Universidad de Granada Digibug
 

Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Granada >
1.-Investigación >
Departamentos, Grupos de Investigación e Institutos >
Departamento de Filosofía I >
DFI - Artículos >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912

Title: When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough
Authors: Bensusan, Hilan
Pinedo García, Manuel de
Issue Date: 2007
Abstract: Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own beliefs and our capacity to normatively respond to the world.
Sponsorship: This paper has been partially funded by the MEC research project HUM2004-02330.
Publisher: Universidad del País Vasco
Keywords: Moran, Richard
Moore's paradox
Self-knowledge
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912
ISSN: 0495-4548
2171-679X
doi: 10.1387/theoria.480
Rights : Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License
Citation: Bensusan, H.; Pinedo, M. When my own beliefs are not first-personal enough. Theoria, 22 (1): 35-41 (2007). [http://hdl.handle.net/10481/29912]
Appears in Collections:DFI - Artículos

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
Bensusan_Beliefs.pdf260.37 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Recommend this item

This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
Creative Commons

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

Valid XHTML 1.0! OpenAire compliant DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2007 MIT and Hewlett-Packard - Feedback

© Universidad de Granada