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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31566

Title: Strategic interaction and conventions
Authors: Espinosa, María Paz
Kovářík, Jaromír
Ponti, Giovanni
Issue Date: 2010
Abstract: The scope of the paper is to review the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people converge to a unique system of self-fulfilling expectations in presence of multiple, equally viable, conventions. While game theory explains the emergence of conventions relying on efficiency and risk considerations, the psychological view is more concerned with frame and labeling effects. The interaction between these alternative (and, sometimes, competing) effects leads to the result that coordination failures may well occur and, even when coordination takes place, there is no guarantee that the convention eventually established will be the most efficient.
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Series/Report no.: The Papers;10/09
Keywords: Behavioral game theory
Conventions
Social norms
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31566
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Espinosa, M.P.; Kovárik, J.; Ponti, G. Strategic interaction and conventions. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2010). (The Papers; 10/09). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31566]
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