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dc.contributor.authorBrandts, Jordi
dc.contributor.authorFatás, Enrique
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-06T07:00:56Z
dc.date.available2014-05-06T07:00:56Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationBrandts, J.; Fatás, E. The puzzle of social preferences. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2010). (The Papers; 10/15). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31572]es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10481/31572
dc.description.abstractWe present a brief overview of the experimental economics literature on social preferences. In numerous experiments, economically incentivized subjects are willing to sacrifice part of their material earnings to compensate the kind behavior of others, or will be willing to reciprocate at a non-negligible cost, or even pay a positive price for punishing the behavior of selfish individuals. All these actions are labeled as social in economics because there is no apparent way to reconcile them with any reasonable form of pure self-interest. We focus on social dilemma games and want to communicate two main messages. First, research in experimental economics has produced abundant evidence that illustrates the social components of people’s preferences. Second, social sanctions of different types play an important role in facilitating cooperative behavior.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Papers;10/15
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Licensees_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es_ES
dc.subjectSocial preferenceses_ES
dc.subjectBehavior es_ES
dc.titleThe puzzle of social preferenceses_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES


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