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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31484

Title: Inducing a self-fulfilling prophecy in public goods games
Authors: Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Fatás, Enrique
Guillén, Pablo
Issue Date: 2006
Abstract: This study explores how a self-fulfilling prophecy can solve a social dilemma. We ran two experimental treatments, baseline and automata. Both consisted of a finitely repeated public goods game with a surprise restart. In the automata treatment it was announced that there might be automata playing a grim trigger strategy. This announcement became a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, most participants actually followed a grim trigger strategy in the automata treatment resulting on an increase on the average contributions to the public good relative to the baseline treatment. Moreover, four out of nine groups managed to fully cooperate almost until the last period. Furthermore, after the surprise restart, when the automata threat is less credible, subjects’ behavior was very close to that in the original game.
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Series/Report no.: The Papers;06/01
Keywords: Self-fulfilling prophecy
Public goods game
Grim trigger strategy
Cooperation
Automata
Beliefs
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31484
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Brañas-Garza, P.; Fatás, E.; Guillén, P. Inducing a self-fulfilling prophecy in public goods games. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2006). (The Papers; 06/01). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31484]
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