	11.223	1	11.223	8.466	0.004
	Within groups	527.575	389	1.326		
	Total	538.798	399	-		
S56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual.	Between groups	25	1	25	16.033	0.000
	Within groups	620.590	389	1.559		
	Total	645.590	399	-		
S57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns.	Between groups	0.303	1	0.303	0.232	0.630
	Within groups	519.395	389	1.305		
	Total	519.698	399	-		
S58. Religious leaders should no influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people.	Between groups	0.563	1	0.563	0.429	0.513
	Within groups	522.015	389	1.312		
	Total	522.578	399	-		
S59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society .	Between groups	6.003	1	6.003	5.084	0.025
	Within groups	469.935	389	1.181		
	Total	475.938	399	-		
S60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth.	Between groups	18.490	1	18.490	12.109	0.001
	Within groups	607.750	389	1.527		
	Total	626.240	399	-		
S61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda .	Between groups	28.090	1	28.090	19.086	0.000
	Within groups	585.750	389	1.472		
	Total	613.840	399	-		
S62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	Between groups	54.760	1	54.760	31.393	0.000
	Within groups	694.240	389	1.744		
	Total	749	399	-		
Total degree of secular system dimension	Between groups	0.541	1	0.541	2.347	0.126
	Within groups	91.804	389	0.231		
	Total	92.345	399	-		

Table No. (59). Mean scores and standard deviation for the dimension of secular system according to governorate.

<i>Dimension of Secular System</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
S55. The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals.	Bethlehem	200	3.27	1.045
	Hebron	200	3.94	1.248
S56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual.	Bethlehem	200	2.90	1.209
	Hebron	200	3.40	1.287
S57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns.	Bethlehem	200	3.45	1.133
	Hebron	200	3.50	1.152
S58. Religious leaders should not influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people.	Bethlehem	200	3.45	1.124
	Hebron	200	3.37	1.166
S59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society .	Bethlehem	200	2.39	0.939
	Hebron	200	2.64	1.216
S60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth.	Bethlehem	200	3.10	1.206
	Hebron	200	2.67	1.265
S61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda .	Bethlehem	200	2.76	1.188
	Hebron	200	3.29	1.238
S62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	Bethlehem	200	2.78	1.338
	Hebron	200	3.52	1.303
Total degree of secular system dimension .	Bethlehem	200	3.0421	0.41453
	Hebron	200	3.1157	0.53804

Please note: the sentences that are carrying a code (S56, S59, S61, S62) are **Negative** sentences. And the sentences that are carrying a code (S55, S57, S58, S60) are **Positive** sentences.

Tables no. (58 & 59) show that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following negative sentences according to governorate: “S56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual”, “S59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society”, “S61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda”, and “S62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only”, the differences are in favor of Hebron Governorate, the means of Hebron are higher than Bethlehem, they are medium, as it shown in table no.(59). On the other hand, there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate: “S55. The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals”, “S57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns”, “S58. Religious leaders should not influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people”, and finally, “S60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth.”, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem Governorate, the means of these sentences are ranging between medium and high, as it shown in table no.(59).

As the case for the state of disparity and difference in the nature of the political system which is supported by the research sample, the same result appeared in the secular dimension which is based on a basic given which is the separation between religion and state or the restriction of the interference of “clergy or religious individuals” into the

public life or policy in particular. The responses of Bethlehem differed from those in Hebron as demonstrated by table no. (59). We also found that Hebron was more supportive of interference of the clergy into the political life than the case in Bethlehem. The latter was characterized by being more supportive of separation between politics and religion. A percentage of (51%) from Hebron supported the following statement, “S56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual” compared with (34%) from Bethlehem. A percentage of (57.5%) from Hebron supported the statement, “S62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only” compared with (33%) from Bethlehem. These results and percentages reinforce the previously analyzed data. This encourages us to formulate a statement denoting that the role and influence of religion is important and essential in the life of the citizens of Hebron more than in the life Bethlehem citizens in addition to the traditional and conservative structure of the city. This is confirmed by the percentage of members joining religious institutions; the number of those members in religious institutions in Hebron reached (30.5%) compared with (18%) from Bethlehem. This is due to social reasons related to the city and its residents as previously mentioned regarding the conflict over the city identity as experienced by the city of Hebron.

As for the positions of the middle class, they are also different, we will give some responses. (A.F). comments by saying, “ separation of religion from the state is a creed that lead to the emergence of capitalism; this contradicts with the Muslims doctrine since the origin in running the life of the Muslims is on the basis of *Sharia*’ rulings which are derived from religion. If religion is separated from the state, then our doctrine becomes another one.” As for Dr. Nabil Mughrabi, he refuses the separation of religion from the state explaining, “ states were found to run peoples’ lives while religion came to organize the peoples’ lives”. Ibrahim Sawalha who sympathizes with the Left supports this when he says, “ Yes the state for the society; religion must be followed, but there is freedom in following religion and disconnecting it with politics.” These are three responses from the middle class in Hebron; their responses reflect their differences in the employment of religion in public life and state; their responses are reflected by individuals who are the most opponents of liberalism to a rejection by the leftist but not directly; this confirms that the discourse and practice of the political party differs from one city to another. Several leaderships of the leftist political parties practice religious duties in Hebron district, but the situation is different in Bethlehem. This is salient in the position of Mahmoud Fanoun when he commented, “Yes , I am with the separation of religion from the state for the following: 1. It is to enable society groups to freely coexist without any restrictions.2. it is because religion is represented by a state of contradictory groups and sects; each sect thinks that its views represent the true religion. 3.our society includes Christianity with its several denominations along with several sects of Islam represented by contradicting parties. In this condition, religions are unable to express themselves in a scientific manner. 4. When Europe separated the religion from the state, and the political

system was liberated from the supremacy of religion, development and prosperity flourished.” Qasim Awad differs with the last proposition and says, “ I do not agree to the separation between religion and the society since it is a part of our life and we need a political system which derives its values from religion.”

As previously emphasized, there is a state of ideological diversity inside the middle class in their attitudes toward religion, life and the nature of the political system which we aspire to build; I believe that its discourse in Bethlehem is more flexible and liberal than in the city of Hebron.

Now we are going to review the back bone of any state when its civic culture is closer to the modern and civilized model; it is the law. Since the Palestinian case is unique due to the fact that it is in the process of state delivery in very difficult conditions, the occupation constitutes one of the obstacles before the process of societal transformation. Thus, in the running of the affairs of its daily life, the society resorted to what is called “*Urf Ashairi*” clan/ tribal customary law which is considered a basic element of the social fabric with regard of its coverage of this aspect of questions.

Dimension of the Rule of Law

To identify the differences in the rule of law dimension according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test, as it shown in tables no. (60 & 61).

Table No. (60). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in the rule of law dimension due to the governorate.

<i>The Rule of law</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
L63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals.	Between groups	5.063	1	5.063	5.373	0.021
	Within groups	375.015	398	0.942		
	Total	380.078	399	-		
L64. Courts are qualified to receive and deal with complaints and cases relating to citizens.	Between groups	3.423	1	3.423	3.971	0.047
	Within groups	343.055	398	0.862		
	Total	346.478	399	-		
L65. There is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought.	Between groups	0.123	1	0.123	0.113	0.737
	Within groups	432.055	398	1.086		
	Total	432.178	399	-		
L66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance of the tribal law.	Between groups	0.063	1	0.063	0.076	0.783
	Within groups	326.115	398	0.819		
	Total	326.178	399	-		
L67. The Tribal Law protects the individuals and their rights when the Civic Law is not independent or during the absence of the Government and the state.	Between groups	4.203	1	4.203	4.377	0.037
	Within groups	382.175	398	0.960		
	Total	386.378	399	-		
L68. The PA is an authority of some individuals, not the Law.	Between groups	9	1	9	6.252	0.013
	Within groups	572.910	398	1.439		
	Total	581.910	399	-		
L69. The PA helped to strengthen the Tribal Law.	Between groups	0.040	1	0.040	0.047	0.828
	Within groups	335.960	398	0.844		
	Total	336	399	-		
L70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent .	Between groups	6.250	1	6.250	5.930	0.015
	Within groups	419.500	398	1.054		
	Total	425.750	399	-		
L71. To apply civic law in the society is better than tribal law.	Between groups	4.410	1	4.410	5.181	0.023
	Within groups	338.750	398	0.851		
	Total	343.160	399	-		
L. 72. I support obeying the law.	Between groups	4.203	1	4.203	3.715	0.055
	Within groups	450.275	398	1.131		
	Total	454.478	399	-		
L73. According to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions.	Between groups	0.063	1	0.063	0.066	0.797
	Within groups	375.835	398	0.944		
	Total	375.898	399	-		
Total degree of the Rule of Law.	Between groups	0.549	1	0.549	3.638	0.057
	Within groups	60.054	398	0.151		
	Total	60.603	399	-		

Table No. (61). Mean scores and standard deviation for the rule of law dimension according to governorate.

<i>The Rule of law</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
L63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals.	Bethlehem	200	3.90	0.893
	Hebron	200	3.67	1.042
L64. Courts are qualified to receive and deal with complaints and cases relating to citizens.	Bethlehem	200	3.29	0.938
	Hebron	200	3.48	0.918
L65. There is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought.	Bethlehem	200	3.21	0.975
	Hebron	200	3.18	0.105
L66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance e of the tribal law.	Bethlehem	200	3.82	0.867
	Hebron	200	3.80	0.942
L67. The Tribal Law protects the individuals and their rights when the Civic Law is not independent or during the absence of the Government and the state.	Bethlehem	200	3.17	0.955
	Hebron	200	3.37	1.004
L68. The PA is an authority of some individuals, not the Law.	Bethlehem	200	3.64	1.117
	Hebron	200	3.34	1.277
L69. The PA helped to strengthen the Tribal Law	Bethlehem	200	3.39	0.878
	Hebron	200	3.41	0.957
L70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent .	Bethlehem	200	3.40	0.940
	Hebron	200	3.15	1.106
L71. To apply civic law in the society is better than tribal law.	Bethlehem	200	3.72	0.853
	Hebron	200	3.51	0.987
L72. I support obeying the law.	Bethlehem	200	3.85	0.967
	Hebron	200	3.64	1.152
L. 73. According to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions.	Bethlehem	200	3.04	0.879
	Hebron	200	3.07	1.057
Total degree of the Rule of Law	Bethlehem	200	3.4914	0.34848
	Hebron	200	3.4173	0.42466

Please note: the sentences that are carrying a code (L65, L68, L69, L70, L72) are **Negative** sentences. And the sentences that are carrying a code (L63, L64, L66, L67, 71, L73) are **Positive** sentences.

The results in the tables no. (60 & 61) show that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following negative sentences according to governorate: “L68. The PA is an authority of some individuals, not the Law”, where the α level is less than 0.05 , the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is medium, with a mean of (3.64), in comparison with Hebron , the mean was(3.34). and the same of sentences that says “L70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent” the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is medium, with a mean of (3.40).

On the other hand, there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate : “L63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals”, ” the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is high, with a mean of (3.90).

“L64. Courts are qualified to receive and deal with complaints and cases relating to citizens”, the differences are in favor of Hebron, the degree of agree is medium, with a mean of (3.48), “L67. The Tribal Law protects the individuals and their rights when the Civic Law is not independent or during the absence of the Government and the state ”, the differences are in favor of Hebron, the degree of agree is medium, with a mean (3.37), and finally “L71. To apply civic law in the society is better than tribal law”, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is high, with a mean of (3.72).

We notice from the above mentioned that the degree of Bethlehem support of the rule of the law and the restriction on the interference of the clan law is more than that in Hebron. This is a natural outcome since “*Jabal al Khalil*” (Hebron Mountain) and its “*Sheikhs*” (chiefs) constitute a basic reference in the tribal law and solutions in the West Bank; this is what dominates the city life in its organization of its life and solution of its problems. A percentage of (71%) from Bethlehem supported the statement , “L63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals” compared with (66%) from Hebron. A percentage of (56.5%) from Bethlehem criticized the Palestinian Authority since it is, “L68. The PA is an authority of some individuals, not the Law” compared with (48.5%) from Hebron. We see that the majority of the research sample refuse tribal law and support the implementation of civic law; however, this is not connected with the attitudes of individuals only but it is also connected with the a social structure and a political decision. For example, a notary judge requests from two citizens a tribal deed to prove that they are no longer at disagreement so as to cancel the case submitted before court. This case is spread all over the Palestinian territories including Bethlehem and Hebron. The citizen finds himself before a choice of commitment toward the family so as to make himself feel safe and secure or not to belong to family institutions; thus, he/she loses his/her rights. A percentage of (64.5%) from Hebron indicated that they belonged to family institutions compared with (46%) from Bethlehem. It is worth mentioning that the degree of family institutionalization in Hebron is more than it is in Bethlehem as it was clarified by the family councils “*Dawawin*” that are spread in Hebron, but do not exist in Bethlehem in the same manner.

The Palestinian Authority dedicate to the clan/family issue a great attention due to its capability to influence peoples’ life. That is why a section in the Palestinian Ministry of Interior was established and named, “ General Administration of Clan and Reconciliation Affairs” . Its activity is concentrated in the southern region in Hebron. They hold periodic meetings with the clans and families representatives. There are several instances of praise of the role the clans perform in keeping security in the Palestinian regions. The regional office seeks to activate the role of clan notables in Hebron, Bethlehem and Jericho. The Authority sees that, “ the clans enjoy a special place in conflict resolutions and reinforcement of stability, security and affability concepts side by side with the general law and the role of the security apparatus”. This is not limited to this; in fact, the

reconciliation figures in Hebron demand from the Ministry of Interior to, “ essentially provide financial funds to those reconciliation figures and notables.” (Ma’an Agency, 2010).

According to our information, the Palestinian police is incapable of resolving any dispute without referring to clan chief “*sheikhs*” especially in Hebron. In order to clarify the positions of the clan *sheikhs*, we will shed light on an interview conducted with two of the sheikhs\ chief of two large families in Hebron Fathi Iwiwi and Naji Abu Snineh about the nature of their work and its importance in solving disputes in the area from their own point of view. Iwiwi says, “ If there were an Authority to the full sense of the word, things would not have reached to this... However, there is not such an Authority. That is why we in Hebron solve our problems by ourselves.” The Authority is unable to protect itself and the people as a result of the political conditions it experiences in the Palestinian territories in addition to the Israeli occupation measures which contribute to the spread of some chaos. In an attempt to control what they call an escalating chaos, Iwiwi, Jabari, Abu Sninah and other local leaders step in to fill the vacuum and deal with homicide crimes, robbery and land disputes. Their influence is derived from the traditional clan norms and sentiments in the Palestinian society, since they are capable if needs be to ask for support and solidarity from hundreds of relatives. Iwiwi adds, “ I can make one phone call and in half an hour (500) person will come right away.” He added that when the Palestinian Authority forces entered into Hebron for the first time 13 years ago, they were strong enough to impose the law and order , but with the passage of time, it lost the might it used to enjoy. He also adds that “ the situation is getting worse and worse”. If reconciliation and clan leaders disappear from the West Bank, there would be fights and quarrels among the citizens.” Iwiwi’s work is not only limited to Hebron; he helped in reaching reconciliation agreements relating to homicide crimes in Nablus to the north of the West Bank.

Sheikh Naji Mustafa Abu Snainah added that he recently intervened into a dispute over four Acres “*fiddans*” of land in Bethlehem. Every rival sought the help of a legal expert to validate his right to own the land. It was possible that this dispute might develop into violence. He added concerning the conditions witnessed by Hebron that, “ the absence of security in Hebron lead to an arms rush among the people ; the situation reached to the extent that some families starved themselves just for the sake of buying and stockpiling weapons.”

Concerning the precedence that Hebron witnessed when there was an attack on the police station in Hebron in November 2008, it came as a result of a dispute between a police officer and a member of Jabari family. This situation developed and lead to the killing of the latter. Then, Jabari family members attacked Hebron police station with guns and hijacked 15 police officers, shot 6 policemen and they sustained leg injuries; they also set 16 police vehicles on fire. Security officials said that they were greatly

unable to quell violence and stand in the face of clan influence and power. A Palestinian police man who asked that his name remain anonymous said, “ I work for the Authority at my own expense and I pay my phone bill.” He added that the restrictions on the movements of the Palestinian police are huge in Hebron city center where the Israeli army deployed around several Jewish settlements. Following the outbreak of the last Palestinian Intifada in 2000, the Israeli forces patrolled the entire city and only allowed the Palestinian Authority to deploy unarmed Palestinian security troops. He went on to say, “ an unarmed security officer cannot arrest a drug dealer since he cannot protect himself in the first place.”

As for the position of the family, Arif Jabari former Hebron governor and a minister without a portfolio accused the Palestinian police of committing a “detestable act” of unnecessarily using excessive force. Jabari said, “the incident is so simple, a young man had a traffic accident and had a verbal quarrel with a police officer, he was provocative in his talk, so he called later a large number of reinforcement; there is no need for this state of alert.” He added, “ they opened fire in an unwise and unsound manner.” “ the issue is big and the action is detestable, there are injured people who were admitted to hospital , it should not pass by like this.” He gave advice to the leadership of security departments, “ I advised them and told them there should be wisdom and you have to win support of the people rather than making them your enemies.”

This is an example of the nature of the clan structure in the Palestinian territories which differs from one city to another in its might and influence. In general, all the members of the middle class agreed on the negative role of the clans since it is a kind of tribal bigotry. In spite of the role of the clans in the resolution of conflicts, they obstruct the implementation of the law. Mahmoud Fanoun explains that the family has a very negative role in dragging itself into tribal wars. There is no positive role for them; we never heard of a family that contributed to the establishment of the infra structure, but we hear a lot of complaints from the people about the revel and roistering of some families and this leads to violations of small families rights.”

We move now to review a different topic which is the dimension of religious, social and political tolerance as it shown in table no. (62 & 63).

Dimension of Tolerance

To identify the differences in the dimension of tolerance according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test, as it shown in tables no. (62 & 63):

Table No. (62). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in Total degree of Tolerance due to the governorate.

<i>Tolerance</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
T74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	Between groups	2.723	1	2.723	5.183	0.023
	Within groups	209.075	398	0.525		
	Total	211.798	399	-		
T75. Most of the time, people help each other.	Between groups	0.090	1	0.090	0.107	0.743
	Within groups	333.820	398	0.839		
	Total	333.910	399	-		
T76. In general, most people can be trusted.	Between groups	3.063	1	3.063	2.940	0.087
	Within groups	414.515	398	1.041		
	Total	417.578	399	-		
T77. I am suspicious when dealing with people.	Between groups	0.723	1	0.723	0.793	0.374
	Within groups	363.555	398	0.911		
	Total	363.278	399	-		
T78. I believe people are good by nature.	Between groups	0.090	1	0.090	0.107	0.744
	Within groups	335.910	398	0.844		
	Total	336	399	-		
T79. Palestinian society values are values that believe in pluralism and tolerance.	Between groups	0.640	1	0.640	0.829	0.363
	Within groups	307.110	398	0.772		
	Total	307.750	399	-		
T80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.	Between groups	39.063	1	39.063	38.782	0.000
	Within groups	400.875	398	1.007		
	Total	439.938	399	-		
T81. I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	Between groups	1.323	1	1.323	1.945	0.164
	Within groups	270.615	398	0.680		
	Total	271.938	399	-		
Total degree of Tolerance dimension	Between groups	1.425	1	1.425	7.677	0.006
	Within groups	73.878	398	0.186		
	Total	75.303	399	-		

The findings in the tables no. (62 & 63) show that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following negative sentence according to governorate: “T80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.”, where the α level =0.000, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is low, with a mean of (2.32), and there are statistically

Table No. (63). Mean scores and standard deviation for the dimension of tolerance according to governorate.

<i>Tolerance</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
T74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	Bethlehem	200	4.56	0.662
	Hebron	200	4.40	0.782
T75. Most of the time, people help each other.	Bethlehem	200	3.53	0.061
	Hebron	200	3.50	0.069
T76. In general, most people can be trusted.	Bethlehem	200	3.01	1.010
	Hebron	200	3.18	1.031
T77. I am suspicious when dealing with people.	Bethlehem	200	3.46	0.907
	Hebron	200	3.38	1.000
T78. I believe people are good by nature.	Bethlehem	200	3.52	0.897
	Hebron	200	3.49	0.940
T79. Palestinian society values are values that believe in pluralism and tolerance.	Bethlehem	200	3.72	0.859
	Hebron	200	3.64	0.898
T80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.	Bethlehem	200	2.23	1.145
	Hebron	200	1.60	0.839
T81. I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	Bethlehem	200	4.15	0.798
	Hebron	200	4.03	0.850
Total degree of Tolerance dimension	Bethlehem	200	3.5194	0.40724
	Hebron	200	3.4000	0.45321

Please note: the sentences that are carrying a code (T77, T80) are **Negative** sentences. And the sentences that are carrying a code (T74, T75, T76, T78, T79, T81) are **Positive** sentences.

significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentence according to governorate : “T74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion”, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is high, with a mean of (4.56). In general, there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in total degree of tolerance, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the degree of agree is medium, with a mean of (3.51).

Based on the above mentioned data, it is clear to us that the research sample possesses a high degree of tolerance. It was higher in Bethlehem than in Hebron. The results confirmed the theoretical analysis in the third chapter. It is a general characteristic that is linked with the Palestinian society in spite of the presence of differences in favor of Bethlehem.

It is worth noting that the results of this table regarding the statement, “T80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells” that the percentage was (14.7%) in Bethlehem opposed to (4%) in Hebron. In spite of the fact that the calculated degree is low as demonstrated by the mean in Bethlehem (2.23) compared with (1.60) in Hebron, we tried to draw more clarification of the reasons for such responses. We found out that a rate of (30%) of the total Christians in Bethlehem agreed to this while (4%) of Hebron residents supported it. These differences are due to Christian religion in Bethlehem while it refers to Hebron residents.

In spite of the fact that our topic here does not concern religion, it is important to clarify this in order not to have a misunderstanding; there is a request from the Christians in Beit Sahour to the Muslims that recitation of the Quran must not be heard on the loudspeakers in preparation for the call for prayer (Azan) especially in the morning; there was an agreement concerning this; the Muslims showed a tolerance and understanding of the Christians' request. This is what really happened. We can see the end outcome and that is the tolerance exhibited by the research sample.

Now we will discuss a basic topic connected with half of the Palestinian society which is the woman. The woman issue will be discussed from the dimension of woman and human rights in order to measure the positions and attitudes of the research sample of the topic of woman political, social, cultural and educational rights.

Dimension of the Woman and Human Rights

To identify the differences in the woman and human rights dimension according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test. Tables no. (64 & 65) show the results:

The findings in the tables no. (64 & 65) indicate that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following negative sentences according to governorate: “HR82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man”, “HR86. The level that the women has reached in the society is considered satisfactory”, “HR91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously”, “HR92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated” and “HR96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls”, the differences are in favor of Hebron, the means of Hebron are higher than Bethlehem, their range between low and medium, as it shown in table no.(65).

On the other hand, there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate: “HR84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state”, “HR87. The woman has the right to freely make decisions which touch her daily life”, “HR88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women”, “HR89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family”, “HR93. I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband.”, and finally, “HR95. I believe that civil law is more capable to do justice to women than any other system out there”, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the means of these sentences are ranging between medium and high, as table no. (65) shows.

The results of the tables below no. (64 & 65) indicate that there are differences and disparity concerning the human rights and woman in particular. Those differences reflect structural dimensions connected with the role and place of the woman in the society and the way how to deal with it and what are her basic rights. The means in Bethlehem are far more supportive of women and human rights than those means of Hebron district. This was referred to in the women aspect and the public sphere. The following percentages support our analysis. A percentage of (53%) from Bethlehem agreed to the statement, “HR84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state.” compared with (29%) in Hebron. We have also found that the differences are not only on the level of the district, but also on the level of gender in the two districts. A percentage of (45%) of the total number of males in Bethlehem agreed to this statement while (61%) of the total number of females. On the level of Hebron, the rate of approval to this effect among males was (23.9%) compared with (35%) among the total number of

Table No. (64). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in dimension of the woman and human rights due to the governorate.

<i>Woman and human right</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
HR82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	Between groups	32.490	1	32.490	24.999	0.000
	Within groups	517.270	398	1.300		
	Total	549.760	399			
HR83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	Between groups	0.723	1	0.723	0.546	0.460
	Within groups	526.215	398	1.322		
	Total	526.938	399	-		
HR84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state.	Between groups	36.603	1	36.603	24.635	0.000
	Within groups	591.335	398	1.486		
	Total	627.938	399	-		
HR85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law.	Between groups	0.360	1	0.360	0.239	0.625
	Within groups	598.350	398	1.503		
	Total	598.710	399	-		
HR86. The level that the women has reached in the society is considered satisfactory.	Between groups	26.010	1	26.010	23.121	0.000
	Within groups	447.740	398	1.125		
	Total	473.750	399	-		
HR87. The woman has the right to freely make decisions which touch her daily life.	Between groups	24.010	1	24.010	27.511	0.000
	Within groups	347.350	398	0.873		
	Total	371.360	399	-		
HR88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	Between groups	8.703	1	8.703	14.882	0.000
	Within groups	232.735	398	0.585		
	Total	241.438	399	-		
HR89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family.	Between groups	23.040	1	23.040	23.552	0.000
	Within groups	389.350	398	0.978		
	Total	412.390	399	-		
HR90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals.	Between groups	3.240	1	3.240	2.761	0.097
	Within groups	467.070	398	1.174		
	Total	470.310	399	-		
HR91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously.	Between groups	23.523	1	23.523	14.361	0.000
	Within groups	651.915	398	1.638		
	Total	675.438	399	-		
HR92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated.	Between groups	95.063	1	95.063	54.792	0.000
	Within groups	690.515	398	1.735		
	Total	785.578	399	-		
HR93. I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband.	Between groups	9.610	1	9.610	11.423	0.001
	Within groups	334.830	398	0.841		
	Total	344.440	399	-		
HR94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society.	Between groups	1.440	1	1.440	1.619	0.204
	Within groups	354.070	398	0.890		
	Total	355.510	399	-		
HR95. I believe that civil law is more capable to do justice to women than any other system out there.	Between groups	12.603	1	12.603	12.587	0.000
	Within groups	398.475	398	1.001		
	Total	411.078	399	-		
HR96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls.	Between groups	15.210	1	15.210	12.839	0.000
	Within groups	471.500	398	1.185		
	Total	486.710	399	-		
Total degree of woman and human right dimension	Between groups	0.026	1	0.026	0.230	0.631
	Within groups	44.204	398	0.111		
	Total	44.229	399	-		

Table No. (65). Mean scores and standard deviation for dimension of the Woman and human rights according to governorate.

<i>Woman and human right</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
HR82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	Bethlehem	200	2.06	0.957
	Hebron	200	2.63	1.279
HR83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	Bethlehem	200	2.75	1.182
	Hebron	200	2.83	1.117
HR84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state.	Bethlehem	200	3.43	1.221
	Hebron	200	2.81	1.217
HR85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law.	Bethlehem	200	3.09	1.231
	Hebron	200	3.15	1.221
HR86. The level that the women has reached in the society is considered satisfactory.	Bethlehem	200	2.47	0.961
	Hebron	200	2.98	1.152
HR87. The woman has the right to freely make decisions which touch her daily life.	Bethlehem	200	4.21	0.816
	Hebron	200	3.72	1.039
HR88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	Bethlehem	200	4.41	0.710
	Hebron	200	4.12	0.816
HR89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family.	Bethlehem	200	4.40	0.826
	Hebron	200	3.92	1.129
HR90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals	Bethlehem	200	3.53	1.084
	Hebron	200	3.35	1.083
HR91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously.	Bethlehem	200	2.10	1.238
	Hebron	200	2.58	1.320
HR92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated.	Bethlehem	200	2.42	1.305
	Hebron	200	3.40	1.330
HR93. I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband.	Bethlehem	200	4.33	0.844
	Hebron	200	4.02	0.985
HR94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society.	Bethlehem	200	3.53	0.789
	Hebron	200	3.41	1.076
HR95. I believe that civil law is more capable to do justice to women than any other system out there.	Bethlehem	200	3.46	0.934
	Hebron	200	3.11	1.063
HR96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls.	Bethlehem	200	1.94	1.016
	Hebron	200	2.33	1.157
Total degree of Woman and human right dimension	Bethlehem	200	3.2047	0.31072
	Hebron	200	3.2207	0.35437

Please note: the sentences that are carrying a code (HR82, HR85, HR86, HR91, HR92, HR96) are **Negative** sentences. And the sentences that are carrying a code (HR83, HR84, HR87, HR88, HR89, HR90, HR93, HR94, HR95) are **Positive** sentences.

females. On the other hand, a percentage of (60.5%) from Bethlehem refused to the statement “HR92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated.” compared with (33%) from Hebron, and also (79.5%) from Bethlehem refused the statement that says: “HR96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls” compared with (66%). At the level of gender in the two governorate. A percentage of (68%) of the total number of males in Bethlehem refused the last statement, while

a percentage of (91%) of the total number of females. On the level of Hebron, the rate of approval to this effect among males was (58.5%) compared with (72.8%) among the total number of females.

We can conclude from the above mentioned that there is a liberated position in Bethlehem toward the woman which is supported by city center, institutions and figures. However, this does not exist in Hebron. The previous male rates in Bethlehem indicate that they are more aware and ready to accept the role and rights of women than those males in Hebron. This gave a different image about the position of the women and their understanding of their rights more than it is with the women in Hebron city.

Nabil Mughrabi adds, “ the chances for education of the woman in Hebron are better than the chances of her employment in Hebron area; the role of the woman is far less than it is in other places especially in the area of employment or in the area of consulting her opinion concerning issues relating to her in particular”.

The following story will proof what we mention above, it is regarding to the experience of Palestinian woman in the municipalities election, the first stage of the local council elections started in the West Bank and Gaza, which included 36 electoral districts, covering all the Palestinian governorates. It started in the West Bank on 24/10/2004 and ended on 23/12/2004.

The Municipality of Halhul in the Hebron Governorate was among the regions that were chosen to be part of the first stage of municipality elections. Indeed that was done on the date referred to. The Palestinian factions and legal persons were active in activating the media committees and social programs presented by the candidates. Faction lists and independent lists were announced, guaranteeing the representation of women candidates.

According to the women quota system, any establishment, organization, party or municipality should have women or men representation by at least (20%) of each sex. Actually women were represented by (20%) of the administrative board of the municipality. And one woman was able to make a success that exceeded by far the majority of votes. Despite that, her victory was not counted as she was considered unable to win the majority of votes. Therefore, only two instead of three became members of the administrative board as they interpreted the law as stating that women should have only a 20% representation. That case aroused the anger of some organizations and the debate continues about granting the third member the right of representation since she was able to win eligibly, which led to a debate about the understanding of the law and the mechanisms of its implementation (Salameh & Da'na, 2006A:86).

This indicates not only the patriarchal structure of the society, but also the weakness of the institutional structure in Hebron. On the other hand, it is the weakness of women movements in the Palestinian society since Iman Shalaldah who is active on the level of women rights in Hebron says, “ we are working on raising the level of societal awareness

of the significance of the role of woman in the society especially in Hebron which is the most conservative Palestinian city in the West Bank .” This is concurrent with the, “ big decline in the role of women movement especially following the foundation of the Authority which minimized the role of the women in the work of institutions rather than popular action as the case was in the First Intifada.”

Dimension of the Civic and Political Participation

To identify the differences in the dimension of civic and political participation according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test. Tables no. (66 & 67) show the results.

Table No. (66). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in the total degree of civic and political participation due to the governorate.

<i>Civic and political participation</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
P97. Do you follow the political news.	Between groups	0.563	1	0.563	0.403	0.526
	Within groups	556.015	398	1.397		
	Total	556.758	399	-		
P98. I attend social and cultural seminars.	Between groups	0.063	1	0.063	0.042	0.838
	Within groups	590.915	398	1.485		
	Total	590.978	399	-		
P99. I attend political meetings.	Between groups	8.410	1	8.410	5.268	0.022
	Within groups	635.350	398	1.596		
	Total	643.760	399	-		
P100. Have you officially complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area.	Between groups	5.760	1	5.760	4.867	0.028
	Within groups	471.030	398	1.183		
	Total	476.790	399	-		
P101. I discuss social problems with other people and try to solve them.	Between groups	4.840	1	4.840	3.514	0.062
	Within groups	548.120	398	1.377		
	Total	552.960	399	-		
P102. I read the news paper.	Between groups	3.240	1	3.240	2.395	0.122
	Within groups	5.38.350	398	1.353		
	Total	541.590	399	-		
P103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council.	Between groups	17.640	1	17.640	8.078	0.005
	Within groups	869.120	398	2.184		
	Total	886.760	399	-		
P104. I participate in protests.	Between groups	18.490	1	18.490	10.677	0.001
	Within groups	689.260	398	1.732		
	Total	707.750	399	-		
P105. How often Do you participate in the municipally elections.	Between groups	0.063	1	0.063	0.024	0.877
	Within groups	1041.115	398	2.616		
	Total	1041.178	399	-		
P106. Do you offer help to others (non relatives) when they need it.	Between groups	2.560	1	2.560	2.949	0.087
	Within groups	345.480	398	0.868		
	Total	348.040	399	-		
P107. Do you participate in activities related to the improvement of living conditions in your area?.	Between groups	0.023	1	0.023	0.016	0.900
	Within groups	565.755	398	1.421		
	Total	565.778	399	-		
P108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	Between groups	3.423	1	3.423	2.930	0.088
	Within groups	464.875	398	1.168		
	Total	468.298	399	-		
Total degree of civic and political participation	Between groups	0.365	1	0.365	0.672	0.413
	Within groups	216.119	398	0.543		
	Total	216.484	399	-		

Table No. (67). Mean scores and standard deviation for the civic and political participation according to governorate

<i>Civic and political participation</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
P97. Do you follow the political news?.	Bethlehem	200	3.37	1.144
	Hebron	200	3.45	1.218
P98. I attend social and cultural seminars.	Bethlehem	200	3.01	1.184
	Hebron	200	2.98	1.252
P99. I attend political meetings.	Bethlehem	200	2.20	1.176
	Hebron	200	2.49	1.345
P100. Have you officially complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area.	Bethlehem	200	1.94	1.042
	Hebron	200	2.18	1.132
P101. I discuss social problems with other people and try to solve them.	Bethlehem	200	3.37	1.100
	Hebron	200	3.15	1.243
P102. I read the news paper.	Bethlehem	200	3.49	1.143
	Hebron	200	3.31	1.183
P103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council.?	Bethlehem	200	3.38	1.612
	Hebron	200	3.80	1.330
P104. I participate in protests.	Bethlehem	200	2.31	1.242
	Hebron	200	2.74	1.386
P105. How often Do you participate in the municipally elections?	Bethlehem	200	3.06	1.696
	Hebron	200	3.08	1.535
P106. Do you offer help to others (non relatives) when they need it?	Bethlehem	200	4.15	0.912
	Hebron	200	3.99	0.951
P107. Do you participate in activities related to the improvement of living conditions in your area?.	Bethlehem	200	3.20	1.260
	Hebron	200	3.22	1.120
P108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	Bethlehem	200	3.24	1.095
	Hebron	200	3.06	1.067
Total degree of civic and political participation .	Bethlehem	200	3.0579	0.73944
	Hebron	200	3.1183	0.73434

Please note: all of the sentences that are carrying a code (P) are **Positive** sentences.

The findings in the tables no.(66 & 67) show that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate : “P99. I attend political meetings”, “P100. Have you officially complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area”, and finally, “P104. I participate in protests.”, the differences are in favor of Hebron, the means of these sentences are ranging between low and medium, as table no. (67) shows.

In general, we can read from table no. (67) that the degree of political and social participation was low and medium as shown by the means. It is interesting to see differences in (3) paragraphs out of (12) in favor of Hebron i.e. Hebron members were characterized by attending political meetings; this is natural especially if we know that (38.7%) of Hebron sample belonged to political parties compared with (33.3%). If we

look, for example, at paragraphs like “ do you read the newspaper” there were no differences; we find that a percentage of (52%) from Bethlehem read the newspaper always and often compared with (44%) in Hebron. As for, “ do you give help when others ask you for it”, a percentage of (46.5%) answered always and often from Bethlehem compared with (31%) from Hebron.

We do believe that the reason for this difference is linked with the family and political structure of Hebron which distinguishes it from Bethlehem in being centralized and including party and institution activities within a family or political central framework compared with decentralization in Bethlehem. This explains the uniqueness of Hebron in the street demonstrations organized by the Islamic political parties especially for religious reasons. The past few years witnessed a considerable number of peaceful demonstrations in Hebron calling for the rise of the Caliphate and they were organized by the Islamic liberation party.

As for the protest against the municipality policies for the sake of improvement of the living standards in Hebron , they are more in Hebron than in Bethlehem. The reason might be due to the fact that Hebron residents suffer more on the level of infrastructure like (electricity, streets, sewerage system, water ...etc) than in Bethlehem. The Census report indicated that the situation of the infrastructure in Bethlehem is much better than that in Hebron (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009A&B).

We move now to an important dimension of the civic culture which is trust in the state, institutions and leaderships. We see that this aspect is linked with the results of the evaluation dimension of the government performance as was tackled earlier.

Dimension of Trusting the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders

To identify the differences in the dimension of trusting the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders dimension according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test. Tables no. (68 & 69) show the results.

Tables no.(68 & 69) show that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate : “TRUST109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen)”, “TRUST110. Palestinian Police”, “TRUST111. Legislative parliaments members”, “TRUST112. Religious leaders”, “TRUST113. Politicians”, “TRUST114. Security forces” and finally, “TRUST115. The legislative Council performance”, the differences are in favor of Hebron, the means of these sentences are medium, as table no. (69) shows.

There is a general characteristic in the results of table (69) of the responses of the research sample. It is as follows: the degree of trust drops if it heads toward an institution or a person linked with politics; it rises the more the issue is linked with a civil issue or activity.

On the level of statistical differences, they were in favor of Hebron; this confirms the results of the evaluation of the two governorate of the governments of Hamas and Fatah and were in favor of Hebron too. This reinforces our impression that the structure of Hebron regardless of the ideological attitude adopted by the individual in it is that it is closer to support of the political system regardless of the fact that the individual adopts the state ideology or opposes it.

It is a culture that reinforces the stability of the political system which was referred to by Almond and Verba (1960). As for Bethlehem, the research results showed that there is a more critical position than the case in Hebron whether it is at the level of evaluation of the political system of Hamas or Fatah governments or with regard to the low degree of trust. This is also documented by the results of the table no.(69). As for the trust in clergy (Religious leaders), the rate of trust was higher among Hebron sample than it is in Bethlehem. It is (49.5%) and (32%) respectively. A percentage of (34.5%) from Hebron responded that they trusted president Abu Mazen while a percentage of (23%) from Bethlehem trusted the president.

Table No. (68). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in Trust the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders due to the governorate.

<i>Trust the performance</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
TRUST109. The President of PA (Abo Mazen)	Between groups	8.703	1	8.703	5.285	0.022
	Within groups	655.375	398	1.647		
	Total	664.078	399	-		
TRUST110. Palestinian Police.	Between groups	12.603	1	12.603	9.868	0.002
	Within groups	508.275	398	1.277		
	Total	520.878	399	-		
TRUST111. Legislative parliaments members.	Between groups	18.923	1	18.923	19.044	0.000
	Within groups	395.455	398	0.994		
	Total	414.378	399	-		
TRUST112. Religious leaders.	Between groups	14.823	1	14.823	13.465	0.000
	Within groups	438.115	398	1.101		
	Total	452.938	399	-		
TRUST113. Politicians.	Between groups	16	1	16	17.689	0.000
	Within groups	360	398	0.905		
	Total	376	399	-		
TRUST114. Security forces.	Between groups	10.240	1	10.240	8.885	0.003
	Within groups	458.720	398	1.153		
	Total	468.960	399	-		
TRUST115. The legislative Council performance.	Between groups	16.810	1	16.810	17.114	0.000
	Within groups	390.940	398	0.982		
	Total	407.750	399	-		
TRUST116. Palestinian Judiciary system.	Between groups	3.610	1	3.610	3.844	0.051
	Within groups	373.750	398	0.939		
	Total	377.360	399	-		
TRUST117. Palestinian Universities.	Between groups	2.403	1	2.403	2.819	0.094
	Within groups	339.195	398	0.852		
	Total	341.598	399	-		
TRUST118. Palestinian Press.	Between groups	0.040	1	0.040	0.058	0.810
	Within groups	276.520	398	0.695		
	Total	276.560	399	-		
TRUST119. Palestinian civil society organizations.	Between groups	0.563	1	0.563	0.842	0.359
	Within groups	265.875	398	0.668		
	Total	266.438	399	-		
TRUST120. Former TV's .	Between groups	0.723	1	0.723	0.779	0.378
	Within groups	369.055	398	0.927		
	Total	369.778	399	-		
TRUST121. Independent civic media.	Between groups	0.723	1	0.723	1.080	0.299
	Within groups	266.255	398	0.669		
	Total	266.978	399	-		
TRUST122. Local authorities (municipality, popular committee).	Between groups	1.210	1	1.210	1.738	0.188
	Within groups	277.030	398	0.696		
	Total	278.240	399	-		
Total degree of Trust the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders dimension	Between groups	5.063	1	5.063	12.621	0.000
	Within groups	159.649	398	0.401		
	Total	164.712	399	-		

Table No. (69). Mean scores and standard deviation for the Trust the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders according to governorate.

<i>Trust the Performance of ..</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
TRUST109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen).	Bethlehem	200	2.51	1.272
	Hebron	200	2.81	1.294
TRUST110. Palestinian Police.	Bethlehem	200	2.81	1.115
	Hebron	200	3.16	1.145
TRUST111. Legislative parliaments members.	Bethlehem	200	2.68	1.022
	Hebron	200	3.11	0.971
TRUST112. Religious leaders.	Bethlehem	200	3:00	1.059
	Hebron	200	3.38	1.040
TRUST113. Politicians.	Bethlehem	200	2.60	0.946
	Hebron	200	3:00	0.956
TRUST114. Security forces.	Bethlehem	200	2.58	1.086
	Hebron	200	2.90	1.061
TRUST115. The legislative Council performance.	Bethlehem	200	2.62	1.025
	Hebron	200	3.03	0.956
TRUST TRUST116. Palestinian Judiciary system.	Bethlehem	200	2.95	0.963
	Hebron	200	3.14	0.975
TRUST117. Palestinian Universities.	Bethlehem	200	3.63	0.937
	Hebron	200	3.78	0.909
TRUST118. Palestinian Press.	Bethlehem	200	3.43	0.894
	Hebron	200	3.45	0.768
TRUST119. Palestinian civil society organizations.	Bethlehem	200	3.33	0.795
	Hebron	200	3.40	0.839
TRUST120. Former TV's .	Bethlehem	200	3.13	0.945
	Hebron	200	3.21	0.980
TRUST121. Independent civic media.	Bethlehem	200	3.41	0.778
	Hebron	200	3.33	0.856
TRUST 122. Local authorities (municipality, popular committee).	Bethlehem	200	3.07	0.815
	Hebron	200	3.18	0.853
Total degree of Trust the performance of formal, and civic institutions, and leaders dimension	Bethlehem	200	2.9793	0.66455
	Hebron	200	3.2043	0.60053

Please note: all of the sentences that are carrying a code (TRUST)are **Positive** sentences.

We can conclude from the above mentioned that Hebron is closer to the dominance of the one dimension ; this is natural in a conservative and traditional environment compared to that of Bethlehem; this manner denies multiple views and ways of life.

This directs us to review the last dimension of civic culture which is the dimension of pluralism or Multi party system.

Dimension of the Multi-party System

To identify the differences in the dimension of the multi-party system according to the governorate, the researcher used (One Way Anova) test. Tables no. (70 & 71) show the results.

The findings in the tables no. (70 & 71) indicate that there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following negative sentences according to governorate: “M125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation” and “M130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior”, the differences are in favor of Hebron, the means of Hebron are higher than Bethlehem, their degree are medium, as it shown in table no.(71).

On the other hand, there are statistically significant differences at the level of $\alpha = 0.05$ in the following positive sentences according to governorate : “M123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society”, “M124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views”, “M126. Diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing”, “M127. Multi religion coexistence(christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance”, “M128. Although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them”, and finally “M129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity”, the differences are in favor of Bethlehem, the means of these sentences are ranging between medium and high, as table no. (71) shows.

The results of table no. (71) show that the differences were in favor of Bethlehem. It is clear to us from the means and percentages like (87%) from Bethlehem compared with (76%) from Hebron regarding the following statement, “M124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views” A percentage of (82.5%) from Bethlehem compared with (57.5%) from Hebron agreed to , “The religious presence (Islamic Christian) in Palestine contributed to tolerance.” A percentage of (29.5%) from Bethlehem and (48.5%) from Hebron agreed to the statement, “M130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior..”

Nidal Abu Akir supports pluralism in the Palestinian society since, “the society is made up of classes, groups and sector and it is multiple at the cultural and ideological level, at the level of religions and necessarily when these social, economic and economic structures express themselves through parties or movements. The rule of the law positively contributes to this diversity which helps social mobility and then development of the society.” Iman Shalaldah adds, “ the secret behind the development of the peoples and societies is their capability to assimilate diversity and plurality inside the same society; this leads to the construction of a democratic society.”

Table No. (70). One Way Analysis of Variance for the differences in the dimension of multi-party system due to the governorate.

Multi-Party System	Source	Sum of Squares	DF	Mean Square	F-Value	Sig.
M123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	Between groups	24.010	1	24.010	25.620	0.000
	Within groups	372.990	398	0.937		
	Total	397	399	-		
M124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views.	Between groups	7.840	1	7.840	12.998	0.000
	Within groups	240.070	398	0.603		
	Total	247.910	399	-		
M125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation.	Between groups	38.440	1	38.440	32.862	0.000
	Within groups	466.560	398	1.170		
	Total	504	399	-		
M126. Diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing.	Between groups	21.160	1	21.160	18.506	0.000
	Within groups	455.080	398	1.143		
	Total	476.240	399	-		
M127. Multi religion coexistence (christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance.	Between groups	24.503	1	24.503	34.426	0.000
	Within groups	283.275	398	0.712		
	Total	307.778	399	-		
M128. Although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them.	Between groups	7.563	1	7.563	10.841	0.001
	Within groups	277.635	398	0.698		
	Total	285.198	399	-		
M129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	Between groups	6.760	1	6.760	8.796	0.003
	Within groups	305.880	398	0.769		
	Total	312.640	399	-		
M130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior.	Between groups	12.960	1	12.960	10.193	0.002
	Within groups	506.040	398	1.271		
	Total	519	399	-		
Total degree of multi-party system	Between groups	2.560	1	2.560	11.862	0.001
	Within groups	85.896	398	0.216		
	Total	88.456	399	-		

The religious, social and political plurality and the state of daily interaction which Bethlehem witnesses has contributed in one way or another to create a state of health sound pluralism based on respect of the other and his/her point of view. This is what the historical experience misses in Hebron in addition to the political conditions which prevented the development and introduction of the city to different experiences over more than a century.

Table No. (71). Mean scores and standard deviation for the dimension of the Multi-Party System according to governorate .

<i>Multi-Party System</i>	<i>Governorate</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
M123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	Bethlehem	200	3.90	0.835
	Hebron	200	3.41	1.085
M124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views.	Bethlehem	200	4.16	0.681
	Hebron	200	2.88	0.862
M125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation .	Bethlehem	200	2.19	1.039
	Hebron	200	2.81	1.123
M126. Diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing.	Bethlehem	200	3.61	1.016
	Hebron	200	3.15	1.120
M127. Multi religion coexistence(christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance.	Bethlehem	200	4.08	0.683
	Hebron	200	3.59	0.979
M128. Although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them.	Bethlehem	200	4.04	0.736
	Hebron	200	3.77	0.924
M129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	Bethlehem	200	3.91	0.797
	Hebron	200	3.65	0.950
M130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior.	Bethlehem	200	2.87	1.104
	Hebron	200	3.23	1.151
Total degree of multi-party system	Bethlehem	200	3.5938	0.43604
	Hebron	200	3.4338	0.49143

Please note: the sentences that are carrying a code (M125, M130) are **Negative** sentences. And the sentences that are carrying a code (M123, M124, M126, M127, M128, M129) are **Positive** sentences.

Since this is the last dimension of civic culture, we can make a generalization based on the research results. It is very closely related with the social, cultural, conservative and traditional structure of Hebron. All the negative statements (nondemocratic practices contradict with human and women rights ... etc) which measure the civic culture were more supported by Hebron than in Bethlehem including pluralism.

How do residents imagine the city image?

In this regard, we will review several aspects which we do believe are important and directly connected with the different social, cultural, religious and political life patterns of the residents of the two governorates. This aspect is considered complementary to what was already analyzed in the previous chapters. In order to fulfill this, we will divide it into several topics which complement one another. However, we opted for this in order to have clear discussion of thoughts:

Identity of the city

The research sample from Bethlehem and Hebron were asked this question in order to see how the citizens view themselves since this is also important for their behaviors which implicitly relate to the city reputation. We have previously talked about how the reputation of Hebron district prevents its residents to follow certain behaviors which are inconsistent with its reputation. Otherwise, they would be interpreted as an insult to a city that hosts the tomb of the prophet Abraham. In order to do so, we have adopted Chi-Square distribution as shown in table (72).

Table No. (72). Chi-Square test for the differences in the identity of the city according to governorate ,

<i>Governorate</i>	<i>Do you think that your city is:</i>					<i>Total</i>
	Conservative in its style of life	Traditional in its style of life	Tolerant in its style of life	Open in its style of life	Librated in its style of life	
Bethlehem	27 13.5%	57 28.5%	36 18%	64 32%	16 8%	200 100%
Hebron	100 50%	61 30.5%	24 12%	12 6%	3 1.5%	200 100%
Total	127 31.8%	118 29.5%	60 15%	76 19%	19 4.8%	400 100%

Chi-Square=88.970

DF=4

Sig=0.000

In spite of the presence of statistically significant differences that prove our proposition, the level of this significance will not be taken into consideration since it is considered a column in the table which includes a percentage less than (5%). It is enough to indicate here the most important percentages which give a general impression about the citizens' perspective of their city. Half of the residents of Hebron at a rate of (50%) see that their city is conservative in its way of life while (30.5%) mentioned that it was traditional. When we add the two percentages, they will be (80.5%) of the city residents who view their city as traditional and conservative. These percentages reflect how the awareness of the individual's stereotyping is formed about the form, nature and living

requirements in such a city and in a manner in one way or another that harmonizes with their perspective of their city. This comes with the interpretation that the imposition of behaviors, values and fashion must be linked with this conservative image. Although (12%) mentioned that Hebron is tolerant, I see that it is closer to a stereotyping which is closer to the pattern closer to religion rather than a pattern of civic life. This also applies to Bethlehem.

The table results confirm that the image of Bethlehem differs qualitatively and quantitatively from what was mentioned earlier. There is more distribution of all options. In spite of this, we see that the percentage of those who mentioned that their city is open and liberated in the way of life is (40%). If we add to it the percentage of those who considered it as tolerant, the percentage would be (58%). This view of the city constitutes patterns and values which must harmonize with the social imagination which was set up as the citizens believe in it; consequently, there will be a larger space from Hebron who wish to be closer to the pattern of civic life. This is what I meant about the significance of having a civil and modern reference in the heart of Bethlehem which Hebron city misses.

Individual Identity

The previous analysis is also connected with a question about the definition of the individual of his identity and how to define it. The research sample was asked to introduce themselves in accordance with seven options to prioritize them according to importance. Number (1) is the most important and number (7) is the least important (see Appendix No.13). We do find that one of the most important results of this table is the harmony between the two cities in the significance of the individual identity to introduce themselves. It is also noticed that there are essential differences between Bethlehem and Hebron especially regarding the religious identity. A percentage of (28.8%) from Hebron chose religion first compared with (4.1%) from Bethlehem. Arab identity (18.1%) Bethlehem and (12.5%) Hebron; Palestinian identity (17.5%) Bethlehem and (14%) Hebron. We notice here the significance of religion in introducing the self according to Hebron residents and Bethlehem residents. However, we can say that religion in Bethlehem is closer to civic religion more than it is in Hebron. We also found out that the Arab nationality and Palestinian identities are the most important identities in the introduction of the self in Bethlehem city.

As for the political identity, it is as we mentioned earlier; it did not enjoy any importance among the two sides since this reflects the state of weakness concerning affiliation to a political party. Bethlehem evaluated the political performance of the political parties in general as negative at a rate of (80.3%) compared with (69%) in Hebron.

Societal Conditions

The social and political conditions along with the customs and traditions control the Palestinian society in general in addition to state of seclusion of the Palestinian cities. This prevented the creation of a state of social and cultural mobility which made the experience of the Palestinian cities unique as a result of its conditions and elite as mentioned earlier. We will now review some of the paragraphs of the questions which support the conservative and traditional attitudes in Hebron city more than in Bethlehem on the level of the citizen. A percentage of (18%) from Bethlehem agreed to the following statement, “ Blind Obedience is the good means to create a good citizen” compared with (38%) from Hebron. Customs and traditions, “ we have to hold fast to customs and traditions” (48.5%) in Bethlehem compared with (59%) from Hebron. In education, “ I encourage my children to be independent in their choices away from my own point of view.” A percentage of (71.5%) from Bethlehem compared with (66%) from Hebron agreed to this. Civic life, “ Theatres and Cinemas play a positive role in the development of the civic and social culture; I am in favor of having them in the city.” A percentage of (64.5%) from Bethlehem compared with (48%) from Hebron agreed to it. Making decisions, “ I support the pyramid system in making decisions”; a percentage of (47%) from Bethlehem compared with (68%) from Hebron agreed to it.

Societal Needs

What does the society want; if it is given a chance to make a decision. This is the question that was directed to the research sample in order to see the priorities of projects that the Palestinian National Authority must fulfill. It reflects the implicit needs of the individuals , way of thinking and life pattern. Table no. (73) clarifies to us the responses of the citizens.

Table No. (73). Chi-Square test for the differences in the type of project that the governorate need.

Governorate	Projects based on the concerns of citizens								Total
	Economic projects	Tackling unemployment	Social justice	Educational reform and university	Reform of the civil and judicial systems	The reform of political parties	The fight against corruption and bribery	The fight against nepotism	
Bethlehem	32 16%	36 18%	21 10.5%	19 9.5%	5 2.5%	44 22%	17 8.5%	26 13%	200 100%
Hebron	30 15.2%	64 32.3%	16 8.1%	16 8.1%	7 3.5%	29 14.7%	21 10.6%	15 7.6%	198 100%
Total	62 15.2%	100 25.1%	37 9.3%	35 8.8%	12 3%	73 18.3%	38 9.5%	41 10.3	398 100%

Chi-Square =15.615a

D.F= 7

Sig= 0.029

We notice that the majority of Hebron residents prefer as first rank that the Authority deals with the issue of unemployment at a rate of (32.2%) second economic projects

(15.2%). As for Bethlehem, the first choice was reformation of political parties (22%) second unemployment (15.2%). A percentage of (10.5%) from Bethlehem chose social justice compared with (8.1%). In spite of the priorities of the living and economic conditions which surround the Palestinian society, the majority of the Bethlehem sample gave priority to reformation of the political parties. The majority of responses in Hebron was concentrated in the economic aspect. The distribution of Bethlehem sample answers was interesting. It reflected the attitudes of the state of diversity which touches the civic life which the district experiences compared with Hebron.

Final Conclusion

Following a review of the research results in which all the comparisons of the aspects and manifestations of the civic attitudes between Bethlehem and Hebron were proved, I can state the following:

- The structure of Hebron is conservative and lacks the political, cultural and religious diversity which is supported by a conservative traditional governorate which was based and developed within a historical and political context which contributed to the crystallization of the residents' identity in harmony with the city reputation compared with the state of relative openness and diversity in Bethlehem city besides the presence of a civilized modern reference in the city center which contributed to the spread of concepts, values and behaviors associated with city life more than in the countryside (see Appendix No.14).
- The discourse of the elite, institutions and leaderships of civil and political action in Bethlehem is closer to the modern discourse which is associated with the image of the open city on the world compared with the traditional religious discourse which controls the civic and political institutions in Hebron which made the city center an extension of the culture and values of the countryside.
- Kinds and variation in the experience of the Palestinian refugees in Bethlehem differ from those in Hebron; the refugees were more integrated into the city life and more influenced by its values since they were centralized in the heart of the city. This is clear from the ability and influence of refugee elite that it possesses in the political and social decision making in the life of Bethlehem more than the case with Hebron (see Appendix No.14).
- Education and the historic experience of it are considered an important aspect in the opening of options, ways of life and widening of the perceptions of holders of academic degrees. It is stressed that Bethlehem is the first Palestinian city which started investment in this respect. This was expressed by statistics which indicated that the low level of illiteracy, number of degree holders and the size of the modern middle class were better in Bethlehem than in Hebron.
- The percentage of the gap between the education of males and females in Bethlehem is small compared to Hebron along with the percentage of its representation in the occupations of the modern middle class.
- There were not striking differences between the countryside, camp and city in Bethlehem on the level of work, education, family size, and size of the middle class as the case in Hebron. This signifies that there is diversity and spread of

experience in Bethlehem besides the case of interaction between them more than in Hebron.

- The disparity in the social and cultural structure of the two cities was expressed through the differences and dissimilarities regarding the attitudes and positions of the two cities toward civic values and dimensions (democracy, human rights, secularism, pluralism and tolerance) the percentage of support of positive manifestations of the civic culture in Bethlehem exceeded that of Hebron in addition to the support of attitudes and values of negative manifestations and uncivilized values by Hebron more than in Bethlehem.
- The same is inferred from the civic options, the relatively open life style and pattern, mixed universities and schools, mixed restaurants, bars, civic tastes which are available in Bethlehem rather than in Hebron.

RESEARCH GLOSSARY

Caliphate: The caliphate represented the political leadership of the Muslim Ummah (Nation). The head of state's position (caliph) is based on the notion of a successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammad's political authority.

City: A city is an urban area with a high population density and a particular administrative, legal, or historical status. Cities generally have advanced systems for sanitation, utilities, land usage, housing, and transportation and more. This proximity greatly facilitates interaction between people and businesses, benefiting both parties in the process. However, there is debate now whether the age of technology and instantaneous communication with the use of the Internet are making cities obsolete.

Civic Virtues : They are personal habits and attitudes that are conducive to social harmony and group well-being. The identification of the character traits that constitute civic virtue has been a major concern of political philosophy. The term civility refers to behaviour between persons and groups that conforms to a social mode (that is, in accordance with the civil society), as itself being a foundational principle of society and law.

Civil Society : It is composed of the totality of voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a functioning society as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state (regardless of that state's political system) and commercial institutions of the market.

Hizb ut-Tahrir: (Islamic Liberation party) is an international pan-Islamist, Sunni, vanguard, political party whose goal is to combine all Muslim countries in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate, ruled by Islamic law and with a caliph head of state elected by Muslims. The organization was founded in (1953) in Jerusalem by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, an Islamic scholar and appeals court judge , from Ijzim, Palestine.

Islamic Movement [Hamas]: It is an Islamic Palestinian socio-political organization which believe in building Islamic state . Since June (2007), Hamas has governed the Gaza portion of the Palestinian Territories. Hamas was created in 1987 by *Sheikh* Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi and Mohammad Taha of the Palestinian wing of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the First Intifada, an uprising against Israeli occupation in the Palestinian Territories.

Intifada : Is an Arabic word which literally means "shaking off", though it is usually translated into English as "rebellion" or "uprising" and it connected with Palestinian resistance against Israeli Occupation, and there are two intifada in the Palestinian contemporary History; the First Intifada (1987–1991) and The Second Intifada, also

known as the al-Aqsa Intifada was the second Palestinian uprising, a period of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence, which began in late September (2000). “Al-Aqsa” is the name of a prominent Muslim mosque.

Islamic Sharia’: Sharia is the body of Islamic religious law. The term means “way” or “path to the water source”; it is the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on fiqh (Islamic principles of jurisprudence) and for Muslims living outside the domain. Sharia deals with many aspects of day-to-day life, including politics, economics, banking, business, contracts, family, sexuality, hygiene, and social issues.

Kinship: It is relationship by blood (consanguinity) or marriage (affinity) between persons; it is a system of rules, based on such relationships, governing descent, inheritance, marriage. All societies recognize consanguineal and affinal ties between individuals, but there is great divergence in the manner of reckoning descent and relationship. Kinship patterns are so specific and elaborate that they constitute an important and independent field of anthropological and sociological investigation. In many societies the concept of kinship extends beyond family ties, which vary in breadth and inclusiveness, to less precisely defined groupings such as the clan, where consanguinity is often hypothetical if not actually mythological. As a rule, however, these groups maintain incest taboos as strict as those for close biological relatives.

Kinship organization : It is pattern of organization that established by the family for it’s members, it works as a body of decision making related to the family interest, through political cultural, economical and education assistance and support to their families member, this type of organization quite familiar in Hebron, they call it as “*Dawawin*” .

Palestine Liberation Movement [Fatah] : It is a Palestinian political party founded in the late (1950s) by a group of Palestinian exiles working in the countries of the Arab Gulf. The party did not have one dingle founding member, nor, in its early years, a single leader. But Fatah's most recognizable founder, and eventually its autocratic leader, was Yasser Arafat, who gave up a lucrative job as an engineer in Kuwait (and a pink Thunderbird convertible) to help establish the party. Fatah is Arabic for, literally, “opening,” although the word is closer in spirit to “victory” or “conquest.”

Palestinian National Initiative [MOBADARA]: It is a Palestinian political movement or party led by Dr. Mustafa Barghouti. Its formation was formally announced on June 17, (2002) in Ramallah on the West Bank, part of the Palestinian Territories, by Dr. Haidar Abdel-Shafi, Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi and Ibrahim Dakkak. The PNI views itself as a “democratic third force” in Palestinian politics, and opposes the dichotomy between Fatah (which it views as corrupt and undemocratic) and Hamas (which it views as extremist and fundamentalist).

Pluralism: Pluralism is, in the general sense, the acknowledgment of diversity. The concept is used, often in different ways, in a wide range of issues. In politics, pluralism is often considered by proponents of modern democracy to be in the interests of its citizens, and so political pluralism is one of its most important features.

The term pluralism is also used to denote a theoretical standpoint on state and power - which to varying degrees suggest that pluralism is an adequate model of how power is distributed in societies. In democratic politics, pluralism is a guiding principle which permits the peaceful coexistence of different interests, convictions and lifestyles. In this context it has normative connotations absent from its use to denote a theoretical standpoint. Unlike totalitarianism or particularism, pluralism acknowledges the diversity of interests and considers it imperative that members of society accommodate their differences by engaging in good-faith negotiation.

Political Culture : It is beliefs and opinions people share about government.

Political Participation : It is activity by individual formally intended to influence either who governs or decision taken by government.

Shura : Is word for “consultation”. It is believed to be the method by which pre-Islamic Arabian selected leaders and made major decisions. Shura is mentioned twice in the Quran as a praiseworthy activity, and is a word often used in the name of parliaments in Muslim-majority countries.

Social Class : It is people having the same social or economic status.

Social Organization : The regularly anticipated and repeated patterns of behavior that are widely observable in social interactions.

Social Structure: The system of formal rules, societal roles, and behavioral norms that constitutes an essential aspect of social organization.

The Culture of Poverty: concept is a social theory explaining the cycle of poverty. Based on the concept that the poor have a unique value system, the culture of poverty theory suggests the poor remain in poverty because of their adaptations to the burdens of poverty.

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP]: It is a Palestinian Marxist-Leninist, secular political and social. It is also frequently referred to as the Democratic Front, It is a member organization of the Palestine Liberation Organization[PLO].led by Naif Hawatmeh.

The Palestine Democratic Union [FIDA]: It is a small Palestinian political party active in the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] and the Palestinian National Authority

[PNA] FIDA formed in (1990) through a split in Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, bringing with it most of the [DFLP] structure in the West Bank. FIDA took a more moderate stance than the main DFLP (led by Naif Hawatmeh) towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has tried to establish itself as a left-wing democratic alternative in Palestinian politics. The youth wing of FIDA is known as Independence Youth Union; there are also workers' and women's groups.

The Palestine Liberation Organization[PLO]: Is a political and paramilitary organization regarded by the Arab League since October (1974) as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964 following an earlier decision of the Arab League, its goal was the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. The original PLO Charter (issued on 28 May 1964) stated that "Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British mandate is an integral regional unit" and sought to "prohibit... the existence and activity" of Zionism. It also called for a right of return and self-determination for Palestinians. Palestinian statehood was not mentioned, although in (1974) the PLO called for an independent state in the territory of Mandate Palestine, the PLO officially endorsed a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side contingent on specific terms such as making East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians the right of return to land occupied by Palestinians prior to the (1948) and (1967) wars with Israeli Occupation.

In 1993, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat recognized the State of Israel in an official letter to its prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. In response to Arafat's letter, Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat was the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee from (1969) until his death in (2004). and now led by Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen).

The Palestinian National Authority [PNA]: Is the administrative organization established to govern parts of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian National Authority was formed in (1994), pursuant to the Oslo Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] and the government of Israel, as a 5-year interim body during which final status negotiations between the two parties were to take place but never did. According to the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority was designated to have control over both security-related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas (referred to as "Area A"), and only civilian control over Palestinian rural areas ("Area B"). The remainder of the territories, including Israeli settlements, the Jordan Valley region, and bypass roads between Palestinian communities, were to remain under exclusive Israeli control ("Area C"). East Jerusalem was excluded from the Accords.

The Palestinian People's Party [PPP]: It founded in (1982) as the Palestinian Communist Party, is a socialist political party in the Palestinian territories and among the Palestinian diaspora. The original Palestine Communist Party had been founded in (1919). After the foundation of the state of Israel and the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, the West Bank communists joined as the Jordanian Communist Party, which gained considerable support among Palestinians. It established a strong position in the Palestinian trade union movement and retained considerable popularity in the West Bank during the (1970s), but its support subsequently declined. In the Gaza strip a separate Palestinian communist organization was established. In February (1982), prominent Palestinian communists held a conference and re-established the Palestinian Communist Party. The new party established relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and joined the PLO in (1987).

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]: Is a Marxist-Leninist, secular, nationalist Palestinian party, founded in (1967). It has consistently been the second-largest of the groups forming the Palestine Liberation Organization (the largest being Fatah). The PFLP has generally taken a hard line on Palestinian national aspirations, opposing the more moderate stance of Fatah. It opposed the Oslo Accords and was for a long time opposed to the idea of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Toleration and tolerance: Toleration and tolerance are terms used in social, cultural and religious contexts to describe attitudes which are “tolerant” (or moderately respectful) of practices or group memberships that may be disapproved of by those in the majority. In practice, “tolerance” indicates support for practices that prohibit ethnic and religious discrimination. Conversely, “intolerance” may be used to refer to the discriminatory practices sought to be prohibited. Though developed to refer to the religious toleration of minority religious sects following the Protestant Reformation, these terms are increasingly used to refer to a wider range of tolerated practices and groups, or of political parties or ideas widely considered objectionable.

Urban: An urban area is an area with an increased density of human-created structures in comparison to the areas surrounding it. Urban areas may be cities, towns or conurbations, but the term is not commonly extended to rural settlements such as villages and hamlets. Urban areas are created and further developed by the process of urbanization. Measuring the extent of an urban area helps in analyzing population density and urban sprawl, and in determining urban and rural populations.

Urban Culture: Is the culture of cities. Cities all over the world, past and present, have behaviours and cultural elements that separate them from otherwise comparable rural areas.

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INTERVIEWES

Dr. A.F: from Hebron, Doctor, and a member of the “*Hizb Tuhrir*” (Islamic Liberation Party). Date in 16/2/2010.

Mr. Arif Jabari: from Hebron, former Hebron governor and a minister. Date in 18/2/2010.

Mr. Qasem Awad: from Bethlehem, Engineer and instructor at Al-Qudes University. Date in 16/2/2010.

Mr. Fathi Iwiwi: from Hebron, sheikh\chief of family, specialist in tribal law. Date in 16/2/2010.

Dr. Ibrahim Sawalha: from Hebron, he is sympathizes with the Leftist parties. Date in 21/2/2010.

Ms. Iman Shalaldah: from Hebron, she is an active on the level of women rights. Date in 21/2/2010.

Mr. K. S . from Hebron, a captain in the Palestinian police. Date in 19/2/2010.

Mr. Mahmoud Fanuon: from Bethlehem, representative of the PFLP, Date in 20/2/2010.

Mr. Musa Ajwa: from Hebron, one of FATAH leader and academic. Date in 13/2/2010.

Ms. N.A.F. : from Bethlehem and she is active in civic institutions. Date in 20/2/2010.

Dr. Nabil Mughrabi : form Hebron, Aroub refugee camp , a university lecturer at Hebron University. Date in 21/2/2010.

Mr. Naji Abu Snineh: from Hebron, sheikh\chief of family, specialist in tribal law. Date in 16/2/2010.


Mr. Nidal abu Akir: from Bethlehem, Deheisha refugee camp, Political active leftist. Date in 20/2/2010.

Mr. Nizar Ramadan: from Hebron, the Hamas representative and Palestinian parliament member,. Date in 15/2/2010.

LIST OF APPENDIXES


Appendix No. (1)

Shows patterns of Dispersion of Palestinian refugees in (1948)




Appendix No. (2)

Shows map of separation wall



Appendix No. (3)

Shows the Palestinian Areas according to Oslo agreement




Appendix No.(4)

Shows the results of the legislative Election 2006.

Legislative Election, 2006

- Change and Reform (HAMAS)
- Fatah Movement




ElectoralGeography.com

Appendix No.(5)

Shows the divided city of Hebron according to Hebron agreement 1997.

The Divided City of Hebron, Following the Hebron Agreement, 1997



Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)

Appendix No. (6)

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 17th January 1997.

In accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and in particular of Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both Parties have agreed on this Protocol for the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron.

Security Arrangements Regarding Redeployment in Hebron

1. Redeployment in Hebron

The redeployment of Israeli Military Forces in Hebron will be carried out in accordance with the Interim Agreement and this Protocol. This redeployment will be completed not later than ten days from the signing of this Protocol. During these ten days both sides will exert every possible effort to prevent friction and any action that would prevent the redeployment. This redeployment shall constitute full implementation of the provisions of the Interim Agreement with regard to the City of Hebron unless otherwise provided for in Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement.

2. Security Powers and Responsibilities

a)1. The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in Area H-1 similar to those in other cities in the West Bank; and

2. Israel will retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area H-2. In addition, Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis.

b) In this context - both sides reaffirm their commitment to honor the relevant security provisions of the Interim Agreement, including the provisions regarding - Arrangements for Security and Public Order (Article XII of the Interim Agreement); Prevention of Hostile Acts (Article XV of the Interim Agreement); Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence (Article II of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); Guidelines for Hebron (Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); and Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters (Article XI of Annex I to the Interim Agreement).

3. Agreed Security Arrangements

a) With a view to ensuring mutual security and stability in the City of Hebron, special security arrangements will apply adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in Area H-1, in the area between the Palestinian Police checkpoints delineated on

the map attached to this Protocol as Appendix 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the attached map") and the areas under the security responsibility of Israel.

b) The purpose of the above mentioned checkpoints will be to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their responsibilities under the Interim Agreement, to prevent entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other people threatening security and public order, into the above mentioned area.

4. Joint Security Measures

a) The DCO will establish a sub-office in the City of Hebron as indicated on the attached map.

b) JMU will operate in Area H-2 to handle incidents that involve Palestinians only. The JMU movement will be detailed on the attached map. The DCO will co-ordinate the JMU movement and activity.

c) As part of the security arrangements in the area adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, as defined above, Joint Mobile Units will be operating in this area, with special focus on the following places:

1. Abu Sneinah.
2. Harat A-Sheikh.
3. Sha'aba.
4. The high ground overlooking new Route No. 35.

d) Two Joint Patrols will function in Area H-1:

1. a) Joint Patrol which will operate on the road from Ras e-Jura to the north of the Dura junction via E-Salaam Road, as indicated on the attached map; and
2. a Joint Patrol which will operate on existing Route No. 35, including the eastern part of existing Route No. 35, as indicated on the attached map.

e) The Palestinian and Israeli side of the Joint Mobile Units in the City of Hebron will be armed with equivalent types of weapons (Mini-Ingraham submachine guns for the Palestinian side and short M16s for the Israeli side).

f) With a view to dealing with the special security situation in the City of Hebron, a Joint Co-ordination Center (hereinafter the "JCC") headed by senior officers of both sides, will be established in the DCO at Har Manoah/Jabel Manoah. The purpose of the JCC will be

to co-ordinate the joint security measures in the City of Hebron. The JCC will be guided by all the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement, including Annex I and this Protocol. In this context, each side will notify the JCC of demonstrations and actions taken in respect of such demonstrations, and of any security activity, close to the areas under the responsibility of the other side, including in the area defined in Article 3(a) above. The JCC shall be informed of activities in accordance with Article 5(d)(3) of this Protocol.

5. The Palestinian Police

a) Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H-1, manned by a total of up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicles and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations.

b) Four designated Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) will be established and stationed in Area H-1, one in each of the police stations, as delineated on the attached map. The main task of the RRTs will be to handle special security cases. Each RRT shall be comprised of up to 16 members.

c) The above mentioned rifles will be designated for the exclusive use of the RRTs, to handle special cases.

1. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H-1.

2. Activities of the RRTs armed with rifles in the Agreed Adjacent Area, as defined in Appendix 2, shall require the agreement of the JCC.

3. The RRTs will use the rifles in the rest of Area H-1 to fulfil their above mentioned tasks.

d) The Palestinian Police will ensure that all Palestinian policemen, prior to their deployment in the City of Hebron, will pass a security check in order to verify their suitability for service, taking into account the sensitivity of the area.

6. Holy Sites

a) Paragraphs 2 and 3(a) of Article 32 of Appendix 1 to Annex III of the Interim Agreement will be applicable to the following Holy Sites in Area H-1:

1. The Cave of Othniel Ben Knaz/El-Khalil;

2. Elonei Mamre/Haram Er-Rameh;

3. Eshel Avraham/Balotat Ibrahim; and

4. Maayan Sarah/Ein Sarah.

b. The Palestinian Police will be responsible for the protection of the above Jewish Holy Sites. Without derogating from the above responsibility of the Palestinian Police, visits to the above Holy Sites by worshippers or other visitors shall be accompanied by a Joint Mobile Unit, which will ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the Holy Sites, as well as their peaceful use.

7. Normalisation of Life in the Old City

a) Both sides reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life throughout the City of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may affect the normal life in the city.

b) In this context, both sides are committed to take all steps and measures necessary for the normalization of life in Hebron, including:

1. The wholesale market - Hasbahe - will be opened as a retail market in which goods will be sold directly to consumers from within the existing shops.

2. The movement of vehicles on the Shuhada Road will be gradually returned, within 4 months, to the same situation which existed prior to February 1994.

8. The Imara

The Imara will be turned over to the Palestinian side upon the completion of the redeployment and will become the headquarters of the Palestinian Police in the City of Hebron.

9. City of Hebron

Both sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their understanding that the division of security responsibility will not divide the city. In this context, and without derogating from the security powers and responsibilities of either side, both sides share the mutual goal that movement of people, goods and vehicles within and in and out of the city will be smooth and normal, without obstacles or barriers.

Civil Arrangements Regarding the Redeployment in Hebron

10. Transfer of Civil Powers and Responsibilities

a. The transfer of civil powers and responsibilities that have yet to be transferred to the Palestinian side in the city of Hebron (12 spheres) in accordance with Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement shall be conducted concurrently with the beginning of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron.

b. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred to the Palestinian side, except for those relating to Israelis and their property, which shall continue to be exercised by the Israeli Military Government.

11. Planning, Zoning and Building

a) The two parties are equally committed to preserve and protect the historic character of the city in a way which does not harm or change that character in any part of the city.

b) The Palestinian side has informed the Israeli side that in exercising its powers and responsibilities, taking into account the existing municipal regulations, it has undertaken to implement the following provisions:

1. Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 meters) within 50 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the list attached to this Protocol as Appendix 3 (hereinafter referred to as "the attached list") will be coordinated through the DCL.

2. Proposed construction of buildings above three floors (9 meters) between 50 and 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.

3. Proposed construction of non-residential, non-commercial buildings within 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list that are designed for uses that may adversely affect the environment (such as industrial factories) or buildings and institutions in which more than 50 persons are expected to gather together will be coordinated through the DCL.

4. Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 meters) within 50 meters from each side of the road specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.

5. The necessary enforcement measures will be taken to ensure compliance on the ground with the preceding provisions.

6. This Article does not apply to existing buildings or to new construction or renovation for which fully approved permits were issued by the Municipality prior to January 15th, 1997.

12. Infrastructure

a) The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, through the DCL, 48 hours in advance of any anticipated activity regarding infrastructure which may disturb the regular flow of traffic on roads in Area H-2 or which may affect infrastructure (such as water, sewage, electricity and communications) serving Area H-2.

b) The Israeli side may request, through the DCL, that the Municipality carry out works regarding the roads or other infrastructure required for the well being of the Israelis in Area H-2. If the Israeli side offers to cover the costs of these works, the Palestinian side will ensure that these works are carried out as a top priority.

c) The above does not prejudice the provisions of the Interim Agreement regarding the access to infrastructure, facilities and installations located in the city of Hebron, such as the electricity grid.

13. Transportation

The Palestinian side shall have the power to determine bus stops, traffic arrangements and traffic signalization in the city of Hebron. Traffic signalization, traffic arrangements and the location of bus stops in Area H-2 will remain as they are on the date of the redeployment in Hebron. Any subsequent change in these arrangements in Area H-2 will be done in cooperation between the two sides in the transportation sub-committee.

14. Municipal Inspectors

a) In accordance with paragraph 4.c of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, plainclothes unarmed municipal inspectors will operate in Area H-2. The number of these inspectors shall not exceed 50.

b) The inspectors shall carry official identification cards with a photograph issued by the Municipality.

c) The Palestinian side may request the assistance of the Israel Police, through the DCL of Hebron, in order to carry out its enforcement activities in Area H-2.

15. Location of Offices of the Palestinian Council

The Palestinian side, when operating new offices in Area H-2, will take into consideration the need to avoid provocation and friction. Where establishing such offices might affect public order or security the two sides will cooperate to find a suitable solution.

16. Municipal Services

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, municipal services shall be provided regularly and continuously to all parts of the city of Hebron, at the same quality and cost. The cost shall be determined by the Palestinian side with respect to work done and materials consumed, without discrimination.

Miscellaneous

17. Temporary International Presence

There will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.

18. Annex I

Nothing in this Protocol will derogate from the security powers and responsibilities of either side in accordance with Annex I to the Interim Agreement.

19. Attached Appendices

The appendices attached to this Protocol shall constitute an integral part hereof.

Done at Jerusalem , this 17th day of January 1997.

D. Shomrom


S. Erakat

For the Government of
the State of Israel

For the PLO

Appendix No. (7)

Shows The Tools of the Research (A)

	<p>The University of Granada</p> <p>Faculty of Sociology</p>	<p>civic culture In Palestinian cities: a comparative study between Hebron and Bethlehem</p>
	<p>Number of questionnaire</p>	<p>The code of District.....</p>
	<p>Name of population cluster</p>	<p>Result of interview 1. <i>completed</i> 2. <i>didn't completed</i></p>

The researcher is conducting a research on the civic culture In Palestinian cities: a comparative study between Hebron and Bethlehem. He is conducting this research as one of the requirements for his PhD program.

Student Name: Bilal Salameh

Advisor : Prof. Francisco J. Carmona

Table No (1) arranging family members by category required

Name	Rank	The chosen

Find the rank to the names of family members according to the alphabetical order of the letters (if the first letter is similar go to the second letter, and so on)

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

A coding of the random numbers, according to the Family serial form of the family in the area of the countdown

Table No. (2)

No. of the family in the countdown	The coding
1	A
2	A
3	B1
4	B1
5	B2
6	B2
7	C
8	C
9	D
10	D
11	E1
12	E1
13	E2
14	E2
15	F
16	F

Table No(3)

6more	5	4	3	2	1	coding
Chose the person that his rank is						
1	1	1	1	1	1	A
2	2	1	1	1	1	B1
2	2	2	1	1	1	B2
3	3	2	2	1	1	C
4	4	3	2	2	1	D
5	3	3	3	2	1	E1
5	5	4	3	2	1	E2
6	5	4	3	2	1	F

Percentage for Research Population

Independent Variables:

1. Gender:

Gender	Number	Percentage
Male	201	50.3%
Female	199	49.8%
Total	400	100%

2. Age: _____ years old.

Age group	Below 25 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 and above
Number	122	142	78	34	18
Percentage	31%	36%	19.8%	8.6%	4.6
Total	396*				

* 6 Missing values.

3. District:

District	Number	Percentage
Bethlehem	200	50%
Hebron	200	50%
Total	400	100%

4. Area of living:

Area	Number	Percentage
City Center	105	26.3%
Out of City Center	295	73.8%
Total	400	100%

5. Residence:

Residence	Number	Percentage
City	238	59.5%
Village	126	31.5%
Refugee camp	36	9%
Total	400	100%

6. Working :

Working	Number	Percentage
Yes	229	57.3%
No	171	42.8%
Total	400	100%

7. Profession:

Profession	Number	Percentage
Government employee	64	16.1%
Employed at the civic society institutions	43	10.8%
Unskilled worker	25	6.3%
Private section	96	24.1%
House keeper	51	12.8%
Farmer	7	1.8%
Student	88	22.1%
Unemployed	24	6%
Total	398*	100%

* 2 Missing values

8. Marital Status:

Marital Status	Number	Percentage
Married	230	57.6%
Single	163	40.9%
Something else	6	1.5%
Total	399*	100%

* 1 Missing value

9. How religious :

How religious	Number	Percentage
Very religious	178	45.2%
Somewhat	167	42.4%
Not religious	49	12.4%
Total	394*	100%

* 6 Missing values

10. Are you?

Are you	Number	Percentage
Originally born in Palestine	382	95.5%
Coming back with PA	18	4.5%
Total	400	100%

10. Religion:

Are you	Number	Percentage
Muslim	345	86.3%
Christian	55	13.8%
Total	400	100%

12. Monthly Salary:

Monthly Salary	Number	Percentage
Less than 300 JD	178	47.2%
From 301 to 599 JD	135	35.8%
From 600 to 899 JD	43	11.4%
More than 900 JD	21	5.6%
Total	377*	100%

* 23Missing Values .

13. Level of education:

Level of education	Number	Percentage
Secondary and less	155	39%
Diploma	59	14.9%
BA	157	39.5%
Masters/PhD	26	6.5%
Total	397	100%

Which of these establishments you are a member of (answer yes or no)

Organization	Yes	No
14. Tribal institutions	55.3%	44.8%
15. Religious institutions	24.3%	75.8%
16. Youth institution	37.3%	62.7%
17. Media institutions	16.8%	83.3%
18. Women institutions	21.6%	78.4%
19. Law institutions	32.9%	67.1%
20. Academic institutions	47.8%	52.3%
21. Health institutions	32.9%	67.1%
22. Political institutions	23.8%	76.3%

23. Do you belong to civic organization?

Do you belong to civic organization	Number	Percentage
Yes	192	54.2%
No	162	45.8%
Total	354*	100%

* 46 Missing Values.

24. Do you belong to political party ?

Do you belong to political party	Number	Percentage
Yes	115	36.1%
No	204	63.9%
Total	319*	100%

* 81 Missing values.

25. What is your ideological orientation:

Level of education	Number	Percentage
Secular	124	31.9%
Leftist	65	16.7%
Islamic	200	51.4%
Total	389	100%

* 11 Missing Values.

26. In the last parliament election, to which political party you vote.

Political party	Number	Percentage
Fatah	125	31.6%
Hamas	66	16.7%
Popular Front	46	11.6%
The alternative(Popular Party, FIDA, Democratic Front)	12	3%
Third way(Islam Fayad and Hanan Ashrawi)	9	2.3%
Independent Palestine (M. Albargouthi)	15	3.8%
I didn't vote	100	25.3%
White paper	18	4.5%
Other	5	1.3%
Total	396	100%

27. Which social class that you think you belong to :

Social class	Number	Percentage
Upper class	25	6.3%
Middle class	324	81.6%
lower class	48	12.1%
Total	397*	100%

* 3 Missing Values.

Before you are a number of statements concerning the dimensions of Civic culture, please check what is appropriate for you.

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
Democracy (Code D)						
D28. The Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it	7%	14.8%	12%	39.3%	27%	2.36
D29. Hannyah,s Government should ban any activity or protest against it.	6.3%	12%	9%	44%	28.8%	2.23
D30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	4.8%	13.5%	18.3%	51.3%	12.3%	2.47
D31. Are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank.	6.5%	11%	9.5%	45.5%	27.5%	2.24
D32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza	2.5%	4.5%	7.3%	47.3%	38.3%	1.86
D33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	1.3%	3.5%	7.3%	37.8%	50.3%	1.68
D34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	16.8%	39.5%	25.3%	14%	4.5%	3.50
D35. Democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general	23.8%	50%	15.3%	7.5%	3.5%	3.83
D36. Democracy is an atheist system-should not be used	4.5%	7.3%	13.3%	46.3%	28.8%	2.13
D37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state	16%	41.5%	23.3%	14%	5.3%	3.49
D38. Democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties.	19.5%	47%	18.5%	9.3%	5.8%	3.65
D39. What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view.	9.3%	20%	20.5%	33.3%	17%	2.71
D40. Citizens should support government decisions even if they disagreed with these decisions.	4.3%	21.3%	29.8%	34.5%	10.3%	2.75
Evaluation of political system in the west Bank (Code E)						
E41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	11%	22.3%	21.8%	23%	22%	2.77
E42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	4.3%	23.8%	22.8%	33%	16.3%	2.67
E43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	9.5%	25.3%	29.5%	23.5%	12.3%	2.96
E44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	4.8%	14.8%	25%	33.3%	23.3%	2.47
E45. Government respects and observes human rights.	4.8%	22.3%	31.5%	23.8%	17.8%	2.73

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
E46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	4.3%	14.5%	24%	33.5%	23.8%	2.42
E47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	6.5%	22%	30%	26.5%	15%	2.79
E48. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	3.5%	18.8%	26%	28%	23.85	2.50
E49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	6.5%	25%	27%	22.8%	18.8%	2.78
E50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	4.5%	20.8%	21%	27.8%	26%	2.50
E51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	7.8%	23%	29.5%	25%	14.8%	2.84
E52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	3.3%	16.5%	21.8%	34.3%	24.3%	2.40
E53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	5.3%	24%	30%	24.5%	16.3%	2.78
Evaluation of political system in the Gaza Strip (Code E.no.b)						
E41b. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	9.8%	28.8%	22.8%	21.3%	17.5%	2.92
E42b. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	4.5%	18.5%	24.5%	29.5%	23%	2.52
E43b. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	7.3%	17.5%	27.3%	28.5%	19.5%	2.65
E44b. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	3.8%	14%	23%	34.8%	24.5%	2.38
E45b. Government respects and observes human rights.	4.3%	18.8%	26.8%	26.5%	23.8%	2.53
E46b. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	4%	12.5%	24%	30%	29.5%	2.32
E47b. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	4.8%	18.3%	28.3%	33.5%	15.3%	2.64
E48b. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	4%	13%	23.5%	29.5%	30%	2.32
E49b. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	4.8%	16.5%	24.5%	29.5%	24.8%	2.47
E50b. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	3.3%	16.5%	20.8%	29.8%	29.8%	2.34
E51b. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	6.5%	17.8%	31.3%	29.5%	15%	2.71
E52b. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	5.3%	17.5%	24.3%	30.8%	22.3%	2.53
E53b. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	5.5%	19.8%	27.8%	29.8%	17.3%	2.67

54. Below you can find some kind of political system, in your opinion, which one would be appropriate for the Palestinian? .

Political System	Percentage
A parliamentary system in which nationalist, left-wing, and Islamic political parties all compete in elections.	62.8%
A parliamentary system in which only Islamic political parties and factions compete in elections	5.8%
A system with a strong president and military in which elections and competition among political parties are not important	8.9%
A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections.	22.5%

* 5 Missing values .

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean	
Secular system (Code S)						
S55. The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals	13.8%	24%	28.8%	25.8%	7.8%	3.10
S56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual	18%	24.5%	22%	25%	10.5%	3.15
S57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns	18.3%	39.3%	19.8%	17%	5.8%	3.47
S58. Religious leaders should no influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people	17.5%	36%	21.8%	19.3%	5.5%	3.41
S59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society	6.5%	10.5%	27.8%	38.3%	17%	2.51
S60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth	13.3%	20.5%	20%	33.5%	12.8%	2.88
S61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda	12%	28.3%	23%	23.3%	13.5%	3.02
S62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	20.8%	24.5%	19.3%	20%	15.5%	3.15

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean	
Rule of the Law (Code L)						
L63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals	23%	45.8%	20.3%	8.5%	2.5%	3.78
L64. Courts are qualified to receive and deal with complaints and cases relating to citizens.	7%	44.3%	33.3%	11%	4.5%	3.38
L65. There is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought	10.3%	30%	33.3%	21.8%	4.8%	3.19

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
L66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance of the tribal law.	22.5%	44.5%	26%	5.3%	1.8%	3.81
L67. The Tribal Law protects the individuals and their rights when the Civic Law is not independent or during the absence of the Government and the state.	9.8%	32%	37.5%	16.8%	4%	3.27
L68. The PA is an authority of some individuals, not the Law.	25%	27.5%	24.8%	16.5%	6.3%	3.49
L69. The PA helped to strengthen the Tribal Law.	9.8%	38.3%	36.8%	12.8%	2.5%	3.40
L70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent.	10.8%	33.8%	32.5%	18.3%	4.8%	3.28
L71. To apply civic law in the society is better than tribal law.	15.3%	44.3%	28.8%	9.8%	2%	3.61
L72. I support obeying the law.	25.5%	41%	19.8%	9.8%	4%	3.74
73. According to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions.	6.3%	25.5%	41%	21.8%	5.5%	3.05
Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
Tolerance (Code T)						
T74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	57.3%	37%	2.8%	2.3%	0.8%	4.48
T75. Most of the time, people help each other.	11.5%	42.3%	36.5%	5.8%	4%	3.52
T76. In general, most people can be trusted.	7.3%	27.5%	40.5%	16.8%	8%	3.09
T77. I am suspicious when dealing with people.	10.8%	39.5%	33.8%	12.8%	3.3%	3.42
T78. I believe people are good by nature.	11.8%	42%	33%	11%	2.3%	3.50
T79. Palestinian society values are values that believe in pluralism and tolerance.	13.5%	52.5%	24%	8%	2%	3.68
T80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.	4.3%	5%	10.5%	38.3	42%	1.91
T81. I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	30.5%	54.3%	10.5%	3%	1.8%	4.09

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
Woman , and Human Rights (Code HR)						
HR82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	5.5%	14.5%	15%	38.5%	26.5%	2.34
HR83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	6.5%	24.8%	23%	32.5%	13.3%	2.79
HR84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state.	17.3%	24%	20.5%	29.3%	9%	3.11
HR85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law	11.8%	33.8%	21%	21.3%	12.3%	3.12
HR86. The level that the women has reached in the society is considered satisfactory.	5%	22.3%	25%	35.8%	12%	2.73
HR87. The woman has the right to freely make decisions which touch her daily life.	32%	42.3%	17.8%	5.8%	2.3%	3.96
HR88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	42.3%	45.5%	9.3%	2.3%	0.8%	4.26
89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family	46%	34.8%	11.3%	4.8%	3.3%	4.16
HR90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals	17.8%	33.8%	25.8%	19.8%	3%	3.44
HR91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously	8.5%	15.3%	10.3%	33.5%	32.5%	2.34
HR92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated	17%	23.3%	13%	27%	19.8%	2.91
HR93. I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband.	42.8%	39.5%	12%	3.5%	2.3%	4.17
HR94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society	14.3%	33.5%	39%	11%	2.3%	3.47
HR95. I believe that civil law is more capable to do justice to women than any other system out there.	10.8%	33%	34.3%	17.8%	4.3%	3.28
HR96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls.	4.5%	9.3%	13.8%	40.3%	32.3%	2.14

Statement	Always	often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Mean
Civic and political participation (Code P)						
P97. Do you follow the political news.	23%	23.8%	29.8%	18%	5.5%	3.41
P98. I attend social and cultural seminars.	12.8%	20.8%	34%	18%	14.5%	2.99
P99. I attend political meetings.	7%	12.8%	23%	21.8%	35.5%	2.34
P100. Have you officially complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area.	2.5%	8%	23.5%	24.5%	41.5%	2.06
P101. I discuss social problems with other people and try to solve them.	16.3%	28.3%	29.3%	17.8%	8.5%	3.26
P102. I read the news paper.	20.8%	27.3%	28.5%	17.8%	5.8%	3.40
P103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council.	39%	22.5%	15.3%	5%	18.3%	3.59
P104. I participate in protests.	10.5%	14%	23.5%	21.5%	30.5%	2.53
P105. How often Do you participate in the municipally elections .	29.3%	17%	14%	10.8%	29%	3.07
P106. Do you offer help to others (non relatives) when they need it?.	40.5%	31.8%	23%	3.8%	1%	4.07
P107. Do you participate in activities related to the improvement of living conditions in your area?	16.8%	24.3%	30.8%	19.5%	8.8%	3.21
P108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	9.3%	29.5%	37.8%	13.8%	9.8%	3.15
Statement	Strongly trust	Trust	Between	I don't trust	I never trust	Mean
How Palestinian citizens Trust the performance, I trust the performance of(Code TRUST)						
TRUST109. The President of PA (Abo Mazen)	9.8%	19%	22%	25.8%	23.5%	2.66
TRUST110. Palestinian Police.	9%	25%	33.5%	20.3%	12.4%	2.98
TRUST 111. Legislative parliaments members.	4.3%	24.5%	37.3%	24.3%	9.8%	2.89
TRUST112. Religious leaders .	9.5%	31.3%	35.8%	15.5%	8%	3.19
TRUST113. Politicians.	3%	20.5%	39.5%	27.5%	9.5%	2.80
TRUST114. Security forces.	4.3%	21.8%	32.3%	27.3%	14.5%	2.74
TRUST115. The legislative Council performance.	2.8%	24.5%	36.3%	25.5%	11%	2.83
TRUST116. Palestinian Judiciary system.	3.8%	29.8%	41.5%	16.8%	8.3%	3.04
TRUST117. Palestinian Universities.	17%	48.8%	24.5%	7%	2.8%	3.70

Statement	Strongly trust	Trust	Between	I don't trust	I never trust	Mean
TRUST118. Palestinian Press.	6.3%	44.3%	40%	6.3%	3.3%	3.44
TRUST119. Palestinian civil society organizations .	5.8%	38.5%	44.3%	9.3%	2.3%	3.36
TRUST120. Former TV's.	5.8%	33.5%	44.3%	9.3%	2.3%	3.17
TRUST121. Independent civic media.	5.8%	38.8%	44.5%	8.5%	2.5%	3.37
TRUST122. Local authorities (municipality, popular committee)	2.5%	30.5%	47%	16.5%	3.5%	3.12
Statement	Strongly agree	Agree between	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean	
Multi party system (Code M)						
M123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	18.5%	45.3%	21.5%	12.3%	2.5%	3.65
M124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views.	25.5%	56%	13.8%	4%	0.8%	4.02
M125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation.	6.8%	12.5%	22.5%	40.5%	17.8%	2.50
M126. Diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing.	15%	35.3%	28%	16.3%	5.5%	3.38
M127. Multi religion coexistence(christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance .	22%	48%	22%	7.3%	0.8%	3.83
M128. Although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them.	21.5%	56%	14.8%	6.8%	1%	3.90
M129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	18.5%	51.5%	21%	7.5%	1.5%	3.78
M130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior.	9.3%	29.8%	27.8%	23.3%	10%	3.05

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
Social Ties and General Trend (Code AT)						
AT131. I reject patronage and nepotism even if I needed a job.	26.8%	38.8%	25%	7.3%	2.3%	3.81
AT132. Blind obedience to the authority is the means to create a good citizen.	5.8%	22.5%	28.8%	32.8%	10.3%	2.81
AT133. I support holding on traditions and customs.	14.8%	39%	36.3%	6.3%	3.8%	3.55

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Mean
AT134. I use proverbs and local wisdom sayings to justify something I cant change.	9.8%	28.8%	42.5%	17.5%	1.5%	3.28
AT135. I push my children to be independent in making their decisions away from my own views and approaches.	20.3%	48.5%	18.5%	11%	1.8%	3.75
AT136. Civil society institutions play a great rule in civilizing social life.	5.5%	48.3%	35.3%	9%	2%	3.46
AT137. Theaters and Cinemas play a positive role in the development of the social and civil culture. I full support establishing them.	15%	41.3%	23.3%	17%	3.5%	3.47
AT138. The presence of a strong leader is necessary to make a homogenous point of view.	24.3%	41.8%	21%	10.3%	2.8%	3.75
AT139. Occupation is very strong and we can not get rid of it.	5.8%	11.8%	12.8%	36.8%	33%	2.21
AT140. I support hierarchy in decision making.	10.8%	46.8%	28.3%	12%	3.2%	3.52
AT141. Social Change is difficult and we need to give our best.	2%	5.5%	15.3%	43.8%	33.5%	1.99
AT142. I believe in religious leader in making social balance in the society.	7.8%	32.8%	35.3%	17.8%	6.5%	3.18
AT143. I believe in secular leaders in making social balance in the society.	5.8%	24.5%	34%	26.3%	9.5%	2.91

144. Before you a range of issues and needs that affect the lives of citizens in an essential way, on the assumption that the Palestinian National Authority announced its intention to build projects based on the concerns of citizens, I support (please chose the most important one)

Projects	Number	Percentage
Economic projects	62	15.6%
Tackling unemployment	100	25.1%
Social justice	37	9.3%
Educational reform and the university	35	8.8%
Reform of the civil and judicial systems	41	10.3%
The reform of political parties	38	9.5%
The fight against corruption and bribery	73	18.3%
The fight against nepotism	12	3%
Total	398*	100%

* 2 Missing values.

145. How would you rate the performance of the political parties:

performance of the political parties	Number	Percentage
Good	65	25.2%
Bad	193	74.8%
Total	258*	100%

* 142 Missing Values.

146. How much do satisfied in your life:

Satisfied in life	Number	Percentage
Satisfied	101	25.3%
Sort of	182	45.6%
Not satisfied	116	29.1%
Total	399*	100%

* 1 Missing Value.

147. I value my personal interests over the general interests.

personal interests over the general interests	Number	Percentage
Always	35	8.9%
Sometimes	220	55.8%
Never	139	35.3%
Total	394*	100%

* 6 Missing Values.

148. I don't see the value of giving since no one is worthy of receiving .

I don't see the value of giving since no one is worthy of receiving	Number	Percentage
Always	30	7.6%
Sometimes	154	38.9%
Never	212	53.5%
Total	396	100%

* 4 Missing values.

149. In your opinion, do you think that your city, is:

ID of the City	Number	Percentage
Conservative in its style of life	127	31.8%
Traditional in its style of life	118	29.5%
Tolerant in its style of life	60	15%
Open in its style of life	76	19%
Librated in its style of life	19	4.8%
Total	400	100%

Affiliation

150. If you were asked to introduce yourself using the following choices and you were asked to prioritize them on a scale of 1 most important to 7 least important, how would you introduce yourself?

I am (your name)

rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	52.8%	10.4%	8.5%	11.7%	6%	6.5%	4.1%

* 14 Missing Values .

I am a Muslim / Christian

Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	12.5%	8.8%	22.3%	16.1%	15.1%	13.2%	11.9%

* 15 Missing Values.

I am a resident of the town / village/refugee camp

Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1.6%	3.4%	21.6%	19.7%	20.3%	28.1%	5.5%

* 15 Missing Values.

I belong to family

Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1.3%	37.4%	10.1%	11.9%	20.3%	11.7%	7.3%

* 15 Missing Values.

I am an Arab

Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	15.3%	15.3%	15.3%	17.1%	15.8%	14.3%	6.8%

* 15 Missing Values.

I am a Palestinian

Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	15.8%	24.3%	17.6%	17.6%	16%	7.5%	1.3%

* 13 Missing Values.

I am a member of Palestinian party

rank	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1.6%	1.3%	3.6%	5.5%	7%	18.2%	62.9%

* 15 Missing Values

150. If you were wronged in some case, which body do you seek to help you get justice(please chose one).

To	Number	Percentage
Family and tribe	123	30.8%
Police	108	27.1%
Other security forces	8	2%
Human rights institutions	31	7.8%
Powerful individuals	30	7.5%
A lawyer	31	7.8%
No one	68	17%
Total	399*	100%

Appendix No. (7) B

B. The interview

1. Career
2. Level of education.....
3. Age.....
4. District.....
5. Are you a political active 1. Yes 2. No
6. Which political party you support.....
 - What it is the political system that you support in Palestine?.
 - What it is the role of the family in the social/political life in your district?.
 - What it is the role of political party in democratic life ?.
 - Do you support multiparty (religion/political/social) in Palestine? Why?.
 - What it is your evaluation to role of woman in your district?.
 - What is your evaluation to performance of PA in Gaza and West Bank?
 - What do you think about the tribal law?
 - Is the Palestinian society regarded as conservative society? Why?
 - Do you want to add/comments something, or suggestions?.

Appendix No.(8)

Group of referees and expert arbitrators

Professor Name	University/Institution
Hatem Qrareya	Demography Statistics Department General Directorate of Population and Social Statistics in Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.
Ahmed Attia	General Directorate of Population and Social Statistics Program governance and democracy in Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
Nayef Abed	Department of the samples and methodologies in Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
Kamil Katalo	University of Hebron
Adli Dana	The Palestinian Center for Media, Research and Development
Osama Al-Ja'afari	General director of research unit at Ma'an institution
Firas Jaber	General director of research unit in Pissan Center
Mudar Kassis	Birzeit University
Majdi Al-Malki	Birzeit University
Mahmoud Miari	Birzeit University
Ismael Al-Nashif	Birzeit University
Mahmoud Hammad	Bethlehem University
Norma Hazbon	Bethlehem University
Walid Attallah	Bethlehem University
Hanna Musleh	Bethlehem University
Walid Mustafa	Bethlehem University
Mohammed Farahat	Al-Quds Open University
Nassar Ibrahim	Alternative Information Center
Jabraeel Shomali	Democratic Centre for Research & Development

Appendix No. (9)

9.1 Pearson correlation for the Supporting practical Democratic with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
28. The Palestinian authority should ban any activity or protest against it	0.61**
29. Hannyah,s Government should ban any activity or protest against it.	
30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	0.50**
31. Are you with closing Hamas civil organization by PA in West Bank.	0.63**
32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza	
33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	0.31**
34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	0.45**
35. Democracy is the right to chose what is good for me and people in general	0.46**
36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used	
37. Democratic system is the most suitable system to Palestinian state	0.37**
38. Democratic elections is the means to solve problems between political parties.	0.41**
39. What is the level of your support of the use of force to oust any elected Palestinian government if you thought that it was bad from your own point of view.	0.33**
40. Citizens should support government decisions even if they disagreed with these decisions.	0.48**

***Means correlated.**

9.2 Pearson correlation for Evaluation the performance of FATAH government in west Bank. with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	0.74**
42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	0.71**
43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	0.67**
44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	0.73**
45. Government respects and observes human rights.	0.73**
46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	0.68**
47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	0.72**
48. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	0.77**
49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	0.71**
50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	0.71**
51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	0.71**
52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	0.70**
53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	0.58**

***Means correlated.**

9.3 Pearson correlation for Evaluation the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza Strip with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism.	0.65**
42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	0.70**
43. Government contributed to providing security to the citizen.	0.70**
44. Government contributed to implementation of laws on all without any distinctions.	0.76**
45. Government respects and observes human rights.	0.75**
46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	0.71 **
47. Government demonstrates professionalism in its makeup.	0.74**
48. Government respects the citizen's right to express his/her point of view.	0.78**
49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	0.76**
50. Government respects the right of political opposition in its peaceful forms.	0.72**
51. Government guarantees independence of judiciary.	0.72**
52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	0.69**
53. There is separation between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.	0.62**

*Means correlated.

9.4 Pearson correlation for Supporting Secular System with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
55. The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals	0.37**
56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual	0.24**
57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns	0.56**
58. Religious leaders should no influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people	0.56**
59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society	0.40**
60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth	0.41 **
61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda	0.27**
62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	0.20**

*Means correlated.

9.5 Pearson correlation for The Role of law according the Sample position with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
63. Instead of the Tribal Law, the Civil Law is the only means to do justice toward the individuals	0.62**
66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance e of the tribal law	0.65**
67. The Tribal Law protects the individuals and their rights when the Civic Law is not independent or during the absence of the Government and the state	0.31**
69. The PA helped to strengthen the Tribal Law	0.55**
71. To apply civic low in the society is better than tribal low.	0.66**
72. I support obeying the law.	0.62 **

*Means correlated.

9.6 Pearson correlation for Measurement of tolerance with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	0.46**
75. Most of the time, people help each other.	0.67**
76. In general, most people can be trusted.	0.67**
78. I believe people are good by nature.	0.69**
79. Palestinian society values are values that believe in pluralism and tolerance.	0.61 **
81. I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	0.43**

***Means correlated.**

9.7 Pearson correlation for woman and human right with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	0.20**
83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	0.38**
84. Do you accept women in leadership positions, including the president of the state.	0.15**
85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law	0.27**
86. The level that the women has reached in the society is considered satisfactory.	0.20**
87. The woman has the right to freely make decisions which touch her daily life.	0.33**
88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	0.36**
89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family	0.36**
90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals	0.32**
91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously	0.36**
92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated	0.42**
93. I believe a woman has the same rights as men when it comes to education, work, freedom of travel and choosing a husband.	0.38**
94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society	0.21**
95. I believe that civil law is more capable to do justice to women than any other system out there.	0.39**
96. In general, education is the most important for boys than girls.	0.20**

***Means correlated.**

9.8 Pearson correlation for Civic and political participation with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
97. Do you follow the political news	0.67**
98. I attend social and cultural seminars	0.65**
99. I attend political meetings	0.76**
100. Have you officially complained about the municipal policies in order to change something that is not in your interest or the people of the area	0.61**
101. I discuss social problems with other people and try to solve them	0.70**
102. I read the news paper	0.60**
103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council	0.60**
104. I participate in protests	0.65**
105. How often Do you participate in the municipally elections	0.55**
106. Do you offer help to others (non relatives) when they need it?.	0.38**
107. Do you participate in activities related to the improvement of living conditions in your area?	0.66**
108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	0.22**

***Means correlated.**

9.9 Pearson correlation for How Palestinian Citizens trust the performance of formal and civic institutions, and leaders with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen)	0.77**
110. Palestinian Police	0.79**
111. Legislative parliaments members	0.79**
112. Religious leaders	0.38**
113. Politicians	0.71**
114. Security forces	0.79**
115. The legislative Council performance	0.80**
116. Palestinian Judiciary system	0.75**
117. Palestinian Universities	0.51**
118. Palestinian Press	0.59**
119. Palestinian civil society organizations	0.59**
120. Former TV's	0.54**
121. Independent civic media	0.42**
122. Local authorities (municipality, popular committee)	0.52**

*Means correlated.

9.10 Pearson correlation for Multi Party System with the total degree sub-scale.

Scale Items	R-value
123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	0.71**
124. I respect the views that are different from mine regardless of it being political, cultural or religious views	0.66**
126. Diversity and multi-party political system is a positive thing.	0.69**
127. Multi religion coexistence(christens and Muslims) in Palestine contributed to the tolerance	0.69**
128. Although different points of view could confuse me, I still like to and prefer to listen to them.	0.59**
129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	0.65**

*Means correlated.

Appendix No. (10)

Cronbach Alpha reliability analysis for the questionnaire sub-scales.

Sub-scale	No	Alpha
Supporting practical Democratic	10	0.60
Evaluation the performance of FATAH government in west Bank.	13	0.91
Evaluation the performance of HAMAS government in Gaza Strip.	13	0.92
Supporting Secular System	8	0.55
The Role of law according the Sample position	6	0.58
Measurement of tolerance	6	0.64
Human and Woman Rights	15	0.82
Civic and political participation	12	0.83
How Palestinian Citizens trust the performance of formal and civic institutions, and leaders	14	0.89
Multi Party system	6	0.77

Appendix No.(11)

Results of (T-test). Tables show the differences between male and female according to the dimension of Woman and human rights.

Group Statistics

	Gender	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
HR82	Male	201	2.57	1.182	.083
	Female	199	2.11	1.121	.079
HR83	Male	201	2.81	1.161	.082
	Female	199	2.77	1.140	.081
HR84	Male	201	2.89	1.260	.089
	Female	199	3.34	1.211	.086
HR85	Male	201	3.23	1.272	.090
	Female	199	3.00	1.168	.083
HR86	Male	201	2.98	1.104	.078
	Female	199	2.47	1.014	.072
HR87	Male	201	3.77	.980	.069
	Female	199	4.16	.911	.065
HR88	Male	201	4.09	.782	.055
	Female	199	4.44	.735	.052
HR89	Male	201	3.99	1.044	.074
	Female	199	4.32	.962	.068
HR90	Male	201	3.42	1.093	.077
	Female	199	3.45	1.081	.077
HR91	Male	201	2.38	1.264	.089
	Female	199	2.29	1.339	.095
HR92	Male	201	2.96	1.381	.097
	Female	199	2.85	1.426	.101
HR93	Male	201	4.03	.971	.069
	Female	199	4.31	.865	.061
HR94	Male	201	3.38	.962	.068
	Female	199	3.55	.919	.065
HR95	Male	201	3.24	1.069	.075
	Female	199	3.33	.958	.068
HR96	Male	201	2.42	1.129	.080
	Female	199	1.84	1.000	.071

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
HR82	Equal variances assumed	6.416	.012	4.051	398	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			4.052	397.279	.000
HR83	Equal variances assumed	.011	.916	.323	398	.747
	Equal variances not assumed			.323	397.975	.747
HR84	Equal variances assumed	.212	.645	-3.609	398	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.610	397.651	.000
HR85	Equal variances assumed	5.526	.019	1.874	398	.062
	Equal variances not assumed			1.875	395.766	.062
HR86	Equal variances assumed	.251	.617	4.836	398	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			4.838	395.758	.000
HR87	Equal variances assumed	1.021	.313	-4.118	398	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			-4.120	396.418	.000
HR88	Equal variances assumed	1.443	.230	-4.579	398	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			-4.581	396.917	.000
HR89	Equal variances assumed	.274	.601	-3.301	398	.001
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.303	395.997	.001
HR90	Equal variances assumed	.086	.770	-.316	398	.752
	Equal variances not assumed			-.316	398.000	.752
HR91	Equal variances assumed	.822	.365	.704	398	.482
	Equal variances not assumed			.704	396.180	.482
HR92	Equal variances assumed	.283	.595	.755	398	.451
	Equal variances not assumed			.754	397.302	.451
HR93	Equal variances assumed	.062	.804	-2.952	398	.003
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.954	393.651	.003
HR94	Equal variances assumed	.169	.682	-1.856	398	.064
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.856	397.478	.064
HR95	Equal variances assumed	3.549	.060	-.865	398	.388
	Equal variances not assumed			-.865	394.133	.387
HR96	Equal variances assumed	6.043	.014	5.423	398	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			5.426	393.190	.000

Appendix No.(12)

The results of Kruskal-Wallis Test

Test Statistics ^{a,b}

	D28	D29	D30	D31	D32	D33	D34	D35	D36	D37	D38	D39	D40
Chi-Square	4.193	2.870	4.151	1.457	.165	.590	5.379	11.084	7.577	9.102	3.427	17.311	2.590
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.041	.090	.042	.227	.685	.442	.020	.001	.006	.003	.064	.000	.108

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics ^{a,b}

	E41	E42	E43	E44	E45	E46	E47	E48	E49	E50	E51	E52	E53	Tot Evaluation FATAH
Chi-Square	13.901	5.124	5.968	8.711	5.256	4.173	7.330	5.140	5.650	.910	1.970	6.690	2.067	11.739
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.024	.015	.003	.022	.041	.007	.023	.017	.340	.160	.010	.151	.001

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics ^{a,b}

	E41b	E42b	E43b	E44b	E45b	E46b	E47b	E48b	E49b	E50b	E51b	E52b	E53b	Tot Evaluation HAMAS
Chi-Square	26.485	10.441	4.394	9.103	7.099	2.192	8.175	4.380	3.897	2.739	6.681	4.162	10.063	14.860
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.001	.036	.003	.008	.139	.004	.036	.048	.098	.010	.041	.002	.000

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics ^{a,b}

	S55	S56	S57	S58	S59	S60	S61	S62	TotSecular
Chi-Square	8.350	15.062	.368	.182	2.357	12.271	16.948	29.288	.989
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.004	.000	.544	.669	.125	.000	.000	.000	.320

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics ^{a,b}

	L63	L64	L65	L66	L67	L68	L69	L70	L71	L72	L73	TotLOW
Chi-Square	3.654	4.412	.175	.004	4.368	4.899	.224	5.260	3.401	2.132	.115	2.166
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.056	.036	.676	.950	.037	.027	.636	.022	.065	.144	.734	.141

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics ^{a,b}

	T74	T75	T76	T77	T78	T79	T80	T81	Tot TOLERANCE
Chi-Square	5.108	.059	2.907	.521	.181	.976	38.953	2.009	8.460
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.024	.808	.088	.470	.670	.323	.000	.156	.004

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics^{a,b}

	HR82	HR83	HR84	HR85	HR86	HR87	HR88	HR89	HR90	HR91	HR92	HR93	HR94	HR95	HR96	TotWOMEN
Chi-Square	18.277	.503	23.875	.242	21.200	23.965	15.825	22.207	2.507	16.079	48.434	12.105	.562	11.924	12.956	1.164
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.478	.000	.623	.000	.000	.000	.000	.113	.000	.000	.001	.453	.001	.000	.281

- a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics^{a,b}

	P97	P98	P99	P100	P101	P102	P103	P104	P105	P106	P107	P108	Tot Participation
Chi-Square	.617	.017	4.044	4.585	3.292	2.704	4.671	9.468	.005	3.146	.000	4.308	.332
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.432	.897	.044	.032	.070	.100	.031	.002	.941	.076	.986	.038	.565

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics^{a,b}

	TRUST109	TRUST110	TRUST111	TRUST112	TRUST113	TRUST114	TRUST115	TRUST116	TRUST117	TRUST118	TRUST119	TRUST120	TRUST121	TRUST122	TotTRUST
Chi-Square	5.422	10.188	19.676	13.649	16.557	10.334	17.197	4.972	2.452	.008	1.494	.462	.662	2.612	13.731
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.020	.001	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.026	.117	.930	.222	.496	.416	.106	.000

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable: District

Test Statistics^{a,b}

	M123	M124	M125	M126	M127	M128	M129	M130	TotMULparty
Chi-Square	21.921	9.951	31.768	17.529	27.066	7.812	6.618	11.515	10.027
df	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.005	.010	.001	.002

a. Kruskal Wallis Test

b. Grouping Variable: District

Appendix No.(13)

Table show Chi-Square test for the differences in Identity according to Governorate

ID	Governorate	I am ...							Total	Chi-square	Sig.
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
I am	Bethlehem	111 57.5%	14 7.3%	17 8.8%	25 13%	9 4.7%	12 6.2%	5 2.6%	193 100%	9.151	0.165
	Hebron	93 48.2%	26 13.5%	16 8.3%	20 10.4%	14 7.3%	13 6.7%	11 5.7%	193 100%		
Religion	Bethlehem	8 4.1%	10 5.2%	45 23.3%	30 15.6%	27 14%	37 19.2%	34 17.6%	193 100%	48.516	0.000
	Hebron	40 20.8%	24 12.5%	41 21.4%	62 16.1%	31 16.1%	14 7.3%	12 6.3%	192 100%		
Place	Bethlehem	4 2.1%	5 2.6%	52 26.9%	43 22.3%	45 23.3%	41 21.2%	3 1.6%	193 9.4%	26.805	0.000
	Hebron	2 1%	8 4.2%	31 16.1%	33 17.2%	33 17.2%	67 34.9%	18 9.4%	194 100%		
Family	Bethlehem	2 1%	86 44.6%	18 9.3%	27 14%	36 18.7%	16 8.3%	8 4.1%	193 100%	16.624	0.011
	Hebron	3 1.6%	58 30.2%	21 10.9%	19 9.9%	42 21.9%	29 15.1%	20 10.4%	192 100%		
An Arab	Bethlehem	35 18.1%	31 16.1%	22 11.4%	23 11.9%	30 15.5	35 18.1%	17 18.1%	193 100%	18.644	0.005
	Hebron	24 12.5%	28 14.6%	37 19.3%	43 22.4%	31 16.1%	20 10.4%	20 10.4%	192 100%		
Palestinian	Bethlehem	34 17.5%	46 23.7%	30 15.5%	31 16%	32 16.5%	16 8.2%	5 2.6%	194 100%	7.689	0.689
	Hebron	27 14%	48 24.9%	38 19.7%	37 19.2%	30 15.5%	13 6.7%	0 0%	193 100		
Political party	Bethlehem	1 0.5%	2 1%	9 4.7%	11 5.7%	15 7.8%	35 18.1%	120 62.2%	193 100%	4.404	0.622
	Hebron	5 2.6%	3 1.6%	5 2.6%	10 5.2%	12 6.3%	35 18.2%	122 63.5%	192 63.5%		

** DF= 6

Appendix No.(14)

Statistical Differences By place

Bethlehem Governorate: One Way analysis of variance for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features.</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
D. 32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza.	Between groups	19.159	2	9.579	12.662	0.000
	Within groups	149.036	197	0.757		
	Total	168.195	199	-		
D.34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by	Between groups	13.357	2	6.678	7.035	0.001
	Within groups	186.998	197	0.949		
	Total	200.355	199	-		
D. 36. Democracy is an atheist system-should not be used.	Between groups	5.737	2	2.868	4.703	0.010
	Within groups	120.138	197	.610		
	Total	125.875	199	-		
E.41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism..	Between groups	20.600	2	10.300	6.356	0.002
	Within groups	319.220	197	1.620		
	Total	339.820	199	-		
E.42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	Between groups	7.594	2	3.797	3.337	0.038
	Within groups	224.161	197	1.138		
	Total	231.755	199	-		
E.46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	Between groups	8.297	2	4.149	3.950	0.021
	Within groups	206.883	197	1.050		
	Total	215.180	199	-		
E.49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	Between groups	12.135	2	6.067	4.670	0.010
	Within groups	255.945	197	1.299		
	Total	268.080	199	-		
E.52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	Between groups	10.290	2	5.145	5.101	0.007
	Within groups	198.705	197	1.009		
	Total	208.995	199	-		
S. 55.The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals.	Between groups	6.613	2	3.306	3.090	0.048
	Within groups	210.807	197	1.070		
	Total	217.420	199	-		
S.56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual	Between groups	32.539	2	16.269	12.410	0.000
	Within groups	258.256	197	1.311		
	Total	290.795	199	-		
S.57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns	Between groups	13.351	2	6.675	5.433	0.005
	Within groups	242.044	197	1.229		
	Total	255.395	199	-		
S.58. Religious leaders should no influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people	Between groups	12.818	2	6.409	5.292	0.006
	Within groups	238.577	197	1.211		
	Total	251.395	199	-		
S.59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society	Between groups	26.318	2	13.159	17.368	0.000
	Within groups	149.262	197	0.758		
	Total	175.580	199	-		
S.60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth	Between groups	8.987	2	4.493	3.159	0.045
	Within groups	280.208	197	1.422		
	Total	289.195	199	-		

Bethlehem Governorate: Mean scores and standard deviation for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
D. 32. Do you Agree that Hamas government arrests Fatah members in Gaza.	City	117	1.63	0.750
	Village	59	2.32	1.090
	Camp	24	1.71	0.806
D.34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by	City	117	3.75	1.041
	Village	59	3.25	0.863
	Camp	24	4.00	0.885
D. 36. Democracy is an atheist system- should not be used.	City	117	1.82	0.784
	Village	59	2.19	0.776
	Camp	24	1.79	0.779
E.41. Palestinian Authority fight against corruption and nepotism..	City	117	2.79	1.344
	Village	59	2.07	1.127
	Camp	24	2.42	1.248
E.42. Government guarantees freedom for local media and does not incriminate them in the event that they opposed the Authority.	City	117	2.68	1.201
	Village	59	2.41	0.812
	Camp	24	2.13	0.900
E.46. Government offers services to citizens regardless of their political or religious affiliation.	City	117	2.46	1.079
	Village	59	2.05	0.936
	Camp	24	2.04	0.955
E.49. Government respects freedom of thought and belief.	City	117	2.85	1.164
	Village	59	2.32	1.136
	Camp	24	2.42	1.018
E.52. Government holds all accountable regardless of place, rank, or office if law is violated.	City	117	2.40	1.059
	Village	59	2.15	0.943
	Camp	24	1.71	0.859
S. 55.The secular system guarantees the rights of the individuals.	City	117	3.39	1.090
	Village	59	3.20	0.979
	Camp	24	2.83	0.868
S.56. Religious government is the best system to protect the rights of the individual	City	117	2.56	1.185
	Village	59	3.39	0.965
	Camp	24	3.33	1.341
S.57. Religious figures should not influence peoples opinion during the election campaigns	City	117	3.63	1.201
	Village	59	3.05	0.918
	Camp	24	3.50	1.063
S.58. Religious leaders should no influence the decisions of the government or the future of the people	City	117	3.66	1.108
	Village	59	3.15	1.031
	Camp	24	3.13	1.227
S.59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society	City	117	2.17	0.950
	Village	59	2.95	0.705
	Camp	24	2.08	0.830
S.60. Religion and politics should be separated because politics is concerned with justice not truth	City	117	3.27	1.317
	Village	59	2.85	0.943
	Camp	24	2.83	1.090

Please note: the means indicate the differences in favor for.

Bethlehem Governorate: One Way analysis of variance for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
S.61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda .	Between groups	30.759	2	15.379	12.108	0.000
	Within groups	250.236	197	1.270		
	Total	280.995	199	-		
S.62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	Between groups	27.352	2	13.676	8.190	0.000
	Within groups	328.968	197	1.670		
	Total	356.320	199	-		
L.65. There is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought.	Between groups	6.506	2	3.253	3.508	0.032
	Within groups	182.674	197	0.927		
	Total	189.180	199	-		
L.66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance of the tribal law.	Between groups	5.832	2	2.916	3.998	0.020
	Within groups	143.688	197	0.729		
	Total	149.520	199	-		
L.73. According to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions.	Between groups	6.454	2	3.227	4.318	0.015
	Within groups	147.226	197	0.747		
	Total	153.680	199	-		
T. 74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	Between groups	8.846	2	4.423	11.109	0.000
	Within groups	78.434	197	0.398		
	Total	87.280	199	-		
T. 76. In general, most people can be trusted.	Between groups	12.665	2	6.332	6.554	0.002
	Within groups	190.330	197	0.966		
	Total	202.995	199	-		
T. 78. I believe people are good by nature.	Between groups	12.308	2	6.154	8.211	0.000
	Within groups	147.647	197	0.749		
	Total	159.955	199	-		
T. 80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.	Between groups	17.195	2	8.598	6.951	0.001
	Within groups	243.680	197	1.237		
	Total	260.875	199	-		
T. 81. I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	Between groups	5.303	2	2.651	4.299	0.015
	Within groups	121.492	197	.617		
	Total	126.795	199	-		
HR. 83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	Between groups	8.580	2	4.290	3.137	0.046
	Within groups	269.415	197	1.368		
	Total	277.995	199	-		
HR.85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law.	Between groups	34.735	2	17.367	12.823	0.000
	Within groups	266.820	197	1.354		
	Total	301.555	199	-		
HR.88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	Between groups	4.141	2	2.070	4.238	0.016
	Within groups	96.239	197	0.489		
	Total	100.380	199	-		
HR. 89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family	Between groups	9.776	2	4.888	7.641	0.001
	Within groups	126.019	197	0.640		
	Total	135.795	199	-		

Bethlehem Governorate: Mean scores and standard deviation for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
S.61. I support political parties that adopted religious agenda .	City	117	2.44	1.199
	Village	59	3.31	.951
	Camp	24	2.96	1.160
S.62. The political conflict in Palestine is religious reason only.	City	117	2.50	1.271
	Village	59	3.34	1.295
	Camp	24	2.75	1.391
L.65. There is no justice in the current civil law and that is why the tribal law is sought.	City	117	3.20	1.028
	Village	59	3.41	0.812
	Camp	24	2.79	0.977
L.66. The independence of the law protects the rights of the people and decreases the importance of the tribal law.	City	117	3.91	0.896
	Village	59	3.56	.0772
	Camp	24	4.00	0.834
L.73. According to your belief, magistrates are independent in their decisions.	City	117	3.03	0.835
	Village	59	3.24	0.971
	Camp	24	2.63	0.711
T. 74. A good neighbor is a good one regardless of his religion.	City	117	4.73	0.551
	Village	59	4.25	0.733
	Camp	24	4.50	0.722
T. 76. In general, most people can be trusted.	City	117	2.97	1.042
	Village	59	3.31	0.915
	Camp	24	2.46	0.833
T. 78. I believe people are good by nature.	City	117	3.35	0.941
	Village	59	3.90	0.635
	Camp	24	3.38	0.970
T. 80. I felt disturbed from the practice of religious rituals like Azan (Call of Prayer) and Toll of Bells.	City	117	2.47	1.317
	Village	59	1.92	0.726
	Camp	24	1.79	0.721
T. 81. I respect others' social customs which are different from mine.	City	117	4.23	0.834
	Village	59	3.90	0.759
	Camp	24	4.33	0.565
HR. 83. Woman has the right to hold any higher executive posts except the office of Authority president.	City	117	2.84	1.245
	Village	59	2.44	1.022
	Camp	24	3.04	1.122
HR.85. I support death penalty in Palestinian law.	City	117	2.74	1.276
	Village	59	3.61	0.929
	Camp	24	3.50	1.103
HR.88. Making decisions inside the family has to involve the women.	City	117	4.53	0.638
	Village	59	4.22	0.832
	Camp	24	4.29	0.624
HR. 89. A wife, daughter, sister must not be beaten in any circumstance inside the family	City	117	4.58	0.673
	Village	59	4.14	0.955
	Camp	24	4.13	0.947

Please note: the means indicate the differences in favor for.

Bethlehem Governorate: One Way analysis of variance for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
HR.90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals.	Between groups	17.565	2	8.782	7.998	0.000
	Within groups	216.310	197	1.098		
	Total	233.875	199	-		
HR. 92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated.	Between groups	24.515	2	12.258	7.685	0.001
	Within groups	314.205	197	1.595		
	Total	338.720	199	-		
P. 97. Do you follow the political news.	Between groups	22.595	2	11.297	9.350	0.000
	Within groups	238.025	197	1.208		
	Total	260.620	199	-		
P. 108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	Between groups	16.643	2	8.321	7.390	0.001
	Within groups	221.837	197	1.126		
	Total	238.480	199	-		
TRUST. 109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen)	Between groups	13.429	2	6.715	4.287	0.015
	Within groups	308.551	197	1.566		
	Total	321.980	199	-		
TRUST. 110. Palestinian Police.	Between groups	11.024	2	5.512	4.594	0.011
	Within groups	236.371	197	1.200		
	Total	247.395	199	-		
TRUST.117.Palestinian Universities.	Between groups	9.083	2	4.542	5.397	0.005
	Within groups	165.792	197	0.842		
	Total	174.875	199	-		
TRUST. 120. Former TV's.	Between groups	10.838	2	5.419	6.391	0.002
	Within groups	167.037	197	0.848		
	Total	177.875	199	-		
M. 125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation .	Between groups	20.017	2	10.009	10.124	0.000
	Within groups	194.763	197	0.989		
	Total	214.780	199	-		
M. 129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	Between groups	5.127	2	2.563	4.165	0.017
	Within groups	121.253	197	0.615		
	Total	126.380	199	-		
M.130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior.	Between groups	12.814	2	6.407	5.492	0.005
	Within groups	229.806	197	1.167		
	Total	242.620	199	-		

Bethlehem Governorate: Mean scores and standard deviation for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
HR.90. Human rights should be respect even with criminals.	City	117	3.73	1.039
	Village	59	3.07	1.081
	Camp	24	3.67	1.007
HR. 92. A person has the right to kill if his female honor was violated.	City	117	2.13	1.193
	Village	59	2.88	1.403
	Camp	24	2.71	1.233
P. 97. Do you follow the political news.	City	117	3.51	1.119
	Village	59	2.88	1.084
	Camp	24	3.88	1.035
P. 108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	City	117	3.14	1.082
	Village	59	3.64	0.961
	Camp	24	2.75	1.189
TRUST. 109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen)	City	117	2.73	1.297
	Village	59	2.24	1.150
	Camp	24	2.13	1.262
TRUST. 110. Palestinian Police.	City	117	3.00	1.075
	Village	59	2.49	1.073
	Camp	24	2.63	1.245
TRUST. 117. Palestinian Universities.	City	117	3.79	0.889
	Village	59	3.31	0.969
	Camp	24	3.63	0.924
TRUST. 120. Former TV's.	City	117	3.01	0.933
	Village	59	3.47	0.897
	Camp	24	2.83	0.917
M. 125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation .	City	117	1.97	0.951
	Village	59	2.68	1.090
	Camp	24	2.04	0.955
M. 129. National identity for me is the incubator for every diversity.	City	117	3.96	0.759
	Village	59	3.69	0.876
	Camp	24	4.21	0.658
M.130. Religion and sectarian identity is the Basic issues of my believes and behavior.	City	117	2.74	1.155
	Village	59	3.25	0.902
	Camp	24	2.58	1.100

Please note: the means indicate the differences in favor for.

Hebron Governorate:

One Way analysis of variance for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
D. 30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	Between groups	11.757	2	5.878	5.812	0.004
	Within groups	199.263	197	1.011		
	Total	211.020	199	-		
D. 33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	Between groups	6.595	2	3.298	3.905	0.022
	Within groups	166.360	197	0.844		
	Total	172.955	199	-		
D. 34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	Between groups	16.722	2	8.361	7.173	0.001
	Within groups	229.633	197	1.166		
	Total	246.355	199	-		
S. 59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society .	Between groups	9.592	2	4.796	3.318	0.038
	Within groups	284.763	197	1.445		
	Total	294.355	199	3.298		
L. 70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent .	Between groups	9.299	2	4.650	3.911	0.022
	Within groups	234.201	197	1.189		
	Total	243.500	199	-		
HR. 82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	Between groups	13.592	2	6.796	4.167	0.017
	Within groups	321.283	197	1.631		
	Total	334.875	199	-		
HR. 91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously.	Between groups	23.342	2	11.671	7.110	0.001
	Within groups	323.378	197	1.642		
	Total	346.720	199	-		
HR. 94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society.	Between groups	9.232	2	4.616	4.115	0.018
	Within groups	220.963	197	1.122		
	Total	230.195	199	-		
P. 97. Do you follow the political news.	Between groups	10.984	2	5.492	3.804	0.024
	Within groups	284.411	197	1.444		
	Total	295.395	199	-		
P. 99. I attend political meetings.	Between groups	18.930	2	9.465	5.468	0.005
	Within groups	341.025	197	1.731		
	Total	359.955	199	-		
P. 103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council.	Between groups	10.881	2	5.440	3.142	0.045
	Within groups	341.119	197	1.732		
	Total	352.000	199	-		
P.104. I participate in protests.	Between groups	18.058	2	9.029	4.881	0.009
	Within groups	364.422	197	1.850		
	Total	382.480	199	-		
P.108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	Between groups	7.619	2	3.809	3.430	0.034
	Within groups	218.776	197	1.111		
	Total	226.395	199	-		
TRUST. 109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen)	Between groups	14.836	2	7.418	4.587	0.011
	Within groups	318.559	197	1.617		
	Total	333.395	199	-		

Hebron Governorate: Mean scores and standard deviation for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
D. 30. Under the supposition that the elected Legislative Council waived its confidence in the government, will you be in favor of continuity of the government.	City	121	2.72	0.985
	Village	67	2.45	1.049
	Camp	12	1.75	0.965
D. 33. Do you support tolerance with an official figure who squandered public money or embezzled it.	City	121	1.69	0.857
	Village	67	1.93	1.063
	Camp	12	1.17	0.577
D. 34. Despite its weak points, democracy is the best way to rule by.	City	121	3.42	1.039
	Village	67	3.09	1.190
	Camp	12	4.33	0.778
S. 59. Politicians who aren't religious are not suitable to lead the society .	City	121	2.59	1.108
	Village	67	2.85	1.395
	Camp	12	1.92	0.900
L. 70. The PA did not work on applying the civic law and make an independent .	City	121	2.98	1.057
	Village	67	3.45	1.171
	Camp	12	3.17	0.937
HR. 82. Women should not get involved in politics or economics and leave that to the man.	City	121	2.76	1.304
	Village	67	2.55	1.283
	Camp	12	1.67	0.888
HR. 91. Killing based on the female honor is accepted religiously.	City	121	2.38	1.185
	Village	67	3.04	1.471
	Camp	12	2.00	1.044
HR. 94. Social Justice is not present in the Palestinian society.	City	121	3.23	1.101
	Village	67	3.67	0.960
	Camp	12	3.67	1.155
P. 97. Do you follow the political news.	City	121	3.26	1.242
	Village	67	3.75	1.159
	Camp	12	3.67	0.985
P. 99. I attend political meetings.	City	121	2.25	1.368
	Village	67	2.91	1.240
	Camp	12	2.50	1.168
P. 103. How often Do you participate in the Legislative Council.	City	121	3.62	1.343
	Village	67	4.03	1.314
	Camp	12	4.33	0.985
P.104. I participate in protests.	City	121	2.50	1.403
	Village	67	3.15	1.282
	Camp	12	2.83	1.337
P.108. Do others offer help to you when ask them to do so.	City	121	2.91	1.155
	Village	67	3.33	0.824
	Camp	12	3.00	1.128
TRUST. 109. The President of PA(Abo Mazen)	City	121	3.02	1.200
	Village	67	2.48	1.386
	Camp	12	2.42	1.311

Please note: the means indicate the differences in favor for.

Hebron Governorate :One Way analysis of variance for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>DF</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F-Value</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
TRUST. 114. Security forces.	Between groups	11.680	2	5.840	5.419	0.005
	Within groups	212.320	197	1.078		
	Total	224.000	199	-		
TRUST. 115. The legislative Council performance.	Between groups	8.313	2	4.156	4.719	0.010
	Within groups	173.507	197	.881		
	Total	181.820	199	-		
TRUST. 120. Former TV's .	Between groups	23.474	2	11.737	13.787	0.000
	Within groups	167.706	197	0.851		
	Total	191.180	199	-		
M. 123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	Between groups	15.149	2	7.574	6.812	0.001
	Within groups	219.046	197	1.112		
	Total	234.195	199	-		
M.. 125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation .	Between groups	9.763	2	4.881	3.990	0.020
	Within groups	241.017	197	1.223		
	Total	250.780	199	-		

Hebron Governorate: Mean scores and standard deviation for the sentences that found that there are statistically differences according to place.

<i>Features</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>N.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
TRUST. 114. Security forces.	City	121	3.09	0.931
	Village	67	2.64	1.202
	Camp	12	2.42	1.084
TRUST. 115. The legislative Council performance.	City	121	3.18	0.975
	Village	67	2.85	0.857
	Camp	12	2.50	1.000
TRUST. 120. Former TV's .	City	121	3.48	0.857
	Village	67	2.85	1.034
	Camp	12	2.50	0.905
M. 123. Religious, Multi-party system is in good in the Palestinian society.	City	121	3.19	1.075
	Village	67	3.69	1.047
	Camp	12	4.00	0.853
M.. 125. My relations with others is based on religious affiliation .	City	121	2.93	1.119
	Village	67	2.75	1.119
	Camp	12	2.00	0.853

Please note: the means indicate the differences in favor for..



A review of the social history of the study population (Bethlehem and Hebron) is considered significant for the understanding of societal tastes and civic attitudes of its residents. The comparison between the two cities reflects a state of dissimilarity on the level of cultural pattern, social intellectuality of the city which were formed according to the interactions of citizens and the way they envisage their city; this, later on, constituted a state of solitary which formed the identity, pattern and behaviors of citizens which distinguish them from the other inhabitants of other cities.

