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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31581

Title: The effect of elections on third-party punishment: an experimental analysis
Authors: Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
Jiménez, Natalia
Solano-García, Ángel
Issue Date: 2012
Abstract: In this paper we analyze the behavior of an official who is elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously. To this aim, we conduct an economic experiment in which officials are third party punishers in a public goods game. We consider two different scenarios which differ in the degree of cooperation within the society. We find that officials increase their punishment when they face elections in both scenarios. The increase in punishment is larger in the more cooperative scenario although differences are not statistically significant. Contrary to candidates’ expectations, voters always vote for the least severe candidate.
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Series/Report no.: The Papers;12/01
Keywords: Opportunism
Public good games
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31581
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Cobo-Reyes, R.; Jiménez, N.; Solano-García, A. The effect of elections on third-party punishment: an experimental analysis. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2012). (The Papers; 12/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31581]
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