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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31574

Title: Accounting for real wealth in heterogeneous-endowment public good games
Authors: Georgantzís, Nikolaos
Proestakis, Antonios
Issue Date: 2011
Abstract: Wealth heterogeneity infuences people's behavior in several socioeconomic environments, especially when groups consisting of "unequal" members have to take a collective action which affects all members equally or proportionally. After eliciting real out-of-lab wealth, we form 4-player groups playing an one-shot public good game with heterogeneous laboratory endowments. Endowing subjects according or against their real wealth gives rise to a series of interesting results. Endowment heterogeneity, lack of real relative wealth information and being "rich" both inside and outside the lab raise contributions. Finally, when eliciting subjects' beliefs, we find out that only relatively "poor" subjects expect others to contribute more than what they actually are prepared to do theirselves.
Sponsorship: Financial support was received by the Junta de Andalucia, grant P07-SEJ-003155.
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Series/Report no.: The Papers;10/20
Keywords: Public goods
Experiments
Endowment heterogeneity
Real wealth
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31574
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Georgantzís, N.; Proestakis, A. Accounting for real wealth in heterogeneous-endowment public good games. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2011). (The Papers; 10/20). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31574]
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