When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
ISSN: doi: 10.1387/theoria.480
MetadatosMostrar el registro completo del ítem
Universidad del País Vasco
Moran, RichardMoore's paradoxSelf-knowledge
Bensusan, H.; Pinedo, M. When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough. Theoria, 22 (1): 35-41 (2007). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912]
PatrocinadorThis paper has been partially funded by the MEC research project HUM2004-02330.
Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.