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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31482

Title: The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation
Authors: Brañas-Garza, Pablo
Durán, Miguel Ángel
Espinosa, María Paz
Issue Date: 2005
Abstract: This paper explores new motivations behind giving. Specifically, it focuses on personal involvement and responsibility to explain why decision makers give positive amounts in dictatorial decisons. The experiment is designed to uncover these motivations. Subjects face the problem of a dictator's allocation of an indivisible pie P to one of two players; indivisibility creates an extremely unequal outcome and the dictator is given a chance to correct this outcome at a cost. The willingness to pay to correct the outcome is examined under different scenarios so that we learn about several features concerning preferences.
Sponsorship: María Paz Espinosa acknowledges Financial aid from UPV and MCT (BEC2003-02084); Pablo Brañas-Garza from Fundación Ramón Areces (2005-07) and DGCYT (SEJ2004-07554/ECON).
Publisher: Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica
Series/Report no.: The Papers;05/21
Keywords: Fairness
Dictator game
Moral cost
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31482
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Brañas-Garza, P.; Durán, M.A.; Espinosa, M.P. The role of personal involvement and responsibility in dictatorial allocations: a classroom investigation. Universidad de Granada. Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica (2005). (The Papers; 05/21). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/31482]
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