OSMAN AND MUHAMMAD EL-ATTAZ, MUSLIM PRINCES CONVERTED TO CHRISTIANITY AND THEIR ROLE IN THE ‘HOLY WAR’ AGAINST ISLAM

Osman y Muhammad el-Attaz, príncipes musulmanes convertidos al cristianismo y su participación en la “Guerra Santa” contra el Islam

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Abstract: On 15 September 1667 died in the Colegio Imperial of Madrid Muhammad el-Attaz baptized as Baldassare Diego Loyola, son of Prince Abdelwahid of Fez. Baldassare Diego Loyola’s life very much parallels the life of another ‘Muslim converted to Christianity’ and member of a religious Order, Osman later baptized as Domenico di San Tommaso alias Padre Ottomano. Both were captured while on their way to Mecca by knights of Malta, and stayed for some years on Malta before they moving on to Italy to increase the number of celebrities in Catholic Europe to be counted as triumphs for the Counter-Reformation, as described and praised in many pamphlets, sonnets, and monographs. This paper focuses on Padre Ottomano’s role in the last phase of the War of Candia, trying to show that political and economic pragmatism did not allow for revival of a Holy League against the Ottomans.

Resumen: El 15 de septiembre de 1667 moría en el Colegio Imperial de Madrid Muhammad el-Attaz, bautizado como Baldassare Diego Loyola, hijo del Príncipe Abdelwahid de Fez. La vida de Baldassare Diego Loyola transcurre paralela a la vida de otro ‘musulmán convertido al cristianismo’ y miembro de una orden religiosa: Osman, bautizado más tarde como Domenico di San Tommaso, alias Padre Ottomano. Ambos fueron capturados por los caballeros de la Orden de Malta mientras se dirigían a la Meca y vivieron algunos años en Malta, antes de trasladarse a Roma para incrementar el número de “celebridades” de la Europa Católica, otorgando cierto triunfo a la Contrarreforma. Este trabajo, además de tratar el paralelismo de estas dos vidas, se centra en el papel que el Padre Ottomano desempeñó en la etapa final de la Guerra de Candia e intenta mostrar que el pragmatismo político y económico no permitió un renacer de la Liga Santa contra los Otomanos.

Key words: Domenico di San Tommaso. Baldassare Diego Loyola. Ottoman Empire.

Palabras clave: Domenico di San Tommaso. Baldassare Diego Loyola. Imperio Otomano.

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MUSLIM PRINCES TURNED CHRISTIANS — TWO PARALLEL LIFE’S

In the years 1644 respectively 1651 the galley fleet of the Order of Malta captured two high ranking personalities; Osman alias Padre Ottomano and Muhammad el-At-
taz later known as Baldassare Diego Loyola. The Order’s historiographer, the Knight from Verona, Bartolomeo Dal Pozzo who was a direct contemporary of the events, describes in his ‘Historia’ how in summer 1651 Captain General Baldassare Demandolx with four galleys near Cape Bon stopped an English ship and captured 32 travellers from Morocco, amongst them ‘Mehemet Bin Thesi, figlio del Re de Fes, e di Marocco, giovine di 21 anni’. All captives were transferred as slaves to Malta. More spectacular had been the events of late September of 1644 when the galley squadron of the Order then consisting of six vessels under the command of Captain General Gabriel de Chambres Boisbaudrant encountered near the island of Rhodes a convoy of Ottoman ships on their way from Constantinople to Alexandria. The convoy consisted of ten ships. Most of them were pinks and saiques but one was a huge galleon, in the Christian documents commonly referred to as ‘gran galleone’ or ‘gran sultana’. After more than five hours of fighting and considerable losses on

1. In the Spanish documents he appears as Baldassare de Loyola Mandes, respectively Baldassarre de Loyola Méndes.
both sides the Hospitallers managed to take the galleon and a saique as prizes, and to sink a pink. In total 116 Christian soldiers, sailors, and galley rowers had lost their lives, eleven knights and 251 soldiers and galley rowers were injured, but 380 prisoners were made. Amongst them was the ‘gran judice del Cairo’ Muhammad Effendi from Bursa, other men and women of distinction, and a lady of the sultan’s harem with her baby boy who according to the sources then was not older than 30 months. The captives and the riches were brought to Malta. In the next months and years news spread that this lady — the so-called Zaphira or Zafira — had been the favorite of Sultan Ibrahim I and the boy called Osman the first born son of the sultan. The figure of Osman is inseparably linked with the so-called War of Candia. The capture of the gran galeone with Osman and his mother on board and the subsequent use of the Hospitallers’ squadron of the port of Kalismene at Crete formed a pretext for Sultan Ibrahim I to declare war on Venice and in late June 1645 to attack Crete.

Both captive’s lives developed in many aspects very similarly. Osman and the prince from Morocco stayed on in Malta. The knights of St John, proud to have the references in Giovanna Fiane. Schiavitù mediterranea. Corsari, rinnegati e santi di età moderna. Milan, 2009.


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se personalities on their island, treated both with great honours. Muhammad el-Attaz was taken in custody by the Portuguese Bali Diego de Melo while Osman’s tutor was the Knight Raimondo d’Alvito. It was in the same year, 1656, when both in Malta were baptized and in solemn and pompous festivities converted to the Christian religion. Baldassare was baptized in the centenary of Ignatius’ death (July 31, 1656), Osman on 12 January 1656. From then on Osman took on the official name of Domenico di San Tommaso, while Muhammad el-Attaz was baptized as Baldassare Diego Loyola.

There are certain similarities in the contemporary descriptions about the events which led to the baptism of both. Baldassare Loyola and his biographer Domenico Brunacci describe a dramatic vision which made the son of King Abdelwahid of Fez and Morocco convert. After five years of captivity in Malta his ransom was paid. While preparing to leave the island he received a vision: “I was in the middle of the sea; half of the sea was black, the other half was aflame; I was treading water in the black half, but I was pulled to the flames. When I was almost in the fire, I began to cry loudly ‘Help me, help me Lord.’. Then I saw (...) a mountain in that immense sea, and on it a man dressed in white who stretched a hand towards me. He pulled me out, and I found myself out of danger. I asked him, ‘(...) who are you who freed me from the sea?’ and he answered: ‘I am the holy Baptism. Without me, neither your father nor your mother can save you from this sea. That’s why God put so many obstacles in your way while you were in a Christian land.’ Having shaken myself out of the vision, I felt things were extremely simple: the desire to leave, to see again my children, my wife, and all the others, was converted into affection for Christ and the Holy Faith. I confessed out loud: ‘I am a Christian, I do not want to visit the false prophet Muhammed. The true faith is the faith in Christ’.


baptism was not the end of a spiritual journey but only a step in the process. It was after the baptism when their illustrious careers took off. Both then joined a Christian religious order —Osman became a Dominican, Muhammad el-Attaz became a Jesuit— both achieved great fame all over Catholic Europe, and both in a later phase of their lives prepared to return actively on the forefront of Islam-Christian antagonism. One —Baldassare Diego Loyola— intended to risk travelling to North India and to carry out missionary work there, the other, Domenico di San Tommaso alias Padre Ottomano became an important part in the Christian plans to stop the Ottoman siege of Crete and to destabilize Ottoman power in the Eastern Mediterranean. As a twist of destiny in Turin in early August 1664 these two personalities met by coincidence. Obviously the two understood each other well as later Baldassare Diego Loyola remembered the encounter and called Padre Ottomano his friend. Both visited —albeit not together— the shrine of Loreto, the anti-Muslim shrine par excellence. In the contemporary descriptions of both lives Christian pilgrimages appear as the opposite to their former situations, being on a Pilgrimage to Mecca. The past appears as the mirror of the present, highlighting in this way the great gift of conversion. While travelling around Italy, Baldassare Loyola and Padre Ottomano were in touch with the same prominent religious and political authorities, including Benedetto Odescalchi, the future pope Innocent XI, cardinal Antonio Barberini, the Viceroy of Naples, and members of the Medici, Doria, and Savoia families.

Both died as sort of martyrs, Baldassare Loyola in Madrid on his way to a dangerous avant-garde mission of the Society of Jesus in Northern India, the Padre Ottomano in a heroic fight against the plague in Malta. The lives of Baldassare Loyola and Padre Ottomano served as perfect examples of how Christianity was perceived as the only possible source of salvation. There are other interesting parallels which were to a certain extent caused by political circumstances. Contrary to the rather discrete and modest appearance of Baldassare Loyola and the Padre Ottomano, their environment produced great baroque pomp whenever the two appeared at a foreign

city or court. This international interest and curiosity about their former lives and origin was shared by many eminent religious and political authorities in Italy, France, and Spain, who wanted to meet the alleged primogenito of Sultan Ibrahim or the prince of Fez and not a simple Dominican, respectively Jesuit. Here we have a paradox: on the one hand we have a Sultan’s son and the prince of Fez who wanted to become conventional Christians and friars in religious orders, on the other hand we have the general public and audience who wanted them to continue being high-ranking authorities and acting like that.

Meanwhile there was hardly any discussion if Muhammad el-Attaz was really the son of Prince Abdelwahid of Fez the case of Osman alias Domenico di San Tommaso alias Padre Ottoman is different. It is still controversially discussed if Osman really was a son of Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim. For the context of this paper it is of no real relevance if he was or not. What mattered was that in Catholic Europe, and especially in those countries and territories facing immediate Ottoman expansion and aggression it was widely believed that Osman really was a Sultan’s son. The population was delighted to learn that with the help of the Chivalric Order of Malta and divine providence he was turned into a Christian, and a Dominican. For Catholic propaganda of the counter-reformation these conversions were ‘gems’ and needed to be publicized and celebrated as ‘triumphs’.

This paper intends to outline how Padre Ottoman was used in the epic Christian-Muslim antagonism in the Mediterranean. This intention will limit our time frame on the last period of the so-called War of Candia (guerra di Candia), that is the years from 1667 to 1669. For a better understanding of the subsequent events it appears necessary to have a short look on both protagonist’s previous life’s, and its international context.

MUHAMMAD EL-ATTAZ BECOMES BALDASSARE DIEGO LOYOLA

In the last decades have appeared several studies on the life of Baldassare Diego Loyola. These studies were facilitated by the rich amount of primary sources on the
Jesuit and showed the enormous attention the figure of Baldassare Diego received from his Christian contemporaries. This interest in the person of the converted Muslim prince even found entrance into works of world literature like Calderon de la Barca’s sacred drama on Baldassare’s conversion, ‘El Gran Príncipe de Fez Don Baltasar de Loyola’, first published in ‘Cuarta parte de comedias nuevas de Don Pedro Caldérón de la Barca’. Baldassare Diego also features in various Spanish, Italian, and German Jesuit plays and literary works and he was seen as a fine example of the triumph of the Counter Reformation. In this context modern historians have pointed out the often ambivalent attitude of Baroque Catholic Christianity, with the stereotyped image of Muslim characters being accompanied by a true fascination for Islam. Innumerable contemporary literary texts on converts are proof for this ambivalence.

Born in 1631 to King Abdelwahid of Fez and Morocco of the Sa’adian dynasty Muhammad grew up studying the Koran, and was married with three children before turning twenty, at which point he embarked on a pilgrimage to Mecca without his...
father’s consent. In summer of 1651, during one of his cruises, Captain General Balthasar Demondolx (in the Spanish documents Baldassare Mandols, respectively Mandes or Méndes), captured an English vessel\(^\text{21}\) sailing from Tunis to Egypt with ‘Mehmed Bin Thesi, tenuto figlio del Sultano del Marocco’ and his retinue on board. Muhammad and his entourage were held ransom in Malta for the next five years\(^\text{22}\). There, saddened by the ignorance of the other Muslim captives, Muhammad devoted himself in teaching and copying the Koran. After five years his ransom was paid. According to his autobiography and letters he was just about to leave the island of the Knights, when he received a vision that resulted in his decision to convert to Christianity\(^\text{23}\); a story which in parts appears to have been a fabric and later altered to lay emphasis on the miraculous character of this conversion.

The Order’s historian Bartolomeo Dal Pozzo presents this story even more dramatic and charged with providence when he describes that the ship which should bring Muhammad el-Attaz home already would have left Malta but was driven back by strong winds: “Della custui santa ispiratione appari contrasegno molto chiaro. Percio che havendo egli pagato il suo riscatto, & essendosi con una tartana partito per Barberia, fù astretto dal vento contrario a tornarsene addietro; e toccata da Dio, non più cercò di seguire quell camino, ma fece istanza al Prior della Chiesa d’essere battezato. Ricevuto poi nella Compagnia di Gesù, riuscì famoso Predicatore, e dig ran frutto nella vigna del Signore, convertendo molti infideli alla S. Fede, & in fine morì in concetto d’un gran Servo di Dio. Anco verso di lui dimostrossi le Religione liberale, assegnandogli in vita 15 scudi il mese”\(^\text{24}\). This version can hardly be true —but shows the tendency of the contemporary baroque authors to present these sorts of events as a divine stroke of fate. Baldassare Diego in his autobiography and letters said that he had had a vision in the house of the captain of the galleys Balthasar De-
mandolx which made him converse to Christianity. This conversion took place on 12 June 1656, and baptism already followed on 31 July of that year. He was catechized and baptized, and chose for himself the first name of Captain General Baldassare Demandolx — Balthasar respectively in Italian Baldassare — who had taken him prisoner five years before, and to whom he obviously later had established a close relationship, adding the name ‘Loyola’ in honour of St Ignatius, on whose feast day he was baptized. In fact ‘Mehmed bin Thesi’ was baptized in the Jesuit church in Valletta and registered as Baldassare Diego. The patron of the convert was the Portuguese Knight Diego de Melo, therefore the second name.

Baldassare Diego Loyola subsequently went to Palermo and Messina, where he established contacts with some local Jesuits and decided to join the Society. Baldassare is one of the few known exceptions to the decree of the fifth General Congregation (1593) that prevented people of Jewish and Muslim ancestry from joining the Society of Jesus. His case was discussed by the Jesuit authorities during the eleventh General Congregation in 1661.

In this year he settled at the novitiate in Rome. He was ordained a priest two years later. For about three years (1664–1667) he devoted himself to the conversion of Muslims in the seaports of Genoa and Naples with considerable success. Because of his status as a prince and a convert from Islam, Baldassare Diego became popular among prominent secular and religious authorities, he was in touch, for instance, with the Cardinals Antonio Barberini and Benedetto Odescalchi (the future Pope Innocent XI) and with the distinguished Savoy, Medici, and Doria families.

Yet his main interest was focused on something else: he petitioned to be assigned to a Muslim territory, with the hope of receiving the gift of martyrdom. He was eventually permitted by Jesuit General Giovanni Paolo Oliva to carry out missionary work at the Mogul’s court in North India. From Rome he travelled through France where in Arlès he met by chance once more Balthasar Demandolx. On 15 September 1667 he died in the Colegio Imperial of Madrid, after falling sick travelling to Lisbon, from where he was supposed to sail to India. Before he died he was visited by Queen-Regent Mariana of Austria who also ordered a solemn and pompous funeral in the Colegio Imperial. Sonnets were composed to celebrate his saintly life. In one
of them, Pedro Francisco Esquex’s ‘Sermon fúnebre historial’ (1667) he is celebrated as a new St Paul, a former enemy of Christianity who became a tireless missionary. In 1692 Baldassare Diego’s spiritual director, the provincial in Rome and director of the Collegium Romanum, Domenico Brunacchi composed a long monograph on Baldassare’s life, probably to support Baldassare Diego’s canonization.28

The written legacy of Muhammad el-Attaz alias Baldassare Diego’s gives precious insight in several aspects of life in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century. Modern research on individuals living at and between the borders of Islam and Christianity, such as converts or renegades, has already shown that the boundaries between the Maghreb and Christendom were more subtle, mobile, and porous than previously imagined. A deeper reading of Baldassare Diego’s letters and autobiography shows that he perceived and described Malta as a Muslim space. During his captivity he lived in a Muslim community —that is in the bagno and later the house of Diego de Melo in Valletta— spoke Arabic with Muslims and the local Maltese population, taught Islamic law, and copied the Koran. It is interesting to read that he never mentions any social pressures exerting an influence on him. Baldassare Diego’s life therefore offers —beyond contemporary Catholic propaganda— interesting insight into the different faces of Muslim-Christian antagonism, and shows that besides strict enmity there was also an everyday life of ‘unofficial’ pragmatic coexistence.

We already have pointed out the parallel aspects of Baldassare Diego’s and the Padre Ottomano’s life; these parallels went beyond pure biographical lines of events, the same acquaintances and visits to locations. This kind of synchronicity had a deeply political momentum. What happened in the subsequently described episode of the War of Candia cannot be understood without a look at the achievements of Baldassare Diego. The use of Padre Ottomano for the political purposes of Venice appears to have been instigated or at least encouraged by the positive example of the success of Baldassare Diego in converting Muslims. From his precise and detailed records we can count almost 800 conversions in about three years work in Naples and Genoa.29 This of course was thanks to his knowledge of Arabic and to his knowledge of Koran. The case of Padre Ottomano was different; one doubts that Osman, who was a very young boy when captured by the galleys of the Order had a good command of Turkish, least Arabic or knowledge of the Koran. Baldassare Loyola’s met-

28. Preserved in APUG, Vitae 105-106.
hod to convince his former Muslim brethren to abandon their faith often were based on symbolic actions: “One day, while he was preaching on a ship in the port of Naples, surrounded by a large crowd of Muslims, he pulled out a copy of the Koran in order to challenge it. At the sight of the book, the Muslims bowed their heads in sign of respect. When he saw that, Baldassare full of zeal, threw the book down, stamped on it, and tore out the pages (...) screaming against the sacrilegious book of such a cruel legislator” 30.

Meanwhile in the summer of 1667 Baldassare Diego prepared for his mission to India also Padre Domenico di San Tommaso’s rather reclusive life was going to be changed drastically. The main reason for that was more than 2.000 miles away from his then residence, the convent of SS. Annunziata in Paris. We already have mentioned that Sultan Ibrahim had used the taking of the gran galeone near Rhodes as pretext to put a plan into practice which since long had been in the pipeline: the conquest of the Venetian island of Crete 31.

**THE PADRE OTTOMANO AND VENETIAN POLITICS**

It was only step by step that the Italian States and Republics joined forces to support Venice. Traditionally in rather bad terms with the Venetians it also took some while until the Order of St John was willing to send its fleet to join the relief forces 32. The war also continued with Sultan Ibrahim I’s assassination in 1648 and the succession to the throne by Mehmet IV.

In the subsequent years the Venetians and their auxiliary forces together with the galleys of the Order could archive some spectacular naval exploits against the Ottomans. In 1651 near Naxos and 1656 at the Dardanelles the Ottoman navy

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suffered hefty defeats\textsuperscript{33}. Despite of these successes the main goal could not be achieved as the Ottomans did not lift their sieges and blockage of the main ports, towns, and fortresses of Crete. By 1650, except the capital Candia (today Iraklio)\textsuperscript{34} and the fortresses of Carabusa (Gramvousa), Spinalonga (Kalydon), Sitia, and Souda nearly the whole island was occupied or controlled by the Ottoman forces. In the next years up to 1667 one might speak of a sort of frozen war. Despite the participation of allied troops from Germany, several parts of Italy including Savoy, Switzerland, and France, a real relief of Candia never could be achieved. It were mainly the campaigns in Transylvania (today Romania) and in Hungary which prevented the Ottomans in the late 1650s and mid-1660\textapos;s to throw more troops to Crete.

When in 1666 the energetic Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü\textsuperscript{35}, then the driving force in Ottoman politics, concluded a peace treaty on the Balkans, the assault on the fortresses of Crete could be resumed with new strength and fresh troops. In the autumn of 1666 Köprülü himself led a huge army to Crete. In the subsequent campaign the most of the country was cleared from remaining Christian forces. In the spring of 1667 with more than 30.000 troops the final siege on the capital Candia could be prepared\textsuperscript{36}.

The leader of the Venetian forces and their Christian allies was then \textit{Capitano Generale} Francesco Morosini (who in 1688 should get elected Doge of Venice), assisted by the Piedmontese \textit{Marchese} Geronimo Francesco Villa and the German Georg Friedrich Count of Sparr\textsuperscript{37}. The general-proveditor and commander of the town of Candia was the Venetian Antonio Barbaro who soon should be succeeded by Bernardo Nani.

Morosini was well aware that his troops were much too weak—and continuously reduced by diseases and effects of hunger and bad provisions—to start a counter attack. For the moment nothing could be done as to play on time and hope that soon


\textsuperscript{34} In the contemporary Italian documents Crete and its capital feature as Candia. In the Ottoman documents it is referred to as Kandiye. Here the word Candia is used.


\textsuperscript{37} Cf. the contemporary account by François Savin d`Alquié. \textit{Memoires du voyage de M. de Ville ou Histoire du siege de Candie}. Paris, 1670.
more Christian relief forces would come. The situation went worse when the Ottomans managed to place some gun batteries near the port of Candia and therewith prevented to let Christian ships to enter it. Provisions therefore could only be brought into the city and under high risks in the night time. In the limited space of this paper we cannot discuss in more depth what happened when on 28 May 1667 the siege of the city of Candia had started. Until September 1667—despite of massive efforts by the attackers to undermine the fortress walls and bastions and to carry out subterranean explosions—the Ottomans only managed to conquer some advanced escarpes.

At this stage strong rainfalls and the plague made Grand Vizier Köprülü stop the assaults, and decide to safe the forces for a new attack next spring. That gave the Venetians some respite to discuss how to face the oncoming dangers. Calls from Venice and from the Pope for help and support of the ‘Christian’ case were once more send to European princes, and for the campaign of 1668 Duke Johann Friedrich of Braunschweig-Lüneburg sent three regiments, Bavarian Duke Elector Ferdinand Maria sent some contingents of specialists; the duke electors of Mainz and Cologne and the bishops of Strasbourg and Paderborn sent 400 soldiers each. The duke of Savoy sent 500 men under Lieutenant General Alexandre Montbrun, Marquis de Saint André, the same amount of soldiers was sent by Pope Clement IX under the command of Sergeant-General Muzio Mattei and it was furthermore allowed to the Venetians to recruit 700 mercenaries in the territories of the Papal State. The Council of the Order of St John sent 63 knights and c 350 mercenaries commanded by Ettore de Fay la Tour.

Although also Emperor Leopold I promised to transfer 2,000 men infantry to Crete, lack of means of transport delayed their departure, and they should only arrive in the Serenissima when Candia had surrendered. Pope Clement IX who propagated the events at Candia as a sort of Holy War against the infidels also contributed the huge sum of 1,800,000 scudi. In winter 1667/68 was further negotiated that a joint Venetian-Maltese-Papal fleet should be gathered to hit against the Ottoman transport ships bringing soldiers and ammunition to Crete. This fleet later should be joined by nine big war ships which the Spanish government had ordered the Viceroy of Sicily

40. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, p. 125 et seq.
to send to Candia. They needed however first to be overhauled and subsequently ar-
ived too late for the campaign of 1668.

From the French side not much support was to expect. Louis XIV did not want to
risk damage the traditionally good relations of France with the Ottoman Empire. The
Levantine trade still played a vital role in French economy. The newly founded
French ‘Compagnie du Levant’ gives proof of this. Louis XIV therefore did not con-
sent to send official French troops to the Eastern Mediterranean and only gave per-
mission that Venice could recruit French volunteers. Not to provoke the Ottomans
the 1,200 troops which the Duke de Feuillade finally recruited were forbidden to be
transported to Candia on French ships41. They sailed under the flag of the Order of
Malta. France only consented to contribute with 400,000 scudi. That the unitas chris-
tianae was far from reality is further proven by the fact that English and Dutch mer-
chant vessels supplied the Ottomans with ammunition and other necessaries42.

With this support the number of the defenders of Candia amounted to c 5,000, the
value of some of this quickly and sometimes by force hired troops however were
rather questionable. In total the defenders had 90 heavy cannons and 300 lighter can-
 nons to their disposal43. The enemies forces were clearly superior, in winter 1667/1668
there were further 3,500 janissaries, 4,000 Egyptian and Syrian soldiers, 1,000
Armenian miners and artillery men, and 1,000 sipahi’s landed44.

In June 1668 the Ottomans opened the campaign again. By August several Chris-
tian bastions and walls had been damaged and a deep breach in one side of the for-
tress of Candia had been cut45. The defenders enjoyed some relief when in this month
some 2,500 mercenaries form Venice, Hannover, and Brunswick, under the com-
mand of Catterino Cornaro arrived46. In around the same time Francesco Morosini
arrived with the Venetian fleet and took over the supreme command over the defense
of Candia. Besides calling for money, troops, ships, and military material there was
developed another idea.

This had very much to do with the beginning of the pontificate on 20 June 1667
of Pope Clement IX who soon showed to be a fervent supporter of the Venetian case.

42. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, p. 154.
43. A good eyewitness account on the situation is given by the German military engineer Johann Bern-
hard Scheither. Novissima praxis militaris, chapter 3; cf. also the compilation of eye witness reports gathe-
red in Matthäus Merian (ed.). Das lange bestrittene Königreich Candia. Frankfurt, 1670.
44. On the campaign of 1668 cf. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 155 et seq.; Roger Palmer of
45. Kriegsgeschichtlich Einzelschriften, p. 155.
46. Ibid., p. 157.
It is certainly no coincidence that the year 1667—after the resuming of the War of Candia—witnessed a new climax of Padre Ottomano’s and Baldassare Diego Loyola’s popularity. A number of sonnets and poems to their praise were published in Italy and elsewhere, maybe the most popular was ‘Lode del P. Ottomano’ published in 1667 in Ferrara. We already have pointed out that Baldassar Diego then had had great success in Naples and Genoa to convert Muslim slaves to the Catholic faith.

With the new steaming up of the machine of Catholic propaganda there was prepared the involvement of the Padre Ottomano in the theatrum belli. The Padre Ottomano then was living in Paris in the convent of SS. Annunziata and already the previous year had received three letters written by Maurizio Paleologo, the vicar general of the Greek Orthodox Church of Alexandria, which urged the Padre to get personally active as in the province of Greece—then occupied by the Ottomans—and the major part of Armenia most of the Christian population would be ready to raise against the Sultan and acclaim the Padre Ottomano as their king. This would have been the dear wish of the Patriarch of Alexandria who also would work on the scheme that the King of Poland, the Russian Czar, the Prince of Walachia and the leaders in Christian Ethiopia would attack the Ottomans from different sides. A few weeks later Padre Ottomano received a letter by Gregory Basil, the son of Prince Rákóczi of the Walachia, which contained similar proposals.

There were also plans developed how these efforts could be combined with a direct attack on the Dardanelles by the fleets of Venice, Malta, Florence, the Papal State, and others. This of course—at least on paper—appeared to be menacing for the mainly Protestant powers like the Netherlands or England who because of commercial reasons sided with the Ottomans and who feared a complete destabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean.

We do not know if it was the Padre Ottomano himself who informed foreign diplomats at the French court about the matter, fact is that Marco Antonio Giustiniani, the Venetian ambassador at Paris, immediately informed the Senate of the Serenissima about this exciting news which promised a substantial relief for the besieged defenders of Candia. The winter of 1666/67 was spent with negotiations between the Papal State—partly halted because of the bad health of Pope Alexander VII—the General of the Dominicans Giovanni Battista de Marinis, the representatives of the Serenissima, and the French Court how best to make use of the Padre Ottomano in this affair. The Venetians succeeded to put their concept through that the famous Do-

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minican friar should be personally involved in the next campaign for the relief of Candia

On 27 July 1667 Padre Ottomano and his assistant Padre Ignozzi di Terracusa left Paris for Venice. After his arrival in the Lagoon city the Dominican friar was received by Doge Domenico II. Contarini and the Senate and there were detailed discussions how to proceed further to relief besieged Candia. It was soon decided that the Padre Ottomano should sail with the Venetian relief forces. This had to be confirmed by Giovanni Battista de Marinis, the General of the Dominicans and by the newly elected Pope Clement IX. It is interesting to notice that up to this moment there is no evidence whatsoever that the Padre Ottomano himself took the initiative or that such-like plans were proposed by him. The Dominican friar until then preferred an extremely reclusive life style, and hardly had frequented the salons or political circles of Paris or Venice.

His biographers Bulgarini, de Jant, Tempia, and the other contemporary commentators called his behavior unassuming and modest (‘tutt`umile e modesto’), which one might realistically interpret as lethargic or passive. If we believe his biographers, this attitude completely changed after his visit to Venice in the summer of 1667. Obviously in this time a group of people must have pushed him to assume the role of an active uomo politico which up to now was very much opposite to his character and intentions. Still on 1st November 1664 the French chargé d`affaires in Turin, Baron Servien, after some conversation with the Padre Ottomano had written to the French court that he would not claim any royal honors or right of succession to the Sultan’s throne but nothing but a modest and monastic life style.

That the ambitious design ‘nel quadro d’un piano politico antiturco’ connected with the Padre Ottomano was not his own plan is almost clear. The French court understood this too clearly and therefore blamed the Roman Curia and the Venetians as the masterminds. According to some eyewitnesses it had been the Venetian char

54. Cf. the letters by the Papal Nuntio at Paris to Cardinal Rospigliosi from 5 and 19 July 1669. Archi-
gê d’affaires at the Roman Curia, Antonio Grimani, who had managed very cleverly to convince the Pope to involve the Padre Ottomano in the Candia-campaign55. What also appears from the letter exchanges is that before he left Paris Padre Ottomano and his circle did not communicate to the French court that his departure from the French capital had to with a mission to the Eastern Mediterranean. This is in so far understandable as it was certainly not in the French interests to support a complete destabilization of the Near East. One might wonder what would have happened to him if the Dominican friar already then would have presented himself as ‘tool’ against the Ottoman Empire and an instigator of an inner Ottoman revolt.

Things got more clear-shaped and more news filtered into the public when Padre Ottomano in January 1668 travelled from Venice to Rome and had several meetings with the cardinals, and also with the Pope. According to Antonio Grimani the Padre then maintained that his supposed younger brother Mehmet IV would be hated by the Turkish population and that the War of Candia would have contributed very much to an oncoming financial bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire56. He would hope to be able soon to sail to the Levant on the Papal squadron. His presence there would certainly have a great impact on the Muslim soldiers and local population and change the outcome of the Siege of Candia. In collaboration with the Greek Patriarchs it was hoped to bring the Greek population and the ‘honest’ Turks on his side57. The greater scheme was to instigate the Greeks and Turks to revolt against his alleged younger brother Sultan Mehmet IV. Finally an Oriental Christian empire should be erected58.
There was of course a great deal of optimism if not naïvity in these plans. Because of lack of alternatives, it seemed however to be one of the last options to change the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the Padre Ottomano in May of 1668 had left Rome, the Pope expressed his hopes in several communications that the Dominican friar’s mission really would cause an upheaval in the Ottoman Empire against reigning Sultan Mehmet IV. In the meantime Francesco Morosini had been informed in detail about the oncoming mission of the Padre Ottomano and he was entrusted to make best use of the alleged older brother of the reigning Sultan.

That only a few months before in London a book was published which tries to unveil Padre Ottomano as an impostor (‘Historia de tribus hujus saeculi impostoribus’) appears to have been connected with the events then happening in Venice and Rome. The authorship it attributed to the well-known author and diarist John Evelyn, and the booklet soon left an impact on the international market, was republished, and translated from the Latin into English, and into German. For the English side—always very well informed what was going on in the Mediterranean—the latest rumors about a ‘secret’ weapon of the Catholic side against the Ottoman archenemy and for the destabilization of the Near East appeared to be disquieting. The subject of the Padre Ottomano as an impostor was from then on taken up by other authors.


62. The full title of the English version reads: The history of the three late, famous impostors, viz. Padre Ottomana, Mahomed Bei and Sabatai Sevi the one, pretended son and heir to the late Grand Signior, the other, a prince of the Ottoman family, but in truth, a Valachian counterfeit, and the last, the supposed Messiah of the Jews, in the year of the true Messiah, 1666: with a brief account of the ground and occasion of the present war between the Turk and the Venetian, together with the cause of the final extirpation, destruction and exile of the Jews out of the Empire of Persia. London, 1667.


64. Cf. Jean Baptiste Rocoles. Les imposteurs insignes, ou histoire de plusieurs homes de néant de toutes les nations, qui ont usurpé la qualité d’Empereurs, Rois et Prince. Amsterdam, 1683.
THE PADRE OTTOMANO IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

By the middle of May 1668 the Padre Ottomano arrived in Civitavecchia where the Papal fleet consisting of five galleys, two transport ships and a felucca was preparing to sail to Crete. At first it was planned that the illustrious Padre should travel at the capitana of Admiral Bali Vincenzo Rospigliosi65. When the Papal fleet finally set sail on 19 May the Padre was staying at the galley S. Pietro, commanded by his old acquaintance, the knight of Malta Commander Buontempo66.

From Civitavecchia the Papal fleet proceeded to Naples and further to Messina where the Papal ships should unify with the galley squadron of the Knights Hospitallers. Discussions about etiquette and unfavorable winds delayed the tour. So it took until 5 June when the Papal fleet arrived at the port of Messina where the six galleys of the Order of Malta commanded by Captain General Clemente Accarigi already waited67. In the following days the joined fleets proceeded along the Calabrian Coast and then near Cape S. Maria crossed the Adriatic Sea for Corfu where they arrived on 15 June. At Corfu Admiral Rospigliosi found a letter by Francesco Morosini urging him to hurry up to unify with the Venetian fleet —consisting of 5 large galleasses, 15 galleys, and a number of galleottes, and brigantines— then anchoring near the Island of San Teodoro and the fortress of Candia68. There were soon to come three more Venetian galleys escorting nine transport vessels with relief forces to Corfu. After these ships had arrived Rospigliosi should set sail and proceed directly to Cape Spada.

On 25 June the unified Maltese and Papal fleet left Corfu. Although there was intelligence that near Cerigo there were ten Muslim corsair ships on the hunt for Christian transport ships on their way to Crete Rospigliosi felt strong enough to continue his way to the Eastern Mediterranean. The corsairs did not risk attack the 14 Maltese-Papal-Venetian galleys accompanying the transport ships. The rest of the voyage was uneventful and as planned on the 7 July near Cape Spada they met the Venetian fleet under Morosini. Together the ships proceeded to the island of San Teodoro. On the 18 July there was a meeting on Morosini’s capitana to discuss how

68. Ibid., p. 138.
to proceed further to install the Padre Ottomano as the new pretender to the Sultan’s throne and to provoke a rebellion amongst the Ottoman attackers of Candia. The next day with the relief forces the Padre Ottomano landed at Candia. He was received by Governor Bernardo Nani in the fortress of Souda where the next steps of action should be discussed. It was decided to write letters to Grand Vizier Köprülü, the pasha-general and the most important officers of the Ottoman army in which the Padre Ottomano should present himself as the first born son of Sultan Ibrahim. To these Ottoman officers was promised highest positions and financial reward when they should change sides and support the Christian case. For the delivery of the post were used Ottoman prisoners of war and slaves. The first aim of delivery was the pasha-general who—against the hopes of the Christians—immediately kept the messenger, according to the documents a certain Yussuf, under strict custody and apparently without even seeing the letters sent them to the grand vizier and also gave orders to all officers that from now on no letters from the Christian side should be accepted. If Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü studied the letters we do not know. If he did so the contents seemed not to have left the least impression on him as he sent them sealed to Sultan Mehmet IV to Istanbul. Therefore we can summarize that these letters did have no impact on the enemy’s side. What is also sure is that the Ottoman leaders tried their best to prevent that the presence of the Padre Ottomano was made public to their soldiers.

After this failure Morosini suggested other methods to communicate the presence of the Padre and ordered to shoot with arrows proclamations and leaflets in the Turkish language to the Ottoman camps which demanded from the Muslim soldiers to desert from the grand vizier and Sultan Mehmet and to convert to the side of the Padre Ottomano who as first born son of the late sultan would be the legal ruler of the Ottoman Empire. We are not informed in how much this effort to reach the Ottoman camps succeeded. Most likely the squadron commanders (bölük başı) and regiment commanders (ağası) were ordered to confiscate these messages and leaflets immediately, and it furthermore is very doubtful that many of the Ottoman soldiers could read or write. And even if these communications were read, how could the Muslim soldiers know that it was to be true? Without a visual appearance of the alleged son of Sultan Ibrahim there were not many effects to be expected. The elite troops of the

69. Ibid., p. 151 et seq.
janissaries were anyway completely loyal to Sultan Mehmet IV. So for the moment—and until better ideas could crop up—there was nothing else to do for the Padre Ottomano than to wait.

Although the main assault had not yet started the Christians already had several problems, one of them was the supply of water. In course of July there were several skirmishes because of the provision with water, the bloodiest one was near Calamino when a contingent of Maltese and Papal soldiers secretly wanted to fetch water in the territory of the enemy but were attacked73.

Other problems were homemade but typical for the age of Baroque. There were constant clashes between the leading officers of the Christian forces because of etiquette. It was especially the knights of Malta who were creating problems in this respect as they wished to have a better treatment as the Papal, German, Savoy, and Venetian officers. Commander Accarigi brought this case to Admiral Rospigliosi. When the latter answered that he as the supreme commander of all the fleet could not guarantee these prerogatives the knights declared that then they would refuse to obey to the commands of the admiral74. Rospigliosi replied that the knights then had to take responsibility for their actions in front of their grand master and the Pope as the supreme head of the Order. Although Accarigi for the moment gave in the situation remained tense and certainly did not contribute to the fighting spirit of the Christian troops in general.

Despite these setbacks the Christian forces on 3 August succeeded to reconquer the Island of San Teodoro; the main reason for that were the good fresh water wells there75. In the meantime the Ottoman assault on the fortress town of Candia had commenced and it took not long until the attackers managed to cut a deep breach in the seaside bastions of the city, also had the daily bombardments diminished the number of the defenders substantially. To avoid a threatening invasion of the city Morosini decided that parts of the crews and soldiers on the Venetian fleet should be transferred into besieged Candia76. After some heated discussions with Commander Accarigi who for the moment did not want to move his ships into the fire of the port of Candia, Admiral Rospigliosi decided to divide the fleet; all the galleys, manned by strong contingents of soldiers, should proceed to Candia, meanwhile the other war ships, galleons, galeottes, and brigantines should remain at San Teodoro.

73. Ibid., p. 142.
74. Ibid., p. 143.
75. Ibid., p. 146.
76. Ibid., p. 147.
When the galleys arrived off Candia on 9 August it was found out that the enemy’s batteries were too strong and tactically too well placed to risk a landing and attacking. In the nighttime the Christians managed to transfer some 800 men into the besieged fortress city77. What the Christians only got to know later was that because of the momentary presence of the joined Venetian, Maltese, and Papal galleys an Ottoman fleet with fifty ships under the command of the Kapudan-Pasha had given up the plan to land fresh troops there and instead proceeded to the Southern coast of Crete where a few days later they set the troops on land. End of August a strong storm damaged the Kapudan Pasha’s fleet considerably and sunk several ships.

The events on 24 August show how fragile the Christian alliance was: On this day Admiral Rospigliosi with some Venetian galleys and the Maltese squadron returned from an excursion to fetch water; the remaining Venetian galleys and galleasses greeted Rospigliosi’s *capitana* with the common salute of gun shots, but refused to do so when the Maltese flagship passed. After convening a council with all his captains, Captain General Accarigi informed Rospigliosi that because of this ‘insult’ the Maltese galleys are going to return to Malta78. Accarigi only was ready to stay on when he got an official order by Rospigliosi in the latter’s function as the commander-in-chief of the unified Christian fleet. Rospigliosi refused that, as he felt not in power to decide in questions of status and etiquette and did not want to wait until a confirmation of the Roman Curia in the matter would arrive79. So on 28 August Captain General Accarigi called it at day and set sail for a return to Messina where in the winter season the ships should be repaired and keeled over.

To the Venetians delight news arrived that a Spanish relief fleet was on the way to Crete. However things turned out differently when on 19 September the Spanish ships and a part of the Venetian fleet met at Corfu where because of unfavorable weather it was decided to end the maritime season. Meanwhile the Siege of Candia continued with heavy losses on the Christian side. While the Maltese had returned to Messina and the Spanish fleet to Naples, Admiral Rospigliosi had arrived in Rome and had to explain the events of the campaign to his uncle Pope Clement IX.

Against all expectations the campaign for 1668 was however not yet over. By early November 1668 a corps of 800 mercenaries and adventurers, composed of many noblemen, led by François d’Aubusson, Duke de la Feuillade arrived at Candia80. De la Feuillade had sailed under the banner of the knights of Malta for Louis

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77. Ibid.
XIV — as already mentioned — did not want to ruffle his relations with the sultan. A few weeks later some 1,600 Venetian soldiers and 400 French mercenaries under the command of the Comte d’Harcourt, as well as a reinforcement of the Maltese battalion with some hundred men, amongst them 63 knights of the Order of St John, arrived at Candia81. With these reinforcements the Duke de la Feuillade thought about starting a surprise attack on the Ottomans. As more so as the noblemen and adventurers of his corps had come to Candia for the search of fame and glory and did not want to wait another five months in the damp casemates and trenches of the city until the new military season would commence. That de la Feuillade had to pay half of the costs of his contingents out of his own pocket put also some pressure to end the fighting as soon as possible. When however de la Feuillade proposed to Morosini to start a surprise attack this was refused82. Morosini knew very well about the real strength of the enemy and the tactical cleverness of the Ottomans. De la Feuillade then declared he would carry out this attack with his own contingents alone. According to the volunteer status of the French adventurers and mercenaries the Venetian general could not forbid this. The French duke fixed the date of his surprise attack for 16 December and disregard the orders by Commander-in-chief Morosini also 48 knights of Malta and 400 Maltese soldiers joined de la Feuillade’s attack83. When the surprise attack was launched in the early hours of 16 December indeed the first line of the Ottomans could be taken but when the enemy recovered, strong artillery fire and counter attacks soon threw back the French and Maltese forces. In the end the attack proofed a complete failure and cost the lives of half of the attackers. Subsequently de la Feuillade and his adventurers lost their ambitions to participate further in the fights and left Candia on 24th January 166984.

By then also the Padre Ottomano had left Candia. We are not informed on board of which ship he had left the island. What we know is that the scheme of his use was changed. As there was obviously no chance to leave an impact on the attackers on Candia now it was tried to provoke an insurrection of the population of the Morea

82. Ibid., p. 160 et seq.
and Albania against the Ottoman occupants. A new Northern front should be opened to distract the attackers of Candia85.

In Candia there was no chance that the Padre could get in direct contact with the Ottomans. Apparently it was hoped that the physical presence of the alleged son of Sultan Ibrahim should show its effects on the locals at the Morea. First it was intended to transfer the Dominican father to Cerigo, but General Morosini recommended to him rather to move first to the island of Zante86. By end of November 1668 the Padre Ottomano and his assistant Padre Ignazio di Terracusa had arrived at Zante and presented Morosini’s letters of recommendation to the Venetian governor General Valier87. In the subsequent weeks the Dominican started to establish contacts with several representatives of Greek, Albanian, Macedonian, Bulgarian, and other folk of the Balkans to negotiate their rebellion against the Ottoman occupants. To get active, these representatives waited for direct military support and arms. In December of 1668 and January of 1669 the Padre Ottomano wrote several letters to the Roman Curia, the Senate of Venice, the grand master of Malta, and other princes to apply for support for the locals. Until March there was no response and when in that month the Venetian officer and diplomat Marchese Annibale Porrone on his way from Candia to Venice had a short sojourn at Zante the Padre Ottomano used this occasion to ask him for support. The Padre sorted out in detail the great advantage which a rebellion at the Morea could have not only for Venice but for whole Christianity. When in early April Porrone arrived in Venice he duly communicated the Padre’s plea for help to the Senate and to Lorenzo Trotti, archbishop of Carthage and Papal Nuntio at the Serenissima88.

THE PADRE OTTOMANO BETWEEN CHRISTIAN PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL PRAGMATISM

In early May 1669 the subject of the resurrection at the Morea and Southern part of the Balkans were discussed in the Venetian Senate. A strong group in the Senate was rather sceptical in the probability of a successful resurrection of the Morea against Ottoman occupation. It was argued that for a quick substantial financial, military, and logistic support the resources of Venice were after the long War of Candia too much exhausted. There was also the open question what would happen when the locals really would have managed to get rid of Ottoman rule; would they be loyal to the Venetians or would the whole region turn into a destabilized, heterogeneous powder keg? There was also another side of the plan which was not to the liking of the Venetian senate. If the Padre Ottomano could really convince other European powers to invest money and arms to cause a resurrection of the population of the Morea and Balkans, would not try these powers —like for example Austria— to take over the leading role at this enterprise and maybe establish themselves at the Morea, so near to the Venetian hemisphere and vital sea routes in the Adriatic Sea to the Levant and other commercial centers of the Mediterranean? These thoughts led the Senate decide not to follow up the suggestions of the Padre Ottomano but to set their hopes on that the Christian forces under Morosini and Rospigliosi, and more French support would be enough to relief Candia and to hold the Ottomans finally at bay. In this moment there appears to have been a clear rift between the classification of the situation at Candia of the Venetian senate thinking in global strategic concepts and the perception of the actual defenders of the fortress city who surely would have welcomed very much the opening of a second front for the Ottomans at the Morea.

The supporters of the scheme of a rebellion still did not give up and now entrusted the Ligurian Knight of Malta, Commander of Milan and Balí of San Giovanni a Mare of Naples, Carlo della Lengueglia—an old acquaintance of the Padre Ottomano—to inquire in the matter. Lengueglia then was travelling to Venice in his function as officer in the Maltese battalion at Candia and should communicate about the disastrous situation at the besieged fortress of Candia and therefore should put more pressure on the Venetian Senate to support the Padre Ottomano’s mission at the Morea. He readily responded to support the Padre Ottomano and after a stop at Zante proceeded to Venice, and later to Rome. By late May della Lengueglia had arrived in Venice and gave more detailed news about the plans and activities of the Padre Ottomano at Zante. Now it was proposed not only to involve money and arms but also to use

troops to instigate the rebellion. According to the Padre Ottomano 4,000 Christian soldiers would be enough to light the fire of a resurrection at the Morea. It was also reported that the representatives of the local ethnic groups and factions at the Morea and the Southern Balkans were to ask for a huge sum of cash before being ready to give command for a rebellion. 

In early June 1669 the affair was once more discussed in the Senate and again it came to no positive outcome for the Padre Ottomano’s schemes. Now it was pointed out that the Republic of Venice was not willing to pay a huge sum before and then running a risk that the resurrection would be a failure.

The Papal Nuntio at the Serenissima, Lorenzo Trotti, had a different opinion and in his correspondence to the Roman Curia followed the lines of arguments of the Dominican Padre and judged it not to be a ‘very dangerous nor difficult enterprise’ to get active at the Morea and support the locals. From Venice della Lengueglia travelled further to Rome and handed over to Pope Clement IX letters of the Padre Ottomano. It is only surprising at first glance that—to della Lengueglia’s disappointment—also the pope who before was such a fervent supporter for a relief of Candia showed some hesitation to support the plans of the Padre Ottomano whole heartedly and openly. The correspondence between Cardinal Rospigliosi and the Papal Nuntio in Paris, Pietro Bargellini, from July of 1669 gives some insight into the deeper reasoning of the Roman Curia not to get active. This correspondence shows how well the Roman Curia was informed about the preoccupied attitude at the French Court of the supposed ‘negotiations between the Padre Ottomano and the Grand Vizier’ and his suspicious activities at Zante.

France with its strong economic and also—since the times of King François I in the early sixteenth century—traditionally close political ties with the Ottoman Empire and the Levant was everything but enthusiastic about a destabilization of the Morea and a possible involvement of the Austrians, that is the dynasty of the Hapsburg’s then ruling over Spain and the German Empire. Feeling French pressure—then on the rise to the most important power in Central Europe—the Roman Curia was very

much interested to maintain good relations with Louis XIV, the Roi soleil. Therefore in late July and again on 13 August the Roman Curia sent letters to the French Court to calm down French preoccupation by pointing out that there were no ‘negotii gravi’ between the Padre Ottomano and the grand vizier. It was furthermore pointed out that the activities of the Padre Ottomano at Zante and the Morea were not carried out by order of Pope Clement IX. This deeper reasoning of course could not be communicated openly by the representatives of the Papal State. In August 1669 it was therefore answered to della Lenguglia that the plans sent by the Padre Ottomano were to be without solid basis and had no chance to be put in practice.

In the end it was therefore the particular economic and strategic interests of France and Venice which—beyond the Padre Ottomano’s direct use in the Siege of Candia—blocked the great schemes developed around the Dominican friar. This lack of unitas christianae was lamented by many of his seventeenth and eighteenth Catholic biographers like Ottaviano Bulgarini, Jacques de Jant, or Felice Tempia who present the Dominican father in the literary tradition of a suffering Christian hero, ‘che appare vittima destinato di uno scontro storico più forte di lui, e che cerca invano di accordare le armi cristiane nelle sforzo commune contro il paese da cui era uscito fanciullo’. As modern literature historians have analyzed: “Il padre Ottomano raccoglie l’idealità cavalleresca in quanto missione sacrificale: è dunque un eroe passive, incurante del ricatto politico a cui lo espongono i potenti, preoccupato del bene altrui assai più che della propria gloria”.

It must have therefore come somewhat as a relief for the English, Dutch, and also the French, when the use of the Padre Ottomano in 1668 and 1669 at the Morea did not work and had no impact whatsoever on the stability and balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

When in late summer 1669 it became obvious that no support for the Padre Ottomano’s mission at the Morea was to expect, his person disappeared from the limelight of the theatrum europaeum. By late September he had left Zante and arrived in Venice on 10 October, where he took lodging in the house of his acquaintance

97. Cf. the programmatic title of Erasmus Francisci’s then very popular anthology, Theatrum Europaeum. Nuremberg, 1690.
della Lengueglia. Apparently the Padre had resumed his old reclusive life style. Although his biographer Bulgarini maintains that he presented himself to the Venetian Senate to give account of the events at Crete and the Morea no archival evidence for this could be found. Six years of a more or less completely reclusive life in Rome followed before the Padre ended his days as Dominican Prior of Porto Salvo and Dominican Vicar General for Malta on the 26 October 1676 in the supposed age of 34.

The War of Candia had been long over by then. It had ended when — exhausted by permanent Ottoman attacks and running out of ammunition and provisions — in late August 1669 the Christian forces were evacuated from the fortress Candia and on 6 September 1669 Francesco Morosini, seemingly without authorization, made a peace treaty with Sultan Mehmet IV. These negotiations for the peaceful surrender of Candia allowed avoid further losses of troops and equipment. In the end there prevailed pragmatism. The treaty allowed Venice to retain the possession of the three fortresses of Gramvousa, Spinalonga, and Souda, protecting natural harbors where the Venetian ships could stop during their route to the Levant. Venice was furthermore compensated for the loss of Candia by an expansion in Dalmatia. In the end it was the lack of massive support by Christian powers as well as the vast pool of manpower the Ottomans had at their disposal which made them achieve to conquer Crete.

CONCLUSIÓN

The Padre Ottomano’s involvement in the campaigns to relief the besieged fortress of Candia and his use to destabilize the Eastern Mediterranean have never been studied by historians. It gives some precious insight into the realities of military proceedings, intelligence and channels of information as well as limits of the forces of Venice, Malta, or the Papal State to fight the Ottomans. The roles of Baldassare Diego Loyola and the Padre Ottomano in general and especially in the events of the War of Candia have to be seen in the context of the special and complex Christian spirit which prevailed in Southern Europe in the seventeenth century. Baldassare Diego

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Loyola’s and Padre Ottomano’s destinies were deeply connected with anti-Ottoman propaganda and multifaceted psychological aspects on the one side and political and economical pragmatism and reality on the other. Both sides could rarely be unified or harmonized. The antagonism between the French and Hapsburgs’, the economical interests of the British and the Dutch, and the consequences of emerging Lutheranism were too deep to allow Christian fraternization.

As it is shown with the case of the War of Candia, the concept of a ‘Holy League’ was—with the exception of the events of 1571 leading to the victory of Lepanto—difficult to put into practice in Early Modern Times. It was this failed attempt to gather a strong Christian League which caused the fall of Crete. Padre Ottomano was a prominent figure in this attempt but he could never serve as a unifying figure. After 1600 the so-called ‘Holy League’ had been just a memory of long gone days and had proofed to be just an episode in Mediterranean history.

Padre Ottomano’s failure to contribute to end the Siege of Candia also shows that in the end the papal support for his case was a rather fragile affaire. Feeling French pressure the Roman Curia was very much interested to maintain good relations with Louis XIV instead of risking, to provoke a clash by giving further military and diplomatic help to the alleged son of Sultan Ibrahim. In the greater context this follows the logic of contemporary economic and political developments.

The seventeenth century is also described by several modern historians as the period when the ‘peripheralization’ or marginalization of the Mediterranean set in, a development which, however, developed rather unnoticed by most locals and contemporaries. Historians like Fernand Braudel, Kenneth M. Setton, David Abulafia, Maurice Aymard, Alexander H. de Groot, and Michel Fontenay have carried out detailed investigations which show the slow but steady process of the decline of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in favour of the Atlantic.


With the direct route to India and the Asian maritime centers and the development of the New World, the important centers of European trade shifted from the ‘old’ Mediterranean to the Atlantic capitals of Europe\(^{105}\). At the same time these new trading powers, that is the Netherlands, France, and England, took over great parts of the Mediterranean Trade\(^{106}\). The former leading western Mediterranean powers Spain, Genoa, Venice, and Florence, did not have the means to stop this process. During the same period, contrary to the perception of the political and economic leaders of the Occident in earlier times, by the seventeenth century the focus of world history shifts from the Mediterranean to the ‘New World’ and beyond.

Besides France, even England and the Netherlands did not have an interest to allow the destabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. The political use of Padre Ottomano therefore belonged to a concept which had by then become anachronistic. Nevertheless the study of personalities like Baldassare Diego Loyola and the Padre Ottomano have their true value to understand better the history of ideas and cultural climate of an epoch on the move to modern times and which was characterized by the co-existence of the new and the old. These tensions and problems are summarized in the stories of the Padre Ottomano and Baldassare Loyola.

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105. Cf. the ‘depressing’ news which reached Venice in October 1503 that three Portuguese vessels had returned from India via the Cape of Good Hope carrying 3000 quintali pepper. This quantity corresponded to the amount which was imported from the Levante by the Serenissima in one year. Here quoted by Fontenay. *Op. cit.*, p. 56.