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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582

Title: Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences
Authors: Staffiero, Gianandrea
Exadaktylos, Filippos
Espín, Antonio M.
Issue Date: 2013
Abstract: The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind.
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Description: First Version (“Accepting Zero in the Ulti matum Game: Selfish Nash Response?”): January 2013.
Series/Report no.: The Papers;13/01
Keywords: Ultimatum game
Dictator game
Altruism
Social welfare
Selfishness
Other-regarding preferences
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Staffiero, G.; Exadaktylos, F.; Espín, A.M. Accepting zero in the ultimatum game does not reflect selfish preferences. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2013). (The Papers; 13/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31582]
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