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dc.contributor.authorCobo-Reyes, Ramón
dc.contributor.authorJiménez, Natalia
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-02T08:59:40Z
dc.date.available2014-05-02T08:59:40Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationCobo-Reyes, R.; Jiménez, N. The dark: side of friendship: envy. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2007). (The Papers; 07/07). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31506]es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10481/31506
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the effect of social relations on the convergence to the effcient equilibrium in a 2x2 coordination game. We employ a 2x2 factorial design in which we explore two different games with asymmetric payoffs and two matching protocols: "friends" versus "strangers". In the first game payoffs of the worse off player are the same in the two equilibria, whereas in the second game, this player must sacrifice her own payoff for achieving the efficient equilibrium. Results show that "strangers" coordinate more frequently in the efficient equilibrium than "friends" in both games. Regarding network measures, (such us degree in, degree out and betweenness) they are all positively correlated with the strategy which leads to the efficient outcome except clustering. In addition, envy is a salient factor in explaining efficient convergence.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support is gratefully acknowledge by the Generalitat Valenciana GV 06/275 , Spanish Ministry SEJ2007-62081/ECON and Junta de Andalucía SEJ-2547.es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherUniversidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económicaes_ES
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe Papers;07/07
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Licensees_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es_ES
dc.subjectCoordinationes_ES
dc.subjectEfficiencyes_ES
dc.subjectEnvy es_ES
dc.subjectExperimentses_ES
dc.subjectFriendship es_ES
dc.subjectSocial networks es_ES
dc.titleThe dark side of friendship: envyes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/reportes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES


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