Postponing the legal retirement age Lacomba Arias, Juan Antonio Lagos García, Francisco Miguel Legal retirement age Pension benefits Redistribution level This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, firstly, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the re-distributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to postpone the pensionable age. 2014-04-30T07:19:02Z 2014-04-30T07:19:02Z 2005 info:eu-repo/semantics/report Lacomba, J.A.; Lagos, F. Postponing the legal retirement age. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2005). (The Papers; 05/13). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31474] http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31474 eng The Papers;05/13 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica