Ascriptions with an Attitude
A Study on Belief Reports

Tesis doctoral

Doctorando: Neftalí Villanueva Fernández
Directora: María José Frápolli Sanz

Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Granada
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Introduction

There is a problem on the one hand, and more than one hundred years of literature on the other. Alleged substitutivity failures have been presented under many different guises, in a huge number of contexts, and linked with a vast array of philosophical and non-philosophical topics. We do not know whether an exhaustive historical reconstruction of the intricacies of the problem can be done, but that is certainly not the aim of this work. We want to address the elusive problem of substitutivity, and hopefully shed some new light on it, even defend a novel solution for it.

Acquiring a first hand intuition about the nature of the trouble is terribly easy. It is among the easiest problems in the philosophy of language to state for civilians. Substitutivity *salva veritate* is a very appealing rule, one that seems practically evident to anyone. If ‘Batman’ and ‘Bruce Wayne’ are names of the same guy, then you can place ‘Batman’ instead of ‘Bruce Wayne’ in ‘Bruce Wayne lives in Wayne Manor’ and the result will be true under the same circumstances. Surprisingly enough, the alleged exemptions to such an intuitive norm turn out to be equally apparent. Oedipus believed that his wife was the sexiest woman of the whole known world, but he did not believe that his own mother was sexy at all. When he discov-
ers that he is married with his mother he hurts himself badly. His reaction may seem a bit exaggerated, but the situation makes sense because we can talk about why he did what he did in a way that we all understand, in spite of the trouble it poses for substitutivity. Similarly, the new conquest of the playboy Bruce Wayne, unaware of his secret identity, may be said to believe that Bruce Wayne is a generous gentleman, while Batman is a weird creature of darkness.

Not only the anagnorisis of tragic heroes and the stories about masked individuals with superpowers host this kind of difficulties for substitutivity. Everyday life examples of this phenomenon appear almost constantly when we talk about the reasons for the behavior of a deceived person. Those poor people who were not aware that the evening star is the morning star, Byzantium is Istanbul, Julian Edwin Adderley is Cannonball, etc., have been insensitively forced into the subject through numerous examples. A priori, whenever there is some sort of disequilibrium between speaker’s and audience’s shared knowledge and the epistemic condition they attribute to the believer, the communicative situation may end up hosting a problematic case for substitutivity.

But, is it really clear what the problem is? Substitutivity failures are not always carefully distinguished from other general rules regarding how a theory of language must be constructed. Before properly addressing the question concerning how to deal with examples that seem to pose a problem for a principle that looks otherwise so obvious, some arduous work needs to be done in order to set apart substitutivity from other semantic principles, and discriminate those examples where substitutivity is threatened from others that look quite similar but in fact instantiate different logical properties. Our point of view on this matter is that general rules such as direct reference, semantic innocence and compositionality, when properly formulated, should be treated as regulative principles at least as long as a theory can hold them. They must be considered innocent until proven guilty. The “tragic” situation that a theory about the meaning of belief reports must face is that it is not possible to hold all these principles together with substitutivity and pay at the same time a sincere respect for the opinion of the agents involved in a communicative episode about the meaning of the acts they are performing. A broad conception of the problem can serve as a good way to approach the different theoretical settings, compare them and extract some conclusions about their benefits. Some of these principles have been prioritized over others at distinct points of the history of the discipline. Frege sacrificed semantic innocence and direct reference,
Hintikka only direct reference, the Implicature theorists undermine
spearkers’ intuitions, the Hidden-Indexical Theory’s treatment of
compositionality is not always accepted, and so on. Widening the
reach of the problem is a good way both to examine the historical
alternatives and to assess the pros of new proposals. One of the
greatest things about theoretical research is that you do not have to
stab your eyes out when you realize that there is a tragedy going on,
you may well just take advantage of it.

Nature has kindly provided philosophers with an imagination of
gigantic proportions. In between the discussions about reductionism,
substitutivity problems were considered by some the irrefutable
proof of the distinctness of the human genre from the rest of the ani-
mal kingdom. We humans can explain our behavior with a special
kind of expressions that are essentially different from the ones that
we use to explain the rest of the world around us. There, somewhere
in natural languages, lied an irreducible set of expressions that alone
preserved the “mark of the mental”. Fortunately, time changes man-
ners, and all this Holy Grail story has only survived in the minds of
old fashioned templars. Still, from that historical moment, some as-
sumptions have endured over the years, and now they are usually
presented as part of the establishment, the common ground of undis-
putable notions that together form the solid rock of the discipline. As
part of this heritage, nice insights about the treatment that the mean-
ing of belief reports can be found, and they are worth defending, but
some other ideas are just old prejudices that, to our mind, have not
helped much to clarify the central points of the issue. Before getting
into the details of the analysis for the meaning of belief reports that
we favor here, we will scrutinize some of these inveterate assump-
tions.

One of the nicest examples of philosophers’ imagination ir-
resistible tendency to become over-excited with this topic concerns the
nature of the objects of thought. Two different strategies link the
problem of the inner structure of our thoughts with the analysis of
belief reports. A first group of philosophers would say that it is not
possible to give an account of the meaning of belief ascriptions with-
out investigating in the first place what it is to believe something. The
second group would maintain exactly the opposite directive: re-
search on the meaning of belief ascriptions will tell us about the
structure of our thoughts. Both projects are equally misleading. They
carry sets of fixed intuitions that often prevent the most effective
theoretical options from surviving. A theory about the meaning of a
certain group of expressions, as we conceive the task here, must offer
a consistent abstraction of their inferential capacities. The logical form of a belief ascription will not suddenly reveal the nature of our thoughts, all it has to do is to show in a consistent way what it is the role that ascriptions plays in argumentation. This purpose is neither simple to achieve nor insignificant. Belief ascriptions play a decisive part in our efforts to try and explain human behavior, and it is essential to be clear about what can be extracted as a consequence of what we say and what can what we say be a consequence of.

Under “mark of the mental”, many different natural language phenomena confusingly conflate. Only the problem of opacity is addressed in this work. In opaque reports, some expressions cannot be substituted salva veritate for others with the same meaning. Other criteria used to highlight the irreducible character of these cases are taken to correspond to different distinctions or to be just empty. In particular, we do not think that the ambiguity of scope between existential quantifiers and doxastic operators makes any difference for the truth conditions of belief ascriptions.

Our positive proposal for the treatment of the meaning of belief reports is characterized by the central role of deference and the hypothesis that public language words can be used as “modes of presentation”. Opaque belief reports have been sometimes called ‘translucent’, because they do not block our vision, so to say, but merely make the medium relevant. Looking through a window glass, we can focus on whatever it is behind the glass, or fix our eyes in the glass as well, becoming instantly aware of the imperfections of the surface. Likewise, in a belief report the words may be used transparently, to talk about something else, or may acquire a decisive relevance for the inferential import of the report, in opaque cases. This importance of the medium blocks substitutivity. We just take this metaphor as literally as possible. If the adjustment of our focus may make some of the words that we use essential to understand the logical behavior of opaque ascriptions, let the words themselves deal with the trouble.

**The schedule**

Chapter 1 is dedicated to the idea of substitutivity. We carry this principle from Leibniz’s Law to a modified version of intensional substitutivity, in order to fully understand what kind of commitment would be in trouble in the examples that will center our attention along the thesis. Intensional substitutivity is distinguished from other
related rules concerning the possible limits of a theory that tries to address the topic of meaning in natural language. It has been maintained that opacity did not only violated substitutivity, but posed a problem for direct reference, semantic innocence, and compositionality. The discussion about these principles involves other issues frequently associated with them and not always put apart carefully, like rigidity, the nature of the relation between names and their references within a directly referential theory, the presence of context-shifting expressions in natural language, Montague’s homomorphism, the Grammatical Constraint, iconicity, and reverse compositionality. We will consider the respect for speakers’s intuitions as well as a desideratum for a theory about the meaning of belief reports. A theory should try not to contravene in a systematic way what those involved in a communicative act think about the truth of what they are saying. A theory cannot hold instensional substitutivity, direct reference, semantic innocence, compositionality, respect the intuitions of the speakers, and provide at the same time a coherent treatment of the content of certain utterances. We will not deal with each and every example that was once supposed to support this paradoxical result. The chapter contains a list of cases that will be analyzed later on in the thesis and an explanation of why some other classics of the literature are left out.

Intentionality is the big theme that we address in chapter 2. After paying some tribute to those who insist on how distorted usual interpretations of Brentano are, we introduce and discuss five features that have been proposed to distinguish intentional contexts: existential commitment, truth-functionality, substitutivity, exportation, and excluded middle. Excluded middle is the principle that better captures the distinction between specific and non-specific readings of Buridan cases, while substitutivity is logically independent from excluded middle and existential commitment. Temporal, modal, epistemic and doxastic operators are non truth-functional functions of propositions. We end up with three different distinctions instead of the classic intentional versus non-intentional, where the mark of the mental was said to leave a trace in natural language: specific versus non-specific readings of Buridan cases, relational versus notional, and transparent versus opaque belief reports. Every relational Buridan case corresponds to a specific reading, but not the other way around, and, for the rest of it, no logical relation is postulated. The nature of “quotational intrusions” is also historically introduced in this chapter. We examine Quine’s general proposal, Carnap’s intensional isomorphism, and the different responses to Mates’ argument.
Certain morals are extracted from this discussion that will turn out to be enlightening at further stages of this work. Besides quotational intrusions, some other options are considered and discarded as the source of opacity. We examine the idea that an opaque report is one in which the believer is related in a particular way with the object of her belief, and the alternative that defends that opaque reports contain the points of view of speaker and believer while transparent one only respect the speaker’s point of view. Opacity, the phenomenon associated with substitutivity failures of co-intensional expressions, is posed as a consequence of a covert mention, and intensional substitutivity is the only way to set apart opaque from transparent belief ascriptions.

The argument presented in chapter 4 goes along the following lines: if there is a principled distinction between circumstances of evaluation and context of interpretation and belief operators are circumstance-shifting operators, then exportation is not a useful method to set apart two different readings of belief reports. We reject Quine’s idea that the difference of scope between existential quantifiers and belief operators can be used to account for the difference between opaque and transparent reports. The difficulties in exporting the material under the scope of doxastic operators cannot be considered opacity’s birth-mark in a theory that favors the circumstance-shifting function of belief operators. We analyze the notions of circumstance-shifting and context-shifting, and introduce a somewhat basic approach to “Austinian semantics”. The truth-conditional import of scope ambiguity is also treated. We study the consequences of the coincidence of existential and universal quantifiers, temporal and modal operators. Finally, a possible objection against the argument presented in the chapter is discussed and we try to calm the possible reaction of those used to consider Quine’s proposal as one of the fundamental truths in the philosophy of language.

Chapter 5 deals with some theories that approach the paradox of meaning by alternatively weakening compositionality or respect for the intuitions of the speakers, instead of focusing on a reform of intensional substitutivity, like those interested in the notion of synonymity did, or renouncing to direct reference à la Hintikka. The Implicature Theory is strongly revisionist with respect to speakers’s intuitions, but it manages to keep together the rest of the principles. We are not satisfied with a strategy that departs so much from the opinion of those involved in a conversation about the truth of what they are saying, and finds lots of difficulties to reach a merely coherent formulation. The alternative considered here among the theories
that respect the context-dependent nature of belief reports is the Hidden-Indexical Theory. The best formulation of this theory is Recanati’s, which is reconstructed at length in this chapter. Among the troubles that Schiffer posed for the Hidden-Indexical Theory, the meaning-intention problem, the logical form problem, and the mode of presentation problem, only the last one is really persistent. At the end of the chapter, we develop an argument against the compatibility of a coherent treatment of belief iteration, semantic innocence, and a non-revisionist attitude concerning speakers’s intuitions.

Deference centers our attention in chapter 6. We distinguish between deliberate and default deference. With deliberately deferential utterances, the speaker relies for the meaning of the words in her utterance in somebody else’s linguistic knowledge. Speaker and audience take the meaning of a certain utterance to be partially or completely fixed by the rules governing a particular idiolect or sociolect. The language parameter contained in every context is changed, and the utterance has to be interpreted with respect to a different norm. In default deference cases, on the other hand, no translinguistic context-shift is postulated, and the rules governing the meaning of what we say are those belonging to the language parameter present in the context of utterance, being it public language, a sociolect or an idiolect. We analyze some of the contextual resources that have to be manipulated by the speaker in order to prompt a deferential interpretation, and evaluate the connections between linguistic deference and other related phenomena like epistemic deference and imperfect mastery.

In chapter 7 we spell out some details of the version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory that we favor. The chapter is structured around two main theses: 1) opaque belief reports are a proper subclass of deliberately deferential utterances, and 2) public words may effectively play the role of “modes of presentation” in a theory about the meaning of belief ascriptions. We give examples of transparent reports made by means of deliberately deferential utterances, both cases in which the deferee and the believer differ and examples in which they coincide. Some of the benefits of taking most transparent reports to be default deference utterances are also examined. It is shown that we can use simple natural language expressions to give an account of the inferential import of opaque belief reports. In order to achieve this result, we need to introduce certain modifications to the criterion that determines the function performed by “modes of presentation”. We argue against some classic objections to this position and prove that the kind of analysis that we propose, including
public words as modes of presentation, deals perfectly with some non-obvious cases.
Parameters and cases of study

1 Introduction

In this chapter we set out the principles and problems that will guide the rest of the work. Substitutivity problems cannot be treated in isolation. One of the main problems concerning substitutivity is that every time we try to secure the interchangeability of synonymous expressions salva veritate we end up creating troubles for jeopardizing another very reasonable intuition. In this work, this situation receives the –certainly pompous– denomination of “paradox of meaning”. The first step to take is to define the principles that we consider may be involved in a theory of meaning when the problem of substitutivity arises. Thus, substitutivity, semantic innocence, direct reference, and compositionality will be characterized and compared with other similar but distinct principles.

Not every example that can be used to illustrate the paradox of meaning will be treated in this essay. The last section of this chapter offers the list of cases that will receive our attention and a succinct explanation of the absence of other famous cases.
2 Substitutivity

This section is devoted to studying the idea that two expressions with the same meaning may be interchanged everywhere without affecting the meaning of the sentence that hosts them. Some explanations will be introduced about Leibniz’s Law, to arrive at a formulation of an intensional principle of substitutivity. Some remarks will be dedicated to clarifying the relationship between substitutivity and theories of meaning. Extensional options for substitutivity will be considered as well.

Leibniz and the substitutivity of identicals.

In his *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz states that ‘it is never true that two substances are entirely alike, differing only in being two rather than one’. This idea has become famously known as “Leibniz’s Law”. Apparently, two different principles are conflated in this law: the identity of indiscernibles and the indiscernibility of identicals. The indiscernibility of identicals gives a principled appearance to the idea that if no one can distinguish between two elements, then we are not confronted with two different elements, but just one. The identity of indiscernibles, on the other hand, tells us that two elements linked by an identity relation cannot differ in whatever can be predicated of them. Both the indiscernibility of identicals and the identity of indiscernibles may be expressed somewhat more formally in the following way:

**Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles:** \( \forall x \forall y (\forall \phi (\phi(x) \leftrightarrow \phi(y)) \rightarrow x = y) \)

**Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals:** \( \forall x \forall y (x = y \rightarrow (\phi(x) \leftrightarrow \phi(y))) \)

**Leibniz’s Law (LL):** \( \forall x \forall y (x = y \leftrightarrow (\phi(x) \leftrightarrow \phi(y))) \)

Now, we could say of this Law what Benjamin Peirce told his students in front of a certain formula written on the blackboard, that ‘we have not the slightest idea what this equation means, but we may be sure that it means something very important’. Evidently, if something looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, we may reasonably conclude that it *is* a duck. But Leibniz’s intuition goes a bit further than this. Leibniz thought that ‘things are indi-
viduated by their “whole being” (Mates 1986, 122). For two things to be the same, they have to share each and every property; every property is essential.

The duck-intuition is quite an appealing idea. If I wake up half-slept after a bad night and see a silhouette which is just like mine, then turn the lights on and see a perfect duplicate of myself in a mirror, with my hair, my pajamas and my bent nose, exactly in the position my own reflection should have in the mirror, I may plausibly suppose that I’m still alone in the house and that the origin of this mirrored image is nothing but myself. Such a platitude is the idea captured by the identity of indiscernibles. If something is exactly like me in every respect, it has to be me!

It is not obvious at all, on the other hand, how someone unused to the philosophical jargon could make sense of the converse, the indescernibility of identicals. According to this principle, two identical things must necessarily have all their properties in common. But this is fairly counterintuitive. I might have woken up this morning ten minutes later, or might have eaten a different sandwich, or have had a wonderful siesta instead of being here working; would any of these have made me a different being? According to the principle of indiscernibility of identicals (and to Leibniz’s Law) the man who, being exactly like me in every other respect, woke up this morning ten minutes later would not be me. If I had written an interrogative sign at the end of this sentence instead of a full stop, I would have been a different being from the one I am. To my mind, this sounds really odd. We usually think that counterfactual discourse is about our common things, the same ones that we face in everyday life. Some philosophers, like Kripke (Kripke 1971), have followed this latter intuition in their efforts to devise a plausible semantics for counterfactual discourse. Others, like Lewis (Lewis 1968), have respected the Leibnizian stance concerning “whole identities”, and have called our counterfactual selves “counterparts”, distinct entities living in a possible world different from the actual world.

Often referred to as Leibniz’s Law, we find the much-quoted principle:

*General Principle of Substitutivity (GPS):* $x$ is the same as $y$ if and only if $x$ can be substituted for $y$ in any proposition whatsoever *salva veritate.* (cfr. Mates 1986, 123).
LL and GPS are, appearances notwithstanding, different principles. In LL, quantifiers range over *objects*, every kind of objects. In GPS, however, we have three restrictions for our objects: they must be capable of undergoing substitution, they must somehow take part in propositions and they have to be *substitutable salva veritate*. Almost every object I can think of can be substituted, given a certain frame, a certain context. A BMW can be substituted by a Mercedes in a traffic jam next to my flat, an apple may be substituted by an orange on a shelf in the supermarket, and so on. Of course, a marketing manager of BMW could say that “a BMW is unsubstitutable”, but this kind of slogan is not relevant here. In the broad sense that we are using the term, everything can be substituted by everything. The context and the objects involved in the substitution determine the different effects a substitution may have. Substituting an orange for an apple in a bowl in my kitchen can cause a quite different effect from the one caused by the substitution of an enormous UFO fora car in a normal traffic jam, or by the replacement of the sheets of my bed by an enraged cat in a particularly peaceful moment of the night. GPS requires a special kind of substitution –substitution by objects of the same kind– in a certain context –a proposition–, and excludes a particular effect –alteration of truth-value. The context of the substitution is a *proposition*. We will consider that, in this kind of classical formulation, the word ‘proposition’ was ambiguous between the sentence, the linguistic expression, and the *content* expressed by the utterance of a sentence. By uttering a sentence, we usually describe a certain state of affairs, we name the objects we find in it and say something about them. Whenever the situation described corresponds with the facts, the proposition expressed by our utterance is true, otherwise it is false.

Still, we do not know in which sense GPS is different from LL. The items *x* and *y* are to be substituted ‘in any proposition...’, says GPS, and that should give us a clue about the particular kind of objects that our attention has to be focused on when dealing with this principle. As said above, ‘proposition’ is ambiguous between the mere sentence and the content expressed by the utterance. If we took the latter option, we wouldn’t have much, just something like this: take two objects whatsoever and try to place them in the same states of affairs expressed by the same utterances; if the number and distribution of truths you get is the same in both cases, you do not have two different objects, but just one. Maybe this resembles Leibniz’s intentions to a T, but this criterion of identity –substitutivity– has been traditionally read as supplying more information, information
related to the meaning of our expressions. GPS is used as a method to identify words that contribute identical ingredients to the propositions expressed by the utterances of sentences containing them. To capture this, we have to disambiguate ‘proposition’ favoring the former sense of ‘proposition’, in which it is synonymous with ‘sentence’, and provide a modified version of GPS along these lines:

*Modified General Principle of Substitutivity (MGPS):* the semantic contribution of an expression \( x \) is the same as that of an expression \( y \) if and only if, for every proposition \( p \) expressed by the utterance of a sentence containing \( x \), the substitution of \( y \) for \( x \) in \( p \) does not alter the truth-value of \( p \).

In MGPS quantifiers range over linguistic expressions, but the principle is not meant to individuate objects of this kind. MGPS tells us when it is that two expressions make the same contribution to what we say by using them. This is part of the reason why MGPS is not affected by the counterintuitive effect of LL, the one corresponding to the indescernibility of identica ls. LL is a general principle that individuates every kind of entities. MGPS is a heuristic guide to determine the meaning of linguistic expressions. Whatever ‘meanings’ turn out to be in our theory, two expressions with the same meaning must be intersubstitutable *salva veritate*.

**Meaning and substitutivity**

Why is it necessary to talk about ‘meanings’ at all? The dominating intuition here is that we can say different things using the same expression and, conversely, that we can say the same thing using two different expressions. In the presence of Mary and Peter alone, I can utter ‘He is an ophthalmologist’ or ‘Peter is an oculist’ to say exactly the same thing. In addition, when I am with John and Luke later on and, ostensibly referring to John, I utter the words ‘He is an ophthalmologist’, I am saying something completely different from what I was saying before by using the very same words; before I said that Peter was an ophthalmologist, now I am saying that John is an ophthalmologist. This evidence is what prompts the use of ‘meanings’ as theoretical entities. The investigation that concerns the logical form of linguistic expressions is an effort to specify in the clearest possible way the distinct realm that appears as we approximate to our use of language. This is the general frame in which theorists like Ruth Bar-
can Marcus maintain that the principle of substitutivity ‘may be perceived as both true and regulative’ (Marcus 1993, 108).

Cartwright too distinguishes between Leibniz’s Law taken as a principle of identity, or object individuation, and a principle of substitutivity. He states the substitutivity principle in the following way:

for all expressions \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), \( [\alpha = \beta] \) expresses a true proposition if and only if, for all sentences \( S \) and \( S' \), if \( S' \) is like \( S \) save for containing an occurrence of \( \beta \) where \( S \) contains an occurrence of \( \alpha \), then \( S \) expresses a true proposition only if \( S' \) does also. (Cartwright 1971, 120).

He equates Leibniz’s dictum with the indescernibility of identicals and thinks that, conceived that way, what he calls the Principle of Identity is a ‘self-evident truth’ (Cartwright 1971, 133). Nevertheless, he is not so sure about the principle of substitutivity. He insists that we have to declare this principle false, on the basis of examples as (1) and (2):

(1) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.

(2) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size.

These examples, proposed originally by Quine (Quine 1943, 113) are used by Cartwright to show that the principle of substitutivity does not hold. ‘Giorgione’ and ‘Barbarelli’ are different names for the same individual. Their intersubstitution results, nonetheless, in propositions with different truth-conditions. (1) is true, because Giorgione is so-called, ‘Giorgione’, because of his size, while (2) is false – he is not called ‘Barbarelli’ due to his size. Therefore, concludes Cartwright, the principle of substitutivity is wrong, and one should accept this evidence once and for all.

We grant Cartwright’s conclusion that the principle of substitutivity may not be implied by the identity principle. To show this, we only need to argue that the kind of examples that could disprove substitutivity would be harmless for the identity principle – Cartwright’s version of LL, namely, indescernibility of identicals. This could be argued quite convincingly, though we do not want to commit with this, especially using only Cartwright’s assumptions. Indeed, this is
the only thing Cartwright can get. He cannot prove that his principle of substitutivity is false because it is underspecified. The only thing proved with the invalid inference from (1) to (2) is that two expressions, ‘Giorgione’ and ‘Barbarelli’ cannot be on either side of an identity sign and express a true proposition. Well, in a sense, what Cartwright’s principle of substitutivity gives us is no more than an identity criterion for expressions. ‘Barbarelli’ and ‘Giorgione’ are two different expressions, no doubt about that, so what would be the surprise if the statement “Giorgione’ = ‘Barbarelli” turned out to be false? That would be what one should expect. Substitutivity salva veritate is a relation between expressions with the same meaning, expressions that make the same contribution to the propositions expressed by the utterances of sentences that contain them. Cartwright’s way to state the principle fails to accomplish this task. When, having Cartwright’s principle in mind, we consider cases like (1) and (2) we only reach a very reasonable conclusion, that ‘Barbarelli’ and ‘Giorgione’ are two different expressions. Cartwright’s substitutivity principle is a self-evident useless truism.

Substitutivity salva veritate tells us something about the meaning of linguistic expressions. It says that two expressions have the same meaning if and only if they can be substituted everywhere salva veritate. It is a criterion to individuate expressions with the same meaning, expressions that make the same contribution to the truth-conditions. It is a guide in our research of the logical form of linguistic expressions. Whenever in our theory examples like (1) and (2) menace our principle of substitutivity, the theoretical decision concerning the nature of meanings for linguistic expressions is mistaken. Standing alone, GPS is no more than a general desideratum, a methodological device waiting for a concrete theory to be implemented.

**Extensional Substitutivity**

To put some flesh on the MGPS, we need to specify what we take to be the ‘semantic contribution’, the ‘meaning’ of an expression. From a logical point of view, four different basic kinds of expressions have been traditionally distinguished both for artificial and natural languages: names, verbs, sentences, and conjunctions – syncategorematic terms. Names designate objects, verbs are the expressions used to form sentences from names, and conjunctions are expressions used to form sentences from other sentences (Prior 1971, 17). The first candidate to perform the role of ‘meaning’ for those linguistic expressions is their extension. Apparently, this is the most neutral option from an ontological point of view. The extension of a
name is the individual it designates, the extension of a verb is the group of objects that allow the verb to form true sentences out of them, the extension of a sentence is a truth value –true or false–, and the extension of a conjunction is given by its truth-table. Thus, we can be a bit more specific about MGPS:

*Extensional MGPS:* the extension of an expression x is the same as that of an expression y if and only if the substitution of y for x does not alter the extension of any proposition whatsoever expressed by the utterance of a sentence containing x.

It didn’t take too much to realize that a principle like this had more counterexamples than a theory worth defending should have. Imagine, for example, that the set of PhD candidates is, by pure chance, equal to the set of insomniacs in Spain in 2005. Thus, the predicative expressions “being a PhD candidate” and “being an insomniac” would have the same extension, and should be able to be intersubstituted everywhere *salva veritate*. This would guarantee the move from (3) to (4), which is clearly invalid:

(3) Necessarily, all PhD candidates are PhD candidates.

(4) Necessarily, all PhD candidates suffer from insomnia.

The inference from (3) to (4) is not *truth-preserving*, is not a correct; (3) is evidently true while (4) is obviously false. (4) is the result of substituting in (3) the predicative expression ‘being an insomniac’ for the predicative expression ‘being a PhD candidate’, two expressions which, according to our description of the case, are extensionally equivalent, as the classes associated with both expressions contain exactly the same individuals. If a semantic theory wants to keep the idea that the meanings of linguistic expressions, their contribution to the propositions expressed by the utterance of the sentences in which they are included, are their extensions, then it cannot give a consistent account of languages containing expressions like ‘possible’, ‘necessarily’ and many others. Given the unavoidable relevance of this kind of expressions, our options are reduced to the following dilemma: either we drop MGPS or we reject the idea that the meanings of linguistic expressions are their extensions.
Abandoning extensions was not an option that many theorists were ready to adopt without a fight. The classic semantic project is based on two main notions, as Brandom (vid., e. g. Brandom 2000, chapter 1) has insistently repeated, truth and reference. A basic run-of-the-mill correspondence theory of truth and a class of referential expressions was supposed to be all that was needed to define all the semantic notions in order to give an account of the logico-semantic characteristics of languages. For philosophers like Quine (Quine 1956), as we will see later, leaving the realm of extensions to venture out into the unknown was abandoning the realm of true logic to embrace the “creatures of darkness”.

Intensional Substitutivity
Less reluctant theorists give a chance to intensions. The intensions of proper names are the individuals they refer to, the intensions of predicative expressions are the properties associated with them, and the intensions of complete sentences are the propositions expressed by uttering them. Meanings for conjunctions in intensional systems are still, generally, correctly captured by their truth-tables. Since the notions of ‘property’ and ‘proposition’ are not always easy to explain, many theorists trust in the intuitive appeal of ‘synonymity’, in a way to be spelled out in the next chapter, and include as a criterion for identity of intensions this general restriction:

*Identity Criterion for Intensions (ICI)*: two expressions are said to have the same intension if and only if they have the same extension in every circumstance, possible world or state-description (Cfr. Carnap 1956, 10, 19, sections 2-2 and 4-13. Vid. Also Recanati 2000, 40).

Correspondingly, we will have a principle of substitutivity for intensions:

*Intensional MGPS*: the intension of an expression $x$ is the same as that of an expression $y$ if and only if the substitution of $y$ for $x$ does not alter the truth-value of any proposition whatsoever expressed by the utterance of a sentence containing $x$. 
Neat as ICI looks, it is not exactly the characterization we were seeking. It saves us from the difficult task of finding details concerning the nature of obscure entities such as properties and propositions, at least at this very early stage of our inquiry, but, on the other hand, it doesn’t tell us much about how to flesh out MGPS. Indeed, ICI seems nothing but a not very original way to paraphrase Intensional MGPS; it basically says that an intension is whatever satisfies the intensional MGPS.

Surprisingly enough, examples involving epistemic contexts have been considered classically to be a source of continuous violations of Intensional MGPS. For instance, suppose Peter is looking for a present for his friend Mike. Peter has visited Mike’s clinic many times, and is used to the ad in the main door that calls his friend ‘the best ophthalmologist in town’. Nevertheless, he hasn’t heard the word ‘oculist’ in his whole life, his education lacking every contact with the Latin language. In the shop, Peter sees a wonderful lamp, something that looks like a very good present, but as the clerk explains that is a tool specially designed for oculists, Peter drops the idea, convinced that it would be useless for his ophthalmologist friend. In this context, we could explain Peter’s behavior by means of an utterance of (5):

(5) Peter believes that Mike is not an oculist.

If we substitute in (5) the predicative expression ‘oculist’ for other synonymous predicative expression, ‘ophthalmologist’, we will have a shocking result:

(6) Peter believes that Mike is not an ophthalmologist.

Apparently, nothing can be wrong with the inference from (5) to (6). We took two different synonymous expressions and applied MGPS, a principle that was “harmlessly” transformed into Intensional MGPS. If, following our theory, we make the substitution and consider the proposition expressed by the utterance of (6) in this context true, we are not only going against our strong intuitions about its truth, but we are precluding the possibility of explaining what happened in a situation like the one described above using expressions like (5) and (6). Talk about beliefs is one of the key ways to under-
stand human behavior. If in a case as simple as this we cannot use expressions (5) and (6) to explain Peter’s actions, we will lose too much explanatory power. We do not want a theory of meaning that makes of us creatures unable to explain others’ behavior. This theory of meaning would be pointless from a philosophical point of view. This is the reason why some theorists maintain that we should not have intensional, but hyperintensional systems.

Advocates of hyperintensionality maintain that cases like (5) and (6) are examples of failures of Intensional MGPS. But, how can this even be conceived? As we have seen, ICI, our general way to specify what kind of entities intensions were, did not add much to Intensional MGPS. In other words, nothing could be an intension and at the same time fail to qualify as an expression interchangeable for other co-intensional expressions salva veritate. A system that tried to keep ICI, intensional MGPS and hyperintensionality would be inconsistent. We think that this is the spirit of Marcus’ dictum that the principle of substitutivity is ‘regulative’; there is no way of abandoning the substitutivity principle without dispensing with the whole project of the logical form for natural-language expressions. Substitutivity, intensional substitutivity, is the guide we must stick to in order to pull together the different strands of our logico-semantic theory.

What are these other pieces that can be re-accommodated in our theory in order to find a suitable environment for the substitutivity principle? One of the first ideas we could put into question is the substantive commitment assumed while trying to specify Intensional MGPS beyond ICI. Maybe we were not absolutely right when we said that intensions for proper nouns, predicative expressions and sentences were, correspondingly, the individuals they refer to, the properties associated with them, and the propositions expressed by their utterances. Maybe these entities do not capture whatever it is that two different but synonymous expressions really have in common. One of the earliest and most prolific discussions on metarepresentation went on between philosophers that pursued insistently the nature of this mysterious class of entities that was to be the solution for the synonymy problem, a class of entities associated with linguistic expressions capable of resist hyperintensionality. We will analyze these debates in chapter 3.

Other principles one could look at when faced with hyperintensionality cases are those of direct reference, rigidity, compositionality, and semantic innocence, together with the idea that the surplus of information that jeopardizes Intensional MGPS should be part of the
truth-conditions of the propositions expressed—instead of considering our semantic-intuitions to be simply mistaken. All these principles have been related to the idea that the intensions of proper names were their extensions, the individuals they refer to, but should be taken as different criteria, in the way we will state in the following section. Some of the theories that followed this strategy of accommodating other principles of our semantic theory, as an alternative to considering that the whole project of the logical form was shaky by questioning Intensional MGPS, will be scrutinized in chapter 5.

3 Parameters

The study of the peculiar logico-semantic features of belief reports is a whole sub-discipline within the bigger frame of analytic philosophy of language, at least since Frege’s “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (Frege 1892). For different reasons, it has become one of the favorite places to test theories of meaning and distinct general philosophical approaches to language. As pointed out above, a philosophical conception of language cannot avoid the fact that we can say different things using the same words, and, conversely, that we can say the same thing using different words. A related idea that has guided research in philosophy of language over the years is the assumption that we can say an indefinitely large number of things using a definite, rather small, number of linguistic expressions and combinatorial rules. In addition, there is no a priori limit to the things that can be understood, still using the very same limited number of linguistic expressions and combinatorial rules. Language is a tool whose productivity is only constrained by the richness of human activity, and that richness is subjected to human necessities and creativity, whose boundaries are certainly difficult to establish. It seems, prima facie at least, that the number of possible human purposes for which language may be useful cannot be predicted.

These essential features of linguistic activity are grasped through a cluster of principles, not always appropriately distinguished. Basically, they try to give an explanation of the productivity and systematicity of language. In this section we will survey a few of them, the ones that are permanently present in theories about the meaning of belief reports: semantic innocence, direct reference and compositionality, and some others related to these three. Needless to say, the literature on these topics is huge. We will only focus our attention on
those features that prove to be useful for our general purpose, specially those that will allow us to distinguish these general principles from their similar but distinct relatives.

**Semantic Innocence.**

The general idea is that linguistic expressions always make the same contribution to the propositions expressed by the utterances of sentences that contain them. If the contribution of a singular term like ‘Brad Mehldau’ in a normal utterance of ‘Brad Mehldau lives in New York’ is the brilliant American pianist, then the occurrence of the same expression in a normal utterance of ‘Last year in Granada Brad Mehldau played a cover of “She’s leaving home”’ must refer to the same individual and make an identical contribution to the truth-conditions. The first proposition will be true if and only if Brad Mehldau lives in New York, and the second one just in case the same musician played the Beatles song last year in Granada.

Davidson supported the view that we cannot give a theory of meaning without having in mind certain *innocence restrictions*, since “language is the instrument it is because the same expression, with semantic features (meaning) unchanged, can serve countless purposes” (Davidson 1969, 172-173). That is, language, just because it is the tool it is, needs a stable class of meanings consistently associated with a class of linguistic expressions, meanings that cannot change with the different occurrences of these expressions. If linguistic expressions could make a different semantic contribution every time we used them, it would be impossible to explain productivity using systematicity. Without semantic innocence as a regulative principle, default interpretations for utterances never heard before would be impossible, and, ultimately, we wouldn’t be able to explain normal understanding in common linguistic practice (Vid. Hornsby 1989).

Davidson called semantic innocence “pre-Fregean innocence” (Davidson 1969, 172) because Frege was allegedly the first philosopher who put into question something like this idea. Frege argued that the meaning of linguistic expressions must be analyzed using two different notions: those of sense and reference. In cases like belief reports, the reference of the embedded sentences (ordinarily a truth-value) was its usual sense (a thought). This was meant to account for the fact that we cannot substitute ‘Mike is not an ophthalmologist’ for ‘Mike is not an oculist’ in (5) –both of which express propositions with the same truth-conditions when un-embedded–
without altering the truth-conditions of the whole. This deviant use of expressions within epistemic contexts was challenged by semantic innocence.

A standard formulation of semantic innocence would be this:

*Semantic Innocence (SI):* the semantic value of an embedded expression is its normal semantic value.

If ‘oculist’ and ‘ophthalmologist’ are synonymous expressions in utterances of ‘Mike is not an oculist’ and ‘Mike is not an ophthalmologist’, then they should still be synonymous in (5) and (6). If (SI) is a regulative principle for a theory of meaning, then we should look somewhere else to accommodate our uncomfortable intuitions about the truth of (5) and (6).

Pietroski (Pietroski 1996) provides interesting examples in favor of (SI) and against Frege’s deviant thesis that the reference of an embedded expression is its usual sense.

(7) Nora believes that Fido barks and he does bark.

Had the semantic value of Fido been a sense, it would have been anaphorically exported to the second part of the conjunction. But it is clear that when someone says that ‘he does bark’ they are saying something about an individual, not about a thought. This argument would go against Frege’s deviant thesis quite effectively, but cannot, as such, be considered an argument in favor of (SI). (SI) is a general principle, and this example leaves open the possibility that *sometimes* the semantic-value of an embedded expression is its normal semantic value, while *sometimes* it is not.

An expression is embedded when it occurs under the scope of a certain operator, be it modal, epistemic, temporal, etc. *Necessity* and *possibly* are modal operators, epistemic operators are typically related to locutions like ‘believes’ or ‘knows’, and temporal operators explicitly state the time at which what is said should be evaluated to determine its truth. (SI) states that ‘Brad Mehldau’ must make the same contribution in ‘Brad Mehldau lives in New York’ in ‘Possibly, Brad Mehldau will tour Europe next year’, in ‘John believes that Brad Mehldau lives in New York’ and in ‘Last year, Brad Mehldau played in Granada’.
A very closely related idea is the one defended by Kaplan (Kaplan 1989) and Lewis (Lewis 1998), among others, that there are no context-shifting operators in natural language. Modal, epistemic and temporal operators change the circumstances in which a certain proposition shall be evaluated. Context-shifting operators, monsters – as they are sometimes called – would change the interpretation parameters of the utterances considered. Expressions under the scope of monsters, by definition, do not make their normal semantic contribution. Under the form of a principle:

*Monsters Principle (MP):* There are no context-shifting operators in natural language.

Again, the justification of this principle has a lot to do with the inner nature of language and linguistic activity:

To be sure, we could speak a language in which ‘As for you, I am hungry’, is true iff ‘I am hungry.’ is true when the role of the speaker is shifted from me to you – in other words, iff you are hungry. We could but we don’t. For English, the speaker is not a shiftable feature of context. We could speak a language in which ‘Backward, that one costs too much.’ is true iff ‘That one costs too much.’ is true under a reversal of the direction the speaker’s finger points. But we don’t. (Lewis 1998, 27-28)

As for (SI), it seems that the best argument to support (MP) is just that natural language is what it is. (MP) has been recently questioned from the linguistic side (Vid. Schlenker 2003), and it would turn out to be useless if sufficient grounds for the distinction between circumstance of evaluation and context of interpretation could not be found. Arguments that appeal to the inner essence of objects of study, working as transcendental arguments, look a bit suspicious to us. Why should a theoretical principle devised by philosophers as an explanatory resource be a necessary condition of a certain phenomenon? What arguments like Lewis’ in favor of (MP) and Davidson’s in favor of (SI) show is that they are well-established hypotheses, ideas worth pursuing as regulative principles for our logico-semantic theories, assumptions that should only be dropped in the face of strong empirical evidence or the extenuation of the whole paradigm.
We will explore in detail the nature of circumstance and context-shifting operators in chapter 4. For now, it is important to realize that, as much as (MP) resembles (SI), they are different principles. (MP) is a necessary condition for (SI), but it is not sufficient. If there were linguistic expressions in natural language working as context-shifting operators when uttered in communication exchanges, then embedded expressions would have a semantic value different from the one they have in un-embedded occurrences, because that is exactly what context-shifting operators do, they change the semantic contribution of some expressions under their scope. However, having a language free from context-shifting operators does not preclude the possibility that embedded expressions may have different semantic values. An expression may make a deviant semantic contribution when embedded but not every time it is embedded, and this would show that the operator under whose scope the expression occurs is not responsible for the context-shift. We will come back to this point in our discussion of Recanati’s theory of belief reports, in chapter 5.

**Direct reference**

Necessary identities constituted a challenge for analytic philosophers during the early stages of modal logic. Intuitively, we could go from the law of substitutivity and the idea that every entity is necessarily identical to itself to the conclusion that every identity is necessary.

\[
\begin{align*}
(a) & \quad (x) (y) [(x=y) \to (Fx \to Fy)] \\
(b) & \quad (x) \text{nec (x=x)} \\
(c) & \quad (x) (y) [(x=y) \to (\text{nec (x=x)} \to \text{nec (x=y)})] \\
(d) & \quad (x) (y) ((x=y \to \text{nec (x=y)})
\end{align*}
\]

(a) is a common formulation of the substitutivity law for formal calculi. (b) is nothing but the idea that every entity is identical to itself. (c) is the result of replacing in (a) the property F with the property of being necessarily identical to x. From (b) and (c) we obtain (d), a general statement that makes every identity statement *necessary.*

This result is supposed to be very controversial given the number of *informative* identity statements we run into in our normal use of language. Propositions like the one expressed by a normal utterance of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ are formally identities, but they contrib-
ute new knowledge. The mere suggestion that a statement like that could be *necessary* seems quite counterintuitive to many philosophers. Necessary statements are truistic statements like ‘every red car is red’ or ‘a triangle has three vertices’, true just in virtue of the meanings of the words involved, a characteristic we grasp at first glance. Many identity statements, by contrast, when established as true, add new information to the state of the art in the empirical sciences, for example. When the astronomer discovered that ‘Hesperus was Phosphorus’ he was not making a truistic statement, he was providing an empirical statement, likely to be corroborated or rejected via empirical research. Nothing in the meaning of the words, according to these philosophers, will tell us that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, we have to look at the world to know that.

For Kripke, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is *necessary and a posteriori*. Necessity and possibility are metaphysical concepts, while *a priori* and a *posteriori* are epistemological notions. To determine whether something is necessary or contingent, we have to pay attention to a number of counterfactual situations. A piece of information with propositional character would be *a priori* or *a posteriori* depending on how can we establish its truth. If we know *a priori* its truth or its falsity, the proposition will be *a priori*, and *a posteriori* otherwise (Kripke 1971, 150-151). Not every necessary truth is known *a priori*. Informative identities are the perfect example of this category.

To justify this proposal, Kripke appeals to the *rigid* nature of names, in contrast with the *non-rigid* nature of most definite descriptions. Kripke maintains that the meaning of a proper name is not equivalent to a definite description or a set of definite descriptions. A definite description may change its semantic contribution across different counterfactual situations. For instance, ‘the President of the USA’ as uttered today in an unmodified occurrence refers to George W. Bush. But we can think of many distinct situations in which this expression would make a different contribution. George W. Bush was not the President of the USA ten years ago, will not be the President –hopefully– in one hundred years and might have not been the President today. The voting could have been different, he could have resigned, forgotten that he had to come back to the White House and wasted his time killing raccoons at the ranch etc. Proper names behave quite differently. According to Kripke (Kripke 1971, 145), they are *rigid*. 
Rigidity: a term is rigid iff it designates the same object in all possible worlds, circumstances or counterfactual situations.

As Quentin Smith (Smith 1995) points out, the core of these Kripkean ideas could be found in a paper published ten years before by Ruth Barcan Marcus (Marcus 1961, reprinted in Marcus 1993). For Marcus, proper names have no meaning (Marcus 1993, 11), they are just ‘identifying tags’ for things. Like Kripke, she stressed the difference between proper names and definite descriptions. Marcus’ insight is one of the precursory ideas for direct reference.

Direct Reference: a theory of meaning is directly referential iff it contains within its assumptions the hypothesis that proper names contribute just their referents, the individuals they designate, to the propositions expressed by the utterances of sentences containing them.

Rigidity and Direct reference are related but distinct principles a theory may assume. A theory could be directly referential and its proper names function as non-rigid terms. The restriction that a proper name’s semantic contribution is exclusively its referent does not imply that it has to be the same referent in every possible world. Conversely, Hintikka’s theory of epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962) is a characteristic example of a position that could not be taken as directly referential but in which rigidity and SI are preserved (Egré forth.).

The difference between Rigidity and Direct Reference is evident as soon as we take a look at the relation between these two principles and SI. Rigidity implies SI. If a theory’s proper names designate the same objects in every possible world, then they make the same semantic contribution, whether embedded or un-embedded. SI, however, does not imply Rigidity. The semantic contribution of a proper name may be a function from possible worlds to individuals, and this function could point to a different individual in distinct possible worlds. Direct Reference, on the other hand, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for SI. The semantic contribution of proper names may be just their referent and still they may contribute different individuals when embedded. As long as they contribute nothing but their referents to the propositions expressed, the theory will be directly referential, even if, in their embedded occurrences, the indi-
vidual is different from the one designated by the same expression in un-embedded occurrences. Finally, a theory can preserve SI and drop Direct Reference, given that the constant semantic contribution of proper names in a theory may or may not be just the individual they designate.

The intuition that proper names function as “identifying tags”, and the insistence on their having a different character from that of definite descriptions (cf. the dictum that ‘proper names have no meaning’) was really useful as a breakthrough to fight ill-grounded assumptions like that of forbidding necessary a posteriori statements. However, this “tag insight” may lead to significant misconceptions. In the first place, a theory need not postulate that proper names have no meaning in order to be directly referential. Kaplan’s theory recognizes the presence of a linguistic meaning, the character, associated with singular terms, even if their only semantic contribution to the things we say using them is their reference. Moreover, as was argued by Quine (in the discussion of “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, included in Marcus 1993), proper names lacking lexical meanings may suggest that objects are essentially linked with their tags. Both Marcus and Kripke, nevertheless, react to this last criticism, clearly separating their proposal from the essentialism of the relation between a proper name and the individual it designates. Even if, during the discussion of Marcus’ original paper, Kripke followed Quine’s suggestion, he obviously changed his mind by the time of his 1971 paper.

Among considerations informing my view was the claim of linguists that proper names are not lexical items at all. They lack “lexical meaning”. Quine saw trouble. I did not. So, even on the matter of supposing as I did that there were directly referring proper names, it appeared that for Quine the trouble also came down to essentialism, since it suggested that things have their proper names necessarily. During the discussion that ensued after Quine’s comments Kripke reinforced Quine’s view with his remark that “such an assumption of names is equivalent to essentialism”. But that was not my claim. Socrates might have been named Euthyphro; he would not thereby be Euthyphro. (Marcus 1993, 226-227).
To get rid of one confusion which certainly is not mine, I do not use "might have designated a different object" to refer to the fact that language might have been used differently. For example, the expression 'the inventor of bifocals' might have been used by inhabitants of this planet always to refer to the man who corrupted Hadleyburg. This would have been the case if, first, the people on this planet had not spoken English, but some other language, which phonetically overlapped with English; and if, second, in that language the expression 'the inventor of bifocals' meant 'the man who corrupted Hadleyburg'. Then it would refer, of course, in their language, to whoever in fact corrupted Hadleyburg in this counterfactual situation. That is not what I mean. What I mean by saying that a description might have referred to something different, I mean that in our language as we use it in describing a counterfactual situation, there might have been a different object satisfying the descriptive conditions we give for reference. So, for example, we use the phrase 'the inventor of bifocals', when we are talking about another possible world or counterfactual situation, to refer to whoever in that possible situation would have invented bifocals, not to the person whom people in that counterfactual situation would have called 'the inventor of bifocals'. They might have spoken a different language which phonetically overlapped with English in which 'the inventor of bifocals' is used in some other way. I am not concerned with that question here. (Kripke 1971, 145).

These reactions to Quine’s fears will be important to realize that our explanation of opacity in belief reports, based on the notion of deference and translinguistic context-shifts, constitutes a menace neither for rigidity nor for direct reference. Rigidity and direct reference do not entail that expressions have an essential relation with the things they designate. In different languages, public languages or idiolects, linguistic expressions may mean different things, and this does not threaten our adhesion to rigidity and direct reference.

**Compositionality**

The basic intuition that an indefinite number of things can be said and understood using a limited vocabulary and a set of rules would not be fairly reflected in a theory of meaning by the mere inclusion of SI. SI guarantees that the semantic contribution of linguistic expressions is going to remain constant in every context, but that would be compatible with a non-systematic approach to natural language,
since it leaves open the possibility that the meaning of complex expressions may not have much to do with the constant meaning of its constituents. Thus, in order to accomplish its task properly, SI needs to be completed by the following statement:

*Compositionality (C):* the meaning of a complex linguistic expression is determined by, and only by, the meanings of its constituents and the way they are combined\(^1\).

C is meant to reflect the intuition that whoever knows the meaning of a certain group of words and the way they may combine, can perfectly understand the meaning of complex expressions made up of them. If you know the meaning of the words ‘the’ ‘Pope’, ‘Reagan’, ‘collaborated’, ‘to’, ‘halt’, ‘communism’, and how they can be put together, you have everything that is needed to produce and understand (8) and see how it differs from (9):

(8) The Pope and Reagan collaborated to halt communism.

(9) The Pope and communism collaborated to halt Reagan.

We specify (Pelletier 1994) that the meaning of the whole is determined by, and only by, the meaning of its parts because, otherwise, the knowledge of each word in (8) and the way they may possibly combine would not give us automatically the meaning of the whole, since the possibility would be open that the meaning of complex expressions could be determined only partially by the meaning of its constituents.

One of the advocates of the principle that first tried to capture these intuitions under a formal guise was Montague (Montague 1970). Montague thought that the key to understanding compositionality lay in *homomorphism*, the idea that there should be a correspondence between linguistic expressions and their meanings\(^2\). In order for a language to be compositional, there should be a meaning-assignment function from the syntactic algebra of that language to the set of available meanings. A syntactic algebra contains a set of

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the expressions of the language plus a set of operations from sets of expressions to sets of expressions.

Montague’s *homomorphism* needs to be distinguished from two different ideas that could be associated with compositionality: Jackendoff’s *Grammatical Constraint* and Fodor, Cappelen and Lepore’s explicit avoidance of unarticulated constituents. “Superficial grammar” has not constituted the preferred means of philosophers of language to access the logical form corresponding to the content of linguistic practices. Indeed, for some ideal language philosophers, the work of natural language grammarians was taken to be nothing besides a subtle distraction, an element of the appearance one should not trust in one’s search of the logical forms. Russell’s theory of definite descriptions has been a touchstone of analytic philosophy, considered one of the quintessential discoveries of the philosophy of language, even though proposed that a grammatical singular term was in fact a general concept. Against this grammar-free logical enterprise, theorists like Jackendoff have defended the importance of the superficial form of linguistic events:

*Grammatical Constraint:* One should prefer a semantic theory that explains otherwise arbitrary generalizations about the syntax and the lexicon. (Jackendoff 1983, Cfr. Recanati 2000, 28).

In logico-semantic research, one should ‘attempt to minimize the differences of syntactic and semantic structure’ (Jackendoff 1983, 14). Some have taken this principle so seriously as to modify their theories of meaning in order to remain as close as possible to the principle. Thus, Recanati has introduced (Recanati 2004) certain changes in his original approach to the logical form of belief reports (Recanati 2000) in order to preserve his intuition that practically ‘we are always supposed to try to eliminate discrepancies between syntactic and semantic structure’ (Recanati 2000, 28).

It is strange to notice how grammarians are more reluctant than philosophers to embrace a principle like the Grammatical Constraint. Huddleston and Pullum are quite convinced that, to avoid certain mistakes in the definitions of grammatical categories, we need to ‘introduce a qualification to allow for the fact that there is no one-to-one correlation between grammatical form and meaning’ (Huddleston and Pullum 2005, 7). This qualification is incompatible with a narrow, or “practical” interpretation of the Grammatical Constraint,
but plainly compatible with Montague’s *homomorphism*. *Homomorphism* requires the existence of a mapping function from the syntactic algebra to semantics, but this function does not necessarily have to be a one-to-one function. Advocates of a strict reading of the Grammatical Constraint, in contrast, hold that we need to show a corresponding distinction at the grammar level for every difference at the semantic level and vice versa. Anyway, it is not the appropriateness of the Grammatical Constraint that we are concerned with here; we only want to stress the difference between this intuition and Compositionality understood as homomorphism.

The second idea that Montague’s homomorphism shall be kept separate from is Fodor, Cappelen and Lepore’s explicit denial of unarticulated constituency. For many years now, Fodor and Lepore (vid. Fodor and Lepore 2002 for an overview) have championed the proposal that compositionality was the key both to account for certain essential features of languages –like systematicity, productivity, and so on– and to distinguish their own denotational bottom-up proposal from many other theoretical alternatives. Recently, they have proposed the following characterization of the Principle of Compositionality:

**Fodor and Lepore’s Compositionality (F&L):** Here’s the general idea: by stipulation, a sentence of L is compositional if and only if a (canonical) representation of its linguistic structure encodes all the information that a speaker/hearer of L requires in order to understand it. This means that, if L is compositional, then having once assigned a linguistic representation to a sentence token, there is no more work for a hearer to do in order to understand it. And since having knowledge of the syntax of the sentences in L and of the meanings of its lexical items is presumably constitutive of being an L-speaker/hearer, it follows that anyone who is a speaker/hearer of L is thereby guaranteed to be able to interpret an utterance of any of its sentences. (Fodor and Lepore 2005, 3)

F&L may be useful to characterize certain theories of meaning, but it is important to notice that in C the nature of the constituents of the complex expression is not specified, as it is in F&L. In F&L the meaning of uttered sentences, complex expressions, is made up of the meanings of the lexical items of those sentences. A theory could include between the sub-parts of a complex meaning entity certain elements which are not directly triggered by any lexical item of the
sentence uttered (Vid. Chapter 5). Jaszczolt, for example, argues (Jaszczolt forth. a, 17 and ff.) that her version of Recanati’s Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (Recanati 2002) respects C, though it is clearly incompatible with F&L.

It could be argued that F&L is the appropriate principle to capture our intuition that one cannot understand the meaning of the constituents of a complex expression plus the way they combine and fail to understand the meaning of the whole. This is what Robbins states as an “epistemological premise”:

\[ \text{EP*: One cannot understand the words contained in a modifier-head construction plus its syntax without understanding the construction itself. (Robbins 2003, 5)} \]

“Words”, “lexical items”, are elements of common knowledge, shared by public language speakers. Unarticulated constituents like the ones used in (Jaszczolt forth. a) include variadic functions, technical devices of which normal speakers are absolutely unaware. C is a necessary condition of F&L, but not enough to explain EP*. On the other hand, we think that C is all we need to account for our intuitions of systematicity and productivity in natural languages. To construct a theory of meaning that does not preclude the assumed fact that we say and understand an indefinitely large number of things out of a limited vocabulary and some rules, we only need C. This shows that not only non-equivalent principles have been proposed as ‘Compositionality’, but that some of the basic ideas behind them are different as well.

Fodor and Lepore (Fodor 1998, Fodor and Lepore 2001) wanted to be sure too that the only “compositional” option for a theory of meaning was to be denotational, against other theories of mental and linguistic content. To give an explanation for the idea that one cannot understand the meaning of a complex expression without understanding the meaning of its parts, they proposed the principle of reverse compositionality.

\[ \text{Reverse Compositionality: From the meaning of a modifier-head construction and its syntax it is possible to derive the meanings of the words it contains. (As stated in Robbins 2003, 4).} \]
This principle has not been very well received in the literature, and many authors have convincingly argued against it (Vid. E.g. Robbins 2003; Johnson forth; Patterson 2005). We are not interested in determining whether this principle is true or legitimate, since it has not been very successful in theories of meaning, and especially in theories of belief reports. However, the epistemic intuition behind it (EP) has received a VIP treatment in (Recanati 2000), under the guise of the Principle of Iconicity.

(EP) One cannot understand a modifier-head construction without understanding the words it contains. (Robbins 2003, 4)

**Principle of Iconicity:** Attitude reports and other metarepresentations contain the object-representation not only syntactically, but also semantically: the proposition $Q$ expressed by $dS$ ‘contains’ as a part the proposition $P$ expressed by $S$ — and that’s why one cannot entertain $Q$ without entertaining $P$. (Recanati 2000, 10)

Compositionality, as we have seen, must be distinguished from many other related principles, like the Grammatical Constraint, F&L and the Principle of Iconicity. All of them will help us understand certain subtleties of the theories analyzed in the next chapters, but they should not be confused.

**Final Parameter.** Not every theory of meaning is equally respectful of ordinary speakers’s intuitions about what is said when they are engaged in communication. Some have privileged other principles over what the speakers (and audience) thought about the truth-conditions of the utterances they were making (typically Implicature theorists and Braun and Saul). Some principles, like the ones treated above, are so appealing that one could reasonably consider the option that whenever normal language users’ behavior seems to impugn them it has to be that behavior that is wrong. However, at least at first glance it is reasonable to suppose that we should try to keep the basic idea that one knows what one is saying when one is saying it; that the ultimate criterion to determine what has been said by a certain utterance, what its truth-conditions are, lies in normal context-informed language users.
Intuitions of the speaker (Int): The less a semantic theory is at odds with normal context-informed language users’ intuitions, the better for our theoretical purposes.

The Paradox of Meaning. What is the relation, then, between the principles we have been dealing with above? With Dever (Dever 1999, 314), we think that C implies the principle of substitutivity\(^3\). Szabó (Szabó 2000, 491 and ff.) maintains that both principles are logically independent, but, according to our reconstruction, if Intensional MGPS is an identity criterion for meanings in general, and \(C\) concerns meanings, one cannot have \(C\) without Intensional MGPS. Therefore, \(C\) implies Intensional MGPS. For the same reason Intensional MGPS is also a necessary condition for Int, Direct Reference and SI. But now we have to face a paradox:

The Paradox of Meaning:

(i) Intensional MGPS is a necessary condition for SI, Direct Reference and \(C\).

(ii) A theory cannot have among its principles SI, Direct Reference, \(C\), Int, and Intensional MGPS.

Intensional MGPS is a pre-condition to formulate principles concerning the meaning of linguistic expressions, thus, it is implied by SI, Direct Reference and \(C\), but, on the other hand, when a theory buys SI, Direct Reference, Int and \(C\), it needs to deal with lots of counterexamples, allegedly to Intensional MGPS, but that in fact impugn the whole structure. These examples characteristically involve belief ascriptions, and we will see a few in the following section.

To disarticulate the paradox, two types of strategies can be adopted: either one tries to find a way to specify Intensional MGPS so as to avoid counterexamples while keeping SI, Direct Reference, \(C\), and Int, or one modifies one of the latter principles in such a way that Intensional MGPS remains untouched. The first strategy is the one followed by theories in the next chapter, and is essentially fo-

\(^3\) Our treatment of this idea is, nonetheless, quite different. Dever thinks that the fact that \(C\) implies substitutivity does not do any good, since, he says, substitutivity is a false principle. According to his view, if we want to preserve compositionality, we need to formulate it in a way logically independent from substitutivity.
cused on the notion of *synonymity*. The second one is the path pursued by theories explained in chapter 5.

### 4 A pocket full of kryptonite

In this section we will offer a list of the examples that will be discussed at length later on. The analysis of belief reports has been a major concern of analytic philosophy for almost one century, and that means a lot of literature. Before discussing more general topics, it is imperative to put forward the kind of examples our proposal will account for. We shall give, as well, a brief reason for skipping famous examples much discussed in the literature of belief reports.

#### Cases to be addressed in this essay. What it is like to be transparent/opaque

Imagine Jor-El, Superman’s biological father, pays a visit to his son on Earth. Here he meets Lois Lane, Superman’s colleague at The Globe. Unable to understand English, Jor-El does not grasp a single word of what Lois says, nor does he gain any extra information about her conceptual habits by indirect means. He just realizes, by the way Lois looks at his son, that she finds him very attractive. Back on Krypton, Jor-El discusses with his wife Lara certain aspects of Superman’s life on Earth. Both of them usually call Superman ‘Kal-El’, his Kryptonian name, but are aware that the Earthians call him “Superman” and ‘Clark Kent’, without understanding exactly why. In this context, Jor-El utters what could be considered as the translation in Kryptonian of the following sentence:

\[(10)\text{Lois Lane believes that Kal-El is pretty handsome.}\]

During this conversation, Jor-El could have uttered (11) or (12) to express the very same thing:

\[(11)\text{Lois Lane believes that Superman is pretty handsome.}\]
\[(12)\text{Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is pretty handsome.}\]
Utterances of (10), (11) and (12) would have sufficed to express the proposition that Lois Lane believes that their son is very good-looking. In this context, ‘Kal-El’ could have been substituted salva veritate not only by ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, but by any expression synonymous with them. If our language contained just cases like the utterance of (10), belief ascription wouldn’t be a problem for theories of meaning. Substitutivity, SI, Direct Reference, C and Int could be maintained together without any harm. Transparent utterances do not pose a problem for this cluster of principles, unlike opaque utterances.

**Standard cases.** Imagine now that Lois Lane is on the roof of a building in fire. She is with Clark Kent up there, and thinks that Superman is her only hope in that circumstance, since she could only escape from that situation by flying. As she doesn’t know that Superman is Clark Kent, she gradually starts trembling with panic. Jonathan and Laura Kent, Superman’s Earthian parents, wait on the ground and watch the scene. Both of them know what there is to know about Superman’s secret identity and are aware that Lois Lane does not. To explain why Lois Lane is trembling even if she has Clark Kent by her side, Martha Kent says:

(13) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent cannot fly.

In this context, ‘Clark Kent’ cannot be replaced salva veritate by ‘Superman’. What is said by (13) is true, while what would be expressed by the utterance of (14) in this context would be false.

(14) Lois believes that Superman cannot fly.

Lois Lane believes that Superman flies indeed, and that is the reason she scrutinizes the sky desperately waiting for his arrival. But she believes that Clark Kent cannot fly, and is getting more and more nervous with him by her side. Martha explains this situation through the utterance of (13). If the same were to be said by the utterances of (13) and (14), how would Lois’s behavior possibly be explained?

In opaque belief reports it is not possible to replace an embedded expression, an expression under the scope of the $x$ believes that operator, by any other synonymous expression. Substitution of expressions with the same semantic contribution may change the truth-
value of the global utterance. These cases put at risk our theory of meaning. Here is why. ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are expressions that function as singular terms and refer to the same individual. According to Direct Reference, their only contribution to the proposition expressed by the utterance of sentences containing them is that very same individual. Their contributions in (13) and (14) have to be their normal semantic values, since, by SI, the semantic value of an embedded expression must be its normal semantic value. The meanings of the complex expressions (13) and (14) are determined by the meanings of their components (C), and they only differ in the substitution in (14) of ‘Superman’ for ‘Clark Kent’; therefore, they must be the same meaning, they must have the same truth-conditions. Nonetheless, our intuitions as normal language users (Int) tell us that by the utterance of (13) something true would be said, while the utterance of (14) would result in something false. In conclusion, if two expressions with the same meaning can be intersubstituted in every context salva veritate, then Direct Reference, SI, C, and Int cannot be held together, since they produce contradictory results. This is what we have called the paradox of meaning.

Speaker and audience share some information about the use of certain words by the ascribee (the subject of the ascription) that turns out to be relevant for the truth-conditions of opaque belief reports. Substitutivity is restricted to what speaker and audience suppose together about the ascribee’s linguistic usual practices. In (13) and (14), Martha and Jonathan Kent both think that Lois Lane does not know that Superman is Clark Kent, and this is what triggers the opaque interpretation of the utterance of (13). Note that they could be wrong about Lois Lane, Lois Lane could have been aware of the intricacies of Superman’s secret identities and, still, the opaque interpretation would have been favored, since it depends on what speaker and audience think about the ascribee, and not on what the ascribee really thinks.

Limiting cases in this general characterization of opacity are those examples in which speaker and audience suppose that they both think that the use made by the ascribee of the embedded words is exactly theirs. In these cases there will be no difference between the opaque and the transparent reading. If Martha and Jonathan thought that they share the information that Lois Lane knows that Superman is Clark Kent, then (13) and (14) would be assigned the same truth-value, as in the transparent reading. At the other extreme of the spectrum, we find cases in which the information shared by speaker and audience about the ascribee is minimal. We could imag-
ine a case in which the only thing speaker and audience knew about the ascribee is that she had, or would, use a certain expression. When this expression is embedded in a metarepresentation, it can be replaced by no other expression. If Martha sees Lois looking scared and repeating once and again ‘xp126cup is coming, is coming’, Superman’s mother could make her son understand part of Lois’s behavior by saying ‘Lois believes that ‘xp126cup’ is a menace’. Quotation marks are generally, but not necessarily, used for this kind of cases, and they are considered the closest to direct speech reports.

**Misplaced reference cases.** Another group of belief ascriptions that poses a problem for the joint assertion of Intensional MGPS, SI, Direct Reference, C, and Int includes those in which the ascribee confuses the meanings of two words, and ascriber and audience know it. Suppose Petra is a country girl who has just arrived in Metropolis. She has heard about two main heroes in town, but thinks that the one with the red dress and the big ‘S’ on his chest is called ‘Batman’, and that the superhero that resembles a bat is called ‘Superman’. Petra is a relative of Jonathan and Marth Kent and is living with them. She knows everything about the secret identities of Superman and Batman, she knows that Superman is also called Clark Kent when he is disguised as a journalist, and that Batman is Bruce Wayne, the wealthy businessman. One day, in the middle of the street, Petra is attacked by a group of villains. Batman suddenly appears and defeats the attackers. Later at home, Batman visits the Kents and Petra runs to kiss him. Jonathan tells Martha:

(15) Petra believes that Superman deserves a kiss.

In this context, what is said is that Petra believes that Batman deserves to be kissed. She was close to the action, and could clearly see the bat-like figure fighting for her. She is not confused about who her savior was, she just thinks that he is called ‘Superman’. Jonathan uses his common knowledge about Petra’s particular use to refer to Batman using instead the word ‘Superman’. ‘Superman’ cannot be replaced by another expression that refers to the same individual in this context – ‘Batman’, ‘Bruce Wayne’ – since that would result in a false statement, like (16). Nevertheless, as Jonathan and Martha know that Petra knows that Superman is also called ‘Clark Kent’, Jonathan could have said the same in this situation using (17).
(16) Petra believes that Batman deserves a kiss.

(17) Petra believes that Clark Kent deserves a kiss.

Again, speaker and audience’s shared information about how the ascribee uses some embedded expressions is relevant to determining the truth-value of the statement. Substitution of expressions with the same meaning in this context is not allowed without restriction. Thus, these cases are opaque as well.

**Cases containing indexicals.** Some of the most famous examples of substitutivity problems involve indexicals. Indexicals, allegedly, are directly referential devices, their only function being to refer to a certain individual. This individual is their only contribution to the truth conditions of the utterance of the sentence in which they occur. All the same, sometimes replacement of an indexical by a proper name referring to the same individual seems to be blocked. Let’s consider a modification of Richard’s famous example:

Consider A —a man stipulated to be intelligent, rational, a competent speaker of English, etc.— who both sees a woman, across the street, in a phone booth, and is speaking to a woman through the phone. He does not realize that the woman to whom he is speaking —B, to give her a name— is the woman he sees. He perceives her to be in some danger —a run-away steamroller, say, is bearing down upon her phone booth. A waves at the woman; he says nothing into the phone. (Richard 1983, 439)

To explain A’s behavior, we could say something like (18). But an utterance of (19) in this context would be false, would fail to explain A’s behavior, even if we were aware that A knew his interlocutor’s name by heart.

(18) A believes that she is in danger.

(19) A believes that B is in danger.

‘She’ and ‘B’ are directly referential expressions that make the same contribution to the statements made by uttering (18) and (19). Still, they cannot be substituted *salva veritate*. One of the solutions proposed for these cases is explained in chapter 7. It is based on the assumption that, to block substitutivity, we only need to qualify one of
the statements of the inference as opaque. Here, (18) would be considered transparent and (19) opaque. A different solution would be to consider (19) as a form of de se attribution (see below), substitutivity being blocked by the fact that (18) is not de se, but de re.

**Iteration.** Iteration of belief reports will play a very important role in this work. Examples of iterated belief ascriptions are the utterances in a standard context of (20) and (21):

(20) Martha Kent believes that Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.

(21) Jor-El believes that Batman believes that Superman believes that Jonathan Kent is a good father.

Iterated ascriptions will serve three purposes throughout the essay:

a) They will be used to show that the distinction between transparent and opaque reports cannot be a matter of point view, in chapter 3.

b) With them, an argument will be provided that ‘believe’ is not an ambiguous verb, conceding equal rights to transparent and opaque readings. This will support Jaszczolt’s idea on this point, that de re interpretation is the option by default (Jaszczolt 1999). In chapter 4.

c) Iterated examples will show that there is a clash between default de re readings and SI in chapter 5.

**Cases not to be addressed in this essay**

**Embedded identity sentences.** One of the main concerns of many theorists has been to scrutinize how it could be possible that (22) were always true while (23) could be false in many contexts:

(21) Lois Lane believes that Superman is Superman.

(22) Lois Lane believes that Superman is Clark Kent.

We will not deal with these examples, though, properly understood, we think they do not present any peculiar difficulty. Following Williams (Williams 1989, 1992), we think that the identity operator is a higher-order operator that converts n-place predicables into n-1-place predicables. This operator is unable to have as arguments individu-
als, like the ones designated in common contexts by the otherwise singular terms ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’.

**Definite descriptions.** One of our main interests is in trying to determine whether Direct Reference can survive in a epistemically sensitive theory of meaning, a theory that faces the problem of epistemic attributions. Definite descriptions have their own *de re/de dicto* problems (Donnellan 1966), and with those we do not want to deal here. So, we will avoid examples like (23).

> (23) Lois Lane believes that the man in the corner is wearing a hat.

**Referential** definite descriptions cannot produce by themselves opaque belief reports, and this is completely compatible with our general approach based on deference. Concerning *attributive* definite descriptions inside belief reports, we will only defend the view that their specific behavior cannot be explained by saying that the existential quantifier takes wide scope, with a Smullyan-like strategy (see chapter 3).

**De se attributions.** Another source of important counterexamples against this cluster of principles are self-attributions. Here, ‘self-attributions’ are not to be understood as ascriptions that have a first person pronoun as the subject of the main clause in belief reports, but attributions in which the subject of the embedded sentence is related in a somewhat intimate way with the subject of the main clause. Not only are they the same individual, they know they are the same individual.

Imagine Lois Lane is watching television one night, a show in which people are confronted with uncomfortable secrets from their past. Most of the secrets are false, but all the same the person is embarrassed in front of everybody. To create a bit more suspense, the person who is going to receive the surprise can only be seen through a blackened photograph, and is named by an alias, in this case ‘Idora’. Tonight’s secret is that the mother of the unfortunate “victim” had had an affair in her youth with a Spanish bullfighter, as a result of which a daughter was born, a daughter who should be 34 years old, exactly the same age as the victim. Lois is amused, she thinks ‘whoa, that’s something, suddenly you realize that your father was a Spanish bullfighter!’ The program is building up to a climax, and the host announces the name of the woman in the silhouette. Some
light is put on it and the real name of ‘Isidora’ is discovered: she is Lois Lane, the famous reporter of the Globe. Lois Lane blushes at that.

What is happening in the context we have just described before Lois discovers it is her they are talking about, while she is amused right in front of the dark silhouette, can be explained saying something like this:

(24) Lois Lane believes that Isidora is going to be embarrassed.

(25) Lois Lane believes that she (the woman in the darkened picture) is going to be embarrassed.

An utterance of (26) would have been an unsuccessful explanation:

(26) Lois Lane believes that Lois Lane is going to be embarrassed.

Had (26) been true, Lois Lane would have blushed before. (24), (25), and (26) again illustrate standard opaque cases and opaque cases containing indexicals. Consider now the following variation on the example. Lois Lane has recently suffered amnesia and has forgotten her name. The rest of her memories are more or less unaffected. She is bemused? watching the show: the host announces that Lois Lane is the bullfighter’s daughter, and Lois Lane thinks ‘poor Lois Lane’. However, only when the silhouette is properly lit and she discovers that it is her they are talking about does she blush. Here, (26) would not be an appropriate explanation of Lois’s automatic reaction. Lois reddens only as she realizes that she, herself, is the victim. This reflexive use of the pronoun has been marked with an asterisk by Castañeda (Castañeda 1966, 1967). While (24), (25) and (26) would have been appropriate explanations of the situation before the picture is properly lit in this context, only (27) wouldn’t.

(27) Lois Lane believes that she*, herself, is going to be embarrassed.

The difference, in this context, between the utterances of (24), (25) or (26) on the one hand, and the utterance of 27 on the other is what
is exploited to understand why Lois Lane did not blush until she saw her photograph on the screen. Lois knew that she, the woman in the darkened photograph, was going to have a hard time. Lois also knew that ‘Isidora’ was ‘Lois Lane’. She just did not know that they were talking about herself. ‘She’ cannot be replaced in (24) by ‘she*’ salva veritate, even though they are both indexicals, singular terms whose only contribution to the truth conditions is the individual they designate, and that is the same individual. The failed inference from (24) to (26) can be explained by arguing that at least (26) is opaque, but this strategy is no longer available to explain the inference failure that involves (24) and (27). Here we need to appeal to a new category of ascriptions, besides de re and de de dicto, de se ascriptions.

De se ascriptions have received considerable attention in the literature (vid. Castañeda 1999, Lewis 1979, Stalnaker 1981, Perry 1993). The distinction between normal pronouns and reflexive pronouns is a very important one, and deserves to be clarified, but in this essay we are particularly concerned with the special problems of substitutivity that may arise as a result of our common use of belief reports. Reflexive pronouns constitute a different problem, though it may reach the surface via the same symptoms, namely, intensional substitutivity failures. Reflexive pronouns are usually presented as essentially meaning basically two different things: that they cannot be intersubstituted with any other co-referential expression salva veritate in every context, and that they “like to take wide scope”. It is just this final assumption what we will oppose as an explanation for de se attributions at the end of chapter 4.

One last thing about de se reports. When we introduced examples with indexicals above, we mentioned a case described by Richard (Richard 1983). A is talking with B on the phone, he sees a woman in a phone booth but does not realize that she is B. A sees a steamroller approaching the phone booth at high speed, and says (28), but not (29).

(28) I believe that she is in danger.

(29) I believe that you are in danger. (Richard 1983, 440-441)

In de se reports, the referent of the subject of the main clause is the referent of the subject of the embedded sentence, and, by stipulation, she must know this for the attribution to be de se. (28) and (29) look similar, but the subjects do not coincide, and they don’t involve self-
attributions, but second person ascriptions. Williams, though, has defended the idea that second person attributions could prompt the appearance of a Castañeda-like operator.

However. Suppose that Arthur had said, in Mary’s hearing, that he thought the senior mistress on duty ought to speak to Shirley Makepeace’s mother about her behaviour. Arthur did not realize that Mary was the senior mistress on duty. Someone might say of Arthur that he told Mary that she ought to talk to Shirley Makepeace’s mother. But again, Arthur might object that he did not realize he was telling Mary that she ought to do the talking. It seems to me that this ‘she’ too might properly be adorned with an asterisk and identified as the CRP [Castañeda Reflexive Pronoun].

True, it does not represent ‘I’ in oratio recta but rather ‘you’. (Williams 1991, 143)

So, according to Williams, for the inference used by Richard to be valid, we should modify (28) and include some sort of asterisk operator to qualify ‘she’, only referring to the second person instead of the first one. Unless other examples come out, we will suppose that cases of intensional substitutivity failures between indexicals—not necessarily the ones between indexicals and proper names— are to be explained by reference to their de se nature.

**Simple Sentences.** Generally, intensional substitutivity failures are described in propositional attitude contexts. However, some examples have been proposed of this kind of phenomenon outside the scope of any attitude operator.

(30) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out.

(31) Superman is more successful with women that Clark Kent.

(32) Being Clark Kent is much more difficult that being Superman.

(33) Byzantium was more beautiful than Constantinople.

These sorts of cases were profusely discussed a few years ago (Vid. e. g. Saul 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999; Moore 1999, 2000; Predelli 1999, 2001; Barber 2000). In all of them, proper nouns cannot be
replaced *salva veritate* by any other singular term referring to the same individual. Just to see why, consider:

(30’) Superman went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out.

(31’) Superman is more successful with women than Superman.

(32’) Being Superman is much more difficult than being Superman.

(33’) Byzantium was more beautiful than Byzantium.

As uttered in a normal context, (30’), (31’), (32’), and (33’) would not preserve their original truth-value.

We will not deal with these cases in the following chapters. An explanation for intensional substitutivity failures in belief reports does not necessarily have to be extended to cover these examples. Our intuition here, contrary to what we say happens in normal attitude ascriptions, is that a context-shift (vid. chapter 7) is taking place. When we say (30) we are not reporting somebody else’s point of view, we are creating the fiction that we are talking about two different things, like when we joke about the “first Wittgenstein” and the “second Wittgenstein” being two different individuals. In this context, the two singular terms we are using, though normally co-referential, point to different individuals, and, therefore, they cannot be intersubstituted *salva veritate*.

Be that as it may, we do not want to make a strong commitment about what the analysis for these cases should be. We just want to reject the idea that their explanation needs to be the one given for attitude ascription cases of intensional substitutivity failures.

### 5 Closing comment

The principles and examples that will hold most of our attention in the rest of the study have been introduced in this chapter. Some theories that try to address the paradox of meaning via the notion of synonymy will be analyzed in the next chapter. Later on, we will consider theories that prefer to sacrifice the strength of some other principle in order to preserve substitutivity. The paradox of meaning is used in this work as a heuristic mechanism, a useful tool to under-
stand some intricacies of this proper sub-discipline of the philosophy of language.
3

From Intentionality to Opacity

1 Brentano’s theme

What Brentano did not say

Brentano is wellknown in analytic philosophy as the oldest source for the topic of intentionality. Brentano’s original move is the proposal that mental phenomena are characterized by the intentional inexistence of their object, something that is known as ‘Brentano’s thesis’. Even if Brentano’s explicit sayings are no more than a historical curiosity for the purpose of this chapter, it is better to be cautious, since a step in the wrong direction may, with a bit of luck, add our names to the list of misreaders of Brentano’s work. Despite all appearances, it is necessary to state with absolute clarity from the very beginning a couple of facts about intentionality:

(a) Intentionality does not mean direction to an object.
(b) Inexistence does not mean non-existence.

According to Brentano, sciences study phenomena, which can be physical or mental. Mental phenomena always contain other phe-
nomena within themselves, and there is no transcendent reality supporting them, unlike physical phenomena. Presentations, the essential kind of mental phenomena, can enclose a mental phenomenon (inner perception) or a physical phenomenon (outer perception), but there is never a worldly reality corresponding to the presentation itself. Both inner and outer perceptions are set apart from physical phenomena by their aboutness or direction on objects.

Kneale does not argue against this standard characterization of Brentano’s thought, he just resists the assimilation of ‘intentionality’ and ‘aboutness’ (Kneale 1968, 75). In the scholastic literature, ‘Intentio’ was the word to designate whatever was between the mind that entertains and the entertained things of the external world. It is just because Brentano writes about the intentional inexistence of mental phenomena in the process of explaining their definitive feature of aboutness that intentionality and aboutness are so consistently associated.

Crane (Crane forth.) argues that an appropriate exposition of Brentano’s ideas about the particularity of mental phenomena is incompatible with a different myth of modern treatments of intentionality: that Brentano’s thesis was motivated by his concern with the possibility of entertaining non-existent objects. Brentano has been usually read as supporting the view that mental phenomena were essentially directed to an object whose existence was restricted to the limits of the mind. This was supposed to be an appropriate answer to the question concerning our thoughts about objects that do not necessarily exist in the actual world, like unicorns, giants, and so on. As stated by Crane, this worries had nothing to do with the 1874 formulation of Brentano’s thesis. Objects of thought were nothing but phenomena, either mental or physical, and phenomena were mere signs of a different reality, a reality to which we had no direct access. Thus, to Brentano’s mind in 1874, not only unicorns, but everything we could direct our mind to, was non-existent in a sense, it was simply a phenomenon.

It is in 1911, when Brentano changes his mind about the immanent nature of objects of thought, that the problem of non-existent objects acquires a decisive import. If objects of thought, those objects our mind is directed to in mental phenomena, are transcendent, then the problem arises of how to explain our trains of thought about unicorns and the likes. The solution to this new problem was to deny the relational character of mental phenomena. Thoughts were not relations between an individual and a certain object of thought, be it immanent or transcendent, but quasi-relations.
Intentionality is associated by contemporary ears with the classical *questio de ponte*, the question concerning our epistemic relations as human beings with the “external world”. More specifically, the problem seems to be how to reconcile common-sense externalism about the individuation of mental content with apparently nonexistent objects of thought. It is assumed on numerous philosophical occasions that real external objects are the things we need to have a look at when we want to determine the content of our thoughts and utterances, but it is inevitable to acknowledge as well that we can think and talk about objects of which we wouldn’t be willing to predicate existence.

Brentano’s 1911 strategy has been taken to be just an exotic re-statement of the problem by many theorists (vid. e. g. Chisholm 1956, 148, Jacob 2003, Crane forth.). Indeed, calling whatever connects thinkers and thoughts a *relation* or a *quasi-relation* is not necessarily a self-enlightening key-element for this ancient topic. But this says nothing against the correction of the statement. Brentano realized that a *relation* could only be established between two first-order elements, and that the very nature of “objects” of thought excluded this possibility. Surprisingly enough, this piece of evidence is clearly against one of the principles in vogue these days, the Grammatical Constraint (cfr. Chapter 2, vid. also Recanati 2004).

In the following sections we will not address directly the contemporary version of the problem of intentionality, the question of the nature of objects of thought and their compatibility with theories like externalism, but its linguistic version, as proposed by Chisholm and Quine in those happy days in which the “mark of the mental” was still to be found in a prolific and elusive feature of natural language: quotational intrusions. We will examine in this chapter different approaches to this problem.

**Intentionality and intentional contexts**

There is something about the way we talk about human beings’ beliefs, hopes, wishes, needs, etc. which is missed in our descriptions of the common physical world. The human ability to entertain inexist-ent objects and counterfactual situations vividly contrasts with other worldly phenomena. Every time a human factor interferes with the world, the possibility of deception and error is present, and many times it is necessary to explain some of the most relevant features of the situation. Today, 140 passengers have had their lives miracu-
lously saved when a disabled plane made a successful emergency landing in Los Angeles. The plane took off from Burbank heading for New York, but the front landing gear did not retract, and the plane was diverted to Los Angeles, where, only after releasing all its fuel into the Ocean, it was authorized to attempt an emergency landing. Apparently, some of the passengers inside the plane were watching live broadcasting news, and they were aware that a plane was in trouble in the area even before they had been informed by the pilot about their actual situation. As usual, reporters were enjoying the drama on TV, and they depicted the situation in terms that the pilot would have never used, to avoid frightening its passengers. We can imagine now three kinds of passengers. The first group are watching the news and get terribly nervous when they receive the information from the pilot. They know that, despite the pilot’s cautious words, they are in danger, they are in the very same dramatic situation described on TV; the plane they are seeing on the screen is the one they boarded an hour before in Burbank. A second group of passengers are also watching the news, but they think that the tiny little problem mentioned by the pilot cannot be the life or death situation talked about in the news, and so, they conclude, the plane on the screen is a different plane from the one they are in. Finally, there is a teenager listening to Marilyn Manson on his ipod and thinking that the images on the TV belong to a very boring disaster movie that does not deserve his auditory attention.

Passengers from the first group are scared to death, they shout loudly and desperately demand explanations from the aircrew. Guided by the TV comments, they are pretty sure that the end is nearing fast; they think that the plane on the screen is going to crash and that they will die in it. The members of the second group, on the contrary, are quite relaxed. They just consider the plane’s erratic behavior to be typical of these cheap flightsdays, but to have nothing to do with the horrible situation of the flight on the screen, which is, by all authorized opinions, just about to crash. Still, they hope that the plane on the screen will be saved in a spectacular final operation. The Marilyn Manson boy really wants the plane on the screen to crash, so that the movie ends and he can see at least a tasty explosion, and he is thrilled by that.

How come rational human beings’ behavior in the same situation needs to be explained in such different ways? They are all watching the same channel, they all see identical images on the television. However, some passengers go crazy, desperately wanting the plane on the screen to be rescued, others remain calm watching the plane
on the screen, no feelings but sympathy involved in their desire for
the plane to land safely, and some other passengers wish the plane to
-crash as soon as possible in an angry outburst. All these people are
related with the plane on the screen in a particular way. To explain
the distinct attitudes within the plane, we need to be liberal about
certain features of our ascriptions, which are clearly precluded en-
gaged in other linguistic activities:

1) We can say that every passenger thinks that the plane on the
screen is going to crash, and that would be so even if the footage
used in the news was from a perfectly safe flight recorded three
years ago for a documentary film. They would have false beliefs,
but our attribution would be true. In contrast, the vast majority of
the expressions we use to form complex propositions are truth-
functional; their truth-value is determined by the truth-values of
their arguments. My claim that the window is behind the computer
-and the notebook on top of a bunch of papers is only true in case
the window is truly behind my laptop and the notebook is in fact
on top of a number of papers; my claim that the window is behind
the notebook if my notebook is on top of a bunch of papers is false
-only if my notebook is truly on top of the papers but the window is
not behind the laptop. Truth-values of belief attributions, for ex-
ample, are clearly independent of the truth-values of their embed-
ded propositions. Thus, when we say that every passenger believes
that the plane on the screen is going to crash, we are ascribing a
relation that differs from the one established between the two pairs
of propositions mentioned above.

2) For the case of the Marilyn Manson kid, we do not even have to
suppose that there is a real plane to say that he wishes the plane in
the screen to explode as soon as possible. This is quite unlike the
situation in which I say that the window is behind my computer,
for there I need an actual computer and an actual window if my
claim is to have a chance of being declared true. So, the relation
with the plane attributed to the kid is not of the same type as those
with which we describe the disposition of objects around us.

3) I can alternatively say that the window is behind the laptop, or
that the window is behind my Power Book G4 to reach the same
effect, namely, an approximate depiction of a portion of my visual
field. By contrast, the behavior of the relaxed members of the sec-
ond group of passengers could be explained by saying that they are
certain that the plane on TV is going to crash but that the 292 flight
they are traveling in is safely approaching New York. Had we said that they are certain that the 292 flight they are traveling in is going to crash but that the plane on TV is safely approaching New York, we would not have been able to explain successfully why they comfortably sit drinking martini and watching the news. The only difference between the two utterances is the use of the definite description ‘the 292 flight they are traveling in’ instead of ‘the plane on TV’, and both expressions refer to the same plane. Apparently, then, substitution of co-referential terms in certain contexts may produce unexpected effects.

Chisholm supports an interpretation of Brentano’s thesis that is not exactly identical to the one we put forward in section 2, following Crane’s recent papers (Chisholm 1986, 9-10). By 1905, according to Chisholm, Brentano thinks that those objects our thought is necessarily directed to in mental phenomena are not other phenomena, but individuals; chairs, unicorns, laptops, centaurs, etc. Whenever one thinks, contemplates, entertains one of these thoughts, one is thinking about, contemplating, entertaining a thing, something that, if it were to exist, would be a thing. It is to these things that human beings are related to in thinking episodes. The special nature of these individuals motivates a peculiar move in Brentano’s theory. As is widely accepted, a relation can be postulated only between two already existent individuals, not between an individual, the subject who thinks, and something that could be a thing in case it existed. Despite appearances, then, our relation with the things we entertain cannot be systematized in terms of run-of-the-mill first-order relations (Brentano 1995, 272).

The discussion concerning the relational, or quasi-relational, character of our link with the external world was read in linguistic terms by philosophers like Chisholm and Quine, allegedly the theoretical origin of the way the modern debate about intentionality was inherited. The problem of intentionality was identified with the problem of physicalism (vid. Quine 1960, 220, for example), the problem about the reduction of every meaningful linguistic form to the language of physics. The human ability to entertain those individuals that Brentano talks about must leave a trace in language, and the resulting contexts must exhibit certain peculiar features, somehow related with Brentano’s characterization of the problem. The ways we talk about physical and mental phenomena need to be significantly different, to reflect the logical peculiarities human thought displays.
This was the assumption that prompted Chisholm’s first list of linguistic features for intentional contexts. Before deciding whether psychological contexts were reducible to contexts containing only purely physical vocabulary, it was necessary to track down the logical nuisances of psychological contexts. This was the only way to be fair to the nature of the problem.

For Chisholm, Brentano’s intentional inexistence reflected the fact that mental phenomena can be said to have objects within themselves, even though these objects they were said to be directed to do not exist (Chisholm 1957, 169). Diogenes, Chisholm says, could have been looking for an honest man even if there had not been any, while he could not have been said to be sitting on his favorite rock for meditation if the rock had not existed. This is the rationale for the first systematic trace of intentionality in natural language pointed to by Chisholm:

(Existential Commitment) A simple declarative sentence is intentional if it uses a substantival expression—a name or a description—in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there isn’t anything to which the substantival expression truly applies (Chisholm 1956, 126, Chisholm 1957, 170).

We can entertain in our minds centaurs, unicorns and all kinds of strange fictional entities without having any commitment to the real existence of these individuals.

The second feature to recognize an intentional context is based upon the fact that not every intentional verb has an individual as its direct object. Many times what we find in such a position is a whole clause, usually preceded by the complementizer ‘that’. We can think of fast computers and funny movies, but we can believe as well that the sky is almost transparent today or know that in 27 minutes it will be noon. As sentences containing other sentences, intentional compounds behave in a non-standard way. Chisholm writes that ‘neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the propositional clause is true or that it is false’ (Chisholm 1956, 127; Chisholm 1957, 171). This contrasts with other functions of propositions, like current logical connectives. The truth or falsity of a negative statement, for example, certainly implies the falsity or truth of the proposition under the scope of the connective. If my saying ‘It is not
sunny’ expresses a false proposition, then an occurrence of ‘It is sunny’ in the same context must express a true proposition.

The problem with Chisholm’s wording for this criterion is that there are some intentional verbs that do work as propositional functions and are not subject to this restriction. For instance, the truth of my saying ‘I know that there is a window in front of me’ implies the truth of ‘there is a window in front of me’. A proper characterization of the special behavior of intentional functions of propositions would be this:

(Truth-functionality) A sentence made out of a function of propositions and its constituents is intentional if and only if this function of propositions is not truth-functional, i.e., if and only if the truth-value of the compound does not depend only upon the truth-values of the constituent propositions (cfr. Russell 1940, 260).

My knowing that there is a window in front of me implies that there is a window in front of me, but the truth of this knowledge attribution is not dependent exclusively on facts about the window, my position in the room, etc., since there can be lots of true things that I do not know. Whether I can be truly said to know that there is a window in front of me depends on what I know. The truth-value of a knowledge ascription partially depends on the truth-value of what is expressed by the that-clause. The truth of the embedded clause is a necessary condition for the truth of the compound sentence. So, it is not the case that every intentional compound is logically independent of the truth-value of the embedded sentence, as Chisholm says.

Finally, the third criterion proposed by Chisholm to make sense of the clues left by intentionality in natural language is our well-known substitutivity principle, in this case a mixture of extensional and intensional substitutivity:

(Substitutivity). A sentence is intentional if it contains a name (or description) of a certain thing in such a way that its replacement by another name (or description) of the same thing results in a sentence whose truth-value may differ from that of the original sentence (Chisholm 1956, 128; Chisholm, 1957, 171).
As this principle and its intricacies were extensively treated in the previous chapter, we will not say much here. For those who think that we may be paying too much attention to substitutivity, it may be useful to consider Chisholm’s opinion about the power of this last principle. If we were to adopt Frege’s theory of meaning, Chisholm says, we could make this criterion do the work of the other two (Chisholm 1956, 128). Substitutivity failures could be taken to be, then, with respect to natural language, the “mark of the mental”.

**Digging up the existential commitment. Specificity**

Diogenes’ example clearly exhibits the ambiguity between what medieval logicians called *suppositio determinata* and *suppositio confusa*. As explained by Geach (Geach 1972, 130), Buridan analyzed the ambiguity in examples like ‘I owe you a horse’, where a distinction can be made between a sense in which what the speaker is saying is that she owes her interlocutor a certain horse, and a different reading in which it is just a horse (no matter which one) that is owed. Two different criteria have been proposed to throw light on the logic of this distinction, with unequal success. The first one is originally due to Quine (Quine 1943, 116-118; Quine 1956):

(Exportation) Inference by existential generalization is not systematically granted for objects in subject position in that-clauses under the scope of an intentional verb.

This mechanism differentiates between the two readings in Buridan cases. Only when the object we are talking about is *determinate*, when we are talking about a particular horse and not just about a horse, is it possible to make an inference applying the rule of existential generalization. This criterion has been almost unanimously adopted since its formulation.

The second approach to this difference was proposed by Anscombe in 1965 (Anscombe 1981, 6):

(Excluded Middle) Intentional constructions of the form ‘[aVt] Pb’ do not imply the corresponding ‘([aVt] Pb & Qb) or ([aVt] Pb & ¬Qb)’, where [aVt] is an intentional operator containing an intentional verb and a subject, a and b are individuals and P and Q are normal first-order relations. ‘Diogenes is looking for an honest
man’ does not entail ‘either Diogenes is looking for an honest man at least six feet tall or Diogenes is looking for a honest man under six feet tall’.

It is important to notice that, unlike exportation, Anscombe’s criterion is focused on specificity rather than on the existential commitment. Quine thought that exportation was to cover both the cases about unicorns and centaurs that originally worried Brentano and those in which the Buridan problem had surfaced. From ‘John is thinking about unicorns’ we cannot infer ‘There is something John is thinking about’, and Diogenes’ searching for an honest man does not imply that there is an honest man that is searched for by Diogenes. Thus, apparently, exportation could do all the work that there was to do about this first feature of intentional contexts. Quine’s main concern was the relation between designation and quantification (Quine 1943, 116-119; Quine 1956, 177). He wanted to have a criterion to determine whether an expression had a real reference or not, and that was the aim of his assumption about the differences in the behavior of quantifiers. Expressions without designation did not license exportation, and that was true for fictional terms and unspecific expressions. Behind this whole discussion was his firm conviction of the ontological import of existential quantifiers (vid. next section).

We will argue later against the very criterion of exportation (vid. Chapter 4) but, for the moment, we would like to spell out a significant difference between specificity and existential commitment, between Buridan cases and fictional examples. In order to do this it is necessary to assume that what we have called here Excluded Middle (vid. Caston 1998, 152) accurately sets apart the two possible readings in Buridan cases. This is not too hard, since it seems quite intuitive to suppose that from the fact that I owe you a horse it does not follows that either I owe you a horse that is at least 10 feet high or I owe you a horse that is under 10 feet high, I just owe you a horse, and that is all there is to it. Imagine now that Peter is 7 years old and that he has gone to the opera for the first time in his life. His parents have taken him to see The Magic Flute, persuading him with the promise that a bird catcher will appear in the play, something that Peter finds particularly funny. The play starts and, after the overture, a prince emerges in the scene on stage? chased by an enormous serpent. Peter is amused, but looks a bit disappointed, and his mother tells his father:
(1) Peter believed that a bird catcher was the first thing that he was going to see in the play.

In a situation like the one described above, clearly the mother’s utterance of (1) requires the non-specific reading available in every Buridan case. Peter knew no details about the bird catcher, he was just willing to see a person seeking birds. The proposition expressed by an utterance of (1’) will not be entailed by what Peter’s mother says in this context:

(1’) Either Peter believed that a bird catcher, a woman, was the first thing that he was going to see in the play or Peter believed that a bird catcher, a man, was the first thing that he was going to see in the play.

Peter was hoping to see a bird catcher, but had no particular bird catcher in mind. There is no bird catcher that Peter believed was the first thing that he was going to see in the play.

The panorama changes drastically if we modify the basic scenario. We may suppose that Peter has been told the story of Tamino, Pamina, Papageno, etc. a thousand times by his father, who is a Mozart fan. Peter also has on one of his bedroom walls a huge poster of Walter Berry chasing a bird, disguised as Papageno, wearing a colorful hat and strange sandals. We are back in the theater and they are watching the performance. Peter looks a bit upset at the beginning of the first act, and his mother says (1) to his father. Both Peter’s mother and his father know about Peter’s fixation with that poster on the wall. In this context, it is not just a bird catcher that Peter is expecting to see, but a very particular one, the one he sees every day in the poster while his father tells him the story about Papageno and Papagena. The reading for the utterance of (1) that is favored in this context is obviously the specific one, under which it entails the proposition expressed by a normal utterance of (1’).

The point we would like to highlight at this stage is that every character in Mozart’s play is a fictional character. They do not exist, so to say, in the real world. Peter and his parents know this, both in the first and in the second case, and even so a Buridan case can be easily put together. ‘A bird catcher’ could have been ‘a mythological monster’ ‘a centaur’, ‘a unicorn’, etc. Conversely, it is clear that not every fictional term produces a Buridan-like ambiguity, and thus we
have to conclude that this kind of term shows a proclivity to be involved in cases that fail the Excluded Middle test as any other in natural language. Anscombe’s criterion and Exportation are not extensionally equivalent (if Exportation is to work as Quine says it should work).

It could be argued that we are parting ways here with Anscombe’s proposal. Anscombe’s criterion is meant to mark not only for both sides of Buridan cases, but for intentional contexts too (Anscombe 1981, 6). In every intentional context, it is the lack of specificity that blocks the mentioned inference. Even in cases like the second scenario described above, we cannot infer from (1) a proposition of the form of (1’) for every true description of the bird catcher in the picture. Papageno may have 50000 hairs on his head, covered by the colorful hat, and still from (1) we cannot infer (1’):

\[(1’’) \text{ Either Peter believed that a bird catcher with more than } 49999 \text{ hairs on his head was the first thing that he was going to see in the play or Peter believed that a bird catcher with less than } 50000 \text{ hairs on his head was the first thing that he was going to see in the play.}\]

Peter has never seen Papageno’s hair, and has never thought about the number of hairs on his head, so, how can he be said either to believe that Papageno has more than 49999 hairs on his head or that he has less than 50000? Anscombe seems to be supposing that it is this lack of specificity that characterizes intentional contexts. It is clear that from ‘a bird catcher is playing the pan pipes’, a non-intentional context, it can be inferred that ‘either a bird catcher with more than 49999 hairs is playing the pan pipe’ or ‘a bird catcher with less than 50000 hairs is playing the pan pipe’. So it is perhaps the lack of specificity that marks the presence of the mental in natural language.

As Anscombe says, even when I think about a particular man, not every true description of him is one under which I am thinking of him. But she thinks that this is due to a “lack of specificity”, and with that she is somehow connecting this problem with the Buridan ambiguity. Buridan cases have a specific reading and a non-specific one, and this possibility of having a less specific reading is what makes it possible that I may be thinking of somebody without thinking about her under every true description of her. It is this link that we do not quite understand. What we think lies behind the difficulty to infer propositions such as those expressed by normal utterances of
(1’) from (1) is a variant of the problem of omniscience. We cannot suppose anybody to believe every single logical consequence of what in a moment they might be truly said to believe. In the examples we are dealing with, it is not the impossibility of logical omniscience that matters, but a different kind of limitation of human beings. The number of descriptions that can be produced in natural language to assess a certain situation is *a priori* infinite, but the descriptions under which someone can be said to be thinking of an object in the same situation are quite limited. There is an evident pragmatic factor involved: producing descriptions for a situation and ascribing propositional attitudes are very different activities. The limits of the first are only determined by our persistence and imagination, while a propositional attitude report usually has a purpose other than itself. Attitude ascriptions are normally uttered to try and explain someone’s behavior, and for that purpose it makes no sense to suppose a prolific production of alternative descriptions. Many times what is relevant to explain someone’s actions has to do with what she is thinking at the very moment that she performs the action. Besides our limitations, in some situations what is at stake may be something we know as a true description of an individual but which we do not have in mind while performing the action that somebody else is trying to explain by ascribing to us a propositional attitude. In general, knowing everything there is to know about an individual takes unlimited time and epistemic capacities, and we possess neither of them. At the very least, the possibility of error and incomplete knowledge is a common assumption in the background of almost every propositional attitude ascription. To prevent such an assumption we would have to adjust the contextual parameters in a quite peculiar way, and specify that we are talking about a logically omniscient super-being, capable of having all her knowledge present at once when performing each one of her actions. These logically omniscient super-beings are just not what we usually talk about when we produce propositional attitude reports.

In contrast, Diogenes’ looking for a man instead of a particular man has almost nothing to do with his limitations as a human being. We do not want to go into what this difference may mean in terms of human conceptual reasoning, but it is evident that it is not just our being limited that causes Buridan cases to appear. An omniscient super-being could be said to be looking for a man, or to owe somebody else a horse, and the same ambiguity will arise there.

If these explanations sound like bad philosophy of mind to you, don’t worry, there is a logical divergence between the two groups of
cases. Anscombe’s Excluded Middle criterion really covers two different criteria:

(Excluded Middle 1) For every $Q$ that can be said of $x$, intentional constructions of the form ‘$[aVt] Pb$’ do not imply ‘$(aVt) Pb & Qb)$ or $(aVt) Pb & \neg Qb)$’, where $[aVt]$ is an intentional operator containing an intentional verb and a subject, $a$ and $b$ are individuals and $P$ and $Q$ are first order relations.

(Excluded Middle 2) Intentional constructions of the form ‘$[aVt] Pb$’ do not imply, for every $Q$ that can be said of $x$, ‘$(aVt) Pb & Qb$) or $(aVt) Pb & \neg Qb)$’, where $[aVt]$ is an intentional operator containing an intentional verb and a subject, $a$ and $b$ are individuals and $P$ and $Q$ are first order relations.

In Excluded Middle 1, the quantifier ranging over properties is outside the scope of negation, while in Excluded Middle 2 it is inside it. In Buridan cases, the non-specific reading implies a proposition resulting from the application of excluded middle for no property at all. This is the whole point of the insistence on owing just a horse. To prevent an indiscriminate attribution of weird propositional attitudes, like the one exemplified by the example of the number of hairs, we need to block the arbitrary application of the excluded middle rule for every description that can be truly said of an individual, and this is what we do with Excluded Middle 2.

**Digging up the existential commitment. Scope**

Quine is not alone in thinking that we could express the ambiguity between *suppositio confusa* and *suppositio determinata* in Buridan cases manipulating the scope of the existential quantifier and that of the intentional operator. Geach proposes the following pairs to illustrate this idea:

(2) In order to see, I need an eye.
(3) There is an eye that I need to see with.
(4) There always has been a man alive.
(5) There is a man who has always been alive.
(2) and (4) express what we have called earlier the non-specific readings of these pairs. Our story about Peter and the Magic Flute showed that Buridan cases could be reproduced in fictional contexts, and, thus, that if we had a strongly ontological conception of the quantifiers, we would have to reject the idea that there was an ambiguity of scope beneath Buridan cases. Still, someone could be a bit more reasonable concerning quantifiers and admit that if I can be truly said to be thinking of Sherlock Holmes, then there is something I am thinking about. The question would arise then, whether, leaving aside these fictional cases, Exportation was co-extensive with Excluded Middle 1 or Excluded Middle 2.

If we followed Geach, we would say that exportable forms always correspond to the specific reading. If we can say that there is an honest man that Diogenes is searching for, that is because Diogenes is searching for a specific honest man, and not just an honest man. If exportation were to serve as a criterion to distinguish between the two readings of Buridan cases, it would set apart the same cases that Excluded Middle 1 does. We cannot specify what Diogenes is searching for besides saying that it is a man and that he must be honest. Of course, if a case satisfies Excluded Middle 1, it satisfies Excluded Middle 2. Now consider this case. Elizabeth has suffered a car accident and has suffered some serious injuries to her eye. In spite of her being conscious of the critical situation, she is pretty confident in modern medicine, and thinks that a good oculist will help her. An spectator is commenting on the situation to a relative and says:

(6) Elizabeth believes that an ophtalmologist will save her eye.

As it happens, Elizabeth has a pretty good idea of what an ‘oculist’ is, but thinks that an ‘ophtalmologist’ is a member of a strange Amazonian tribe. Arguably, some intentional operators may change the extension of the predicates under their scope – this is the reason why their behavior is not truth-conditional. The truth of ‘Peter believes that the window is brown’ does not depend on the real world, but on whether the window belongs to the extension of the predicate ‘being brown’, in the model we produce to specify the semantics of Peter’s notional world. For the same reason, if ‘ophtalmologist’ is under the scope of the intentional operator [Elizabeth believes that], it will contain in its extension all the members of an Amazonian tribe, in-
stead of a group of doctors. Obviously, this is not what the spectator wants to say and what the audience understands. The indefinite description must be outside the scope of the intentional operator. So, we should have a reading of (6) along the lines of (6'):

(6’) There is an ophtalmologist that Elizabeth believes will save her eye.

Again, in logical form, we need the existential quantifier and the predicate ‘being an ophtalmologist’ outside the scope of the intentional operator if we want this indefinite description to be about doctors and not about Amazonian tribesmen. (6’) is nothing but the way we should paraphrase (6) if we were to try and represent what it means, our way to convey where we should place an existential quantifier and a predicate if we were to use them as a formal alternative for an indefinite description.

The problem is that (6) contains the ambiguity between a specific and a non-specific reading; it is a Buridan case. Elizabeth may believe of a particular doctor that she will save her eye, or just be so confident in medicine as to believe that any doctor will do. There is a reading under which (6) will entail (7) and another one under which it will not.

(7) Either Elizabeth believes that a female-ophtalmologist, will save her eye or Elizabeth believes that a male-ophtalmologist will save her eye.

(6) may or may not satisfy Excluded Middle 1. As Elizabeth is not a logically omniscient epistemic super-being, it will always satisfy Excluded Middle 2. If Geach and the liberal Quinean were right, and we want to give (6) a non specific reading, that in which (6) would not entail (7), we would have to place the quantifier inside the scope of the intentional operator, to mark the difference with the specific reading. But that would cause the utterance of (6) to express a proposition about a tribesman, just a tribesman. Even if it is not a specific aborigine, this is not what we want at all.

An appropriate interpretation of what is said by the utterance of (6) in the context described above will have to place the quantifier and the predicate ‘being an ophtalmologist’ outside the scope of the
intentional operator. Still, (6) can provoke a Buridan ambiguity. If
this kind of ambiguity could be analyzed along the lines proposed by
Geach and Quine, we should have the possibility of putting the quan-
tifier and the predicate inside the scope of the intentional operator.
This is not the case because it will definitely alter the meaning of our
utterance. Therefore, the manipulation on the scope of quantifiers
and intentional operators is not always the most precise way to repre-
sent the ambiguity between specific/non-specific in Buridan cases.

With regard to examples (2)-(5), we must add a remark. [x de-
sires that] is an intentional operator that can be said to behave in
many relevant aspects like [x believes that]. In particular, the exten-
sion of certain predicates falling under its scope may change, and
that is why it satisfies the Truth-functionality test for intentional con-
texts. I can be truly said to desire what is not true here and now,
likewise the truth of a belief ascription does not depend on the truth
of the proposition expressed by the isolated utterance of the embed-
ded sentence. Consequently, an example like that of Elizabeth and
the Amazonia could be easily produced for intentional contexts
formed by the use of the verb ‘to desire’. By contrast, ‘always’ be-
haves like ‘necessarily’, operators that cannot avoid a decisive ambi-
guity of scope when confronted with existential quantifiers. Propos-
tions under the scope of ‘always’ are to be evaluated in a multiplicity
of moments, and whenever the proposition contains an existential
generalization, it is not the same to pick an individual and check
whether it satisfies a certain property at each of these moments as
evaluating whether the predicate is satisfied by one individual or
other at every moment.

Exportation then is not a good criterion to determine whether a
Buridan case must receive a specific or a non-specific reading. A
Buridan ambiguity may be present in cases containing fictional
terms, which will not pass the exportation test, and the ambiguity of
scope is not always a satisfactory way to delimit specific readings
from non-specific ones. But Quine had a bigger mission, he was try-
ing to determine what there is, and was not just worried about the
appropriate characterization of the inferential commitments of our
utterances in natural language. This further motivation will be
spelled out in the next section.
2 Quotational intrusions

Quine’s agenda

Quine thought that Chisholm’s recuperation of the medieval theme of intentionality was of special interest for his own purposes. The three features that Chisholm used to distinguish intentional contexts were, for Quine, a definitive sign of the presence of a designative expression used in a non purely designative way. Designative expressions are typically proper names and descriptions. They refer to the objects of which we predicate certain properties or relations when we utter standard declarative sentences. Whenever a referential expression occurs in a non purely designative way, the statement we make by uttering the sentence containing that expression does not only depend upon the object usually referred by the referential expression, but on the form of the name (Quine 1943, 114). ‘Boston’ is a designative expression, but when it appears in the sentence ‘‘Boston’ has five letters’, it is not the city in New England the object of which we are predicating something, but the word ‘Boston’.

A context in which there is at least a designative expression used in a non purely designative way is called by Quine ‘opaque’. Intentional contexts are always opaque, and vice versa. Non intentional contexts are ‘transparent’. Some examples of opaque contexts are:

(8) ‘Cicero’ contains six letters.
(9) Giorgione is so-called because of his size.
(10) Philippe is unaware that Tully denounced Catiline.
(11) Necessarily 9 is greater than 7.

In each one of these cases, there is a designative expression occurring in a non purely designative way. ‘Cicero’ in (8), ‘Giorgione’ in (9), ‘Tully’ in (10) and ‘9’ in (11) cannot be replaced by other co-designative expressions without altering the truth-conditions of the propositions expressed by the utterance of the sentences containing them, as is clear from looking at (8’), (9’), (10’), and (11’):

(8’) ‘Tully’ contains six letters.
(9’) Barbarelli is so-called because of his size.
(10’) Philippe is unaware that Cicero denounced Catiline.

(11’) Necessarily the number of planets is greater than 7.

(8’), (9’), and (11’) are false, while the primitives (8), (9), and (11) were true. (10’) would have to be declared false if we made the supposition that Philippe knows who Cicero is, but does not know that he is called ‘Tully’ as well. Any substitution of the mentioned terms in these examples would be like trying to substitute ‘kitten’ for ‘cat’ in ‘cattle’ (Quine 1943, 114). The impossibility to substitute freely shows that there is a *quotational intrusion*, that the reference is not all that matters to determine the contribution of the designative expression to what we say.

Substitutivity is maybe the easiest way to recognize an opaque-intentional context, but what really interests Quine is Exportation. Existential quantification, says Quine, is not allowed for non purely designative occurrences of designative expressions. If the role of a term is not to provide the reference for the predication, then the rule of existential generalization cannot be applied to it. From (9), for example, it cannot be inferred that ‘There is an x such that x is so-called because of his size’. Quotational intrusions systematically block existential generalization.

This strategy might sound a bit strange. Even if it is clear why we cannot apply the existential generalization rule to cases like (8) and (9), that is not so clear for (10). Why is it that we cannot infer (10’’) from (10)?

(10’’) There is an x such that Philippe is unaware that x denounced Catiline.

Quine is so certain about this because he has major purposes to accomplish. Chisholm tests and the impossibility to reduce intentional contexts to extensional contexts, the problem of physicalism, isare? for Quine the proof of the ‘emptiness of the science of intention’ (Quine 1960, 221). Quine’s aim is none other than ‘limning the true and ultimate structure of reality’ (loc. cit.), and the key to doing that is to be extremely careful with the use of quantifiers. What there is in the world is what a true theory tells us that there is, and it can be determined studying the values of the bound variables used in the formulation of this theory. This is the basic ontology of the world,
and such a huge objective is what Quine tries to achieve through his main notational proposals. Even if he admits the difficulties that appear when we prevent proper names from exportation (Quine 1959, 84 and 221), he is decided to keep exportation away from intentional contexts, and proposes the dissolution of singular terms into bound variables and predicates.

For less elevated purposes, like clarifying logical deductions, propositional attitudes are only “tolerable” if we forbid our variables inside propositional attitude operators to be bound by quantifiers located outside the scope of the operator. Concerning the logical syntax of these statements, Quine defends the view that the that-clauses need not be taken as singular terms. In his positive approach to this subject, ‘believe’ is part of the operator ‘believe that’, ‘which, applied to a sentence, produces a composite absolute general term whereof the sentence is counted an immediate constituent’ (Quine 1960, 216). It is exactly this syntactical option that causes a lot of hassle with alethic modalities. Quine thinks that expressions like ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are better understood as first-order relations taking names of sentences as arguments (op. cit. 196). ‘Necessarily 9>4’ should be understood as ‘‘9>4’ is analytic’. One of the alleged advantages of moving to the “operatorial form” for these idioms is the possibility of quantifying into modal positions. But this, as we have seen in the example of the number of planets, is no more allowed here than in the rest of intentional contexts.

Matters concerning substitutivity in intentional contexts escape the limits of extensionality. We must investigate the meanings of the notions involved to determine whether a couple of expressions can be intersubstituted salva veritate or not in intentional contexts. This exceeds the power of logical equivalence. The best way to settle the question of substitutivity in intentional contexts goes through the notion of synonymity, which belongs to the realm of psychology, not to that of logic (Quine 1943, 120). Quine’s strategy for intentional contexts is one of all or nothing at all: Chisholm’s three criteria are extensionally equivalent, and intentional contexts, essentially doxastic and alethic modalities, cannot be fruitfully treated with the tools of logic.

The general mood of our approach to intentionality will be exactly the opposite, as we have started to show in the previous sections. We think that the different criteria proposed to identify intentional contexts do cover a number of distinct phenomena in natural language. Maybe they all have the same root, the normative character that concerns human matters and the possibility of error, as we
said above to introduce the case of the plane in trouble, but we firmly believe that the analysis of these problems can be prolific and useful. The first step in this enterprise is avoiding the confusion that arises from considering that intentionality has a homogeneous counterpart phenomenon in natural language.

**Alethic modalities recovered**

We have just seen how Quine argued that it did not make any sense to quantify inside modal contexts, be they doxastic or alethic. The reason was that Substitutivity did not apply unrestrictedly and that was connected with the non purely designative use of some designative expressions. It is not possible to quantify over expressions that do not contribute exclusively their referents to the propositions expressed by the utterances of the sentences containing them. To show how this worked for alethic modalities, Quine proposes the following argument:

A. It is necessary that 9 < 10.

B. 9 = the number of the planets.

C. Therefore, it is necessary that the number of the planets is less than 10.

C is false, because it is contingent that the number of planets is less than 10, but it seems to follow from A and B, which are true. Smullyan (Smullyan 1948) and Marcus (Marcus 1948) were convinced that this argument was based on a fallacy. According to them, Quine confuses D and E:

D. The so-and-so satisfies the condition that it is necessary that Fx.

E. It is necessary that the so-and-so satisfies the condition that Fx.

Quine is confident that A and B imply E, but they just entail D, which is arguably true given A and B and distinct from E, so the paradox does not arise.

This argument plus the rejection of the objectual view for the interpretation of quantification (cfr. Marcus 1993, 16) and direct reference (vid. previous chapter) eliminated every concern about alethic
modalities, at least for the vast majority of logicians. Quantification inside these contexts was now possible, since substitutivity (substitutivity of co-intensional entities) was granted and the counterintuitive intuitions produced by the ontological commitment associated with quantifiers were now put aside. Thus, an intensional logic could be produced for languages containing idioms like ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’. It was not clear, though, if the same process could be undertaken for doxastic modalities. The problem was made explicit in Carnap’s *Meaning and Necessity*.

**Intensional isomorphism**

*Intensionality* was a matter of degree for some modal logicians like Prior and Marcus. Marcus says that a language is intensional ‘to the degree to which it does not equate the identity relation with some weaker form of equivalence’ (Marcus 1993, 5). In *extensional* languages, Extensional MGPS (vid. Chapter 2) is satisfied by every formula. An intensional language is one that contains at least a sentence that violates Extensional MGPS. In some systems, identity is equated to material equivalence; languages that include idioms such as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are intensional; identity is equated with strict equivalence. Still, there are some systems that can be said to be more strongly intensional, in which strict equivalence may not be enough. Among these systems are those that include expressions used to report propositional attitudes (Marcus 1993, 6). ‘Believe’ is the paradigmatic example of an expression that forms intensional contexts, and therefore can only be included in strongly intensional systems.

For Carnap, intensional systems are just those in which identity is equated with strict equivalence, and it is not a matter of degree. Belief reports are problematic because they trigger contexts that are neither extensional nor intensional. We proceed now to introduce all the concepts that are necessary to understand this thesis in the system presented by Carnap in *Meaning and Necessity* (Carnap 1956). Every sentence in an *intensional semantical system* is either extensional or intensional, and at least one is intensional. In *extensional systems*, every sentence is extensional. A *sentence is extensional with respect to a certain occurrence* of an expression if and only if that expression is interchangeable with any equivalent expression. A *sentence is intensional with respect to a certain occurrence* of an expression if and only if that expression is L-interchangeable with any L-equivalent expression. A *sentence is extensional* if and only if it is
extensional with respect to all the expressions within this sentence, and is intensional if and only if it is either intensional or extensional with respect to all its embedded expressions and intensional at least with respect to one. (op. cit., 48).

An expression is interchangeable with another expression if and only if the truth-value of the sentence remains unchanged when the first expression is replaced by the second one. If and only if the change does not affect the intension of the sentence, those expressions are L-interchangeable (op. cit. 46). Two expressions A and B are equivalent in a certain language if and only if ‘A≡B’ is true in that language, and they are L-equivalent if and only if ‘A≡B’ is L-true in that language (op. cit. 14). A sentence is L-true if and only if it is true in every state description (op. cit. 10). An atomic sentence is true if and only if the individual designated by the singular term possesses the property “referred” to by the predicate (op. cit. 5). The truth of non-atomic sentences is determined using the common rules of truth for the connectives.

A state description is set of sentences that contains, for every atomic sentence, either this sentence or its negation (op. cit. 9). Two expressions have the same extension if they are equivalent, and the same intension if and only if they are L-equivalent (op. cit. 18-19).

We are now in a position to understand Carnap’s thesis (op. cit. 53 and ff.) that systems containing belief ascriptions can be considered neither extensional nor intensional. Carnap wants us to consider two different attributions:

(11) John believes that D.
(12) John believes that D’.

In the language we are considering, there are some sentences that are true just in virtue of the meanings of their terms. Those sentences are L-true, they are true in every state-description. Every L-true sentence is L-equivalent with any other L-true sentence. Since they are true in every state-description, they are true in the same state-descriptions, and therefore they are L-equivalent. L-equivalent expressions are unrestrictedly L-interchangeable in every context for intensional languages. As John is a “creature with limited abilities” (op. cit. 54, vid. as well Excluded Middle 2) there are some L-true sentences he believes and some others he does not believe. Let’s consider D a L-true sentence John believes, and D’ one he does not
believe. (11) is true, then, and (12) is false. We may take (12) as the result of substituting D’ for D in (11), two L-equivalent sentences. This change has affected the truth conditions of (11). Thus, (11) is not intensional with respect to D, and consequently, a language containing (11) is not intensional. Every L-true expression is true as well, therefore (11) is not extensional with respect to D, and a language containing sentences like (11) is not extensional.

In Carnap’s terms, then, a language containing idioms used to ascribe propositional attitudes would be neither intensional nor extensional. His conclusion is the same Marcus provides by saying that a language containing these idioms could not equate identity with strict equivalence. If it is not L-equivalence, what then? Carnap’s proposal was the beginning of a series of debates concerning the notion of synonymity. For Carnap, the best way to account for the relation of synonymity between expressions, and thus of that relation which identity is going to be equated with using the method of extensions and intensions, is intensional isomorphism. Two expressions are synonymous if they are intentionally isomorphic, and two intentionally isomorphic expressions can be interchanged salva veritate in every context.

Two sentences are said to be intentionally isomorphic if they have the same intensional structure, if they are built in the same way. Every two corresponding expressions of those sentences have to be L-equivalent, only then would we say that these two sentences are intentionally isomorphic. D, an L-true sentence, is by definition L-equivalent with any other L-true sentence, for example D’, but this does not make D and D’ a pair of intentionally isomorphic sentences. ‘Every bachelor is unmarried’ and ‘Every ophtalmologist is an oculist’ are two L-true sentences. However, neither is ‘bachelor’ L-equivalent with ‘ophtalmologist’ nor is ‘unmarried≡oculist’ an L-true sentence. Therefore, ‘Every bachelor is unmarried’ and ‘Every ophtalmologist is an oculist’ are not intentionally isomorphic. Intensional isomorphism was apparently this criterion that Quine thought only psychologists and linguists could develop (Quine 1943, 120), the key to understand synonymity.

Synonymity battles
The real hostilities in this field did not start with Quine’s philosophical skepticism and his appeal to psychology and linguistics, but with an argument proposed by Benson Mates against any form of syn-
nymity criterion (Mates 1952). His line of reasoning can be reproduced in the following way:

(i) If there is an adequate definition of ‘synonymity’, then any two expressions will be synonymous in a certain language if and only if they can be interchanged in any sentence containing them of that language salva veritate.

(ii) Consider these examples, which include D and D’, two synonymous expressions:

(a) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D, believes that D
(b) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that D, believes that D’

(iii) There is no definition of ‘synonymity’ that can make (b) always true for any pair of true synonymous expressions.

(iv) Therefore, (i) is not a good criterion of adequacy for synonymity, or there is no possible definition of this notion, or (iii) is not true.

Those who attacked this argument focusing on the falsity of premise (iii) can be divided in two groups. Putnam, on the one hand, modified the criterion of intensional isomorphism introducing some changes in the notion of compositionality. Church, Sellars, and Pap, on the other hand, considered that the basic problem did not lie in the difficulties to find a new and adequate criterion for synonymity, but in Mates’ intuition about when (b) could be considered false. According to the second group, in these cases we find a “disguised mention”, responsible for Mates’ intuition about the truth-conditions of (b). Finally, a third kind of response would be that of Lambert, who argued that (i) could not be the adequacy condition for a definition of synonymity. We will see this in some detail.

Putnam (Putnam 1953) proposes modifying the criterion of intensional isomorphism along the lines of his revision of the principle of compositionality. The problems of substitutivity arise from a deficient reading of the principle that states that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts (Putnam 1953, 118). This is what prevents two synonymous expressions to be declared interchangeable in every context salva veritate. The principle of compositionality should be modified so as to state that the sense of a sentence is a
function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (loc. cit.). Accordingly, the criterion for intensional isomorphism will be:

Putnam’s Intensional Isomorphism: two expressions are intensionally isomorphic if they have the same logical structure, and if their corresponding parts are L-equivalent (op. cit. 119).

Let’s see how this proposal deals with Mates’s argument. Suppose ‘Greek’ and ‘Hellene’ are two synonymous expressions. Following Mates, one could not be said to be able to substitute one for the other salva veritate in every context, since (13) looks true and (14) seems false.

(13) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that all Greeks are Greeks, believes that Greeks are Greeks.

(14) Nobody doubts that whoever believes that all Greeks are Greeks, believes that Greeks are Hellenes.

(13) and (14) are not intensionally isomorphic according to Putnam’s modified criterion, since ‘All Greeks are Greeks’ and ‘All Greeks are Hellenes’ have different logical structure. The first one is of the form ‘All F are F’, while the second one is of the form ‘All F are G’, and thus they are not intensionally isomorphic and cannot be interchanged everywhere salva veritate (op. cit. 118).

There certainly is an astonishing consequence to this new criterion is: no two different expressions are ever synonyms. Surprisingly, this is explicitly accepted by Putnam: ‘we cannot make the slightest change in the wording of a belief sentence without altering its sense’ (op. cit. 120). In fact, his conclusion is rather pessimistic: to give up synonymity between every pair of different sentences will be problematic for a sensible treatment of indirect quotation, but to establish differences between pairs of sentences will be arbitrary (op. cit. 121).

Church and Sellars developed independently in 1954 the same kind of counterattack against Mates’ argument. If D and D’ are taken to be two synonymous sentences used in (a) and (b), then, no matter what Mates says he believes, they have the same truth-conditions. Church grants a test of translation to another language the power to
decide whether a statement ‘is to be regarded as a statement about some sentence, linguistic expression, or word, or rather as about something which the sentence, expression, or word is being used to mean’ (Church 1954, 70). This kind of test supports his idea that the doubt Mates expresses is not really about the truth of (b), but about the truth of some other sentential matrices containing metalinguistic information, i.e. quoted words. In the same vein, according to Sellars, the sentence that is said to be disbelieved by Mates, is one in which at least some elements of D appear mentioned, and not purely used (Sellars 1954, 119). Only used synonymous expressions can be said to be interchangeable salva veritate, and Mates’ examples contain some “covert” or “disguised” mention (op. cit. 119-120).

Now the truth of the matter is that the argument summarized above rests on a simple mistake. And if Putnam had asked himself why he does not doubt that whoever believes that all Greeks are Greeks believes that all Greeks are Hellenes, he would undoubtedly have discovered his mistake, and saved himself a considerable expenditure of ingenuity (op. cit. 118).

What makes the mention “disguised” is our being unaware that Mates’ examples are not to be taken as asserted by us, which is the only case where we are free from quotational intrusions.

Lambert was dubious that a uniform definition of synonymity could be given for every occurrence of two wanted-to-be-candidate synonymous sentences. This concept is context-dependent, just like ‘greater than’ (Lambert 1956, 72). This intuition is perfectly compatible with Sellars’s proposal about the origin of quotational intrusions. It is not possible to know beforehand whether a sentence is going to be purely used or not, and that will prevent us from postulating a general criterion for synonymity. Of course, Lambert thought that this context-dependency defeated any possible definition of synonymity, while for Sellars, these cases in which there is a disguised mention are simply irrelevant for the evaluation of the adequacy of a criterion of synonymity.

Taking stock
To be fair with Carnap’s proposal, we must be clear about the aim of it, and not be confused by the multiplicity of factors involved in belief sentences. Carnap wanted to achieve with intensional isomor-
phism a solution for the problem of logically omniscient epistemic super-beings that we isolated in the previous sections through the criterion of Excluded Middle for intentionality. So, our being limited creatures is a phenomenon that affects the way we should treat the inferential import of belief reports, but it is not the only one. Belief reports, like every other intentional context, can host Buridan cases and, finally, cases of quotational intrusions. Intensional isomorphism is, for all we know, a suitable solution for one of the problems concerning belief reports. That it does not do all the work there is to do in order to determine the inferential peculiarities of these ascriptions is what is shown by means of Mates’ argument. Church and Sellars follow the right intuition, to our mind, when they seek in a metalinguistic intrusion the source of the problems of substitutivity salva veritate for L-equivalent expressions. Finally, Lambert’s insight about the context-dependency of the concept of synonymity, correctly interpreted, can be a very fruitful and reasonable way to look at the problem of why sometimes it seems that substitutivity of L-equivalent expressions is granted and at other times it is not. Sometimes what we say about someone else’s beliefs is independent of the particular way in which that other person would express it, but many times the linguistic habits of the ascribee are relevant to assess the truth of the ascription, and that is when quotational information intrudes into the truth-conditions of the propositional attitude ascription. In some contemporary theories, including the one we will present in this study, the principle of compositionality receives some serious amendments coming from the fact that quotational intrusions are strongly context-dependent.

Opacity, the problem of substitutivity of L-equivalent expressions, is the central problem that this dissertation addresses. We have already seen that this problem can be differentiated from Buridan cases, problems related to our limited abilities, fictional non-existent entities etc. They come to light through different criteria and they have different origins, if maybe a general common root could be found in the normative character of many human practices. Opaque cases are those in which Intensional MGPS does not apply, and they are generated by quotational intrusions, having to do with the consideration of somebody else’s linguistic habits. Before proceeding, we must discard some other efforts to explain opacity as a phenomenon coming from sources other than quotational intrusions.
3 The persistence of opacity

We have seen above how for Quine at least three of the criteria for intentionality were co-extensive. This is exactly the opposite attitude we are trying to adopt in this chapter. The first step to try and address the problem of opacity is to be clear about its extension and, if possible, about its origin. In the previous sections we have pointed to ‘quotational intrusions’ as the source of opacity. Intrusions coming from the context-dependent import of the linguistic habits of the ascribee of the belief report are responsible for alleged failures of intensional substitutivity. There are two ideas on the market that could be taken to be natural enemies of the proposal just described for opacity. The first one has to do with the distinction between singular beliefs and general beliefs, the second one explains opacity as a result of the adoption either of the point of view of the ascribee or the point of view of the ascriber and the ascribee. We will defend Searle’s intuition on the matter in this section from its alternatives.

Believe as a first-order relation

The idea that certain beliefs require the existence of the objects referred to by the terms embedded in the that-clause is classically attributed to Evans (Evans 1982). Some beliefs do have this relational character. In general, a singular belief is one in which a person is related to an individual, one in which the believer believes something about an individual. On the other hand we find general beliefs, those that do not posit a relation between the subject and an individual. Ascriptions that report singular beliefs are relational belief reports, and those that report general beliefs are notional belief reports (cfr. Recanati 2000, 121 and ff.) In the end, all these difficulties with opacity could be no more than a difference in the kind of beliefs we are reporting, more specifically a matter of the type of relation that is reported in a belief ascription. If it is a relational belief, then the ascription should be free of Intensional MGPS failures, but condemned to them otherwise. That is the position supported by Quine in his 1956 paper, and it will be treated in chapter 4. Here, our main concern is to show the trouble one gets into when trying to declare a belief report relational.

No matter how well-documented the relational character of some of our beliefs may be, the number of problems multiplies when we try to accommodate this relational feature to our ascriptions. Brentano was the first one to acknowledge that, if psychological idioms
were to link subjects and real objects of the external world, this link could not be a proper relation. In a first-order relation, the arguments are to be occupied by individuals, and for a relation to express a true or false sentence, systematically the individuals performing the role of its arguments have to exist. The verb ‘to eat’ is usually formalized as a dyadic first-order relation, and is only capable of expressing a proposition when there is an individual who eats and something that is eaten. As we saw in Buridan cases, sometimes well-formed expressions using intentional idioms entail no existential commitment for the entity denoted by the direct object. Every time I eat something, there is something I eat, but Diogenes may be looking for an honest man even if there is none. Whether fictional entities or Buridan cases are the reason, Brentano decided to call the relation expressed by the utterance of intentional verbs a ‘quasi-relation’ (Brentano 1995, 272). Some have expressed their doubts about the theoretical utility of this declaration of ‘quasi-intentionality’ (e.g. Crane forth., 19), but as we will soon see, asserting the non-relational nature of these ascriptions is not a harmless move in this field context.

Before proceeding further, we will introduce a note on the relation between the distinction between singular and notional and the ambiguity between specific and non-specific in Buridan cases. Again, apparently they cover the same groups of cases, but we cannot help express some reluctance to this view. Singular beliefs, and relational belief reports require the existence of the object the believer is said to be related to. The appeal to aboutness and the presumption of a special epistemic capacity only exercised when really in presence of the object justify this reading of the distinction (see. Recanati 2000, 122; Jacob 2003); singular thoughts not only involve a particular object, they entail is existence; the believer is said through the relational belief report to be in a special epistemic relation to an object. However, the specific reading for Buridan cases does not entail the existence of the object thought about. As shown above, a Buridan case may involve fictional characters, with which no direct relation is allowed. But no fictional entities are even needed to see this point. Consider the following case. John and Pedro play cards and Pedro loses his prized watch. As it is the only thing left to him by his grandfather, he wants to play double or nothing to recover it. Since Pedro does not have so many possessions and is quite confident that he cannot lose again, he starts talking to John about his wonderful car. When John is finally convinced of the excellence of Pedro’s imaginary car, they play again and Pedro loses for a second
time. They arrange the payment for some other moment and head home. John arrives at his house and tells his wife:

(15) Pedro owes me a car.

Obviously, (15) is to be interpreted in a specific way. Pedro does not owe John *just a* car, but a very particular one, the one he has been talking about for thirty minutes before John made up his mind and accepted the bet. I think there is nothing wrong with (15), John has been deceived, but that does not make (15) a non-specific Buridan case. (15) shows that the ambiguity in Buridan examples does not correspond with the relational versus notional distinction. Whenever a relational belief report appears under the form of a Buridan case, it will receive a specific reading, but not the other way around.

None of this goes against regarding relational belief reports as relational. One could admit that beliefs involving fictional terms are not singular and that the category of relational belief reports does not correspond with the specific reading in Buridan cases, and still be ready to maintain that genuine singular beliefs, those in which the objects necessarily exist, are expressed through relational belief reports, utterances that predicate a certain first-order relation between a subject, the believer, and the objects believed. To my knowledge, the only two alternatives concerning the logical form of belief reports compatible with this possibility are the orthodox grammar (vid. Kiteley 1964, 246) defended by Moore (Moore 1953), which has many different variants, all of them treating *that*-clauses as singular terms, and the multiple relation theory, originally proposed by Russell (Russell 1912, 126-128) and recently advocated by Moltmann (Moltmann 2003). The essential motivation for the first family of theories is the Grammatical Constraint, and they are committed to the view that the verb ‘to believe’ expresses a first-order relation between a subject, the believer, and a sentence, a proposition or any other entity suitable for the purposes of the theory. The multiple relation theory is prompted by some failures of the orthodox grammar and states that ‘to believe’ expresses a first-order relation between the believer and each one of the constituents of the proposition expressed by the *that*-clause. According to the orthodox theory, when a sentence like ‘María believes that Peter is tall’ is said in a normal context, one is stating a relation between María and the object referred to by ‘that Peter is tall’. Under the multiple relation theory,
Maria would be said to be related with ‘Peter’ and ‘being tall’ taken as objects that can function as arguments of first-order relations.

These two theories have a common feature, they both hold that belief ascriptions report a relation of the first order. It is this shared feature that raises the issues that we are going to come up with. If occurrences of ‘believe’ express a first-order relation, at least three questions can be genuinely asked: what is the nature of this relation? And what are the objects that fulfill its argument-positions? If it is a first-order relation, it must be classified like any other first-order relation. It must be possible to determine whether this relation is transitive, symmetric, reflexive, etc. Yet, this question makes no sense at all; the objects in the first argument-place of this relation cannot occupy the second place, and vice versa. For the second one, some doubts have been traditionally raised about the “objectual” status of the believer (cfr. Wittgenstein 1922, §5.5421; Wittgenstein 1953, §573), and that of the object of thought, be it a proposition, a sentence, a fact, etc. (cfr. Prior 1971, chapters 1 and 2). The way out of these difficulties is to consider the verb ‘to believe’ as a constituent of a complex operator of the form ‘x believes that’, functioning as a function of propositions, despite its acknowledged lack of truth-functionality. The relational analysis about of belief reports is so often considered the standard view on the matter, that it seems worth reproducing a brief list of the authors who have taken these worries seriously and have proposed considering [x believes that] as a function of propositions, just like ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’. This idea has been defended by Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1922, §5.541 and ff.), Urmson (Urmson 1952), Quine (Quine 1960, 216), Prior (Prior 1971, 16 and ff.), Hintikka (Hintikka 1962 and 1989, 183), Kitely (Kitely 1964), Kneale (Kneale 1968, 86), Cohen (Cohen 1968, 132), Mathews (Mathews 1994), Recanati (Recanati 2000, 19 and ff.), among many others.

Here we do not want to argue in favor of a special syntactic option. We will take it for granted that the most appropriate one for our purposes is the adverbial –non-relational– one, essentially because it is widely used by the theories that our proposal is taking a bit further. The aim of this section was just to show that, firstly, the position that

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4 Many of these theorists propose as a criterion to determine whether a context is intentional the very non-relational nature of the [x believes that] operator. Hintikka (Hintikka 1989, 183) and Kneale (Kneale 1968, 86), for example, explicitly support the view that an intentional context is one in which we find a proposition about propositions. Doxastic operators are simply a special kind of logical constants (cfr. Prior 1971, 16 and ff.).
relational belief ascriptions report singular beliefs carries a lot of problems with it, because it is not so easy to specify the status of the subject, object, and relation involved in this peculiar form of attribution, and, secondly, that Brentano’s claim about the “quasi-relational” character of intentional idioms is not a new wording for an old problem, but an alignment with a whole series of proposals that were to come.

Opacity and point of view

Recanati has suggested that the difference between the pairs Relational versus Notional and Transparent versus Opaque could be explained in terms of a difference in the point of view:

The relational/notional distinction articulates a simple contrast between the point of view of the sole speaker and the point of view of the believer; while the transparent/ opaque distinction articulates a quite different contrast, between the point of view of the sole speaker and the point of view of both the speaker and the believer (Recanati 2000, 133).

If this declaration is more than a hunch or a general description of the difference, it must be possible to develop it into something with the form of a criterion. The resource we find most suitable for this latter purpose is the iteration of belief ascriptions. What better way to mark the difference between speaker’s and believer’s point of view than adding to the sentence we are assessing an operator of the form [believer believes that] or [I believe that]? So, if we have an example like (16), we should settle on which one is the reading to be favored among the possibilities made explicit in (17), (18), and (19).

(16) John believes that Peter is tall.
(17) John believes that John believes that Peter is tall.
(18) I believe that John believes that Peter is tall.
(19) John and I believe that John believes that Peter is tall.

(17) would correspond to the notional reading of the ascription, (18) to the relational one, and (19) to the transparent alternative. According to Recanati, (17) would be a non-cumulative ascription, and
(19) would be a cumulative one. Cumulative belief ascriptions imply the transparent reading, while non-cumulative ones do not. The classic example of a notional reading for Recanati would involve a context of the following kind: Speaker and audience know that John systematically calls Henry ‘Peter’. The speaker utters (16). In this context, (16) would have to be given a reading along the lines of (17), which does not imply (18), but (20):

(20) I believe that John believes that Henry is tall.

In a context in which speaker and audience knew that John calls Peter ‘Henry’ at night and ‘Peter’ otherwise, and (16) is uttered during the day, the reading supported would be (19), the opaque one, which entails the transparent reading (18), even if ‘Peter’ cannot be replaced by ‘Henry’ in (16) *salva veritate*.

But the point of view of the believer alone is not enough to make an ascription opaque. Take, for instance, the next case. Superman’s mother is talking with her grandmother. They both know that Clark Kent is Superman but think that ‘Superman’ is too pretentious and prefer ‘Clark’ for a cozy conversation. They are talking about Lois Lane’s opinion of their relative. Superman’s great-grandmother does not know that Lois Lane is not aware of Superman’s secret identity. Superman’s mother says (21):

(21) Lois Lane believes that she believes that Clark is a good reporter, but in the deep of her heart what she feels is that he does not deserve the credit he gets for his work.

In (21) the point of view in command is only the ascribee’s, Lois Lane’s, but ‘Clark’ is interchangeable with ‘Superman’ *salva veritate*, even though Lois does not know that Superman is Clark Kent. (21) requires a transparent reading, one in which the specific linguistic habits of the believer do not intrude into the truth conditions. So, the sole point of view of the ascribee does not guarantee an opaque report.

Let’s turn now to ascriptions that do not involve proper names. If we eliminated from the distinction between singular and general belief reports the condition about the existence of the object and the relation of *aboutness*, then the pair relational/notional would coin-
cide with the pair specific/non-specific in Buridan cases. Singular beliefs would always be reported by Buridan cases requiring a specific reading (it sounds as if a Buridan case is always a belief report), and notional belief reports (at least the cumulative ones) would have to be considered as Buridan cases in their non-specific fashion. This is not really a strange move. Consider, for example, what happens with Elizabeth, the woman who has had an accident and is about to lose her eye. Imagine that she thinks now that ophthalmologists are eye-doctors, but has no idea about the meaning of ‘oculist’. In this context, (6) is a Buridan case that can have a specific and a non-specific reading.

(6) Elizabeth believes that an ophthalmologist will save her eye.

Is the belief ascribed through the utterance of (6) singular or general? I think that if the belief is such that the utterance of (6) requires a specific reading, then we will consider that the belief is singular, general otherwise. If Elizabeth happened to know a very good doctor, and it is reasonable for speaker and audience to suppose that she might be thinking of him when she says that she is optimistic about her eye, then (6) would demand a specific reading and Elizabeth’s belief would arguably be considered singular. If Elizabeth were just completely confident in the modern practice of medicine, then we would give (6) a non-specific reading, and we could say that her belief is general. This ambiguity is possible even if we take (22) and (23) into consideration.

(22) Elizabeth believes that she believes that an ophthalmologist will save her eye.

(23) I believe that Elizabeth believes that an ophthalmologist will save her eye.

(24) Elizabeth believes that an oculist will save her eye.

Maybe (22) requires an opaque reading, one under which it is not equivalent with (24), but I see nothing in (22) that prompts a specific or a non-specific reading necessarily. (23) can also be taken to be about a specific ophthalmologist or about just an ophthalmologist. Thus, if the distinction specific/non-specific is co-extensional with
the distinction singular/general for Buridan cases—except for the details put aside above—, then it is not correctly grasped by our implementation of the hunch about the points of view. To sum up, if Recanati’s idea about the points of view could be converted into a criterion, and this criterion could be made to work using iterated belief reports, we would still be able to find transparent belief reports constructed strictly under the point of view of the believer and relational belief reports in which the point view that is made explicit is only that of the believer. All of which contradicts Recanati’s distribution of cases. So, either iterated belief reports are not the most appropriate tool to make points of view work as a criterion, or there is no correlation between points of view and the pairs relational/notional, singular/general, transparent/opaque.

4 Some morals from the chapter

It is astonishing how long a monolithic idea of intentionality has survived. Certainly, it would be great if every little feature in natural language that cannot be accommodated in an extensional language were present in the same cases, and the “mark of the mental” (cfr. Moore 2000) could be easily observed and treated in isolation. Things are simply not like that. If the features considered as signs for the presence of intentionality in natural language have a common root, this is not particularly useful to acquire an appropriate view of the variety of cases. The aim of this chapter has been to help and draw this map of intentionality, paying more attention to the differences than to the similarities between the various cases. This is the spirit of the multiplicity of criteria that we have proposed to deal with what we have taken to be significantly different phenomena. We do not pretend our positive proposal to be a solution for all of these problems. We want to address the problem of opacity, and there were no other way to approach it than the previous amputation and cauterization of its mischievous excrencencies.

Intentional contexts can host three different ambiguities:

i) Specific reading versus on-specific reading in Buridan cases.

The criterion to distinguish between those readings is Excluded Middle 1.
ii) Transparent reports versus opaque reports. Opaque reports do not respect Intensional MGPS. Unrestricted substitutivity of co-intensional terms is blocked in opaque cases.

iii) Relational reports versus notional reports. In relational belief reports the objects about which the ascribee is said to believe something necessarily exist.5

We have shown that these criteria are not extensionally equivalent. Only one logical relation can be established between them: every relational belief report, in case the report is a Buridan case, will receive the specific reading. For the rest of it, each category can be successfully crossed with any other. We have argued in favor of the independence of the Buridan Ambiguity from two other phenomena: fictional terms, ambiguities of scope. Opacity too has been distinguished from the problem of logical omniscience (through intensional isomorphism) and considerations about points of view. Relational belief reports have been characterized as “quasi-relational”.

There are two more features of intentional contexts:

iv) Non truth-functionality.

v) Excluded Middle 2.

For the case of belief reports, these two criteria are satisfied. Belief reports are constituted by non-truth-functional functions of propositions, and our limited abilities force the attributions on our beliefs to satisfy Excluded Middle 2. All of these features may co-exist with opacity, but Intensional MGPS definitely cannot be made to do the work of every other criterion for intentionality.

Although we have made a few comments about Quine’s motivation for his proposal of exportation, it is only in the next chapter that this criterion will be treated at length. Other assumptions are needed before reaching our desired conclusion that exportation is a vacuous criterion.

5 We think that this is the criterion that most appropriately grasps the spirit of the distinction. In what follows, we will essentially treat cumulative and non-cumulative cases as a subclass of deliberate deference cases, but the relevance of this will not be appreciated until chapters 6 and 7.
Quining Exportation

1 Introduction

The argument we will present in this chapter goes along these lines:

(i) There is a principled distinction between the context of interpretation of an utterance and its circumstance of evaluation.

(ii) Belief operators change the circumstance of evaluation of the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence.

(iii) Exportation helps to make no distinction concerning belief ascriptions. There is no scope ambiguity between existential quantifiers and belief operators.

This chapter is not devoted to the defense of (i), (ii), or (iii). I can conceive the possibility of an enraged reaction against any of these theses, even though (i) and (ii) are, in my opinion, both reasonable and very well-known in the literature; but a violent response to these points will be harmless for the purpose of the chapter. Our aim is not to show that they are true or even plausible, but just to argue that if...
you buy (i) and (ii), then you are necessarily taking (iii) home with you.

The argument will take a negative form: it will be argued that the only way to make (iii) false is to renounce (ii), or (i) and (ii). We will analyze, in the first place, the rationale for a principle like Exportation. Despite some acknowledged difficulties, it has been widely considered as a good criterion for the distinction between relational and notional belief reports. Secondly, some basic notions will be introduced concerning premises (i) and (ii), in order to understand the relevance of such a treatment for the treatment of belief reports. Finally, it will be shown that only by dropping (ii), or (i) and (ii), could an ambiguity of scope between existential quantifiers and doxastic operators survive. As a corollary, some consequences of the theses defended in the chapter will be analyzed.

2 Exportation

One of the classics of the literature on belief reports is Quine’s 1956 ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’. There, Quine states again his criterion of exportation to detect the ambiguity between relational readings and notional readings of propositional attitude ascriptions. A sentence like (1) can be used, under normal circumstances, to express (2) or (3):

(1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy.
(2) ∃x (Ralph believes that x is a spy).
(3) Ralph believes that ∃x (x is a spy).

(2) corresponds to the relational reading, one on which there is a particular individual who is believed by Ralph to be a spy, while (3) represents the notional reading, where what is meant is just that Ralph believes that there are spies. Despite the success of this distinction, Quine’s conclusion is rather negative. He is not happy with the idea that belief reports and other propositional attitude ascriptions may be systematically ambiguous, and tries to find an analysis of these utterances that might somehow eliminate the problem, but neither the use of intensions nor that of sentences can provide a suitable solution. Thus, Quine ends up in a position with respect to exporta-
tion that is quite similar to the one attributed to Mates concerning opacity. The former thinks that the ambiguity between the relational and the notional reading cannot be explained away, and Mates maintains that opacity renders impossible any adequate definition of synonymy.

Exportation and opaque belief reports

In the previous chapter, we saw that Quine is more interested in discovering the real composition of the world than in the analysis of our inferential practices with linguistic expressions in communication. Existential quantifiers are the chosen instrument to accomplish such a lofty goal. Only those contexts within which we can unrestrictedly quantify are to be considered for the mission Quine undertakes. Belief reports, and intentional contexts in general, are not suitable for this kind of inquiry. Exportation, as we saw, was not only the criterion for detecting the relational/notional ambiguity, but a perfect way, for Quine, to give an account of other related problems, like Buridan cases and opaque examples.

According to Geach, the medieval logician Buridan was the first to propose a similar criterion to mark the difference between the suppositio determinata and suppositio confusa, what we have called the specific and non-specific reading for Buridan cases. Buridan thought that the best way to show the difference was to respect a simple rule: specific readings should have the subject in the first position of the sentence, while non-specific readings have it after the intentional verb. So, the specific reading of ‘I owe you a horse’ was necessarily something like ‘There is a horse I owe you’. Even though this rule cannot be applied systematically, at least neither in English nor in Spanish, something like it has been used many times to make the difference manifest. The literature concerning exportation is divided between those who prefer the paraphrase ‘believes of’ (vid. e.g. Hornsby 1977, 32; Over 1984, 48; Laurier 1986, 43; Kapitan 1994, 274) and those who opt for the Buridan method of placing in the first place the exportable subject (vid. e.g. Temin 1975, 299; Swoyer 1983, 210; Forbes 1987; Soames 1994, 258; Almog 1998, 42; Williams 2004, 2). Within this second group we usually find phrases like ‘there is an individual such that…’, ‘there is at least one such that…’, ‘someone is such that…’, passive constructions, and others. Even for proper names, the possibility of exportation may be marked in this way, like in ‘Frege is such that Russell believed he
was a logician’ (Richard 1993, 207) or ‘Phosphorus is something Ralph believes to be a star’ (Forbes 1987, 12).

Our position is that it is not possible to construct a Buridan case using proper names. Quine was not alone, though, in thinking that the relational/notional ambiguity was to be extended to proper names. Hintikka, for example, grants the possibility of exportation only to “distinguished terms”, terms that pick out the same individual fromin all possible worlds (Hintikka 1971, 497). For Hintikka, a term that does not behave in this way is able to occur in opaque contexts. But the distinction between opaque and transparent belief reports does not coincide with the ambiguity between relational and notional ascriptions. For a theory that respects Direct Reference, an ascription containing a proper name will always be relational, since proper names are rigid designators, although substitutivity of co-intentional terms *salva veritate* may not apply. Some have pointed to a more basic distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* uses (vid. e. g. Recanati 2000, 130). Baker, for example, explains that beliefs come ‘in two varieties’, *de re* beliefs are about an object, while beliefs *de dicto* concern a *dictum* (Baker 1982, 363-364). I cannot find a theoretical context in which this kind of characterization is useful at all; it is a general label for a number of other distinctions, with no descriptive content in itself. In fact, Baker describes the ambiguity *de rel*/*de dicto* in such a way that it is not distinguishable from Recanati’s relational/notional. Maybe there was a stage in the history of the subject when saying that a belief was either about a *dictum* or about a *res* meant a lot, but I cannot see what the relevance of such a distinction could be now, once you have distinguished between specific and non-specific, relational and notional, transparent and opaque belief reports.

In chapter 3, we made explicit the problems that a theory willing to state the difference between relational and notional belief reports in terms of the nature of the relation between the believer and the object of its belief would have concerning the logical status of that first-order relation expressed by the verb ‘to believe’. Still, some have thought that the relational/notional distinction captured a difference between singular beliefs and general beliefs. For those who include Direct Reference among the assumptions of their theories, this distinction could not overlap with the one between transparent and opaque cases. Every case involving a proper name expresses a singular belief, and, thus, has to be exportable. What is not always highlighted is that the reason not to wonder whether a belief report involving proper names is relational or notional has to do as well with
the impossibility of generating Buridan cases in these kinds of examples. Theorists who admit that certain occurrences of proper names within intentional contexts cannot be exported are seeking to spell out a phenomenon different from the one that provokes the ambiguity between *suppositio determinata* and *suppositio confusa*. Of this new phenomenon we only know that it may have to do with two different kinds of beliefs, one that always involves a *res* and another that systematically contains a *dictum*.

Recanati is one of the theorists interested in stating the difference between the cases set apart by exportation and the phenomenon of opacity. His strategy is to produce an opaque case that is undoubtedly relational. Here is his proposal (Recanati 2000, 131):

(4) Ralph believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.

(5) Ralph believes that Tully denounced Catiline.

(6) Ralph believes of Cicero that he denounced Catiline.

(7) Ralph believes of Cicero, thought of as ‘Cicero’, that he denounced Catiline.

If we take (4) to be opaque, that is, if we take it to be uttered in a context in which it is clear for both speaker and audience that Ralph does not believe that Cicero is Tully and this piece of information is relevant, then (4) does not imply the proposition expressed by an utterance of (5) under these contextual parameters. Now, the proposition expressed by (4) can be successfully represented by (7), which reproduces one of the formulations for relational cases.

In the same vein, other examples could be proposed to show that apparently exportable (or already *exported*) proper names may produce opaque cases in intentional contexts:

(8) John believes that Cicero is a Roman orator.

(9) Cicero is believed to be a Roman orator (by Ralph), but not Tully.

(10) Cicero is the one who Ralph believes to be a Roman orator, not Tully.
(11) It is Cicero that Ralph believes to be a Roman orator, not Tully.  

If Ralph has failed a test about Roman history and we try to explain why he made so many mistakes concerning Catiline’s trial, maybe the appropriate elucidation will lie in Ralph’s not being aware that Cicero is Tully. It is not difficult to suppose that such a fact could be emphasized by taking ‘Cicero’ to the first position of the sentence. Clearly, though, they are opaque cases.

To my mind, these are the best examples you can have if you think, as Recanati does, that opaque and transparent belief reports are both relational reports. Very good examples to show the difference between the two pairs of cases come up if we are a bit more permissive. Obviously, a directly referential theory has to say that proper names always prompt singular beliefs, and are consequently only used in relational belief reports. But what if/in this precludes the possibility that certain general beliefs may be reported through opaque ascriptions? In chapter 3, we considered the case of Elizabeth, who has had an accident and does not know the meaning of the word ‘oculist’. She trusts modern medicine and, despite her injuries, she believes that her eye is safe:

(12) Elizabeth believes that an ophthalmologist will save her eye.

It was shown that (12) is a Buridan case in this context, that it may receive a specific or a non-specific reading, depending on whether it is of a certain ophthalmologist that Elizabeth believes she will save her eye or she just thinks that an ophthalmologist, whoever that might be, will help her. Suppose it is the non-specific reading we favor here. Cases that need a non-specific reading cannot be considered relational, whatever our final characterization of that notion may be. Still, in (12) we cannot replace ‘ophthalmologist’ with an L-equivalent expression like ‘oculist’ salva veritate. Therefore, notional belief ascriptions can be opaque. Belief reports involving singular terms are always relational, but opacity is not restricted to these cases, and that may be used to show the logical independence of the two distinctions.

6 I owe these examples to Philippe De Brabanter.
**Intentional Identity**

The best way to make some real sense of the distinction between relational and notional belief reports is to consider notional belief reports always to be non-specific readings of Buridan cases and relational reports to be a subclass of specific readings, those in which the object necessarily exists, so to say. If we are not the Taliban of objective quantifiers, then we can very well say that Buridan cases that allow exportation are specific, and that they are non-specific otherwise.

(13) Diogenes is looking for an honest man.

(14) There is an honest man such that Diogenes is looking for him.

Only the specific reading of (13) implies the proposition expressed by a normal utterance of (14). Under this view, exportation would no longer serve the purpose intended by Quine. Existential quantifiers would not tell us anything about the inner structure of the world, but they could explain some of our inferential practices. If exportation cannot determine unequivocally when a term has been used in a purely designative way, i.e. we do not allow this criterion to set apart transparent and opaque cases, and an existential quantifier with the widest scope does not guarantee the existence of the object talked about, then the whole Quinean project is seriously undermined. Still, exportation may be the key to understanding the old distinction between suppositio confusa and suppositio determinata.

Geach thinks that the problem raised by Buridan cases can be explained as an ambiguity of scope, but that a related problem appears as soon as we try to refer anaphorically to an object under the scope of an intentional operator in a Buridan case (Geach 1972, 146 and ff). This is the problem of **intentional identity**. Take the following case:

(15) Hob thinks that a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob’s mare killed Cob’s sow (op. cit. 150)
In cases like this, Geach says, ‘the scope of the quantified phrase thus seems both to lie wholly within the earlier oblique context and to cover something in the later context’ (loc. cit.).

Intentional identity is, according to Geach a distinct problem, and one that he sees no solution for. If the difference of scope does a good job of distinguishing the specific reading from the non-specific in examples like (16) and (17), then intentional identity must be a different phenomenon.

(16) There always has been a man alive.
(17) There is a man who has always been alive.

Our own intuition is that cases like (15) should make us suspect that exportation is not always an accurate criterion to distinguish readings in Buridan examples. This is the hunch we develop in this chapter.

3 Circumstance-shifting, context-shifting

In order to accommodate the reasonable intuition that indexicals are genuine singular terms, despite their being context-dependent, David Kaplan (Kaplan 1989) proposed a distinction between context of use and circumstance of evaluation. A directly referential singular term may refer to distinct individuals through different contexts of use, but once the reference is fixed, that individual is the only contribution that singular term makes to the proposition that has to be confronted with the circumstances of evaluation in order to assess its truth-value. Take (17):

(17) He is completely out of his mind.

The contribution of the indexical expression ‘he’ to the proposition expressed by (17) on a particular occasion depends on a number of factors associated with the conditions under which the sentence is uttered. If I am in my flat and say (17) to a friend while quietly pointing to my mad neighbor through the window, the contribution of ‘he’ will be different from the one it would have been if the
speaker was an employee of the White House pointing to the actual-current? president of the United States.

Once the propositional ingredient is identified, we may want to know whether the proposition expressed is true or false. Again, here we have several options. The number of counterfactual situations we may possibly evaluate (17) is a priori up to our imagination. Bush might be a genius, or a mad man in a mental health clinic, an alcoholic in rehab, or a brilliant scientist receiving a Nobel Prize. Only in some of these circumstances would (17) be true. Transition is abrupt. Kaplan and Lewis maintain that no linguistic expression in natural language can perform a context shift (vid. Chapter 2, Monters Principle). Certain operators, though, are taken to change the circumstances of evaluation of the propositions under their scope. The truth of (18), for example, does not rely on the actual circumstances. In order to know whether (18) is true or false it is not enough to check what is said by means of it in the actual world; we have to look at a different situation, at the special configuration the world exhibited ten minutes ago.

(18) Ten minutes ago, my purse was on the table.

According to Recanati, belief operators are circumstance-shifting operators too.

**Context and circumstance**

The context of an utterance is basically what determines the value of the singular terms, rigid designators, included in that utterance. For a situation to qualify as a context, an agent must utter an expression belonging to a certain language in that situation (Recanati 2004, 3). Some of the contextual features upon which the reference of indexicals depend, the indices, can be manipulated by the speaker, while some others cannot. The speaker can change the index of ‘he’ by pointing to a different individual in an utterances of (17), while some other indices cannot be changed, like those corresponding to who the speaker is or the language that is spoken in performing an utterance. These latter features are fixed independently of the speaker’s intentions. Still, we can pretend that some of these non-intentional features have changed. Pretense may supply two different types of context-shifts: locutionary and illocutionary, corresponding to the con-
text of utterance and the context of assertion (op. cit., 14 and ff). In utterances where the speaker pretends that the context of assertion has changed, she adopts the point of view of a different person, and expresses somebody else’s opinion; she puts herself in somebody else’s shoes. But the indices remain constant with respect to the original context unless a locutionary context-shift is occurring simultaneously.

(19) John to Bill: Okay, I am stupid and I don’t understand the matter. Why do you ask me for advice, then? (op. cit., 13)

(20) John to Bill – both know that Peter systematically confuses Quine with McPherson, they have been talking about it recently, and McPherson is walking towards them with a friendly attitude: Quine wants to talk to us.

(21) Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker Street.

In (19), the speaker pretends that the context of assertion has changed, and he displays Bill’s opinion as if it was his. (20) is a case of deference, in which the language parameter of the locutionary context has changed from standard English to Peter’s idioclect. Fictional cases like (21) are examples of pretending that non-intentional features of the context have changed as well. In fiction, we usually pretend that singular terms lacking a reference in the actual context, like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, do possess a reference.

The notion we will use in this dissertation is that of non-intentional locutionary context-shift, because this is the kind of pretense that will be necessary to understand the deferential process at the origin of every opaque belief report.

Thus, we can distinguish between features that affect the interpretation of our utterances, the context, and features that determine the evaluation of what we say, the circumstance. As functions of propositions, belief operators alter the circumstance of evaluation within which we have to assess the truth of the proposition under their scope. They make us travel, so to say, from the circumstance in which the belief sentence is uttered, to a different circumstance, corresponding to the notional world of the person whose beliefs we are talking about. To specify the function performed by belief operators, Recanati introduces what he calls “Austinian semantics” (Recanati 2000, 63 and ff.). Facts, worlds, and situations are the essential con-
cepts to understand this approach. A fact is represented as an n-tuple containing either an individual and a property, or n-1 individuals and an n-1-adic relation. A world is made up of a set of objects Dom and a function W from Dom to a set of facts. A situation is anything that a fact may concern (op. cit., 69). For example, my pencil can be considered a situation as we can say of it that it is green, is right next to my ipod nano, etc. W(s) is the set of facts concerning the situation s. For semantic purposes, we will essentially use the notion of support. A situation s is said to support a relation represented with the sign ‘|=’ a fact g if and only if g belongs to W(s).

(22) My pencil is next to my ipod.
(22’) [my pencil] |= <my pencil, my ipod, being next to>

In a simple case, like (22), my pencil considered as a situation supports the fact that it is next to my ipod. (22’) states that the fact represented by <my pencil, my ipod, being next to> belongs to W(my pencil) with respect to the actual world.

Belief reports are a bit more complex. They are structures of the form dS, consisting of a sentence S and a circumstance-shifting operator d (op. cit., 108). A situation may appear in different possible worlds; a circumstance is a situation as assigned to a particular world, ‘a situation qua belonging to a certain world’ (op. cit., 109). Circumstances are said to involve a place, a time, and a world. In this kind of expressions, at least one of these parameters is altered.

(18) Ten minutes ago, my purse was on the table.
(23) In the kitchen, John is cooking.
(24) Juan believes that Peter is tall.

(18), (23), and (24) are structures of the form mentioned above. They have a circumstance-shifting operator and a sentence that falls under its scope. In (18), I claim that my purse was on the table ten minutes ago, maybe to emphasize that it is no longer there. The truth of the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence has to be evaluated in the circumstance that we are driven to by the operator [ten minutes ago]. Similarly, the truth-value of (23) does not depend on the
evaluation of the proposition expressed by the utterance of ‘John is cooking’ in the situation of utterance, we have to move to the kitchen to assess the truth of it. In (24), the speaker declares that a certain belief state supports the fact that Peter is tall. Using the symbolism introduced above, these metarepresentations could be expressed as follows:

(18’) \[s] \models_{@} \langle\text{ten minutes ago} \rangle \models_{@} \langle\text{my purse, the table, being on}\rangle$

(23’) \[s] \models_{@} \langle\text{in the kitchen} \rangle \models_{@} \langle\text{John, cooking}\rangle$

(24’) \[s] \models_{@} \langle\text{Juan’s belief state}\rangle \models_{@} \langle\text{Peter, being tall}\rangle$

The situation of utterance, \(s\), supports a complex fact, made out of another situation that supports a different fact. In (24’), the fact \(\langle\text{Juan’s belief state}\rangle \models_{@} \langle\text{Peter, being tall}\rangle\) is said to belong to \(W(s)\) for the actual world. Juan’s belief state is taken to be an entity of the actual world and a situation supporting another fact at the same time. The superscript \(w\) means that \(\langle\text{Peter, being tall}\rangle\) holds in the possible world \(w\), ‘deployed through’ [Juan’s belief state] (cfr. op. cit., 106).

What is the difference, then, between a circumstance-shift and a context-shift? Belief reports are heterogeneous \(d\)-structures, they involve two different possible worlds, one concerning the situation in which the sentence is uttered and a different one associated with the situation talked about. The proposition expressed by the embedded sentence in a belief report must be evaluated with respect to the notional world of the believer. A change from a possible world to a different one may alter the extensions and denotations of the expressions. Counterfactual possible worlds are usually produced altering the extension of the predicates; we may imagine that I belong to the extension of the predicate ‘being bald’ or ‘being able to jump 4 meters high’. In the actual world, I do not possess these properties, I do not belong to their extension. As we saw in chapter 2, Direct Reference does not imply, as Quine suggests, that the relation between an expression corresponding to a singular term and its reference is essential. There ‘are possible worlds in which Jospin is called ‘Chirac’’ (op. cit., 169), but when we talk about imaginary situations, as we do in belief reports, the reference of indexicals and proper names, rigid designators, are those they have in the actual world. Only a context-
shift can alter the denotation of names and indexicals (cfr. loc. cit.), and belief operators only change the circumstance of evaluation, never the context of interpretation.

Other theorists have defended exactly the opposite view. Schlenker has recently maintained that belief operators were in fact context-shifting operators. Monsters are, according to Schlenker, a very common phenomenon in natural language (Schlenker 2003), and quite often belief reports change the context of interpretation of the proposition expressed by the embedded utterance. Hintikka’s approach to epistemic and doxastic modalities too could be interpreted as a vindication of the context-shifting function of these intentional operators. He thinks that a concept is intentional if and only if ‘we have to consider several possible situations or courses of events and their relation to each other in spelling out the semantics of the concept’ (Hintikka 1989, 183). As distinct possible worlds may differ in many ways, intentionality comes in degrees. We need to consider here two of these many ways. A possible world may have a different set of individuals from that of the actual world – conservation of the existence of individuals (op. cit., 189) –, and individuals from the actual world may split or merge in a different possible world – conservation of identity of individuals (op. cit., 189). Both are allowed by the kind of intentionality we find in belief reports.

Any theory in which belief operators could change the context of interpretation would not only go against the Monsters Principle, but against Semantic Innocence as well. I think it is worth exploring the possibility of leaving these two principles untouched as far as possible in a theory. And so thinks Recanati, who explicitly denies that belief operators might entail the degree of intentionality postulated for them by Hintikka:

[…] the ontology remains that of the ascriber all along, even though the ‘world’ which is described is that of the attitudinist: the objects the speaker’s belief is said to be about are picked out in the speaker’s world, that is, in the actual world (Recanati 2000, 178).
4 Scope and belief operators

Scope ambiguity
Consider the following excerpt:

‘You said you saw the daughter in here?’ Rebus was anxious to have his questions answered before the alcohol took effect on Barr,

‘That’s right. She came in pretty regularly.’

‘By herself?’

‘No, always with some guy.’

‘One in particular, you mean?’

But Willie Barr laughed, shaking his head. ‘A different one every time. She’s getting a bit of a name for herself. And,’ he raised his voice for the barman’s benefit, ‘she’s not even eighteen, I’d say.’

‘Were they local lads?’

‘None I recognized. Never really spoke to them.’ Rebus swirled his glass, creating a foamy head out of nothing. (Ian Rankin, A Good Hanging and Other Stories, Orion, 2005, page 36)

Some temporal operators, like ‘always’ can produce ambiguous expressions when they are put together with quantifiers. Detective Inspector Rebus is trying to get as much information as possible from Barr, but the answers of the local are not very specific. Barr is more interested in conveying his own opinions about the dissolute behavior of the girl, than in helping to solve the crime Rebus is investigating. Barr’s utterance of ‘She always comes with some guy’ can receive a reading under which it is always the same guy or it is a different one every time she comes. Rebus asks about this particular point and Barr chooses the second option.

As we saw in chapter 3, Geach has supported the view that this ambiguity coincides with the one between the specific reading and the non-specific one in Buridan cases. ‘There always has been a man alive’ must receive the non-specific reading, while ‘There is a man who has always been alive’ receives the specific interpretation. Being careful with the order of quantifiers is what we need in order to expose this difficulty.
‘Always’ works here as a quantifier over possible worlds. For something to be always true, it has to be true in every possible world under the range of the quantifier. In this case, the range is restricted to those occasions on which she went to the bar. But there is a difference between picking an individual and checking that it is true that every time she came, she came with him, and assessing the truth of the claim that she never came alone. The latter possibility allows for a different partner each time, while the former one forbids it. This is what Rebus wants to be sure about.

A similar ambiguity is found in examples like (27):

(27) Every Real Madrid player is in love with a model.

It is also well-known that (27) may receive two very different readings. By the utterance of (27), a speaker may be saying that there is one single, unique, model such that every Real Madrid player is in love with her, or she may just be conveying the fact that footballers playing for the Real Madrid have a weakness for models. Under the first reading, the existential quantifier gets wide scope and the universal quantifier narrow scope, as is shown in (28), while in (29) the quantifier with the wider scope is the universal one, corresponding to the second reading.

(28) $\exists y \forall x \ (y \text{ is a model } \& \ x \text{ plays for the Real Madrid } \& \ x \text{ is in love with } y)$

(29) $\forall x \exists y \ (x \text{ plays for the Real Madrid } \& \ y \text{ is a model } \rightarrow x \text{ is in love with } y)$

Modal operators like ‘necessarily’ exhibit the same problem when combined with existential quantifiers:

(30) Necessarily, the president is corrupt.
(31) The president is necessarily corrupt.

(30) and (31) may be used to express a general predisposition of every president to be corrupt or a fact about the actual president. As we have said, different worlds may assign different sets of facts to their domain, that is, the extension of their predicates changes across different counterfactual situations. [Necessarily] is a function of propositions that requires the proposition under its scope to be evaluated in every possible world. What the embedded proposition says is that there is a unique individual such that it is the president and that this individual is corrupt. We may consider that the definite description falls inside or outside the modal operator, and therein lies the ambiguity. Using a simple Russellian methodology, the difference is expressed in (30’) and (31’).

\[
(30') \exists y ( (\forall x) (y \text{ is the President } \land x \text{ is the President } \leftrightarrow x=y) \land \text{Nec } (y \text{ is corrupt}))
\]

\[
(31') \text{Nec } ( (\exists y) ( (\forall x) (y \text{ is the President } \land x \text{ is the President } \leftrightarrow x=y) \land y \text{ is corrupt})
\]

Thus, an expression that combines an existential quantifier with a function of propositions that makes us consider more than one possible world for the evaluation of the proposition under its scope may prompt two different readings. On the first one we pick an individual and check whether it possesses the property ascribed to it in the proposition that falls under the scope of the function of propositions or not. If we take the second option, we should prove that there is at least one individual in each one of the possible worlds under the range of the operator that satisfies that property. For the proposition resulting from the first reading to be true, the same individual needs to have the property in every possible world belonging to the range of the propositional function. That is not the case for the second reading.

**Belief operators**

Sometimes, the same phenomenon is found when existential quantifiers are combined with operators that do not involve the consideration of more than one possible world:
The current president may be said to have been corrupt ten years ago, or the claim may concern the individual that was president ten years ago. For simplicity reasons, operators like [ten years ago] will be interpreted as world-shifting operators, saying that the proposition under their scope has to be evaluated in the possible world corresponding with the way the world was ten years ago. The extension of the predicate expressed by ‘being president’ in the actual world is not necessarily identical with the extension it has in the world we have to travel to if we want to assess the truth of a claim about something that happened ten years ago. The Russelian framework can be used again to express the difference:

(32') (∃y) ((∀x) (y is the President & x is the President ↔ x=y) & [Ten years ago] y is corrupt)

(33') [Ten years ago] ((∃y) ((∀x) (y is the President & x is the President ↔ x=y) & y is corrupt))

Let’s consider now a case involving a doxastic operator:

‘It’s possible that Geoffrey might become a suspect in a rather high profile murder. There was a woman found dead, and she was thought at first to be the victim of a serial killer, but evidently now…’

‘Let me stop you right there. In the spirit of small worlds, I think I’m involved with the DA leading that case’

‘You think you’re involved or you think she’s the DA?’

‘Both, so we should probably terminate this discussion’ (The Practice, Season 2, episode 19).

The operator [I think that] in ‘I think I’m involved with the DA heading that case’ can affect the extension of ‘I’m involved with’ or
that of ‘being the DA heading this case’. The first speaker wants to
know what the exact scope of the operator is, since that may be rele-
vant for his petition. We usually add the expression ‘I think’ to
claims that we are not completely sure of. For the first speaker it is
important to know whether the second lawyer is expressing some
doubts about his involvement with the District Attorney or about the
professional status of the girl he is going out with.

Of course, belief reports exhibit the same behavior:

(34) John believes that the president is corrupt.
(34’) (∃y) (∀x) (y is the President & x is the President ↔ x=y) &
[John believes that] y is corrupt
(35) John believes of the president that he is corrupt.
(35’) [John believes that] (∃y) (∀x) (y is the President & x is the
President ↔ x=y) & y is corrupt

John may be said to believe that someone both is the president and is
corrupt, or rather that the actual president, not only the one believed
by John to be so, is corrupt.

But there is a very important difference to be noticed between
operators like [ten years ago] and those that behave like [always].
Within the first group, we have only one world to consider for the
evaluation of the proposition embedded, and so there is no ambiguity
coming from the fact that the claim may allow the possibility that the
individual satisfying the formula could be different in every possible
world to be checked or not. Even so, many times the propositions
represented by (36) and (37) are considered to render distinct truth
conditions:

(36) ∃y [Ten years ago] (y is corrupt)
(37) [Ten years ago] ∃y (y is corrupt)

The domain of the world associated with the circumstance shift pro-
vided by the operator [ten years ago] need not necessarily belong to
the domain of the actual world. So, a difference can be made be-
tween stating the fact that some individual of the actual world was
corrupt ten years ago, or that ten years ago there was someone cor-
rupt (cfr. Van Benthem 1988, 8). An ambiguity between existential quantifiers and operators belonging to this first group exclusively appears when the domain of the world associated with the input circumstance differs from the domain associated with the output circumstance.

Belief operators belong to this first group, with [ten years ago], [x thinks that], etc. When they are included in contexts containing descriptions and quantified expressions, they provoke ambiguities of scope, nicely accommodated by the change they may introduce in the extensions of some predicates with respect to the actual world. However, Exportation requires a bit more than that. Exportation tells us that the distinction between specific and non-specific readings of Buridan cases must be explained as a case of ambiguity between the scope of the existential quantifier and that of the intentional operator. So, let’s go back to Elizabeth, who either thinks that a certain ophthalmologist is going to save her eye, or that any ophthalmologist will do. (12) could thus be analyzed as (38) or (39):

(12) Elizabeth believes that an ophthalmologist will save her eye.

(38) \exists y \ [Elizabeth believes that] (y is an ophthalmologist & y will save her eye)

(39) [Elizabeth believes that] \exists y (y is an ophthalmologist & y will save her eye)

Are the specific and non-specific readings of (12) properly captured by (38) and (39)? If Exportation is to have any function at all, it must be this. We have seen that this criterion can be used neither to distinguish relational ascriptions from notional ones, nor transparent reports from opaque belief attributions. Its last chance to avoid being declared a dummy tool in the belief reports playground was Buridan cases.

If belief operators behave like [ten years ago], then the truth conditions of (38) and (39) can only be said to be different provided that the domain of the world associated with the circumstance talked about somehow differs from the domain of the actual world. How are we supposed to justify the difference between (38) and (39) if the domain of the actual world and that concerned by the situation talked about in belief reports are necessarily identical? If [x believes that] behaves like [ten years ago] except for the fact that the possible
world involved in the evaluation of the embedded proposition has to preserve the ontology of the actual world, then there is no way for us to spell out the difference between (38) and (39). Exported and non-exported forms of belief reports simply have the same truth-conditions.

If these two assumptions are correct for the analysis of belief reports, then Exportation is no longer a useful criterion to spell out any phenomenon concerning the inferential behavior of belief attributions. Semantic Innocence and Direct Reference rule out exportation.

An objection
If the vindication of Exportation were really incompatible with important principles like Semantic Innocence and Direct Reference, we would have a very strong reason to drop this criterion, despite our intuitions about the radical difference that is felt between cases like (40) and (41):

(40) There is someone who is believed by John to be a spy.
(41) John believes that there are spies.

This difference genuinely corresponds to the distinction between specific and non-specific readings of Buridan cases, and the tendency to phrase (40) and (41) as (40’) and (41’) is almost impossible to resist:

(40’) ∃y [John believes that] y is a spy
(41’) [John believes that] ∃y y is a spy

Still, if Semantic Innocence were compromised, and the whole view of belief operators as circumstance-shifting operators were to fall with it, would it be so undesirable to sacrifice our inner tendencies for the benefit of the major project?

Certainly not, but there is no such necessity. The rejection of Exportation is based on two different assumptions. The first one has to do with the constraints that the logical status of belief operators receives as a result of being included in a framework that assumes Semantic Innocence and Direct Reference, but the second one is that
these operators belong together with operators like *ten years ago*. *[Ten years ago]* makes us evaluate the embedded proposition in a different circumstance related to one possible world, while assessing the truth of modal statements containing a necessity operator involves the consideration of more than one possible world.

Recanati thinks that the evaluation of belief ascriptions necessarily demands the consideration of a class of possible worlds together with the output situation (Recanati 2000, 72 and ff.) The reason to adopt this theoretical option is that the output situation in the circumstance-shifting process carried out by belief operators is an imaginary situation. To state the difference between (42) and (43), we need to make it clear that the output situation in (42) is imaginary, while that involved in (43) is not.

(42) If he sees my sister, he will be glad.

(43) When he sees my sister, he will be glad.

An imaginary situation cannot be defined as a situation that supports a fact with respect to a world \( w \) different from the actual world (op. cit. 71), because sometimes what we describe in the antecedent of a conditional happens to be true in the actual world, is a fact that belongs to the co-domain of the function \( W \) associated with the actual world. The solution proposed by Recanati ‘consists in acknowledging that \( w \) need not be an unique world, but may be (and typically is) a class of possible worlds’ (op. cit. 72). This class may or may not contain the actual world \( @ \).

The consequent of a conditional has to be evaluated in a number of circumstances, corresponding to all these worlds relevantly similar to the actual world in which the antecedent holds. In a belief report, the output situation concerns a class of possible worlds as well; those compatible with whatever the ascribee believes. So, the difference between ‘\( \exists y (x \text{ believes that } \phi (y)) \)’ and ‘[x believes that] \( \exists y (\phi (y)) \)’ could be explained in the same manner as the one between ‘\( \exists y (\text{always} \phi (y)) \)’ and ‘[always] \( \exists y (\phi (y)) \)’. They prompt two distinct evaluation processes: in the first one we pick an individual and then check whether this individual belongs to the extension of \( \phi \) in every possible world compatible with \( x \)’s beliefs; in the second one, we check in every possible world if there is an individual that satisfies \( \phi \). Therefore, Exportation can be maintained while leaving Semantic Innocence and Direct Reference untouched.
A response

I have no direct answer to this objection, but a couple of comments and a general worry about this modified approach. Firstly, if possible worlds are taken to be maximally consistent sets of propositions, then two possible worlds cannot be both different and compatible with the ascribee’s notional world. If it is not the ascribee’s notional world, but the speaker’s partial reconstruction of it that has to be compatible with every member of the evaluation class, then belief reports will always be true. A proponent of this modified version of the framework owes us an explanation of what it is that possible worlds have to be compatible with to belong to the evaluation class of a belief operator, and what it is for a possible world to be compatible with this entity.

In the second place, I do not see the point in trying to over-explain the imaginary nature of the world concerning the output circumstance in belief reports. The accessibility relation for the [x believes that] operator is not symmetric, as it is for the case of [necessarily] and [x knows that], for example, in a modal framework. For the truth of a belief ascription, the truth-value of the embedded proposition is a priori irrelevant, while that is not the case when we make analytic statements or knowledge attributions. This is all we need to know about the world that we are going to find in association with the output situation.

Finally, I think that this theoretical move uncovers an important logical distinction. We can make the pairs ‘∃y ([x believes that] φ (y))’ versus ‘[x believes that] ∃y (φ (y))’ and ‘∃y ([always] φ (y))’ versus ‘[always] ∃y (φ (y))’ differ because of the same technical reason if we want, the multiplicity of possible worlds associated with the output situation, but the rationale is quite distinct for each one of the two pairs.

Consider these cases:

(16) There always has been a man alive.
(17) There is a man who has always been alive.
(16’) [Always] ∃y (y has been alive)
(17’) ∃y ([Always] y has been alive)
(44) If John went to Lyons, he took a train.
(44') ∃y ([If John went to Lyons] y is a train & John took y)
(44'') [If John went to Lyons] ∃y (y is a train & John took y)
(45) John believes that someone is a spy.
(45') ∃y ([John believes that] y is a spy)
(45'') [John believes that] ∃y (y is a spy)

According to the common view there is a single phenomenon that
t provokes the different readings represented by (16’)-(17’), (44’)-(44’’), and (45’)-(45’’). It is usually believed that they all are Buridan cases. If that were the case, we would be more than happy with
the prospect of having a single logical tool, ambiguity of scope be-
tween existential quantifiers and intensional operators, to represent
the difference between the specific and the non-specific reading for
all of them. But they are essentially dissimilar. In (16’), (17’), (44’),
and (44’’) we can apply the excluded middle rule with no restric-
tions. They all imply the alternatives eliminated by Anscombe for
intentional contexts, in this case (46) and (47):

(46) There has always been a man alive and either he was 10 feet
high or he was not 10 feet high.
(47) If John went to Lyons, either he took a long train or he took a
short train.

Belief operators behave in a very different way. (45) does not imply
(48):

(48) Either John believes that someone is a spy and is a woman, or
that someone is a spy and is a man.

Even if the man that we are talking about in (16) may be a different
one in every possible world associated with the output circum-
stances, the height of this man or men must be specifiable, which
makes (46) true. The same goes for (44), yet in this case in which the
speaker has no idea about the specific train that John took if he went
to Lyons, we must agree that of that train, whichever it may be, it can
be said that it is either long or short in this context. The non-specific
reading of (45), on the other hand, essentially precludes the applica-
tion of the excluded middle rule. If our intention is to say merely that John believes that spies exist in the world, it is not correct to infer that John is either thinking of a man or of a woman, he just believes that there are spies.

Genuine Buridan cases are those in which Excluded Middle 1 is satisfied. If we have to add a number of complicated modifications to our theory just in order to preserve Exportation, and at the end what we obtain is a single logical tool that covers up two distinct phenomena, maybe the whole move is just not worth it.7

5 Conclusion

Some consequences
None of the three central distinctions that we have been talking about in this chapter is explicated by the exploitation of the ambiguity of scope that may appear when existential quantifiers and belief operators collide. There is just no ambiguity of scope involving these logical constants in systems willing to preserve Semantic Innocence and Direct Reference, or the Monsters Principle. Specific and non-specific readings of Buridan cases are differentiated using Excluded Middle 1. Relational belief reports are a subclass of specific Buridan cases. Every belief attribution whose embedded sentence expresses a singular proposition is relational as well. Notional belief reports are either specific Buridan cases in which the object does not necessarily exist or non-specific Buridan cases. There are no notional belief re-

7 Indeed, Recanati’s last proposal for the analysis of belief ascriptions under the standards of Austinian semantics, seems to imply that the distinction specific/non-specific is not determined by an ambiguity of scope, and cannot be explicated with a semantic apparatus. An example like that of Elizabeth, the woman who trusts modern medicine, will be represented as follows:

(49) [s] |=w <[Elizabeth’s belief state] |=w 〈∃y (y is ophthalmologist)] |=w y will save her eye>>

Where the situation 〈∃y (y is ophthalmologist)] is either ‘contextually determined or left unspecified’ (Recanati 2000, 108). Ambiguity of scope should be playing a role here, since relational belief reports are a subclass of specific readings of Buridan cases, but it is not.
ports among belief ascriptions containing embedded singular propositions. Intensional MGPS, the principle of substitutivity of L-equivalent expressions, is what characterizes the difference between transparent and opaque belief ascriptions.

Sometimes, the special behavior of certain indexicals like ‘I’, or Castañeda’s quasi-indicators, has been explained by appealing to the fact that they always have ‘the largest scope’ (Castañeda 1999, 94). Nothing is gained by saying that an existential quantifier escapes the scope of a belief operator. Those who think that a descriptive view of indexicals is possible would not derive any benefit from placing their existential quantifiers before belief operators. Even more, a system that makes sense of the difference between circumstance-shifting and context-shifting operators in the way ours does has no room for a descriptive theory of indexicals or proper names; it has to stick to the view that these expressions are directly referential linguistic instruments.

**A few words for the skeptic**

Our conclusion could be rejected by those who either do not agree that there is a principled distinction between context of interpretation and circumstance of evaluation, or consider that doxastic operators are context-shifting operators (vid. Schlenker 2003). They could both keep the relational/notional distinction as stated in Quine’s terms. But, again, their claim is not about the validity of our argument, but about the principles involved as premises.

Someone could even be so convinced by Quine’s intuitions about ambiguity of scope as to think that if the argument were to work, then some of the premises must be wrong. As I said at the beginning of the chapter, this will not affect the main point of the argument defended here, but, still, I think that something could be said about it. It is not completely unreasonable to discard Quine’s approach. Scope ambiguity shows a very particular logical feature of operators’ behavior, which we may call ‘specificity’ if we want, but that is absolutely free from the epistemic burden Quine attributes to it when one of the operators is a doxastic one. If I say ‘Everyone in the neighborhood burnt a car’ I may be describing the riot in some Parisian or a recurrent episode in a peaceful community in Minnesota that celebrates every Thanksgiving Day by burning the oldest car in the neighborhood and making a barbecue. The ambiguity has to do with whether there was a smoking car for each and every neighbor or just one for all; it has nothing to do with the epistemic relationship be-
tween the neighbors and the car. If this is evident for quantifiers, modal, and temporal operators at least, why should it be different for doxastic operators? The existential quantifier is still the same, where has this strange rabbit come from?

It is true that many times, what looks like a non-exported form results in a non-specific reading of a Buridan case, as in (50):

(50) ‘I hope there’s someone who’ll take care of me when I die’  
(Hope There’s Someone, Anthony and the Johnsons)

(50) looks like and really is a genuine Buridan case receiving a non-specific reading. From (50) we cannot infer that he either hopes that a man will take care of him or that a woman will take care of him. But as a final, and certainly less oppressive, example, please consider this case in which we can find a propositional attitude operator, an existential quantifier outside its scope (already exported), in a context in which there is no epistemic relation between the subject of the ascription and the alleged “object of thought”:

(51) ‘There’s a somebody I’m longing to see / I hope that she turns out to be / someone to watch over me’ [the speaker does not know who that person might turn out to be] (Someone to watch over me. George and Ira Gershwin)
5

Context and Opacity

1 Introduction

In chapter 2, we introduced what we called ‘The Paradox of Meaning’, a way to formulate the problem every theory encounters when trying to combine Intensional MGPS, Semantic Innocence, Direct Reference, Compositionality, while respecting the intuitions that those involved in the communication exchange have about the content of what has been said (Int). We said that there were two main strategies to try and overcome this difficulty. The first one consisted in amending Intensional MGPS in such a way as to allow the preservation of the other principles. Carnap’s intensional isomorphism was an effort in this direction. He tried to specify a criterion for synonymity, identity of content, different from material and logical equivalence, to guarantee substitutivity. Under his reformulation of Intensional MGPS, co-intensional expressions cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate; only expressions with the same intensional structure, intensionally isomorphic, can be intersubstituted safely. This restriction was successful in avoiding some of the pernicious effects of logical omniscience. Carnap wanted his system not to grant an inference from a belief report concerning an agent and a logical truth to every belief report involving that agent and any logical truth. With this problem, intensional isomorphism dealt reasonably well,
but this criterion was not enough to offer a consistent explanation of synonymity, as shown by Mates’s argument. The second set of strategies do not propose modifying intensional MGPS, but adjusting some other of the principles involved in the paradox of meaning. The analysis of some of these theories will be the main topic of this chapter.

For some theorists, the best way to accommodate intensional substitutivity is to deny the authority of those involved in the communication exchange to decide about the content of what has been said. As the most representative of these positions, we will treat the version of the Implicature Theory defended by Nathan Salmon. Other theorists think that the best way to find a way out to the problem of opacity is to ease up on the principle of Compositionality. Within this second group, our interest will be focused on the Hidden-Indexical Theory and Recanati’s version of this approach. Finally, some objections against the Hidden Indexical Theory will be analyzed.

2 Opacity and implicatures

Pragmatically imparted guises

Nathan Salmon, who formulated the standard version of the Implicature Theory for doxastic contexts (Salmon 1986), maintains that proper names’ only contribution to the proposition is their reference. He is, at the same time, willing to give an explanation of the intuitions of those who think that normal utterances of (1) and (2) may differ in their truth conditions.

(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.

(2) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly.

If the only contribution made by a proper name to the truth-conditions expressed by the utterance of a sentence containing it is its reference, and ‘Superman’ and ‘Lois Lane’ refer to the same individual, then the inference from (1) to (2) is logically warranted, no matter what whose involved in the communicative exchange could
think about it. According to Salmon, Direct Reference takes priority over Int:

*Direct Reference*: a theory of meaning is directly referential iff it contains within its assumptions the hypothesis that proper names contribute *just* their reference, the individual they designate, to the propositions expressed by the utterances of sentences containing them.

*Intuitions of the speaker (Int)*: The less a semantic theory is at odds with normal context-informed language users’ intuitions, the better for our theoretical purposes.

Salmon’s proposal is structured around two fundamental theses: 1) there is a difference between *semantically codified* information and *pragmatically imparted* information (Salmon 1986, 58); and 2) There are different *modes* under which we can access information, different *guises* under which we may find it or be familiar with it (op. cit. 104 and ff.). Speakers are quite often unaware that every change in the information pragmatically conveyed does not necessarily imply a difference in the proposition that has to be evaluated to assess the truth of the utterance. Not every piece of pragmatically conveyed information is semantically encoded. This distinction becomes evident as soon as non-linguistic examples are taken under consideration. We may obtain some information from observing someone sneezing, with red-eyes and a handkerchief in his hand walking down a park between the flower beds in the middle of May; it is reasonable to think that this person is allergic. Nevertheless, ‘though the blowing of a nose may thus impart certain information, it would be ridiculous to suppose that nose blowing has any semantic content’ (op. cit. 58). Utterances, like any other event, *pragmatically impart* some information. Paradigmatically, they *impart* the information *semantically encoded*; but on top of this, they also make accessible information concerning the speaker’s beliefs, attitudes, etc. (op. cit. 59). Speakers generally understand utterances without making any effort to distinguish between different kinds of information, which provokes mistakes such as that of considering that utterances of (1) and (2) express different propositions. For an agent to have a belief is to have a disposition to assent to a certain proposition (op. cit. 110), and this disposition has to remain unmodified if the proposition embedded is not essentially changed.
Now, Salmon is not insensitive to the intuitions of those involved in a communicative exchange about the truth conditions of their utterances. He wants to offer an account of the information that makes speakers express wrong judgments about inferences that should be warranted by the principle of substitutivity of co-intensional expressions in doxastic contexts. An explanation is needed for the tendency of so many speakers to say that they will never assent to those propositions that our theory tells us they have a disposition to assent to. Believing a proposition is having a favorable attitude toward a piece of information, but this does not mean, Salmon says, that there must be a disposition ‘to inward assent or agreement no matter how the information is taken’ (op. cit. 110). Thus, Lois Lane believes the proposition expressed by normal utterances of (1’) and (2’), but she does not believe it when it is presented as in (2’).

(1’) Superman can fly.
(2’) Clark Kent can fly.

We can grasp the same information through different paths, the same piece of information may appear under different guises. Even though a theory having Direct Reference, Semantic Innocence and Compositionality as some of its assumptions must support the view that normal utterances of ‘Superman can fly’ and ‘Clark Kent can fly’ express the same proposition, we cannot help acknowledging that they somehow differ. The guises under which a proposition can appear make the utterances of (1) and (2) impart different information, even though this does not belong to what is semantically codified.

According to Salmon, the information semantically codified in a normal utterance of (1) and (2) is: there is at least one guise under which Lois Lane believes the singular proposition including the predicate ‘being able to fly’ and the individual Superman/Clark Kent. What makes some speakers dissent from this view is the common confusion about the nature of the information having to do with the particular guise under which Lois Lane believes this singular proposition. This piece of information is not part of what is semantically codified, and therefore does not alter the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed.
Conversational implicatures and opaque reports

Proponents of what has been called here the Implicature Theory think that the portion of information that confuses speakers about the truth-conditions of utterances like those of (1) and (2) is pragmatically conveyed through the use of a very particular tool, *conversational implicatures*. Paul Grice was the creator of this notion, originally introduced as a way to put account for some intuitions about the content of logical constants that were not reflected in their truth-conditional meaning. Communication was, for Grice, ruled by a basic general principle: ‘make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged’ (Grice 1989, 26). This was called the *Cooperative Principle*, and was spelled out in four different categories, *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *manner*. Under each category, some more specific *maxims* are specified. For speakers engaged in communicative exchanges whose purpose is the efficient transmission of information, the Cooperative Principle may be taken to be a regulative principle. Communication is the kind of activity that it is because every agent is supposed to be following the maxims. An exchange of information in the terms Grice establishes is not possible without the confidence of the speakers in a large amount of shared knowledge. And even the most basic rules governing communicative exchanges, like those derived from the Cooperative Principle, can be used in order to transmit some extra information. Speaker and audience are supposed to know the kind of intercourse they are engaged in, and any apparent deviation from the basic rules will provoke an inferential process to secure the information necessary to re-establish the norm, rather than the immediate abandonment of the assumption that speaker and audience are part of a rational exchange with the purpose of transmitting information. This information that is acquired when an apparent deviation from the Cooperative Principle prompts an inferential process is said to be *implicated*.

To calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being preserved (op. cit. 39-40).

Conversational implicatures are usually characterized in terms of three of their core features:
a) **Cancelability**: ‘a putative conversational implicature that \(p\) is explicitly cancelable if, to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that \(p\), it is admissible to add *but not* \(p\), or *I do not mean to imply* that \(p\), and it is contextually cancelable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry the implicature’ (Grice 1989, 44).

b) **Nondetachability**: If something has been conversationally implicated through a certain utterance, ‘it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question, except where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant for the determination of an implicature (in virtue of one of the maxims of manner) (op. cit. 39).

c) Any evidence in favor of the presence of a conversational implicature must be ‘supported by a demonstration of the way in which what is putatively implicated could have come to be implicated’ (op. cit. 43). It must be possible to reconstruct the inferential process from what is said, the proposition primarily expressed by an utterance, and the Cooperative Principle, to the ‘implicatum’.

Let’s see how the mechanism of conversational implicatures may work for belief reports that resist substitution of co-intensional terms. The utterance of (1) in a normal context conversationally implicates that Lois Lane thinks of Superman as ‘Superman’, and the utterance of (2) in the same context implicates that Lois Lane thinks of Superman as ‘Clark Kent’. Imagine that we are telling Superman’s story to a friend. Debating a certain detail of a spectacular combat between Metropolis’ hero and Lex Luthor, we utter (2). At that moment, our interlocutor asks ‘Didn’t you say that Lois Lane didn’t know Clark Kent was Superman?’ To that we could reply without contradiction ‘Yes, but by saying (2) I didn’t mean Lois Lane thought of Superman as ‘Clark Kent’ at that point’. In doing that, we would have explicitly cancelled the implicature prompted by the utterance of (2).

Cancelability, though, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary criterion for declaring that some piece of information belongs to what is implicated rather than to what is said. Nondetachability may strengthen the case that what makes (1) differ from (2) is really a matter of conversational implicatures. Sometimes, rewording an opaque belief report makes the “putative” implicature disappear. If we re-phrase (2) as ‘Lois Lane believes of Clark Kent that he can fly’
or ‘Clark Kent is believed by Lois Lane to be able to fly’, we give the impression that our utterance merely concerns the individual Superman/Clark Kent and the predicate ‘can fly’, with no mention to the particular way in which Lois Lane may grasp this singular proposition. Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous chapter, these forms can very well correspond to opaque belief reports. Thus it seems that it is not possible to change the wording of an opaque belief report carrying a putative implicature, and thereby rule out the possibility that this utterance may provoke the same implicature.

Apparently then, the information that makes the utterance of (1) differ from the utterance of (2) is both cancelable and detachable. That would make a good case in favor of its status as a conversational implicature. Before going further, let’s look at a couple of details about the cancelability and non-detachability of the putative implicatures carried by belief reports. The fact that the information pertaining to the guise is explicitly and contextually cancelable backs up Lambert’s intuition about the context-dependency of the meaning of ‘synonymity’. Remember that Lambert (cfr. Chapter 3, Lambert 1956) thought that the conditions under which a pair of expressions could be substituted salva veritate could change from context to context, which severely complicates the whole synonymity project. This is what makes opacity, the source of intuitions against the substitution of co-intensional expressions salva veritate, a very slippery phenomenon. It cannot be foreseen whether a belief sentence is going to turn into an opaque or a transparent report before considering the utterance in its context. Sometimes a slight tacit or explicit modification of the context may change the surroundings of the original opaque report so that it becomes transparent. Framing our analysis in such a way that a belief report can turn from transparent to opaque and vice versa, depending on the context where it appears, is a very sensible move for an approach to the logical form of belief reports, though it may collide with other desiderata of our theory, like Semantic Innocence. We will come back to this point later in this chapter.

Concerning nondetachability, one may consider the following line of reasoning. (1) and (2) are said to have the same truth conditions, since (2) is the result of substituting ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ in (1). (2) is nothing but a different way of phrasing (1), one in which a singular term is replaced by a co-referential one, keeping the proposition expressed unchanged. Non-detachability forbids modifications that do not alter the truth-conditions of the proposition expressed by an utterance to introduce changes in the information im-
plicated, but this is exactly what we can observe here. We modify an expression, express the same proposition by uttering it, and end up with two different conversational implicatures, one according to which Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly under the guise ‘Superman’, and another one according to which Lois’s belief contains the guise ‘Clark Kent’. The obvious way out is to consider that the conversational implicature that triggers speakers’s confusion about the truth-conditions of (1) and (2) depends on an exploitation of one of the maxims of manner. As said above, implicatures generated as a result of an exploitation of the maxims of manner cannot be said to be detachable. The problem is that none of these maxims seems to fit very well with the usual contexts in which opacity appears.

The category of manner is structured into 4 maxims and a supermaxim:

Be perspicuous (supermaxim)
   i) Avoid obscurity of expression.
   ii) Avoid ambiguity.
   iii) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
   iv) Be orderly.

Which one of these maxims is a speaker exploiting when she wants her audience to make an inference from what she says by uttering (1) to the specific guise under which Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly? None of them seems to serve to reconstruct the inference with enough clarity, and this situation has made other proposals flourish. Barwise and Perry extract, among others, this corollary of the Cooperative Principle for the particular case of attitude reports:

A. Speaker: When using an attitude report to explain a person’s actions (as opposed to using it as evidence of what the world is like), do not use the terms describing or suggesting the agent’s unapplied concepts or irrelevant anchors or other modes of recognition not used by the listener. Listener: assume that the speaker is referring to the agent’s applied concepts, relevant anchors, and other modes of recognition used by the agent (Barwise and Perry 1983, 258).
The proposition expressed by a normal utterance of (1) is, according to Salmon, identical to that expressed by a normal utterance of (2). This use does not respect the consequence Barwise and Perry derive from the Cooperative Principle. It could be argued that this is the maxim exploited in order to prompt the inference from what is said by (1) and the proposition containing the guise under which Lois Lane believes that the individual Superman/Clark Kent can fly. If this maxim of faithfulness (cfr. Recanati 1993, 333) were associated to the general category of manner, a putatively coherent version of the Implicature Theory could be taken into consideration.

**Intuitions of the speakers**

Thus, for Salmon, ‘believe’ expresses a triadic relation between a believer, a proposition, and some guise. The specific guise under which the believer has access to this proposition is pragmatically imparted, but not semantically encoded. It belongs to the information conversationally implicated. When a speaker utters (1), she is conveying the information that there is a relation (maybe that of being disposed to inward assent) between Lois Lane, the singular proposition ‘<Superman, being able to fly>’, and some guise. As such, this utterance would not follow the maxim of faithfulness, since the proposition expressed by the utterance described would be identical to the proposition expressed by the utterance of (2). The speaker would not be trying to represent the information believed by Lois Lane under the appropriate guise. To preserve the alleged observance of the Cooperative Principle, a proposition containing the specific guise under which Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly is inferred.

The Implicature Theory is presented as a way to keep Semantic Innocence, Direct Reference, and Int together in the same framework. But its treatment of Int is not as satisfactory as we should expect. Conversational implicatures are brought into the picture to explain how it is that people engaged in successful communicative exchanges involving belief reports can be unaware of what they are really doing. This is what we find deeply unsatisfactory. A theory that manages to give an account of what is happening in a conversation without appealing to the dumbness of those engaged in it is clearly preferable to the Implicature Theory. How can the speaker and audience of a certain utterance be wrong about what they are doing? Is this even conceivable? There is no need of a poll to answer this question; if a dialogue like the following one is possible, then a
theory that explains it without saying that the entire exchange rests on a mistake is better than one that does not.

‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly’.

‘No, that’s not true, she believes that Superman can fly, not Clark Kent. She doesn’t know that Clark likes to wear tight red clothes when nobody is watching’.

‘You’re right’.

There is no reason to suppose than an inner semantic force makes these people be wrong about what they are doing while a normal dialogue with no doxastic operators is enough to be certain that the truth-values of the propositions expressed differ. If I tell you ‘this car is red’ and you respond ‘No, it’s not red, it’s yellow’, our utterances essentially expressed different propositions. I see no reason why the situation might be different just because some functions of propositions are part of our utterances. If the reasons we consider as valid to state that two propositions are identical change in intentional contexts, some kind of innocence is lost. A theory able to maintain that (1) and (2) express different propositions will always be a first option for those interested in a fair treatment of Int.

3 The Hidden-Indexical Theory

The standard version

In a less revisionist spirit concerning speakers’s intuitions, the Hidden-Indexical Theory has been widely defended since it was formulated by Stephen Schiffer. Apparently this theory had everything the Implicature Theory lacked, it was designed to preserve Semantic Innocence, Compositionality, Direct Reference and Int. Under the Hidden-Indexical Theory, normal utterances of (1) and (2) simply express different propositions. The pragmatic processes recognized by the Implicature Theory as the source of the different intuitions of the speakers about the truth-conditions of (1) and (2) receive a different treatment now, and they are allowed to take part in the determination of the proposition expressed.

Under the Hidden-Indexical Theory, ‘believe’ expresses a triadic first-order relation between a believer, a proposition, and a mode of
presentation. Examples like (1) and (2) should be analyzed the following way (cfr. Schiffer 1992, 503):

\[(1') \exists m_1 (f (m_1) \& \text{BELIEVES (Lois Lane, <Superman, CAN FLY>, } m_1))\]
\[(2') \exists m_2 (g (m_2) \& \text{BELIEVES (Lois Lane, <Clark Kent, CAN FLY>, } m_2))\]

There is a mode of presentation \(m_1\), which belongs to a certain type (specified by the function \(f\)), and that is in the triadic relation BELIEVE with the individual Lois Lane and the Russellian proposition \(<\text{Superman, being able to fly}>\), made up of the individual Superman/Clark Kent and the property CAN FLY. And for (2'), there is a mode of presentation \(m_2\), which belongs to a certain type (specified by the function \(g\)), and that is in the triadic relation BELIEVE with the individual Lois Lane and the Russellian proposition \(<\text{Superman, CAN FLY}>\), made up of the individual Superman/Clark Kent and the property CAN FLY. Through the utterances of (1) and (2), we say that Lois Lane believes that Superman/Clark Kent can fly under this and that other mode of presentation. What we say in the first case is true, while what is said in the second case is false. That \(m_1\) and \(m_2\) are modes of presentation of different types is all the explanation we need to give an adequate account of our semantic intuitions.

Sometimes a specific mode of presentation type is not referred to by the speaker. Schiffer proposes the following example (Schiffer 1995, 111):

\[(3) \text{Jean Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool.}\]

(3) is supposed to be said by Stella, ‘a non-philosopher who likes to drop names’, in the course of a conversation about the French Riviera. If the first version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory were true, says Schiffer, Stella would have to be credited with referring to the particular mode of presentation type under which Jean Luc Godard believes that Brigitte Bardot is selling her villa in St. Tropez and moving to Liverpool. Yet, according to Schiffer, Stella is not referring in this context to a particular mode of presentation under which
Goddard has to grasp each one of the constituents of the proposition he is said to believe. This must, somehow, be left indeterminate. Speakers can make indeterminate statements, and the Hidden-Indexical Theory must be prepared to accommodate this evidence. All there is to do is restate the theory ‘in a way that allows for the speaker’s hidden-indexical reference to be indeterminate’ (Schiffer 1995, 113).

Whatever the device we choose to solve this particular problem, that would not affect the general characteristics of this approach. Singular terms contribute to the propositions represented in (1’) and (2’) with their references only, and consequently, the Hidden-Indexical Theory may be said to respect Direct Reference. Besides, the occurrences of the embedded sentences “Superman can fly” and “Clark Kent can fly” find their way into the truth conditions of the global proposition as Russellian propositions, their constituents working exactly in the same way they would have worked in an unembedded occurrence of the sentences. Therefore, the Hidden-Indexical Theory is also semantically innocent.

In the sentences uttered, there is no expression corresponding to the modes of presentation. The reference to the type of mode of presentation is contextually determined, and different utterances of the same belief sentences may carry distinct types of modes of presentation, whence the name ‘hidden-indexical’ for this theory (Schiffer 1992, 503; Schiffer 1995, 509).

John Perry was not completely unhappy with the benefits of the Implicature Theory, and insisted that a mechanism like conversational implicatures was the most appropriate way to deal with cases of opacity concerning proper names (Barwise & Perry 1985, 406). Later, though, he became convinced that the “bite the bullet approach”, as he calls his former position due to its severe correctional duties over speakers’s intuitions, was not the best way to handle these cases. The fact that the Hidden-Indexical Theory offered a perfect chance to apply the theoretical concept of unarticulated constituent helped as well to make up his mind (Perry 1993, 278) in favor of this new position. Unarticulated constituents came into the picture to explain the ‘hidden’ nature of the indexical through which speakers refer to mode of presentation types in belief reports.

Perry (Perry 1993, 206) introduced the notion of unarticulated constituent to give an account of a particular feature of natural language analysis. Often, when assessing the truth-conditions of an utterance, certain elements are taken into consideration for which no explicit reference has been made through the sentence uttered. ‘Each
constituent of the content which is not itself in the content of some expression in the sentence is an unarticulated constituent’ (Crimmins 1989, 699). If we compare the propositions expressed by normal utterances of (4) and (5), we realize that the relation that can be established between the propositional constituents and the sentence elements is not 1 to 1 in the case of (5).

(4) Pedro is looking for María.
(5) It’s raining.

In a normal utterance of (4), the constituents of the proposition expressed are the individuals Pedro and María, the relational property expressed by the predicate ‘being looking for’, and a time index \( t \) completed with the aid of the tense of the verb. In relation to (5), as uttered in the classic example by Perry’s son checking the weather through the window to see whether they can go and play tennis, three distinct propositional constituents can be identified. This utterance of (5) would only be true if it was raining at that moment in Palo Alto, the place where (5) was said. The argument place for the temporal index is again provided by the tense of the verb, but there is apparently no hint in the sentence itself as where to find the information necessary to complete the second argument place. There is no expression in the sentence referring to the place index, it is an unarticulated constituent of the proposition expressed.

Belief reports express a triadic relation (a four-place relation if we consider the temporal index) through a dyadic predicate (Crimmins 1989, 699). The constituents of the propositions expressed through the utterance of belief sentences are an individual, a proposition, and a sequence of notions corresponding to each one of the elements of the embedded proposition. This sequence of notions determines the mode of presentation type included in the analysis proposed in (1’’) and (2’’). This theory is scrupulously respectful of the intuitions of the speakers about the different truth-conditions of utterances like those of (1) and (2), unlike the Implicature Theory, but it is not completely free from trouble though.

Problems for the Hidden-Indexical Theory
A funny detail about the Hidden-Indexical Theory is that his original proponent, Stephen Schiffer, has never defended the theory. His ar-
gument was a negative one: if a compositional semantic theory could be concocted for natural language, then the Hidden-Indexical Theory would be the only way to deal with belief reports; but the Hidden-Indexical Theory has to be dismissed, and therefore, there is no compositional semantics for natural language. So, in order to find the classical objections against Schiffer’s theory, we just have to take Schiffer’s own writings.

According to Schiffer, the Hidden-Indexical Theory has to face three major difficulties:

The meaning-intention problem: ‘one may reasonably doubt that belief ascribers mean what the Hidden-Indexical Theory requires them to mean when they ascribe beliefs’ (Schiffer 1992, 512).

The logical form problem: it is not completely obvious that information that makes the content of normal utterances of (1) and (2) differ may be included as an argument of a three-place relation of the first order (cfr. Schiffer 1992, 518; Schiffer 1996).

The mode of presentation problem: it is not clear which theoretical entity could perform the role assigned by the Hidden-Indexical Theory to modes of presentation (Schiffer 1986, 101; Schiffer 1990; Schiffer 1992, 510).

In this section, we will focus our attention on the first two objections. The meaning-intention problem. This problem can be illustrated by considering (6):

(6) Flora says Harold believes that TWA is offering a $318 NY-Paris return.

With the utterance of (6) we would be reporting Flora’s saying that there is a mode presentation of a certain type such that Harold believes that TWA is offering a $318 NY-Paris return under this mode of presentation. It is certainly weird to suppose that such an utterance necessarily involves Flora making conscious reference to the mode of presentation or notions by which Harold grasps the embedded proposition. Flora and her audience, Schiffer says, could be perfectly unaware of what they are saying. The Hidden-Indexical Theory falls under a tradition that considers the meaning of an utterance as a
function of the intentions of the speaker. We may take the intuitions of speaker and audience as an appropriate way to determine what is said by a particular utterance, but is it really necessary to undertake the computation of so many modes of presentation in order to understand the meaning of (6)? Is it reasonable to suppose such an effort in real life communication?

We do not think that a theory about the truth conditions of belief reports should pursue the exact representation of whatever is in the head of the speakers when they report beliefs. The cognitive difficulties to entertain such a complicated structure are irrelevant. The idea that meanings of utterances are functions of the intentions of the speaker is perfectly compatible with a non-representational view of the work that we do when a certain logical form is postulated for a piece of discourse. If we abandon the hypothesis that every token in the representation of the content of an utterance must correspond to a mental entity consciously accessible to the speaker, the meaning-intention objection is no longer a problem. In the framework that we favor, a representation of the content of an utterance is just a way to specify its inferential properties. Opacity is not a problem about the mental configuration? of speakers when they talk, but a concern related to the special inferential behavior of certain utterances.

The logical-form problem. According to the second problem posed by Schiffer for the Hidden-Indexical Theroy, the logical form of belief reports under this framework is not constituted quite neatly. The third place of the believe-relation looks to Schiffer more like an adverbial qualifier than a proper argument. ‘In the most exciting way’ functions like an adverb in ‘He kissed her in the most exciting way’, while ‘her husband’ is an argument of the relation expressed by the utterance of ‘give’ in ‘Mary gave the house to her husband’. The argument-nature of ‘her husband’ is revealed in the fact that we can answer ‘her husband’ to the question ‘to whom did you wonder whether Mary gave the house?’ A similar answer, on the other hand, cannot be provided to the question ‘In what way/under what mode of presentation did you wonder whether Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly?’

Ludlow has replied to this criticism to the Hidden-Indexical Theory by analyzing the iterated behavior of arguments and adverbs, adjuncts. Adverbs can be iterated, while it is only possible to make sense of the coincidence of several arguments with the use of conjunctions. He convincingly argues against the iteration of modes of presentation (Ludlow 1995, Ludlow 1996).
(7) John buttered the toast, the brioche, the roll.

This kind of cases can only be interpreted by using constructions with conjunctions, as in (8):

(8) John buttered the toast and John buttered the brioche and John buttered the roll.

Ludlow maintains that belief ascriptions with two different modes of presentation behave in this way, being the modes of presentation *arguments* of the verb, rather than *adjuncts*. A belief report with two modes of presentation like (9) should then be interpreted using conjunctions, along the lines of (10).

(9) John believes that Fido barked in a way m₁ in a way m₂
(10) John believes that Fido barked in a way m₁ and John believes that Fido barked in a way m₂.

‘Clearly’, Ludlow says, ‘if one believes-that-Fido-barked-under-mode-of-presentation-m₁, one does not do so under some additional meta-level mode of presentation’. Every time we find a belief report with two modes of presentations, we should interpret it as a complex ascription, one that is composed of two different belief reports each one containing a mode of presentation. This works pretty well with cases like the one in (9).

A related problem. It is certainly more difficult to know how this heuristic model should be applied in different cases, where *modes of presentation* seem to be iterated, like (11).

(11) Flora believes that Harold believes that TWA is offering a $318 NY-Paris return.

The proposition expressed through a normal utterance of (11) should be represented as follows:
There is a mode of presentation $m_1$ under which Flora believes that there is a mode of presentation $m_2$ such that Harold believes $\langle \text{TWA, OFFERING A $318 NY-PARIS RETURN} \rangle$ under it. The general rule of reading distinct belief episodes for each mode of presentation and finally stringing them all together using a conjunction cannot work in examples like (11). We have two different beliefs here, Flora’s belief and Harold’s belief. But in order to make sense of Flora’s belief we need to compute the different constituents of the propositions she believes under a certain mode of presentation. Harold’s belief is embedded in Flora’s.

It seems reasonable to assume that the computation of different modes of presentation is going to become an increasing problem as we prefix $[x \text{ believes that}]$ operators to our clauses. This general tendency becomes evident when we look at cases like (12):

(12) Lois Lane believes that Lana Lang believes that Laura Kent believes that Superman can fly.

Are we supposed to compute each and every mode of presentation in this utterance to have an idea of the truth conditions? Is this even possible? Does a proposition like (12’) make any sense?:

(12’) $\exists m_1 (f (m_1) \& \text{BELIEVES (Lois Lane, } \exists m_2 (g (m_2) \& \text{BELIEVES (Lana Lang, } \exists m_3 (h (m_3) \& \text{BELIEVES (Laura Kent, } <\text{Superman, CAN FLY}>, m_3), m_2)), m_1))$

No one can deny that iteration of belief attribution is a common practice in natural language, a practice for which a stable theory of belief reports must offer a coherent account. The hidden-indexical theory fails in this task. As Ludlow shows, the only way to make sense of the addition of modes of presentation is the composition of a conjunction made up of sentences. This is the main reason Ludlow gives in favor of the thesis that the hidden-indexical in opaque belief reports constructions is an argument instead of an adjunct, and it can
be a definitive one for his view, and I think this claim is justified. But this leaves us with no answer as to how to treat real-life iteration of modes of presentation.

If both transparent and opaque belief reports are condemned to include modes of presentation in their logical form, I do not see an easy solution for this problem. I reckon it does not depend on the difficulties a speaker may encounter to make reference to such a complex composition of theoretical entities. The problem rather lies in the inability of the theory to make sense of the logical forms it produces. At this point, either you develop an algorithm to compute hierarchized modes of presentation and apply it everywhere, or admit that transparent belief reports do not carry modes of presentation under their sleeves and assume that most utterances of iterated belief operators involve transparent reports. In the framework developed by Recanati in 2000 for the analysis of belief reports, modes of presentation belong just to the propositions expressed by opaque belief reports.

4 Recanati’s theory of belief reports

Quine thought that substitutivity was a necessary and sufficient condition of pure referentiality. Pure referentiality was a necessary and sufficient condition for transparency. According to Recanati, however, referentiality implies neither substitutivity nor transparency. Nor even does transparency imply substitutivity.

One of the sources of Quine’s error lies in his treatment of quotation as a logical block. The typical example of a noun occurring in a non-purely referential position is:

(13) ‘Rose’ has four letters.

In cases like this it is clear that we are not interested in the reference of the proper noun, but in its form, the word. Still, there are cases in which we are interested both in the form of word and in its reference. Recanati borrows a Quinean example to make his point:

(14) Giorgione was so called because of his size.
(15) Barbarelli was so called because of his size.

The truth of (14) does not imply the truth of (15), even though we have just substituted a proper name for another proper name with the same reference. This could make us believe that the ‘Giorgione’ occurrence in (14) is not purely referential. Still, are not (13) and (14) different? In (13) it is clear that ‘Rose’ is contained in the sentence like ‘cat’ is contained in ‘cattle’. But this is not the case for ‘Giorgione’ in (14). ‘Giorgione’ in (14) is used and mentioned at the same time.

The singular term ‘Giorgione’ makes its normal contribution to the proposition expressed by (14), that is, the individual it refers to (also called ‘Barbarelli’). It is another component of the expression, namely the adverb ‘so’, which includes in its contribution to the proposition a reference to the word ‘.’. We could rewrite (14) splitting in two the double function of the proper noun:

(14*) Barbarelli was so called, ‘Giorgione’, because of his size.

These cases are the key to the differences between referentiality, substitutivity and transparency.

A) Referentiality does not imply substitutivity. Substitutivity is not the criterion for referentiality. To know whether a singular term is directly referential, whether it is a genuine singular term, we should look at its semantic value, its contribution to the truth conditions expressed by the utterance. Sometimes substitutivity is not possible, even though we clearly have a genuine singular term.

(16) John, who always confuses me with my father, believes that I am an engineer.

(17) John, who always confuses me with my father, believes that Neftalí Villanueva Fernández is an engineer.

According to Recanati, ‘I’’s contribution to the proposition is exclusively its reference. Thus, “I” behaves in (16) as a genuine singular term. In spite of this situation, the replacement of “I” by another singular term with the same reference could alter the truth conditions of the utterance. We just have to imagine that John is a blind man who
knows my name and my father’s name perfectly well. Besides, he keeps confusing the sound we make as we walk and always asks me questions about engineering.

B) Referentiality does not imply transparency. Recanati distinguishes two senses in which someone can talk about an expression’s contribution to a proposition. The narrow semantic contribution of an expression is its content, the systematic contribution the expression makes to the propositions expressed by the utterances of the sentences that contain this expression. On the other hand, to the broad semantic contribution of an expression belongs all the information depending on that expression which alters the truth conditions of the proposition.

In (14), the narrow semantic contribution of the singular term Giorgione is just its reference, while its broad semantic contribution includes its form, ‘Giorgione’. In fact, ‘Giorgione’ is part of the narrow semantic contribution of the adverb ‘so’.

Having in mind this distinction, Recanati defines referentiality and transparency:

Referentiality: a singular term \( t \) has a purely referential occurrence if and only if the narrow semantic contribution of the singular term \( t \) is nothing but its reference.

Transparency: An expression transparently contains a singular term \( t \) if and only if the broad semantic contribution of the singular term \( t \) is nothing but its reference. Otherwise, itopaquely contains the singular term.

Thus, in (14) the singular term Giorgione is directly referential, occurs in a purely referential position, while the global expressionopaquely contains the singular term.

C) Transparency does not imply substitutivity. Belief operators can behave in a reflexive way or in a non-reflexive way. A belief operator behaves non-reflexively if the global meta-representation transparently contains all the expressions under the scope of the belief operator. Otherwise, it behaves reflexively. The reflexive character of the operator results from a pragmatic process of free enrichment. Free enrichment being a highly context-sensitive process, it can happen that a change in the context, introduced by the replacement of a genuine singular term for another genuine singular term with the same reference, triggers the pragmatic process of free en-
richment, even though the original belief operator behaved non-reflexively with the first singular term.

**Deference and mental content**

A woman goes to the doctor and is diagnosed to be suffering from arthritis. The lady comes back home while thinking about the diagnosis. In the lift of her building, she meets a neighbor and engages in this conversation:

**NEIGHBOR:** How are you? What did the doctor say about your pain in the knee?

**LADY:** I’m fine, thanks. I happen to have arthritis in my knee.

**NEIGHBOR:** I see.

**LADY:** By the way, do you remember that pain your daughter said she had in her thigh? Arthritis, for sure.

In fact, arthritis can only affect joints, like the knee. Pains in muscles, like the thigh, cannot be caused by this illness. We can say then that this lady has a deficient concept of arthritis, or even that she completely lacks the concept ARTHRITIS, as some theories seem to defend. As we have seen, she is not able to use this concept properly, and that is plainly manifest in the conversation. What can we say about the walk back home? What are the thoughts she’s thinking, which include the symbol ‘arthritis’, about? What is the content of this kind of thoughts? What can be said to be in her “belief box”?

Recanati faces the problem of deference trying to answer the following question: Can we believe what we do not understand? In other words, can the arthritically affected concept-lacking lady believe that she has arthritis? He supports the idea that the content of the lady’s thought ‘I have arthritis’, is the same one as the doctor’s ‘You have arthritis’ when ‘you’ refers to the lady. The difference, Recanati says, has to be found not at the level of content, but at that of character.

Recanati’s main interlocutor on this topic is D. Sperber. Sperber distinguishes between two modes of evaluating a sentence. There is a *descriptive* mode, in which we first determine the proposition the sentence expresses when uttered or thought, and then we evaluate the resulting proposition as true or false. But there is another mode, the
symbolic one, in which evaluation precedes interpretation. This distinction corresponds to two modes of being ‘stored in the belief box’. A representation can be directly inside the belief box as it is, or it can be embedded within a meta-representation, which itself figures in the belief box. Embedded representations cannot logically interact with the other representations in the belief box. For example, my belief that ‘My-five-year-old cousin believes that cows lay eggs’ does not imply I have in my belief box ‘Cows lay eggs’, contradicting other beliefs of mine such as ‘Cows are mammals’.

Nevertheless, an embedded representation can be emancipated if it is contained within a special kind of meta-representation, a validating meta-representation. Validating frames such as ‘It is true that...’, allow the emancipation of the embedded representation. Someone who believes that it is true that cows lay eggs can be said to believe that cows lay eggs as well. If she has in her belief box the representation ‘It is true that cows lay eggs’, she will have ‘Cows lay eggs’ too.

Emancipation, however, is not always possible. Sometimes the process is blocked because some of the symbols that take part in the embedded representation are semantically ill-formed. If we apply Sperber’s view, this is what happens in cases like:

(18) The doctor says I have arthritis in the knee. [As thought by the lady we have talked about before].

(19) The teacher says Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches. [Thought by a pupil who doesn’t know what a synecdoche is].

(20) Lacan said that the unconscious is structured like a language. [Thought by a Lacanian].

The arthritic lady, the student and the Lacanian have a validating belief for the object representation, but their object representations cannot be emancipated because they contain some uninterpreted symbols. In (18) the symbol ‘arthritis’, as thought by the lady, is semantically defective. In (19), the pupil does not know what special figure a ‘synecdoche’ is. Finally, in (20), even Lacanians are unable to report what the complete object representation means. They just trust the primary source of these locutions. So, in their belief boxes they cannot have the emancipated representations. Their thoughts are not about arthritis, synecdoches and the unconscious structured like a language, but about some ailment called ‘arthritis’, about some fig-
ure of speech called ‘synecdoche’ and about whatever Lacan meant when he said, ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’. Thus, as Sperber says, the lady has the quasi-belief that she has arthritis; the pupil has the quasi-belief that Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches and the Lacanian has the quasi-belief that the unconscious is structured like a language. From an evolutionary point of view, it would be dangerous to have in our belief box a representation whose meaning we don’t know.

Recanati maintains that mental representations (concepts) should be analyzed in terms of character and content. (18), (19), and (20) can be semantically indeterminate at the level of content or at the level of character, but it is necessary for a mental representation to have a character accessible to the subject in order to be entertained by that subject. Against Sperber, Recanati thinks that there is no difference at the level of content between plain belief and quasi-belief. The arthritic lady does not completely lack the concept ARTHRITIS. She lacks the concept of arthritis, but she possesses a concept of arthritis, namely, a deferential concept.

Sperber only recognizes two possible candidates for going inside the belief box: the validating meta-representation and the object representation.

(18) The doctor says I have arthritis in the knee.
(21) I have arthritis in the knee.

Recanati, by contrast, admits three possible candidates:

(18) The doctor says I have arthritis in the knee.
(21) I have arthritis in the knee.
(22) I have ‘arthritis’ in the knee.

Like Sperber, Recanati thinks that (21) cannot go inside the belief box of the lady because she does not own the concept ARTHRITIS (neither the basic concept of arthritis nor the scientific one). For (22), however, his opinion is different. Recanati maintains that the arthritic lady has in her belief box representations (18) and (22), i.e. the validating meta-belief and the deferential belief.
To see what the special characteristics of this ‘deferential’ belief are we must pay attention to a special component: the *deferential operator*. In writing down thoughts like (5) we use quotes to mark the mental presence of a *deferential operator*.

The deferential operator $R_x(\cdot)$ applies to a symbol $\sigma$ and yields a complex expression $R_x(\sigma)$ whose character is distinct from that of $\sigma$ (if $\sigma$ has one). The character of $R_x(\sigma)$ takes us from a context in which the speaker tacitly refers to a certain cognitive agent $x$ (which can be an individual or a community of users) to a certain content, namely the content which $\sigma$ has for $x$, given the character which $x$ attaches to $\sigma$ (Recanati 1997, 91-92).

Before moving to the analysis of the cases of imperfect mastery we have dealt with, let’s test the deferential operator in a case of conscious deference. Imagine we have a friend named Antonio who likes traveling to exotic places, and always confuses ‘Bahrain’ with ‘Qatar’. Our friend is actually in Qatar, but in our thinking about his coming back, we can entertain the following representation:

(23) Antonio has not come back from ‘Bahrain’ yet.

Of course, when we entertain the symbol ‘Bahrain’, we try to do so as he does it, that is, instead of the symbol ‘Qatar’. We defer to his use of the symbol. Using the deferential operator, we can rewrite (23) as (23’).

(23’) Antonio has not come back from $R_{Antonio}(\text{Bahrain})$ yet.

The character of the symbol ‘$R_{Antonio}(\text{Bahrain})$’ is a function from the context in which the thinker refers to a certain cognitive agent, Antonio, to the content the symbol “Bahrain” has for this cognitive agent. The content of $R_{Antonio}(\text{Bahrain})$ is the content ‘Bahrain’ has for Antonio, namely the same content ‘Qatar’ has for everybody.

What, then, is the difference between entertaining a representation containing a deferential concept ($R_{Antonio}(\text{Bahrain})$) and entertaining a representation that has as constituent a concept whose con-
tent is the same as that of the deferential concept (QATAR) instead? What is the difference between (23’) and (24)?

(24) Antonio has not come back from Qatar yet.

According to Recanati’s analysis, (23’) and (24) have different characters – (23’) has what we could call a ‘translinguistic character’ – but one and the same content.

It is now time for applying this framework to imperfect mastery. In cases of imperfect mastery the bearer of the thought does not possess the usual concept that appears in her belief. Cases of imperfect mastery have been classified by many as cases of deference. The thinker lets, they argue, the semantically uninterpreted symbols of his thought rest on other people’s epistemic capacities. As they are cases of deference, we are allowed to rewrite them using Recanati’s deferential operator.

(22) I have ‘arthritis’ in the knee.
(25) Cicero’s prose is full of ‘synecdoches’.
(26) ‘The unconscious is structured like a language’.

(22’) I have R_{doctor} (arthritis) in the knee.
(25’) Cicero’s prose is full of R_{teacher} (synecdoches).
(26’) R_{Lacan} (The unconscious is structured like a language)

The deferential operator alters the character of the expressions in its scope, and changes their contents for the contents the character of the person deferred to assigns to these expressions. In the thought (22’) the expression ‘R_{doctor} (arthritis)’ has as its character a function from the context in which the lady tacitly refers to the doctor to the content that ‘arthritis’ has for the person she defers to. In (25’) the character of ‘R_{teacher} (synecdoches)’ is a function from the context in which the pupil tacitly refers to the teacher to the content the teacher’s character for “synecdoche” assigns to that expression. Finally, in (26’) the character of ‘R_{Lacan} (The unconscious is structured like a language)’ is a function from the context in which the speaker
tacitly refers to Lacan to the content Lacan’s character of the expression under the scope of the deferential operator would have assigned to it. The contents of the expressions in the scope of the deferential operator are the same contents that the people we defer to assign to them. The contribution to the global content of the thought of the deferential concepts is the contribution that corresponding non-deferential concepts would have made. We find a difference only at the level of character.

To answer the question about believing what we do not understand, we should introduce Recanati’s definition of what it is to believe something:

To believe that $p$ is to accept a representation $r$ which means that $p$ (Recanati 2000a, 267).

Consequently, the lady can be said to believe that she has arthritis in her knee, provided that she accepts a representation, as captured by (22) and (22'), which means that she has arthritis in her knee, which has that content. When she entertains that thought, she is thinking about her knee and about arthritis, and not just about some ailment called ‘arthritis’. The student can be said to believe that Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches, even if he has a very limited idea of what a synecdoche is.

Both Sperber and Recanati think that not even Lacan’s character for that expression is enough to determine a definite content for it. So, a Lacanian’s belief has the same content that those words had for Lacan, that is none.

We can summarize Recanati’s argument:

(i) Cases of imperfect mastery should be analyzed as cases of deference.

(ii) Using the deferential operator is the best way to give an account of both the character and content of the deferential expressions.

(iii) To believe that $p$ is to accept a representation $r$ which means that $p$.

(iv) Conclusion: we can believe what we do not understand.
In addition, Recanati has a response to Sperber’s argument about the dangerous step of introducing in our belief box a representation whose meaning we do not know. Recanati accepts that the thinker does not know what her deferential beliefs mean, but he sees no problem with that.

There is a clear sense in which cognitive agents do not, in general, “know” the propositional contents of the representations they accept: that is the lesson of externalism. There is nothing exceptional about deferential representations, in that respect (Recanati 1997, 94).

Cognitive agents, in general, do not “know” the contents of the representations they accept, and every time this happens, we have a new example of imperfect mastery. However, it seems that we will not detect a conscious deference process in all these examples of imperfect mastery. A year after her visit to the doctor, the lady hears the neighbor’s daughter screaming from her pain in the thigh and thinks:

(27) She has arthritis in her thigh.

The lady has forgotten the doctor’s diagnosis a year ago, but she still can think that her neighbor’s daughter has arthritis in her thigh.

This is a usual example of imperfect mastery. The lady has no conscious validating belief about the doctor. How can (27) be analyzed? Recanati’s answer is clear enough: just in the same way we analyzed the occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in (22), when she has a conscious validating meta-belief. The difference between (22) and (27) is syntactic, not semantic. In (27) the operator acts as if it were articulated, it performs the same task it does in (22’), despite its being syntactically unarticulated. Thus, we can find a deferential operator in every case of imperfect mastery.

The difference between conscious and unconscious deferential beliefs will be the main topic of the last section of this paper.

**Deference and opacity**

At the end of his most extensive work on this subject (Recanati 2000a, 315), Recanati maintains that deference is one of the two
pragmatic processes that jointly or singly are responsible for opacity. In what follows, we will push this analysis a bit further, in order to display the internal mechanism of opacity. Although Recanati does not disclose the details, our treatment perfectly dovetails with his main premises. We will put together different aspects of Recanati’s theory of meaning to form a complete picture of the semantics of belief reports. A similar reconstruction has been made by Jaszczolt (Jaszczolt forth.)

Recanati, as we saw in the previous chapter, considers that the first element we should distinguish in a belief report is a circumstance-shifting operator of the form [x believes that] that takes a proposition as argument. This operator tells us that we have to evaluate the proposition that falls under its scope not in the actual world, but in a particular circumstance, something like the “conceptual world” of x.

(28’) [My five-year-old cousin believes that] cows lay eggs.

The truth-value of (28) does not depend on the real existence of oviparous cows, but on the contents of the representations, we could say, contained in the belief box of my five-year-old cousin.

Recanati says that there are two pragmatics processes that are singly or jointly responsible for opacity (Recanati 2000a, 315): free enrichment and deference. Free enrichment as applied to belief reports results in a theory equivalent to the Hidden-Indexical Theory. Unarticulated constituents allow us to enrich the truth conditions of the global utterance while preserving the contents of the expressions that fall under the scope of the circumstance-shifting meta-representational operator. Unarticulated constituents result from a pragmatic process of free enrichment. Free enrichment is a highly context-sensitive process, and substituting an expression for another one with the same content changes the context of interpretation. This change of context can trigger the primary pragmatic process of free enrichment, thus affecting the truth conditions of the global utterance. Free enrichment, through unarticulated constituents, introduces the classical modes of presentation, but they affect just to the truth conditions of the global utterance, and so allow preserving direct reference and semantic innocence.

The second pragmatic process responsible for opacity is deference. When we defer to other people’s use of some expression, we
usually change the content of the expression and this, according to Recanati, causes opacity.

Now we are going to formally develop these “two sources of opacity”. Both processes will be explained using Recanati’s theory of unarticulated constituents (Recanati 2002). In his defense of Truth-Conditional Pragmatics against minimalism, Recanati needs to prove the presence of some pragmatic constituents of the proposition that are not linguistically mandated. According to Recanati, genuine unarticulated constituents are always optional. Thus, the criterion for identifying one in a certain utterance will be to imagine a context in which the same words are used normally, and a truth-evaluable statement is made, but this constituent is not provided. If I cannot imagine such a context, the constituent will have to be said to be articulated at some level of linguistic analysis. Note that this characterization of unarticulated constituents is different from Perry’s.

Take Perry’s example:

(5) It is raining.

Some people would say that it is not possible to semantically evaluate an utterance like that of (5) without a location. Recanati, however, thinks that the location provided in most of the utterances of (5) is a genuine unarticulated constituent. Applying his criterion, Recanati offers a context in which (5) is truth-evaluable without providing a location. We just reproduce his explanation, despite its oddness:

I can imagine a situation in which rain has become extremely rare and important, and rain detectors have been disposed all over the territory (whatever the territory — possibly the whole Earth). In the imagined scenario, each detector triggers an alarm bell in the Monitoring Room when it detects rain. There is a single bell; the location of the triggering detector is indicated by a light on a board in the Monitoring Room. After weeks of total drought, the bell eventually rings in the Monitoring Room. Hearing it, the weatherman on duty in the adjacent room shouts: ‘It’s raining!’ His utterance is true, iff it is raining (at the time of utterance) in some place or other (Recanati 2002, 317).
We just need an example of the application of the criterion of optionality, jointly with a proper specification of how we can have an extra argument place for a function, in this case an argument place for location. Recanati says that in cases like this free enrichment provides:

1) A variadic function that makes a predicate out of a predicate. They (variadic functions) can provide an extra argument place for the input predicate or suppress it. In (5) the variadic function adds a new place of argument to a zero-relation, a place for a location.

2) The appropriate information to fulfill this new argument place.

Hence, the analysis of (5) when uttered to mean that it is raining in Paris will be:

(5’) Circ_{location: Paris} (It is raining (Paris))

Where ‘Circ_{location: Paris}’ is the representation of a variadic function that receives as input the predicate ‘raining’ and provides as output a new predicate with a new place for an argument, something like ‘raining in ____’. Moreover, ‘Circ_{location: Paris}’ includes the specifications to fill the new argument place with the appropriate information, (Paris).

The context of interpretation triggers the inclusion in the proposition of an unarticulated component like this. Unarticulated constituents are not articulated at any level of linguistic analysis. Their appearance is triggered by the context and depends on what those who fully understand the utterance believe is being said. In that sense, speakers’s intentions have the last word for the presence of unarticulated constituents. In successful communication, the speaker conveys some information using semantic and contextual resources. Semantically encoded information is modulated by pragmatic processes, which are triggered by the context. Unarticulated constituents result from a pragmatic process of free enrichment. Hence, their inclusion in the truth conditions of the utterance depends on what the speaker seeks to communicate, on the speaker’s communicative intentions.

Let’s go back to opacity. In (1), we said, we cannot substitute ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ without altering the truth conditions of

\[9\] This notation is slightly different from Recanati’s.
the utterance, provided that we know that Lois Lane does not know that her mate at the office is the famous hero. Dealing with belief reports, the optionality criterion is always satisfied, since we can always find a context in which the broad contribution to the proposition of every term in the belief report is just its content. For (1), we only need to consider what would happen if Lois Lane was aware of the secret identity of Superman. In this new context, opacity will not appear, and we would give this utterance a transparent reading.

The variadic function in belief reports takes as input the meta-representational operator \([x \text{ believes that}]\), which has only one argument place – for a proposition – and yields a new operator \([x \text{ so-believes that}]\) with two argument places, one for a proposition, and the other one for a mode of presentation. Hence, the analysis of (1) in its opaque reading will be:

\[(1^*) \text{Circ}_{\text{mode}} ([\text{Lois Lane believes that}] ((\text{Superman, can fly}), \text{(in that way)})).\]

When someone utters (1) intending some of the elements of the sentence to be non interchangeable for others with the same content, we must analyze his utterance using an unarticulated constituent like that in \((1^*)\), which introduces some mode of presentation in the truth conditions of the utterance, in the proposition expressed by the utterance of that sentence. The broad semantic contribution to the proposition of the singular term ‘Superman’ would include information about the very form of the word, which functions as the demonstratum of the hidden indexical, introduced via free enrichment. Still, its narrow semantic contribution would be the individual the singular term refers to. Therefore, this proper noun would occur in a purely referential position.

The next step will be to apply the theory of unarticulated constituents to deferential utterances. Provided that Recanati believes, with Kaplan, that there is no context-shifting operator in natural language, we have to think that the deferential operator, which performs a translinguistic change of context, is not syntactically articulated. The deferential operator changes the context of interpretation of the symbols in its scope, causing the interpreter to pick the content of these symbols in a context such as the “language of the person we defer to”.

As Recanati points out, deference is a matter of degree. Thus, in some cases the application of the optionality criterion is easier than in other ones. Take for example these two deferential utterances:

(29) Your friend Antonio has not come back from “Bahrain” yet.
(30) My grandmother always asked me what “philtosophy” was.

(29’) Your friend Antonio has not come back from R_{Antonio} (Bahrain) yet.
(30’) My grandmother always asked me what R_{grandmother} (philtosophy) was.

The degree of deference is contextually determined, but it is easy to see that the degree involved in (30) where the speaker uses the non-word ‘philtosophy’ in deference to the idiolect of her grandmother is greater than that involved in (29), where the speaker defers to Antonio, who always mixes up ‘Bahrain’ and ‘Qatar’. (29) can be semantically interpreted even if we subtract the deferential operator, leaving ‘Bahrain’ with its normal content. If we remove the deferential operator from (30), on the other hand, we will not be able to provide a semantic interpretation for the utterance, since ‘philtosophy’ is an uninterpreted symbol. In (30) the deferential operator allows us to interpret the utterance, giving the non-word at least a character. Hence, we conclude that these kinds of cases in which the deferential operator applies to a non-word are cases with the highest level of deference. Except for these special examples of the highest degree, the optionality criterion is satisfied by all occurrences of the deferential operator.

Again, the occurrence of a deferential operator depends on the intentions of the speaker. The speaker intends to defer to another person’s use of a certain word, and that move introduces certain factors into the context of interpretation (a special tone, for example), which trigger the occurrence of an unarticulated constituent in the interpretation of the utterance, a deferential operator, as a result of a pragmatic process of free enrichment. As said above, the content of the expressions within the scope of the deferential operator are the contents they would have for the people to whom the meaning is deferred.

Consider now a particular case of deference: deference under the scope of a circumstance-shifting meta-representational operator:
(31) Antonio believes that “Bahrain” is a great country.

Due to the change of context introduced by the deferential operator contained in this deferential utterance, one cannot substitute some expression of the embedded representation for another one with the same content in the current context *salva veritate*. We cannot substitute ‘Bahrain’ for another expression with the same content as ‘Bahrain’, because the content of ‘Bahrain’ in (31) deferentially interpreted is no longer Bahrain, but Qatar. Thus, deference produces opacity.

We can find, however, some cases in which the deferential operator triggers a trans-linguistic context shift with no impact at the level of content. Suppose someone is making fun of the fact that Lois Lane does not know Superman’s secret identity even though she spends most of her time with the individual Superman/Clark Kent, properly disguised. In that conversational context, the man utters:

(32) Lois Lane believes that “Superman” is a very strong guy.

That man is using a deferential expression ‘R_{Lois Lane} (Superman)’ which has the content the expression ‘Superman’ has in Lois Lane’s idiolect, namely, the individual Clark Kent/Superman. In cases like this, the context shift introduced by the deferential operator is vacuous at the level of content. The content of (32’) is the same as the content of (32’’). They just differ at the level of character.

(32’) [Lois Lane believes that] R_{Lois Lane} (Superman) is a very strong guy.

(32’’) [Lois Lane believes that] Superman is a very strong guy.

The problem is that, under this analysis, substitution *salva veritate* of expressions with the same content in the current circumstance is possible in these cases. It seems, however, that when he utters (32) the man is trying to express a proposition in which the expression ‘Superman’ plays some role. According to the intuitive truth conditions of (32), substitution doesn’t seem to be possible. To give an
account of these intuitions, we should consider the introduction of the unarticulated constituent introduced before, the variadic function which opens an argument place for the form of some expressions. Thus, the analysis of (32) would be:

$$(32^*) \text{Circ}_{\text{mode}} ([\text{Lois Lane believes that}] (R_{\text{Lois Lane}} (\text{Superman, being a very strong guy}), in that way)).$$

Recanati calls these opaque belief reports ‘cumulative’, together with those produced just by the action of free enrichment, and they entail the transparent reading of the utterance. Being cumulative, (32*) entails (32’). An example of non-cumulative belief report is (31).

5 Conclusion

We will summarize in this section some of the benefits of Recanati’s version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory, and raise a couple of objections. With respect to the standard version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory, Recanati’s approach nicely solves the problem of the iteration of modes of presentation. There is no urgent need for an algorithm to compute hierarchized modes of presentation, since transparent reports carry no modes of presentation. The processes of deference and free enrichment that may make a report opaque trigger the appearance of unarticulated constituents, variadic functions, modes of presentation or deferential operators. In transparent reports none of these processes occur. Usually, in iterated reports, only the modes of presentation ascribed by the individual in the subject position of the main clause are relevant to determine the truth conditions of the global proposition. Recanati’s theory allows him to take advantage of this fact so that no computation of distinct modes of presentation for the same constituent is required. In a broader perspective, we think that it is quite reasonable to suppose that in transparent reports no reference to any mode of presentation is made. The difference between transparent and opaque belief reports is a very important one, and the Hidden-Indexical Theory did not have the necessary ingredients to address it successfully. This was the root of Schiffer’s problem concerning Stella and the French Riviera. The optional
character of unarticulated constituents in Recanati’s framework can
be used to face this challenge quite effectively.

Under Schiffer’s view, embedded sentences express singular
propositions, which perfectly fits Direct Reference, but no mention
was made of the problem of quotational intrusions. Recanati keeps
Direct Reference by using the distinction between the broad semantic
content and the narrow semantic content of an expression. Singular
terms in belief reports are used in a purely referential way, they just
contribute their reference to the proposition expressed, but they may
function as the demonstratum of the hidden indexical. So, there is no
need for a complete sequence of notions to give an account of the
problems of intensional substitutivity in opaque reports. The mode of
presentation picks its demonstratum in the embedded sentence and
enriches the global proposition.

Besides, for Recanati, at least in his 2000 book, ‘believe’ does
not express a first-order relation, but a circumstance-shifting oper-
or. The benefits of this option were explained in chapter 3.

Of those principles included in the Paradox of Meaning, Compos-
itionality is the one that suffers the worst blows in the Hidden-
Indexical Theory. Under Schiffer’s version, the principle simply
does not hold. Modes of presentation are ‘contextually determined’,
and thus the meaning of the global utterance is no longer a function
of the meaning of its constituents. In those versions that use the no-
tion of unarticulated constituents, we can still say that the meaning of
the global utterance is a function of the meanings of its constituents,
articulated and non-articulated. This modification quite seriously
affects the strength of the principle. Under this new definition, it is
difficult to imagine a theory that may possibly fail to achieve compo-
stationality.10

The remaining troubles for the Hidden-Indexical Theory concern
the nature of their star notion ‘mode of presentation’, and the ac-
commodation of semantic innocence. As pointed out by Schiffer, it is
not clear which theoretical notion can be put to work to do what
modes of presentation are supposed to do for the Hidden-Indexical
Theory. Recanati’s approach does not treat this point either. We will
come back to it in chapter 7.

Pierre Jacob has argued that the Hidden-Indexical Theory was
not compatible with Semantic Innocence:

10 To see the form such a version of compositionality can adopt, see simple inheritance in
Recanati 2003.
The point of unarticulated constituency is that two utterances of ‘It is raining’ may contain two distinct unarticulated references to two different places. But if one accepts the notion of unarticulated constituency, then, it seems, Semantic Innocence (at least in Fodor’s version) must go. According to Fodor’s statement of Semantic Innocence, ‘the expression ‘believes that it’s raining’ is used to attribute a belief-relation to the proposition that it’s raining; and this is the very same proposition that the unembedded formula ‘it’s raining’ is used to express’. What is the proposition expressed by an utterance of ‘it’s raining’? Is there a single such proposition? According to unarticulated constituency, it cannot be the proposition that it is merely raining. Nor is it, I have claimed, the proposition that it is raining somewhere or other. No, it is the proposition that it is raining in some contextually determined definite place (Jacob 1997).

Well, according to Recanati’s view on unarticulated constituents, the proposition expressed by ‘it’s raining’ can perfectly be one of the alternatives dismissed by Jacob. The optional character of unarticulated constituents allows this possibility. But obviously, this does not affect Jacob’s main point. Jacob wonders what is the proposition that remains unchanged when embedded under an attitude operator. If it cannot be decided in advance, then Semantic Innocence must go.

It is true that if we seriously take unarticulated constituents into consideration, it is not possible to foresee what the proposition expressed by an utterance of a sentence like ‘It’s raining’ may turn out to be, but this is not exactly what Semantic Innocence forbids. For this principle to be preserved, what is required is that the proposition expressed, whatever it might be in the context in which the sentence is uttered, remains constant when embedded in a belief report. Once every other contextual parameter is fixed, an utterance of ‘It’s raining’ should express the same proposition inside and outside the scope of a belief operator. A priori, there is nothing in belief operators that would alter temporal or spatial parameters, so it is not completely unreasonable to suppose that if every other feature of the context is under control, no changes will be introduced into the content by embedding a sentence like ‘It’s raining’.

Maybe a framework that admits unarticulated constituents should revise its conception of Semantic Innocence, in order for it to remain a useful principle. I think that this is the good intuition behind Jacob’s objection. But I have no idea what this new Semantic Inno-
ence might look like. The situation becomes especially awkward once we explore Jacob’s idea about the incompatibility of Semantic Innocence and the Hidden-Indexical Theory having in mind iterated belief operators. Imagine that Jor-El, Superman’s Kriptonian father, travels to The Earth to pay a visit to his son. He knows nothing about Metropolis and thinks that the colourful costumes his son normally wears to ‘change his identity’ are just weird elements of a peculiarly eccentric game. Actually, he does not know that some people are not aware of the dual personality of his son. Superman, clark-kently disguised, introduces his father to Lois Lane. A few moments later, a truck is just about to have an accident when Superman, now supermanly disguised, rushes to avoid the collision. Both Jor-El and Lois Lane witness how Superman, in the middle of his flight, unexpectedly falls. Now consider the possible utterances of these two sentences:

(33) Lois Lane believes that Superman has lost his powers.

(34) Jor-El believes that Lois Lane believes that Superman has lost his powers.

In this context, (33) must be opaquely interpreted, since we (the interpreters) know that Lois Lane does not know that Clark Kent is Superman. Thus, (33) should be read as:

(33’) [Lois Lane believes that] Superman has lost his powers, under this guise.

In (33), ‘Superman’ is used and mentioned at the same time. (33), interpreted as (33’), is an opaque cumulative belief report, since it entails (33’’) (Recanati 2000, 200), the transparent reading of (33):

(33’’) [Lois Lane believes that] Superman/Clark Kent has lost his powers.

Opacity arises in the interpretation of (33) as uttered in this context as the effect of a primary pragmatic process of free enrichment. It affects the truth conditions of the proposition expressed by the utter-
ance of (33). In cumulative belief reports, Recanati says, Semantic Innocence holds.

The utterance of (34) in a context like that prompts a transparent interpretation, because we know that Jor-El knows nothing about the particular epistemic characteristics of Lois Lane, nor anyone’s on Earth. Hence, (34) should be read as (34’).

(34’) [Jor-El believes that] Lois Lane believes that Superman/Clark Kent has lost his powers.

(34), interpreted as (34’), is obviously a cumulative belief report. Semantic Innocence tells us that the semantic value of an embedded expression is its normal semantic value (un-embedded). The semantic value of (33) is the proposition it expresses when uttered in this context, that is, (33’). The truth conditions of (33’) are not that of (33’’), since (33’’) would be false in case Lois Lane did not believe the singular proposition under this guise. So, the propositions expressed by (33’) and (33’’) are quite distinct.

Now the point we have been heading towards: is the semantic value of (33) when embedded the same semantic value (33) displays when uttered un-embedded? In this context we should give a negative answer to this question. It seems clear that the truth conditions of (33) when it appears under the scope of [Jor-El believes that] cannot be the same truth conditions it expresses when uttered in isolation, since we know what Jor-El does not know. It would be impossible for Jor-El to entertain a proposition involving a mode of presentation like that of (33’).

The contexts for the utterances of (33) and (34) are identical (ex-hypothesis) except for the belief operator. Embedded (33) must be given a transparent interpretation – it should be read as expressing a singular proposition – while non-embedded (33) expresses an enriched proposition in this context. The semantic value of an embedded expression, namely (33), is not its normal semantic value, therefore, Semantic Innocence does not hold with cumulative cases either.

Recanati’s solution for cumulative cases is designed to preserve the semantic value of transparent expressions (singular propositions) when they become embedded in opaque expressions, but it is incompatible with the opposite move, that from opaque un-embedded expressions to transparent embedded ones. To get examples of the latter we just have to iterate belief operators, which regularly exhibit
the tendency to host transparent embedded propositions, as explained above.

The conclusion of this last objection could be generalized as a problem for any theory willing to preserve among its merits: a fair interpretation of Int (anti-revisionist), Semantic Innocence, respect for the distinction between transparent and opaque belief reports, and a coherent treatment of iterated belief reports.

In the next two chapters, an extension of the Hidden-Indexical Theory is presented, based upon the idea that deference is the only source of opacity.
Deferential Utterances

WITH PHILIPPE DE BRABANTER, ISIDORA STOJANOVIC, AND DAVID NICOLAS

1 Introduction

As we saw, Recanati’s version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory still has to face the mode of presentation problem. In order to get rid of this worry, some modifications must be introduced within the general picture. Basically, we think that opacity, the phenomenon that produces alleged failures of the substitutivity principle for co-intensional identities, has at its root a single cause: deference. We will argue that belief reports always involve a pragmatic process by which the speaker relies for the meaning of some of the words contained in the sentence she utters on somebody else’s linguistic/inferential habits. In particular, our thesis will be that opaque belief reports are cases of deliberate deference. This modification of the Hidden-Indexical Theory will not only provide a solution for the mode of presentation problem, but a new perspective on the phenomenon of opacity. In order to understand the details of this position, some precisions about the basic notion of deference are needed.
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the distinctions and the relationships among several phenomena, each of which has certain characteristics of what is generally called ‘deference’. We distinguish linguistic deference, which concerns the use of language and the meaning of the words we use, from epistemic deference, which concerns our reasons and evidence for making the claims we make. In our in-depth study of linguistic deference, we distinguish two subcategories: default deference (roughly, the ubiquitous fact, noted by externalists like Burge or Putnam, that the truth conditions of our utterances are determined with respect to the language parameter supplied by the context), and deliberate deference (roughly, the intentional, communicative act of using a given expression the way it is used in some contextually specified idiolect or dialect). We also discuss the phenomenon of imperfect mastery, often associated with deference, and which we show to be independent both of linguistic deference and of epistemic deference. If our analysis is correct, then some recent debates on deference (e.g. between Recanati and Woodward) can be shown to result from a failure to appreciate all the distinctions that we draw here.

The plan
In our taxonomic study, we draw a distinction between linguistic and epistemic deference. Within linguistic deference itself, we distinguish between default deference and deliberate deference. A first approximation to those distinctions may be provided using a single example, the arthritis example, a version of which was given by Burge (1979). Additional examples will be provided as we get to discuss those distinctions in more detail.

Consider a woman who, coming back from the doctor’s, tells her partner ‘I have arthritis.’ Although it is not the first time she has heard of arthritis, she only has a vague idea of what arthritis is, insufficient for distinguishing arthritis from many other diseases. Thus, she may be unable to differentiate between arthritis, which is a condition of the joints, and myositis, which is a condition of the muscles, and she may even say such things as “I have arthritis in the thigh.” Even though the woman’s concept of arthritis is poor and, so to speak, indeterminate, i.e. insufficient for fixing the truth conditions of her utterance, this utterance has a determinate truth value, as Burge, Putnam, and externalists in general have successfully argued. This truth value is determined by appealing to the experts, and to the linguistic community more generally, regarding the question of what counts as “arthritis”.

This general and truly ubiquitous phenomenon corresponds more or less to what we call default deference. A speaker who defers by default most often does not have the intention to defer. As a consequence, default deference usually goes unnoticed by speaker and hearer. This contrasts with what we call deliberate deference. A speaker who defers deliberately must intend to do so, and her intention must be recognized by her interlocutors.

In general, deliberate deference involves a language-shift. The speaker intends to use an expression in the way in which it is used in some dialect, sociolect or idiolect. She exploits various contextual features to enable her interlocutors to recognize her deferring intention and identify the intended deferee. Consider for instance two doctors who have a patient in common, and suppose that this patient believes that arthritis is an inflammatory condition of the muscles, and keeps saying to her doctors things like ‘I’ve been suffering so much from the arthritis in my left thigh.’ Now suppose that one of the doctors has pain in his calves, and, making it clear to the other doctor that he is alluding to their common patient, he says ‘My calves really hurt. It must be arthritis.’ Here, the doctor intends to use the word ‘arthritis’ in the way the patient does, that is, for muscle inflammation. He makes use of the context to elicit a language-shift to the patient’s idiolect when it comes to interpreting the word ‘arthritis’. Deliberate deferring, in sum, is an intentional act in which the dialect deferred to must be made salient by the speaker and identified by the interpreter.

An important notion that is related to linguistic deference but should not be confused with it is that of epistemic deference. Let us go back to the lady who, coming home from the doctor’s, tells her partner ‘I have arthritis.’ To establish the truth value of her assertion, we need to determine with respect to which language (dialect, sociolect, idiolect) her words must be interpreted. In English, the meaning of ‘arthritis’ is established in connection with the common body of medical knowledge. So, even if the lady has picked up the word ‘arthritis’ from her doctor, it is not quite right to say that she is deferring to him for her use of the word. For imagine that the doctor himself is mistaken on the question of what arthritis is, and believes that it is a condition of the muscles. Then, if the lady says ‘I have arthritis in the thigh,’ with no overt intention to defer precisely to her doctor, her utterance is false, given that arthritis is a disease of the joints.

\[11\] Of course, whenever we engage in communication, we implicitly intend to conform to the rules of language use.
Now, even though the lady defers by default to the English linguistic community, not to the doctor, there is a sense in which she *does* defer to the doctor. But, rather than to his linguistic competence, she defers to his judgment (his diagnosis) that she has arthritis. This is what we call *epistemic deference*.

Below, we present more thoroughly the distinction between default and deliberate deference, and we argue that both phenomena are distinct from epistemic deference. We also discuss in more detail the phenomenon of *imperfect mastery*, already mentioned above. As we will show, partial understanding of a concept implies neither that a speaker using the word associated with the concept will intend to defer to others for the meaning of that word, nor that a speaker using the concept in making a claim will base this claim on someone else’s judgment. Thus, even though they are often not differentiated, default deference, deliberate deference, epistemic deference, and imperfect mastery will be shown to be distinct phenomena.

### 2 Linguistic deference: default deference vs. deliberate deference

*Default deference* is involved in every communicative act. When interpreting and evaluating an utterance, we must take into account a language parameter (which is typically the language of a larger linguistic community, like English, though it can also be a dialect, sociolect or idiolect), and this language parameter is contextually given a default value. To designate this default value, we will use the term ‘source language’. Default deference takes place whether or not we seek to defer. *Deliberate deference*, on the other hand, is something done intentionally by the speaker. The speaker targets a particular value for the language parameter and exploits the context to help the interpreter identify this value. In this section we will illustrate this distinction with a number of examples and provide a more complex theoretical panorama. We will show that, even if a speaker typically defers by default to the linguistic community, she can also defer by default to a sociolect or idiolect. Similarly, in deliberate deference, even though a speaker typically intends to defer to a certain sociolect or idiolect, she can also deliberately defer to the linguistic community.

There are a few distinctions with which the distinction between default and deliberate deference might be confused, so let us forestall
those possible confusions before proceeding. Deliberate deference is intentional and therefore conscious: a speaker who is deferring deliberately must be aware of what she is doing. But this does not make the default/deliberate distinction collapse into the self-conscious/unconscious distinction, for in the case of default deference, too, the speaker may be perfectly aware of the fact that she is deferring by default. A second possible confusion consist in seeing default deference as \textit{semantic} and deliberate deference as merely \textit{pragmatic}: in the default case, the truth value of the utterance containing the deferential expression would depend on the source language provided by the context, whereas in the deliberate case, the speaker would merely convey her intention to use an expression in the way in which it is used by the deferee, without this impinging on the actual truth value of the utterance. On our view, however, both default and deliberate deference affect the truth values of utterances.

2.1 Default Deference

When the lady comes home from the doctor’s and tells her partner ‘I have arthritis in the thigh’, our intuitions are clear that the truth conditions of the utterance involve arthritis, not any other medical condition. As the lady cannot have arthritis in her thigh, she is saying something false. People often say false things when they use words they do not completely understand. This is the widespread phenomenon that Brian Loar called “falsity-due-to-misunderstanding” (Loar 1990).

Cases like these were used by externalists to show that, if the sense of a term were identified with the set of descriptions available to a competent language user, then this sense could not determine the term’s semantic value. Falsity-due-to-misunderstanding is possible only because the terms we use in our utterances make a semantic contribution that is fixed by linguistic conventions that reflect the community’s knowledge of the way the world is. In externalist frameworks, this idea is often grounded in a theory of the social division of linguistic labor. In every linguistic community, there are special groups of language users, the \textit{experts}, who are entrusted with an important task: determining the semantic value of the terms of the language. Average members of the linguistic community defer to these experts whenever they have to determine the truth conditions of utterances like ‘I have arthritis in the thigh’. The words used by

\footnote{We are thinking of Recanati (2000, 281ff) here, even though Recanati himself opposes \textit{self-conscious} deference to \textit{imperfect mastery}, and does not speak of \textit{unconscious} deference.}
the lady in the context described above acquire their semantic value through these experts. As arthritis is a disease of the joints and cannot affect the muscles, the proposition expressed by her utterance is false. Our intuitions about the truth conditions of this proposition are justified by her deferential use of the term ‘arthritis’. Deference bridges the gap between the “arthritic” lady’s incomplete understanding and the way the world happens to be. The process described above is what we call default deference. As suggested earlier, whenever an utterance is produced for the purpose of communication, the participants in the communicative exchange have to settle on a language with respect to which interpretation can be carried out, i.e. the source language. In cases of imperfect mastery, it is the experts who determine to which thing or event a given expression applies correctly.

If we resort to Recanati’s deferential operator\textsuperscript{13} to analyze what the arthritic lady says in the context above, and use it in the manner suggested by Recanati, we get the following representation:

\begin{equation}
(1) \text{I have } R_{\text{doctor}}(\text{arthritis}) \text{ in the thigh,}
\end{equation}

where ‘$R_{\text{doctor}}(\text{arthritis})$’ is the complex expression that results from the application of the deferential operator to the term ‘arthritis’. The semantic value of this complex expression is arthritis (the actual disease). (1) is false because arthritis is a disease of the joints and there are no joints in the thigh. The subscript specifies who is being deferred to, in this case the doctor whom the lady visited. As we shall see, this kind of analysis does not entirely do justice to our intuitions about the truth conditions of deferential utterances.

\textbf{2.1.1 Deference by default is not always deference to the “experts at hand”}

Let us imagine that the doctor the lady consulted is not a real doctor, but some madman in a white coat who had just escaped from a psychiatric ward. This bogus doctor thinks that arthritis is nothing but a bad hangover. Moreover, he has got it into his mind to pay no attention to his lady patient’s symptoms and to tell her that she has arthritis. The lady comes home and reports to her partner that she has

\textsuperscript{13} Vid. previous chapter for details.
arthritis. What she says could conceivably be represented with the help of the deferential operator:

(2) I have $R_{\text{bogus doctor}}(\text{arthritis})$.

But are the truth conditions of the lady’s utterance correctly captured by (2)? We do not think so. What the lady says is true if and only if she has in fact arthritis. The semantic contribution of the term ‘arthritis’ to the proposition expressed by her utterance is not a bad hangover, as (2) states, but arthritis. Perhaps the lady had one too many glasses of vodka the night before and was suffering from a bad hangover on the day that she uttered (2), but that would not make the proposition expressed by her utterance any truer. Only arthritis can make that proposition true.

What is happening here? The lady is deferring epistemically to the bogus doctor, since she trusts his diagnosis without further questioning. But she is not deferring to the bogus doctor for the meaning of the term ‘arthritis’. Instead, she is deferring by default to the norms of the linguistic community. She is not deferring by default to the first expert at hand, but to whoever really knows the meaning of ‘arthritis’. Only this ideal expert can satisfy both the externalist claim that meanings are in the world and our intuitions about the truth conditions of her utterance in this context.

### 2.1.2 Deference by default is not always deference to the linguistic community

Pedro and María are watching the race walking competition in Beijing 2008. Pedro has not seen a race walking event in his entire life, but María, who knows a thing or two about the rules, has just spelt out to him the difference between walking and running in this Olympic sport. Some time after the start, the following dialogue takes place:

(3) (a) Pedro: ‘Hey, the second guy is walking so fast he’s gonna catch up with the one in the lead!’.

(b) María: ‘Actually, he’s running… I’d say he’s gonna be disqualified’.

(c) Pedro: ‘Oh, yes, you’re right, he had both feet off the ground for a fraction of a second’.
If Pedro and María were not in a race walking context, their judgments would probably be different from those expressed in the above conversation. For instance, it is not unreasonable to assume that neither Pedro nor María would distinguish between the first and second contestant, so similar is the way they are moving. It is quite possible that they would judge both to be running rather than walking. Yet, these are realistic assumptions only if we take Pedro and María to be using the verbs ‘walk’ and ‘run’ in their ordinary sense. And our claim is precisely that they are not. We think that, in the context at hand, the source language is not the common language but the particular sociolect of the race walking community. This community has its own experts, namely IAAF judges. These experts define walking in their rule 230 as ‘a progression of steps so taken that the walker makes contact with the ground, so that no visible (to the human eye) loss of contact occurs’. Rule 230 is the convention that determines the correct application of the term ‘walk’ in this context. The judgments expressed in (3), and the distinctions underlying them, only make sense with respect to such conventions. Various elements contribute to making the race walkers’ sociolect the source language here. Pedro and María are watching an Olympic race walking event, a sport whose rules they are now familiar with. They have been talking for some time about the technical interpretation of terms like ‘walking’ and ‘running’. The meaningfulness of their conversation, including their initial disagreement, is further evidence that they are not speaking everyday English. We can therefore conclude that deference by default can select a source language whose conventions differ from those of the language community as a whole.

2.1.3 Deference by default to a particular ‘local dialect’

Imagine twin sisters, Natalya and Olga, who have been brought up in a very isolated area. Their parents use Standard English, except in one respect: they have a peculiar sense of humor, and thought it would be fun to always use ‘apple’ for ‘pear’ (and conversely) in their daughters’ presence. This is a reclusive family and, by the age of six, the sisters have hardly had any contact with anyone outside the family. On their first day at school, the two six-year-olds share the meal their parents have prepared for them, including some fruit. Looking enviously at her sister’s bigger pear, Natalya says to Olga:
(4) Hey, *that’s* a huge apple!

Any speaker of Standard English would say that the fruit is a pear and would therefore judge Natalya to have uttered a false proposition. But the thing is, in this case, that there is no speaker of Standard English involved in the situation. Both the speaker and her addressee are using the local dialect that their parents have taught them. The whole of their linguistic community actually amounts to themselves and their parents (in their playful mood). The sisters are not even aware that there is a wider linguistic community whose norms may differ from what they have learnt from their parents. Thus, when Natalya or Olga use ‘apple’ and ‘pear’, they defer by default to their parents’ invented dialect, not to the norms of a language community of which, strictly speaking, they are not part. Using the deferential operator, one could represent the proposition expressed by Natalya and understood by Olga as:

(4’) The object Natalya is pointing at is a huge $R_{\text{parents}}(\text{apple})$,\(^\text{14}\)

which is the same as:

(4’’) The object Natalya is pointing at is a huge pear.

We are aware that this analysis is not self-evidently the right one. All the same, we believe it to be plausible: Natalya and Olga have always deferred by default to their parents, who were the purveyors of the linguistic norm in their environment.\(^\text{15}\) As long as their linguistic community does not extend beyond their parents and each other, they could not defer to anyone else than their parents. This situation will change if their conversation is overheard by someone who knows for a fact that (according to the conventions of Standard English) the

\(^{14}\) We are not, at this stage, claiming that the deferential operator is suitable for analyzing instances of default deference. Here, it is simply a convenient means for representing the manner in which “apple” is to be interpreted. See section 2.1.4 for a discussion of some problems raised by the application of the deferential operator in default cases.

\(^{15}\) Had the conventions of their parents’ language been the same as those of the common language, Natalya and Olga would eo ipso have deferred by default to the linguistic community as a whole. But the point here is precisely that (a few of) the conventions set by the parents clash with those of the whole linguistic community.
fruit they were talking about is a pear, not an apple, and who feels it is her duty to set the record straight for the kids. If the children accept that they are dealing with someone who is more trustworthy than their parents, they will probably change their minds about apples and pears. In our framework this change of mind would be explained as follows: the sisters will have realized that they belong to a wider language community, and that in the community there are experts who are more reliable (more knowledgeable) than their parents as to what this or that object or event ought to be called. If that is what takes place, then the source language of their utterances will shift from their parents’ local dialect to Standard English. Now, next time Natalya says to Olga that the fruit she is pointing at is an apple, her utterance will no longer be true if the fruit is indeed a pear. Thus, we see that, other things being equal, the truth conditions of an utterance of (4) are affected by a change in the source language.

2.1.4 Woodfield vs. Recanati on deference by default

Some of the issues we have raised here shed light on certain aspects of the debate between Andrew Woodfield and François Recanati. Woodfield’s opposition to an unrestricted application of the deferential operator is partly rooted in his conviction that in cases of partial understanding the expert is not the final source of normativity the deferrer is seeking for:

Both parties [deferrer and expert] take for granted that there are norms which determine the proper meaning of the word, norms to which they both owe allegiance. D [the deferrer] defers to E [the expert] on a particular issue because D takes E to be a good guide, given the meaning that the word already has. D does not take E to be the giver of meaning. No fact about E constitutes the word’s meaning what it does. D knows that experts are fallible. D regards E’s judgement as good evidence that the word means such and such, but D does not suppose that E makes it the case that the word means such and such (Woodfield 2000, 450).

The example of the bogus doctor in 2.1.1 gives support to this general intuition. Deference does not always convert some speaker into a “giver” of meaning. In our example, even if the lady heard the word ‘arthritis’ for the first time from the bogus doctor, that would not mean that the bogus doctor could impose his peculiar use of ‘ar-
thritis’ on the meaning of the lady’s utterance. The intuitions about the truth conditions of the proposition expressed in that case are that the semantic contribution of the word ‘arthritis’ is the disease arthrit-is, and not a bad hangover.

To make his point, Woodfield (Woodfield 2000, 448) resorts to the following example. Alf is a boy who has been told by his teacher that Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches. The boy picked up the word ‘synecdoche’ from his schoolteacher, unaware that the latter systematically called ‘synecdoches’ what are actually metonymies. Alf meets L, an expert who knows what a synecdoche is, and the following conversation takes place:

(5) (a) Alf: ‘Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches’.
    (b) L: ‘No it is not. It’s true that his prose is full of figures of speech. But very few of them are synecdoches’.
    (c) Alf: ‘I accept what you say. Cicero’s prose is not full of synecdoches’.

According to Recanati, Alf’s utterances should be analyzed in the following way:

(5) (a’) Cicero’s prose is full of R\textsubscript{teacher} (synecdoches)
    (c’) Cicero’s prose is full of R\textsubscript{L} (synecdoches)

On this view, what ‘R\textsubscript{teacher} (synecdoches)’ contributes to the proposition expressed by Alf in (5a’) is the content the teacher attributes to the word ‘synecdoches’, that is, metonymies. In (5c’), however, the semantic contribution of ‘R\textsubscript{L} (synecdoches)’ is synecdoches. It would seem then that Alf and L are “talking at cross-purposes”. What Alf says in (5c) does not deny what he said in (5a). This, for Woodfield, is an unacceptable situation. Within our framework, this problem does not arise. When Alf says in (5a) that Cicero’s prose is full of ‘synecdoches’, he is not using his schoolteacher as a sense-giver; he is deferring by default to the linguistic community through his teacher, whom he takes to be a reliable expert. As in the case of the bogus doctor, deference by default is not always deference to the first expert at hand. Alf is deferring to the linguistic community, and thus the semantic contribution of the
word ‘synecdoches’ as used in (5a) is synecdoches, not metonymies. When Alf is corrected by L, he learns something about Cicero’s prose. His utterance in (5c) is the negation of (5a), because the semantic contribution of the term ‘synecdoches’ is, in both cases, synecdoches. In (5a) he was deferring epistemically to his teacher, since he was taking for granted what the teacher had told him. Now that he has found a more reliable source of knowledge, he decides to defer epistemically to this new source, namely L, and consequently reconsiders his first statement that Cicero’s prose is full of synecdoches.\footnote{We are ignoring the possibility that Alf might be deferring deliberately to his teacher, in which case the proposition expressed by his first utterance would contain metonymies, not synecdoches. This is not the way the example was originally framed by Woodfield.}

Our discussion of (5) shows that there is a difficulty with the application of the deferential operator to instances of default deference. The question is whether the deferential operator can be used in a proper representation of the truth conditions of utterances like these while, at the same time, preserving the explanatory power that the device has for cases of deliberate deference.

This is a problem that Woodfield has successfully detected. However, his own characterization of deference faces real difficulties. Though it is adequate for what we have called default deference to the linguistic community, it would have a hard time accounting for cases in which the speaker defers to a certain sociolect or local dialect, as illustrated by the examples of the race walkers and the misled sisters. Given that Woodfield recognizes only deference to the linguistic community, it is not clear how he could deal with these examples, where it is plausible to assume that the IAAF judges and Natalya and Olga’s parents play a central role in fixing the meaning of certain terms. Furthermore, Woodfield would have some difficulty accounting for deliberate deference too, since typically, as we shall see, one defers deliberately to a certain idiolect or sociolect, rather than to the whole linguistic community.

2.2 Deliberate deference

Imagine that Tineke and Jan know about the bogus doctor who takes arthritis to be a bad hangover. And they like the story. Last night they partied especially hard and had a lot to drink. In the morning, they wake up and Tineke says to Jan:
Jan, I have this bad case of arthritis. Would you close the curtains and hand me some aspirin?

Tineke’s head is aching badly and she is feeling sick. But she is making playful use of the bogus doctor’s misapplication of the term ‘arthritis’ to say that she has a hangover. She knows she can rely on certain contextual features to make manifest the language with respect to which the term ‘arthritis’ is to be interpreted. Tineke goes even further than that: she engineers a language-shift to a target language different from the source language set by default, namely a shift from Standard English to the bogus doctor’s idiolect. This, she can afford to do because she can rely on certain features of the context, notably the fact that Jan and herself had a laugh about the story of the bogus doctor and had a lot to drink the previous night. But Tineke could also have made her meaning clear by uttering ‘I have a bad arthritis’, thus using, anomalously, the mass noun ‘arthritis’ as if it were a countable noun. Contextual features of the above kind pretty much ensure that (6) is going to be understood by Jan as expressing the following proposition:

(6’) Tineke has a bad case of $R_{\text{bogus doctor}}$ (arthritis).

Unlike what we observed in cases of default deference, the application of the deferential operator does not raise any issues here. Thanks to it, we can show how Tineke managed to express the proposition that she had a bad hangover, even though she uttered the word ‘arthritis’. (6) is a paradigmatic case of deliberate deference. It presents all the characteristics of instances of “self-conscious” linguistic deference mentioned in the literature: (i) the speaker chooses to defer for the interpretation of some of her words; (ii) she defers to someone’s idiolect; (iii) deference takes the form of a language-shift that results from the exploitation of certain contextual features. It is to the needs of these examples that Recanati’s deferential operator is tailored.

As we shall see, the above characteristics are not exhibited by all cases of deliberate deference. The following sections are devoted to a scrutiny of non-paradigmatic instances of deliberate deference. In sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, we established that the status of the source language (common language vs. sociolect and local dialect) was not
constitutive of default deference: a speaker can defer by default not just to the whole linguistic community, but also to a sociolect (the race walking example) and even to a very local dialect (the misled sisters example). Similarly, we will see in the next section that characteristic (ii) does not apply systematically: deliberate deference does not have to involve a shift to someone’s peculiar idiolect; in some cases, the target language is a sociolect or even a common language like English. This means that the distinction between default and deliberate deference cannot be a matter of the sort of language to which speaker and hearer defer. In section 2.2.2, we will show that characteristic (iii) is not a necessary condition for deliberate deference either. We therefore propose an account of deliberate deference that does not appeal to language-shifts in the strict sense.

2.2.1 Deliberate deference to the linguistic community

Suppose that an interdisciplinary wild bunch are working frantically on a taxonomy of linguistic deference. For several hours now they have been discussing similarities and differences between certain examples of default deference and borderline cases of deliberate deference. All the participants, A, B, C and D, agree on a common characterization for these terms and are now trying to tie up the remaining loose ends. The debate seems never-ending. At a critical moment, realizing that lunchtime is almost over, the most obstinate, A, tells the others:

(7) All right, let’s say that, in deference to you, I’ll accept your argument.

We assume that the source language of their discussions is a local dialect that conforms to the definitions on which they had previously agreed. But, if A’s utterance is understood by B, C and D, they will not think that A is deferring linguistically or epistemically to any of them, but rather that she is accepting their argument out of respect for them. However, respect is not what the word ‘deference’ would mean in the source language of this context: it is a meaning it has in a different language, namely Standard English. In (7), the speaker again exploits contextual features in order to make it manifest that she means to shift out of the source language (the deferentialists’ dialect) and into a target language that is Standard English. The co-text plays a central role: in its source-language tech-
technical sense, the noun ‘deference’ does not collocate with ‘in ____ to you’. This alone should be enough to induce recognition of the shift. All in all, this example shows that deliberate deference does not necessarily rest on language-shifts to an idiolect or a sociolect. One can defer deliberately to the linguistic community.

2.2.1.1 Deference, polysemy and Humpty-Dumpty

This, at any rate, is the conclusion if our analysis is the right one. Yet, we are aware of another possible account for (7): it could be said that, in uttering (7), A simply exploits the polysemy of the word ‘deference’. In other words, where our analysis posits a language-shift from a technical dialect into Standard English, others might see no shift at all. Their argument, then, would be that the technical dialect of the interdisciplinary team is nothing but an extension of the standard language. In this extension, the ordinary senses of “deference” (respect and compliance with another’s judgment) are inhibited, while a technical sense is highly activated. On this view, all A does in uttering (7) is reactivate an ordinary sense of ‘deference’.

We have some sympathy for this analysis. However, we think that its implications are not so straightforward as they look. First, notice that if polysemy is involved in (7), then it is polysemy of a special kind, for the sense that ‘deference’ has in the source language (the technical local dialect) is not (yet) one that is recorded in the lexicon of the target language (Standard English). The problem here is that the deferentialists’ work results in ‘deference’ acquiring a new meaning. Neologisms and meaning-creations always originate in the margins of the common language. Sometimes they catch on, sometimes they don’t. But, if they do, it is always because some aspects of the language spoken by a small group become incorporated into the common core. Until that happens, those aspects cannot be said to belong to the common language. Actually, as some lexicographers have shown (e.g. Rey-Debove 1978, 283-286), new words and new lexical meanings, when they occur in utterances of the common language, are often set off by quote marks or special prosody, indicating that they still feel like words in another language. Our analysis in terms of deliberate deference provides an explanation for the diachronic process by which lexical creations may become part of the common core. In the case of new meanings, this will lead to increased polysemy, but only after the process of extension of the common language has been completed.
Our analysis is less susceptible to accusations of Humpty-Dumptyism than an account strictly in terms of polysemy. On our view of deliberate deference, a speaker does not decree that this or that expression is to be ascribed a new meaning. Rather, she uses expressions which have already acquired a meaning in a given language (be that a common language, sociolect or idiolect). The only decision the speaker makes is to exploit contextual features in order to induce the appropriate language-shift. That is not Humpty-Dumptyism. By contrast, those who reject the deferential account and argue that examples like (7) exhibit plain polysemy can be suspected of Humpty-Dumptyism. On their view, a single language underlies the interpretation of (7), namely an extension of the common language. This extension includes a new meaning of an already existing term. It seems then that, merely as a result of their theoretical debates, the deferentialists have succeeded in creating a new meaning for ‘deference’. This means that they have acted pretty much like Humpty-Dumpty in the Alice story.

2.2.1.2 Two more examples

We have shown how our account could accommodate the intuition that polysemy is somehow involved in (7). However, we believe that there are examples similar to (7) for which a polysemy-based account is not even a likely contender. We present two such cases below. The first illustrates deliberate deference to the linguistic community, while the second shows that a speaker can deliberately defer to another common language.

Imagine a guru who, though using the spelling, the grammar and large chunks of the English lexicon, nevertheless chooses to redefine a whole class of key terms (say, ‘life’, ‘love’, ‘devotion’, etc.) in such a way that the ordinary senses of these terms no longer have currency in the language of the guru’s community. One can hardly say here that the guru’s language is a mere extension of Standard English. Now imagine that the guru is preaching to his flock and that his sermon is broadcast on his own satellite TV channel. For a while, he talks directly to his live audience. At one point, however, he looks straight at the camera and, addressing ‘the rest of the world’, says things like:

(8) You may experience “love” and “devotion” in your hearts, but these are just debased forms of true love and true devotion.
Our suggestion is that, at least for the interpretation of ‘“love”’ and ‘“devotion”’, the guru shifts into Standard English. This, we indicate by means of scare quotes, to reflect the fact that the language-shift engineered by the guru is a deliberate one. Examples (7) and (8) belong with a class of utterances which display an intrasentential shift into another common language, as in:

(9) Barthes described the book as ‘un choc historique’ and ‘un repère nouveau et un départ pour l’écriture’. (Times Literary Supplement, 03/05/02 : 9)

The shift here may be for the sake of accuracy in quoting, or for local color, or meant as a display of one’s linguistic skills. However that may be, this is a deliberate language-shift into a common language: French. Although we acknowledge that (9) is different from the previous two examples, it provides further evidence suggesting that deliberate deference is not systematically to idiolects and sociolects.17

2.2.2 Deliberate deference without language-shift?

We now consider a class of utterances that seem to fall under the same category as the previous ones. Yet, they turn out to lack one important property exhibited by the various examples of deliberate deference studied so far.

Let us assume that Kate, who has no training in law, is attending a trial. Both the judge and the defendant’s counsel use terms of art with which she is not familiar. For instance, it is not obvious to her whether the defendant committed a felony, an offence or a misdemeanor.

During a break, while talking about the proceedings with other members of the audience, Kate is trying to determine the sort of crime that the defendant is guilty of. In so doing she says things like:

(10) I don’t think what he did was a felony. I’d say it was a misdemeanor.

17 There are plenty of examples like (9), and they are usually taken to be related to quotation. (See issue 17 of The Belgian Journal of Linguistics for various discussions.)
Since she realizes that her understanding of these terms is at best sketchy, she often supplements her utterances with a metalinguistic comment, or articulates them with a special intonation pattern, of the sort that can be rendered by means of scare quotes:

(10') I don’t think what he did was a felony, as the judge put it. I’d say it was a misdemeanor, if I understand the lawyer’s distinction.

(10'') I don’t think what he did was a “felony”. I’d say it was a “misdemeanor”.

These comments and extra markers indicate that we are not dealing with instances of default deference. So, are we dealing with deliberate deference, and, if so, to whom? In an externalist framework such as ours, it is generally accepted that the meaning of legal terms is fixed by members of the legal profession for the whole of the linguistic community. There should therefore be no difference between the meaning that the judge ascribes to ‘felony’ and ‘misdemeanor’ and the meaning that these terms have in the lexicon of English. And if there were a difference, Kate, as a non-expert member of the audience, would probably choose to trust the norms of the linguistic community (as fixed by the body of experts alluded to above). This suggests that, when Kate utters (10), (10’) or (10’’), she is not (just) deferring to this judge or lawyer, or even to the legal profession, but to the norms of the linguistic community.

It is tempting to conclude that examples (10)-(10’’) are a further illustration of deliberate deference to the linguistic community. But, as hinted above, these examples lack one significant feature exhibited by the other cases: they involve no language-shift. In (10)-(10’’), the language with respect to which terms such as ‘felony’ and ‘misdemeanor’ are interpreted is none other than the source language set by default. This entails that, unlike what can be observed in (6) and (7), Kate’s deferring turns out to have no impact on the truth conditions of her utterances. Still, there is a major difference between (10)-(10’’) and genuine cases of default deference. Kate resorts to metalinguistic comments or special intonation patterns in order to make the language parameter of the context salient. This does not happen in cases of default deference, where the speaker typically has no communicative intention to bring the language of interpretation into the foreground.
Faced with these facts, we believe that the right theoretical choice consists in maintaining that (10)-(10’’) involve deliberate deference. Accordingly, we must relax criterion (iii) of paradigmatic instances like (6), so as not to require the presence of a language-shift in the strict sense.\footnote{Another option would be to leave the criterion for deliberate deference unaltered. As a result, examples like (10)-(10’’) would come under a third category of linguistic deference, intermediate between default and deliberate. In our view, however, these examples have much more in common with deliberate deference; hence we shall not pursue this line of reasoning further.} We therefore propose the following definition:

S performs an act of deliberate linguistic deference if and only if:

(a) S produces an utterance \( u \);
(b) S exploits certain contextual features in order to make salient the linguistic parameter \( L \) for the interpretation of \( u \) or some segment of \( u \);
(c) S wants her exploitation of contextual resources to be recognized as part of her communicative intentions by the audience.

Although our definition does not include any requirement for a language-shift, cases of deliberate deference can still be represented by means of the deferential operator. For instance, what happens in (10) can be captured by the following formula:

\[
(10)_{\text{a}}: \text{I don’t think what he did was a } R_{\text{StandardEnglish}}(\text{felony}). \text{ I’d say it was a } R_{\text{StandardEnglish}}(\text{misdemeanor}).
\]

The deferential operator indicates that the expressions ‘felony’ and ‘misdemeanor’ are to be interpreted with respect to Standard English. In cases of language-shifts, the only difference is that the value of ‘\( x \)’ in \( R_x(\sigma) \) is distinct from the source language. Deliberate deference with a language-shift is nothing more than an important sub-category of deliberate deference.
3 Non-linguistic deference and other related phenomena

In this section, we study the notions of epistemic deference and imperfect mastery. Epistemic deference should be carefully distinguished from linguistic deference, and our first comments will be focused on justifying this distinction. We then show that the notions of epistemic deference and epistemic evidence, though related, must be kept well apart. Finally, we discuss the phenomenon of imperfect mastery and its relationship to linguistic and epistemic deference.19

3.1 Epistemic deference

Deference is an issue of interest not only to linguists and philosophers of language, but also to epistemologists and philosophers of science. It is generally admitted that a lot of the knowledge that we possess is acquired deferentially, by testimony. But deference does not only affect the things we know: it also affects our beliefs, beliefs we are none the less ready to act upon. We receive information from many different sources, and we make choices as to which information to accept and which to reject. Imagine a lady with a rare disease who wants to gather different opinions about her illness before undertaking a medical treatment. Every doctor she meets gives her an opinion, based on evidence and other considerations. If the diagnoses differ, she will have to decide which doctor to trust above all others. But, underlying our beliefs and actions are not just other people's judgments on issues for which there is a fact of the matter. We also defer to others on issues that are largely a matter of personal opinion. Suppose that Takeshi has been told by one friend that Sakura is the best sushi-bar in town, and by another that Mikado is the best. If he wants to take his fiancé(e) for a date, Takeshi will have to decide which friend to trust, whose judgments of taste are more reliable.

In what follows, we will focus on those instances of epistemic deference that underlie assertions, because it is in these cases that epistemic deference may be most easily confused with linguistic deference. We will say that a person who makes an assertion is epistemically deferring when she bases her claim, partly or completely, on someone else’s opinion. Typically, a person who asserts that she has arthritis is epistemically deferring to the doctor.

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19 Let it be clear from the outset that our goal in this section is not so much to make a new contribution to the existing literature on epistemic and cognitive issues related to deference, as to clearly distinguish those issues from the ones that arise in relation to linguistic deference.
on whose diagnosis she relies. We argue below that this phenomenon is distinct from linguistic deference. Furthermore, it cannot be reduced to the notion of epistemic evidence, even if a certain correlation exists.

### 3.1.1 Epistemic and linguistic deference

Whereas linguistic deference is involved in fixing the meaning of a term, epistemic deference occurs when a person defers to someone else concerning a particular judgment. Whether a speaker is deferring epistemically or not is independent of whether she is deferring deliberately or by default for the use of the words occurring in her utterance.

To begin with, it is easy to realize that default linguistic deference must be independent of epistemic deference. As we have argued at length, default linguistic deference is a ubiquitous phenomenon. Epistemic deference, on the other hand, occurs when we rest a claim upon other people’s opinions. It is not surprising, then, that default linguistic deference can, but need not, co-occur with epistemic deference. For example, suppose that Tim goes to see a doctor who, having examined him, tells him: ‘You have myositis’. Tim does not know what myositis is. He only understands that it is related to the pain he is feeling in his calves. Back at home, he tells his mother:

(11) I have myositis. It is nothing serious. I should just rest for a while.

In saying (11), Tim is deferring by default to the linguistic community concerning the meaning of the term ‘myositis’, and, at the same time, he is deferring epistemically to the doctor, the truth of whose diagnosis he takes for granted. But when Tim tells his mother: ‘My calves hurt badly’, he is certainly not deferring epistemically to the doctor, for he is best placed to judge whether a part of his own body hurts or not. However, Tim will still be deferring by default to the linguistic community concerning the meanings of the words that he is using to report the pain in his calves, such as ‘calves’, ‘hurt’, etc.

Somewhat more interesting are the connections between epistemic deference and deliberate linguistic deference. Let us approach these through various examples. We have already seen that
epistemic deference occurs independently of default linguistic deference. When Tim sincerely asserts that he has myositis, he is deferring epistemically to the doctor, but from a semantic point of view, he is deferring by default to the entire linguistic community. This is even more obvious in his assertion that ‘it is nothing serious’, which is again epistemically based on the doctor’s judgment, but involves only terms that Tim, a native English speaker, fully masters.

Conversely, deliberate linguistic deference occurs independently of epistemic deference. This is clear from our analysis of example (5) above:

(5) Jan, I have this bad case of arthritis. Would you close the curtains and hand me some aspirin?

Though Tineke is borrowing the bogus doctor’s deviant definition of ‘arthritis’, she is not deferring to any medical diagnosis made by that doctor, or even to any opinion that he might have regarding her condition.

The mutual independence of linguistic and epistemic deference can be given a more complex, and subtler, illustration. Think again of the doctor who intentionally uses the word ‘arthritis’ with the deviant meaning that his patient attributes to it. Suppose that this doctor asked for a specialist’s opinion regarding the symptoms in his calves. Diagnosed with inflammation, which is precisely the condition for which the misguided patient uses the word “arthritis”, he tells the colleague with whom he has that patient in common: ‘My calves hurt. It is arthritis’. Although he does not defer epistemically for the claim that his calves hurt, the doctor defers epistemically to the specialist for the claim that his condition is ‘arthritis’, i.e. inflammation of his calf muscles. At the same time, he is deferring deliberately to their patient’s idiolect, for the semantic question of what counts as ‘arthritis’. In this case, deliberate linguistic deference occurs together with epistemic deference, but with distinct deferees.

In sum, linguistic deference and epistemic deference are distinct and mutually independent phenomena, though they can combine in various ways, as has been amply illustrated in previous sections.

3.1.2 Epistemic deference and epistemic evidence

The examples given above might suggest that epistemic deference occurs as a direct result of there being insufficient epistemic
deferential utterances

Evidence for making a claim. And it is true that epistemic deference is quite often a matter of the amount of epistemic evidence that one has for making a certain statement. Thus, if you have no independent evidence to assert \( p \), but have been told by someone you trust that \( p \), you are likely to assert \( p \), simply because you rely on that person’s judgment. We say in such a case that you are epistemically deferring to that person. On the other hand, when you have the best possible epistemic grounds of your own for asserting \( p \), then in asserting \( p \), you will probably not want to rely on someone else’s judgment.

However, lack or poverty of epistemic grounds are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for epistemic deference. Someone who has all the evidence that can be had may still choose to defer epistemically to someone else. Thus consider a doctor who happens to be the greatest expert on arthritis, but lacks self-confidence. It is plausible to say that, when he tells a lady patient ‘You have arthritis’, he is epistemically deferring to his colleagues on the issue of whether that woman’s condition is indeed arthritis, even though he has enough of his own evidence for this claim. To indicate that he is doing so, he might say ‘We believe that what you have is arthritis’. Or, imagine that Naïma is a first-rate scientist whose research shows how to achieve cold fusion, but is very shy and insecure. She is doing tests in her lab when a senior researcher, whom she deeply respects and admires, tells her: ‘You are wasting your time. Believe me, cold fusion is something impossible!’ Out of sheer insecurity, she decides to defer to his opinion, even though it directly contradicts a claim that she has excellent evidence for, namely, that cold fusion is possible.

Conversely, there are situations in which people may form and express a firm judgment even on an issue for which they have no good epistemic grounds. Consider a woman whose partner tells her ‘You have arthritis’ just out of some inner conviction. He is not, then, deferring epistemically to anyone. People do make claims for which they have no good evidence, and which do not reflect other people’s opinions. Such claims –people’s best guesses, as we might put it– exemplify the case where one lacks epistemic evidence, and yet abstains from deferring epistemically.

3.2 Imperfect mastery

Many philosophers hold that there are concepts, and that concepts are very much like mental files in which information gets stored. Consider the concept that Carmelia has of a certain particular, say François Recanati. Her concept contains three main types of information: perceptual information, e.g. that the particular
formation: perceptual information, e.g. that the particular concerned by this concept is that guy, whom she sees talking right there in front of her, descriptive information, e.g. that he is the author of Literal Meaning, and metalinguistic information, e.g. that he is called ‘François Recanati’. Our concepts of universals, too, mostly combine those three types of information. But in many cases, the concepts that we associate with words that we use, like ‘arthritis’, ‘elm’ or ‘hydrogen’, are fairly poor, and the information they contain does not enable us to decide on any given occasion whether the word correctly applies to something we are presented with, or to draw certain inferences that someone more knowledgeable could draw. If the concept that a person associates with a term is poor or, at any rate, not as rich as the concept that experts associate with it, we talk of imperfect mastery. Note that mastery is very much a matter of degree, and that it is not obvious that anyone ever achieves perfect mastery. But to bring the issue home, one might want to know how the phenomenon of imperfect mastery relates to linguistic and to epistemic deference, and ask questions like the following. What information must be present in a concept for one to be able to defer, deliberately or by default, using the associated term? Conversely, could the presence of some information make deferring impossible? Does epistemic deference arise whenever we make assertions using concepts that we do not perfectly master? And will the wealth of information in our concepts prevent us from deferring epistemically?

By way of giving a single answer to these questions, we hold that imperfect mastery is a phenomenon that must be kept separate from linguistic deference and from epistemic deference. In other words, whatever a person’s mastery of the concept associated with some term, whatever the amount and quality of the information contained in the mental file, the following options all remain viable: the person will defer by default when using the term, or she will defer deliberately to some contextually salient dialect, be it or not the dialect from which she picked up the term. Likewise, the person may or may not defer epistemically for assertions that she makes using the term.

3.2.1 Imperfect mastery and linguistic deference

Consider a medical expert whose concept of ‘arthritis’ is as rich and determinate as can be. Does such a person defer linguistically when she uses the term ‘arthritis’? The intuition is that the meaning
of such terms is determined precisely by such experts. So if we say that the expert defers in turn, who could she possibly defer to?

Though there may be a grain of truth in this intuition, our account of default deference does not require the speaker to have the intention to defer, or to know which source language is contextually selected. This means that even our medical expert defers by default to the linguistic community when using ‘arthritis’. It just happens that she is among the experts who ultimately determine the meaning of the term.

We have just shown that ‘perfect’ mastery is compatible with deference by default. Is it also compatible with deliberate deference? Again, the answer is ‘Yes’. To see this, just recall our example of the doctor who suffered from an inflamed calf muscle. This doctor could be assumed to know as much about arthritis as possible. Yet, this did not prevent him to wittily exploit the ignorance of a patient and tell his colleague ‘It must be arthritis’.

In a similar way, imperfect mastery allows both for default and deliberate linguistic deference. A woman who knows virtually nothing about arthritis, except that there is something called ‘arthritis’, can use this word to say true or false things, whether or not she has any intention to defer linguistically at all. Or she may defer deliberately, indicating the source from which she got the word and making it clear that she intends to apply the word to whatever it is that her source applies it to, even though she might have no idea what that is.

### 3.2.2 Imperfect mastery and epistemic deference

Our level of mastery of a given concept can neither force us to defer epistemically nor prevent us from doing so. Someone who has perfect mastery can still choose to defer epistemically, like the shy scientist who endorses her senior colleague’s opinion that cold fusion is impossible. Most often, though, people with excellent mastery of a concept make assertions without deferring to other agents, provided that they have strong enough epistemic grounds for their assertions. It is true, too, that, if we know hardly anything about myositis, we are unlikely to go around making unwarranted claims about it. Thus, if we report that Tim has myositis, we will typically do so because someone whose judgment we trust told us that Tim had myositis, or because we read it in Tim’s medical file. In those cases, we defer epistemically. But others with the same level of mastery may make the very same claims without deferring epistemically, e.g. out of
some inner conviction, however odd this may seem. In any case, even cautious speakers aware of their poor mastery of a given concept will be ready to make certain assertions about myositis without deferring epistemically. For example, they will confidently assert that myositis is a condition called ‘myositis’, or that they would not like to be diagnosed with myositis, even though they have no idea what that is.

In sum, even though there is probably a correlation between an agent’s imperfect mastery of a certain concept and her being inclined to defer epistemically, epistemic deference and imperfect mastery are distinct phenomena, irreducible to one another.

4 Conclusion

We have argued for the mutual independence of three related phenomena, namely linguistic deference, epistemic deference and imperfect mastery. One of our initial questions has been what kind of framework could accommodate instances of falsity-due-to-misunderstanding and cases in which a speaker overtly chooses to use an expression the way someone else uses it. Our answer has been that, in both types of cases, an expression or segment of discourse is used deferentially. This is what grounds the category of linguistic deference. Within this category, we have distinguished two varieties, default deference and deliberate deference, which, together, cover a significant proportion of the examples addressed in the literature. Default deference has been shown not to be restricted to those cases where the speaker defers to the linguistic community as a whole. We have supplied examples of default deference to a sociolect and even to a local dialect. As for deliberate deference, which is usually understood as deference to an idiolect or local dialect, we have given evidence that it ain’t necessarily so. Our examples suggest that speakers sometimes defer deliberately to the norms of the common language. The account we provide differs in one further respect from the picture that emerges from what little literature has been written on the subject. Deliberate deference does not always involve a genuine language-shift.

Concerning the related notions of epistemic deference and imperfect mastery, we have contended that they are distinct from each other and orthogonal to linguistic deference. Someone defers epistemically when they base a claim on someone else’s judgment, but this does not entail that they are deferring for the meaning of the words they
are using. With respect to imperfect mastery, we have shown that the partial understanding of a concept does not constrain a speaker to defer either linguistically or epistemically.

Providing a taxonomy of the various cases of deference discussed in the literature is like drawing a map of the tip of an iceberg. However accurate the map, it is insufficient. Just as safe navigation requires awareness of what lies under the water surface, any stable theory of deference requires awareness of the philosophical and linguistic issues of titanic proportions that underlie it. In the case at hand, the submerged part of the iceberg comprises issues such as quotation, simulation, echoic uses, irony, polysemy, knowledge acquisition, justification, cognitive architecture and concepts.

The next chapter will be focused on the defense of the thesis that opaque belief reports are cases of deliberate deference, and the consequences of this position.
1 Introduction

In this chapter, we will explore the consequences of our thesis that opaque belief reports are a proper subclass of deliberate deference cases. Some of the theoretical pieces that we have been dealing with in the previous chapters will have to be rearranged in the aftermath of our view. The first section comprises a full statement of our thesis and a preliminary approach to some of its benefits. The mode of presentation problem will be addressed in the second section, where a proposal about the logical form of belief reports is also presented. Before the final evaluation of the paradox of meaning, we will show how some non-obvious cases where problems for the principle of substitutivity of co-intensional expressions arise can be analyzed within this strategy.

Ascriptions with an Attitude
Neftalí Villanueva Fernández / Supervisor: María José Frápolli Sanz
Universidad de Granada
2 Deference and opacity again

Opaque reports as a proper subclass of deliberate deference cases

Contrary to what we saw in Recanati’s version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory, we think that there is only one source of opacity: deliberate deference. The list of authors that took quotational intrusions to be at the basis of alleged failures of intensional substitutivity is long, and we have seen many examples of this idea along the previous chapters. From Quine and Sellars to Recanati, they all believe that opacity cannot be treated in isolation from other related natural language phenomena, like quotation, mixed quotation, etc. One of the first occurrences of the expression ‘transparent’ associated with substitutivity problems is in Whitehead and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica*. Transparent expressions are used to say something about a different thing, but nothing is said about the expression itself (Whitehead 1910, App. C). In contrast with this clear-cut intuition about the origin of opacity, the analysis of belief reports has stubbornly tried to offer an answer to a different worry. A theory about belief reports must offer not only an approach to the logico-semantic/pragmatic –inferential– properties of an utterance containing a belief sentence what a theory about belief reports must offer, but it must also respond to our natural worries about the composition of our thoughts. Here, we are not interested in “limning” the inner nature of the mental. This is quite an interesting topic, but it is not necessarily the primary aim of a theory about the meaning of belief reports. Thus, our approach is designed to respond only to the inferential particularities of belief reports. The most straightforward way to reach this goal is considering opacity as a result of a process of deference.

We think that every opaque belief report contains an episode of deference. When we say that Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly but she does not believe that Clark Kent can, we are appealing to a shared piece of knowledge about the peculiar way Lois has of using these terms, even though they are co-referential. If John wants to say (1) to María in such a way that the proposition expressed by its utterance does not imply the proposition expressed by an utterance of (2) in this context, John has to be sure that this shared knowledge about Lois’s peculiar use of ‘Superman’ is salient enough.
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(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.

(2) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly.

John has to be sure that María knows about Lois Lane’s deviant use of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, and has to be certain that this information is active enough as to take part in the process of interpretation of his utterances in this context. An opaque report is one in which both speaker and audience agree that the believer would assent to an utterance of the embedded sentence. (1) and (2) are opaque because John and María think that Lois would assent to an utterance of ‘Superman can fly’ and would dissent to an utterance of ‘Clark Kent can fly’. John has to suppose that María thinks that, and María has to suppose that of John. Only in this kind of context a belief report can be declared opaque.

Likewise, an utterance can only be analyzed as a successful case of deliberate deference if a number of common assumptions take place. Sergio can only say to me that Antonio has just come back from Bahrain through the utterance of (3) if he thinks that I think that Antonio systematically confuses Qatar with Bahrain. He has to suppose as well that I think that he intends this piece of information to be relevant for the interpretation of his utterances.

(3) Antonio has just come back from Qatar.

In such a context, by the utterance of (3), Sergio will be telling me that Antonio has just come back from Bahrain. Usually all this background is provided by a previous conversation about the deferee. In normal deliberate deference cases, like the utterance of (3) in this context, the information belonging to the relevant background concerns the conceptual habits of the deferee. We can say (3) to mean that Antonio has just come back from Bahrain because we think that Antonio confuses Qatar with Bahrain. But all we need in order to give the truth conditions of such an utterance is a consideration about Antonio’s linguistic deviation from the standard linguistic pattern for the use of the expressions ‘Qatar’ and ‘Bahrain’. The same happens in opaque belief reports. It is knowledge about the conceptual habits of the believer that is part of the necessary background, but all we need to have in mind to represent the meaning of an utterance of (1) is the believer’s linguistic deviation from the norm. In the context
just described, Lois can be said to believe that Superman can fly but that Clark Kent cannot because she does not know that Superman is Clark Kent, but this does not necessarily have to reach the truth conditions as such. In deliberate deference cases that do not involve doxastic operators, we do not intend to end up with a representation of the deferee’s conceptual structure, even if it is an epistemic peculiarity—or the supposition that there is one—that allows the deferential process to take place. Why should it be different for the case of opaque belief reports? In cases of deference as much as in cases of opacity, epistemic confusions only reach the surface of verbal communication through apparent deviations from the linguistic norm.

Two related theses
We want to disclose two theses that directly follow from our consideration of opaque belief reports as a proper subclass of deliberate deference cases:

1) Deliberately deferential utterances of belief sentences can be used to make transparent belief reports.

2) Most transparent belief reports are cases of default deference.

There are transparent deliberately deferential utterances of belief sentences. Recanati distinguishes between cumulative and non-cumulative belief reports. The rationale of the distinction is to be able to isolate those cases in which Semantic Innocence does not hold. An utterance of (1) in the context just described would be called ‘cumulative’ by Recanati because it implies the transparent reading. Cumulative opaque reports contain the singular proposition that the embedded sentence would have expressed in case of being uttered in a non-embedded context. We think that the departure from Semantic Innocence is a phenomenon that far exceeds the limits of belief reports. A whole subclass of cases involving a translinguistic-context shift—deliberate deference cases—escapes Semantic Innocence restrictions. Non-cumulative cases will be those deliberate deferential utterances in which the target—output—language is intentionally different from the source—input—language, i.e. the reference of directly referential expressions has changed or the concepts expressed by the utterance of the predicates of these languages does not remain the same. The idiolect of a child who calls philosophy
‘philosophy’ and that of a messed up philosophy student who confuses Daniel Dennett with Robert Brandom are \textit{intensionally} different from standard English. In standard English, an utterance of ‘philosophy’ expresses no concept at all, and ‘Robert Brandom’ refers to Robert Brandom, and not to Daniel Dennett. The propositions expressed in non-cumulative examples do not entail the propositions expressed via deferential by default utterances of the same sentences.

In our view, deference and free enrichment are both needed to provide an account of opacity. Deference alone does not grant opacity. Recanati thinks that the utterance of (4) in a context as the one described above would qualify as an opaque report just because ‘Qatar’ refers to Bahrain instead of Qatar. ‘Qatar’ cannot be substituted by any co-referential expression because its contribution to the truth conditions is not Qatar, but Bahrain.

(4) Antonio believes that Qatar is a very nice country.

Fair enough, if ‘Qatar’ does not refer to Qatar, no expression referring to Qatar can be substituted for it in an utterance of (4) in this context \textit{salva veritate}. But is this really a proof that opacity is involved in this utterance? When a \textit{non-cumulative} trans-linguistic context-shift takes place, like it does in some cases of deliberate deference, it makes no sense to check whether substitutivity holds with expressions that were co-referential in the \textit{input language}. Non-cumulative deferential utterances of belief sentences \textit{can} be used to make transparent reports. Take this example. Sergio finds the fact that Antonio confuses Bahrain with Qatar amusing, and we have been making jokes about it for a while. Now we are talking about María, who is struggling with a PhD about the socio-economic situation of the Persian Gulf. Sergio and I think that María knows almost everything there is to know about the region. Among other things, we suppose her to know the local names of these countries. That is, we assume that there is no particular feature of her behavior \{has optado por ortografía americana?\} that can be explained appealing to a special deviation from the standard linguistic norm. In this context, the proposition expressed by (5) entails both a normal interpretation of (6) and a deferential reading of (7).

(5) María believes that “Qatar” is a very funny country.
(6) María believes that Mamlakat Bahrayn is a very funny country.

(7) María believes that Dawlat Qatar is a very funny country.

A certain belief is attributed to María using Antonio’s peculiar idiolect, whose amusing particularities are specially salient at this point of the conversation. (5) contains the local name for Bahrain, ‘Mamlakat Bahrayn’, and (6) the local name for Qatar, ‘Dawlat Qatar’. Sergio’s relying on Antonio’s linguistic knowledge to provide the meaning of ‘Qatar’ in (4) is not enough to prompt opacity. ‘Qatar’ can be substituted for any co-referential term. They just have to be co-referential in the output language, i.e. Antonio’s idiolect. Despite appearances, the utterance of (5) in this context is transparent. Sergio and I do not take María’s assent to an utterance of the sentence embedded in (5) to be a necessary condition for the truth of the proposition expressed by (5). The utterance of (5) in this context is a non-cumulative deliberately deferential utterance of a belief sentence that expresses a transparent belief report.

But we do not need to take advantage of the fact that the believer and the deferee may be different persons to produce examples of transparent reports made via non-cumulative deliberately deferential utterances. If Sergio and I know that Antonio is mad about geography and usually reads everything he can in connection to the countries he is going to visit, we may reasonably suppose that before his tour through the Persian Gulf, he was well aware of the local names for the countries of the region. Antonio, in spite of all his geography knowledge, confuses Bahrain with Qatar. The headings of the reports he found in the internet were switched. We know that, and Sergio says (4) to me. With this slight modification, the proposition expressed by (4) implies the proposition expressed by a normal utterance of (8) and a deferential reading of (9).

(8) Antonio believes that Mamlakat Bahrayn is a very nice country.

(9) Antonio believes that Dawlat Qatar is a very nice country.

Speaker and audience recognize in Antonio at least the same capacity they have to produce expressions whose reference is Bahrain. Any expression co-referential with ‘Qatar’ in this context could be interchanged for it salva veritate. The proposition expressed by the
utterance of (4) in this new context does not contain any information relative to the form of the word ‘Qatar’. The deferential process affects only the character of the expression, as we saw in the previous chapters. The content of the word ‘Qatar’ in this context is Bahrain, and this reference is reached, in a sense, transparently. Any other word referring to Bahrain could take its place in the utterance and the content would remain constant. If we wanted the proposition expressed by (4) not to grant inferences to propositions like those expressed by (8) and (9), free enrichment would have to be playing a second role, besides introducing the deferential operator as an unarticulated constituent.

Just to make clear that Antonio’s possible assent to the embedded sentence in (4) plays no role in the utterance we analyze, imagine that Pedro calls Bahrain ‘Brain’ and that this piece of shared knowledge is sufficiently salient in the conversation. The proposition expressed by (4) in this context would be equivalent to the proposition expressed by an utterance of (10) in this context, even if Sergio and I knew that Antonio had never met Pedro:

(10) Antonio believes that “Brain” is a very nice country.

Clearly, Antonio would not admit ‘Brain is a very nice country’ as one of his beliefs, but this is irrelevant in order to assess the correctness of the inferences between (4) and (10) in this context.

Non-cumulative deliberately deferential utterances can be used to express transparent reports, both when the deferee and the believer differ and when they coincide. Cumulative deliberately deferential utterances of belief sentences, on the other hand, are systematically associated with opaque belief reports. The deferential process involved in cases like the utterance of (1) is not focused on the reference of ‘Superman’. ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ do still have the same reference in Lois Lane’s idiolect, and this is why Semantic Innocence holds for this set of cases, but a peculiar aspect of Lois’s use of these terms is taken to be relevant for the truth conditions of the global utterance, stopping the inference from (1) to (2). The language-shift is not intensional for these cases. The contents of directly referential expressions do not move an inch. Yet Lois’s use of the terms is taken to be important to address the inferential import of the utterance. It is in this sense that we think deference is involved in cumulative cases as well. A particular aspect of Lois linguistic hab-
its, one that usually would not have any weight in the truth conditions of her utterances, becomes a decisive factor of the opaque attribution. We go into some details on this particular matter on section 3.

**Most transparent belief reports are cases of default deference.** The shared difference between the linguistic knowledge that speaker and audience attribute to the believer and their own essentially determines the appearance of opacity. In those cases in which speaker and audience think that the believer’s use of words does not dissent from theirs, simply there is no reason to highlight an aspect of the believer’s idiolect in order to explain her behavior. If speaker and audience think that Lois Lane knows about Superman exactly what they know, Lois’s peculiar use of ‘Superman’ will never reach the truth conditions of their utterances. If a colleague journalist at The Globe is talking with a friend about Lois, and they have no clue about Superman’s secret identity, we may suppose that their utterance of (1) will be intended to be transparent. There can be no feature of Lois’s behavior that they may try to explain by her being unaware that Superman is Clark Kent, because they do not know that Superman is Clark Kent either.

Now, saying that speaker’s and audience’s beliefs are relevant to determine whether we face a transparent or an opaque report does not entail that the meaning of the report is dependant on their point of view. They rely on the standard norm to fix the meaning of the words they are using. The contribution of the embedded proposition in the utterance of ‘Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly’ in this context is identical with the proposition expressed by an utterance of ‘Superman can fly’ in this context. We assume that speaker’s and audience’s ignorance of the details of Superman’s secret identity is irrelevant for the truth conditions of ‘Superman can fly’ in this context. Their intention is to stick to the norm. The point of view is important to determine whether we are going to face a transparent report or an opaque one, but the meanings of the words involved in the utterance are the ones they receive in public language. This is one of the benefits of taking most transparent reports to be cases of default deference utterances instead of just talking about the difference regarding the point of view.

The lady that comes home from the doctor and speaks to her husband about her pain, could have said (11):
(11) The doctor believes that I have arthritis.

As we saw in the case of the bogus doctor, the truth-conditions of ‘I have arthritis’ are neither fixed by the lady’s beliefs about the nature of the illness nor by the first-expert-at-hand’s opinion about what arthritis is. Cases of falsity due to misunderstanding show that the meaning of the terms in cases of default deference is fixed by the language parameter established in the first place for this context. Even if the lady and her husband think that arthritis is a disease of the muscles, her utterance of ‘I have arthritis’ will be true just in case she suffers from her articulations. If the lady and her husband think that the doctor is a real one, they will have no reason to suppose that the doctor’s use of ‘arthritis’ somehow differs from the norm. So, the utterance of (11) will express a true proposition if the doctor believes that the lady suffers from her articulations, no matter what the lady and her husband may think about the meaning of ‘arthritis’. Their point of view does not determine the meaning of the words they are using here. Their confidence in the doctor prompts a transparent interpretation, despite of their lacking the full concept expressed by ‘arthritis’. Considering transparent belief reports as the result of default deference utterances is the best way to accommodate these cases.

A different but related benefit of our view on transparent reports is that the alleged ambiguity of the verb ‘believe’ can now be seen under a different light. Quine was not satisfied with the verb ‘believe’ being equally able to express alternatively opaque and transparent reports (Quine 1956), and we somehow sympathize with this opinion, even though our reasons could not be more dissimilar. Disambiguation is a semantic process that is commonly assumed to take place prior to the intervention of pragmatic processes of enrichment. The opacity of belief reports is highly context-sensitive. To make an opaque report, a lot of contextual information needs to be salient enough in the context, as we have explained above. The speaker has to exploit various contextual features in order to convey that the appropriate pieces of information are shared and active when making her utterance, for it to be recognized as an opaque report by the audience. The amount of effort required to produce and interpret opaque and transparent belief reports is radically different. It is not a process of disambiguation that makes the audience decide whether a certain utterance expresses an opaque report or not; many contextual features have to be taken into account.
Not only semantically-minded people have resisted the idea that ‘believe’ was ambiguous. Those who wanted to maintain that the intuitions of the speakers about the difference in the truth-conditions of (1) and (2) could be explained using conversational implicatures sometimes use special maxims to accomplish their purpose. One of the special principles they use is the maxim of faithfulness. As seen in chapter 5, this maxim states that the speaker must report a belief by using, if possible, the same expressions the believer might have used to report the same belief. This intuition about the default character of opaque interpretation is clearly opposed to Jaszczolt’s view that there is a default de re principle (Jaszczolt 1999, 121 and ff.):

The de re reading of sentences ascribing beliefs is the default reading. Other readings constitute degrees of departure from the default, arranged on the scale of the strength of intentionality of the corresponding mental state (op. cit. 190).

We take Jaszczolt’s side in this debate, but the argument we have to favor this option has nothing to do with a broader conception of the mental. Our line of reasoning requires two steps: 1) iterated belief reports could not be understood on a regular basis if there weren’t a default inclination for one of the options, and 2) it is reasonable to suppose that as we add belief operators, our belief report becomes more and more probably transparent. Utterances of (12) and (13) may take a bit of thought, but there is no doubt that they can be understood as meaningful with some patience:

(12) Lana Lang believes that Batman believes that Superman can fly.

(13) Lana Lang believes that Spiderman believes that Batman believes that Superman is an oculist.

Let’s take a quick look at the epistemic possibilities. Lana Lang may be aware/unaware that Batman is Bruce Wayne, she may be aware/unaware that Superman is Clark Kent, and she may be aware/unaware that Batman/Bruce Wayne is aware/unaware that Superman is Clark Kent. With a couple more of expressions susceptible to be interpreted as opaque, ‘Spiderman’ and ‘being an oculist’, the
number of possibilities spectacularly increases. The amount of information needed to favor one of these interpretations and exclude the others is huge. It is absurd to suppose that every speaker willing to say (12) or (13) has to manipulate so many contextual features to be sure that the audience appropriately grasps the correct option. We think that the most reasonable way to accommodate this situation is refusing to go along with the implicature theorists in saying that there is a conversational maxim that systematically favors the opaque interpretation\textsuperscript{20}. There must be a favored interpretation, and this should be, unless other way to explain iterated belief reports comes up, the transparent one.

We do not need to postulate any new principle to grant the preeminence of transparent cases. Most transparent reports are made via instances of default deference. In default deference, no translinguistic context-shift is involved; speaker and audience rely on the standard norm to determine the meanings of the terms they use. Every belief report made through a default deference utterance will be transparent. In these cases, it is the public use of the words that matters, no particular feature of the believer’s idiolect reaches the truth conditions. In our view, the essential difference between transparent and opaque belief reports is respected and inserted in a wider picture that contains other linguistic phenomena. To deal with the high context-dependency of opacity, we will analyze the three different tasks that free enrichment has to perform in order to produce an opaque belief report.

### 3 Analysis of opaque belief reports

#### Overview

Formally, our approach is very similar to the reconstruction we made of Recanati’s framework in chapter 5. We take belief ascriptions to be formed out of a doxastic operator like \textit{[Lois believes that]} where \textit{Lois} is the believer, and a proposition. The belief operator changes the circumstance of evaluation of the proposition under its scope, as

\textsuperscript{20}The implicature theorists could still say that there are two principles at work here, the maxim of faithfulness and the default de re principle, and that the implicatures carrying the opaque information are generated through a clash of maxims. Even so, the final picture would look rather odd. It would be certainly strange to have two contradictory maxims belonging to the same category of manner.
we saw in chapter 4. This works in the same way for transparent and opaque reports. To deal with opacity, we need free enrichment to perform three different tasks. An opaque report is contextually enriched with a deferential operator, a variadic function, and a hidden indexical. These three elements are introduced by means of top-down pragmatic processes, they are not linguistically mandated. The variadic function turns the monadic operator \[\text{Lois Lane believes that}\] into a dyadic one. This new place of argument if filled by an indexical whose demonstrata —or index— are the expressions under the scope of the deferential operator. The proposition expressed by (1) in an appropriate context would look like (1′):

(1′) Circ_{mode:this} [Lois Lane believes that] (<R_{Lois Lane} (Superman), can fly>, this)

The variadic function Circ makes a dyadic operator out of \[\text{Lois Lane believes that}\], one of the places of argument is occupied by the singular proposition <\text{R}_{\text{Lois Lane}} (\text{Superman}), \text{can fly}\> and the other one by an indexical —the hidden indexical. The deferential operator \(R\) takes ‘Superman’ under its scope and modifies its character. The character of this expression is now the character it has in Lois’s idiolect. As we know, the character function picks the same individual in Lois’s idiolect and in public language, Clark Kent/Superman. This example is cumulative, and Semantic Innocence holds. The expression ‘Superman’ is the demonstratum of the indexical in the second place of argument.

If there are various deferential operators in a report, the demonstratum/a of the hidden indexical will be the expression/s under the scope of the deferential operator in which the believer and the deferee match. Take Sergio, who is talking about Elizabeth, the woman who did not know that ophthalmologists were oculists. As it happens, she is now in Bahrain. We have been talking about Antonio, who confuses Qatar with Bahrain, and Sergio says:

(14) Elizabeth believes that there are lots of good ophthalmologists in Qatar.

If this were a context in which the fact that Elizabeth does not know that ophthalmologists are oculists was necessary to understand the
behavior that Sergio was trying to explain by saying (14), then the
proposition expressed by his utterance would be analyzed in the fol-
lowing way:

\[(14') \text{Circ}_{\text{mode: this}} [\text{Elizabeth believes that}] \left< \text{There are lots of good}\right.
R_{\text{Elizabeth}} (\text{ophthalmologists}) \text{ in } R_{\text{Antonio}} (\text{Qatar}), \text{this}\right>\]

To make justice to the fact that the inference from (14’) to the
proposition expressed by (15) in this context is unsound, we need to
make ‘ophthalmologists’ be the demonstratum of the hidden indexi-
cal.

\[(15) \text{Elizabeth believes that there are lots of good oculists in Qatar.}\]

The version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory defended by Schi-
ffer, Crimmins and Perry cannot offer a treatment of these cases, be-
cause it requires a mode of presentation associated with the believer
to be computed for every constituent of the embedded proposition.
(14’) may be true even if Elizabeth were completely unaware of An-
tonio’s particular use of ‘Qatar’. If a mode of presentation was to be
computed for the expression ‘Qatar’, it would be Antonio’s, with
which Elizabeth may be completely unacquainted.

**The mode of presentation problem**

One of the problems posed by Schiffer against the Hidden-Indexical
Theory concerns the nature of the contribution of the hidden indexi-
cal. A theoretical entity willing to play the role that this theory re-
quires for the modes of presentation must meet the following restric-
tion:

Frege’s Constraint: ‘you cannot rationally believe and disbelieve
something under one and the same mode of presentation, or under
modes of presentation that you realize as modes of presentation of
the same thing’ (Schiffer 1992, 502-503).

Schiffer considers and rejects as viable candidates *individual con-
cepts, general properties, percept tokens, stereotypes, characters,*
Mentalese expressions, functional roles, causal chains, and public language expressions (op. cit 511). The last one will be our favored option, but before getting into that, we must introduce some modifications on Frege’s Constraint.

Our aim is not to come up with an analogous representation of whatever there is in the heads of believers. We try to provide a logical form that guarantees the correct inferences to and from our proposition and excludes the wrong ones. In order to achieve this goal, the representationalist strategy may be efficient, but we prefer to try a shorter way. It is true that the discussion about belief reports seems to make of the representationalist path an almost irresistible option, but we do not have to take it by all means. If we do not let us go with this representationalist tendency, and keep our focus on the logical – inferential – properties of belief reports, all we need a “mode of presentation” to meet is this Modified Frege’s Constraint:

Modified Frege’s Constraint: an agent considered as rational by speaker and audience cannot be said to believe and disbelieve something under one and the same mode of presentation, or under modes of presentation that speaker and audience think that the agent realizes as modes of presentation of the same thing.

This constraint is not completely free from representationalism, but at least it does not blur our purpose in the way the first one did. Natural language expressions can be shown to accomplish this constraint in a framework in which the inferential import of belief reports guides the analysis.

Nunberg distinguishes between the index and the reference of an indexical expression (Nunberg 1993). The index is what we have been calling the demonstratum, the salient object in the context to which the indexical expression points. The reference of the indexical is the contribution to the proposition expressed by the utterance of the sentence containing it. In order to interpret an indexical expression, the context must provide the index and the relation between the index and the reference. Sometimes this relation is identity, but it is not necessarily so. As we take public expressions to be the modes of presentation needed to make sense of opaque reports, most times the relation between the hidden indexical index, the expression/s under the scope of the deferential operator, and its reference will be iden-
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tity. The index of ‘this’ in (1’) is ‘Superman’, and this very expression is its reference in our approach.

(1’’) Circ\textsubscript{mod;this} [Lois Lane believes that] (<R\textsubscript{LoisLane} (Superman), can fly>, ‘Superman’)

The difference with the proposition expressed by the utterance of (2) is clear:

(2’’) Circ\textsubscript{mod;this} [Lois Lane believes that] (<R\textsubscript{LoisLane} (Clark Kent), can fly>, ‘Clark Kent’)

(2’’) cannot be inferred from (1’’), and vice versa, because the expression occupying the second argument place of argument {a mí me suena mejor “argument place” pero lo tienes así en varios sitios y quizá lo sepas tú mejor} is different in both cases. The transparent interpretation of (1) and (2) expresses the same proposition, (1*), and is implied both by (1’’) and (2’’). (1’’) and (2’’) are thus cumulative.

(1*) [Lois Lane believes that] <Superman, can fly>

The narrow semantic contributions of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ to (1’’) and (2’’) are their normal contributions, and the embedded propositions are singular. Our modification respects the inferential import originally attributed to opaque reports –substitutivity is blocked and they imply the transparent reading– and does not alter the innocence of the approach.

Public expressions, words of natural language, appear in the second place of argument of our analysis of belief reports as the reference of the indexical element introduced by means of free enrichment. Lois Lane can be said to believe and disbelieve the singular proposition expressed by ‘Superman can fly’ because the attributions contain two different “modes of presentation”, ‘Superman’ and ‘ClarkKent’.

One of the arguments against this view has to do with the specifically linguistic nature of these modes of presentation. This approach would leave unexplained beliefs ascribed to animals, or to
people that do not speak our language (cfr. Schiffer 1990). Both problems come from an intrusion of the representational view. Our analysis of belief ascriptions is not committed with the believer using this or that public language expression. The inclusion of public language expressions in the determination of the meaning of belief reports is just a way to give an account of the inferential commitment that belief reports carry. As we saw in cases of non-cumulative deliberative deference, an epistemic peculiarity of the deferee is analyzed in purely linguistic terms when it comes to assess the truth-conditions of a statement. Confusions of animals and non-English speakers can be reported in an opaque way, and the analysis of these attributions needs no more than purely linguistic means to be inferentially adequate. The utterance of ‘My dog believes that Superman will feed him today’ does not state a relation of first order between my dog, a proposition and a word. ‘Believes’ does not express a first-order relation in our position, belief reports do not assert a relation between different objects. Consequently, we should not be worried about the problems posed by non-linguistic creatures to our analysis.

In the same spirit, it could be argued that it is odd to suppose that we have a certain belief under a public language word. Two comments could be made to this objection. First, it only comes from the representationalist/descriptivist impetus. Second, as far as I know, no definition for what it is to believe a proposition under a mode of presentation has been provided. As Schiffer says, the notion of ‘mode of presentation’ is a technical one (Schiffer 1992, 501), and we should check the convenience of our candidate with our eyes fixed in the main goal. Our aim is no other than securing those inferences taken as correct from/to our proposition and blocking the incorrect ones. If this can be done using public language words as modes of presentation, I see no reason why this option should be resisted.

4 Some cases

Whether a belief report turns up to receive a transparent or an opaque interpretation depends on certain contextual parameters concerning speaker and audience. Shared information about the conceptual habits of the believer, salient enough at this point of the conversation for both speaker and audience, becomes decisive for the truth conditions
of a belief report. In what follows, we will take a look at the inferential behavior of a report through different contexts, and the adequacy of our analysis will be tested. S stands for the speaker, A for the audience, and ‘Superman’, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Kal-El’ are taken to be three different names for the same individual.

(1) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.
(2) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly.
(16) Lois Lane believes that Kal-El can fly.

Context 1. S and A believe that Superman is Kal-El and Clark Kent. S and A believe that Lois Lane knows that Superman is Kal-El. S and A believe that Lois Lane knows that Superman is Clark Kent. All this information is shared by S and A, active enough at this point of the conversation, and relevant to explain a certain aspect of Lois’s behavior.

Context 2. S and A believe that Superman is Kal-El and Clark Kent. S and A believe that Lois Lane believes that Superman is not Kal-El. S and A believe that Lois Lane believes that Superman is not Clark Kent. S and A believe that Lois Lane believes that Kal-El is not Clark Kent. All this information is shared by S and A, active enough at this point of the conversation, and relevant to explain a certain aspect of Lois’s behavior.

Context 3. S and A believe that Superman is Kal-El and Clark Kent. S and A believe that Lois Lane knows that Superman is Kal-El. S and A believe that Lois Lane believes that Superman is not Clark Kent. All this information is shared by S and A, active enough at this point of the conversation, and relevant to explain a certain aspect of Lois’s behavior.

Context 4. S and A believe that Superman is not Clark Kent. S and A believe that Superman is not Kal-El. S and A believe that Lois Lane knows that Superman is not Clark Kent. S and A believe that Lois Lane knows that Superman is not Kal-El. All this information
is shared by S and A, active enough at this point of the conversation, and relevant to explain a certain aspect of Lois’s behavior.

Context 5. S and A believe that Superman is Clark Kent. S and A believe that Lois Lane believes that Superman is not Clark Kent. All this information is shared by S and A, active enough at this point of the conversation, and relevant to explain a certain aspect of Lois’s behavior. S and A do not believe that Superman is Kal-El. Lois Lane believes that Superman is Kal-El. S and A do not believe that Lois Lane believes that Superman is Kal-El.

In Contexts 1 and 4, speaker and audience attribute to Lois no deviant use of any of the terms in the embedded sentence. Contexts in which speaker and audience’s shared knowledge is identical to the one they attribute to the believer, usually host transparent interpretations of belief reports. There is no reason to give a special role to the believer’s idiolect because it is taken to be identical with the one that speaker and audience share. So, (1), (2) and (16) would express equivalent propositions in this context, under the form of (1*).

Utterances of (1), (2) and (16) in Context 2 receive an opaque interpretation. (1) expresses (1’’), (2) expresses (2’’) and (16) expresses (16’). They all imply the transparent reading (1*) but they are logically independent.

(1’’) Circ_{mode}this [Lois Lane believes that] (<R_{Lois Lane} (Superman), can fly>, ‘Superman’)
(2’’) Circ_{mode}this [Lois Lane believes that] (<R_{Lois Lane} (Clark Kent), can fly>, ‘Clark Kent’)
(16’) Circ_{mode}this [Lois Lane believes that] (<R_{Lois Lane} (Kal-El), can fly>, ‘Kal-El’)

For all speaker and audience know, Lois may be said to believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent or Kal-El can fly.

The intricacies of Context 3 cannot be so directly explained. There, the utterances of (1) and (16) should receive an opaque interpretation, because substitutivity does not hold for the pairs Superman/Clark Kent and Kal-El/Clark Kent. But if S and A trust the
abilities as a journalist of Lois Lane and think that she knows that Superman is Kal-El, then the proposition expressed by the utterance of (1) must be equivalent to the proposition expressed by the utterance of (16). However, what we took to be opaque interpretations of the utterances of (1) and (16), (1'') and (16'') are logically independent. The solution for this difficulty goes as follows: contextual parameters concerning indexical expressions determine not only the demonstratum—the index—but the relation between the demonstratum and the reference as well. This relation was identity in Context 2, but it is not necessary so in this context. Here, the logical form of the propositions expressed by (1) and (16) must grant the inference from one to the other, according to our intuitions. So, we just have to consider that the reference of the hidden indexical here is a pair of expressions, ‘Superman’ and ‘Kal-El’. The propositions expressed by the utterances of (1), (2), and (16) would look like this:

(1!) \text{Circ}_{\text{mode:thi$s$}} \text{[Lois Lane believes that]} \langle \text{R}_{\text{Lois Lane}} \text{ (Superman), can fly}, \text{‘Superman’, ‘Kal-El’} \rangle

(2'') \text{Circ}_{\text{mode:thi$s$}} \text{[Lois Lane believes that]} \langle \text{R}_{\text{Lois Lane}} \text{ (Clark Kent), can fly}, \text{‘Clark Kent’} \rangle

(16!) \text{Circ}_{\text{mode:thi$s$}} \text{[Lois Lane believes that]} \langle \text{R}_{\text{Lois Lane}} \text{ (Kal-El), can fly}, \text{‘Superman’, ‘Kal-El’} \rangle

(1!) and (16!) are equivalent and logically independent from (2''), all of which matches up with our intuitions about the inferential behavior of what is said in this context.

Someone could object to our treatment of Context 3 by saying that, whenever an opaque attribution is made, speaker and audience take for granted every substitution that could receive the believer’s assent. The inclusion of a couple of expressions would block substitutivity, but it would not guarantee the inference to the propositions that Lois could assent to. This could only be achieved by letting the reference of the hidden indexical to be composed by a set of all the expressions to which Lois might assent. In contrast, we think that opacity is a much more local process. Usually opaque reports involve a small set of expressions to explain an episode of the believer’s behavior. The believer is confused about the use of these expressions, as a result of an epistemic problem, and this provokes a particular behavior that is explained by means of opaque belief re-
ports. In order to achieve this goal, the substitution with a larger set of expressions is not in question, what matters is the relationship between the set of expressions—normally no more than two expressions—used to talk about the believer’s confusion.

*Context 5* reinforces our position on this matter. In Context 5, S and A believe that Superman is Clark Kent, and they believe that Lois does not know that. The possibility that Superman may be Kal-El has never crossed S and A’s minds. Lois Lane, on the other hand, has investigated Superman’s past and knows that Superman’s Kryptonian name is Kal-El. The utterance of (1) in this context would express an opaque proposition, because S and A believe that Lois does not know that Superman is Clark Kent. The question whether this proposition should imply or not an opaque reading of an utterance of (16) does not arise because every utterance of (16) in this context would receive a transparent reading. Even though Lois believes that Superman is Kal-El but not Clark Kent, an utterance of (16) would express a transparent proposition like (16’’) because S and A have never thought about Lois’s epistemic state with respect to Superman and Kal-El.

\[(1’’) \text{ Circ}_{\text{modefthis}} \{\text{Lois Lane believes that} (\langle R_{\text{Lois Lane}} (\text{Superman}), \text{can fly} \rangle, \text{‘Superman’})\}\]

\[(16’’) \{\text{Lois Lane believes that} <\text{Kal-El, can fly}>\]\n
Thus, in this context, the proposition expressed by the utterance of (1) would trivially imply the proposition expressed by (16), simply because (1’’) is cumulative and the proposition expressed by the utterance of (16) corresponds to its transparent reading.

A harmless modification of our approach is able to cope with our intuitions about the inferential behavior of the utterances of (1), (2), and (16) in these five different contexts. And this job is done with public language words working as “modes of presentation”.

5 Conclusion

We have spelled out in this chapter some of the details of the version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory that we support. Two characteristics distinguish our approach from the common alternatives within the
Hidden-Indexical Theory: under our framework, belief reports are a proper subclass of deliberately deferential utterances, and public language expressions play the role of modes of presentation. Cases of transparent deliberately deferential utterances of belief sentences have been provided, and it has been shown how the preeminence of transparent cases is explained in a straightforward manner as we take most transparent reports to be cases of default deference. Our solution to the mode of presentation problem has been proved to be a good choice by means of checking its performance with some non-obvious cases.

With respect to the Paradox of Meaning, Recanati’s version of the Hidden-Indexical Theory and our approach stand in the same position. Int and Direct Reference are fully respected, while Compositionality and Semantic Innocence face the problems explained in chapter 5.

The “radical” approach to the analysis of the truth conditions of belief attributions presented here is one of the central pieces of the general position held in this work. Before addressing the problem of opacity in isolation, it had to be properly distinguished from other related phenomena, like the ambiguity of Buridan cases and the relational/notional distinction. Exportation has been discarded as a reliable mechanism to set opaque cases apart from transparent ones; failures of Intensional MGPS are the only trace of opacity. A theory about the truth conditions of opaque utterances should essentially justify our intuitions concerning the inferential import of opaque and transparent propositions regarding substitutivity of co-intensional expressions. Our proposal is exclusively focused on this point, and with that it deals reasonably well.
References


Ascriptions with an Attitude
Neftalí Villanueva Fernández / Supervisor: María José Frápolli Sanz
Universidad de Granada


Resumen y conclusiones

Tenemos por un lado un problema y por otro más de cien años de literatura. Los supuestos fallos del principio de sustitutividad se han presentado bajo una enorme cantidad de apariencias, en muchos contextos diferentes, y en relación con una inenumerable selección de temas tanto filosóficos como extra filosóficos. No sé si es posible hacer una reconstrucción histórica exhaustiva de las vicisitudes del problema, pero desde luego no es el objetivo de este trabajo. Queremos ocuparnos del escuálido problema de la sustitutividad, y arrojar alguna nueva luz sobre él, incluso defender una nueva solución para él.

Adquirir una intuición de primera mano acerca de la naturaleza del problema es muy sencillo; es uno de los problemas más fáciles de formular de la filosofía del lenguaje, uno de los que los civiles pueden comprender sin necesidad de ningún aparato teórico especial. La sustitutividad salva veritate es una norma de lo más intuitiva, y a casi cualquier persona cuyo uso del lenguaje no esté deformado por la investigación conceptual le parece evidente. Si “Batman” y “Bruce Wayne” son nombres del mismo tipo, entonces puedes colocar “Batman” en lugar de “Bruce Wayne” en “Bruce Wayne vive en Wayne Manor” y el resultado será verdadero en las mismas circunstancias. Es decir, tanto “Bruce Wayne vive en Wayne Manor” como “Batman vive en Wayne Manor” serán verdaderas si Batman/Bruce Wayne vive en Wayne Manor, y falsas en caso
contrario. Sorprendentemente, tampoco acerca de las supuestas excepciones a esta norma tan intuitiva cabe el menor atisbo de duda. Edipo creía que su mujer era la mujer más sexy de Tebas, pero no creía que su propia madre fuera sexy en absoluto. Cuando descubre que está casado con su madre, se hiere de un modo terrible. Su reacción nos puede parecer un poco exagerada, pero la situación en general tiene sentido porque podemos hablar de ella de un modo que todos podemos comprender, a pesar de que suponga un problema para la sustitutividad. Del mismo modo, de la última conquista del playboy millonario Bruce Wayne puede decirse que cree que Bruce Wayne es un caballero generoso mientras que Batman es una salvaje criatura de las tinieblas.

No sólo la anagnórisis de los héroes trágicos y las historias acerca de enmascarados personajes con superpoderes albergan este tipo de dificultades para la sustitutividad. Ejemplos de la vida cotidiana aparecen casi constantemente cuando intentamos explicar el comportamiento de una persona confundida o engañada. Esa pobre gente que no sospecha que el lucero del alba es el lucero del atardecer, que Bizancio es Estambul, que Julian Edwin Adderley es Cannonball, etc., ha venido sirviendo de ejemplo a los teóricos desde los albores de la disciplina. A priori, cada vez que haya un desequilibrio entre el conocimiento compartido entre hablante y oyente y la disposición epistémica que atribuyen a la persona a la que adscriben la creencia, la situación comunicativa puede acabar albergando un caso que resulte problemático para el principio de sustitutividad.

Pero, ¿está realmente claro cuál es el problema? No siempre se distingue apropiadamente entre los fallos del principio de sustitutividad y los casos que ponen en peligro otras reglas generales acerca de cómo ha de estructurarse una teoría del significado. Antes de centrarnos en la cuestión acerca de cómo hemos de dar cuenta de los ejemplos que aparentemente suponen un problema para el principio de sustitutividad, debemos llevar a cabo un trabajo meticuloso que nos permita diferenciar el principio de sustitutividad de otros principios semánticos y separar los casos que efectivamente amenazan la sustitutividad de otros que parecen similares pero que realmente instancian otras peculiaridades lógicas relativas a principios distintos.

Nuestra opinión con respecto al grupo de normas generales formado por la sustitutividad, la referencia directa, la inocencia semántica y la composicionalidad, toda vez que estén apropiadamente formulados, es que deben ser tratados como principios regulativos, y
conservados en una teoría acerca del lenguaje hasta que no quede más remedio que rebajar o desechar alguno de ellos. Hay que pensar que son inocentes hasta que no se demuestre lo contrario. La situación “trágica” a la que una teoría acerca del significado de las adscripciones de creencia ha de enfrentarse consiste en la confluencia de varios principios que parecen igualmente válidos pero que no es posible mantener a la vez. Referencia directa, inocencia semántica, composicionalidad y sustitutividad son incompatibles en conjunto con una actitud sincera de respeto hacia la opinión de los agentes involucrados en un episodio comunicativo con respecto al significado de los actos que llevan a cabo. Esta concepción ampliada del problema que suponen los ejemplos en los que el principio de sustitutividad parece estar en peligro es una buena herramienta para tratar las diferentes alternativas teóricas, compararlas y extraer conclusiones acerca de sus virtudes y defectos. Frege sacrificó la inocencia semántica y la referencia directa, Hintikka sólo la referencia directa, o algún aspecto de ella, los teóricos de la implicatura minusvaloran las intuiciones de los hablantes, el tratamiento que la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto hace del principio de composicionalidad está lejos de ser considerado suficiente, y así sucesivamente. Aumentar el alcance del problema es un buen modo de tratar las opciones históricas y de evaluar las consecuencias positivas de las nuevas propuestas. Una de las ventajas de dedicarse a la investigación de cuestiones teóricas es que cuando uno descubre que se encuentra ante una situación trágica no tiene por qué arrancarse los ojos, sino que puede incluso sacar provecho de ello.

La naturaleza ha provisto amablemente a los filósofos de una imaginación de proporciones gigantescas. Durante el período en el que la discusión acerca del reduccionismo estuvo más de moda, los problemas de sustitutividad llegaron a ser considerados la prueba irrefutable del carácter único del género humano con respecto al resto de los animales. Los humanos explicamos nuestro comportamiento a través de un tipo especial de expresiones que se diferencian de modo cualitativo de las que usamos para dar cuenta de los fenómenos del mundo que nos rodea. Alfí, en alguna parte en el lenguaje natural, hay un irreducible grupo de expresiones que preservan en soledad la “marca de lo mental”. Afortunadamente, el tiempo cambia algunas actitudes, y toda esta historia del Santo Grial de lo mental sólo ha sobrevivido en las mentes de algunos templarios del concepto chapados a la antigua. Sin embargo, algunas de las ideas que se forjaron en ese momento histórico han acabado perdurando a lo largo
de los años y ahora se las suele presentar como parte de la roca sólida de la disciplina. Algunas de estas suposiciones recogen importantes intuiciones acerca de cuál podría ser el tratamiento que recibiera el significado de las adscripciones de creencia, y merece la pena defenderlas, pero otras no son más que viejos prejuicios que, en mi opinión, no han ayudado demasiado a clarificar los puntos centrales del problema. Antes de entrar en detalle en el análisis del significado de las adscripciones de creencia que aquí defendemos, someteremos a una consideración crítica algunas de estas asunciones inveteradas.

Uno de los ejemplos más claros de la tendencia a la sobreexplotación que experimenta la imaginación de los filósofos cuando se enfrentan a este temática tiene que ver con la naturaleza de los objetos de pensamiento. Dos estrategias diferentes han sido usadas para enlazar el problema de la composición de nuestros pensamientos con el análisis de las adscripciones de creencia. El primer grupo de filósofos diría que no es posible dar cuenta del significado de las adscripciones de creencia sin saber antes qué sea creer algo. El segundo grupo mantendría la directiva opuesta: la investigación acerca del significado de las adscripciones de creencia nos dará las claves de los componentes del pensamiento. Las dos alternativas están igualmente desencaminadas, y llevan consigo conjuntos de intuiciones que a menudo hacen que las opciones teóricas más efectivas no puedan siquiera tomarse en consideración. Un teoría acerca del significado de un determinado grupo de expresiones, tal y como concebimos esta tarea aquí, debe ofrecernos una abstracción consistente de sus capacidades inferenciales. La forma lógica de las adscripciones de creencia no revelará de repente la naturaleza de nuestros pensamientos, y no tiene por qué hacerlo, su cometido es mostrar de un modo consistente cuál es el papel que la adscripción desempeña en las argumentaciones en las que aparece.

Bajo la etiqueta de “la marca de lo mental”, se agrupan de un modo confuso mucho fenómenos distintos del lenguaje natural. El único de todos ellos que nos interesa en este trabajo es el problema de la opacidad. En las adscripciones opacas, algunas expresiones no pueden ser sustituidas *salva veritate* por otras que tienen el mismo significado. Creemos que el resto de criterios que han sido usados para distinguir las adscripciones opacas de las transparentes y marcar el carácter irreducible de las primeras en realidad corresponden a distinciones diferentes, o simplemente no sirven para discriminar ningún grupo de adscripciones de creencia. En particular, no pensamos que la ambigüedad de alcance entre operadores doxásticos y
cuantificadores existenciales afecte a las condiciones de verdad de las adscripciones de creencia.

Nuestra propuesta positiva para el tratamiento del significado de las adscripciones de creencia se caracteriza por el puesto central que en ella ocupa la deferencia y por defender la hipótesis de que las palabras del lenguaje público pueden ser usadas como “modos de presentación”. Las superficies transparentes permiten ver lo que hay detrás de ellas, mientras que las opacas impiden que pase la luz, y bloquean, con ello nuestra visión. Las adscripciones opacas han sido llamadas en ocasiones “translúcidas”, porque no bloquean nuestra visión, sino que simplemente convierten el medio en una parte de lo que vemos, lo hacen relevante. Al mirar a través del cristal de una ventana, podemos enfocar lo que hay detrás o fijarnos también en el cristal, con lo que nos damos cuenta al instante de las posibles imperfecciones de la superficie. Así, en las adscripciones de creencia las palabras pueden ser usadas de un modo transparente, para hablar acerca de otra cosa, o pueden adquirir una importancia decisiva para el potencial inferencial de la adscripción, en los casos opacos. Cuando el medio se vuelve decisivo, la sustitutividad aparece bloqueada. Nosotros, simplemente, tomamos esta metáfora del modo más literal posible. Si ajustar nuestra mirada puede hacer que algunas de las palabras que usamos resulten insustituibles para entender el comportamiento lógico (inferencial) de las adscripciones de creencia, dejemos que sean las palabras mismas las que se ocupen del problema.

La agenda
El capítulo 1 está dedicado a la idea de sustitutividad. Llevamos este principio desde la Ley de Leibniz a una versión modificada de la sustitutividad intensional, con vistas a comprender el tipo de compromiso al que pondrían en peligro los ejemplos en los que nos vamos a centrar a lo largo de la tesis. Diferenciamos la sustitutividad intensional de otro tipo de ideas acerca de los posibles límites que una teoría que intente dar cuenta de la cuestión del significado en el lenguaje natural debe tener. Se ha defendido que la opacidad no sólo violaba la sustitutividad intensional, sino que también podía suponer un problema para la referencia directa, la inocencia semántica o la composicionalidad. La discusión acerca de estos principios involucra otras cuestiones frecuentemente asociadas con ellos y no siempre distinguidas con cuidado, como la rigidez, la naturaleza de la relación entre nombres y sus referentes dentro de una teoría directamente
referencial, la presencia de expresiones que producen cambios de contexto en el lenguaje natural, el homomorfismo de Montague, el Requisito Gramatical, la iconicidad y la composicionalidad inversa. Consideraremos que respetar las intuiciones de los hablantes es también un desideratum de una teoría acerca del significado de las adscripciones de creencia. Una teoría debe evitar contravenir de un modo sistemático lo que aquéllos involucrados en un episodio comunicativo piensan acerca de la verdad de lo que dicen. La paradoja de la que esta tesis se ocupa reside en la imposibilidad de mantener sustitutividad intensional, inocencia semántica, composicionalidad, referencia directa y respeto por las intuiciones de los hablantes, y dar al mismo tiempo un tratamiento coherente del contenido de ciertas preferencias. No nos vamos a ocupar de todos y cada uno de los ejemplos de los que alguna vez se dijo que podrían reforzar la paradoja del significado. Este capítulo contiene una lista del tipo de casos que analizaremos más tarde en la tesis y una explicación acerca de los motivos por los cuales otros ejemplos se dejan fuera.

La intencionalidad centra las pesquisas del capítulo 2. Tras pagar tributo a los que insisten en cómo han distorsionado las interpretaciones habituales de Brentano dentro de la filosofía analítica el espíritu y la letra del autor, introducimos y discutimos cinco rasgos que se han propuesto para distinguir los contextos intencionales: compromiso existencial, veritativo-funcionalidad, sustitutividad, exportación y tercio excluso. El principio del tercio excluso, en una de sus versiones, es el que mejor capta la distinción entre la interpretación específica y la no específica de los casos de Buridan, mientras que la sustitutividad es lógicamente independiente con respecto al tercio excluido y al compromiso existencial. Concluimos con tres distinciones en lugar de la clásica oposición entre contextos intencionales y contextos no intencionales, donde se decía que la “marca de lo mental” dejaba su huella en el lenguaje natural: interpretaciones específicas versus interpretaciones no específicas de los casos de Buridan, adscripciones relacionales versus adscripciones nocionales y adscripciones transparentes versus adscripciones opacas. Todas las versiones relacionales de un caso de Buridan corresponden con una interpretación específica del mismo, pero no al contrario, y para el resto de las distinciones no se postula ninguna relación de dependencia lógica. La naturaleza de las “intrusiones” de material mencionado también se aborda desde un punto de vista histórico y sistemático en este capítulo. Por lo que concierne a este apartado, nuestra atención se centra en la agenda quineana, el isomorfismo
intensional de Carnap y las distintas respuestas que recibió el argumento de Benson Mates contra la posibilidad de obtener una definición consistente y materialmente adecuada de “sinonimia”. Extraemos algunas consecuencias de esta discusión que reaparecerán más tarde en el trabajo. También descartamos algunas de las propuestas que se han hecho acerca de cuál sea el origen de la opacidad, como la idea de que en las adscripciones transparentes el creyente se encuentra en una relación especial con el objeto de su creencia, o la alternativa que defiende que las adscripciones opacas contienen tanto el punto de vista del hablante como el del creyente mientras que las actitudes transparentes sólo reflejan el del hablante. La opacidad, el fenómeno que asociamos con los fallos de sustitutividad de expresiones co-intensionales, es una consecuencia de una mención encubierta, y el único modo de distinguir las adscripciones transparentes de las opacas es el criterio de sustitutividad intensional.

El argumento que presentamos en el capítulo 4 se estructura del siguiente modo: si hay una distinción justificada entre las circunstancias de evaluación y el contexto de interpretación, y los operadores de creencia son operadores de cambio de circunstancia, entonces la exportación no es un método útil para separar dos interpretaciones genuinamente diferentes de las adscripciones de creencia. Rechazamos la idea quineana de que la diferencia de alcance entre los cuantificadores existenciales y los operadores de creencia puede ser usada para dar cuenta de la diferencia entre adscripciones transparentes y adscripciones opacas. Las dificultades para “exportar” el material que cae bajo el alcance de los operadores de creencia no pueden ser consideradas la marca de nacimiento de las actitudes opacas en una teoría que defiende que los operadores de creencia son operadores de cambio de circunstancia. Analizamos las nociones de cambio de circunstancia y cambio de contexto e introducimos de un modo básico la “semántica Austiniana”. Nos ocupamos también de considerar generalmente las ambiguiedades de alcance a las condiciones de verdad, para lo cual tomamos en consideración las posibles coincidencias de cuantificadores existenciales y universales, operadores modales alétticos y temporales. Finalmente, nos ocupamos de una posible objeción al argumento que se presenta en este capítulo y tratamos de contemporizar la posible reacción de aquellos acostumbrados a pensar que la propuesta de Quine acerca del alcance de los cuantificadores existenciales y doxásticos era una de las verdades por antonomasia de la filosofía del lenguaje.
En el capítulo 5 nos ocupamos de algunas de las teorías que abordan la paradoja del significado mediante la debilitación del principio de composicionalidad o el respeto hacia las intuiciones de los hablantes, en lugar de centrarse en la reforma de la sustitutividad intensional, como habían hecho los interesados en la noción de sinonimia, o renunciar al componente de rigidez que poseen las teorías de la referencia directa como hizo Hintikka. La Teoría de la Implicatura es fuertemente revisionista con respecto a las intuiciones de los hablantes, pero se las arregla para mantener con bastante solvencia el resto de los principios. No nos satisface de esta estrategia el hecho de que se aleje tanto de la opinión que los involucrados en una conversación tienen acerca de la verdad de lo que están diciendo y que encuentre graves problemas para poder alcanzar una formulación coherente y efectiva. La alternativa que consideramos aquí entre las teorías que respetan naturaleza contexto-dependiente de las adscripciones de creencia es la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto. La mejor formulación de esta teoría es la llevada a cabo por Recanati, que reconstruimos detalladamente en este capítulo. Entre los problemas que Schiffer delineó en contra de la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto, el problema del significado y la intención, el problema de la forma lógica y el problema del modo de presentación, sólo el último es realmente persistente. Al final de este capítulo desarrollamos un argumento en contra de la compatibilidad entre un tratamiento coherente de las adscripciones de creencia iteradas, la inocencia semántica y una actitud no revisionista acerca de las intuiciones de los hablantes.

El tema que centra nuestra atención en el capítulo 6 es la deferencia. Distinguimos entre deferencia deliberada y deferencia por defecto. En las preferencias deliberadamente deferenciales, el hablante hace depender el significado de las palabras que se incluyen en la oración que profiere del conocimiento lingüístico de alguna otra persona. Hablante y oyente toman el significado de una determinada preferencia como si estuviera determinado por las reglas que gobiernan un sociolecto o idiolecto particulares. El parámetro del lenguaje que contiene cada contexto cambia, y la preferencia ha de ser interpretada con respecto a una norma diferente. Para los casos de deferencia por defecto, por otro lado, no postulamos ningún cambio de contexto translingüístico y las reglas que gobiernan el significado de lo que decimos pertenecen al lenguaje que aparece en el parámetro correspondiente del contexto en el que se profiere la oración, ya sea un idiolecto, un sociolecto o el lenguaje público. Analizamos algunos de
los mecanismos contextuales que han de ser manipulados para que el hablante logre dar a entender que intenta que su preferencia se interprete como producto de un proceso de deferencia deliberada, y evaluamos las conexiones entre la deferencia lingüística y otros fenómenos relacionados, como la deferencia epistémica y los casos de conocimiento incompleto de los conceptos que uno usa.

En el capítulo 7 nos ocupamos de la versión de la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto que favorecemos en este trabajo. El capítulo se estructura alrededor de dos tesis: 1) las adscripciones de creencia opacas son una subclase propia de las preferencias deliberadamente deferenciales, y 2) las palabras del lenguaje público pueden llevar a cabo de un modo efectivo el papel que tradicionalmente se asigna a los “modos de presentación” en una teoría acerca del significado de las adscripciones de creencia. Damos ejemplos de adscripciones transparentes realizadas mediante el uso de preferencias deliberadamente deferenciales, tanto casos en los que el creyente y la persona sobre la cual se defiere no coinciden como casos en los que es el mismo individuo aquel al que adscribimos una creencia y aquel de cuyo conocimiento lingüístico hacemos depender el significado de algunas de las palabras que usamos. También analizamos los beneficios que una teoría obtiene al considerar que la mayoría de las adscripciones transparentes se llevan a cabo a través de preferencias deferenciales por defecto. En lo tocante al segundo gran lema, mostramos que podemos usar simples palabras del lenguaje natural para dar cuenta del potencial inferencial de las adscripciones opacas de creencia. Para alcanzar este resultado, introducimos algunas modificaciones en el criterio que determina la naturaleza teórica de la noción de “modo de presentación”, damos argumentos en contra de las objeciones clásicas que nuestra opción provoca y probamos que el tipo de análisis resultante de nuestra posición, que incluye expresiones del lenguaje público en lugar de modos de presentación, explica perfectamente algunos casos no obvios.

1 La teoría que defendemos

Vamos a explorar en este capítulo las consecuencias de nuestra tesis de que las adscripciones opacas de creencia son una subclase propia de los casos de deferencia deliberada. Algunas de las piezas teóricas
que hemos tratado en los capítulos anteriores deberán reordenarse como consecuencia de nuestra alternativa. La primera sección comprende una formulación completa de la tesis y un acercamiento preliminar a algunas de sus ventajas. El problema del modo de presentación es tratado en la segunda sección, en la que también presentamos una propuesta acerca de la forma lógica de las adscripciones de creencias. Justo antes de la evaluación final de la paradoja del significado, mostraremos cómo pueden ser analizados dentro de nuestra estrategia algunos casos no obvios en los que encontramos problemas para el principio de sustitutividad de expresiones co-intensionales.

2 Deferencia y opacidad

Adscripciones opacas como una subclase propia de los casos de deferencia deliberada

Al contrario de lo que vimos acerca de la versión de Recanati de la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto, nosotros pensamos que la opacidad sólo proviene de una fuente: la deferencia deliberada. La lista de autores que han colocado las intrusiones de información mencionada a la base de los aparentes fallos de la sustitutividad intencional es larga. Desde Quine y Sellars a Recanati, todos ellos creen que la opacidad no puede ser tratada de un modo aislado con respecto a otros fenómenos del lenguaje natural relacionados, como los casos de mención, la mención mixta, etc. Una de las primeras apariciones de la palabra “transparente” asociada con los problemas de sustitutividad está en el libro de Whitehead y Russell Principia Mathematica. Las expresiones se usan de un modo transparente cuando queremos mediante ellas decir algo, y no decimos nada acerca de las expresiones mismas (Whitehead 1910, App. C).

En contraste con esta clara intuición acerca del origen de la opacidad, el análisis de las adscripciones de creencia ha tratado una y otra vez de ofrecer una respuesta a una cuestión diferente. No es sólo un tratamiento de las propiedades lógico-semántico/pragmáticas (inferenciales) de una preferencia que contenga una oración de creencia lo que debe ofrecer una teoría acerca de las adscripciones de
creencias, sino que a menudo se asume que ha de responder también a nuestras normales inquietudes acerca de la naturaleza intrínseca de lo mental. Este tema puede resultar muy interesante, pero no tiene por qué constituirse en el principal objetivo de una teoría del significado de las adscripciones de creencias. Nuestra propuesta está diseñada para dar cuenta únicamente de las particularidades inferenciales de las adscripciones de creencias. El modo más directo de lograr este propósito es considerar la opacidad como el resultado de un proceso de deferencia.

Creemos que cada adscripción de creencia opaca contiene un episodio de deferencia. Cuando decimos que Lois Lane cree que Superman puede volar pero que ella no cree que Clark Kent pueda, estamos apelando a una porción del conocimiento compartido acerca del uso particular que Lois hace de estos términos, a pesar de que sean co-referenciales. Si John quiere decir (1) a María de un modo tal que la proposición expresada por su preference no implique la proposición que expresaría una preference de (2) en este contexto, John tiene que estar seguro de que el conocimiento compartido acerca del uso peculiar que Lois hace de la expresión “Superman” es suficientemente vívido.

(1) Lois Lane cree que Superman puede volar.
(2) Lois Lane cree que Clark Kent puede volar.

John tiene que estar convencido de que María conoce el especial uso que Lois Lane hace de “Superman” y “Clark Kent”, y debe estar seguro de que esta información es suficientemente activa como para formar parte del proceso de interpretación de las preferencias en este contexto. Una adscripción opaca es una en la cual tanto el hablante como el oyente están de acuerdo en que el creyente asentiría a una preference de la oración incrustada. Las preferencias de (1) y (2) son opacas porque John y María creen que Lois asentiría a una preference de “Superman puede volar” y disentiría ante una preference de “Clark Kent puede volar”. John tiene que suponer que María lo cree, y María tiene que suponer eso de John. Sólo en este tipo de contexto una adscripción de creencias puede ser declarada opaca.

De un modo similar, una preferencia sólo puede ser analizada a como un caso exitoso de deferencia deliberada si consideramos como garantizadas varias asunciones comunes. Sergio puede decírmelo de Antonio acaba de volver de Bahrain mediante la preferencia de (3) si
cree que yo pienso que Antonio confunde sistemáticamente Qatar con Bahrain. También ha de suponer que yo creo que él intenta que esta porción de información sea relevante para la interpretación de sus preferencias.

(3) Antonio acaba de volver de Qatar.

En un contexto tal, a través de la preferencia de (3), Sergio me estaría diciendo que Antonio acaba de volver de Bahrain. Usualmente, toda esta información de fondo se alcanza a través de una conversación previa acerca de la persona sobre la que se defiere. En casos normales de deferencia deliberada, como la preferencia de (3) en este contexto, la información que pertenece al trasfondo relevante concierne los hábitos conceptuales de la persona sobre la que se defiere. Podemos usar (3) para decir que Antonio acaba de volver de Bahrain porque pensamos que Antonio confunde Qatar con Bahrain, pero todo lo que necesitamos para dar las condiciones de verdad de una preferencia como ésa es considerar el modo en el que el idiolecto de Antonio se desvía de los patrones lingüísticos estándar que conciernen el uso de las expresiones “Qatar” y “Bahrain”. Lo mismo pasa con las adscripciones de creencias opacas. El trasfondo informacional necesario está compuesto por conocimiento acerca de los hábitos conceptuales del creyente, pero todo lo que necesitamos tener en mente para representar el significado de la preferencia de (1) es la desviación lingüística por la que el creyente opta con respecto a la norma. En el contexto que acabamos de describir, se puede decir que Lois cree que Superman puede volar y que Clark Kent no puede porque ella no sabe que Superman es Clark Kent, pero esto no tiene por qué alcanzar necesariamente las condiciones de verdad tal cual. En los casos de deferencia deliberada que no involucran operadores doxásticos no se pretende lograr una representación de la estructura conceptual de la persona sobre la que se defiere, incluso aunque sea una peculiaridad epistémica (o la suposición de que hay una) la que permite que el proceso deferencial tenga lugar. ¿Por qué habría de ser diferente para las adscripciones de creencia opacas? Tanto en los casos de deferencia como en los de opacidad, las confusiones epístémicas alcanzan la superficie de la comunicación verbal sólo a través de aparentes desviaciones de la norma lingüística.
Dos tesis relacionadas

Vamos a desarrollar dos tesis que se siguen directamente de nuestra consideración de las adscripciones opacas de creencias como una subclase propia de los casos de deferencia deliberada:

1) Las preferencias deliberadamente deferenciales de oraciones de creencia se pueden usar para hacer adscripciones transparentes de creencia.
2) La mayoría de las adscripciones transparentes de creencia son casos de deferencia por defecto.

Hay casos de preferencias transparentes deliberadamente deferenciales de oraciones de creencia. Recanati distingue entre adscripciones de creencia cumulativas y no cumulativas. La razón de esta distinción se encuentra en el intento de aislar aquellos casos en los cuales el Principio de Inocencia Semántica no se cumple. Una preferencia de (1) en el contexto descrito anteriormente sería considerada cumulativa por Recanati, puesto que implica la interpretación transparente de la oración profesa. Las adscripciones de creencia cumulativas contienen la proposición singular que la oración insertada habría expresado en caso de ser profesa de un modo no-incrustado. Pensamos que la violación del Principio de Inocencia Semántica es una fenómeno que excede de lejos los límites de las adscripciones de creencia. Una subclase entera de los casos que involucran un cambio de contexto transcultural (los casos de deferencia deliberada) escapa a los rigores de la Inocencia Semántica. Entre los casos no cumulativos se encuentran las preferencias deliberadamente deferenciales en las cuales el lenguaje output es intensionalmente diferente con respecto al lenguaje input, i. e. la referencia de las expresiones directamente referenciales ha cambiado o los conceptos que expresan las preferencias de los predicados de estos lenguajes no permanecen idénticas con respecto al lenguaje input. Los idiolectos de un niño que llama a la filosofía “filtosofía” y de un confundido estudiante de filosofía que piensa que Daniel Dennett es Robert Brandom son intensionalmente diferentes con respecto al español estándar. En español estándar, la preferencia de “filtosofía” no expresa ningún concepto, y “Robert Brandom” refiere a Robert Brandom, y no a Daniel Dennett. La proposición expresada en los ejemplos no cumulativos no implica la proposición expresada por las preferencias no deliberadamente deferenciales de las mismas oraciones.
De acuerdo con nuestra posición, tanto deferencia como libre enriquecimiento son necesarios para dar cuenta de la opacidad. La deferencia a solas no garantiza la opacidad. Recanati piensa que la proferencia de (4) en un contexto como el que describimos más arriba sería considerada como una adscripción opaca simplemente porque “Qatar” refiere a Bahrain en lugar de a Qatar. “Qatar” no puede ser sustituida por ninguna expresión co-referencial porque su contribución a las condiciones de verdad no es Qatar, sino Bahrain.

(4) Antonio cree que Qatar es un país muy agradable.

Obviamente, si “Qatar” no refiere a Qatar, ninguna expresión que refiera a Qatar podrá ser sustituida por la primera en una proferencia de (4) en este contexto salva veritate. Pero, ¿prueba esto realmente que esta proferencia expresa una proposición opaca? Cuando un cambio de contexto translingüístico no cumulativo ocurre, como pasa en algunos casos de deferencia deliberada, no tiene sentido comprobar si la sustitutividad se mantiene con respecto a expresiones que eran co-referenciales en el lenguaje input. Las proferencias deferenciales no cumulativas de oraciones de creencia pueden usarse para llevar a cabo adscripciones transparentes. Consideremos el siguiente ejemplo. Sergio encuentra particularmente gracioso el hecho de que Antonio confunda Bahrain con Qatar, y hemos estado haciendo bromas acerca de esto un buen rato. Ahora estamos hablando de María, que realiza un doctorado sobre la situación socio-económica en el Golfo Pérsico. Sergio y yo pensamos que María sabe seguramente casi todo lo que hay que saber acerca de la región. Entre otras cosas, asumimos que conoce los nombres locales de estos países. Esto es, asumimos que no hay ningún rasgo en particular de su comportamiento que pueda explicarse atendiendo a una desviación con respecto a la norma lingüística estándar. En este contexto, la proposición expresada por (5) implica tanto la interpretación normal de (6) como una interpretación deferencial de (7).

(5) María cree que “Qatar” es un país muy divertido.
(6) María cree que Mamlakat Bahrayn es un país muy divertido.
(7) María cree que Dawlat Qatar es un país muy divertido.
Atribuimos una creencia determinada a María usando el peculiar idiolecto de Antonio, del cual Sergio admira especialmente algunos rasgos divergentes que están muy vivos, por así decirlo, en este punto de la conversación. (5) contiene el nombre local de Bahrain, “Mamlakat Bahrayn”, y (6) el nombre local de Qatar, “Dawlat Qatar”. Sergio hace que sea el conocimiento lingüístico que atribuimos a Antonio el que fije el significado de “Qatar” en (4), pero esto no es suficiente para hacer que la atribución de creencia sea opaca. “Qatar” puede ser sustituida por cualquier término co-referencial, simplemente tenemos que asegurarnos de que son co-referenciales en el lenguaje output, i. e. el idiolecto de Antonio. En contra de lo que pudiera parecer, la preferencia de (5) en este contexto es transparente. Sergio y yo no tomamos el que María asienta a la preferencia de la oración incrustada en (5) como una condición necesaria para la verdad de la preferencia expresada mediante (5). La preferencia de (5) en este contexto es una preferencia no cumulativa deliberadamente deferencial de una oración de creencia que expresa una proposición transparente.

No es necesario, sin embargo, sacar partido del hecho de que el creyente y la persona sobre la cual se defiere pueden no coincidir para producir ejemplos de adscripciones opacas llevadas a cabo a través de preferencias no cumulativas de preferencias deliberadamente deferenciales. Si Sergio y yo sabemos que Antonio es un gran aficionado a la geografía y que normalmente lee todo lo que encuentra en relación con los países que visita, podemos muy bien suponer que, antes de su viaje al Golfo Pérsico, Antonio estaba absolutamente al tanto de los nombres locales de los países de la región. Pero, a pesar de todos sus conocimientos sobre geografía, Antonio confunde Qatar y Bahrain, porque los títulos de los informes que encontró por Internet acerca de estos dos países estaban cambiados de sitio. Sergio y yo sabemos esto y Sergio me dice (4). Con esta sencilla modificación, la proposición expresada mediante (4) implica la proposición expresada mediante una preferencia normal de (8) y una interpretación deferencial de (9).

(4) Antonio cree que Qatar es un país muy agradable.
(8) Antonio cree que Mamlakat Bahrayn es un país muy agradable.
(9) Antonio cree que Dawlat Qatar es un país muy agradable.
Hablante y oyente reconocen en Antonio al menos la misma capacidad que ellos tienen de producir expresiones cuyo referente sea Bahrain. Cualquier expresión co-referencial con “Qatar” en este contexto podría ser intercambiada por ella salva veritate. La proposición expresada mediante la proferencia de (4) en este nuevo contexto no contiene ninguna información relativa a la forma de la palabra “Qatar”. El proceso deferencial sólo afecta al carácter de la expresión, como vimos en los capítulos anteriores. El contenido de la palabra “Qatar” es en este contexto Bahrain, y esta referencia se alcanza, en un sentido, de un modo transparente. Cualquier otra palabra que refiera a Bahrain podría ocupar su lugar en la proferencia y el contenido permanecería igual. Si quisiéramos que la proposición expresada mediante (4) no asegurase las inferencias a proposiciones como las expresadas a través de las proferencias (8) y (9) en este contexto, el libre enriquecimiento debería desempeñar un segundo papel, además de introducir el operador deferencial como un constituyente no articulado.

Simplemente para dejar claro que el posible asentimiento de Antonio hacia la proferencia de la oración incrustada en (4) no juega ningún papel en la determinación del contenido de la proferencia que analizamos, imaginemos que Pedro llama “Brain” a Bahrain, y que esta porción de conocimiento compartido está suficientemente activa en la conversación. La proposición que se podría expresar mediante la proferencia de (4) en este contexto sería equivalente a la proposición expresada mediante (10) en este contexto, incluso aunque Sergio y yo supiéramos que Antonio no conoce a Pedro:

(10) Antonio cree que “Brain” es un país muy agradable.

Claramente, Antonio no admitiría que “Brain es un país muy agradable” es una de sus creencias, pero esto resulta irrelevante para determinar la corrección de las inferencias entre las proposiciones expresadas mediante (4) y (10) en este contexto.

Las proferencias no cumulativas deliberadamente deferenciales pueden ser usadas para expresar adscripciones transparentes, tanto cuando el creyente y la persona sobre la que se defiere coinciden como cuando esto no ocurre. Las proferencias cumulativas deliberadamente deferenciales de oraciones de creencia, por otro lado, están sistemáticamente asociadas con adscripciones de creencias opacas. El proceso deferencial involucrado en casos como el de la
proferencia de (1) no se centra en la referencia de “Superman”. “Superman” y “Clark Kent” conservan la misma referencia en el idiolecto de Lois Lane, y es por esto que la Inocencia Semántica se conserva para todo este conjunto de casos. Pero un aspecto particular del uso que Lois Lane hace de los estos términos sí que es relevante para determinar las condiciones de verdad de la proposición global, las que permiten detener la inferencia de (1) a (2) y viceversa. El cambio de lenguaje no es intensional en estos casos. Los contenidos de las expresiones directamente referenciales no se mueven ni un milímetro. Sin embargo, alguna particularidad concerniente al uso que Lois hace de los términos resulta ser relevante para abordar las propiedades inferenciales de la proferencia. Es en este sentido en el que pensamos que la deferencia se ve envuelta también en los casos cumulativos. Un aspecto específico de la práctica lingüística de Lois, que usualmente no tendría ningún peso en las condiciones de verdad de sus proferencias, se convierte en un factor decisivo de la atribución opaca. Entraremos en detalles acerca de este asunto en particular en la sección 3.

La mayoría de las adscripciones transparentes de creencia son casos de deferencia por defecto. La diferencia compartida entre el conocimiento lingüístico que hablante y oyente atribuyen al creyente y el suyo propio determina de un modo esencial la aparición de la opacidad. En aquellos casos en los que hablante y oyente piensan que el uso de las palabras que hace el creyente no difiere del que ellos mismos hacen, simplemente no hay ninguna razón para subrayar algún aspecto del idiolecto del creyente con vistas a explicar su comportamiento. Si hablante y oyente piensan que Lois Lane sabe acerca de Superman exactamente lo mismo que ellos saben, el uso que Lois haga de “Superman” nunca alcanzará las condiciones de verdad de sus proferencias. Si un colega periodista del Globe está hablando con un amigo acerca de Lois, y ninguno de los dos sospecha nada acerca del pequeño secreto de Superman, podemos suponer que su proferencia de (1) expresará una proposición transparente. No puede haber ningún rasgo del comportamiento de Lois que ellos puedan tratar de explicar apelando al hecho de que ella no sabe que Superman es Clark Kent porque ellos tampoco lo saben.

Ahora bien, mantener que las creencias de hablante y oyente son relevantes para determinar si nos encontramos frente a una adscripción transparente o a una opaca no implica que el significado de la adscripción dependa de su punto de vista. Ellos confían por defecto en
la norma estándar para fijar el significado de las palabras que están usando. La contribución de la proposición incrustada en la preferencia de “Lois Lane cree que Superman puede volar” en este contexto es idéntica a la proposición expresada por una preferencia de “Superman puede volar” en este contexto. Su intención es mantenerse dentro de la norma. El punto de vista es importante para determinar si nos enfrentamos a una adscripción transparente o a una opaca, pero los significados de las palabras involucradas en las preferencias son los que reciben en el lenguaje público. Ésta es una de las ventajas de considerar que la mayoría de las adscripciones transparentes son casos de preferencias deferenciales por defecto, en lugar de tratar simplemente la diferencia con respecto al punto de vista.

La señora que vuelve a casa del médico y habla con su marido acerca de sus dolores, le podría haber dicho (11):

(11) El doctor cree que tengo artritis.

Como vimos en el caso del falso doctor, las condiciones de verdad de “Tengo artritis” no están fijadas ni por las creencias de la señora acerca de la naturaleza de la dolencia ni por la opinión del experto más a mano sobre lo que sea la artritis. Los casos de falsedad debido a la incomprensión muestran que el significado de los términos en los casos de deferencia por defecto se fija exclusivamente a través del parámetro de lenguaje establecido en primer lugar para el contexto en cuestión. Incluso si la señora y su marido piensan que la artritis es una enfermedad de los músculos, su preferencia de “Tengo artritis” será verdadera sólo en el caso de que su dolencia esté realmente en las articulaciones. Si la señora y su marido piensan que el doctor que la ha atendido es un médico de verdad, no tendrán ninguna razón para suponer que el uso que él hace de la palabra “artritis” difiere en algún modo de la norma, por lo que la preferencia de (11) expresará una proposición verdadera si el doctor cree que el problema de la señora está en las articulaciones, independientemente de lo que piensen ella y su marido acerca del significado de “artritis”. Su punto de vista no determina el significado de las palabras que están usando aquí. Su confianza en el doctor provoca que la adscripción reciba una interpretación transparente, aunque ellos carezcan del concepto completo que “artritis” expresa. Considerar que las adscripciones transparentes de creencia son el resultado de preferencias deferenciales por defecto es el mejor modo de acomodar estos casos.
Una ventaja distinta pero conectada de nuestra posición acerca de las adscripciones transparentes es que la aparente ambigüedad del verbo “creer” puede observarse ahora bajo una luz diferente. Quine no estaba satisfecho con la conclusión de que el verbo “creer” fuese igualmente capaz de expresar, alternativamente, adscripciones transparentes y opacas (Quine 1956) y nosotros estamos, de algún modo, de acuerdo con esta opinión, a pesar de que nuestras razones no podrían ser más distintas de las que Quine alegaría. La desambiguación es un proceso semántico que, tal y como se asume normalmente, ocurre antes de la intervención de los procesos pragmáticos de enriquecimiento. La opacidad de las adscripciones de creencia es altamente contextosensible. Para conseguir una adscripción opaca, es necesario que una gran cantidad de información contextual sea lo suficientemente vívida, tal y como se explicó más arriba. El hablante ha de explotar varios rasgos del contexto para transmitir que las porciones apropiadas de información son compartidas y están suficientemente activas al llevar a cabo la preferencia, si quiere que la adscripción opaca por parte de la audiencia. La cantidad de esfuerzo que requiere producir e interpretar adscripciones opacas y transparentes de creencia es radicalmente diferente. No es un proceso semántico de desambiguación lo que hace que la audiencia decida si una cierta preferencia expresa una adscripción opaca o no; muchos rasgos puramente contextuales han de tomarse en consideración.

No sólo autores especialmente inclinados hacia la semántica han resistido la idea de que “creer” fuese un verbo ambiguo. Aquellos que mantienen que las intuiciones de los hablantes acerca de la distancia que separa las condiciones de verdad de las preferencias de (1) y (2) pueden ser explicadas mediante el uso de implicaturas conversacionales, a menudo se ayudan de máximas especiales para acercarse a su propósito. Uno de los principios especiales que usan es la máxima de fidelidad. Como vimos en el capítulo 5, esta máxima establece que el hablante debe adscribir una creencia usando, si es posible, las mismas expresiones que el creyente mismo podría haber utilizado para auto-adscribirse la misma creencia. Esta intuición acerca del carácter por defecto de la interpretación opaca claramente se opone a la posición de Jaszczolt, quien sostiene que hay un principio de la interpretación de re por defecto (Jaszczolt 1999, 121 y siguientes):
La interpretación *de re* de oraciones que adscriben creencias es la interpretación *por defecto*. Otras interpretaciones constituyen grados de alejamiento de la dada por defecto, de acuerdo con la escala de fuerza de la intencionalidad del correspondiente estado mental (op. Cit. 190).

Nosotros tomamos partido con Jaszczolt en este debate, pero el argumento que proponemos para favorecer esta opción no tiene nada que ver con una concepción general de lo mental como en su caso. Nuestro razonamiento requiere dos pasos: 1) las adscripciones de creencia iteradas no pueden ser comprendidas de un modo habitual si no hay una inclinación por defecto hacia una de las dos opciones que se ofrecen a la interpretación, y 2) es razonable suponer que, a medida que añadimos operadores de creencia, nuestra adscripción resulta más y más probablemente transparente. Entender las preferencias de (12) y (13) puede llevar un poco de reflexión, pero no hay duda de que pueden ser comprendidas con algo de paciencia ni de que son significativas:

(12) Lala Lang cree que Batman cree que Superman puede volar.
(13) Lana Lang cree que Spiderman cree que Batman cree que Superman es oculista.

Echemos un rápido vistazo a las posibilidades epistémicas. Lala Lang puede saber / no saber que Batman es Bruce Wayne, puede saber / no saber que Superman es Clark Kent, y puede creer / no creer que Batman/Bruce Wayne cree /no cree que Superman es Clark Kent. Con un par de expresiones más susceptibles de ser interpretadas como opacas, “Spiderman” y “ser oculista” en (13), el número de posibilidades se dispara espectacularmente. La cantidad de información que se necesita para favorecer una de estas interpretaciones y excluir el resto es enorme. Es un poco absurdo suponer que cada hablante que desea proferir (12) o (13) tiene que manipular tantísimos factores contextuales para estar seguro de que la audiencia capta adecuadamente la opción correcta. Pensamos que el modo más razonable de dar cuenta de esta situación es rechazar la opción de los teóricos de la implicatura de que hay una máxima conversacional que sistemáticamente favorece la interpretación
opaca\(^1\). Ha de haber una interpretación favorecida y ésta debe ser, a
menos que aparezca otra forma de explicar lo ocurrido con la iteración
de operadores doxásticos, la interpretación transparente.

No necesitamos postular ningún tipo de nuevo principio para
garantizar la preeminencia de los casos transparentes. La mayoría de
las adscripciones transparentes se hacen a través de casos de
derencia por defecto. En la deferencia por defecto, no hay
involucrado ningún cambio de contexto translingüístico; tanto el
hablante como el oyente confían en la norma estándar para determinar
los significados de los términos que usan. Todas las adscripciones de
creencias que se hacen mediante preferencias deferenciales por
defecto serán transparentes. En estos casos, es el uso público de las
palabras lo que importa, ningún rasgo particular del idiolecto del
creyente alcanza las condiciones de verdad. De acuerdo con nuestra
posición, la diferencia esencial entre las adscripciones de creencia
opacas y transparentes es respetada e insertada en una propuesta más
amplia que contiene otros fenómenos lingüísticos. Con el objeto de
tratar la elevada contexto-dependencia de la opacidad, analizaremos
las tres tareas que el libre enriquecimiento ha de llevar a cabo para
producir una adscripción de creencia opaca.

3 Análisis de las adscripciones de creencia

La propuesta

Formalmente, nuestro plan es muy similar a la reconstrucción que
hicimos del sistema de Recanati en el capítulo 5. Las adscripciones de
creencias se componen de un operador doxástico \([x \text{ cree que}]\), donde \(x\)

\[^1\] Los teóricos de la implicatura podrían aún postular que hay dos principios actuando aquí, la

maxima de fidelidad y el principio de la interpretación de re por defecto, y que las implicaturas
que contienen la información opaca se generan median un choque de máximas. Incluso así, la

propuesta final no parece muy atractiva; tendríamos dos máximas contradictorias que

pertenecerían a la misma categoría.
necesitaremos que el libre enriquecimiento lleve a cabo tres tareas distintas. El enriquecimiento libre provee a una adscripción opaca de un operador deferencial, una función variádica y un deíctico oculto. Estos tres elementos se introducen a través de procesos pragmáticos top-down, no están lingüísticamente comandados. La función variádica convierte el operador monádico \( [x \text{ cree que}] \) en un operador diádico. Este nuevo lugar de argumento es rellenado por un deíctico, cuyos **demonstrata** (índices) son las expresiones bajo el alcance del operador deferencial. La proposición expresada por (1) en un contexto apropiado tendría este aspecto:

(1') Circ\(_{modoesto}\) [Lois Lane cree que] (<\(R_{Lois \ Lane} \) (Superman), puede volar>, esto)

La función variádica \( \text{Circ} \) convierte en diádico el operador \( [Lois \ Lane \ cree \ que] \), uno de los lugares de argumento está ocupado por la proposición singular <\(R_{Lois \ Lane} \) (Superman), puede volar> y el otro por un deíctico, el deíctico \( oculto \). El operador deferencial \( R \) tiene la expresión “Superman” bajo su alcance y modifica su carácter. El carácter de esta expresión es ahora el carácter que la expresión tiene en el idiolecto de Lois Lane. Como sabemos, la función carácter escoge el mismo individuo en el idiolecto de Lois y en el lenguaje público, Clark Kent/Superman. Este ejemplo es cumulativo y la Inocencia Semántica se mantiene. La expresión “Superman” es el demonstratum del deíctico que ocupa el segundo lugar de argumento.

Si hubiera otros operadores deferenciales en la adscripción, el demonstratum del deíctico \( oculto \) sería la expresión que cayera bajo el alcance del operador deferencial en el que coincidan el creyente y la persona con respecto a la cual deferimos. Imaginemos que Sergio está ahora hablando acerca de Elizabeth, la mujer que no sabía que los oftalmólogos eran oculistas. Casualmente, ella está ahora en Bahrain. Sergio y yo hemos estado hablando acerca de Antonio, que confunde Qatar con Bahrain, y Sergio dice:

(14) Elizabeth cree que hay un montón de buenos oftalmólogos en Qatar.

Si éste fuera un contexto en el que el hecho de que Elizabeth no sabe que los oftalmólogos son oculistas fuese necesario para comprender el comportamiento que Sergio estaba tratando de explicar cuando dijo
(14), entonces la proposición expresada por su preferencia sería analizada del siguiente modo:

(14’) Circ modo: esto [Elizabeth cree que] (<Hay muchos buenos R_{Elizabeth} (oftalmólogos en R_{Antonio} (Qatar)>, esto)

Para hacer justicia al hecho de que la inferencia desde (14’) a la proposición expresada mediante (15) en este contexto no está justificada, necesitamos hacer que “oftalmólogos” sea el demonstratum del deictico oculto.

(15) Elizabeth cree que hay muchos buenos oculistas en Qatar.

La versión de la Teoría del Deictico Oculto que defienden Schiffer, Crimmins y Perry no puede ofrecer un tratamiento de estos casos de un modo directo, porque requiere que se compute un modo de presentación asociado con el creyente para cada uno de los constituyentes de la proposición incrustada. (14’) sería verdadera incluso si Elizabeth careciera de toda idea acerca del particular uso que Antonio hace de la palabra “Qatar”. Si tuviéramos que computar un modo de presentación asociado con la expresión “Qatar” en esta preferencia, sin duda sería el de Antonio, acerca del que Elizabeth puede no saber absolutamente nada.

**El problema del modo de presentación**

Uno de los problemas propuestos por Schiffer contra la Teoría del Deictico-Oculto se centra en la cuestión acerca de la naturaleza de la contribución del deictico oculto a la adscripción de creencia. Una entidad teórica que quisiera desempeñar el papel que esta teoría reserva para los modos de presentación, debería cumplir el siguiente requisito:

Requisito de Frege: “no puedes creer y no creer racionalmente algo bajo un único modo de presentación, o bajo modos de presentación que reconoces como modos de presentación de la misma cosa” (Schiffer 1992, 502-503).
Schiffer considera y rechaza como candidatos viables los conceptos individuales, las propiedades generales, los tokens perceptuales, los estereotipos, los caracteres, las expresiones del mentalés, los roles funcionales, las cadenas causales y las expresiones del lenguaje público (op. cit. 511). La última de estas opciones será la alternativa que vamos a favorecer en este trabajo, pero antes de entrar en esa cuestión, debemos introducir algunas modificaciones en el Requisito de Frege.

Nuestro propósito no es lograr una representación análoga de lo que sea que haya dentro de las cabezas de los creyentes. Tratamos de proporcionar una aproximación a la forma lógica de estas adscripciones que garantice las inferencias correctas desde y hasta nuestra proposición y que excluya las incorrectas. Para alcanzar este objetivo, la estrategia representacionalista puede resultar eficiente, pero nosotros preferimos optar por un camino más corto. Es cierto que la discusión acerca de las adscripciones de creencias parece hacer casi irresistible el camino representacionalista, pero no tenemos que tomarlo necesariamente, no obstante. Si no nos dejamos llevar por esta tendencia representacionalista y mantenemos nuestro foco en las propiedades lógicas (inferenciales) de las adscripciones de creencia, todo lo que necesitamos que un “modo de presentación” cumpla es el siguiente Requisito de Frege Modificado:

Requisito de Frege Modificado: de un agente considerado como racional por hablante y oyente no se puede decir que cree y no cree algo bajo el mismo modo de presentación, o bajo modos de presentación que hablante y oyente creen que el agente considera como modos de presentación de la misma cosa.

Este requisito no está completamente libre de débitos representacionalistas, pero al menos éstos no nublan nuestro propósito del modo que lo hacían en la primera formulación de la restricción. Mostraremos que las expresiones del lenguaje natural pueden cumplir con este requisito en un marco en el que es el potencial inferencial de las adscripciones de creencia lo que guía el análisis.

Nunberg distingue entre el índice y la referencia de una expresión deictica (Nunberg 1993). El índice es lo que hemos venido llamando demonstratum, el objeto del contexto al cual la expresión deictica apunta. La referencia de un deictico es la contribución que hace a la proposición expresada mediante la preferencia de la oración que lo contiene. Para interpretar una expresión deictica, el contexto debe proveer el índice y la relación entre el índice y la referencia. A
menudo esta relación será la identidad, pero no siempre ocurre así. Al tomar las expresiones del lenguaje público como los modos de presentación que necesitamos para comprender las adscripciones opacas, la mayoría de las veces la relación entre el índice del deíctico oculto, las expresiones bajo el alcance del operador deferencial, y su referencia será la de identidad. El índice de “esto” en (1’) es “Superman”, y esta misma expresión es su referencia en nuestra teoría.

La diferencia con la proposición expresada mediante la proferencia de (2) es evidente:

(2’’) Circ\_modo\_esto [Lois Lane cree que] (<R\_Lois\_Lane (ClarkKent), puede volar>, “Clark Kent”)

(2’’) no puede inferirse de (1), y viceversa, porque la expresión que ocupa el segundo lugar de argumento es diferente en ambos casos. La interpretación transparente de (1) y (2) expresa la misma proposición, (1*), y es implicada tanto por (1’’) como por (2’’). (1’’) y (2’’) son, por lo tanto, cumulativas.

La contribución semántica estrecha de “Superman” y “Clark Kent” a (1’’) y (2’’) es su contribución normal, y la proposición incrustada es singular. Nuestra modificación respeta las propiedades inferenciales originalmente atribuidas a las adscripciones de creencia (se bloquee la sustitutividad y se implica la interpretación transparente) y no altera la inocencia de la propuesta inicial.

Expresiones públicas, palabras del lenguaje natural, aparecen en el segundo lugar de argumento de nuestro análisis de las adscripciones de creencia como referencia del elemento deíctico introducido a través del libre enriquecimiento. Se puede decir que Lois Lane cree y no cree la proposición singular que expresaría la proferencia de “Superman puede volar” porque las atribuciones contienen dos “modos de presentación” diferentes, “Superman” y “Clark Kent”.
Uno de los típicos argumentos contra esta posición tiene que ver con el carácter específicamente lingüístico de estos modos de presentación. Esta posición dejaría sin explicar creencias adscritas a animales, o a personas que no hablan nuestro idioma (cfr. Schiffer 1990). Ambos problemas provienen de una intrusión del impulso representacional. Nuestro análisis de las adscripciones de creencias no se compromete con que el creyente use tal o cual expresión. La inclusión de expresiones del lenguaje público en la determinación del significado de las adscripciones de creencia es sólo un modo de dar cuenta del compromiso inferencial que suponen las adscripciones de creencia. Como vimos para los casos de deferencia deliberada no cumulativa, una peculiaridad epistêmica se analiza en términos puramente lingüísticos cuando el objetivo es proporcionar las condiciones de verdad de una afirmación. El comportamiento resultante de las confusiones de animales y personas que no hablan español se pueden explicar a través de adscripciones opacas y el análisis de estas adscripciones no necesita más que medios puramente lingüísticos para resultar inferencialmente adecuado. La preferencia de “Mi perro cree que Superman le dará de comer hoy” no afirma una relación de primer orden entre mi perro, una proposición y una palabra. “Creer” no expresa una relación de primer orden de acuerdo con nuestra posición, las adscripciones de creencia no afirman que determinados objetos se encuentran en una relación de primer orden. En consecuencia, no debemos preocuparnos acerca de los problemas que se puedan plantear a partir de la consideración de criaturas no-lingüísticas o personas que desconocen nuestro idioma.

Podría argumentarse también que parece raro suponer que poseemos una cierta creencia bajo una palabra del lenguaje público. En primer lugar, esta inquietud proviene de nuevo del impetu representacionalista/descriptivista. En segundo lugar, no conozco ninguna definición de lo que sea creer una proposición bajo un determinado modo de presentación. Como dice Schiffer, “modo de presentación” es una noción técnica (Schiffer 1992, 501) y debemos someter la conveniencia de nuestros candidatos conservando nuestro propósito general en mente. Nuestro objetivo no es otro que asegurar las inferencias que se consideran correctas hasta y desde la proposición que analizamos y bloquear las inferencias incorrectas. Si esto puede hacerse usando las palabras del lenguaje público como modos de presentación, entonces no veo razón alguna por la que esta opción debiera resistirse.
Algunos casos

El hecho de que una adscripción de creencia acabe recibiendo una interpretación transparente u opaca depende de algunos parámetros contextuales que conciernen a hablante y oyente. La información compartida acerca de los hábitos conceptuales del creyente que es suficientemente vívida en este punto de la conversación tanto para el hablante como para el oyente se convierte en un factor decisivo para las condiciones de verdad de una adscripción de creencia. A continuación analizaremos el comportamiento inferencial de una adscripción a través de varios contextos diferentes y pondremos a prueba la adecuación de nuestra propuesta. S se corresponde con el hablante, A está en lugar del oyente, “Superman”, “Clark Kent” y “Kal-El” son considerados nombres diferentes del mismo individuo.

(1) Lois Lane cree que Superman puede volar.
(2) Lois Lane cree que Clark Kent puede volar.
(16) Lois Lane cree que Kal-El puede volar.

Contexto 1. S y A saben que Superman es Kal-El y Clark Kent. S y A saben que Lois Lane sabe que Superman es Kal-El. S y A creen que Lois Lane sabe que Superman es Clark Kent. Toda esta información es compartida por S y A, suficientemente vívida en este punto de la conversación, y relevante para explicar cierto aspecto del comportamiento de Lois.

Contexto 2. S y A creen que Superman es Kal-El y Clark Kent. S y A creen que Lois Lane cree que Superman no es Kal-El. S y A creen que Lois Lane cree que Superman no es Clark Kent. S y A creen que Lois Lane cree que Superman no es Clark Kent. Toda esta información es compartida por S y A, suficientemente vívida en este punto de la conversación, y relevante para explicar cierto aspecto del comportamiento de Lois.

Contexto 3. S y A creen que Superman es Kal-El y Clark Kent. S y A creen que Lois Lane sabe que Superman es Kal-El. S y A creen que Lois Lane cree que Superman no es Clark Kent. Toda esta información es compartida por S y A, suficientemente vívida en este punto de la conversación, y relevante para explicar cierto aspecto del comportamiento de Lois.

Contexto 4. S y A creen que Superman no es Clark Kent. S y A creen que Superman no es Kal-El. S y A creen que Lois Lane sabe que Superman no
es Clark Kent. S y A creen que Lois Lane sabe que Superman no es Kal-El. Toda esta información es compartida por S y A, suficientemente vívida en este punto de la conversación, y relevante para explicar cierto aspecto del comportamiento de Lois.

Contexto 5. S y A creen que Superman es Clark Kent. S y A creen que Lois Lane cree que Superman no es Clark Kent. Toda esta información es compartida por S y A, suficientemente vívida en este punto de la conversación, y relevante para explicar cierto aspecto del comportamiento de Lois. S y A no creen que Superman sea Kal-El. Lois Lane cree que Superman es Kal-El. S y A no creen que Lois Lane crea que Superman es Kal-El.

En los contextos 1 y 4, el hablante y el oyente no atribuyen a Lois ningún uso divergente de los términos que aparecen en la oración incrustada. Los contextos en los cuales el conocimiento compartido de hablante y oyente es igual que el que atribuyen al creyente, no dan lugar usualmente a adscripciones transparentes de creencia. No hay ninguna razón para conceder un papel especial al idiolecto del creyente porque se piensa que éste es idéntico con el lenguaje público que hablante y oyente comparten. Por tanto, (1), (2) y (3) expresarían proposiciones equivalentes en este contexto, bajo la forma de (1*).

(1*) [Lois Lane cree que] <Superman, puede volar>

Las preferencias de (1), (2) y (16) en el contexto 2 recibirían una interpretación opaca. (1) expresaría (1''), (2) expresaría (2'') y (16) expresaría (16'):

(1'') Circ< modo esto [Lois Lane cree que] (<R<Lois Lane (Superman), puede volar>, “Superman”)
(2'') Circ< modo esto [Lois Lane cree que] (<R<Lois Lane (ClarkKent), puede volar>, “Clark Kent”)
(16’) Circ< modo esto [Lois Lane cree que] (<R<Lois Lane (Kal-El), puede volar>, “Kal-El”)

De acuerdo con lo que creen hablante y oyente de Lois, se puede decir que cree que Superman puede volar sin pensar que cree que Clark Kent o Kal-El pueden volar.
Los detalles del contexto 3 no se pueden explicar de un modo tan directo. Aquí, las preferencias de (1) y (16) deben recibir una interpretación opaca, porque la sustitutividad falla para los pares Clark Kent/Superman y Kal-El/Clark Kent. Pero si S y A confían en las habilidades como periodista de Lois y piensan que ella cree que Superman es Kal-El, entonces la proposición expresada mediante (1) debe ser equivalente a la expresada a través de la preferencia de (16).

Sin embargo, lo que tomamos como las interpretaciones opacas de las preferencias de (1) y (16), (1’’) y (16’’) son lógicamente independientes. Esta dificultad se soluciona del modo siguiente: los parámetros contextuales que conciernen a las expresiones deícticas determinan no sólo el demonstratum (el índice), sino también la relación que se establece entre el demonstratum y la referencia. Esta relación era la identidad en el contexto 2, pero no tiene por qué ser así en este contexto. Aquí, la forma lógica de las proposiciones expresadas mediante (1) y (16) debe garantizar la inferencia desde una a la otra, de acuerdo con nuestras intuiciones. Así, debemos tomar como la referencia del deíctico oculto al par de expresiones “Superman” y “Clark Kent”. Las proposiciones expresadas por las preferencias de (1), (2) y (16) quedarían del siguiente modo:

(1!) Circ,moduloesto [Lois Lane cree que] (\langle R_{Lois \ Lane}(Superman), puede volar\rangle, (“Superman”, “Kal-El”))

(2’’) Circ,moduloesto [Lois Lane cree que] (\langle R_{Lois \ Lane}(Clark\ Kent), puede volar\rangle, (“Clark Kent”))

(16!) Circ,moduloesto [Lois Lane cree que] (\langle R_{Lois \ Lane}(Kal-El), puede volar\rangle, (“Superman”, “Kal-El”))

(1!) y (16!) son equivalentes y lógicamente independientes de (2’’), todo lo cual se corresponde perfectamente con nuestras intuiciones acerca del comportamiento inferencial de lo que se dice en este contexto.

Alguien podría oponerse a nuestro tratamiento del contexto 3 aduciendo que, dondequiera que se haga una atribución opaca, hablante y oyente dan por sentado que cualquier sustitución que recibiera el asentimiento del creyente podría realizarse salva veritate. La inclusión de una pareja de expresiones bloquearía la sustitutividad, pero no garantizaría la inferencia hacia las proposiciones a las que Lois asentiría. Esto sólo podría lograrse haciendo que la referencia del deíctico oculto estuviera compuesta por el conjunto de todas las
expresiones ante las que Lois asentiría. Por el contrario, nosotros creemos que la opacidad es un fenómeno mucho más local. Usualmente las adscripciones opacas involucran un pequeño número de expresiones para explicar un episodio del comportamiento del creyente. El creyente confunde el uso de estas expresiones, como resultado de un problema epistémico, y esto provoca un comportamiento peculiar que se explica gracias a las adscripciones opacas de creencia. En el curso de alcanzar este objetivo, explicar el comportamiento del creyente, la posible sustitutividad con respecto a una clase mayor de expresiones simplemente no se plantea, lo que cuenta es la relación que existe entre un grupo de expresiones, normalmente no más de dos expresiones, que se usan para poner de manifiesto la confusión del creyente.

El contexto 5 refuerza nuestra posición a este respecto. En el contexto 5, S y A creen que Superman es Clark Kent, y creen que Lois no lo sabe. La posibilidad de que Superman sea Kal-El jamás ha pasado por las mentes de S y A. Lois Lane, sin embargo, ha investigado el pasado de Superman y sabe que el nombre que Superman recibió en Krypton es Kal-El. La proferencia de (1) en este contexto expresaría una proposición opaca, porque S y A creen que Lois no sabe que Superman es Clark Kent. La cuestión relacionada con la posible inferencia de (1'') a una posible interpretación opaca de una proferencia de (16) no surge porque toda proferencia de (16) en este contexto recibiría una interpretación transparente. Aunque Lois cree que Superman es Kal-El y no Clark Kent, una proferencia de (16) expresaría una atribución transparente como (16'') porque S y A nunca han pensado acerca de los estados epistémicos de Lois relacionados con Superman y Kal-El.

(16'') [Lois Lane cree que] <Kal-El, puede volar>

De este modo, en el contexto 5, la proposición expresada a través de la proferencia de (1) implicaría trivialmente la proposición expresada mediante (16), simplemente porque (1'') es cumulativa y la proposición expresada mediante la proferencia de (16) corresponde a una interpretación transparente. 

Una modificación aséptica de nuestra posición inicial permite dar cuenta de nuestras intuiciones acerca del comportamiento inferencial de (1), (2) y (16) en estos cinco contextos diferentes. Y esto se puede
hacer considerando que las palabras del lenguaje público funcionan como “modos de presentación”.

4 Conclusión

Hemos desarrollado en este capítulo algunos de los detalles de la versión de la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto que defendemos. Las características que distinguen nuestra propuesta de otras alternativas dentro de la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto son: las adscripciones de creencia son una subclase propia de las proferencias deliberadamente deferenciales y son las expresiones del lenguaje público las que hacen el papel de los modos de presentación. Hemos puesto ejemplos de casos de proferencias transparentes deliberadamente deferenciales de oraciones de creencias, y hemos mostrado que la preeminencia de los casos transparentes se puede explicar de un modo muy directo y sencillo atendiendo al hecho de que la mayoría de las adscripciones transparentes se llevan a cabo a través de proferencias deferenciales por defecto. Nuestra solución al problema del modo de presentación ha demostrado ser una buena opción gracias a su desempeño en el tratamiento de algunos casos no obvios.

Con respecto a la Paradoja del Significado, la versión de Recanati de la Teoría del Deíctico Oculto y nuestra posición se encuentran en la misma situación. Int y Referencia Directa se mantienen sin mácula, mientras que Composicionalidad e Inocencia Semántica sufren los problemas ya expuestos en el capítulo 5.

La aproximación radical al análisis de las condiciones de verdad de las atribuciones de creencia que aquí se defiende es una de las piezas centrales de la posición general que se mantiene en este trabajo. Antes de abordar el problema de la opacidad de un modo aislado, debimos distinguirlo de un modo apropiado de otros fenómenos relacionados, como la ambigüedad de los casos de Buridan y la distinción relacional/nocional. Descartada la exportación como mecanismo para separar los casos opacos de los transparentes, sólo nos quedan los aparentes fallos de MGPS intensional como marca de la opacidad. Una teoría acerca de las condiciones de verdad de las proferencias opacas debe justificar de modo esencial nuestras intuiciones acerca del potencial inferencial de las proposiciones transparentes y opacas en relación con la sustitutividad de las expresiones co-intensionales. Nuestra propuesta se centra
exclusivamente en este punto, y de este problema da cuenta de un modo razonablemente satisfactorio.