From plurality rule to proportional representation Ergun, Selim Jürgen Electoral systems Plurality Proportional representation Coalitions I consider the decision of a parliament that might change the electoral system for the forthcoming elections from plurality rule to proportional representation. Parties are office-motivated. They care about winning and about the share of seats obtained. I consider two di¤erent scenarios of how parties in the government share the spoils of office: Equally or proportionally to their share of seats. If the government is formed by a single party and parties expect that each party will obtain the same share of votes in the next election the electoral rule will never be changed. That is, for a change to occur the government should be formed by a coalition. I ?nd that a change is more likely to occur when the number of parties is larger and also when the spoils of o¢ ce are shared equally among the members in the governing coalition. I extend these results to analyze the decision of a change from a less proportional rule to a more proportional one. 2014-05-02T11:22:42Z 2014-05-02T11:22:42Z 2008 info:eu-repo/semantics/report Ergun, S.J. From plurality rule to proportional representation. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2008). (The Papers; 08/07). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31516] http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31516 eng The Papers;08/07 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica