

UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA
FACULTAD DE POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA



PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA EN LA SOCIEDAD PALESTINA

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY

TESIS DOCTORAL PRESENTADA POR
SHAHER AMER ABDEL QADER SALAMA

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PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA EN LA SOCIEDAD PALESTINA

Tesis presentada para aspirar al grado de doctor por
Don **SHAHER AMER ABDEL QADER SALAMA**, dirigida por la
Dr. Don Fernando Fdez-Llebrez y por el **Dr. Don Ángel Manuel Molina**

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Departamento de Sociología

El Dr. Ángel Manuel Molina, Profesor Titular de Sociológica de la Universidad de Granada, como directora de la tesis presentada para aspirar el grado de doctor por Don. Shafer Amer Abdel Qader Salama.

El Dr. Fernando Fdez-Llebrez, Profesor Titular de Políticas de la Universidad de Granada, como segundo director de la tesis presentada para aspirar al grado de doctor por Don. Shafer Amer Abdel Qader Salama.

HACEN CONSTAR:

Que la Tesis titulada: "**Participación Política en la Sociedad Palestina**" realizada por el citado doctorando, reúne las condiciones científicas y académicas necesarias para su presentación.

Granada, 2012.

Fdo Dr. Don Ángel Manuel Molina **Fdo. Dr. Don Fernando Fdez-Llebrez**

Dedication

I dedicate this achievement to...

To all the lovers of freedom and those who work for it...

To my father Amer Aloul, who sacrificed his soul and he martyred for
the liberation of Palestine.

And to you.....

I dedicate this Dissertation.

Shaher A. A. Salama

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2012

Shaher A. A. Salama

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Resumen in Español

La investigación que tiene como objeto de estudio la participación política ha solido centrar su atención principalmente en el funcionamiento de la democracia dentro de los países occidentales, sin prestar atención a lo que sucedía en otros países; sin embargo en los últimos años los investigadores han comenzado a investigar las implicaciones de la democracia en la participación política de modo global, debido al creciente fenómeno de la democracia en los países del Tercer Mundo. Esta área ha sido de especial interés tras el surgimiento del llamado "Nuevo Orden Mundial," que trata de presentar una alternativa democrática a las formas tradicionales de gobierno político.

Existen muy pocos estudios de campo sobre la participación política de los ciudadanos, especialmente en lo que respecta a la información sobre el proceso de participación política en los países árabes e islámicos, que sigue siendo escasa y carente de clasificación (Ghalom et al 1997:11).

En este estudio intentaremos dar una imagen completa y clara que llene los vacíos de los estudios anteriores: (Nazzal, 2004; Rahal, 2004; Ismael, 2004; Qasem, 2009), que analizaron solamente la realidad de la participación política de la mujer palestina. En cambio, el investigador se dedicará a la participación del ciudadano palestino en general, y tratará nuevos temas: las formas, los motivos y los obstáculos de la misma participación en cuanto a los ciudadanos en Cisjordania y en la Franja de Gaza, y que no fueron tratados en el estudio de Miari (La Cultura Política en Palestina, 2003; El Comportamiento Político de los Estudiantes en las Universidades Palestinas, 1996).

Nuestras consideraciones sobre el tema han dado lugar a la necesidad de abordar la cuestión de la participación política, en términos de estudio y análisis, a través de la identificación del grado de participación política en la comunidad palestina; para ello formulamos una serie de cuestiones básicas:

1. ¿Cuál es el grado de participación política en la comunidad palestina?
2. ¿Cuáles son las principales formas de participación política en la comunidad palestina?
3. ¿Cuáles son los principales motivos de participación política en la comunidad palestina?

4. ¿Cuál es el alcance del impacto del entorno socioeconómico del ciudadano sobre el grado de cooperación política de éste?
5. ¿Existe alguna relación entre la exposición a la violencia israelí y la participación política de la sociedad palestina?
6. ¿A qué obstáculos se enfrenta la participación política en la sociedad palestina?

La importancia de este estudio, como ya hemos señalado, radica en su intento de completar las lagunas que los estudios previos (Nazzal, 2004; Rahal, 2004; Ismael, 2004; Qasem, 2009; Miari, 2003; Miari, 1996). Tratará nuevos temas: las formas, los motivos y los obstáculos de la participación política de la sociedad palestina en Cisjordania y en la Franja de Gaza, y el efecto de la violencia israelí sobre la participación política en la sociedad palestina.

En su estudio sobre la participación política, Ali sostiene que la razón de la falta de investigación de campo sobre la misma en el mundo árabe e islámico, sería que existen diversas limitaciones, incluyendo entre éstas las limitaciones geográficas, el extenso analfabetismo, las condiciones políticas, la falta de recursos asignados para la investigación, la ausencia del papel que juegan los centros e instituciones que fomentan la investigación social, y un número mínimo de bibliotecas. Por todo ello es importante llevar a cabo estos estudios de campo relacionados con la participación política en el estado islámico y árabe (Ghalom et al, 1997).

Además de esto, la importancia del estudio de la participación política, entendido como tema de investigación, proviene a su vez del impacto que ésta ejerce sobre el establecimiento de la estructura institucional del Estado en los distintos niveles: políticos, sociales y económicos. La trascendencia de este estudio deriva del hecho de que se examina un tema fundamental, pues la "participación política", es una cuestión controvertida dentro la comunidad palestina; una comunidad que subsiste en condiciones muy difíciles y espera ansiosamente una solución política. Esperamos que nuestro estudio sirva de referencia para aquellos interesados en el área, por su aporte de información a la vez que por su avance en la materia tratada.

Los estudios locales sobre la sociedad palestina no han tratado nunca el impacto de la situación socioeconómica de los ciudadanos sobre la participación política. La inexistencia de estudios en este campo es debida, como ya hemos señalado, a las limitaciones relacionadas

con las condiciones políticas, la falta de recursos asignados a la investigación, la falta de centros e instituciones que ésta, además de bibliotecas y recursos inadecuados. En consecuencia, los datos sobre la participación política de los jóvenes sigue estando dispersos y desorganizados. Por ello resulta ya imprescindible llevar a cabo estudios sobre la participación política en la sociedad palestina, para poder formar una imagen integrada y clara de ésta. Y ése será nuestro objetivo.

Los palestinos son considerados parte de la comunidad árabe, sociedad que en gran medida depende de los conceptos de familia y clan. La sociedad palestina se construye sobre una estructura social y religiosa. En ella, el individuo es parte de un grupo, una tendencia que se solidifica y hace hincapié en el concepto de liderazgo del individuo para la toma de decisiones que afectan a todo el grupo, bloqueando y deslegitimizando las opiniones de los demás. Dentro de este tipo de estructura existen aspectos positivos, tales como la solidaridad social, el apoyo, la lealtad, la cooperación, la modestia y la autoestima (Al-Azar, 1996:45).

La cultura palestina, como una parte de la cultura árabe en general, comparten con ésta una serie de cualidades y características. Sin embargo hallamos también algunas pequeñas diferencias en ciertos aspectos, debido a las circunstancias concretas que los palestinos han experimentado.

La cultura política palestina incluye valores que no son tradicionalmente democráticos: una autoridad paterna fuerte, la cohesión del grupo y una firme creencia en obligaciones ineludibles (Miari, 2003:28).

Podríamos considerar la sociedad palestina como una sociedad semi-conservadora, ya que mantiene el equilibrio entre la necesidad de cambio y la voluntad de encontrar una manera de salir del statu quo, por una parte, y por otra, el deseo de mantener el modelo actual asociado con los valores de siempre imperantes (Saed y Hamamy, 1997:115).

La cultura política palestina ha estado bajo la influencia de muy diferentes y conflictivos factores, debido a la ocupación y la diáspora. La cultura también ha sufrido esa influencia al carecer de un sistema económico o social, que debería haberse mantenido estable y unificado, regulando todas las interacciones y los procesos políticos, sociales, económicos y culturales

ya que se enfrentaba a la ausencia de una cultura política normal, de un especial sistema palestino específico (Jibreel y Rahall, 2003). La sociedad palestina se caracterizaría por el pluralismo, ejemplificado en la variedad de tendencias diferentes dentro de la OLP. Sin embargo, este pluralismo restringió las demandas palestinas por consenso nacional (Kassis, 1999:29).

En Palestina, se han celebrado muchas elecciones, tanto en secreto como públicamente. Muchas de estas elecciones se llevaron a cabo antes de la existencia de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina (ANP), ya fuera en las universidades al elegir a los líderes del senado de estudiantes, que organizaban los asuntos del movimiento estudiantil, o bien elecciones municipales, siendo las primeras celebradas en 1978. Después de que se estableciera la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, las elecciones legislativas y presidenciales se celebraron en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza, y fueron consideradas, por primera vez, como unas elecciones libres y justas.

Uno de los efectos de la ocupación es que los palestinos se obsesionan buscando continuamente maneras de encontrar libertad en su vida cotidiana, la libertad que la ocupación quiere coartar levantando muros, físicos y mentales, que aíslan a los palestinos en una zona donde son acosados a diario cuando tan sólo intentan ir de un lugar a otro.

Esta situación vital empujó a la mayoría de los palestinos a participar en actividades políticas, en todas sus formas, organizando desde marchas, manifestaciones, huelgas laborales, boicot de productos israelíes hasta afiliaciones de partidos políticos.

Las autoridades de la ocupación israelí han tratado de evitar cualquier forma de participación política del pueblo palestino en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza reprimiendo marchas y manifestaciones por la fuerza y estando siempre al acecho de los palestinos que pertenecen a alguna facción política palestina. También mediante la confiscación de libros y revistas, bajo el pretexto de que son publicaciones incitadoras. Impiden también la libertad de opinión y de expresión, y consecuentemente, los palestinos sufren la censura impuesta por Israel, la detención de periodistas, y la represión de manifestaciones o incluso los más elementales medios de expresión, en una clara violación de las leyes internacionales (Jabarin, 2008).

Tras el acuerdo de Oslo y el establecimiento de la ANP, las autoridades de la ocupación trataron de frustrar el proceso electoral palestino mediante la construcción de unos 600 puestos de control militar para evitar que los candidatos y los votantes se movieran libremente por los territorios palestinos. A pesar de que la libertad de circulación es un derecho fundamental garantizado por la Declaración de los Derechos humanos, las autoridades de ocupación israelíes imponen estrictas restricciones a la libertad de movimiento en Cisjordania y en la Franja de Gaza, que no sólo afectan a los movimientos de los palestinos, sino también a su forma de pensar y a su identidad.

Las autoridades de ocupación israelíes también trataron de obstaculizar las elecciones legislativas organizados por la ANP cerrando los colegios electorales en Jerusalén y deteniendo al personal de la Comisión Electoral Central (La Comisión Electoral Central de Palestina, 2010).

Las dificultades que Israel planteó frente a la participación de los votantes palestinos de Jerusalén han sido las prácticas israelíes más peligrosas en el intento de obstaculizar el proceso electoral y privar al pueblo palestino de ejercer su derecho a la participación política, ya que existen dimensiones e implicaciones políticas que afectan al futuro de la ciudad santa. Se sabe que la cifra de palestinos en Jerusalén es superior a 250.000 habitantes, lo que significa que un enorme sector de palestinos no han podido participar en el proceso electoral (Nofal, 2007).

Anteriores estudios demostraron el interés de investigadores y pensadores en el tema de la participación política. Se abordaba la cuestión. Investigadores de diferentes segmentos hicieron diversos esfuerzos para enfocar este tema en varios aspectos. La participación política ocupó la atención de manera general pero también ocupó un lugar destacado dentro de la sociedad palestina en la que la vida cotidiana está controlada por la política. El objetivo de estos estudios en su conjunto es el de introducir este tema en términos de motivos, formas, manifestaciones y obstáculos a la participación política. Se llegó al acuerdo de que estos estudios se centraran en las formas, las manifestaciones y los múltiples obstáculos de la participación política, sin embargo dichos estudios presentarían las siguientes deficiencias:

1. La escasez de estudios de campo relacionados con el objeto de estudio directo.

2. El enfoque de la mayoría de los estudios anteriores sobre el tema de la participación política más centrado en el aspecto intelectual de la teoría, la narrativa histórica y el análisis personal de este tema.
3. Los estudios previos han optado en el análisis de este tema por el recurso secundario de los medios de comunicación y los artículos personales y han olvidado las fuentes primarias, lo que ha distraído al lector, y ha contribuido a la formación de interpretaciones contradictorias en la materia.
4. No se han abordado las diferentes dimensiones de el estudio de este fenómeno, tales como las dimensiones sociales y económicas.
5. Se ha trabajado con una muestra limitada de encuestados, y no se ha realizado un estudio de la sociedad palestina en su conjunto.
6. Muchos de estos estudios no se centran en la especificidad de la sociedad palestina y el contexto histórico en el estudio de este tema, enmarcado dentro del contexto de esta comunidad única.
7. La incapacidad de algunos investigadores para esclarecer la verdad, a veces detrás de la debilidad de la participación política en las comunidades de los países en desarrollo en general, y en la sociedad árabe en particular.

En cuanto a ciertos estudios (Omar Rahall, Yusuf Ali Ghalom, Rima Nazzal, y Samaa Suleiman), que tienen una relación muy estrecha con el tema, podemos citar las siguientes deficiencias: estos estudios surgen de un modo puramente teórico; el estudio de Omar Rahall sobre la participación política de las mujeres palestinas, no es más que un punto de vista del escritor sobre el tema de la participación política ya que el estudio del pasado o la adopción de un concepto presupuesto de naturaleza de la participación política en el que se basa no especificaba las herramientas y los medios que nos ayudarán en la interpretación del fenómeno. Por otra parte, el resumen del contenido dice que "la forma, el valor y el impacto de la participación, están estrechamente vinculados a la forma y naturaleza de los mecanismos de la democracia que prevalecen en la sociedad". Por las razones expuestas más arriba, esto es aplicable al estudio de Rima Kataneh, el cual está todavía lejos de la realidad en lo que respecta a la participación política de las mujeres palestinas.

El estudio de Solomon sobre la participación política de las mujeres del Golfo no superaba una visión de futuro o una estrategia para la activación del papel de la mujer ya que la encuesta se limitó a revisar las cifras publicadas y las estadísticas publicadas con anterioridad

sobre la realidad de las mujeres la participación política en dicho lugar y por lo tanto hablaba sobre la visión de futuro de la participación de las mujeres en el Golfo, pero no explicaba los conceptos estudiados o sus relaciones.

En el estudio de Yusuf Ali Ghuloom sobre la participación política en Kuwait se discutían una serie de variables independientes que medían la desigualdad estructural, los enlaces de redes sociales, las aficiones comunes y la conciencia política. Los análisis se realizaron siguiendo la estructura de las teorías tradicionales y de la teoría de la movilización de recursos. El investigador en el estudio ignoró el impacto de un entorno social fluctuante, lo que sin duda afecta, positiva o negativamente, al comportamiento político de los individuos. El estudio de Abdel-Majid Azzam sobre las tendencias en una muestra seleccionada de la sociedad jordana sobre la participación política no concordaba con los objetivos de las preguntas de la investigación para identificar el estado y el alcance de la lealtad de las personas al sistema político. La importancia de los partidos políticos como forma de organización de la participación política no mide realmente las tendencias en la sociedad jordana en dicha participación política.

Observando objetivamente las deficiencias de los estudios citados, comprendimos que era necesario seleccionar un estudio de campo sobre la participación política que se centrara en aspectos importantes, aspectos que habían sido dejados al margen en los estudios previos. Nuestro trabajo incluye así variables que miden las dimensiones del marco social de la participación política, teniendo en cuenta también las dimensiones de los estudios adicionales, tales como el impacto de anteriores dimensiones culturales y ambientales sobre el grado de participación política. De todas formas los estudios previos son citados en la presente investigación con la intención de arrojar luz sobre el tema de las diversas dimensiones de la participación política. Esto es lo que ha motivado que el investigador que esto suscribe avance en el estudio de este fenómeno y que la presente investigación complemente y complete estos estudios, tal y como se apunta en las recomendaciones.

Tras la revisión de algunos de los anteriores estudios sobre la participación política, podemos concluir lo siguiente:

1. Observamos que los estudios previos, en una variedad de temas tratados y seleccionados con respecto a la participación política, variaban en la elección del método de análisis; los

estudios teóricos eran estudios descriptivos y analíticos; otros estudios adoptaban un enfoque comparativo o histórico. Los estudios de campo seguían un enfoque analítico descriptivo, estudio del caso o la forma de muestra de encuesta.

2. La participación política de los jóvenes, que está vinculada a la marcha de la lucha nacional y la historia política en Palestina, demostró ser vulnerable y casi de participación nula en todos los partidos, sin excepción. El hallazgo más importante de los estudios es el repliegue en los movimientos estudiantiles después de los acuerdos palestino israelíes. Los movimientos estudiantiles se mantenían en un estado de presencia popular en las diferentes etapas de la confrontación con la ocupación, mientras que entran en estado de decadencia y contracción en cuanto a su papel cuando la situación es de calma o ligera intensidad en la confrontación con la ocupación. Por otra parte, la relación de los movimientos estudiantiles con su entorno social se debilitó. Ya no existen trabajos voluntarios realizados por los estudiantes para ayudar a los diferentes sectores sociales. No hay trabajo realizado por estudiantes. Los estudios han demostrado que los estudiantes participan en la política que no está relacionada con la educación de estudiantes y un mejor conocimiento, ya sea en el contexto de la universidad o dentro de los términos de referencia de las instituciones palestinas de educación superior (Khader, 2008; Osman, 2008).

3. La participación política de la población palestina no es baja, especialmente cuando se la compara con la del resto del mundo árabe. Hubo una referencia a la disminución en la participación política, un poco después de la aparición de la Autoridad Palestina, y a la disminución de la actividad política de los partidos (Miari, 2003). El estudio de Al-Azzam (1991), que examina la cuestión de la participación política de Jordania y su relación con algunas variables demográficas, como la variable social y el lugar de residencia, reveló la existencia de diferencias estadísticamente significativas entre la tarea de la participación política y las variables de edad, sexo, nivel educativo, tamaño del lugar de residencia, ingresos, empleo y tamaño de la familia, a excepción del cambio de género. Este resultado es lógico si sirviera para observar la realidad de las sociedades de Oriente y la naturaleza de los valores, que permiten una mayor libertad para hombres y mujeres. Los resultados del análisis estadístico confirmaron la validez de la hipótesis con respecto a la percepción de la sociedad de la participación política como una forma de mejorar las condiciones sociales y económicas, y no como un fin en sí mismo. El estudio mencionaba algunas interpretaciones de las relaciones que existían entre la participación política y las variables antes citadas.

4. El papel del sistema político estatal y las funciones de los partidos políticos influyeron en la participación política. Hay muchos factores que afectan a la participación política, empezando por la tribu, que controla las opiniones y las actitudes de los individuos, y el clima político. Hay quienes creen que el clima político no es propicio para la participación política (Naqshabandi, 2000; Al-Azzam, 1991; Alkadi, 1999); sin embargo, el estudio de Alsharai (2001) dio como resultado lo contrario con respecto a este factor. El investigador descubrió que el clima político contribuía a aumentar la participación política. Asimismo, se aceptó, a partir de los resultados de un estudio piloto realizado en 2003, el papel negativo de los partidos políticos y de las organizaciones sobre las cuestiones económicas y sociales y sobre los problemas y los derechos culturales que afectaban a los miembros de la comunidad. La naturaleza de la conciencia política entre los ciudadanos y las élites políticas es la misma. Existe también una continuación de la tradición y un bajo nivel de educación y de desarrollo cultural en la mayoría de los miembros de la sociedad. El estudio demostró que los partidos políticos juegan un papel positivo al incitar a la gente a participar en las elecciones parlamentarias. Esta actividad de los partidos en las elecciones es la mejor manera de introducir a los ciudadanos en los partidos políticos y las organizaciones.

5. La incapacidad de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil para animar a los ciudadanos a tomar parte en la participación política, y para identificar las prioridades estratégicas en sus objetivos, programas, proyectos y relaciones internas y externas. La reacción sin planificación o el hecho de existir un objetivo especialmente fijado, y la incapacidad de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil para la propuesta, la difusión y la popularización del concepto y los objetivos de la sociedad civil a sectores más amplios que los incluyan, en lugar de establecerse de forma limitada en ciudades y pueblos grandes, conducen a su fracaso en el fomento de la participación política. Éstas también tienen una débil presencia en las comunidades rurales que están social y económicamente marginadas en todo el ámbito nacional palestino (Ali, 2008; Adawi, 2008).

6. Una serie de estudios llegaron a identificar en consenso los obstáculos con los que se encuentra la participación política en el mundo árabe: los obstáculos que impiden la participación política efectiva, incluidos los obstáculos sociales, políticos, económicos y culturales (Dasuki, 2008; Alkhuyt y Said 2002; Osman, 2008.) Los estudios también fueron unánimes en el tema de que la participación política en el mundo árabe se encuentra en muchos de los obstáculos que han caracterizado la vida política árabe. Estos obstáculos se

pueden resumir en dos tipos: las restricciones por la percepción y la conciencia, como el analfabetismo, la desinformación y la frustración. Y las relaciones frías y las limitaciones, tales como la práctica de la dictadura militar y la ley marcial, las emergencias y el desequilibrio en el entorno social y la reestructuración del sistema administrativo.

La participación en la vida política en el Mundo Árabe tiene muchos impedimentos, como consecuencia de la libertad limitada, especialmente la política, a pesar de la existencia de los órganos parlamentarios, partidos políticos, sindicatos y organizaciones profesionales y a pesar de la aprobación de las constituciones nacionales, que confirman los derechos de los ciudadanos y el respaldo de los convenios internacionales y reconocer los países árabes a las mismas. Sin embargo estas constituciones no tienen sentido en el contexto de una legislación basada en la profunda creencia del principio del monopolio del poder y con una actividad insuficiente entre los diversos grupos sociopolíticos, pues el poder ejecutivo a lo largo y ancho del mundo árabe no duda en recurrir a métodos de falsificación en las elecciones locales y nacionales con el fin de asegurar la supervivencia del poder en manos del grupo gobernante. Los estudios revelaron que para los ciudadanos árabes, la toma de decisiones ya ha sido dada desde el principio de sus vidas y de la vida de la sociedad por el estado árabe que ha actuado en su nombre, tanto en los asuntos grandes como en los pequeños. Los estudios también indican que la educación juega un papel importante y activo en el desarrollo de la generación más joven, pero la política educativa en el mundo árabe está vinculada a la política nacional. Esto crea sistemas políticos que no se interesan por la democracia, por lo que obviamente no contribuyen a la creación de una generación basada en esos principios democráticos (Alsaloqi, 2003; Freihat, 1999). De todas formas, otros estudios sostienen que detrás de estos obstáculos se esconde la ausencia de participación política y democrática junto con la voluntad política en los nombramientos llevados a cabo por la Autoridad Palestina en las elecciones locales (Atallah, 2004; Osman, 2004; Miari, 1996).

En el presente estudio se utilizaron los métodos descriptivos cuantitativos y cualitativos, ya que ambos son considerados como los métodos de investigación más adecuados para estudiar la participación política en la sociedad palestina; estos enfoques son los más convenientes para cumplir con los objetivos del estudio ya que se basan en la descripción de las realidades y describen lo que ya existe, y son una recopilación de datos e informaciones que posteriormente se clasifican, organizan y expresan cuantitativamente; la utilización de los dos

métodos también puede ayudar a comprender la relación entre el fenómeno y sus diferentes factores utilizando las herramientas de investigación adecuadas.

La población de estudio está compuesta por todos los ciudadanos palestinos de más de 18 años de edad (que pueden votar en las elecciones) en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza, en los años 2009/2010, un total de (1.883.567) ciudadanos; (1.175.294) en la Ribera Occidental y (1416543) en la Franja de Gaza. Cuadro N (1).

La muestra del estudio consta de (384) ciudadanos palestinos; (239) en Cisjordania y (145) en la Franja de Gaza, seleccionados mediante el método estratificado al azar, tal y como se muestra en el anexo (J). El tamaño de la muestra se calculó utilizando la web calculadora del tamaño de muestra: <http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm> con un error del 0,05 Anexo (C). La muestra constituye un (0,02%) de la población de estudio. Las tablas del (2-25) muestran las principales características de los participantes.

En el presente estudio se utilizaron el método de encuesta por muestreo y el cuestionario (Apéndice A, B), como herramientas para la recopilación de datos. A partir de la revisión de la bibliografía existente relacionada con el tema de la participación política en la sociedad palestina, el investigador desarrolla un cuestionario que consta de cuatro secciones. La primera incluye las características demográficas de los ciudadanos palestinos, tales como género, edad, condición social, formación educativa, región, lugar de residencia, distrito, estatus de refugiado, estatus de trabajador, profesión, ingresos, etc. La segunda sección incluye las motivaciones de la participación política en la sociedad palestina; un bloque formado por 31 puntos. La tercera sección incluye las formas de participación política en la sociedad palestina (38 puntos) en sus diferentes dimensiones: individual, social, religiosa y nacional. La cuarta sección incluye los obstáculos de la participación política en la sociedad palestina, con un total de (41 puntos). La escala de cinco puntos de Likert (muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, neutral, en desacuerdo y muy en desacuerdo) fue la utilizada en el cuestionario. La herramienta de validez y confiabilidad se examinó como sigue:

El cuestionario fue validado al ser revisado por un grupo de árbitros y expertos, quienes aportaron algunos comentarios sobre la herramienta utilizada. Estos comentarios han sido incorporados en la versión final del cuestionario. Por otro lado, la validez también fue medida

estadísticamente por análisis factorial, con el fin de examinar la consistencia interna de los elementos del cuestionario.

Las estadísticas del estudio de la población en la Ribera Occidental y la Franja de Gaza se obtuvieron a través de la Comisión Central de Elecciones palestinas. Esto se logró gracias a la coordinación entre el Comité y el investigador en correspondencia formal a través de los supervisores del estudio.

Siguiendo las herramientas de estudio, el investigador, con la participación de un equipo de expertos de campo-un total de diez investigadores Anexo (D) completó los datos recogidos de los ciudadanos palestinos en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza. El promedio de datos recogidos fue de más de una hora con cada uno de ellos.

El proceso de recopilación de datos se llevó a cabo en el período comprendido entre el 1 de junio al 20 de octubre de 2010. Los participantes fueron muy cooperativos al tratarse de un tema tan importante para la sociedad palestina.

Tras la recogida de datos, éstos se revisaron y prepararon para el procesamiento informático. Se fueron asignando ciertos números, por ejemplo transformado las respuestas verbales en cifras (muy de acuerdo 5, de acuerdo 4, neutral 3, en desacuerdo 2, muy en desacuerdo 1) con el fin de llevar a cabo los procedimientos estadísticos requeridos para los datos que iban surgiendo, obteniéndose: números, porcentajes, medias, desviaciones estándar y gráficos. Citamos además que las pruebas estadísticas utilizadas fueron las siguientes: Correlación de Pearson, Test T, análisis de la variación única, test de Tukey, Alpha de Cronbach, análisis factorial, y cifras, utilizando el paquete estadístico para ciencias sociales (SPSS), a fin de comprender los resultados del estudio.

Los resultados mostraron que el grado de participación política en la sociedad palestina era moderado. Las circunstancias especiales que experimenta el pueblo palestino pueden tener un impacto sobre el grado de participación política. El pueblo palestino vive bajo la supervisión de la Autoridad Palestina, y al mismo tiempo, está sujeto a la ocupación israelí. No hay zonas seguras lejos de la ocupación, incluso en las zonas conocidas como (zona A), que se supone

que deben ser objeto de la plena soberanía de la Autoridad Palestina; sin embargo la ocupación no respeta los acuerdos de paz y a menudo actúa en contra de las convenciones.

Estos resultados pueden ser comprendidos y reconocidos en el marco de las circunstancias especiales que afectan a la sociedad palestina, a la luz de la persistencia de la ocupación unida a la coexistencia de la Autoridad Palestina, con su soberanía desmilitarizada y sus poderes limitados.

Las circunstancias especiales están relacionadas con:

En primer lugar, con la existencia de la ocupación israelí, que produce el desarraigo de palestinos de sus tierras y los obliga a irse, y con las matanzas a manos de los grupos sionistas durante la Guerra de 1948, y la represión y el abuso que se produce a diario, incitando a los ciudadanos a participar en acciones políticas. El ciudadano palestino fue convertido en refugiado, ya sea como alguien que perdió su tierra, de la que estaba orgulloso, o como ciudadano al que le arrebataron la libertad.

En segundo lugar, con respecto a la existencia de una autoridad con la soberanía desmilitarizada y de poderes limitados. La Autoridad Palestina fue un factor depresor, en el que se suprimen las libertades, y se propagan la corrupción y el nepotismo, existiendo en un caos político, lo que dio lugar a la frustración de la situación actual.

El sueño palestino de un estado independiente, que pondría fin al sufrimiento de las personas, se convirtió después de la creación de la Autoridad Palestina, en un estado de frustración. Los palestinos consideraron que tras los sacrificios de decenas de años y los miles de mártires, heridos y prisioneros, no consiguieron un estado independiente, sino una autoridad asediada que transformó la ocupación israelí de los territorios palestinos en una ocupación gratuita.

Estas circunstancias, la presencia bilateral de la ocupación y la autoridad palestina, llevaron a la frustración del ciudadano palestino y al rechazo a la participación política activa, y es por ello que el resultado de la investigación diera un grado moderado en la participación política. Y hablamos de la misma gente que en su día incitó y llevó a cabo dos levantamientos, los cuales subsistieron largos años, durante los que la ocupación practicó todas las formas de intimidación y represión. Y a pesar de la tiranía de la ocupación, ésta fue incapaz de frenar las revueltas, aunque el pueblo palestino estuviera desarmado, excepto por las piedras con las

que expresaban el rechazo hacia los ocupantes, gesto del que resultaron miles de víctimas entre el pueblo palestino. Aún así, la fe del pueblo en sus derechos y en su sed de la libertad fue más fuerte que la dureza de la ocupación.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que los motivos para la participación política de la gran mayoría de los encuestados eran moderados, siendo los más destacados los siguientes: practicar el derecho a expresar opiniones, el deber nacional, cambiar y mejorar la realidad, autoafirmarse, participar con otros en el desarrollo y la mejora de la sociedad y expresar sus reivindicaciones.

El entusiasmo de los ciudadanos por la participación política, y su interés en los asuntos públicos, al servicio de su país y de su gente, es el resultado del sufrimiento común que están padeciendo y ese destino compartido al que los ciudadanos pueden enfrentarse bajo la ocupación israelí de sus tierras. El desplazamiento de los palestinos, el desarraigo de su tierra natal y su sufrimiento diario pueden ser una motivación para ellos hacia la participación política. La gente está esperando una decisión política que ponga fin a su dolor y sufrimiento; una decisión que restituya su derecho a regresar a sus ciudades y pueblos, les conduzca a la independencia y la soberanía sobre sus tierras y les permita establecer su estado y determinar su propio destino.

Por otra parte está la política de Israel de castigos colectivos contra la población palestina, tales como la reclusión en ciudades, aldeas y campamentos de refugiados, los toques de queda y las restricciones de seguridad impuestas al acceso de los palestinos a la tierra y los lugares de trabajo dentro de Israel. Hemos de añadir que Israel asesinó a muchos líderes palestinos y activistas de la resistencia, especialmente durante la segunda Intifada en el año 2000. Israel también ha bombardeado ciudades palestinas, aldeas y campamentos de refugiados causando una destrucción masiva. Y es responsable del estado de sitio impuesto a de la Franja de Gaza, junto con los puestos de control militar y otras formas de castigos colectivos: demoliciones de casas, destrucción de árboles, la construcción del muro del apartheid y la construcción de asentamientos en Cisjordania. Todas estas formas de castigos colectivos refuerzan las diversas motivaciones del pueblo palestino para participar en las actividades de resistencia a la ocupación.

Los resultados del estudio mostraron que la mayoría de las personas que participaron en él creen que el derecho a expresar sus puntos de vista es el gran motivo hacia la participación política. Nadie puede negar el derecho a la libertad de expresión del pueblo palestino, a pesar de que fueron privados de éste por estar bajo ocupación. Sin embargo, la gente se ha sacrificado muchísimo para recuperar tal derecho, y ello se ha convertido también en parte de la herencia y tradición del pueblo palestino, a pesar de todas las actuaciones persuasivas y del hostigamiento de las autoridades israelíes, entre ellas la censura, la detención de periodistas, las manifestaciones o cualquier forma posible de expresar sus opiniones pues son todas prohibidas aun en contra de las normas y leyes internacionales.

La Ley Palestina ha hecho hincapié en la libertad de expresión, como mantiene la Declaración de Independencia de 1988, la existencia de ambiente ético para ejercer la libertad de expresión y de opinión. En 1994, la OLP declaró que la Autoridad Palestina estaba comprometida con los tratados y convenciones sobre los derechos humanos. A finales de septiembre del mismo año, el fallecido presidente, Yasser Arafat, emitió un decreto presidencial demandando la formación de un Cuerpo Superior Palestino de Derechos Humanos. La legislación, compuesta de 51 artículos que incorporan todas las publicaciones y trabajo de prensa, incluía las garantías fundamentales de libertad de opinión y de expresión para todos los ciudadanos, junto con la libertad de acceso, distribución y circulación de la información y la libertad de respuesta y observación. Sin embargo, ciertos artículos de la ley contenían una serie de textos que restringían los derechos humanos en lo referido a la libertad de opinión y de expresión. Así, la Ley palestina de prensa y de publicaciones promulgada en 1995, garantiza la libertad de opinión y de expresión en virtud del artículo (51) y de acuerdo a lo que era el texto del artículo II, al tiempo que garantiza la libertad de prensa como una forma de libertad de opinión y de expresión (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

En la actualidad, la sociedad palestina sufre graves problemas en relación con la violación de los derechos de los periodistas y los medios de comunicación. El derecho a expresar su opinión libremente, sin temor ni restricciones, se convirtió en una esperanza para las personas que trabajaban en este campo. Este derecho es determinante en la vida social, política y cultural del individuo y la sociedad, y ha de ser considerado en su contexto. El derecho de expresión no debe limitarse de ninguna manera a menos que conlleve pérdida de vidas.

La libertad de los medios de comunicación en Palestina varía en un margen considerable, siendo amplia para abordar meras cuestiones de situaciones sociales, y bastante limitada para tratar los temas de delitos de corrupción y asesinato y la anarquía. Los medios de comunicación palestinos están experimentando un renacimiento que podría conducirlos a una mejor situación, sobre todo después de los repetidos ataques a los periodistas por las autoridades de ocupación israelíes, unidos éstos a los ataques internos del lado palestino.

Los medios de comunicación, como radio, televisión y prensa escrita, contribuyen al fomento de la conciencia política y social, a la intensificación de los valores políticos y a la participación política, a la vez que mantienen a la gente consciente de lo que está sucediendo alrededor de ellos, tanto a nivel interno como externo (Tabeel, 2006).

Los acontecimientos que tuvieron lugar en Palestina en 2007, es decir, la división política y el control de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza, y de Fatah sobre Cisjordania, dio lugar a constantes violaciones de los derechos humanos en distintos niveles, como por ejemplo, la supresión de la libertad de expresión, ataques a los periodistas y arrestos políticos, que acababan en pena de muerte según los sus antecedentes partidistas o de resistencia. Además de provocar, obviamente, la crisis humanitaria en Gaza.

El año 2007 fue el peor año para el pueblo palestino desde la creación de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina en 1993. El pueblo tuvo que soportar constantes violaciones de las libertades públicas y la supresión de la libertad de opinión. Las estadísticas indican que los periodistas sufrieron especialmente durante el año 2007. Se vieron obligados a enfrentarse a ataques contra ellos, sus familias y sus posesiones por parte de los grupos armados, que en ausencia de la ley y e inmersos en un conflicto sangriento y de estado de sitio, nunca dudaron en atacar a cualquier periodista o medio de comunicación que los criticase. Esos ataques se ampliaron hasta incluir a los periodistas extranjeros que trabajan en las agencias de noticias internacionales. Se registraron noventa y dos ataques contra los palestinos, entre ellos tres asesinatos. Varios periodistas fueron golpeados o heridos por balas recubiertas de goma y gases, fueron arrestados, o bien sufrieron otro tipo de violaciones como el asalto a sus sedes y la censura en la toma de imágenes.

Tres profesionales de los medios de comunicación fueron ejecutados (Suleiman Al-Ashi, Mohamed Abdu, del diario Palestina, e Isam Al-Jogo de la página Web (Palestine Live). Muchos periodistas fueron detenidos, arrestados o amenazados, las sedes de los medios de comunicación fueron tomadas o destruidas, los equipos fueron confiscados o destruidos, y a algunos se les impidió trabajar; por ejemplo, la Televisión palestina, Sawt Al-`Ommal TV, Sawt TV palestina, Sawt Al-Hurriya TV y Sawt Sha'b TV en Gaza. También las oficinas de Al-Aqsa TV, las oficinas de Al-Sahafa Ruwad en Nablus, y las oficinas de Bayan para la prensa en Selfit. A muchos periódicos se les prohibió la impresión o la distribución, tales como Palestina y Al-Risalah en la Ribera Occidental, y Al-Sabah, en la Franja de Gaza (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

Además a partir de 2007, hemos sido testigos del acoso a las libertades públicas de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina en Cisjordania y del gobierno de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza. Se han practicado medidas de presión sobre las voces que se oponían a sus políticas, detenciones, basándose en antecedentes políticos, cierre de muchos periódicos y estaciones de medios de comunicación, prohibición de marchas y manifestaciones contrarias a la ocupación o la política de la Autoridad o del gobierno de Hamas.

El precio de la libertad, incluida la libertad de expresión, ha sido duramente pagado por los palestinos durante los años de ocupación. Palestina ha tenido miles de mártires y heridos, y miles de presos que todavía están cumpliendo largas condenas, algunos de ellos superando ya los 30 años en cautiverio, todo a cambio de la libertad que tienen prohibida. Por lo tanto, no es en absoluto extraño que el motivo del pueblo palestino para tomar parte en la participación política sea el conseguir libertad de opinión y de expresión.

La libertad de expresión es piedra angular de los derechos y libertades democráticos. Los estatutos internacionales garantizan este derecho. En su primera sesión en 1946, antes de adoptarse cualquier tratado o declaración de derechos humanos, la Asamblea General de la ONU aprobó la resolución N (59/1946) declarando que la libertad de información es un derecho humano fundamental y piedra de toque de todas las libertades a las que las Naciones Unidas consagran sus esfuerzos.

A ello siguió la Declaración internacional de los Derechos humanos en 1948; en su artículo 19 se establece que: "Toda persona tiene el derecho a la libertad de opinión y de expresión, este derecho incluye la libertad de sostener opiniones sin interferencia y buscar, recibir y difundir informaciones e ideas a través de los medios de comunicación y sin importar las fronteras".

Los periodistas que están realizando tareas civiles serias en áreas de lucha armada son considerados civiles, que deben ser protegidos de conformidad con las leyes y los acuerdos internacionales y con el artículo (79) del primer protocolo adicional de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebra para la protección de civiles en tiempo de guerra en 1949 (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

El gran número de violaciones de las libertades de prensa que se dieron durante el año 2007, unido a las decisiones y acciones que impidieron las reuniones y manifestaciones pacíficas, ha afectado seriamente a los ciudadanos y al derecho de la prensa de libertad de opinión y de expresión en los territorios palestinos, a pesar de estar éste garantizado por la ley palestina fundamental y la ley de edición e impresión, tanto como por las estatutos internacionales. Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar que los territorios palestinos, según Reporteros sin Fronteras, ocuparan el lugar 158 el año pasado en el ranking anual de libertad de prensa de 169 países, cuando había ocupado el puesto 134 en el año 2006 (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

Estos factores podrían haber instado a los ciudadanos a lograr desatar la libertad de opinión y de expresión y por lo tanto ampliar su espacio de libertad, lo cual se reflejaría en la participación política.

Los resultados de la investigación mostraron que la mayoría de las personas sometidas a este estudio consideran que su motivación hacia la participación política es cumplir con su deber nacional. Esto podría estar relacionado con la existencia mantenida de la ocupación, acompañado por los constantes arrestos, asesinatos, demoliciones de casas, que aterrorizan a los ciudadanos, las barricadas que dividen los territorios de la patria, la continuación de los planes sionistas por el control de Al-Aqsa a través de las excavaciones y las incesantes irrupciones en la mezquita por los colonos extremistas.

Esta realidad ha dado lugar a la creencia de los ciudadanos palestinos de que la marcha de la lucha nacional aún no ha terminado. La existencia de la ocupación y sus procedimientos sobre el terreno, la existencia de colonos y los asentamientos, convirtió la vida de los palestinos en una realidad dura y miserable, asaltando a unos ciudadanos inermes y arrebatándoles sus casas.

Esta región,"como algunos creen"está destinada a la lucha (Yihad), y se identifica como la tierra de la Ribat. (del ar. Clas ribat, lugar de estacion de los musulmanes que se dedican a la piedad y la guerra santa) (Real Academia Española, 22ª versión) y que"Al-Jihad"es un deber de los musulmanes que tiene como objetivo liberar a esta tierra de la ocupación)

De todas formas, otros estudios sostienen que detrás de estos obstáculos se esconde la ausencia de participación política y democrática junto con la voluntad política en los nombramientos llevados a cabo por la Autoridad Palestina en las elecciones locales (Atallah, 2004; Osman, 2004; Miari, 1996). De todas formas, otros estudios (2004) sostienen que detrás de estos obstáculos se esconde la ausencia de participación política y democrática junto con la voluntad política en los nombramientos llevados a cabo por la Autoridad Palestina en las elecciones locales (Atallah, 2004; Osman, 2004; Miari, 1996).

Por otra parte, esta obligación se une a la lealtad hacia los presos y detenidos que languidecen en las cárceles de la ocupación; personas que se han sacrificado por la defensa de los asuntos nacionales. Algunos han pasado más de 30 años en cautiverio, y hay incluso mujeres y niños, lo que hace que la lealtad sea un motivo para que los ciudadanos hacia la participación política.

Esta obligación también está relacionado con la construcción de las instituciones del país y la organización para la construcción del Estado. Fatah, que apoya al gobierno de Salam Fayyad, cree que lleva a cabo su tarea por medio de la creación de instituciones y la preparación para el nacimiento del Estado palestino.

Algunos consideran que realizan esa tarea trabajando en organizaciones civiles, que prestan servicios a los ciudadanos y fortalecen su presencia en el terreno.

Las plataformas políticas de los diferentes partidos palestinos estimulan a los ciudadanos para que participen en las actividades que dichos partidos promueven. Organizan actividades en los eventos sociales y políticos, y actividades relacionadas con los acontecimientos históricos palestinos, como el aniversario de la Nakba (catástrofe), el día de la tierra, el día los presos, etc.

El pueblo palestino está viviendo ahora una etapa de liberalismo nacional. No es extraño para un país bajo ocupación que se ha sacrificado tanto, que esté de acuerdo en que el motivo para la participación política es cumplir con el deber nacional.

Los resultados del estudio han hecho hincapié en que la voluntad de cambiar la realidad constituye un motivo hacia la participación política para la mayoría de las personas que fueron objeto de este estudio. La situación actual indica la persistencia de la ocupación que se mantiene con el desarraigo de la población palestina de sus tierras a través de una serie de políticas económicas, militares, administrativas y de asentamiento, directas e indirectas, tales como la continuación del bloqueo, el levantamiento de barricadas, la construcción del muro de separación, la continua construcción de asentamientos, la confiscación de tierras, la judaización de Jerusalén, los asesinatos, los ataques aéreos sobre Gaza, etc.

La situación actual refleja el fracaso de la opción de las negociaciones de paz que han llevado la situación a un callejón sin salida. Desde entonces, la ocupación ha dejado de lado, en muchos casos, las obligaciones que se habían acordado. Además, esto lo demuestra el hecho de que continúa el bloqueo de Gaza y el aislamiento a este pueblo que se ha convertido en una gran prisión. Como resultado, la proporción de pobres ha aumentado, y el asedio ha provocado la escasez de medicinas, alimentos básicos y materiales de construcción.

La realidad señala el deterioro de la situación económica de la sociedad palestina y la incapacidad de la Autoridad, en muchas ocasiones, de pagar los sueldos a los empleados del sector público. La economía palestina depende de los países donantes, lo que la convierte en un rehén de la misericordia de los éstos.

La realidad actual de la situación palestina es la división política y geográfica de la tierra en dos partes, la Ribera Occidental (Cisjordania) y la Franja de Gaza, el proyecto inconcluso de

la reconciliación entre Fatah y Hamas, la continuación de las detenciones por motivos políticos y la continuación de la exclusividad política en las resoluciones. Además, la realidad apunta a la persistencia de la corrupción en la Autoridad Palestina y a la disminución del nivel de los servicios prestados a los ciudadanos, incluso después de una serie de huelgas de trabajadores en algunas de las instituciones de la Autoridad Palestina, como la de los trabajadores en el sector de la salud o de la educación, que exigían un aumento en sus salarios a la luz del aumento global en los precios de las materias primas y los suministros de alimentos a nivel mundial.

Ésta es la amarga realidad presenciada por el pueblo de Palestina, que está deseando cambiar, a través de su desafío a la política de ocupación y por medio de las críticas a los dirigentes políticos, que les han decepcionado y cuyas consignas han dejado de tener sentido. Esa amarga realidad es rechazada de lleno por los ciudadanos que están esperando ansiosamente la realización de su sueño nacional de libertad, su destino y su autodeterminación

Los resultados del estudio mostraron también que el proceso de autoafirmación constituye un motivo hacia la participación política, basado en la fe en que el ser humano nace con una voluntad libre y que con ella es capaz de elegir su camino. El proceso de autoafirmación es un motivo hacia la participación política en el sentido de que el individuo considera que la participación política es una forma de alcanzar la libertad nacional, religiosa, etc.

En la sociedad palestina, la gente busca su propia seguridad y tener repercusión en las cuestiones fundamentales de la política. Los sucesivos levantamientos palestinos encarnan una situación revolucionaria constante con el objetivo de poner fin a la ocupación y conseguir los objetivos nacionales del pueblo. Han hecho grandes sacrificios partiendo de una base de profunda fe en la solución justa de su realidad y la comprensión de la naturaleza del enemigo y sus proyectos, con el objetivo de poner fin a ésta situación nacional. Durante décadas, el pueblo palestino ha practicado todas las formas de lucha violentas, pacíficas, políticas, económicas e intelectuales-ofreciendo un modelo único de levantamiento civil que resiste al arsenal de la ocupación militar con férrea voluntad y con la esperanza de libertad e independencia, en un contexto de apoyo regional e internacional a la ocupación y una continua ceguera a los crímenes de ésta, que niegan los derechos del pueblo palestino y su resistencia, aun siendo un derecho legítimo garantizado por los convenios internacionales.

Los resultados de la investigación también muestran que la mayoría de las personas sujetas a este estudio opinaron que los obstáculos para la participación política aluden a la situación política actual después de la creación de la ANP, desde la que se producen los empleos, las relaciones y la compra de conciencia. Estos son los principales factores que obstaculizan una participación política efectiva. Los resultados han demostrado que la mala elección de los candidatos, la prevalencia de la corrupción política, la desconfianza en los nominados, la frustración sobre la situación política imperante en la sociedad palestina, los efectos externos sobre sus decisiones políticas, el caos político, la confusión social y la propagación del favoritismo en el sistema político palestino son los principales factores que se interponen en el camino de los ciudadanos hacia la participación política activa.

Los resultados de la investigación indican que la mayoría de las personas sujetas al estudio confirman que la mala selección de los candidatos, constituye un obstáculo a la participación política.

En las recientes elecciones del Consejo Legislativo en 2006, Fatah no consiguió una mayoría, debido a una mala selección de candidatos. Junto a esto, los candidatos del movimiento Al Fatah no se pusieron de acuerdo para realizar una campaña de propaganda común. Cada candidato llevó a cabo una campaña independiente, lo que se tradujo en la dispersión de los candidatos en las segundas elecciones legislativas en 2006. Los líderes del movimiento Fatah fueron incapaces de persuadir a sus miembros para que apoyaran a sus candidatos, después de que tomaran el control de la vieja generación de asientos de Fatah en las elecciones internas (primarias) en 2005, las cuales tuvieron lugar en medio de una atmósfera de tensión y de recriminaciones mutuas, que incluso a veces llegó a la violencia, a la hora de elegir a sus candidatos para las elecciones legislativas previstas el 25 de enero en las ciudades de Tulkarem, Hebrón, Salfit y Qalqilya, y a pesar de algunos problemas, sobre todo en Tulkarem, Salfit y Hebrón. En Gaza, las milicias ocuparon las oficinas gubernamentales que exigían la reanudación de las primarias que habían sido interrumpidas a causa de los actos de violencia. Por otro lado, las elecciones primarias para elegir 132 candidatos que representaran a Fatah en las elecciones legislativas en Cisjordania, que tenían lugar el 25 de noviembre del 2005, fueron suspendidas en algunas circunscripciones debido a actos de violencia (Al-Saleh, 2005).

Según señalaron algunos observadores, se cometieron muchos fraudes en las elecciones internas de Fatah, como resultado de la elección de algunos candidatos que habían sido previamente acusados por corrupción, o de candidatos que ocupaban múltiples cargos en la Autoridad Palestina. Por ejemplo, candidatos que eran ex ministros o un ex diputados del parlamento saliente, o algunos que ocupaban una colección de varios cargos en la Autoridad Palestina y el movimiento Fatah. No se les dio oportunidad a los grupos más jóvenes, lo que redujo las posibilidades de éxito del movimiento Fatah en las elecciones legislativas del consejo legislativo.

Por otro lado, los candidatos del movimiento Hamas gozaban de una buena reputación social; no surgieron diferencias internas durante las elecciones y su campaña estuvo bien organizada y unificada. Además, las masas buscaban una alternativa. En vista del fracaso del proyecto nacional y la opción de las negociaciones con la ocupación, el movimiento Hamas consiguió el éxito en la selección de sus candidatos para las elecciones del Consejo Legislativo, lo cual se reflejó en su aplastante victoria en las elecciones legislativas.

Los resultados del estudio mostraron que los obstáculos a la participación política se atribuirían a la propagación de la corrupción política. Azmi Al-Shu'aybi, de la comisión general de la coalición (Aman) para la lucha contra la corrupción en los territorios palestinos, afirma que Palestina necesitará muchos años para verse libre de la corrupción, y señala que la corrupción política es uno de las formas más comunes de corrupción en el caso palestino. Según él, la corrupción política se inicia en la parte superior de la pirámide y se limita considerablemente entre los deberes de un ministro y un director general. Al mismo tiempo, señala la importancia de la presencia de una voluntad política en la parte superior de la pirámide política palestina, para luchar contra la corrupción y proteger a la patria de sus peligros.

Al-Shu'aybi, apunta también que el deseo del presidente Mahmud Abbas de combatir la corrupción no es suficiente. Se necesita voluntad de trabajo y personal humano capaz de traducir en acciones prácticas esa determinación. Asimismo critica la actuación de la Autoridad en dicha materia y considera que no se presta suficiente atención a las cuestiones de corrupción.

Al-Shu'aybi, miembro activo en el anterior Consejo Legislativo, considera que la continuación de las actividades normales de la Autoridad, en ausencia de un parlamento en Cisjordania y Gaza, es corrupción política (Al-Shu'aybi, 2011). También señala que entre las otras formas de corrupción están la intromisión en los concursos con intereses particulares y los nombramientos injustificados, y añade que la corrupción política ha surgido recientemente en la arena palestina tras la actual división.

Continúa diciendo que esta corrupción se muestra en la liquidación de las cuentas políticas, donde un partido impide el trabajo del otro partido, pospone las elecciones generales por el bien de los intereses del partido, utilizando medios de titularidad pública como las tierras del Estado para sus propias cuentas (Al-Shu'aybi, 2011). Y tal vez lo que fue publicado por "Al-Jazeera TV", al transmitir cientos de documentos secretos relacionados con el conflicto palestino-israelí que tenían que ver con las negociaciones de los últimos diez años, y el hallazgo de más de 1.600 documentos clasificados relativos a esas negociaciones, fueran también pruebas sobre la corrupción política de los negociadores. A esto se añaden las importantes concesiones sin precedentes a Israel, que el negociador palestino otorgó sin tener en cuenta las instituciones de la Autoridad, los partidos políticos palestinos o el Parlamento. Al-Jazeera ha puesto en marcha un sitio web destinado a la difusión de estos documentos.

Los asuntos de la reforma fueron el denominador común durante esta campaña, debido al fuerte deseo de cambio, que se hizo explícito en el sector más importante de los votantes. La Fundación Coalición para la Rendición de Cuentas e Integridad (Aman) presentó un documento a las facciones, listas electorales y a los candidatos en las segundas elecciones legislativas en 2006, solicitándoles que cumplieran con ello si eran elegidos en el Consejo Legislativo y trabajar para combatir la corrupción en todas las instituciones, sobre todo porque todas las consignas estaban llamando a la lucha contra la corrupción. La mayoría de las encuestas sobre las elecciones mostraron que el tema de la corrupción juega un papel importante en la determinación de la elección del votante. Por ejemplo, la encuesta de opinión que llevó a cabo el Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo en Birzeit obtuvo como resultado que el 98% de los encuestados confirmaba que la justicia y la honestidad eran los criterios más importantes que determinaban la elección de su candidato.

Los resultados del estudio mostraron que la falta de confianza en los candidatos es uno de los principales obstáculos en lo que se refiere a la participación política. El porcentaje de confianza en el sistema político palestino es bajo y los partidos políticos han perdido su capacidad de movilizar a los ciudadanos e instarles a la participación política, sobre todo por la caída en picado de la esperanza de los ciudadanos en el futuro. La confianza refleja las expectativas y los compromisos mutuos, así como una tasa disminuida de la confianza en los sucesivos gobiernos restringidos que no lograron satisfacer todas las necesidades del pueblo palestino.

Los resultados del estudio también han subrayado que los obstáculos a la participación política en la sociedad palestina tienen que ver con una frustración sobre la actual situación política en la sociedad palestina, donde ésta ha llegado a entrar en grave crisis, y también con los diálogos internos palestinos sobre la reconciliación final entre los dos partidos nacionales, Fatah y Hamas, que no han podido hasta ahora llegar a un acuerdo. Se supone que estos diálogos deben dar a la gente una oportunidad de dar su opinión sobre la manera de salir de esta potencial crisis de fracaso.

De todos es sabido que la solución a nuestros problemas reside en la responsabilidad de estos dos partidos, Fatah y Hamas. Hoy en día, las personas carentes de poder son los que han tenido que pagar el impuesto de las crisis y han ido acumulando problemas por culpa de los diferentes puntos de vista de estos dos partidos. Esto nos hace daño a nosotros y a la visión de la cuestión palestina ante el mundo, lo que lleva a que los ciudadanos se enfrenten a los obstáculos y quieran participar activamente en política.

Los resultados han demostrado que al estado de frustración que se ha extendido en la sociedad palestina tras las recientes elecciones palestinas en 2006, le siguieron las luchas internas. Lo más peligroso de todo esto, es la suspensión del sistema político palestino y la profunda división geográfica entre Cisjordania y Gaza, acompañado por la división política dentro de las instituciones y administraciones: judicial, militar y servicios. Esto ha creado una crisis que no parece vaya a terminar pronto (Eenaty, 2008: 115). Cada parte parece estar contento con la situación existente.

Los actos de violencia que estallaron entre los dos principales partidos en la arena palestina han hecho mella en las actitudes de los ciudadanos palestinos que se abstienen de participar políticamente como consecuencia del estado de frustración que sienten. Muchos ciudadanos piensan que los partidos políticos se han convertido en una carga para la cuestión palestina y que van más allá de los asuntos meramente políticos de resistencia a la ocupación. Ibrahim Abrash hizo hincapié en que solamente vemos los partidos políticos dominantes en la ausencia de los independientes o grupos independientes, y sin ningún progreso tangible, en el proyecto nacional como un sistema nacional liberal en vez de un plan para la construcción de un estado.

Tenemos que decir, lamentablemente, que la gran asistencia por parte de los grupos o partidos no resulta ser ya un fenómeno saludable y una necesidad nacional como lo fue antes, debido a la falta de independencia en las decisiones en estos partidos y el conflicto entre las consignas planteadas y la realidad en la práctica (Abrash, 2010).

Las conclusiones del estudio señalan que el estado de confusión política que el pueblo palestino está experimentando acaba siendo un obstáculo que impide a los ciudadanos su participación política efectiva. Las constantes que las facciones políticas palestinas proclaman, ya no existen, después de todas las concesiones hechas por el liderazgo de la Autoridad a la ocupación. Los líderes exigen una consigna que después es fácilmente olvidada. ¿Cuánto hemos oído hablar de la consigna "no hay negociación sobre los asentamientos", y a los pocos días los líderes de la Autoridad renuncian a ella. Existen muchos más ejemplos de este tipo. Todo ello crea la confusión política que genera obstáculos frente a la participación política de los ciudadanos.

Después de la guerra en Gaza, la ONU nombró una comisión de investigación de crímenes de guerra por la violación de derechos contra la población civil en la Franja de Gaza, en la que Israel fue condenado por dichos crímenes. El 02 de octubre 2009, la ANP pidió, bajo la presión de Israel y la administración estadounidense, aplazar la votación sobre una resolución de apoyo (Informe Goldston) en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos en la ONU. El presidente, Mahmud Abbas, admitió que la ANP había solicitado dicho retraso bajo el pretexto de poder asegurar mayor apoyo internacional antes de la votación.

El (Informe Goldstone) se vuelve a proponer en la junta de derechos humanos en la ONU tras las fuertes críticas al ejecutivo de la Autoridad por parte de los medios de comunicación y debido también al resentimiento de las masas palestinas. Al-Jazeera net (2009) muestra hasta qué punto la confusión política está extendida en la Autoridad.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que los obstáculos a la participación política, de acuerdo con la mayoría de las investigaciones, se refieren a la propagación de favoritismo en el sistema político palestino. La corrupción se ha extendido después del establecimiento de las prácticas de monopolización de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, lo cual resultaba evidente en las políticas de empleo, los ascensos y el uso indebido de fondos público; todo ello como resultado directo de la falta de transparencia y la no rendición de cuentas. Azmi El Shuaybi, comisario general de la coalición de regularidad y transparencia, declaró que la forma de corrupción en la sociedad palestina se representaba en la obtención de un empleo público, la práctica de la mediación y el favoritismo y el mal uso de los resultados públicos para intereses personales (Al-Shu 'aybi, 2011).

La corrupción en la sociedad palestina tiene sus propias características, debido a sus circunstancias especiales. Sin embargo, no está arraigada en el sistema social ya que está históricamente asociada con la ocupación y, especialmente, con el espionaje. Al establecer la Autoridad, la corrupción se asocia a nombres concretos, personas que ocupan posiciones de influencia.

El Centro de Estudio e Investigaciones políticas ha señalado en una encuesta realizada en las zonas palestinas sobre la opinión ciudadana en temas de mediación y favoritismo que el 52% de los encuestados afirmaba que el fenómeno de la mediación es la forma más usual en la sociedad palestina para obtener altos cargos en la Autoridad Nacional Palestina.

La gran mayoría (82%) considera que la corrupción está más extendida en el sector público, como en los ministerios y en los sistemas de seguridad, mientras que el (6%) indicó que está más ampliamente difundida en el sector privado; sólo el (5%) cree que el fenómeno está más extendido en el sector nacional.

Resulta evidente que los fenómenos de mediación se utilizan principalmente en la consecución de puestos de trabajo. El (32%) de los encuestados necesitaron la mediación de un miembro de su familia o de algún amigo para conseguir un trabajo; el (27%) afirmó que la mediación se utiliza para conseguir puestos de trabajo en la fuerzas de la policía o en los sistemas de seguridad. (Centro Palestino de Estudio e Investigaciones políticas, 2005).

Un informe de (Azmi El-Shu'aibi) señala que la población relaciona la pobreza a la corrupción y el abuso de posiciones. También muestran su desconfianza en los métodos de tratamiento y en las prioridades que los gobiernos y las organizaciones no gubernamentales adoptan en la toma de decisiones para la solución de problemas. Parece que el favoritismo, la mediación y el soborno han llegado tocar los aspectos básicos de la vida de los palestinos (especialmente a los pobres), tales como la educación, los servicios de salud, empleo y seguridad. Esta franja de población también se refirió a la existencia de corrupción en los nombramientos de los puestos gubernamentales basados en el favoritismo y en consideraciones de partido (Al-Shu'aybi, 2005).

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que los efectos externos sobre la decisión política palestina impiden la participación política. El apoyo absoluto de la administración estadounidense a las políticas de Israel en la región y la debilidad árabe dominante desmoraliza a los ciudadanos palestinos. El pueblo palestino no tiene esperanza ni en la ONU, ni en la administración estadounidense, ni en la comunidad internacional para encontrar una solución justa a su Causa, y por consiguiente, la decepción va aumentando entre el pueblo palestino.

Por otra parte, la financiación externa se dirige de acuerdo a las agendas políticas, por lo que se da prioridad a la continuación del proceso político entre las partes palestina e israelí, y las ayudas sirven, en muchos casos, para debilitar la dimensión de la resistencia a través de los mecanismos de defensa financiados para ello. La naturaleza categórica de parte de la ayuda externa también debilita la posibilidad de desarrollar la capacidad de la comunidad palestina de hacer frente a la ocupación y sus procedimientos.

Junto a esto hallamos la difusión de una mentalidad de dependencia, que es el resultado de la creciente dependencia de la ayuda externa (instituciones gubernamentales o no

gubernamentales). Estos mecanismos conducen a un debilitamiento de las dimensiones de la resistencia en el trabajo de estas instituciones.

El apoyo exterior pasa a través de una estructura institucional en el que la ocupación israelí goza de derecho de veto a cualquier proyecto que entre en conflicto con sus intereses.

Además, el apoyo en relación con determinados programas en un período limitado de tiempo hace que las instituciones financiadas resulten inestables y estén siempre preocupadas por sus posibilidades de supervivencia. ¿Cómo pueden entonces contribuir de manera efectiva dichas instituciones para producir actividades de resistencia o mejorar el patrón de resistencia de las iniciativas de la gente? (Al-Maliki, et al, 2004).

Muchos ciudadanos renuncian a resistirse a la ocupación como parte de la participación política debido a que la ANP trata de rodear a la resistencia. Los territorios palestinos sujetos a la vigilancia de la ANP intentan, por parte de la ANP, de persuadir a los ciudadanos de resistirse a la ocupación; a los manifestantes se les retiene en puntos de contacto que existen con las fuerzas de ocupación, y que están en los límites de las ciudades y pueblos, o bien son detenidos bajo el pretexto de la protección de la seguridad palestina o de dañar los intereses palestinos. Esta política adoptada por la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, que rechaza la idea de la resistencia o la violencia como dicen, ha obligado a muchos activistas políticos a renunciar a la idea de la participación política. Se ha creado una idea a los ciudadanos de que la resistencia a la ocupación ya no es fructífera en la realidad política existente debido a los efectos y las presiones lejanas ya a las decisiones políticas palestinas.

Muchos países extranjeros han dado su apoyo a la ANP por las actitudes adoptadas por dicha Autoridad. Se han practicado muchas formas de presión sobre la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, por países, por ejemplo, que se negaron a pagar a la ANP y cumplir con sus compromisos financieros a menos que la ANP cambiara su postura política.

En realidad, la situación palestina, caracterizada por las luchas internas y la división entre las dos facciones políticas, Hamas y Fatah, se deben en primer lugar a las presiones extranjeras ejercidas sobre el gobierno de Hamas para que reconozca a Israel y respete los acuerdos firmados con la OLP. Esto es lo que el gobierno de Hamas rechazó y fue castigado por la comunidad internacional suspendiéndose las ayudas humanitarias. Por ello el gobierno no ha

podido pagar los sueldos del personal, añadiéndose esto a las malas condiciones económicas de los ciudadanos.

Por otra parte está la extorsión practicada por la ocupación al abstenerse del pago de los impuestos recaudados en los pasos fronterizos y en nombre de la Autoridad. Se abstienen de pagar en muchos casos por múltiples excusas, a pesar de que existe una comisión para la recaudación de impuestos. Estos factores, sin duda, conllevan, de acuerdo a la gran mayoría de las personas examinadas, la disminución de la tasa de participación política en la sociedad palestina.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que la práctica más importante dentro de las formas políticas de los ciudadanos es la de seguir muy de cerca las noticias políticas en diferentes medios de comunicación (periódicos, radio y TV). Así como el sentido de responsabilidad hacia las cuestiones sociales, a raíz de lo que sucede en la arena palestina, y de participación en los trabajos voluntarios que tienen que ver con servicios sociales.

La cuestión palestina se ha convertido en un eje de interés para muchos medios de comunicación como fuente de material para noticias. Los medios de comunicación juegan un papel importante en la transmisión de lo que está sucediendo en la arena palestina. Con el desarrollo de agencias de noticias árabes, como el canal de noticias Al-Jazzera, se atrae a los espectadores de la sociedad palestina, ya que éstos tienen una alta capacidad de transmitir imágenes auténticas de los acontecimientos políticos palestinos y acceden a las noticias revelando información antes oculta. Así que los medios de comunicación fueron influyentes y eficaces, y surgieron como una forma básica de participación política.

Además, los espacios de los medios de comunicación libres comenzaron a atraer a los espectadores en la sociedad palestina, al estar alejados éstos de la política de los medios de comunicación estatales, que siguen la estrategia de la alabanza y el elogio de los líderes y presidentes, y se encargan de la transmisión de protocolos para las ceremonias de recepción de los líderes. El espectador palestino estaba harto de los medios de comunicación estatales, y los medios de comunicación de espacio libre se han convertido en una alternativa ideal para los espectadores de la sociedad palestina, debido a su independencia, credibilidad y profesionalidad en el trabajo. Por estas razones, los medios de comunicación se han convertido en parte de la participación política del ciudadano.

Los resultados del estudio confirman que el sentido de responsabilidad hacia los problemas de la comunidad es un aspecto vital para la mayoría de los encuestados. La participación política desde la perspectiva de la sociología, es el proceso por el cual el individuo puede desempeñar un papel en la vida política y social, ya que los sacrificios hechos por el pueblo palestino reafirman el entusiasmo de sus compatriotas en su sentido de responsabilidad hacia las cuestiones sociales.

La Intifada de Al-Aqsa, en el año 2000, se desató cuando A. Sharon irrumpió en la mezquita, un lugar sagrado para los palestinos y los musulmanes; los palestinos se alzaron en Al-Aqsa, como un símbolo de la santificación de este lugar, en el que nunca podría ser permitido tal ataque. La sensación de peligro que amenazaba a este lugar santo fue el motivo que empujó a los palestinos a la Intifada, que duró varios años y se cobró la vida de miles de mártires, heridos, detenidos y deportados.

Lo que obligó a cientos de terroristas suicidas a inmolarse en lugares dentro de las áreas de ocupación, fue la sensación de injusticia y de responsabilidad hacia los temas nacionales. Estas operaciones, que se consideran el tipo más elevado de sacrificio, representan el mayor de los ejemplos jamás llevado a cabo antes en las páginas de la lucha internacional. El fenómeno atrae a un gran número de palestinos, de diferentes ámbitos, hombres o mujeres, que lo que hacen por el bien de la cuestión palestina (Banat, 2010).

Por otra parte, las manifestaciones celebradas en las aldeas de Al-Walaja y Ni'lin, en protesta contra la instalación, por parte de Israel, del muro de separación en los territorios palestinos representan el sentido de responsabilidad hacia los ciudadanos palestinos vulnerables, a pesar de la violencia israelí, ejercida con gases lacrimógenos, golpes, detenciones o asesinatos.

El sentido de la responsabilidad motiva a los ciudadanos a montar campamentos o a organizar marchas en solidaridad con los presos en la cárcel y expresar así su lealtad hacia ellos.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que la mayoría de las personas sujetas al estudio siguen lo que está sucediendo en la arena política. La política es la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos así como los problemas económicos y sociales en la sociedad palestina; es el resultado de los problemas políticos asociados a la ocupación y sus consecuencias. Esto se

atribuye al cambio de clima político y la ausencia de estabilidad política en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza.

La sociedad palestina está relacionada con la política como si fuera parte de su dieta diaria, por la cual subsisten. Las circunstancias que rodean al ciudadano palestino, como las barricadas erigidas por la ocupación entre las ciudades palestinas, las largas horas de espera para pasar esas barricadas, los reiterados cierres de entrada a Jerusalén o Israel, los asesinatos cometidos contra los activistas palestinos por parte de la ocupación, las detenciones diarias, la confiscación de tierras, incluidas aquellas anexas al muro de separación, el asalto de los colonos o de las fuerzas de ocupación israelíes, todas estas razones impulsan al ciudadano palestino a tener interés en los acontecimientos políticos.

Los acontecimientos políticos tan convulsos en la arena palestina no sólo afectan a los ciudadanos palestinos, sino que también afectan a la estabilidad de la región y a la estabilidad en el mundo, debido al hecho de que esta región se encuentra en un lugar estratégico. Ésta es una de las cuestiones pendientes que todavía necesita una solución justa para todas aquellas personas que pasaron largos años bajo la ocupación.

Los resultados del estudio han confirmado que la mayoría de los que fueron objeto de este estudio participaron en trabajos voluntarios relacionados con el servicio a la sociedad. El pueblo palestino practica desde hace mucho tiempo el trabajo voluntario; forma parte de su patrimonio y de sus valores heredados. Los palestinos suelen hacerse voluntarios para colaborar durante los días de la cosecha, la recogida de la aceituna, y también para labores de construcción. Son valores que se han heredado de nuestros ancestros.

Además, las sociedades de beneficencia desempeñan un papel destacado en el trabajo voluntario y proporcionan servicios gratuitos a los ciudadanos: la sociedad Dar Alaytam ofrece educación gratuita a los niños huérfanos, la Sociedad de Socorro Agrícola apoya proyectos agrícolas y los Comités de Trabajo Médico, de Salud, de Agricultura y de Trabajo ofrecen sus servicios a los ciudadanos palestinos.

Los resultados del estudio muestran que no surgen diferencias, de acuerdo con los distintos géneros, ni en las motivaciones ni en los obstáculos a la participación política en la sociedad

palestina; mientras que las diferencias en las formas de participación favorecen al sexo masculino.

La sociedad palestina sigue siendo una sociedad masculina y una comunidad de padres por lo cual el padre y el jeque de la tribu son los que determinan la participación. Aún está vigente una ley de sociedad tribal regida por costumbres, tradiciones y por una visión conservadora de la mujer. Eso es evidente en la acción política que viene de un propio interés local y familiar y un punto de vista tradicional que no reconoce la condición y el papel de la mujer.

Podemos decir que la cultura en la que se basa la sociedad dentro del marco de Palestina está directamente ligada a la cultura social árabe, en la que las costumbres religiosas, los hábitos y las tradiciones constituyen los principales controles de la sociedad. Ésta se rige por (*halal* y *haram*) la vergüenza y la legalidad, el respeto a la autoridad, el cumplimiento, la religión, la ética, la obediencia a los padres y así sucesivamente. Esta complejidad cultural en la sociedad palestina también está determinada por un conjunto de condiciones reales, tales como la singularidad del grupo de población a la que pertenece el individuo.

La sociedad palestina no tiene interés en el tema de la mujer. Las instituciones de la mujer palestina, aunque relativamente antiguas, se encuentran dispersas, y los partidos políticos no se apoyan en la participación política de las mujeres, excepto en la teoría. La situación de la mujer en los partidos y facciones palestinas sigue siendo similar a su situación en la sociedad y en las instituciones de formación profesional, es decir, que generalmente estas posiciones siguen siendo limitadas a los hombres.

En el nivel de los derechos palestinos las mujeres palestinas se enfrentan a grandes retos reales en términos de participación en el poder y en el proceso de toma de decisiones, a pesar de su participación activa en el proceso de lucha palestina en todas sus etapas, y a pesar de todas las medidas adoptadas por las mujeres palestinas en términos de participación política; sin embargo, el compromiso de las mujeres en la actividad política sigue siendo limitado, y es evidente por su escasa presencia formal en la arena política, especialmente en los puestos ejecutivos (la Autoridad Palestina a través de la legislatura y la presidencia y el Comité Central), las instituciones representantes (municipios y gobiernos locales) y en el ámbito informal, especialmente en las instituciones de la sociedad civil y los partidos políticos (Awad, 2008).

La exclusión de la mujer en el ejercicio de la acción política en los períodos anteriores ha reforzado la creencia entre los ciudadanos de que las mujeres no son apropiadas para estos importantes cargos, y que estos cargos políticos serían un obstáculo para las obligaciones sociales y educativas propias de las mujeres. El trabajo de las mujeres en determinados campos se atribuye a motivos relacionados con su tendencia emocional hacia algunos asuntos, lo que dificulta su consideración para cualquier papel dentro de las instituciones de acción política, incluyendo las instituciones representativas. A pesar de ello, los textos jurídicos y la legislación otorgan a la mujer el derecho a elegir y ser elegidas junto con otros derechos políticos.

Podemos concluir que la participación política de las mujeres es modesta, y que no guarda proporción con el tamaño de los sacrificios hechos por las mujeres. Las mujeres han estado expuestas a las prácticas opresivas de la ocupación israelí tales como el asesinato, la detención y el desplazamiento. Las mujeres se han mantenido unidas a los hombres, en todos los campos y en todos los lugares, y esto es muy normal en la sociedad parental oriental, donde las mujeres están subordinadas al hombre.

A pesar de todo lo presentado en este estudio, datos que dan la impresión de que el papel de la mujer palestina es limitado debido a su participación ordinaria en los asuntos políticos, la realidad de la situación palestina confirma que el porcentaje de participación de la mujer en los asuntos públicos ha superado todas las circunstancias y restricciones propias de la cultura de su sociedad.

Por ejemplo, podemos señalar que la participación de las mujeres palestinas en las primeras elecciones legislativas de 1996 fue baja, como es evidente por las tasas de mujeres candidatas y mujeres elegidas, al igual que la proporción de la presencia de mujeres en 1996 en los cargos de toma de decisiones (los cargos más altos), que también es baja, con una mayor participación en los centros menos importantes. Por ejemplo, el porcentaje de mujeres en el Consejo Nacional Palestino es del 7,5% de un total de 744 miembros en 1996, mientras que las mujeres no estaban representadas en el Comité Ejecutivo, que es el más importante en la toma de decisiones en la OLP.

Ello se debe a las actitudes dominantes de los hombres en la sociedad palestina a través de la discriminación contra la mujer, que se asocia, de una manera u otra, a la naturaleza de la

politización, costumbres y tradiciones, donde muchas familias (esposos o padres) impiden a su esposa o a la mujer tomar parte en las elecciones (Nazzal, 1998).

Los resultados del estudio concluyen en que la religión determina la forma y el grado de participación política en la sociedad palestina. Los resultados han confirmado que la diferencia estaba a favor de los cristianos. La tasa de cristianos en el número total de personas en Palestina es de un 13%. Si bien al inicio del mandato británico, en 1917, se redujo a 6,9%, en 1931 se convirtió en un 8,8%. En 1948, el año del desastre, alcanzó el 8%, mientras que en el año 2000 fue del 6,1%.

Sin embargo, los cristianos palestinos han llegado a ocupar un lugar prominente en el liderazgo del movimiento nacional palestino. Su presencia en la lucha nacional ha sido enorme desde 1917 hasta hoy. Los cristianos de Palestina fueron, después de la ocupación en 1967, los que más sufrieron la confiscación de sus tierras. Por ejemplo, Israel ha confiscado 11 mil hectáreas de olivar en la ciudad de Beit Jala, para construir un asentamiento (Gilo) en él. También se han confiscado miles de hectáreas de tierras pertenecientes a los cristianos para construir una carretera que une los asentamientos judíos en el sur de Belén con Jerusalén (Abu-Fakhr, 2010).

La presencia cristiana en las instituciones políticas palestinas ha sido fuerte, especialmente después del advenimiento de la Autoridad Palestina, que concedía privilegios a los cristianos. Recibieron un número de escaños en todos los órganos políticos y cuerpos de la comunidad. Por ejemplo, en los territorios ocupados, hay diez jefes de municipios cristianos. La Autoridad ha asignado concretamente un número de escaños municipales a los cristianos. Diez altos funcionarios trabajan en la oficina del presidente de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, siete son embajadores de la Autoridad, dos son ministros en el gobierno de Ramala (el gobierno de Salam Fayyad) y siete miembros cristianos obtuvieron escaños en el Parlamento palestino, que recientemente fue suspendido debido a la el conflicto entre Fatah y Hamas.

Por otra parte, el total de cristianos palestinos que están afiliados a partidos políticos no supera el 20% del total de cristianos, mientras que un gran porcentaje está activo dentro de

las instituciones de la comunidad civil palestina; en los territorios ocupados hay 575 organizaciones no gubernamentales cristianas.

En su estudio, (Elías Is'eed) añade que los cristianos se encuentran en todos los partidos nacionales. Y la mayoría de los fundadores de los movimientos revolucionarios palestinos son de origen cristiano, como Nayef Hawatmeh, George Habash, Nassar Saleem y Hanan Ashrawi. (Is'eed, 2009).

Los resultados de nuestro estudio difieren de los resultados del estudio realizado por Jamal Mari (1996) sobre la juventud y la participación política en Jordania, donde se concluyó que no había diferencias estadísticas que indicaran la influencia de la religión en la participación de los jóvenes.

Los resultados de nuestro estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en la forma de participación política en la sociedad palestina entre los trabajadores y los no trabajadores, y estos resultados se mostraron favorables a los trabajadores.

Durante el primer trimestre de 2010, la tasa de población activa en los territorios palestinos alcanzó el 40,7%. Los resultados han demostrado que la tasa de participación de la mujer en el mercado de trabajo ha alcanzado el 14,1% y el número de personas que trabajan en los territorios palestinos llegó a 744.000 en el primer trimestre de 2010. La tasa de individuos desempleados alcanzó el 28,0% en el primer trimestre de 2010 (Sistema Centra de Estadísticas Palestinas, 2010).

En relación con las cifras anteriores, nos damos cuenta de que la tasa de los varones que trabajan es mayor que el de las mujeres. Esto constituye una diferencia a nivel de la participación política, ya que los hombres son más activos políticamente que las mujeres, según los hallazgos del estudio.

La mayoría de los trabajadores en la sociedad palestina son empleados del sector público, y la mayoría de ellos están afiliados a partidos políticos palestinos, generalmente al movimiento Al Fatah. Por lo tanto, están más preocupados por la política que los no trabajadores.

Además, los partidos políticos construyen las instituciones civiles donde han nombrado a sus miembros. De modo que los que están trabajando en estas instituciones están a menudo interesados en los asuntos políticos, por estar afiliados a dichos partidos. Por otra parte, parece que los trabajadores, en virtud de su trabajo, están más interesados en los temas de su comunidad; esto puede ser debido a que están trabajando y son capaces de asegurar sus necesidades lo que les permite participar en los asuntos públicos. Ellos pueden servir a su comunidad, prestar atención a las asuntos sociales fundamentales, seguir los acontecimientos políticos en la arena palestina, o hacer donaciones a un organismo concreto, como podría ser un partido o un candidato político.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que no existen diferencias entre los trabajadores del sector público y los del sector privado, en lo que se refiere a la tasa de participación política. El número de patronos registrados en la Autoridad ha llegado a alcanzar los 160.000, de los cuales 72.000 están en la Ribera Occidental, y 78.000 en Gaza. El número de empleados es de 64.000 militares, mientras que se contabilizan 96.000 empleados en los sectores civiles en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza (Al-Zaitona News, 2010).

Aunque la mayoría de los que trabajan en el sistema militar son los que están afiliados al movimiento Al Fatah, las recientes actitudes de la Autoridad evitan que los patronos dentro de ese sistema se unan a ninguna facción política o realicen cualquier tipo de actividad política. Esto explica el resultado de que no haya diferencia entre los que trabajan en el sector público y los que lo hacen en el sector privado en relación a participación política.

Muchas instituciones privadas fueron construidas con la participación de los partidos políticos. Por lo tanto, no hay ninguna diferencia entre los sectores público y privado en la participación política.

Los resultados del estudio han puesto de relieve que existen diferencias entre los refugiados y los no refugiados en el grado de participación política, y éstos están a favor de los refugiados a pesar de los obstáculos a los que se enfrentan para la participación política.

En 1948, el movimiento sionista anunció la formación del Estado de Israel en el 78% de las tierras palestinas, forzando a los palestinos a abandonar sus casas y desplazando a 700.000 palestinos de alrededor de 20 ciudades y 400 pueblos; una tasa del 66% de la población de Palestina que se dispersó por Cisjordania, la Franja de Gaza y los países vecinos: Jordania,

Siria, Líbano y el resto del mundo. Es decir: se quedaron sin hogar. Esto llevó al colapso de la sociedad palestina y ha creado un nuevo fenómeno en la sociedad palestina: "los campamentos de refugiados", que dan fe de esta catástrofe. (Banat, 2010).

Los refugiados palestinos han padecido condiciones de vida muy difíciles en los campamentos bajo la supervisión de la UNRWA (Agencia de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados de Palestina). Los refugiados han tenido que vivir en pequeñas casas abarrotadas de gente que no contaban siquiera con las más simples necesidades básicas para la vida. Por lo tanto su sentimiento en relación a la base de las cuestiones sociales y su seguimiento de los acontecimientos políticos resultan diferentes a los del resto de palestinos, ya que han probado directamente la amargura de la ocupación, obligados por sus circunstancias excepcionales.

Lo que sucede en el escenario político palestino sobre las negociaciones del derecho al retorno de los refugiados, les hace estar atentos, ya que afecta directamente a sus problemas, y sienten temor a que sus derechos sean olvidados. Tienen derecho de autodeterminación. Tienen el derecho de corregir la posición del negociador palestino en favor del compromiso con el derecho de retorno a los hogares y propiedades. Y aquí está el centro de la lucha de los refugiados para solicitar la participación política en las decisiones palestinas a través de la extensión y el grado de participación política de parte de los refugiados en la sociedad palestina.

No obstante, las duras condiciones de vida de los refugiados, los aplazamientos de los problemas de los refugiados hasta la etapa final de las negociaciones, las iniciativas confesionales por los derechos de los refugiados, junto con todos los sacrificios que los refugiados palestinos han hecho por el bien de cumplir sus sueños en su tierra, para regresar a sus zonas de origen, estando aún a la espera de una decisión política que ponga fin a sus dolores y sufrimientos, y el que nada de esto haya tenido éxito, es un obstáculo al que se enfrentan con respecto a la participación política.

Hay que añadir la situación económica y social de las vidas de los refugiados palestinos, y lo que han tenido que soportar-la represión, el encarcelamiento, la tortura y el sufrimiento-en el resultado final en relación a su participación política. Estos factores desalentadores podrían ser la razón que esté detrás de la disminución de su participación política. En este sentido, el estudio de (Banat y Salama, 2003) concluyó que el grado de participación política entre la

gente del campo de refugiados de Arroub era moderado. Eso se reflejó entre el grupo de estudio sobre el marco general de participación política, que era escasísima, tanto en términos de su falta de voluntad en la dirigencia política como en la afiliación a partidos políticos actuales, o en su tendencia a la participación en las elecciones del Consejo Legislativo. También expresaron su pesimismo sobre el futuro de la acción política en la sociedad palestina.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en la participación política en la sociedad palestina de acuerdo con las afiliaciones políticas de los ciudadanos. Estas diferencias se encontraron en los niveles, motivos y formas de participación política y están a favor de los ciudadanos afiliados.

La afiliación política representa la pertinencia a la patria sobre bases políticas, así como el sentido de la personalidad política. La afiliación política puede definirse como "la medida que determina el nacionalismo del individuo en la sociedad por medio de su amor y lealtad a su país, su disposición a sacrificarse por éste y la adopción de sus ideologías, valores y cultura".

Los partidos políticos jugaron un papel importante en la sociedad palestina en los años sesenta del siglo pasado. Se trabajó para movilizar el sentimiento nacional, a través de un enfoque armado y político, y agitando a las masas en contra de los proyectos que entraban en conflicto con sus derechos nacionales (Abrash, 2010).

Una de las funciones más importantes del partido es la de expresar las necesidades y deseos de las masas, así como el empoderamiento de los individuos y grupos para expresar sus puntos de vista y para defender sus intereses de manera efectiva, ordenada y sistemática (Al-Khazragi, 2004:214).

Durante la ocupación israelí de Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza, los partidos políticos han tratado de involucrar a los ciudadanos palestinos en los distintos programas políticos. Formaron grupos masivos; los más significativos fueron los sindicatos de estudiantes en las universidades. Estos grupos desempeñaron un papel destacado durante los años del primer levantamiento, donde mostraron una fuerte resistencia a la ocupación.

Después de los acuerdos de Oslo y la organización de elecciones legislativas y presidenciales y de comunidades locales, los partidos políticos compiten para ganar el apoyo de los ciudadanos palestinos. Éstos organizan numerosas actividades para atraer a los votantes, como eventos y festivales en honor de las familias de heridos, prisioneros, mártires o de los graduados en la escuela secundaria, etc. Alzan banderas y pancartas en las ocasiones sociales importantes, tales como las fiestas anuales y el día la catástrofe (*Al Nakba*) y los aniversarios de la recaída (*Al-intikasa*), entre otros.

Esa afiliación a los partidos políticos lleva a los afiliados a colaborar dinámicamente en las actividades políticas organizadas por el partido. El estudio mostró que los ciudadanos afiliados a los partidos están políticamente más comprometidos que el resto, y su afiliación política deriva en una participación política activa.

Los resultados del estudio han señalado la existencia de diferencias en las limitaciones de la participación política en la sociedad palestina de acuerdo con la zona en la que residan los ciudadanos (la Ribera Occidental o la Franja de Gaza) y que estas limitaciones son más intensas en la Franja de Gaza.

Alrededor de 1,5 millones de personas viven en la Franja de Gaza en un área que no excede los 365 km². La mayor parte de su población son refugiados palestinos que huyeron de sus aldeas y pueblos, ocupados en 1948. La densidad de población estimada en los territorios palestinos para el año 2010 fue de alrededor de 672 personas por km², de los cuales 444 personas por km² estarían en la Ribera Occidental, frente a 4.206 personas por km² en la Franja de Gaza. La Franja de Gaza es una de las zonas más superpobladas del mundo. La proporción de los refugiados en la Franja de Gaza constituye dos tercios de la población palestina. La población de jóvenes en la sociedad de la Franja de Gaza es más alta que en la Ribera Occidental.

La población de la Franja de Gaza estuvo gobernada por militares egipcios en diferentes periodos de tiempo, y las leyes que tenían seguían el régimen egipcio, hasta la ocupación israelí. La Ribera Occidental estaba sujeta a la tutela de Jordania hasta que surgió la ocupación israelí. Seguidamente, ambas áreas se unieron bajo la Ocupación.

La sociedad palestina en general, y en la Franja de Gaza, en particular, vive bajo la presión del asedio israelí desde que estalló la Intifada de Al-Aqsa el 28 de Septiembre del 2000. Pocos días después del levantamiento de Al-Aqsa, las fuerzas de ocupación israelíes cerraron todos los cruces fronterizos entre la Franja de Gaza y el mundo exterior; se cerraron todas las entradas para los trabajadores palestinos, a los que se privó de trabajo dentro de la llamada Línea Verde, y ya no se les conceden los permisos necesarios que les autoricen a entrar en "Israel" con el fin de ir a sus lugares de su trabajo (Elayan, 2009).

Desde el estallido del segundo levantamiento palestino en el año 2000, la ocupación separó Cisjordania de la Franja de Gaza, donde se prohibió la posibilidad de movimiento para los palestinos entre las dos regiones. Tras las segundas elecciones legislativas en 2006, es decir, después de que Hamas asumiera el control del Consejo Legislativo y formara gobierno, la ocupación cerró el cerco sobre la Franja de Gaza, y lo aisló del mundo exterior. Las luchas intestinas y los conflictos sangrientos que llevaron a la división de Palestina el 14 de Julio de 2007, la toma del poder del movimiento Hamas en la Franja de Gaza y las disposiciones del bloqueo israelí en la Franja de Gaza, tuvieron como resultado una fuerte disminución en las tasas de crecimiento de la economía palestina y un aumento en las tasas de desempleo y de pobreza (Elayan, 2009).

Desde entonces, el constante deterioro de la situación económica y el aislamiento de Gaza del resto del mundo obligan a su población a depender en parte de la ayuda humanitaria de la UNRWA y de otras donaciones extranjeras simplemente para vivir, creándose la llamada economía de alivio paralela. Esto ha llevado también a un aumento en las actividades de la economía de mercado negro, un aumento de los monopolios, de los traficantes y de la mafia, especialmente después de la caída de la mayoría de las principales actividades económicas (Al-Sorani, 2010).

Esta situación también ha incrementado la pobreza y las tasas de desempleo, la disminución de los niveles de vida y la pérdida de los mercados de muchos productos alimenticios y medicamentos esenciales, cuyas alternativas para el individuo en la Franja de Gaza se han convertido en algo raro o incluso inexistente en comparación con otras comunidades. Estos obstáculos llevan a una disminución significativa en el nivel de participación política en la Franja de Gaza.

Además el gobierno de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza tomó el control con mano de hierro, ya que llevó a cabo detenciones por motivos políticos e impidió muchas de las manifestaciones, que no tenían permiso del gobierno, y por tanto se restringió la libertad de opinión. A algunos grupos armados se les impidió la acción armada y el lanzamiento de cohetes sin la autorización del movimiento. El control de Hamas de la Franja de Gaza ha instado a muchos de los partidarios de Al Fatah a escapar de la Franja, lo que redujo el espacio de libertad a disposición de los ciudadanos y por lo tanto causó reticencias hacia la participación política.

Los resultados del estudio mostraron que hasta ahora no se ha observado ningún efecto notorio por la existencia del muro de apartheid en lo que respecta a la forma en la que el pueblo palestino vive la política. No hay casi ningún punto en la sociedad palestina que esté a salvo de los puestos de control israelíes que vigilan el tráfico de los palestinos, o a salvo de los asentamientos que han afectado a la calidad de vida de los ciudadanos al estar sujetos a ataques personales o ataques a sus propiedades. El muro del apartheid corta las extremidades de la sociedad, e impide que los ciudadanos lleguen a sus tierras o visiten a sus familiares.

Todos los palestinos comparten este sufrimiento; es raro encontrar a alguien que no haya sido sometido a tal acoso y tales obstáculos a diario, ya sea con la medida de la distancia o la proximidad de estos puntos de control, o de los asentamientos o el muro. Por lo tanto la proximidad o la distancia de estos lugares no es de gran importancia. Dado que éste es el status quo actual impuesto por la ocupación, tanto si su casa no es adyacente a un puesto de control militar, el ciudadano va a pasar inevitablemente por uno, o pasará cerca o lejos de este o aquel asentamiento, incluyendo en todo esto el muro, de una longitud de 788 kilómetros, extendiéndose del norte al sur de Cisjordania partiendo en dos gran parte de su territorio.

La acción llevada a cabo por la ocupación en la Ribera Occidental con los puestos de control israelíes y otras medidas, tales como las verjas y los cierres de carreteras, han dado lugar a la existencia de bolsas o espacios rodeados por el muro que están separadas del resto de Cisjordania. Esta situación garantiza la continuación de la colonización, que ha sido desarrollada en el territorio de Cisjordania y ha transformado los territorios palestinos en cárceles grandes.

El Departamento de asuntos de elecciones palestinas indica que la construcción del muro entre la parte occidental y oriental causará un daño directo a 865.300 ciudadanos palestinos. Esto equivale a un 37,5% del número de total de ciudadanos en la Ribera Occidental, que viven en 91 centros de población (Jabr, 2005).

Los resultados han demostrado que existen diferencias en la participación política en la sociedad palestina según el grado de violencia israelí a la que están expuestos los participantes. Estos resultados también han demostrado que las diferencias están a favor de las personas que estuvieron expuestas a la violencia israelí en los motivos, las formas y los grados de participación política.

Tal vez la experiencia de los palestinos bajo la ocupación ha sido y sigue siendo algo de lo más significativo, en relación con el número de víctimas que la violencia va dejando atrás, ya sea con muerte o lesiones, abusos físicos, demolición de viviendas, prohibición de desplazamientos, exposición a la deportación, arrestos domiciliarios, confiscación de tierras y aguas y otras formas de violencia. Los palestinos se enfrentan a la ocupación más brutal y feroz que la historia haya conocido jamás.

También notamos que las familias de los detenidos están interesadas en participar en las actividades relacionadas con los asuntos de los prisioneros, como las marchas de solidaridad, las sentadas por huelgas de hambre, etc.

La ocupación israelí practica la fuerza militar y la violencia y no puede dejar de utilizar estos medios; lo que sucedió en Kufur Qasem, Deer Yassin, Sabra y Shatil'a son claros ejemplos de ello. Los ataques militares israelíes, concretamente en la Franja de Gaza, son una catástrofe para los palestinos, y no pueden ser descritos por cientos de investigadores, pues existe un enorme desequilibrio de poder entre las fuerzas israelíes y las palestinas. El último de estos ataques fue la agresión israelí contra la Franja de Gaza a finales del 2008, que duró 23 días (27/12/2008-18/1/2009), en el que las fuerzas de ocupación utilizaron todo tipo de armas, incluyendo algunas prohibidas internacionalmente, en el proceso más amplio de agresión por tierra, mar y aire contra el pueblo palestino. Las mujeres y los niños constituían más del 43% de la población civil desarmada. Muchas zonas han desaparecido. La brutal operación llevó a la matanza de 1285 ciudadanos palestinos, hirió a unos 4336, incluyendo 1133 niños, 735

mujeres, y alrededor de 2.400 casas fueron destruidas. La pérdida material se estimó aproximadamente en 1,9 millones de dólares (Centro Palestino para los Derechos Humanos, 2009).

El estudio del Centro Palestino "Fondo para la Cultura y el Desarrollo Comunitario de Jerusalem", realizado sobre la violencia que ejercen los colonos judíos contra los civiles palestinos en la Ribera Occidental, daba muestra de más de 3000 ataques entre los años 2004 a 2011. El estudio clasificó los ataques de los colonos en cinco categorías principales: la agresión física, el lanzamiento de piedras, la destrucción de propiedades, y los ataques con armas de fuego. Estos tipos representaron el 70% de ataques llevados a cabo por colonos. Los otros tipos de ataque incluirían: el secuestro, el acoso o abuso sexual, los robos o incendios en las casas o tierras, etc.

La mayoría de los ataques ocurrieron en zonas clasificadas como "B" y "C", que son territorios palestinos ocupados bajo el control completo de la seguridad de Israel y están habitados por un pequeño porcentaje de población palestina. Por el contrario, sólo un pequeño porcentaje de estos ataques es llevado a cabo en la zona A que se encuentra bajo control de la Autoridad Palestina, y donde viven la mayoría de los palestinos. El estudio indica que los principales ataques se produjeron en las carreteras principales y los puntos de las zonas de intersección (A, B y C), que permiten a los colonos escapar con facilidad después de cometer sus ataques (Fondo para la Cultura y el Desarrollo Comunitario de Jerusalem, 2011).

Una persona que es sometida a la violencia reaccionará ante ésta; consecuentemente la violencia sólo engendra violencia. El levantamiento de 1987, por ejemplo, estalló después de que trabajadores palestinos fueran atropellados por las fuerzas de ocupación. Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que el grado de participación política para las personas que han estado expuestas a la violencia es mayor que otros. Este es un resultado lógico y es una reacción normal, ya que la presión al final acaba en estallido.

Los resultados indican que existen diferencias en la participación política en la sociedad palestina de acuerdo con la participación de los ciudadanos en las elecciones de 1996. Las diferencias se mostraron a favor de los participantes en las elecciones de 1996, en la forma de

participación política. Esto podría ser debido al hecho de que la mayoría de los candidatos y los electores estaban afiliados al movimiento Fatah, o a otras facciones aliadas.

Los resultados del estudio indicaron pronto que los ciudadanos afiliados al movimiento Al Fatah están más involucrados políticamente que el resto de las facciones. El estudio también dio muestras de que los ciudadanos que están afiliados a una facción política están más involucrados políticamente que los ciudadanos no afiliados, lo que explica la diferencia en la participación política a favor de los participantes en las elecciones de 1996.

La participación en las primeras elecciones legislativas de 1996 se limitaba al movimiento Al Fatah y a las facciones aliadas con él, mientras que el resto de las facciones de la OLP se abstuvieron de participar como una expresión de rechazo a los Acuerdos de Oslo que se firmaron entre la OLP e Israel en 1993, así como el rechazo a la ley electoral de 1995; reclamaban un sistema de representación proporcional que le diera más oportunidad a los partidos pequeños. Los diferentes poderes islámicos palestinos también se abstuvieron de participar en las elecciones por las mismas razones (Departamento de la presidencia, 2008).

Las elecciones presidenciales y legislativas de 1996 se celebraron en circunstancias políticas excepcionales y difíciles. Las negociaciones entre la ANP y el gobierno israelí todavía estaban llevándose a cabo. El aislamiento impuesto a la Franja de Gaza, Jerusalén y Cisjordania, la política israelí de los cierres y las barreras militares dieron lugar a dificultades en la comunicación y la transición y el movimiento de los votantes, lo que obstaculizó el proceso electoral y provocó una caída en la proporción de la participación política en el proceso de votación. Esto se refleja particularmente en los departamentos de Hebrón y Jerusalén, que estaban aún bajo el control israelí durante el período electoral (El Comité Palestino Central de Elecciones, 1996).

La Ribera Occidental (Cisjordania) y Gaza fueron divididas en 16 distritos electorales, lo que derivó en la promoción tribal e individual y el monopolio del poder de un partido. Los resultados de las elecciones mostraron el dominio de las instituciones tradicionales de la OLP sobre la Autoridad Palestina, y que el movimiento Al Fatah formara dos terceras partes del Consejo Legislativo.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en las formas, motivos y niveles de la participación política de la sociedad palestina sobre la base de la participación

de los ciudadanos en las elecciones de 2006. Estas diferencias fueron a favor de los que participaron en ese año. Las elecciones legislativas palestinas se celebraron el 25 de enero de 2006. Todas las fuerzas y facciones palestinas, incluyendo Hamas, participaron en las elecciones, con la excepción de la Yihad Islámica. El resultado fue la victoria aplastante de Hamas. Por lo tanto, el Movimiento Hamas llegó, frente a la oposición de la Autoridad, al Consejo Legislativo en el que obtuvo 76 escaños de 132.

La concentrada participación popular palestina refleja el deseo de cambio hacia una mejor realidad política y unas condiciones de vida mejores. Por otro lado, se incrementó la polarización que domina la arena palestina entre los dos grupos principales, Fatah y Hamas. Estas elecciones tuvieron gran importancia debido a la participación de todas las fuerzas palestinas y sus facciones nacionales e islámicas, que dieron un clima de fuerte competencia entre los partidos. Un total de once partidos compitieron en las elecciones, así como otros tantos candidatos independientes. Esto facilitó un alto grado de participación política representada por el gran número de partidos y candidatos, y este pluralismo formó un claro desafío para todas las fuerzas políticas. Lo que produjo una fuerte competencia entre los partidos, fortaleció la participación política y atrajo la atención de los ciudadanos (Nofal, 2007).

El porcentaje de votación en todos los distritos fue de un 77,69%. El número total de votantes en las circunscripciones de Cisjordania fue de 585.003, una tasa del 74,18%, mientras que los votantes totales en Gaza fueron 396.079, una tasa del 81,65% del total de votantes, con lo que el número final de electores fue de 981.082 (Centro Palestino de Estadísticas, 2006).

Estos resultados sugieren que existía un gran entusiasmo por votar en las elecciones legislativas en 2006, lo que fue el evento más importante y el más grande a nivel de participación política en la sociedad palestina. La participación entusiasta es incuestionable, como lo es el hecho de que quienes no participaron en esas elecciones legislativas de 2006, no se puede esperar que estén interesados en participar en otras actividades políticas.

Por otra parte, la mayoría de las principales facciones palestinas participaron en las elecciones, y los resultados del estudio mostraron que los partidos políticos juegan un papel importante en el impulso de sus afiliados a la participación política. Se espera que todas las personas afiliadas a las facciones políticas estén dispuestos a votar. Por lo tanto, los

resultados de nuestro estudio han indicado que las personas que participaron en las elecciones de 2006 se distinguen de aquellos que no participaron en la forma o los aspectos de la participación política. Estas elecciones, por una parte, ocupan un papel importante en la creación de las instituciones legislativas del Estado, y por otra, son compatibles con los derechos de los ciudadanos en la participación política. Es una herramienta para la expresión de las aspiraciones de la gente y el principal indicador de lo que se desea alcanzar.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en la participación política en la sociedad palestina de acuerdo con la participación de los ciudadanos en las elecciones municipales locales, y estas diferencias en la forma de participación política están a favor de los participantes en las elecciones locales.

Las elecciones de los consejos locales, las aldeas locales y municipios de la Ribera Occidental y la Franja de Gaza se llevaron a cabo por primera vez desde hace casi tres décadas. Se caracterizaron por su transparencia y su alta integridad, según lo descrito por muchos observadores internacionales. En ellas participaron la mayoría de los partidos políticos y las facciones políticas palestinas, incluso las facciones que se abstuvieron en las elecciones anteriores (Hamás y el Frente Popular) participaron masivamente en las elecciones, que tuvieron lugar en momentos diferentes.

Cabe destacar que las elecciones locales son de naturaleza política, en primer lugar para los partidos políticos, incluso si los discursos en los programas electorales versan sobre los temas de servicios, y por lo tanto uno de los principales objetivos de las elecciones locales es identificar cómo afectan a las masas y qué impacto tiene en la comunidad local cada partido. Es también un referéndum para ver el éxito de cada programa y el grado de aceptación de las masas. Por esa razón, existe una estrecha relación entre la participación política, los partidos políticos y las elecciones.

En las elecciones se observó una competición tribal que se mezclaba con las actitudes de partido. Los candidatos de Hamás ganaron las elecciones en la mayoría de los consejos locales y municipales. Estas elecciones estuvieron marcadas por la misma situación en las elecciones legislativas de 2006, debido a que, los que estaban interesados en participar en las elecciones locales mostraron interés en la práctica de todas las formas de participación política. Este es un resultado natural, ya que aquellos que están interesados en los asuntos públicos, están muy interesados en la participación política.

Además, la mayoría de las facciones acudieron masivamente a las elecciones locales, e instaron a sus candidatos a ganar y forjar alianzas con las tribus. Era la oportunidad que tenían las facciones de atraer a las tribus. Los ciudadanos mostraron su interés en estas elecciones, donde la participación fue alta en la mayoría de las mesas electorales. Los ciudadanos mostraron a su vez un alto grado de conciencia en la importancia de estas elecciones y la importancia de su participación. Así que podemos decir que los que participaron en las elecciones locales, ya fueran apoyados por los partidos o clanes, reconocen la importancia de la participación política, y que la participación mediante el voto, la elección y las actividades políticas tienen un efecto que se refleja en sus vidas y su futuro. Esto explica por qué los que tomaron parte en las elecciones locales y municipales, estarían interesados en la participación política más que otros. Por las razones mencionadas anteriormente, se hace evidente que la mayoría de los participantes son los que están afiliados a los partidos políticos palestinos, o los que son conscientes de la importancia de la participación política, que finalmente se refleja en sus vidas.

Los resultados del estudio han hecho hincapié en que no había diferencia entre los solteros o casados en la participación política en la sociedad palestina. El estatus social no constituye variaciones entre los ciudadanos en su participación política. Podemos entender este hallazgo ya que la participación política es una preocupación de la sociedad que interesa tanto a los solteros como a los casados en el mismo grado, a pesar de las responsabilidades son mayores en las parejas casadas. Su comprensión de la importancia de la participación política puede ser la causa de su deseo de participar, en el mismo grado que un joven soltero con no tantas responsabilidades familiares.

Las responsabilidades familiares podrían ser motivo de participación política, ya que tiene una repercusión sobre el futuro de los ciudadanos.

Los resultados indican que existen diferencias en las formas de participación política, de acuerdo a las distintas titulaciones académicas, en donde las muestras indicaron que las diferencias en las formas de participación política entre los que poseen un diploma y los analfabetos, se muestran a favor de los diplomados.

Esto indica que el incremento en el nivel de educación aumenta la participación política. Un mayor nivel de participación política entre los diplomados puede ser atribuido a la edad de este grupo, donde los graduados en los años de la década de los ochenta constituyen una parte

importante de este grupo. Los resultados del estudio han mostrado un aumento en la participación política con el aumento también de la edad, debido a una mayor toma de conciencia. Así que este factor puede tener un gran papel en la diferenciación de los diplomados.

Además, los graduados universitarios son titulares de una licenciatura, y los resultados del estudio mostraron antes que los trabajadores están más involucrados políticamente que los desempleados, por lo que este resultado es lógico y coherente con la realidad.

La disminución en la participación política entre los poseedores de un certificado de enseñanza secundaria general puede ser debida a la falta de conciencia política sobre la importancia de la participación política. Además de esto, una gran parte de ellos trabaja en el sector de la construcción en Israel. El número estimado gira alrededor de unos 140.000 trabajadores, que trabajan desde la mañana hasta altas horas de la noche, y pueden no tener tiempo suficiente para interesarse en sus propios asuntos o los de la política. Israel está castigando a toda persona acusada de acción política con la privación de conseguir un permiso de trabajo. Así que los trabajadores tratan de mantenerse alejados de la política a fin de conservar sus medios de subsistencia.

El hallazgo de este estudio está de acuerdo con los resultados de los estudios de (Al-Hayek y Al-Soa, 1996, Al-Azzam, 1991), que llegaron a la conclusión de que la educación superior aumentaba la participación en la vida política, mientras que, la falta de conciencia disminuía la participación política.

La educación aumenta la presión moral que insta a votar y ofrece a los ciudadanos el conocimiento sobre las cuestiones políticas que les hace capaces de contribuir de manera positiva y les da un sentido de política mundial. Ghazi al-Khalili señaló que la participación de las mujeres se reflejan en la política revolucionaria, pero que esa participación de las mujeres se limitaba a aquellas mujeres que tuvieron acceso a la educación (Al-Khalili, 1981).

Las personas con educación suelen disfrutar del valor intrínseco de la votación, y tienen un sentido de satisfacción emocional cuando votan. La educación aumenta las habilidades cognitivas que hacen que sea más fácil el conocimiento de los asuntos políticos, ya que la educación aumenta la capacidad de un individuo para entender y lidiar con asuntos complejos

e intangibles tales como la política. Así, la educación reduce el costo de la votación por dar a las personas las habilidades necesarias para hacer frente a la información política y a la toma de decisiones políticas. La educación también aumenta la posibilidad de que los alumnos reciban una mejor educación y mayor autosatisfacción a través de la participación política. Esto aumentaría el sentido del deber nacional y la presión moral hacia la participación en la votación y al recibir beneficios significativos gracias a ello. También ofrece los conocimientos especializados que se necesitan en las relaciones burocráticas, tales como rellenar formularios y solicitudes y esperar en las filas para superar los obstáculos de procedimiento necesarios para registrarse y votar.

Los resultados del estudio han puesto de relieve que no hay diferencias entre (pueblo, ciudad, campamento) en la participación política en la sociedad palestina. El lugar de residencia no tiene nada que ver con la participación política. Esto puede deberse al hecho de que el tejido social de la sociedad palestina es uno, y no hay diferencias sustanciales entre la población palestina. Aunque el ministerio del gobierno local de las comunidades palestinas las clasifica en tres categorías, no existen diferencias entre ellos (urbana, rural y el campamento).

Categoría urbana: comunidad que tiene una población de 10.000 personas o más e incluye todos los centros provinciales, independientemente de su tamaño.

Categoría rural: comunidad que tiene una población de menos de 4.000 personas, incluye toda comunidad que tenga una población de entre 4.000-9.999 personas.

Categoría campamento: incluye todas las comunidades conocidas como campamentos y que están a cargo de la UNRWA (Oficina Central de Estadística, 2009).

Estos grupos no mostraron diferencias en el grado, la forma y los motivos de la participación política. El porcentaje de población urbana sobre la base de las estimaciones de población a mediados de 2010 estaba sobre el 73,7%, y el porcentaje de la población que vive en las zonas rurales era del 17,0%, mientras que la proporción en los campamentos era del 9,3% (Oficina Central de Estadística, 2010).

Además, estas comunidades sufren un problema común, el dominio de la ocupación, que trata de eliminar la población de su tierra a través de restricciones a los ciudadanos para obligarlos

a emigrar o a desplazarse. La ocupación está trabajando en el desmembramiento de la sociedad palestina y el aislamiento de las zonas palestinas entre sí mediante el establecimiento de retenes militares, el muro, los asentamientos, o las carreteras de circunvalación. No hacen diferencia entre campamento, aldea o ciudad; todas las comunidades palestinas sufren las medidas arbitrarias de la ocupación.

Los datos de la Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina (PCBS) indicaron que la mayor parte de las características demográficas de la población de los campamentos no son muy diferentes de las características demográficas de la población urbana y rural en los territorios palestinos. Esto puede ser debido al hecho de que el pueblo palestino se caracteriza por un sistema social único y muchos refugiados han abandonado los campamentos y se han ido a vivir a las zonas rurales y urbanas. (Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina, 2002: 70).

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que hay diferencias en los impedimentos para la participación política, de acuerdo con la zona residencial (A, B o C). Los resultados del estudio mostraron que los obstáculos a la participación política de las regiones (C), que están controladas por Israel, eran mayores que en otras regiones.

Los territorios palestinos se dividieron en tres zonas, según el acuerdo entre Israel y Palestina (acuerdo de Taba, en Egipto); acuerdo firmado con gran ceremonia en Washington, el 28 de septiembre de 1995. En él se incluye la división de Cisjordania en tres zonas (A, B C). Esto significaba lo siguiente:

- Las zonas "A" son los centros de las principales ciudades de la Ribera Occidental, con la excepción de Hebrón, que representan menos del 3% de la zona de Cisjordania. Estarían bajo la supervisión administrativa y de seguridad palestina.
- Las áreas "B", que comprenden el 25% de la zona de La Ribera Occidental, y estarían bajo la supervisión administrativa palestina, mientras que la seguridad estará bajo supervisión palestino-israelí.

- Zonas "C", que comprenden alrededor del 70% de la zona de la Ribera Occidental; se encontrarían, en cuestiones administrativas y de seguridad, bajo supervisión israelí (Mohsen, 2002:266; Centro Palestino de Medios, 2003).

La sujeción de la zona C a la soberanía israelí significa mantener estas áreas sin desarrollo, mantener las barreras, continuar con la demolición de casas y la construcción de asentamientos, etc. La presencia de la ocupación en la zona C es suficiente para dañar la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos que están ya cansados de las medidas diarias que ejerce la ocupación y la inspección continua en cada entrada o salida de las zonas cercanas a los colonos, sobre todo en las antiguas ciudades de Hebrón y Jerusalén.

El dominio israelí en las áreas C, constituye un obstáculo para la participación política. La ocupación suprime las marchas y las manifestaciones y prohíbe las reuniones pacíficas, incluso en las zonas bajo su control, así como mantiene las barreras que merman la calidad de vida de los ciudadanos y les impide moverse con facilidad.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que no se hallan diferencias en la participación política en la sociedad palestina según la tendencia religiosa. La sociedad palestina sí tiene una tendencia religiosa, sin embargo, la religión no es la fuente de su motivación para la participación política. Las facciones religiosas en la sociedad palestina son diversas: algunas tienen interés en la política, y otras no tienen ningún interés en absoluto, como los grupos sufíes o el Partido de Liberación, cuyo interés político se limita a crear conciencia en lugar de motivar la acción.

Por otra parte, el conflicto palestino-israelí no es un conflicto religioso, como a algunos les gusta representarlo. El conflicto con la ocupación es un conflicto existencial. Los palestinos creen que esta tierra es la cuna de las tres religiones monoteístas (el islam, el cristianismo y el judaísmo).

La ideología sionista tiene como precepto el conflicto entre el Islam y la religión judía, por un lado, y entre el Islam y el cristianismo por otro. El sionismo explota el nombre de la religión y la percepción de que la tierra de Palestina es la "tierra prometida" para justificar la ocupación en nombre de la religión judía. Las religiones llaman a la tolerancia y la convivencia; el pueblo palestino siempre han estado acostumbrado a eso. Por ejemplo, los grupos

samaritanos que siguen el judaísmo son palestinos con todos los derechos y los deberes propios de los ciudadanos palestinos. Ellos viven con dignidad y respeto entre su propia gente.

Los resultados de este estudio confirmaron que no hay diferencia entre los ciudadanos religiosos y los no religiosos en el grado, las motivaciones y los obstáculos a la participación política. Esto demuestra que las formas de participación política practicadas por los ciudadanos palestinos no son diferentes entre los ciudadanos según su nivel de religiosidad. Porque, tal como se expuso anteriormente, el motivo de la participación política no es la religión sino un sentido de deber nacional.

Las luchas religiosas, como algunos las representan, son, o bien una fuente de la polarización política de algunas facciones, o una respuesta a la extrema posición sionista que utiliza la religión como justificación para la ocupación. El periódico hebreo "Yed` iot Aharonot" llevó a cabo una encuesta de opinión el 30 de julio de 2009, donde el 64% de los israelíes mostraban su apoyo a la idea de construir un edificio (el templo de Suleiman) que reemplazaría a la Mezquita de Al Aqsa. Junto a esto se ha registrado un aumento significativo en la frecuencia de las redadas llevadas a cabo por extremistas judíos, por funcionarios y por la seguridad israelí contra la Mezquita; se registraron un total de 43 asaltos entre el 12 de agosto 2008 al 12 de agosto de 2009. Además, Israel continúa con sus excavaciones bajo la mezquita de Al-Aqsa. Se han llegado a realizar un total de 25 excavaciones hasta el año 2009 (El-Zaytouna Centro de Estudios, 2009).

El fracaso de los acuerdos de Oslo, así como la tarea de promoción de la corriente islámica de ampliar las tendencias religiosas en los años posteriores a 1999, contribuyeron al estallido de la sublevación de Al-Aqsa. Las fuerzas nacionales ya no tenían más opciones, salvo la de volver a la opción de la lucha armada a fin de mantener primero la presencia y luego lograr retener los movimientos islámicos que en este levantamiento habían encontrado una valiosa oportunidad para mezclar las todas las cartas del juego político.

Los años que siguieron a la sublevación de Al-Aqsa, y que precedieron a la elección del Consejo Legislativo Palestino, fueron testigos de la confusión general del concepto de identidad nacional y religiosa. Las frustraciones políticas y sociales instaron a grandes segmentos de la sociedad palestina a buscar posibles e incluso no factibles alternativas. Se

había perdido la confianza en el sistema nacional y en las consignas nacionales al mismo tiempo que los partidos políticos nacionales se estaban deteriorando, lo que dio lugar a la resolución de la batalla una vez más, el predominio de la identidad religiosa, y el declive de la ideología política palestina nacional en favor del Islam político.

Esto quedó demostrado, obviamente, en los resultados de las últimas elecciones legislativas palestinas en 2006, lo que indica una evolución en la identidad palestina, y su transformación, con una tendencia a ser más religiosa, como muestra con evidencia la victoria de Hamas, que declaró ser representante del Islam.

Sin embargo, el movimiento Hamas ha cometido errores que podrían ser cruciales para su ascenso hacia los niveles más altos en los sistemas políticos de la Autoridad, y que afectarían a la comunidad palestina, que estaba predispuesta a la religión, y que empezaría a agitar una vez más los conceptos de democracia y secularismo.

El liderazgo de la división de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza ha cambiado la forma en cómo la gente ve el movimiento, alejándolos de sus ideologías políticas religiosas. La fase de la polarización política de las facciones palestinas ha terminado y ha perdido el apoyo del pueblo. Los palestinos han llegado a un estado de desesperación frente a los actuales partidos políticos, que han hecho mucho mal a la causa palestina.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que no había diferencia en los motivos, los niveles y las formas de participación política de los palestinos entre las personas religiosas y las no religiosas. Por tanto, los resultados de nuestro estudio no concuerdan con los del estudio de (Banat y Salama, 2003) que concluían en que la participación política estaba inversamente relacionada con el nivel de religiosidad.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en los motivos de la participación política en la sociedad palestina de acuerdo con el orden individual en la familia. Las diferencias fueron a favor del hijo mayor.

En las familias palestinas los padres dan al hijo mayor una gran autoridad. Esto puede ser atribuido a sus sentimientos especiales hacia su primer hijo. Dicha política de crianza basada en la distinción entre el hijo mayor y sus hermanos ha existido y se ha transmitido durante

generaciones en la sociedad árabe y palestina. El hijo mayor también tiene mayores responsabilidades familiares frente a otros miembros de la familia, quienes también le confieren una posición especial en la familia árabe. A su vez se le otorga un sentido de responsabilidad hacia su familia, la sociedad y la nación, que se refleja en su tendencia hacia la participación política. Por esta razón, los partidos políticos compiten para ganarse el apoyo de los hijos mayores, puesto que conocen su enorme influencia sobre el resto de los miembros de la familia.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que la diferencia en el número de miembros de la familia en la sociedad palestina no marca ninguna diferencia en su participación política. Los datos de la Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina han indicado que hubo una disminución en el promedio del tamaño de la familia palestina: de 5,8 miembros en 2007 ha pasado a 5,5 miembros en 2010. El tamaño medio de la familia en la Ribera Occidental se redujo a 5,3 miembros en 2010, frente a los 5,5 miembros en 2007. En cuanto a la Franja de Gaza, el tamaño medio de la familia se redujo a 5,8 miembros en 2010, frente al 6,5 de 2007 (Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina, 2010).

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que el nivel, los motivos y la forma de participación política no están relacionados con el número de los miembros de la familia. Las familias palestinas, independientemente de su tamaño, se enfrentan a la misma situación política. Por lo tanto, no encontramos diferencias en la participación política basada en el tamaño de la unidad familiar. Este resultado se enfrenta a los resultados del estudio de (Al-Azzam, 1991), que concluían que cuanto mayor era el tamaño de la familia menores eran los niveles de participación política.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en los motivos de la participación política según sean los ingresos mensuales per cápita. El estudio mostró que las diferencias están a favor de las personas de ingresos moderados o ingresos medios.

Las personas de bajos ingresos suelen estar centrados en garantizar sus necesidades esenciales. Los pobres se dedican a su lucha diaria por la supervivencia. Ellos no tienen tiempo o motivación para la participación en cuestiones que para ellos resultan menos importantes. Las estadísticas, según el Sistema Central de Estadísticas Palestinas, han puesto

de manifiesto que en 2008 más del 50% de la población palestina en Cisjordania y la Franja de Gaza vivían por debajo del umbral de la pobreza. Y así, sus principales prioridades serían asegurar sus necesidades básicas, lo que aleja a esta población de la cuestión de la participación política.

Por su parte, los individuos de altos ingresos mostraron bajos niveles de participación política. Sus intereses pueden ser diferentes debido a su excepcional situación económica, haciendo que los problemas financieros personales ocupen la posición más alta en la escala de sus prioridades, en lugar de los problemas nacionales.

Además, la mayoría de los individuos de ingresos medios son empleados del sector público, que como se discutió anteriormente, tienen especiales intereses políticos debido a las promociones administrativas que están mediadas por los partidos políticos para el beneficio de sus afiliados. Muchos trabajos consideran la afiliación política al partido como uno de los criterios más importantes para conceder un empleo, especialmente el Movimiento Al Fatah. Por esta razón, aquellos que están trabajando en el sector público están dispuestos a participar políticamente.

La Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina ha estimado en un informe la media del umbral de pobreza de la familia palestina de seis miembros en 2007, situando ésta alrededor de los 580 dólares. Mientras que la línea del umbral de pobreza extrema para una familia del mismo tamaño estaría alrededor de los 482 dólares. La tasa de pobreza entre los hogares palestinos durante el año 2007, de acuerdo a los patrones reales de consumo, fue del 34,5%, con una tasa del 23,6% en Cisjordania y del 55,7% en la Franja de Gaza. Hay que considerar que el 57,3% de las familias palestinas obtienen ingresos mensuales por debajo de la línea de pobreza extrema nacional, con una tasa del 47,2% en la Ribera Occidental y 76,9% en la Franja de Gaza. En 2009, estos valores estimaron que el 23,8% de las familias palestinas sufren extrema pobreza de acuerdo a los patrones reales de consumo de la familia con una tasa del 13,9% en la Ribera Occidental y del 43,0% en la Franja de Gaza. Mientras que el 48,0% de las familias palestinas obtienen ingresos mensuales por debajo de la línea de pobreza extrema nacional, con una tasa de 37,3% en la Ribera Occidental y 69,0% en la Franja de Gaza (Oficina Central de Estadística, 2009).

Al observar la tasa de pobreza de la población total, el Banco Mundial ha publicado un informe para mostrar que aproximadamente el 47% de los palestinos están todavía por debajo

del umbral de pobreza (que está muy por debajo del umbral de pobreza israelí). De acuerdo con estos datos, alrededor de 600.000 palestinos viven con menos de 1,5 dólares al día, que son el límite mínimo requerido para proporcionar las necesidades básicas de alimentación, vestido y vivienda. La política de bloqueo impuesta por Israel es la principal causa de la crisis económica que afecta a los palestinos de Cisjordania (Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina, 2009).

Los ricos tienen intereses relacionados con el sistema político, y esto es una motivación para participar en la vida política y poder así elegir el sistema político deseado que proteja esos intereses.

Los resultados del estudio han demostrado que existen diferencias en los grados, motivos y formas de participación política en la sociedad palestina de acuerdo con la facción política. Los resultados han mostrado que hay diferencias entre Fatah y Hamas y otras facciones en los motivos para la participación política. Estos estaban a favor del movimiento Fatah.

Los motivos para la participación política se organizaron de la siguiente manera: Fatah, Frente Popular, Frente Democrático, Al-Mubadara, Yihad Islámica, Independientes, Hamas, otras facciones, y, finalmente, el Partido Popular.

Los resultados han demostrado que hay diferencias entre Fatah, Hamas, Al-Mubadara, y otras facciones en las formas de participación política, y que éstas estaban a favor del movimiento Fatah. Las diferencias entre Hamas y otras facciones estuvieron a favor del movimiento Hamas y las diferencias que existen entre el Frente Popular y Al-Mubadara y otras facciones se mostraron a favor del Frente Popular. Las diferencias entre la Yihad Islámica y otras facciones, estuvieron a favor de la Yihad Islámica.

Las formas de la participación política en la sociedad palestina se organizaron de la siguiente manera: Frente popular, Fatah, Partido Popular, Yihad Islámica, Hamas, Al-Mubadara, Frente Democrático, Independientes y, finalmente, otras facciones.

El investigador estima que las diferencias entre Fatah y Hamas se debieron a la división interna palestina y al control del movimiento Fatah en Cisjordania y de Hamas en la Franja de Gaza. A pesar del gran número de partidarios de Hamas, el número de afiliados al partido ha disminuido debido a la división política. En este caso, la diferencia entre partidarios y

afiliados debe ser señalada. Los primeros puede ser políticamente independientes y apoyar las posiciones políticas de Hamas, pero no necesariamente están por ello afiliados a Hamas.

Es posible que alguno de los encuestados para este estudio en la Ribera Occidental, que estuvieran afiliados al movimiento Hamas, temieran responder a la pregunta de su afiliación política por razones de seguridad personal, lo que explicaría los resultados sobre la diferencia entre Fatah y Hamas en los motivos y formas de participación política.

Los resultados del estudio han concluido que existe una relación positiva entre el grupo de edad y la participación política en la sociedad palestina. La sociedad palestina es considerada como una comunidad joven. El porcentaje de personas menores de 15 años a finales de 2010 se estimó en un 41,1%, con una clara diferencia entre la Ribera Occidental (39,2%) y la Franja de Gaza (44,2%). Además, el porcentaje de personas mayores de 65 años en la sociedad palestina se estimó en un 2,9%, con un 3,2% en la Ribera Occidental y 2,4% en la Franja de Gaza.

La Oficina de Estadísticas Palestina apunta un ligero aumento en la edad media en los territorios palestinos. Se pasó de 16,4 años en 1997 a 18,5 años en 2010. Cuando en la Ribera Occidental, se pasó de 17,4 años en 1997 a 19,4 años en 2010. En la Franja de Gaza se elevó de 14,8 años en 1997 a 17,2 años en 2010 (Oficina Central de Estadísticas Palestina, 2010).

Las decisiones políticas interesan a todos los segmentos del pueblo palestino, independientemente de su edad, ya que afectan a su vida cotidiana. Sin embargo, la edad puede jugar un papel importante debido al aumento de la conciencia política de las personas mayores, y por lo tanto aumentar los niveles de participación política.

Parece también que los jóvenes están un poco alejados de la arena política por el hecho de que el desarrollo de la situación actual no requiere del entusiasmo de la juventud. Esto difiere en gran medida de la situación anterior, que necesitaba del levantamiento de una generación de jóvenes. Ahora los palestinos viven en condiciones confusas que oscilan entre la pausa y la continuación del proceso de negociación entre la Autoridad Palestina e Israel. En consecuencia, la reticencia de los jóvenes a la participación política efectiva puede ser debida a la falta de opciones ofrecidas por la Autoridad. Por otro lado, se les prohíbe manifestarse en

contra de la ocupación por la Autoridad Palestina y por Hamas, y por tanto el entusiasmo de la juventud casi ha desaparecido.

Los resultados de la encuesta realizada por el Foro Al-Shark Shababi en 2009, indicaron que aproximadamente el 70% de los jóvenes palestinos se define como políticamente inactivo. Los jóvenes de la Franja de Gaza se consideran políticamente más activos que sus iguales en la Ribera Occidental. Alrededor del 37% de los jóvenes de Gaza declararon que eran políticamente activos frente al 26% de los jóvenes de la Ribera Occidental (Zama'rah y Abu Kamash, 2010).

Las conclusiones de este estudio sobre el afán de los ciudadanos en la participación política, y su interés en los asuntos públicos surge de su deseo de expresar sus puntos de vista, la creencia de que su participación política es un deber nacional, su deseo de cambiar la realidad actual, tanto como el deseo de trabajar con otros para desarrollar y mejorar su sociedad.

Sin embargo, los países donantes han condicionado su apoyo a la Autoridad Palestina según las posturas que ésta adopta. Se han hecho uso de diferentes tipos de presión sobre la Autoridad Palestina, tales como la paralización de los fondos a menos que la Autoridad Nacional Palestina cambiara su posición política. Esta dependencia de los países donantes hace que la ANP esté a merced de los donantes, que no están dispuestos a tolerar ningún acto de resistencia. Por lo tanto, la ANP ha optado por varios procedimientos sobre el terreno para detener cualquier acto de resistencia. Todo esto ha tenido un impacto en la participación política efectiva de los palestinos. Además de la realidad política actual, la supresión de las libertades en la Ribera Occidental y la Franja de Gaza, la continuación de las detenciones por motivos políticos, la propagación de la corrupción y el nepotismo y la confusión política en general, han dado lugar a una frustración generalizada sobre la situación actual.

La participación política efectiva del pueblo palestino se ha visto afectada por factores tales como los castigos colectivos a los que se enfrentan como resultado de su elección democrática, la posterior fragmentación política, con la paralización del papel del Consejo Legislativo, el aplazamiento de las elecciones legislativas y presidenciales y locales, el fracaso de las negociaciones con Israel, el continuo bloqueo impuesto a Gaza y el aislamiento de ésta del resto del mundo, siendo convertida en una gran prisión, el aumento de la pobreza,

la incapacidad de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina para pagar los sueldos de los empleados, la ocupación israelí y la sus acciones arbitrarias contra el pueblo palestino.

La prevalencia de una ley de sociedad tribal que todavía se rige por las costumbres y las tradiciones con una visión muy conservadora de las mujeres, indica que la acción política se basa en intereses personales, familiares y locales. Este punto de vista tradicional es muy limitado, ya que no reconoce la condición y el papel de la mujer. En general, el interés de la cuestión de la mujer en la sociedad civil palestina sigue estando por debajo de los niveles requeridos. La organización de las mujeres palestinas, aunque establecida desde hace mucho tiempo, sigue estando fragmentada; los partidos políticos tienen poco interés en la participación política de las mujeres, excepto en su literatura y la jerga teórica. Esta situación se refleja también en la sociedad y las instituciones nacionales con el control exclusivo de los hombres.

Por el contrario, la presencia cristiana en las instituciones políticas palestinas es fuerte, especialmente después de la llegada de la Autoridad Palestina, que concedió privilegios a los cristianos, al establecer la presencia cristiana en todos los órganos políticos y de la comunidad. Los cristianos tienen presencia en todos los partidos nacionales, y la mayoría de los movimientos revolucionarios palestinos, que tienen representantes en la OLP, fueron fundados por cristianos.

Los refugiados palestinos siguen las negociaciones palestino-israelíes muy de cerca, ya que éstas afectan directamente a su futuro. Este interés en las negociaciones se debe también a la preocupación de los refugiados por los acuerdos que comprometan sus derechos. Sin embargo, las difíciles condiciones en las que viven, y la demora en la negociación hacen de la cuestión de los refugiados una de las cuestiones fundamentales en los asuntos del estado permanente, y las numerosas iniciativas de compromiso han obstaculizado su participación política.

En Gaza, el bloqueo israelí, la toma de posesión de Hamas de la Franja, las detenciones políticas, la prohibición de las manifestaciones sin el permiso del gobierno de Hamas, las restricciones a la libertad de expresión, y la salida de la mayoría de los miembros de Fatah de

la Franja de Gaza, han afectado a la participación política de todos los habitantes de esta zona.

La sociedad palestina tiende a ser religiosa, sin embargo, la religión no puede ser considerada una fuente de motivación para la participación política. Las facciones religiosas en la sociedad palestina son diversas: algunas tienen interés en la política, y otras, como los grupos sufíes no tienen ningún interés en absoluto. Por otra parte, el conflicto palestino-israelí no es un conflicto religioso, como a algunos les interesa mostrar. El conflicto con la ocupación es existencial. Los palestinos creen que esta tierra es la cuna de las tres religiones monoteístas (el islam, el cristianismo y el judaísmo), pero la ideología sionista presenta el conflicto como una lucha religiosa para justificar la ocupación y alcanzar los objetivos políticos extremistas.

En la familia tradicional palestina, al hijo mayor se le otorga una gran autoridad. Él también tiene muchas responsabilidades, y es además un modelo a seguir para sus hermanos. Por lo tanto, es natural que esté políticamente más implicado que los otros hermanos, algo que puede afectar a sus orientaciones políticas.

El movimiento Fatah sigue desempeñando un papel importante en la movilización de los ciudadanos hacia la participación política, a través de programas y actividades que otras facciones no tienen recursos para mantener. La diferencia entre Fatah y Hamas reside en el grado de participación política. Fatah tiene una visión política basada en las negociaciones y en su historia de resistencia. Por otro lado, las opciones políticas de Hamas son limitadas, y a pesar de su éxito en la gestión de la Franja de Gaza, la división interna palestina ha contribuido a la disminución de la popularidad de Hamas.

Recomendaciones:

- La necesidad de hacer estudios sobre la realidad de los partidos políticos en la sociedad palestina y su impacto en la participación política.
- La necesidad de dar importancia a la mujer por parte de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil y los partidos políticos para que involucre en el proceso político.
- La Autoridad Palestina y el gobierno de Hamas deben:
 - promover la honestidad y la transparencia,

- cambiar sus políticas internas hacia más libertades, parar de arrestar por motivos políticos y abstenerse a cumplir las órdenes procedentes del extranjero.
- La necesidad de que los partidos políticos se abstengan de acosar políticamente entre sí y dar prioridad a la reconciliación política entre Al Fatah y Hamas.
- La necesidad de traducir de este estudio al árabe y publicar sus resultados, debido a la importancia de este tema en la sociedad palestina.

1. Chapter One: Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

The issue of political participation is receiving a wide scale attention from academics and experts in the social and political fields. This is based on the importance of political participation as a mechanism to involve ordinary people in decision-making and engage them effectively in planning, designing, implementing, supervising, directing, and evaluating programs and policies. This effective engagement brings wide benefits to the society and, in turn, to the ordinary citizen.

Although political participation has been receiving great attention, studies that examined the issue of political participation in the Palestinian society are inadequate and largely accidental. This meager research output is not compatible with the fact that the Palestinian life is highly political, highly immersed in politics, and besieged by the policies of the Israeli occupation; hence, the Palestinian citizen is still waiting for a political decision that puts an end to his pains and ongoing suffering.

Studying the issue of political participation is primarily a Palestinian demand. It is also considered an important contribution in order to create a society that is built on an effective political participation of its citizens so that they can influence the Palestinian political system that was established after the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The PNA has the legitimacy to represent the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and is based on majority rule and electoral system; therefore, the legitimacy of its political system underwent a transformation from a revolutionary legitimacy-upon which the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was based-to the democratic-pluralist legitimacy. As a result, the Palestinian political life entered a new era after signing the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PNA, as the PNA and its institutions have become in direct and daily contact with the Palestinian people.

Understanding and analyzing the political participation of the Palestinian people is highly essential because it provides a good explanation and a good indication of the actual behaviour of the Palestinian citizens towards political life. In addition, it is an important factor that

allows us to better understand the influence of the Palestinian society in the political process, and their role in putting frameworks and modes of expression of their interests and demands. Moreover, better understanding and analysis of the Palestinian political participation provides a good indication about the effectiveness of the processes of mobilization and recruitment of the different sections of society, in addition to the modes of organization and frameworks that people use in order to voice their concerns, express their aspirations, defend their interests, and have leverage on the political life.

1.2 The political situation in Palestinian society

The Palestinian political situation has gone through a number of transitions, the most notable being the 1964 establishment of the PLO, after which key features of the Palestinian national identity began to emerge. Another defining event was the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), in 1993, which constituted a major turning point in the Palestinian political track. The establishment of the PNA created a reality on the ground, through which the Palestinian people could achieve an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.

To examine this reality, it is essential to identify the PLO and the PNA, both of which are key actors in the political history of Palestine.

1.2.1 The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is a semi-military and political organization, recognised by the UN and the UN General Assembly as a legislative representative of the Palestinian people, within and outside Palestine. It was established in 1964, after the first conference bringing Palestinians together with fellow Arabs at a conference, held in Jerusalem, following the Arab league resolution of the first meeting in Cairo in 1964. The PLO was intended to represent the Palestinians in the political circles and does indeed represent most Palestinian factions. The chairman of the Executive Committee is considered the President of Palestine and Palestinians in lands controlled by the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Diaspora (Passia, 2002). See figure No.(26) Map of West Bank And Gaza Strip.

The existence of the PLO has been instrumental to the struggle of the Palestinian people for national liberation, as it provided a framework for the factions and movements towards statehood. It also was the foundation of a Palestinian political system, providing spaces for organisational social and political role while aiding in the unification of the different sectors of the Palestinian people and, thus, becoming a political entity.

The PLO was conceived of as a response to the weakness of the existing Arab regimes (Nofal, 1999) and thus considered a by product of existing Arab regimes. Salah Khalf stated, "No sooner did the Fatah movement discover the manoeuvre and assess the danger this institution, which was somehow formed and supervised by Arab regimes, had on the Palestinian national movement" (Hijleh, 1996:40).

During the fifth session of the National Council in 1969, the oppositional parties assumed control of the organization and Yasser Arafat was elected president of the PLO and commander-in-chief of the Palestinian revolutionary forces. During this period, the Fatah movement dominated through obtaining the majority of seats of the national council (As'aad, 1987:189).

The PLO contributed to the organization of a Palestinian society, still under occupation, through the foundation of civil society, vis-à-vis labour, student, vocational and women's unions. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, the PLO assumed responsibility of the Palestinian society, in the absence of an opposing organization of a popular base within the new political entity. The PLO organized the internal Palestinian society as a public authority on Palestinian lands as well as a source of leadership for Diaspora Palestinians. (Jagaman, 1998:30)

It is notable that the formation of the PLO was carried out without democratic elections nor was the Executive Committee, appointed by Al-Shugeri, democratically elected (Abu-Hasna, 2007:27).

The PLO utilized the popular Arab and Palestinian support it received while building Palestinian institutions, throughout the various sectors of Palestinian society and places of association. The PLO also constituted the institutional framework for the Palestinian national movement, paving the way to the birth of the national system. Utilizing its broad social base

the organization established a legislative body; the national council, a judicial and executive authority; all in the absence of sovereignty on Palestinian lands. Moreover, diplomatic missions of the organization were opened in several countries, due to international and Arab recognition of PLO autonomy (Hilal, 1998:56).

The PLO and Yasser Arafat enjoyed great popularity among Palestinians, especially in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and both were increasingly keen to mobilize the population in the occupied territories. Setting up a program for the establishment of an independent state was an important step towards gaining popularity among the majority. The additional step of recovering of unions and frameworks inside, that were created by the faction in the 1970's and 1980's. Due primarily to these factors, the internal society development has been very unique in comparison to outside the Territories (Al-Bideeri et al, 1995; Hilal, 1998:57-59).

Following the 1982 Israel invasion of Beirut, the PLO suffered a great blow through the loss of an important administrative base. Media, diplomatic, political and military operations were all greatly set back and the strength of the PLO was diminished, outside their territories. In addition, this led to the collapse of core unions which negatively affected the PLO's communication with the largest section of the Palestinian people (Al-Bideeri et al, 1995).

1.2.2 The Palestinian National Authority (PNA)

The PNA was founded on the basis of the "Declaration of Principles", an agreement signed on 13 January 1993, by the Palestinians and Israelis and which paved the way for the creation of a transitional autonomous government.. Based on this framework, civil powers were temporarily to the PNA, pending national elections, to be held three years later

Despite the fact that the PNA is viewed as an extension of the PLO and largely considered a political and structural entity, most of the factions under PLO, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, remain opposed to it despite the PNA's best efforts to reach a settlement. As a result, deep rifts were created throughout the PLO, accompanied by a marginal base and role for the left, in addition to the absence of an opposition (Al-Sabi`a, 1996: 196).

At a later stage the "Taba Agreement" was hammered out in Egypt and signed, with much fanfare, in Washington on 28 September 1995. A key component of this agreement entailed dividing the West Bank into three 'zones'; A, B and C (Figure No. 27) and are described as follows:

- **Areas "A"**: These areas are the centres of the main cities of the West Bank, except Hebron, and constitute no more than 3% of the West Bank. This area is under the security and administrative supervision of the Palestinian Authority.
- **Areas "B"**: Administratively, these territories are subject to PNA control, while for security supervision, they are under joint Israel and Palestinian control. These areas constitute 25% of the West Bank.
- **Areas "C"**: These areas will be supervised administratively by the Israelis. In addition, the Israelis will have control over the security arrangements in these areas. These areas constitute around 70% of the West Bank. (Mohsen, 2002:266).

The PNA is made up of the legislative (the Palestinian Legislative Council), the executive power and the judicial power. Under normal conditions, during elections, voters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip elect the chairman of the PNA and members of the Palestinian National Council. In abnormal circumstances, such as in 1996, the elections of the legislative council were held in areas of self-government but were boycotted by Hamas and the other ten factions. As a result, Fatah won three quarters of the seats and Yasser Arafat was elected as president of the PNA, with a majority of 88%. The constitution of the PNA stated that the chairman and the legislative council must be elected periodically, however, elections were held only twice during the period between the establishment of the Authority until 2010; the first being in 1996 and the second being in 2006.

Despite the fact that the PNA has key features of a political system, it has no actual sovereignty over its territory; moreover, it is constrained by the terms of its agreements with Israel, in addition to the powers assumed by Israel. The 'Oslo Accords' state that the power of the PNA extends throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, subject to numerous conditions as well as restrictions on what would be kept for negotiation until the final stages: Jerusalem,

settlements, borders, Israel/Palestinian security arrangements, and what would be done with Palestinian refugees (Mohsen, 2002:266).

The transitional agreement, made between the PLO and Israel, regarding the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, formed the underlying framework that determined the form and structure of the PNA in the first years of establishment. The agreement placed restrictions and conditions that were supposed to be in place for a transitional period of five years; however, they have remained in place.

During the second legislative elections in 2006, Hamas took part and won the majority of the seats of the legislative council (around 57%), and unilaterally formed the cabinet as other Palestinian factions refused to participate. As a result of the landslide Hamas victory, an international boycott was imposed upon the new government and financial support from numerous donor organizations was suspended. Donors that continued their relationship with the government placed conditions such as ensuring Hamas commitment to all agreements previously made by the PNA and PLO, recognition of the Israeli state and acceptance of a two-state solution. Hamas officials rejected the conditions and the boycott of the Hamas dominated government continued.

Furthermore, in light of the division of power in the West Bank and Gaza, by Fatah and Hamas, respectively, Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas took a decision to form an emergency government, presided over by Salam Fayyad. The result was the formation of two governments, one in Ramallah, and the other in Gaza Strip. The next elections were due to be held in 2010, when the legal term of the PNA presidency and the four year term of the legislative council expired.

1.2.3 The Palestinian political system

To talk about a Palestinian political system has been a controversial trend, especially in the absence of Palestinian sovereignty and many academics and pundits have resorted to referring to the current entity as a 'Palestinian political system' Despite the lack of total consensus, some experts insist that the term became valid, post Oslo. This point has been very valid as it

set up the discussion as to what can be studied in the Palestinian political system, during the leadership of the PLO and post establishment of the PNA.

1.2.3.1 The Palestinian political system under the PLO

The Palestinian political system came into being with the emergence of the PLO, which has consistently sought to maintain its independence and prevent the intervention of neighbouring Arab nations into her affairs. This has been achieved through a network of relations built between the PLO and its factions, as well as between the PLO and a number of international powers throughout the world. In addition, the PLO formed paramilitary and political organizations as well as popular and mass unions and societies. These groups created a political centre which earned it legitimacy as it was in line with the consensus on the strategies and objectives expressed by the amended Palestinian National Charter in 1968 (Al-Shiqaqi, 1995).

The PLO morphed into a framework that embodied the Palestinian national identity. In 1968 the institution started with the framework of the independency of the organization, where criteria to form the Palestinian National Council (PNC) were set to include opposition groups and representatives of Diaspora refugees and popular unions. The Executive Committee of the organization was elected by members of the PNC and PLO, creating an all inclusive organization, by including paramilitary and political groups, as well as women's, students, labour, and writers unions; productive institutions, research centres and various others. With the capability of representing the entirety of the Palestinian nation, the PLO also became the chief political and negotiating power (Jagaman, 1997:13).

Despite the fact that a basic Palestinian political system had been formed the role of international opinion and the omnipresent territorial issues played a major role in influencing the created system. It was hard to talk about a Palestinian political system without touching upon the effects of these issues:

The foundation of the PLO was the result of Arab resolution, closely associated with the Arab political equilibriums, and never made manifest the internal Palestinian dynamic, in spite of

the Palestinian resistance movement was evolving and taking shape as an armed organization, but the attitudes and policies and the margin of freedom of movement, remained linked the Arab situation.

Over time the PLO shifted towards the adoption of programmes more consistent with international norms and focused widely on representative legitimacy and adapting to the diplomatic system. Opening up diplomatic relations paved the way for foreign intervention in the Palestinian Diaspora, in spite of insisting upon the independence of the Palestinian nation. This created pressures on the dominating powers of the Palestinian leadership, which adopted unprecedented policies, following the signing of Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (Bishara, 1995:128).

1.2.3.2 The political system after the creation of the PNA

After the PNA was established, the new Palestinian political system became dependent on the legitimacy of representing Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, who chose according the majority vote and electoral system. Consequently, the legal rule upon which the system rests shifted from a leadership based on revolution to a pluralistic democracy. Palestinian political life entered a new stage after the 'Oslo Accords' were concluded and the PNA was founded and its institutions were set up in response to expressed demands of voters, who also demanded new political entity that sought to eventually result in a sovereign state. Responding to and having the consensus of voters formed a firm basis for speaking about the existence of a formal Palestinian political system. This development was a result of the facts on the ground that existed even before the creation of the PNA. This fact, however, constitutes a controversial point among thinkers, regarding the nature of the system. Apparently, this dispute is not formal, but is related to the dimensions of right of self-determination. It was believed that the exclusion of the PLO from the elements of the political system would affect the right of self-determination, which would affect over 50% of the Palestinian people, who live in the Diaspora, and restricted the Palestinian political system to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Theoretically, a conclusion that a new true political system was created was misleading as, the 'new' political stage, post-Oslo, and the establishment of the PNA, never changed the existing stage of affairs in the occupied Palestinian Territories, with regards to the changes that the PNA sought after (Al-Azar, 1996).

While the PLO formed the axis of the system, before the PNA existed, the latter became the focal point of the system. The point of contention, with regards to the experiment of Palestinian government creation, has consistently rested with the argument that the process of state building was still underway and incomplete. There was a national authority and a political system but without a universally recognized and physical state; despite the presence of basic components of a state. While the PLO fought continuously for building of the state, parts of the PLO remained the main power while other parts broke off to become the opposition, before the project was complete and culminated in independence. This reflected on the spectrum and shifting attitudes of the political system and caused a number of structural abnormalities (Hilal, 1998:3).

1.2.3.3 Political parties in Palestine

Palestinian society is characterised by its political organizations and its multiple parties, which had initially been under the umbrella of the PLO. Later, other Islamic-oriented parties emerged, outside the framework of the PLO, whose strength and grassroots support enabled them to challenge the Fatah dominated PLO dominated by Fatah Movement.

Political organizations in Palestine played a strong role in the national struggle and in the mobilisation and organisation of the Palestinian people, despite the fact that most of these organizations were part of the PLO. In spite of this common affiliation, each organization had a unique vision and agenda. This wide range of philosophies led to a high rate of scepticism, intolerance, and fanaticism (Al-Zubaydi, 2003:33).

One of the most important tasks of a party has always been to express the needs and desires of the population. Legitimacy of any party required they enabled the group and individual to express opinions and defend their interests in a systematic way (Al-Khazragi, 2004:214).

When voters' interests are in staging a struggle for independence, parties have to be able to guarantee the right of self-determination through achievement of national independence and sovereignty.

In reality, Palestinian parties typically did not stick to agreed philosophies of the parties and pursued agendas contrary to their platforms while abusing their trusteeships and engaging in cronyism. Party officials also ignored the plight of the Palestinian people, living under occupation. The bulk of the parties' attention was focused on spouting national questions and slogans, clearly not working for their people's interests. The political aftermath of Oslo served to intensify the differences and disputes, intensifying them within and without the PLO. There are many kinds of opposition, mainly, the Palestinian one from within the PLO, which included the Palestinian groups under this organization, but opposed to the peaceful agreements that represent both the Democratic Popular Front. Opposition to the PLO consists of two main streams; an Islamic one, represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, whilst the other stream is represented by political groups such as the Popular Front and the Arab Liberation Front (Qasem,1998:241).

Also deepening the differences amongst Palestinian parties has been the continuous failure of peace agreements and the policies of the Fatah dominated PLO, whilst Fatah exercises powers which extend beyond national agreements and popular policy, pushing references to the PLO to the back burner.

The creation of the PNA was intended to marginalize the decision making power of the PLO, creating a situation that governed the relationship and the roles among the Palestinian parties, which evolved from a state of liberality to a state of structure and development; and from a state of pluralism and participation in policies and decision, whatever the form of government is, to state controlled by a single central authority dominated by a single organization. In addition, there was a move to set up civil, security and administrative systems for the purpose of controlling and strengthening that party's influence and power over the society (Hilal, 1998:80-81).

The emerging political system in Palestine saw, on one hand, a national stream represented by Fatah; and an Islamic stream represented by the Islamic resistance movement or Hamas

(Moheisen, 2007:19). Hamas is the strongest of the external oppositional parties but it chose to abstain from the January 1996 elections and also from participation in the new political and authoritarian mechanisms, which required a different approach and kind of discourse (Al-Jirbawi, 1999:45). This led to a complete paralysis of these parties and made it difficult to become a meaningful or effective opposition (Jagaman 1998:30).

Although the PNA superficially adopted political pluralism, this was not reflected in mass participation in decision-making, which was restricted to the dominant political party, which has led to its inability to play an effective role in national politics. As a result, the PNA suffered from a decrease of membership and support, unlike the Islamic movements, which benefited from the nature of their structures and policies (Jibreel & Rahall, 2003:85).

Hamas, in particular, has expanded since the first intifada and with its ideology, which calls for an expedited Islamic society; it is in contrast to the ideology of those controlling the PNA, as well as the leftist organizations, which also witnessed a remarkable decline in their power base (Hilal, 1998:97-102).

Clearly, the experience of the creation of the PLO, which gave rise to the primary political movements, factions and organizations and the subsequent the birth of the PNA, with all of the political realities that this project created, new facts on the ground were produced. Because of the importance of these two chapters in Palestinian politics, it is important to examine the major political players more deeply to understand the structure and attitudes of the Palestinian political system.

1.2.3.3.1 The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah)

Fateh Acronym for "Harakat At-Tahrir Al-Filistiniya" (Palestinian Liberation Movement), Formally founded in Kuwait in 1959 by Yasser Arafat and associates (incl. Salah Khalaf, Khalil Al-Wazir, Mohd. Yussef An-Najjar, Kamal Adwan), it grew out of a clandestine organization formed by Palestinian students in 1957; advocated armed struggle to liberate all of Palestine by Palestinians, while remaining independent of all Arab govts. Headed by Arafat ever since and is the largest and strongest PLO faction. Initially a network of

underground cells, it reorganized with a central committee in 1963 and took control of the PLO as the largest single bloc at the 5th PNC in Cairo in 1969.

Fateh adopted the principle of political pluralism within the PLO. Until the 1970s, it followed a guerrilla strategy (with its military wing Al-Assifa and squads operating underground in the OPT known as Fateh Hawks and Black Panthers). Formulated a new policy at the 1972 congress putting guerrilla warfare as only one of various means of struggle. Fateh advocates a democratic, secular, multi-religious state. Played a central role in the Intifada. (Passia, 2002). Many founders of Fatah, such as Yassir Arafat, Abu Jihad, and Abu Iyad, were first initially part of Arab associations which resisted the Occupation and the facts it set on the ground. Some Fatah founders were also former members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Sayegh, 1993:78).

Surrounding Arab regimes tried to control the Palestinian liberation movement, prompting Palestinian revolutionary leadership to counteract their impositions. In the words of Abu Iyad, "The founders of Fatah swore allegiance to resist or repel any attempt to submit the Palestinian national movement to the supervision of an Arab regime, whatever the government is. It is also essential to stay alert and prevent any country trying to restore the movement to its pen. It was in our assessment that by only this principle, we will be able to ensure the sustainability of our scheme (Hijleh, 1996:31).

In August of 1982, after the Israel invasion of Lebanon, the Fatah leadership and forces headed for Arab countries, namely Tunisia, which embraced the leadership and its forces. Other Fatah members headed for Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Yemen.

The features of change started to emerge by the end of the 1980's. The PLO declared the creation of the state of Palestine and the recognition of Israel, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242, during a 1991 session of the Palestinian National Council, held in Algeria.

Fatah, participated in a 1991 conference held in Madrid, which led to secret talks between the PLO leadership, headed by Yassir Arafat, Mahmud Abbas, and Ahmed Qurei`a, and Israel. The result of these secret negotiations was the 'Oslo Accords.

The most important outcome of the 'Oslo Accords' was the arrival of the Fatah leadership and forces to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in 1994. Following their arrival Fatah became

increasingly exposed to accusations that the initial united Palestinian front had now been replaced by cronyism and based on the vote of one person, Yasser Arafat. (Salim, 2010).

1.2.3.3.2 The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)

Hamas is an ideological party with its roots in Islamic thought, which aligns it with the Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928 Egypt. Calling for the liberation of Palestine ‘from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean,’ which Hamas views as the historic and national homeland of the Palestinian people, with Jerusalem as its capital.

The foundation of Hamas was proclaimed by Ahmed Yassin following the accident of the Zionist truck in December 1987, when Israeli soldiers attacked Palestinian workers in Gaza, totalling nine people, which initiated the Palestinian uprising of Intifada,) which broke out in 1987 and lasted until 1994. Hamas was established in 1987 but existed, in some form, and was known as ‘Al Murabitoon Ala Ard Al Isra issued its Charter in August 1988 however, until this point, different instances of Islamic movements were seen in Palestine, dating back to 1948. Hamas does not recognize the right of the Jews to declare a state in Palestine although it has shown willingness to temporarily accept the 1967 borders.

It considers its conflict with Israeli Occupation to be a ‘struggle for existence rather than a struggle for boundaries.’ It views Israel as a Zionist ‘Western colonial’ project, aimed at dividing the Arab and Islamic world and forcing the Palestinians out of their lands. It also does not advocate peace negotiations with Israel as a way to liberate the Palestinian lands, believing them to be a waste of time while the rights of the Palestinians are frittered away. Hamas stresses that the compromises made in 1991 Madrid were based on false grounds. In addition, it considers the 1993 ‘Declaration of Principles’ a sell out of the PLO Charter as the cancellation of clauses calling for destruction of Israel a concession of the rights of Arabs and Muslims, regarding historical Palestinian lands (Palestinian Media Center, 2003).

In a 1991 Al Khartom, Oman meeting involving Hamas and Fatah, Hamas rejected the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It justified its stance by saying that if it agrees to recognize the PLO, then, it accepts the

concessions made to Israel, while stressing that the PLO does not represent all the Palestinian people (Heydari, 1993:127).

In 2005, Hamas decided it would participate in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, though it didn't take part in the previous elections, which were held in 1996. On Jan 26, 2006, the elections resulted in a sweeping victory for Hamas, which took 76 out of 132 seats, underlining that Hamas had a huge popularity in Palestine (Palestinian Media Center 2003).

1.3 The Palestinian Economy

1.3.1 The Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Occupation

On 6 June 1967, after the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell under military occupation. The Israeli offensive on Egypt, Syria and Jordan indirectly resulted in the West Bank being economically and politically unified with Jordan, while the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian political administration, becoming a relatively independent economic and legal zone. In 1967, the two areas were reunited under military control, via the Occupation, where military rule and a monetary and customs union with the Israeli economy were imposed. Israel also immediately formed an economic composition of the central bank of Israel and a committee of central statistics, making sure the means of setting up the Palestinian market as a consumer of Israeli goods, a source of labour and an economic bridge to the greater Middle East. In other sectors, such as educational systems, the two areas were not unified until the 1994 creation of the PNA. There are two military and civil administrations that issued different rules and orders (due to the Palestinian Territories being under different administrations) about one case based on the lawful framework that prevailed before the Occupation (Abdullah, 2004).

Israel has sought to change the normal economic relations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the outside world in general and the Arab countries, in particular. The share of commercial exchange with Israel constituted more than 85% of the total of Palestinian foreign trade, sometimes reaching 90%, consequently, Israel has kept tight control on the Palestinian economy (Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2010:3).

The Occupation not only totally subjected the Palestinian economy to Israeli trading policy, but also, the customs union that was arbitrarily applied lead to subjugation of the Palestinian economy while disconnecting it and traditional trading ties with neighbouring Arab countries. The Palestinian market quickly adapted to the new Israeli system and needs, its primary source of market movement. Not only have traditional trade destinations been interrupted while the market structure, including production and labour, was adapted to the Israel needs. Cheap Palestinian labour was a key feature of the Israel system (Abdullah, 2004).

1.3.2 Economies of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Post Creation of the PNA

The Palestinian economy saw significant development since 1993, when the ‘Oslo Accords’ was signed between the PLO and Israel, signifying an end to occupation of lands taken or confiscated in 1967. Despite the time limit set for the evacuation of the Occupation, it still exists and continues to change the geographical features of Palestine, namely around Jerusalem, by means of confiscation, demolition, sabotage, opening or construction of bypass roads, setting up the ‘apartheid wall’ (Figure No. 28) and constructing settlements, under several guises, in addition to the daily routine of arrests of citizens for arbitrary reasons. All this exposed the Palestinian cause, in general, and the economy in particular, to many dangers and difficulties. These obstacles result from the increasing right restriction imposed on freedom of movement and transit among the areas of the PNA and with the outside world. Besides, the policy of closure and the complete isolation imposed on the second half of the Palestinians in Gaza Strip, led to the growing limitations on entering of essential goods and services. Above all, the war Israel launched on Gaza Strip in 2008, left behind destruction of the infrastructure of a lot of agricultural, industrial and commercial capital, leading to deterioration of the social and economic situation in the Gaza Strip (Jaradat, 2010).

The Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip suffers from the policy and procedures of the Israel occupation, clearly aimed at subjugating the Palestinian economy to the Israel economy to serve the Zionist scheme. Israel still controls crossings, the import-export process, and overall operation of the economy of Palestine. That constituted major obstacles in the way of the development of the Palestinian economy (The Strategic Report, 2008:307).

The Palestinian economy is a services economy, in which the basic sectors were undermined. No longer found is a substantial role for industry, agriculture, and tourism. Moreover, the Palestinian economy is mainly based on international aid and donations. It suffers from a high unemployment rates, and growing poverty, aggravated by the geographic isolation which weakens patterns of normal economic development (Mikdad, 2008).

The situation of the Palestinian economy is summarized thusly:

1. Economic dependency on Israel: Through policies aimed at stifling Palestinian foreign trade, agriculture and industry, Israel has not only prevented the Palestinian market from competing with Israel products but from even producing their own products, making Palestine a consumer market for Israeli goods. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement, which set plans for economic relationships, between Israel and the PNA ensured this dependency to Israel.
2. Infrastructural Weakness: Israel has neglected creating an infrastructure in the Occupied Territories while imposing high taxes on any potential Palestinian industries. Diaspora returnees have not been encouraged or given resources towards the development of the infrastructure of Palestinian Territories. In addition, the systematic destruction of what infrastructure exists, and the inability of the PNA to set up and implement a plan to repair the infrastructure despite large amounts of money assigned for this purpose, has also ensure there was no infrastructure to speak of.
3. High Unemployment and Inflation: Israel policies of closure and blockade, in addition to control on crossing points and boundaries, have kept job creation minimum and prices of goods high, due to high transport costs.
4. Corruption and Cronyism: Financial and administrative corruption, increased after the creation of the PNA, where monopolies were imposed while many investors were extorted into participation in strategic investments, by particular executives. Corruption also came in the form of financial and administrative dishonesty and policies of strategic promotion and employment, while wasting the public money, made easy by the result of lack of transparency and accountability.

5. Budget Deficit of the Public Sector: The balance of the PNA has witnessed an annual deficit, due to uncontrolled government spending, especially the high increase in the salaries of the public sector reaching some 70%-90%.
6. Unsuitability of Legal and Investment Environment: Because of the large deformities resulting from the Israeli practices, deteriorating security situations, and corruption hampering natural development of the investment sector, there was no adoption of any policy supporting local producers, in addition to the absence of protectionist policies. These factors contributed to the inability to attract foreign investments.
7. Geographic and Movement Issues: The absence of the freedom of movement and transport, due to the geographical isolation resultant of roadblocks, inspection points, isolation of villages and cities from each other, settlement construction, treacherous roads, and the apartheid wall have ensured a complete lack of mobility and transport.
8. Limitations on the Gazan Economy: Palestinian inability to control borders and crossing points, despite the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, at the same time, the Palestinian were prevented from operating seaports and the repairing and operating their airport, which hampered trade and transport of people and capital.
9. Natural Resources: Limited natural resources and inefficiency in its use in, addition to Israel's continued depletion of the resources available deprived the Palestinians of the ability to exploit natural resources.
10. Dependence on the Foreign Finance and Increasing Debt: The Palestinian relied on foreign finance and debt to finance their own government spending. The PNA did not have clear plan for the allocation of foreign finance and aid.
11. The Blockage on Palestinians: Finally, is the continuous economic blockade on the Palestinian areas, especially on Gaza Strip, which has prevented the import of varied raw materials, building materials and the essential needs like food, medicine, and clothes. The blockade has also prevented Palestinians from reaching out to neighbouring Arab and Islamic partners, aggravating the economic hardships and preventing them from living even the minimum standards of quality of life (Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2010:4).

1.4 Political culture in the Palestinian society

It is important to analyze and understanding the political culture of Palestine, being that it representing differing attitudes, tendencies, values, and beliefs. The presence of this range is vital to understand as `are an important indicator of the actual behaviour of the citizens towards political life. Moreover, the political culture constitutes a significant factor to realize the influence of individuals of the society on the political process and their role in civil society and expression of interests and political demands. Political culture also is an indicator of the extent of the efficiency of mobilisation of civil society and ways of organizing and framing their action, so that they may ensure their voices are heard and they are able to express their aspirations, defend interests, practise pressures and influence political life (Al-Zubaydi, 2003:9-10).

1.4.1 Features of the Palestinian culture

The Palestinians are considered a part of the Arab community, which heavily depends on the family and the clan. The Palestinian society is based on its social and religious structure. It focuses on the individual as part of a group, a tendency which solidifies and emphasizes the concept of individual leadership and decision making for the whole group, blocking out and delegitimizing the opinions of others. There are positives to this kind of structure such as social solidarity, support, loyalty, cooperation, modesty, and self-esteem (Al-Azar, 1996:45).

The Palestinian culture is regarded as a part the general Arab culture, both of which share a number of qualities and features. However, there are some slight differences in some aspects, due to the circumstances the Palestinians have experienced. The Palestinian political culture includes non-democratic traditional values: strong parental authority, group cohesiveness and strong belief in obligatory duties (Miari, 2003:28).

The Palestinian society could be classified as semi-conservative, as it balances between the necessity to change and willingness to find a way out of the status quo on the one hand, and a desire to maintain the existing pattern associated with the prevailing values on the other hand (Saed & Hamamy, 1997:115).

1.4.2 Political popular culture in the Palestinian society

The Palestinian political culture was influenced by differing and conflicting factors, due to the Occupation and Diaspora. The culture also was influenced by not having an economic or social system, which should have been stable and unified, regulating all interactions and the political, social, economic, and cultural processes and in presence of the absence of a normal political culture of a special Palestinian specific system (Jibreel & Rahall, 2003).

The Palestinian society was characterised by pluralism, exemplified by the range of different trends within the PLO. However, this pluralism was restricted by national consensus on Palestinian demands (Kassis, 1999:29).

Another notable feature of the Palestinian culture is the greater tendency towards democracy, in comparison to other Arab countries. This is evident from the fact that the Palestinians give more significance to democracy than Arab peoples (Miari, 2003:28).

Although there a great tendency towards democracy in the Palestinian political cultural, when compared to that of the other Arab countries, the Palestinian culture admittedly does contain values not conducive to democracy, however, the Palestinians believe strongly that they are more democratic than other Arab nations. Regardless of the validity of this claim, the belief in these ideas and the deep-rooted idea that the Palestinian political culture is tends towards democracy is a great impetus towards continual of democratic change (Bishara, 1993:45).

There are those who consider that the Palestinian political culture, with its ability to mobilize the masses, has several disadvantages:

The fostering of loyalty to the organization at the expense of allegiance to homeland, at the same time denial and marginalization of the other, competition for privileges and special favours; these characteristics neither serve the democratic change nor help pluralism foment and certainly do not promote freedom of expression and differences of opinion and political views (Al-Masri, 2004:115).

This diversity and difference in conditions influencing Palestinian political culture have lead to negative effects on political life and on climates of coexistence among the various political

parties. In addition, there are concepts, perceptions, and general national values that devote preservation of the national identity, political and historical rights, while grappling with the conflict and foreign aggression while locked in a continuous battle over how to achieve their rights and goals. Some view these aspects, such as political pluralism, consensus, and popular participation in elections as manifestations of the existence of values that support elections and guarantee equality and respect of citizen's rights. Simple affinity towards democracy, however, is not sufficient for establishing democracy, where there may exist weakness in party operations and civil society, and irreconcilable division between attitudes and perceptions (Hilal, 1998:205-207).

Some pundits think that Palestinian political culture was influenced by the afore mentioned factors, which resulted in inimitable qualities and traits, as a result of the unique historical Palestinian experience, which left deep effects on the actors and systems of political, social, and economic life. Such experts also think these factors contributed to formalizing the values of the Palestinian political culture, determined by Al-Zubaydi as follows:

a) The experience of the Israeli occupation and Palestinian Diaspora:

The years of occupation and its oppressive practices had profound effects on the psyches of the Palestinians. Their suffering also created a profound feeling of weakness, injury, and frustration, which reflect on their beliefs and expectations, thus casting a shadow over their political ambitions, which were markedly low, and subsequently affect their willingness to participate. The violent confrontation with the Occupation led to the emergence of a 'culture of rejection and disobedience,' reflected in daily life where there is a tendency to defy rules and exhibit enmity for general policies. The experiences of Occupation and Diaspora have also influenced the culture of political elites, amongst themselves and with their public. The Diaspora did not produce unified elites rather cronies whose behaviour was marked by doubt and scepticism, intolerance, fears of diversity and pluralism, and personalization of public affairs. Also found amongst political elites is doubt, uncertainty, tendency towards exclusion of 'the other,' unwillingness to accept compromise, are features of the disjointed elite (Al-Zubaydi, 2003:25-28).

b) The political and cultural heritage of the PLO, as well as the structure and pattern of decision-making in the PLO, is not different from other Arab countries, in terms of both exhibiting monopoly of power, a 'one man show' in terms of leadership, weakness of institutional conventions, adherence to cronyism, absence of accountability, lack of discipline and planning, and unconditional loyalty to the faction and its leadership. Though the structure of the PLO developed towards possessing the features of a state and constituted a bureaucratic system, its weaknesses opened the door for the spread of financial, political and administrative afflictions like deficit, corruption, unaccountability, and bureaucratic impotence, which spilled over to the public. The presence of so many negative characteristics, in turn, produced negative values, from the point of view of democracy while particularly dominant traditions and values forced their way into government and imposed themselves, where unpreparedness, misuse of symbolism, and personalization allowed them to do so (Al-Zubaydi, 2003:30-34; Jibreel & Rahall, 2003).

c) Appearance and formation of political Islamic speech

The Palestinian political culture was affected by political Islam, a force that is rapidly gaining speed, clearly evidence by the advancement of its expressions, institutions, and political frameworks. Political Islam also has ideologies, perceptions, concepts, and attitudes about different aspects of life. It was able to attract a great number of people who adopt its political views and attitudes. Moreover, it worked to mobilize and socialize a broad section of people who espouse the slogan "Islam is the solution", in an obvious intention to build an Islamic society that has have power and strength. One of political Islam's effects has been the popular usage of certain terms and concepts, such as truce (Al-Hudna), holy war (Al-Jihad), allegiance (Al-Bayed), and the Islamic nation (Al-Umma) (Al-Zubaydi, 2003:36-44).

A number of factors have contributed to the influence of the Islamic political address on the values of the political culture of the Palestinian society; one of the most prominent factors is the success of the Lebanese resistance led by Hezbollah, which forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon.

1.4.3 The Palestinian political ideology

The political situation that the Palestinians have experienced, through a consistent occupation, which has displaced and deprived the Palestinian people from normal life and development while destroying the economic and social structure, has left an effect on the Palestinian political ideology. So has the deprivation of the Palestinians right of self-determination, the creation of a Palestinian state, as well as the enjoyment of the control and sovereignty over their territories and their development. This situation, have had a sharp political thinking.

Moreover, the political and ideological variance and differences amongst the Palestinian political parties, with the absence of consensus in most cases, have led to the mobilization and association of an intolerant group who do not accept alternative views and do not respect differences and coexistence. There are parties who think their vision represents absolute fact. Others still, are convinced they solely possess the right to represent the national interests and have the capability to defend the nation. Such convictions do not promote cooperation, integration; nor do they allow for a democratic climate, which inherently means the acceptance of popular participation and peaceful transferral of power. Contrarily, these attitudes provide fertile ground for instability and internal conflict, which in turn allows mounting foreign intervention.

1.5 The social structure of the Palestinian people

The Palestinian social situation is unique in the cultural, social economic and political givers, from that of the non-Palestinian Arab. This is evident in daily life, through patterns of interaction and social relations: What most distinguished social relations in Palestinian society is that are they unstable and transitional; new forms of social interaction reflect previous forms (Hils, 2008; Al-Sorani, 2004). Table (73) shows the characteristics of the population in the Palestinian society

1.5.1 Demographic characteristics of the Palestinian society

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has estimated that the population of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has reached about 3.9 million persons; 2 million male, 1.9 million female. The population of the West Bank alone was estimated to be about 2.4 million; of them 1.2 million male and 1.2 million female. The population of the Gaza Strip was estimated to be 1.5 million for the same year. Of them 755,000 were male and 732,000 female.

The Hebron Governorate is the biggest governorate in the West Bank, in terms of population. It was estimated to be about (581,000 people) 2009 whereas the Jordan Valley region and Jericho contain the lowest populations, numbering 44,000.

The Governorate of Gaza is regarded as the largest district of Gaza Strip, in terms of population, which stands at 519,000. The Governorate of Rafah contains the smallest population of all Gaza Strip districts, 182,000 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2009).

The statistical data has shown that the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip is, on average, younger than that of West Bank. In 2004, the percentage of people in the (0-14 year) age group was estimated to be 41.9% of the total number of people in the Palestinian Territories while it was 40% of the population in the West Bank and 44.9% of the Gaza Strip population.

A 2007 Central Bureau of Palestinian Statistics report on the average poverty level for a Palestinian family of six people, estimated the amount was \$580 whereas the abject poverty

line for the same family was about \$482. The rate of poverty among Palestinian families during 2007, according to true consumption patterns, had reached 34.5% of 23.6% in the West Bank and 55.7% in the Gaza Strip, whereas 57.3% of Palestinian families has a monthly income below the poverty line of 27.2% in the West Bank and 76.9% in the Gaza Strip.

It has been pointed out that about 23.8% of families in the Palestinian Territories suffer from abject poverty according to consumption patterns of 13.9% in West Bank and 43% in Gaza Strip. Regarding income, reports show that about 48% of families have a monthly income below the abject poverty line of 37.3% in the West Bank and 69% in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Table (1) shows the characteristics of the population in the Palestinian society.

1.5.2 Internally displaced Palestinians

The percentage of refugees in the Palestinian Territories constitutes 44% of the total population while it constitutes 28.9% of the total population of Gaza Strip (Jum'a, 2009; UNRWA, 2010).

Refugees registered in camps in the West Bank were 13.2% of the total of those refugees in camps, which registered. The number of refugees in the West Bank is estimated to be 771,000. About a quarter of them are distributed among 19 camps, whereas the rest lives in cities and villages of West Bank. Some camps are situated near major cities while others were built in rural areas. The number of refugees registered in the Gaza Strip is estimated at 1,098,000, which is about 75% of the total population of roughly 1.5 million. Roughly, a million refugees live in Gazans refugee camps, which number 8 (UNRWA, 2010).

Refugees are poorest of the Palestinian population. Although families whose family heads are refugees are 40.6% of the Palestinian population, their percentage is 47.5% of total number living in poverty. Furthermore, the refugee camps in the Palestinian Territories are the poorest compared to the rural and urban populations, equally. 47.7% of the families of the refugee camps are suffering from poverty compared to 30.3% in urban areas and 33.1% in the rural areas.

Unemployment amongst refugees has increased noticeably among the refugees, much more so than in comparison with non-refugees (Jum'a, 2009; UNRWA, 2010). (Figure No. 29) Palestinian refugees sites. (Figure No. 30) The path of Displacement of Palestinian refugees.

1.5.3 Education and literacy statistics

The indicates that the number of years of study in West Bank has reached 10.4 for males and 10.3 for females while the number of study years in Gaza Strip has reached 10.4 for males and 9.7 for females. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).

The 2008 data on university graduates who earned their four year degrees was 8.8%, however, the percentage of students who had been fully or partially schooled reached 12.5%. These finding have shown that there was a gap between males and females in scientific achievements. The percentage of males who had not finished the first stage of university education and higher were 9.9%. For females, however, the rate was only 7.6%. As for those who had not finished any formal education, the percentage of males was 9.4% compared to 15.7% for females.

The data from 2008 showed that the percentage of illiteracy among people aged 15 or more in the Palestinian areas was 5.9%. The proportions vary greatly between males and females; 2.9% for males while among females it reached 9.1%. (Palestinian Media Center, 2009)

Refugees that were residing in the Palestinian Territories, as a whole, received more education than their Palestinian non-refugee counterparts. The percentage of the refugees who were 15 years of age or more, earned four year degrees was 9% while the rate for non-refugees was 8.6%.

The percentage of illiteracy, in 2008, among Palestinian refugees in the Territories, who were 15 years or more, was 5.4% in 2008, whereas the rate was 6.5% among non-refugees. Moreover, the percentage of the Palestinian refugees aged 15 or more had earned their four year degree and higher, was 90% of the total number of the refugees aged 15 or more while the rate was 8.6% among non-refugees. In addition, the percentage of refugees who were elderly was lower than their countrymen; 3% among the refugees while the rate was 3.4% among non-refugees (Jum'a, 2009; UNRWA, 2010).

The Occupation had a major, negative effect on education in Palestine. Since 1948, Israel was able to hamper education beginning with unhelpful curriculum policy and aggression by the military and state, which closed schools, prevented new schools from being built, intimidating students and faculty, in addition to arresting and, in many cases, killing them. The Occupation, through blockades and incursions not only hampered the actual process of but also harmed the students and faculty psychologically, to the point of traumatisation. Students and faculty were routinely harassed, arrested, or injured as they passed through or between villages and cities, which were peppered by Israeli military checkpoints. Psychological problems and trauma were common complaints among students and faculty, which not only affected their daily studies but their long term success in the educational process and in scientific achievements (Dawwas, et al 2009:121).

1.5.4 Workforce and income

Palestinian employment, during the first quarter of 2012 was 40.7%, of which 14.1% were females. The total number of employed in the Palestinian Territories was 744,000 thousand, in the same quarter. As for the distribution of labourers according to the sector, in West Bank and Gaza Strip, the percentage working in the agricultural sector in West Bank was 13.3%. The percentage employed in mining, stone cutting, and manufacturing was 15.3%. Employees in the construction sector were 11.4%. Gazans employed in agriculture was 9.9% in the first quarter of 2010 while 18.2% were employed in the hospitality industry. The services sector employed the most workers in the Palestinian Territories, 41.5% of 34.3% in West Bank and 58.2% in the Gaza Strip.

The percentage of Palestinian employed Israel and West Bank settlements was 15.3% in the first quarter of 2010. From these, 39.9% were working with permits and 20.9% were working without permits. As for workers holding Jerusalem ID (Israel ID), cards were 39.2% they don't need work permits (the percentage of those who are working in Israel and settlements reached 13.4% in the fourth quarter in 2009) whereas no Gazans were able to get to or work in Israel or settlements. The public sector occupies 23.2% in Palestine at 42.8% in Gaza Strip and 15.9% in West Bank.

Net daily wages in West Bank were 85.7 NIS while the average daily wage in Gaza Strip was 56.9 NIS. The average daily wage for Palestinians employed in Israel and the settlements were 160.8 NIS.

The average of hours per week for the Palestinian was 41.3 hours per week while in Gaza the average week was 39.1 hour a weeks and in the West Bank 42.8 hours. On the other hand, the average working hours in Israel and settlements were 39.6 hours a week.

Unemployment in Palestine was 28% in the first quarter of 2010. Amongst individual cities, Tulkarem reported the highest rate of unemployment at 24.9%, while conversely, Jericho and the Jordan Valley region recorded the lowest unemployment rate 7%. In the Gaza Strip, the Khan Younis district claimed the highest rate of unemployment at 41%. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

1.5.5 Camps, rural and urban populations

Population centres, in the Palestinian Territories, with some form of authority numbered 495. These authorities were distributed according to the type of power in the West Bank and are categorized thusly: 92 local and municipal councils, 360 village councils, 19 heads of camps while 191 more centres do not have a local authority. In the Gaza Strip, there are 16 municipal councils, 8 village councils, 8 heads of camps (Al-Sorani, 2005).

The Palestinian Territories are divided, administratively, into 16 governorates, 11 of them in the West Bank. These include Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarem, Nablus, Qulqilia, Selfit, Ramallah, and Hebron. In Gaza, there were 5 governorates: Directorates of North Gaza, Deer Al-Balah, Khan Younis, Rafah. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009; Qazzaz, 2007:94)

The directorates include a number of population centres such as the camps and urban and rural population centres. Residents of urban and rural areas were 45%, with the rural areas claiming 30.1% of the population. Camp residents constituted 15.9% of the total population (Abed & Wishahy, 1999:356).

The proportion of the refugees to total population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 43.3%. The proportion of the refugees to the total number of people of Gaza Strip is 69% (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).

1.5.6 The Palestinian clan or tribal system

The most outstanding feature of the Palestinian culture was its Islamic and Arabic make-up, providing the most essential elements, which contributed to the formulation of the culture. That is not to say that the culture was founded only upon pan-Arabic practice and Islamic dogma. Other factors helped to produce the culture and its traditions, including other religious teachings and the nationalistic sentiments of the Palestinian people.

Tribalism, however, was an ancient Arab phenomenon and was in tune with the natural law that organized social life among humans in general. This feature spread in the Palestinian people on a large scale. Features of tribalism were most evident in cities and rural areas, which sometimes bore the title of a particular clan or family.

There were also the societies or associations that reflect places or sentiments of significance to refugees, such as the Lud (formerly a town in historic Palestine) Association, Meeting Hall (Diwan) of the people of Kufur Saba, or the people of Miska (a former Arab village). Because of the Occupation and the demographic upheavals, it could be said that the Palestinians who have been removed from their native environment tend to associate themselves with their villages or cities, in lieu of the traditional clan. Not having a right of return helped to solidify the cancelation of Palestinian identification with clans and native lands so instead displaced Palestinians clung to the idea of a native country, rather than particular parts of it (Jabr, 2009).

The Palestinian society was described as semi-traditional, associated with survival of the dominating role of the family, even in industry, farming and trade as in most the social relations prevailing in cities, villages and camps (Al-Sorani, 2006). The Palestinian society in West Bank and Gaza Strip is characterised by types of family structures. These are tribes, clans, and elite families.

Tribes:

Authentic tribes occupy the least important class on the social and political ladder, amongst the three times of family structures. There is still little Palestinian society who leads a semi-Bedouin life. 15% of the Palestinians descended from tribal origins while 25% of Gazans do while a smaller number of West Bank Palestinians do, being that a great majority of the West Bankers inhabitants are of rural origins. These estimation are likely exaggerated.

Clans:

The structure of a clan in Palestine is marked by being more influential than Bedouin origin tribes. The role of the clan became more important since the disintegration of the institutions of the PNA during the second, or Al-Aqsa Intifada, which broke out in 2000. The clan is composed of many extended families, shared a single ancestor, and are related through the fathers, who associate with their brothers and bequeath their authority to their sons.

Elite Families:

The third group of the family structure in Palestine are elite families from the urban areas. It is a social structure utilized all over the Arab territories, formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire. These families are well known and are considered high in the social stratum. Some well known family names are Al-Ayan, Al-Husein, Al-Nashashibi, Al-Dajani, Abdul-Hadi, Toqan, Al-Nabulsi, Al-Khuri, Al-Tamimi, Al-Khatib, Al-Ja'bari, Al-Masri, Kan'an, Al-Shak'a, Al-Barghuthi, and Al-Rees. These extended families dominated the Palestinian political arena until the 1980's and still occupy prominent positions.

In matters concerning Egypt and Jordan, officials or representatives used members of these families as brokers between them and the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The kingdom of Jordan supported the elite families as they did not affect the participation in national policies, while the Egyptians relied on the Al-Shawwa and Al-Rees families in the Gaza Strip to run the district. In this context, mayors and municipal council directors in West Bank and Gaza in the 1950's and 1960's always descended from these aristocratic families (Robinson, 2008:5).

The historical function of clans:

Firstly, is to be the source of security for the family and the individual. Strangers will think twice before abusing an individual of the tribe, especially if it is a strong family, taking into consideration that the clan will take revenge. It should be pointed out that when the state is powerful, and can be relied on to protect citizens, the role of the clans weakens. This has become a main reason for the prosperity of the Palestinian families whether under the Israel Occupation, or under the circumstances of disconnection with the PNA.

Secondly, many clans or families have formed non-governmental institutions or organizations or other institutional tools to run and invest the funds of the family members in a joint way. This type of administration adopted by the clan and the distribution of wealth was necessary, especially in Gaza where there are few job opportunities savings are not available, and sometimes the family members who live Diaspora contribute large amounts of money to these 'family banks.'

Thirdly, in addition to the two rationales, security and economy, there is an important social aspect as families or clans provide an important resource for those who look for their partners in a society where half of marriages are between cousins. This increases the role of the family in all the social occasions.

Another note is that the families (clans) and their elderly members have a great deal of influence in their communities but this does not reach a national level, implying that it is not possible for a family, due to its members and reputation, to control national Palestinian policies on a large scale. It is possible for a family, however, to gain political significance.

The first way that families or clans may gain political influence is by forming an institution together with its members. Hamas discovered this fact after it confronted certain families in Gaza. Hamas is stronger than any single family, however, after most families felt that they have been endangered by Hamas policy, they started to organize themselves and take action. (Robinson, 2008). Such examples are an indication of the reverse relationship between the influence of the clan and their influence on powers, parties, and social institutions. Whenever the parties and powers have strong massive influence, they will be able to break through the family and its command, and convince that family to work for the interest of the vision of the

political faction. But when the position of these parties is weak and disjointed, they will automatically go into negotiations with the clan and submit to the clan's vision and interests (Nazzal, 2005).

A second way is if the clans are used as a tool in shoring up support for representation in the constituency, when holding parliamentary elections on the basis of constituencies (Robinson, 2008:4). In the first case, local elections have proved that they are disassociated with the structure of the society, the family has to a certain extent, controlled the candidature process of its members, intervened in their electoral behaviour, and organized treaties based on the interests of the clan. The influence of the family in Palestinian society grew as the role and influence of PNA institutions weakened. Additionally, the influence of the clan became stronger at the expense of institutions of law and order. Therefore, the role of the clan emerged as one of the political determinant and component in recent times. The clans have rehabilitated themselves through committees of family reform or what is called 'family prosecution.' Clans have been active in important national events such as elections, which are considered a product and manifestation of the strength, security, and ability to secure their own interests. What is so strange about these scenarios is that most of the political players have come to terms with this reality and use it to their best advantage. The symbolic cloak or tent becomes a machine through which family or clan interests become public affairs (Nazzal, 2005).

The clan has become the instrument that produces leaders, in their own circles, through manoeuvring or guaranteeing candidates wins. Even in cases where the clans supported candidates from the outside of the family, the family meeting hall would be the venue for political debates and approving any deals made, during the election campaign (Robinson, 2008:7).

However, after the law of elections was changed to proportional representation, on a national basis and the law of a single constituency. In future, the importance of clans must ebb in the legislative polls.

The size of small families usually ranges between dozens and hundreds of male members where the size of a big clan may reach thousands of male individuals (Robinson, 2008:4).

It could be stated that Palestinian families still play a vital role in providing security and protection for their members, inversely proportional to the strength or weakness of the PNA where the clan is a source of protection, unity, and social solidarity.

During the second Intifada, PNA headquarters and security compounds were destroyed and security services paralyzed. The institutional framework of the PNA was also eliminated, which forced Palestinian society provide certain services, in the absence of any official authority. Clans had to and did use this opportunity, a social and national crisis, to increase their strength. As the more powerful clans procured arms, they became able to provide security and protection for their members, making them more important in terms of protection and authority. They became local heroes. Since the police and security forces were disbanded, officers simply took their own arms with them and blended in with their civilian family members.

The most prominent manifestation of the increasing influence of clans was evident when the PNA collapsed in Gaza, in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from settlements in 2005. In that aftermath, the powerful clans took control of some settlement lands that had been evacuated. These lands were prime real estate and extend along the shore. Neither PNA, Fatah, nor Hamas has been able to remove these clans from these lands, even today (Robinson, 2008:10).

The researcher thinks that the elites of the clans in Palestinian society played a vital role, especially, in southern governorates like Hebron and Bethlehem, in tribal reform. At the same time, their strong roles meant the strengthening of rules, customs, and social obligations, related to members' social life. Failing to abide by these obligations results in conflicts between family members and between the larger families.

The researcher thinks that after the PNA came into existences, the role of clans waned and waxed between weakness and strength, inversely proportional to the strength or weakness of the PNA. The PNA has somehow harnessed the power of the clans and won support by allowing big clans them to be represented in departments and centres of the PNA, heeding the nuances of clan rules and relationships.

The Agency for Tribal Affairs was the PNA department designed to oversee affairs of clans and tribes, during the leadership of Arafat. This agency legalized the role of tribes and clans, granted them certain powers, including providing funding for tribe and clan activities. In addition to giving jobs on the basis of favouritism, the Agency of Tribal Affairs has worked to undermine the official institutions of law enforcement through promoting the ‘unofficial,’ or tribal justice, which entails that legal problems or conflicts are reconciled by way of tribe or clan negotiations. The PNA even went so far as to form a special unit of mediators who react quickly to intervene in interfamilial conflicts, so as to prevent revenge killings. In addition, the PNA has formed agencies specialized in the tribal customs and solving conflicts in accordance with the tribal law.

The observer wonders whether or not it was a positive development for the PNA to give legal room tribal mediations and tribal custom law. The initial idea was to lessen that era’s prevalent internal social hostilities among the Palestinian social groups, which increased due to the 2000 breakdown of the Palestinian police and security force. Giving tribal law legal force, however, created a whole new set of problems, besides undermining the official Palestinian judicial powers. For instance, the stronger tribes tended to enjoy an advantage in influencing final decisions. Also, women were systematically excluded from the tribal justice process, in light of the fact that women are only member of a family through her male relatives and therefore not eligible for consideration in legal matters. Individuals and weak or marginalized families also did not have fair access to justice (Robinson, 2008:8).

1.5.7 Non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and civil society

Since 2005, there have been 1,870 NGO’s in Palestine; 1,370 in the West Bank and 500 in Gaza Strip. 76.6% of NGO’s are in the West Bank and 23.4% in Gaza Strip. 56.3% of current NGO’s were founded after the creation of the PNA. There are NGO’s in 232 compounds of 645 ones in West Bank compared to 23 compounds in Gaza Strip out of 41 compounds. 60.2% of NGO’s are in cities, 29.3% in villages, and 10.5% in refugee camps. As for the West Bank, the north, middle, and south each contain about the same number of NGO’s. At the same time, NGO’s are concentrated in big cities (Jerusalem, Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Nablus). In Gaza, NGO’s are concentrated in the city of Gaza, while the north

of the Gaza Strip contains the least number of NGO's. In the West Bank, there is at least one NGO per every 2,987 persons, while the number is one NGO for every 5,476 persons in the Gaza Strip (Qazzaz, 2007:94).

The root of the abundance of NGO's in Palestine dates back many decades. Since the 1967 war, the NGO's in Palestine took a turn, as did many other aspects of Palestinian lives. The scope of the work of NGO's changed from charitable relief in the interest of helping the Palestinians in their 'resistance of the Occupation,' which helped to launch the mass movement of the whole Palestinian society in voluntarily engaging in social and cultural movements and organizations, in general. NGO's seem to have become a permanent reality in Palestinian life and not just a temporary result of the Occupation, upon which NGO's seek to exert moral and social pressure. These organizations have developed in the context of defying the Occupation, reacting to Israel's attempts to repress Palestinian national expressions and destroy the structure of their society. The appearance of various institutions and massive frameworks have been associated with the urgent need to politicize the population, at a certain stage, considering the long presence of the Occupation, on the one hand, and to perform needed services, on the other hand (Moheisen, 2007).

The principal motive of the establishment of NGO's, associations, and the politicization of the population before the creation of the PNA, was to ensure Palestinian survival in the face of the Occupation. Palestinian civil and societal action has contributed to the overlapping borders and different features of the Palestinian society. This has created a difficulty in distinguishing between forms and characteristics of the social relations which were established by grassroots created organizations and those established by parties and organizations of the civil society (Al-Jirbawi, 1998:124).

Many civil society organizations were set up by political groups and organizations that enabled the PLO and factions to penetrate the Palestinian society. This has led to the domination of the political dimension over the civil dimension and forced it to become an extension and representation of political organizations (Hilal, 1998:227).

Palestinian civil society has evolved through a number of historical stages which carried national political and economic goals as important signposts of the emergence and progress of

these organizations. Historically, Palestinian NGO's were associated with political and national factors and remained a tributary of grassroots action and a major support of the Palestinian national movement. **The Palestinian civil society movement developed as follows:**

1. The announcement of Balfour Declaration and declaration of the British Mandate for Palestine, in 1922, resulted in Palestinian civil society playing an important role in resisting the Jewish immigration and confiscation of lands.
2. From 1917 until 1948, the thrust of the national action was focused on the demand for independence, Arab unity in resisting the establishment of Jewish national homeland in Palestine. Trade unions, women, and student unions, sports clubs, and charitable societies were all active in this field (Bissan Center for Research and Development, 2002:21-22).
3. During Jordanian rule in the West Bank and Egyptian rule in Gaza Strip, from 1948 until the 1967 war, the existence and role of NGO's have diminished as a result of the frustration that the Palestinian society felt after the catastrophe (Al-Nakba). Further aggravating the situation, and the Palestinians, was the weakness and evaporation of political parties, as well as the strict grip of the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes, which tightly restricted the freedom and movement of the Palestinians. It could be argued that the activity of these organizations has concentrated on the resistance of all projects of settlement and asserting the right of return.
4. The seventies of the 20th century saw the revival of the Palestinian NGO's, as a result of growing force of the PLO in the Palestinian Territories. The PLO set up popular unions abroad with the intent of working to enhance and strengthen steadfastness of the Palestinian people in their occupied homeland. These institutions, however, did not form developmental vocational institutions nor did they provide services for the Palestinians and help to form an independent civil community.
5. The 1980's was a notable stage in the history of Palestinian NGO's and great attention was given to establishing these, in the Palestinian Territories, after the PLO left Lebanon. The orientation of the different factions was to focus on establishing committees through which they could practise political action on the one hand and

provide developmental services for the Palestinian people on the other hand. Agricultural, health, women's, and student committees were formed. These were considered political arms of the major factions in the PLO, such as women's committees, relief committees, medical committees, student's unions, and cultural unions. These have provided developmental alternatives to the social institutions that existed in accordance with Jordanian law, which had strategic goals that were centred on limited charitable activities, away from the process of political and social development, in its proper form. Thus, the notion or the idea of interest in charitable societies rose without subjecting their development to political theory (Bissan Centre for Research and Development, 2002:22-24).

6. The first Intifada (1987-1993): This period witnessed significant changes in the objectives and developmental programmes of Palestinian national institutions. New NGO's, specialized vocational centres, and institutions also appeared, in order to provide essential services, such as relief and medical treatment, for the population (Bissan Centre for Research and Development, 2002:25).

In the same period, NGO's in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were also opened in order to provide a social safety net. It contributed to various national activities, especially in areas of confronting settlements, confiscation of lands, disclosure of scandals involving occupation practices, and violations of the rights of the Palestinians (Moheisen, 2004).

7. After the signing of the 'Oslo Accords', Palestinian NGO's have gained special significance during this period in terms of their roles, not only in the state building process, but also in the determination of objectives. They presented a cultural, developmental perspective and took into consideration the following valued social justices: democracy, human rights, self-reliance, societal participation, women's role in the developmental process, protection of rights of the poor and marginalized groups, dignity, and sustainability; all of which are fundamental concepts of sustainable human development (Moheisen, 2007).

8. During the second Intifada, the role of NGO's was most visible in fields of relief, provision of urgent services, and mobilization of global public opinion (Moheisen, 2004).

Within the framework of the political emergence of the populations and organizations, the question of the role of NGO's in social and political life arose in the Palestinian discourse, in addition to the changes made to the role of NGO's after the creation of the PNA. These NGO's have spread and increased greatly; their cadres were enabled to break into the political plane, due to the support from the Arab world (Bishara, 1995).

The original and fundamental motive of NGO's, people's unions and politicisation, before the PNA, was to ensure Palestinian steadfastness in the face of the Occupation.

NGO's were considered national institutions that worked under suppression and needed coordination because of their multiple tasks and association with political organizations of different ideological attitudes. The term 'civil society' hadn't emerged yet (Hilal, 1998:257).

The role of the NGO's was increasing after the 'Oslo Accords,' to the extent that many Arab financiers began to view them as an alternative to the prevalent government slackness, corruption of power, favouritism, and clientism (Jad,2006:5).

1.5.8 Social life in the Gaza Strip

The Palestinians, Gazans in particular, have been living under Israeli siege, since shortly after the outbreak of the second Intifada on 28 September 2000. The Israeli Occupation Forces closed all the crossing points that joined Gaza Strip to the outside world. They closed all doors to Palestinian labourers and deprived them from working inside called the 'green line.' The permits they used to get to work inside Israel had been cancelled (Elayan, 2009).

Since then, economic and societal problems have been increasing for most Gazans, who are completely isolated from the rest of the world. They relied on international aid from UNRWA and donations from abroad. This created a 'parallel economy,' or relief economy,

accompanied by a black market economy, monopolisers, smugglers, and various mafia-types, which surfaced when a major portion of major economic activities ceased (Al-Sorani, 2010).

Following the results of the Palestinian legislative elections on 1 January 2006, internal fighting led to the Palestinian division on 14 July 2007. Israel has tightened the grip and blockade on Gaza Strip for the purpose of the destruction of the socio-economical structure. One result was a sharp decrease in the growth rates of the Palestinian economy and a high rise in unemployment rates (Elayan, 2009).

This has also left poverty and rise in breadwinners to dependants being a rate 1:6/ Unemployment in the Gaza Strip, mid 2009, was 35.6%. Of the total labour Palestinian, force of around 348,000, of who 105,000 serve in the public sector, 75,000 receive their salaries from the Ramallah government while 30,000 are paid by the Gazan government. 119,000 people are employed in the private sector, 20,000 of which work for UNRWA and other NGO's. As for the unemployed, they are estimated to be about 124,000, which support 615,000 people, at a rate of 1:5, approximately. 41% of Gazans, estimated at 1.5 million people, live under the poverty line (Al-Sorani, 2010).

Life in Gaza is extremely restrictive, and restricted, in comparison with other communities. The socio-economical circumstances are conditional to security measures, which entail magnetized cards, permits, and procedures imposed by the Israeli Occupation, which are the only vehicle that can provide Gazans a way out of Gaza (Elayan, 2009).

1.5.9 Social life in the West Bank

The Palestinians in the West Bank suffer from intense restrictions, imposed by the Israeli Occupation Forces. Following are the major measures from which West Bank citizens suffer:

1. The closure of the disjoined Palestinian Territories increased the process of the settlement expansion escalated, opening of bypass roads, and seclusion of the Palestinian areas. Whereas the PNA has limited power over some areas, Israel controls the movement of people and goods and workers through a sophisticated network of roadblocks, security technology, and military restrictions that restrict movement not

only between Israel and the Palestinian areas, but also between Palestinian cities and villages. This increased complications and difficulty in life for Palestinians. The Israeli policy was marked by the strategy of forcing submission, by way of threats of sanctions and of preventing Palestinian labourers from entering Israel to work and, in general, increasing difficulties in the Palestinian territories (Khan & Hilal, 2004:74).

2. The blockade imposed on the movement of citizens inside the Palestinian areas and checkpoints have also carved up the Territories, causing major losses to the Palestinian economy greatly due to restricting and preventing transport of goods. The Palestinian Territories have become ghettoized, meaning that travel even between PNA supervised areas was unpredictable, as Israelis control the territories in between PNA run areas.
3. By building the 'Segregation Wall,' Israel divided the West Bank into two security zones. One is western and is separated by the western part of the wall, while other is the eastern security zone, in the lowlands. As a result, there is a third zone between the north and west, which contains the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian population centres, which are geographically disconnected because of the strategic Israeli segregation wall. The wall led to the division (the third section divided into four blocs) of these major blocs separated from each other (Hamdy, 2003:191). Israel placed military zones, interspersed throughout the major blocs, creating 13 isolated areas, which are categorized as 'area A,' which is another Israeli method of ensuring disruption between Palestinian population centres. (Figure No. 28) The Separation Wall
4. Israeli soldiers consistently make arbitrary arrests, invade private homes, intimidate, and kill Palestinians. Israel practices, such as these, are noted by many commentators as clearly aimed at undermining any possibility of a two state solution (Al-Naqeeb et al, 2010:1).

1.6 Historical transformations and political effects on the structure of Palestinian society

The political and socio-economic structures of Palestinian society saw many changes since 1948, when huge portions of that population were forced into Diaspora, which in itself led to major structural changes in the social hierarchical composition, Palestinian industry, and economy. This in turn reflected on the Palestinian political structure in terms of the social set up, political systems, civil organizations, and on the structure of the political culture, political action and political values.(Figure No. 32; Figure No. 33)

1.6.1 Effects of the 1948 ‘Al-Nakba’ on the structure

The 1948 ‘Al-Nakba’ (Nakba or disaster) led to displacement of the majority of the Palestinian. They were stripped of their lands, turned into internal refugees all over West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the world. The disaster caused a huge disruption of the socio-economical structure of the Palestinian people, even separating the West Bank and Gaza from each other, as well as from the rest of Palestine. Thousands of refugees were created, in now separate parts of Palestine and to top that off, the West Bank was annexed by the Jordanians and Gaza by Egyptian.

One of the effects of the ‘Al-Nakba’ was the dwindling of urban growth, accompanied by the heavy drainage of employment opportunities and reduction of economic growth. The separation of the Palestinian Territories from each other has had great effects on the socio-economical relations and the manufacturing structure of the Palestinian Territories.

The Jordanian and Egyptian administration hindered the emergence of unions and political life in the West Bank and Gaza, preventing the expansion of the Palestinian national movement and enabled the elites in the Palestinian society to stay in power. The internal refugees who settled either in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, not having any real opportunity to create a real economy, are unique from other populations in that all of their activities are dependent on international aid, irrespective of their social class (Hilal, 1998:146-149).

1.6.2 Post-1967 changes in the society structure

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip led to isolation of Palestinians from their Arab neighbours and forcibly annexed them to Israel. The accompanying Occupation policies caused great interruptions of the social and hierarchical structure of the Palestinian people and created a separate and altered identity for the Palestinian who actually lives in the Territories different, as opposed to those living in other Palestinian communities. It can be said that the society became one of resistance (Al-Bideeri et al, 1995:58).

The Israeli occupation economic measures transformed the Palestinian economy to a non-producing, consumer economy and pushed Palestinian craftsmen and farmers to the labour market in Israel, where they constituted 36% 1982 of the labour force, circa 1982. In Palestine, agriculture's contribution to the Palestinian GDP decreased, due to the loss of experienced Palestinian farmers to the Israeli market. Moreover, great numbers of skilled workers and intellectuals emigrated, creating a vacuum of technical and administrative skills necessary for country development (Hilal, 1998:150-155).

These changes also led to the distortion of the hierarchical social structure of the Palestinian society, however, also led to the formation of a Palestinian National Front, which was made up of a number of women's, labour, and professional associations, societies, and many other types of organizations. Formed in 1973, the Palestinian National Front was the first experiment in which Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip jointly presented political leaders who represent legitimate political groups, with frameworks, and vocational unions (Al-Bideeri et al, 1995:85).

1.6.3 Changes in the structure of Palestinian society after the foundation of the PNA

The PNA came into power when the Palestinians had an economy that was particularly vulnerable, suffered from structural weaknesses and had a market that was particularly dependent on the Israeli market, with its sophisticated political and social structures.

1.7 Palestinian elections, past and present

In Palestine many elections were held, either secretly or publicly. Also, many elections were held before the PNA came into being, whether in universities to elect student senate leaders, who organized student movement affairs or in municipal polls, which were first held in 1978. After the PNA was established, legislative and presidential elections were held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and were, for the first time, considered free and fair elections.

(Figures No.31) Palestinian Parliamentary Election 1996 And 2006

1.7.1 The first legislative and presidential election

The Palestinian legislative and presidential elections were on June of 1996. Participation was limited to Fatah and allied parties while the remaining factions in the PLO boycotted them. The main reason of the boycott was due to rejection to the Oslo Accords. Another reason was that these parties rejected the election law of 1995, which called for the principle of proportional representation, which gave smaller parties more support. The Islamic opposition parties also abstained from the elections, for the same reasons (President Divan, 2008).

The trial run of the Palestinian parliament was enacted due to a transitional peaceful agreement concluded between the PLO and Israel. The 1995 Palestinian Elections Law No (13) was enacted and because of the nature of this law, the structure of the council, number of members, and powers had not been determined. The performance of the council was seriously compromised due to ongoing political negotiations and the incomplete sovereignty of the PNA, which was still engaged in state building. It is important enough to emphasize that these conditions reflected indirectly on the council's performance and limited its size remarkably. The concentration of members influenced the national and political positions regarding the activities and tasks of the council. That was accompanied by a vague relationship between the legislative and executive powers, as there was no constitution to regulate the separation between powers.

Despite the various instruments and mechanisms granted to members of the council to perform their parliamentary tasks, the new government did not flourish or obtain the desired objectives, because of structural weaknesses of the council infrastructure. An example of the

inactivation of the supervision tools, set forth by the internal regulations (Acts 75-85), such as interrogation (questioning), votes of no-confidence, hasty review of some cases. The members of the council did not utilize questioning except in three cases, during the previous period of the council, whereas council members the vote of no-confidence on some occasions in order to obstruct the legislative council (Abu-Dayya, 2004).

1.7.2 The second legislative and presidential polls 2006

The second legislative council elections were held, according to the 2005 Act Number 9, which was endorsed by the legislative council. In accordance with the law, a mixed system was adopted; a party list proportional system and the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be considered a single constituency. Voters would choose vote for party lists rather than individual candidates. The Palestinian Territories were divided into 16 districts; 11 in the West Bank and 5 in Gaza (Nofal, 2007).

The number of people who registered for the elections as 1,340,673 voters of these; 811,198 in West Bank and 529,475 in the Gaza Strip. 414 candidates from 16 districts ran in the electoral process. Eleven (11) list contain 314 candidates all over the country, distributed amongst the following parties: Hamas list of change and reform, Abu Ali Mustapha's list of the Popular Front, the list of Alternative, Union of the Democratic Front and the People's Party, the Independents in Palestine, led by Mustapha Al-Barghthi (Al-Mobadara), and The Third Way led by Salam Fayyad and Hanan A'shrawi (Middle East Center Studies, 2006).

This election held great importance and all factions opted to take part in it, so there was a palpable sense of party competition and it was evident that political pluralism was evolving. Eleven (11) party lists were submitted and many candidates and independents ran in the elections. That high degree of political participation represented by the many candidates and parties meant that pluralism was emerging; a definite change which generated competition and attracted the interested of the voters, who headed to the polls (Nofal, 2007).

The list of Change and Reform was able to reap (76) seats, that's a proportion of 57.6% of the council. While Fatah Movement won (43) seats and constituted proportion of 32.6%. The

Independents supported by Fatah Movement was (4) seats. They constituted 3%. As for the Marty's list of Ali Mustapha it won (3) seat and constituted 2.3%, while the lists of the Alternative; Independent Palestine, Third way won (2) seats for each constituted 1.5% of the total seats of the council. (Middle East Center Studies, 2006) (Table No. 74).

The elections were considered clear change in the nature of the Palestinian political system, which was previously dependent on the system of quota, elite rule, or the revolutionary legal system in obtaining political legitimacy. In these elections, the Palestinian political system was transformed into a system based on popular participation, in which the political legitimacy was received at the polling boxes.

Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and the rejection of the PNA, presided by Mahmud Abbas, to negotiate with it reflected a possible agenda of the legislative council. Representatives of Fatah refused to attend council sessions in Ramallah called for by Hamas and likewise, Hamas rejected the sessions called for by Fatah in Gaza Strip. The council was divided into two parts and thus greatly paralyzed; Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank. Both sides have boycotted council sessions, where the legal quorum necessary for holding the council is 67 representatives.

In Palestine, the actual elections process was considered democratic, however, the international community, including Israel, reacted to the success of Hamas by imposing blockades and restricting or cancelling aid to the Palestinians (Nofal, 2007).

1.7.3 Internal elections (primaries) of political parties

Palestinian political parties are marked by their tendency to be 'one man shows.' In most cases, the role and influence of the party leader takes precedence over the role and influence of the party itself. Elections become an embellishment which grants the party, and by extension the party leader, legitimacy and those leaders do not relinquish their seats.

Political parties, internally, use fraud to evade party conference decisions, dominance by general secretaries, and engage favouritism to ensure certain positions people get the desired

positions in the party. The focus is not on the plight of Palestine's voters, which is put on the back burner, while party leader hopefuls focus on national slogans and seat, all of which indicates to serious defects in party practices (Qasem, 1998:241).

Returning to a previous point, party leaders tried to evade their parties internal electoral system or primaries. Fatah, for example, holds its general conference every three years, in which it discusses the internal and external policies of the movement, elects the members of the central committee, the highest power inside the movement. The conference was already held a few times; the first was in 1964, the second in 1968, the third in 1971, the fourth in 1980, the fifth in 1989 and 20 years later, the sixth conference was held in 2009.

Al-Zubaydi says that Fatah, "...suffered, like other parties, from problems including 'a one man show,' weakness in the institutional structure of the party, nepotism, favouritism, absences, weakness of accountability, corruption, aged council members, the lack of awareness of the external politics, and too much overlap between the party and the government (Al-Zubaydi, 2009).

For its part, Hamas' primaries were held in strict secrecy, in and out of Palestine every four years. In the recent elections Khalid Mesh'al was elected as the head of the party, for the third time in a row. The primaries were held after lists of members, who were eligible to vote, were prepared. These members could choose their own representatives in areas where the movement is found. The primaries, meant to nominate representatives in the public consultative council of the party, besides those representatives, more are elected for the political office. The public consultative assembly elects the head of the political office out of total members of the office.

The movement runs its affairs in three regions (Gaza Strip, West Bank, Abroad) independently. The public consultative assemblies make the decisions, inclusive of their regions. In Gaza, for example, Hamas undertakes the political office, the public consultative assembly in Gaza overtakes administration and decision making that is concerned with the office, and the bank and abroad in coordination among their political offices are made in other issues.

It was noted, during the recent elections, that party primaries were held in the West Bank, on the pretext of the dangerous security situation, following the events of Gaza in 2007. It was meanwhile noted that no real changes with the previous members of the political office were made (Al-Sawaf, 2009).

1.7.4 University student council elections

The elections, held annually at Palestinian universities, are meant to choose student representatives are considered an important branch of Palestinian political action, especially political participation. Through these various activities, political participation will be realized, such as nomination for election of council, introducing electoral programmes, conducting campaigns, and actual voting, in addition to political activities that take place after the formation of student councils. For some analysts, university student elections are a major indicator of a country's political orientations (Abu-Shummaleh, 1999).

It has been noted that there was an absence of agendas of the competing parties, meaning selection and conflict were restricted to the general political program, indicating a high degree of politicization of Palestinian society. This also shows that the politician takes priority over voters' concerns (Hamuda, 2008).

Student parties are greatly affected by the Palestinian political parties and are characterized by the political subordination to national political parties. The student elections are regarded as a unique experiment in political action inside the country. After elections, students' political activities include issuance of political statements, distributing leaflets, journals, slogans, and holding protest marches. Students' parties often exhibit strong competition between them.

The student movement has played a historical and prominent role in resisting the Occupation, insisting on holding elections despite the attempts by the Occupation to abolish them by means such as university closures, in the pre-Oslo era.

Speaking of the Oslo Accords, on the historical plane, they constituted a turning point in the history of the student politics. Before that, the student action was characterized by political polarization, especially between 1978 and the signing of Oslo Accords.

Post-Oslo, the partial removal of certain aspects of the Occupation from some of the Palestinian Territories, in combination of the dominance of the PNA in running the affairs of the Palestinian Territories, a new phenomenon arose, coined by Dr. Majdi Al-Malki as 'partisan chaos' in student politics.

To explain further, what is meant by 'partisan chaos' is that the number of students to the student who have become indifferent to politics is increasing. He cited the decrease in the proportion of ballots in the student elections, in post-Oslo. For example, the percentage of ballots during the Birzeit University elections fell from 92% in 1992 to 86.5% in 1995. It fell further to 78.6% in 1996, the lowest turnout in the history of the University. Al-Malki pointed out that new student organizations have appeared, such as environmental clubs, student rights clubs, student chapters of the Red Crescent, as well as geographically centred and affinity clubs (Al-Malki, 1996:103).

1.7.5 Village and municipal elections

The village and municipal system dates back to the late Ottoman period, however, the laws of municipalities and village councils passed through a number of policies in accordance with the relevant political system. These can be summed up as follows:

1. The Ottoman government passed the original municipal law in 1877 and it was considered the basic organizational legislation for the village and municipal councils during Ottoman rule. It regulates how the municipal council should be chosen, the rules for the electoral process, and determines the powers of the municipal council. This law also targeted ways to apply the central authority on the municipalities and ensure its supremacy. It additionally provided services such as supervision of building and street construction, public lighting, and some economic surveillance. When the Ottomans left Palestine in 1917, there were 22 municipal councils (Al-Jirbawi 1996:32).

2. Following the British Mandate on Palestine, British authorities began to interfere with municipal councils. In 1926, a decree was passed, which granted the High Commissioner absolute powers in the process of organizing the elections and setting the powers of the municipal council. The High Commission appointed a president, selected from elected council members. By virtue of this decree the first municipal elections were held in Palestine, in 1927. They were again held in 1934, after a new set of municipalities law were passed. The third elections were held in 1946, after amendments were made to the 'new' municipalities' law (Al-Jirbawi, 1996:32-35).
3. One of the results of the 1948 war was the fall of the West Bank under Jordanian rule. The first municipal elections of the Jordanian era were held in 1951. In 1954, the Jordanians passed their own municipal law in order to give the interior minister power to set up village councils (Al-Jirbawi, 1996:35-41).
4. Following the 1948 Nakba, Gaza fell under Egyptian control, which lasted until 1967. In Gaza they were only two municipalities, Gaza and Khan Yunis, and during the Egyptian administration, no municipal elections were held. The result was the municipal councils became devoid of local political dimension and an append of the Egyptian central authority. The situation in Gaza was not different from that of the West Bank, which as under Jordanian rule (Saed, 1996:15).
5. After the 1967 war, Israel seized the rest of the Palestinian Territories. The West Bank and Gaza came under the control of the Israel Occupation authorities, which took over all the powers related to the village and municipal councils, and geared them towards advancing the Occupation, at some point proposing to dissolve the elected councils and assign the powers of the municipal council to unelected bodies and agencies (Al-Aksh et al, 1997:146-147). During the Occupation, two sessions of the municipal elections were held. The first was in 1972, and the second was in 1976, which representatives for the national movement won, winning the ire of the Israelis, who expelled or killed most of the elected and instead appointed mayors loyal to the Israelis (Qazzaz, 2007:95; Al-Jirbawi, 1996:59-60).
6. After the PNA was established, a Ministry of Local Government was founded, which appointed the local councils before gradually allowing elections to be held in local Palestinian communities. In 2004, the first stage of the municipal elections in the West Bank was complete, affecting an area that covered Jericho and twenty-five West Bank villages. The first municipal elections took place in Gaza Strip on 27 January 2005, in

the municipalities representing electoral governorates. The third stage of the municipal elections took place on 29 September 2005 and the fourth was on 8 December 2005. It was necessary to hold a fifth round of local elections, to cover the remaining 16 municipalities in which no local elections had been held since 1976 (Qazzaz, 2007:95-96).

The opposition viewed the appointment policy as commitment to the 'political quota,' when the seats of the committees concerned were distributed amongst the political groups. The concerned committees reflected reconciliatory variety between the families and factions. in a number of positions. The opposition, however, stated that the appointment policy aims to garner support for the PNA and reducing the forums that may enable the opposition to exercise their political rights. Al-Jirbawi says that what attracts is that the debate about the issue of the villager and municipal council is the over whelming majority of opinions were confined only to the political dimension. There was little discussion of a balanced relationship between the village or municipal council and the central authority and the inherited legal system was taken for granted (Al-Jirbawi, 1996:9-11).

One of the political effects of the appointment policy is that it discourages political participation as there is no room for citizens to cast a meaningful vote that would be a part of the decision making for their local community (Freihat, 1999:254).

Between 2004 and 2005 the first local elections for the village and municipal councils were held in West Bank and Gaza Strip, on four different occasions, during which most parties and factions took part, including Hamas, which abstained from the general and legislative elections in 1996. The result of the local elections showed that Hamas won, emphasizing that Hamas has greater popularity than Fatah (Adwan, 2006).

1.8 Factors effecting the political participation

1.8.1 The effect of media on political participation

Mass media, such as radio, television, internet, and newspapers contribute to enhance socio-political participation and make people aware of what is going on around them on both external and internal levels. Over the past years, Palestinians were exposed to a fierce Zionist campaign to obliterate its history and heritage, in addition to the daily aggression, property destruction, political sabotage, and killings of man, stone, and tree. Consequently, the Palestinian media had to play an active role to make the masses aware of what was happening, using social media (Tabeel, 2006).

In Palestine, the PNA runs two television stations and one broadcasting station. In addition there is the official news agency (Wafa) subject to the President's authority. Palestinian mass media is licensed by the Ministry of Information, which reports twenty-eight West Bank broadcast stations and nine stations in Gaza. In addition to several private television stations in the West Bank there are three daily newspapers, each of which heavily reliant on PNA financial support. Two newspapers, Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam, are privately owned. Arab satellite Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia have a strong following in the West Bank and Gaza. Some Palestinian political parties and organizations have their own newsletters, some of which criticize the PNA, such as Al-Resala, a Hamas newsletter. Otherwise, media criticism of the PNA is generally scarce.

According to Journalists without Borders, Palestine ranks 115 out of 167 for freedom of the press. The PNA restricts freedom of speech and its security forces repeatedly investigate media institutions, even censoring articles. They have attacked or arrested journalists, including foreign reporters. Moreover, media outlets heavily self-censor due to the closure of some television stations by PNA security forces (Qazzaz, 2007:88-89).

The media in the West Bank and Gaza does exhibit high enough professional standards, according to Al-Sawaf, chief editor of the Palestinian Journal, during a speech about Palestinian media and chances of national reconciliation. He also says that the Palestinian media is party oriented and there is no independent or neutral media, at this stage, which is a

major problem in. He also says that the reality of conflict makes mass media play a negative role in dealing with issues, whether societal or political, as each agency is loyal to the party it is affiliated with and defend that party's viewpoints, whether well founded or not. In the long run, media becomes an instrument by which they spread the propaganda of the party they affiliate, which sets the agenda for what is newsworthy (Al-Madhoon, 2008).

Toman, in her study entitled 'Mass Media and its Effects on Internal Division,' found that the Palestinian media was characterised by:

1. Since their inception, media agencies followed party lines and surrendered their objectivity, especially notable in the 2006 legislative elections;
2. The Palestinian media was transformed into a propagandist machine, paving the way for societal division;
3. The tendency for spokespersons to use extemporaneous speeches and not engaging audiences with well planned media. Impromptu and emotional speeches increased the gap between the different sides;
4. The financial support for the media institutions was conditional, leading to deviation from a united national message;
5. Unethical practices of the media, during the period of the political division, resulted in a lack of credibility and neutrality, amongst members of the society;
6. An abundance of opposing attitudes, within the Palestinian society, spilled over to the media world and introduced division;
7. The media culture adopted by the Palestinian media during period of division, was party politics and unfocused on the national political culture (Toman, 2009).

1.8.2 The effect of the civil society on the political participation

During the sixty years that the Israelis have occupied the Palestinian Territories, the original and main goal of the Palestinians has been to resist the Occupation, realize national liberation, and establish an independent Palestinian state. With the conclusion of the Oslo Accords, some politicians expected that the conditions in the Palestinian Territories would be stable and talk about community, including civil community, began. The discourse centred on the definitions of proposed systems, voluntarism, teamwork, and in general the role of civil society in building the Palestinian state, enacting democratic change instead of just being a people of

resistance, and state building that would be in harmony in the context of the new political stage.

At this stage, Palestinian political organizations set out to organize themselves and found their various political parties and movements. Although political parties and movements are generally considered part of the institutions of a civil society, it remains a controversial issue amongst experts of the civil community. In the case of Palestine, these political parties and movements are considered the most important civil community organizations, being the oldest and most influential in the Palestinian political society. This sector also took the initiative to construct or found most organizations of the civil society or controlled their activities and progress because of the desire to direct their activities towards national liberation, a very facet of the Palestinian characteristic (Adawi, 2008).

The PLO had a significant, but secretive role in the creation of various civil institutions, which worked during the continuing Israeli Occupation. The Orient House, for instance, is considered a Palestinian political symbol inside occupied Jerusalem, in addition to the many other institutions offer services and were supported by PLO parties. The major objectives of these institutions, therefore, were to safeguard the Palestinian presence in the Territories especially, after the exclusion of the PLO from the political arena.

Civil society organizations played an important role in the various stages of the Palestinian national struggle, especially during the first Intifada, during which it carried out many social activities, which gained a great deal of respect and appreciation from the Palestinian public, especially, in areas of development of roles in economic and social issues, as well as matters concerning democratic change. The activities of the time immediately responded to priorities and needs of the society and were flexible and responsive enough to adapt them to programs that could cope with the continuous economic, political, and social changes (Izzat, 2004:6-8).

One of the effects of the creation of the PNA was the emergence of vital organizations that played an important role in confrontation the Occupation, through staying committed to the national interests, at the same time seeking to strengthen the foundations for a democratic society. It was also noted that many other types of organizations appeared, which focused on the internal change process, some dependant on political opposition while others were concerned with presenting the policies and programmes of their party, in the confrontation of

the PNA. Some think that the stage of the national liberation has been completely carried out, have dropped national rights from their agendas and pander to international financiers who are willing to offer conditional support as a reward (Adawi, 2008).

The civil community sought to find integration with the PNA in the services offered for citizens and played a vital role during the second Intifada, when many PNA institutions collapsed, aggravated by the financial deficit the PNA experienced after the second legislative elections, held in 2006. Civil society institutions expanded their scope and focused especially in providing humanitarian aid after the suspension of the international aid for the PNA, as a reaction to the landslide victory that Hamas achieved, and its subsequent rejection of the political terms donor bodies tried to impose on the PNA.

Civil society organizations also played a vital role in promoting or enhancing political participation, in all kinds of forms, such as organizing participation within the framework of existing organizations, thus linking voters to the political system and enabling individuals to express their demands and transform them into political agendas. Methods include organization of political parties, unions, and pressure groups (Abrash, 1998:205).

What hampered the work of the of civil society, after the creation of the PNA, was the prevalence of the parties' focus on concepts, practices, and structure where activity was centred around close knit social groups with particular interests (Ali, 2010:62).

Some civil society organizations are centred around a class or political elite and thus remain practically isolated from the public. In addition, they are prepared to alter their agendas to gain favour with the political power, as to be closely aligned to the Authority is more politically advantageous than being aligned with the public. It is not unusual, therefore, to find that some organizations work for self interest or to build a closer alliance with the PNA (Abu-Amro, 1995:89-90).

Although many civil society institutions are a product of Palestinian parties, their capacity remains marginal and impotent in influencing the citizens political participation while at the same time avoid any opposition to or criticism of the PNA, which has, over time, made the need for an authentic civil society more necessary.

Al-Shu'aybi, Commissioner for Combating Corruption at the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) attributed the weakness of civil society institutions being the product of elites who focus on strategic interests that are subject to limited, narrow discussion. This, in turn, led to these organizations being totally out of step with the needs of the daily Palestinian society.

Al-Shu'aybi, confirmed that the PNA looks at the institutions of civil community as an enemy rather than a partner and that some politicians consider the civil society opposition. thus marginalizing the influence that civil society institutions have over the performance of the executive power (Al-Shu'aybi, 2010).

1.8.3 The effect of political parties on political participation

The party phenomenon is as old as Palestinian political life, dating back to the nineteen twenty's though it has evolved since. During the nineteen sixties, parties helped to mobilize national sentiment and an emotional attachment to the 'homeland,' domestically and abroad, but some factions use of armed political approach to elicit a reaction, ended up conflicting with efforts to realize national rights (Abrash, 2010).

Throughout the Israeli Occupation, political parties tried to mobilize Palestinian citizens in resisting the Occupation and during the last few decades, Palestinian did play an important role in forming the politicization, most prominent of which are university student unions, which played a strong role in confronting the Occupation, during the first years of the Intifada.

Political parties exploited the Intifada, which started December 1987, and in which the majority of domestic Palestinians took part. They rushed to find leadership of the political parties in West Bank and Gaza Strip, which could cooperate with the PLO abroad. Their tasks were mainly to manage the daily activities of Occupation resistance, such as strikes, marches, days of rage, and the distribution of informative leaflets. These local political parties formed committees which were based in different parts of West Bank and Gaza Strip and worked according to an agenda agreed upon by Arab leaders. Party politics were evident in the competition amongst the committees on the ground.

After the Oslo Accords were signed and the legislative, presidential, and local elections were organized, the parties rushed to attract voters, offering services, throwing parties, celebrating feasts, and holding public festivals to attract support from the public. Party members also paid homage to the injured, martyrs, and even celebrated high school graduations.

Political parties in Palestine compete in any arena to persuade people support them, a fact most evident in the university student council elections. During their campaigns student party representatives hold debates, distribute campaign materials, and then hold elections, which usually attract a strong turnout; usually more than 85%.

Although the political parties play a major role in urging the citizens to take part in the political process, they are a burden on the Palestinian cause, especially after the rift they created between the Fatah controlled West Bank and Hamas controlled Gaza. Their bloody conflict touched a nerve in Palestinians, especially independents, who think the quarrellers are simply struggling for power rather than offering real political platforms, geared towards the liberation of Palestine. Abrush said: A question raises itself, while we observe the dominance of political parties in the political arena and the absence of independents. There is no tangible progress in the realization of the national scheme; neither as a project neither of national liberation nor as a plan for the construction of a state. I regret to say that this intense presence of these parties no longer constitutes a healthy phenomenon and a national necessity. The absence of independent decision making from the majority of these parties plus the acute contradiction between the slogans they raise and their practices in reality, calls for a careful study this phenomenon (Abrash, 2010).

The present situation of parties is frustrating as their focuses has totally shifted away from national liberation and no longer seem intent to change the present state of affairs. Their slogans, mottos, and ideologies, which no longer have meaningful content, exist for their own sake and are not applied but the legislation of the source of the national issue. Abrush stated: "Instead of the political parties admitting their mistakes and reconciling or at least take a critical self evaluation and correct their behaviours and hold those accountable for their mistakes, they evade the root problem by blaming each other parties for the clash" (Abrash, 2010).

1.8.4 The effect of Occupation on political participation

It is natural to conclude that any occupation in the world plays a negative role in the occupied country, none more so than in Palestine. The Israelis practise all forms of suppression and torture on the Palestinians, which caused the expected reaction; an uprising or Intifada, the first of which began in 1987.

One of the effects of the Occupation is that the Palestinians obsess over ways to find freedom in their daily lives, freedom that the Occupation seeks to take by erecting hundreds of blocks, physical and mental, isolate the Palestinians in a zone where they are daily harassed when trying to get from place to place.

The living situation of the Palestinians pushed most Palestinians to take part in political activities, in all different forms, like marches, demonstrations, and affiliation with parties, labour strike, and the boycotting of Israeli products.

The Israeli Occupation Authorities have tried to prevent any form of the political participation of the Palestinian people in West Bank and Gaza Strip by repressing marches and demonstrations by force and always hunting for Palestinians belonging to any Palestinian political faction. They also confiscate books and magazines with the pretext that they are inflammatory. They prevent freedom of opinion and expression, however, the Palestinians endured Israeli imposed censorship, arresting of journalists, and prevention of demonstrations or even the most basic means of expression, clearly in violation of international laws (Jabarin, 2008).

After the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PNA, the Occupation Authorities tried to thwart the Palestinian election process by erecting some 600 military checkpoints to prevent candidates and voters from moving freely throughout the Palestinian Territories. Although the freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by charters on human rights, the Israeli Occupation Authorities impose strict restriction on the freedom of movement in West Bank and Gaza Strip which not only affects Palestinians' movements but also how they think and identify themselves.

The Israeli Occupation Authorities also tried to hinder the PNA organised legislative elections by closing polling stations in Jerusalem and detaining staff of the Central Elections Committee (The Palestinian Central Election Commission, 2010).

The difficulties that Israel posed in front of the participation of the Palestinian voters in Jerusalem have been the most dangerous Israeli practices to hamper the electoral process and to deprive the Palestinian people from practising their right of political participation as they have political dimensions and implications affecting the future of the holy city. It is known that the number of Palestinian in Jerusalem is over 250,000, meaning a huge sector of Palestinians were not able to participate in the electoral process (Nofal, 2007).

1.9 Political participation in Palestinian society

There are many forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, some of which are as follows:

1.9.1 Women's movements and political participation

In the early twentieth century, the Palestinian feminist movement began setting up women's societies and national women's organizations, to become one of the most powerful movements in the whole Arab world (Saed & Nasif, 1998:40). In 1921, women's organizations began as women's charitable societies, established by some of the society's elite women and aimed at protesting the unfair practices of the British Mandate (Abrash, 1987:83).

The role of the women's movements in Palestine can be categorized according to the following periods:

1. 1948-1967: During this period, the women's movement was active through charitable societies that worked to combat the hunger and poverty that accompanied the Nakba, which itself caused great losses of land and employment, creating scores of homeless and jobless refugees. Political activities were relatively scarce until the PLO was established at the end of this period, however these associations, promoted women's political action and formed the general union of the Palestinian women in Jerusalem, which served as a model for other women's groups (Daraghma, 1991:53).
2. 1967-1993: Charitable societies continued to provide humanitarian aid for those in need. Women's unions worked from the 1960's until the early 1980's, fulfilling many urgent needs. They were able to support education by constructing private and public schools, open literacy centres, rehabilitate tens of thousands of women, and teach them handicrafts, in order to earn some income (Daraghma, 1991:61). At that time, Palestinian factions also encompassed thousands of women, some of whom had political plans for these organizations, through the women's agendas, with a clear objective of enhancing their influence in the Occupied Territories and to politicize the female population, in the interest of advancing the political agendas of PLO factions.

In the mid-1960's, the women's groups started undercover activities, which were carried out until the defeat after the 1967 war, during which many of the founders distributed letters and leaflets and organized small discussions for women (Al-Khalili, 1977:109).

In early 1978, some of the movement's founders thought it necessary to form a stronger women's movement, or action committee, that would involve hundreds of the active women participants from all associations and political groups and set up a women's action committee that would be considered a foundation for the political struggle to assist the families of the martyrs, prisoners, the needy, inheritance issues, and political, social, ideological, and cultural mobilization of women. No sooner was the action committee created, the presence of different viewpoints meant that differing agendas were formed. Examples are the Union of Women's Action Committee, started by the Democratic Front in 1987, the Working Women's Committee set up by the Palestinian Communist Party in 1980, the Palestinian Women's Committee for the Popular Front in 1981, and the Women's Committee for Social Work, founded by Fatah (Daraghma, 1991:62-108).

During the Intifada, in 1987, women's organizations rushed to participate in mass action and assembled a woman's action summit for resistance of the Occupation. The branches of the woman's organizations spread outwards, for the first time, in camps and the rural areas. As a result of the absence of the state the woman's programmes were to provide relief services, child care, and teaching women home economics. The feminist programmes were dependent on the political factions and worked to resist the Occupation through sit-ins, demonstrations, distributing informational leaflets and statements, organizing marches, sewing Palestinian flags, distributing food supplies to poor families, visiting families of prisoners, martyrs, and the injured (Developmental Affairs, 1988:18; Daraghma, 1991:66-67).

3. After 1993: After signing the Oslo Accords and establishing the PNA, many societal and political changes took place. Hopes were that in a democratic environment, the base of women's participation would be expanded and women would have more access to the political process, by merits of their own needs and competence. These

hopes were not realized, as the PNA did not demonstrate an intention to integrate women into the development process, excepting a few numbers of the leaders of the national women's movement, which lost some women who had experience and competence. Thus, the organizations worked to create new leaders, with different attitudes and visions (Development Studies Programme, 1999:78).

The foundation of the PNA constituted change in the history of the strategic women's movement, which mainly focused on socio-economic issues. The post-Oslo stage was characterized by the emergence of women's institutions which were independent of political parties and adopted women's social issues and activated democratic debate on women's affairs (Qamar, 1992).

1.9.2 The student movement and political participation

The student movement played a remarkable role in the Palestinian political arena. Through the student movement, university students learn about different aspects of political participation such as running for student council seats, creating and offering electoral programmes, in addition to the various political activities that take place after the formation of the student council. Student council elections are usually held at the end of each academic year.

Students, a major component of Palestinian society, play an important role. Student activities are not purely restricted to internal university affairs but also are a strategic way to reach the student audience and mobilize them for political participation, in their communities.

The student movement also played an important role in the national struggle to confront the Occupation and its damaging decisions to close of universities for extended periods, extensive detentions of students and professors, and daily attacks (Al-Ashqar, 2010).

The impetus of the Palestinian student movement, before the PNA came into being, was the existing conflict between the Palestinian society and the Israeli Occupation, with its capricious practices and continual denial of Palestinian rights. Until today, student governments focus on political concerns, ignoring demands that they change their orientation to make way for the PNA's authority. In light of their continued political agendas, student

governments overlap with the PNA in their push towards national liberation and democratic structures. Nevertheless, the role of the student movement has retreated in both directions and has become clear, to the observer, that people support their political party, even at university elections, where each party has its own agenda. The student movements are still dormant, in spite of small and partitioned moves, occurring from time to time, which are connected either to purely partisan issues or political partisan issues (Abdul-Mo'ti,2005).

1.9.3 Popular political participation

Nations, by virtue of being nations, practise their right to 'do' politics and use them to achieve national aspirations; however, the Palestinians have not yet been granted their state, within which they can 'do politics.' As a substitute, Palestinians continually search for a solution to their burgeoning problem and express their right to self determination while doing so. They have practised alternative forms of politics, in lieu of 'normal' politics, the most significant of which are as follows:

1. The first Intifada: The spontaneous uprising started on 8 December 1987, in Jabalia refugee camp, in Gaza. From there it spread to cities, villages, and other refugee camps. The, the old, the young, men, women and children took part. It was halted only with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

The Intifada was characterized by civil disobedience, against the Occupation, which in 1991, reduced its visibility. Generally, the youth took the initiative to throw stones at soldiers and erected their own barriers of burning tyres. They also gathered inside their mosques and defied the Israeli Army to disperse them. Loudspeakers were used to call on people to demonstrate, leaflets were distributed, and rebel graffiti was painted on walls. Leaflets, the only available form of media because of the Israeli's strict censorship of the media and detention of journalists, were distributing them at mosques, slipping them under doors, and throwing them from car windows, pre-dawn. Israel responded of detaining people without trial, torture, closure of universities, economic sanctions, and settlements building. These actions drew international sympathy to the Palestinians and they were, lead by Yasser Arafat, successful in pushing the Palestinian question forward.

Local committees were set up inside camps, which organized unarmed protests against armed Israeli soldiers, as well as providing their fellow Palestinians with food, education, medicine and the essential services for camps and areas, frequently put under curfew. At first, these committees worked independently but soon were united in Fatah, the Democratic and Popular Fronts and the Communist Party. Fatah organizational relations with the PLO, whose headquarters was in Tunisia.

These, like most other factions of the day, demanded the creation of an independent Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank and the withdrawal of Israel from the 1967 boundaries.

2. Civil disobedience: The first Intifada was characterised by extensive civil disobedience and demonstrations against the Israeli Occupation (Sharp, 1989). The idea of civil disobedience was raised before the start of Intifada but the PLO leadership did not show interest, believing the proponents of this idea were naïve and ignorant of the reality of the Palestinian situation. The Israelis were aware of the idea and its implications and applied deterring penal measures to regain control of the Israeli Civil Administration and put an end to the spread of the civil disobedience movement. The penal law was reviewed to allow for conduction of extensive and long term detentions. The Israelis also decided to extend the periods of curfew, which put entire cities and communities on lockdown. During the first year of the Intifada, it is estimated that there were 1600 curfews; out of these no less than 118 were no less than five days long. During this period, Gazans, and eighty percent of Palestinians suffered through long curfews. Universities and schools were also closed, while 140 Palestinian leaders were deported and their homes demolished.

One famous example of civil disobedience is when the community in the town of Beit Sahur voluntarily submitted their identification cards to the local military commander, in their decision to reject payment of taxes, for which they received no services. This action alarmed the commander and Israel began to fear that it would lose control over the Palestinians. Also in Beit Sahur, members of the community initiated a small dairy cooperative, in order to supplement the people's limited access to foodstuffs and provide an alternative to imposed Israeli products. The cooperative was under constant hunt by the Israelis and the cooperative volunteers evaded the Israelis numerous times by smuggling the cows from place to place, during the dark of night, while military patrols were searching for them. (Sharp, 1989)

1.10 Major trends of political participation in the Palestinian society

1.10.1 Motivations for Palestinian political participation

The distinctiveness of the Palestinian situation, in terms of managing both the pursuit of freedom from occupation and creating the PLO, guaranteed that the political motives of the Palestinians were diverse; subject to the political situation imposed on them. Their motives totally changed, and even became contradictory to previous motives, after the creation of the PNA.

Undoubtedly, there were variances among citizens' motives to get into Palestinian politics. The extent of the citizen participation mainly depended on their interests and the political climate. Al-Ajamy said that "An individual's motives for political participation vary. There are those whose motive is to achieve a personal interest, like getting a post or gaining a financial return, and there are those whose drive is realize the public interest and asserting loyalty to their homeland (Ajamy, 2000:50).

Each individual is different, though, and some can have combined personal, and public, more benevolent reasons for getting into politics. In spite of that, whether a person's motivation is personal or public; financial, social, or political the individual aims to achieve a particular goal. Two main types of motivations can be examined but the focus here is public motivations; which inherently carry the notion that participation is a duty and obligation of the individual towards the society in which he lives.

This kind of politician must open up to participation of the population in the public life of the community where they can express their desires, thoughts and opinions about taking decisions, policies, laws, and the programmes or policies. The politician should take into consideration and respond to the citizens' needs, love public work, be willing to share with others the development of the society, improving services, improve life conditions of the citizens, desire to play an effective and focal role in the various activities of the society, in a way that influences its present and future. This kind of politician must also allow the citizens to feel they play a significant role in the society's development and foment their desire to strengthen ties among the various sectors of the community to achieve interaction, and finally, integration, in order to realize the common interests of the people (Elaiwa & Mahmud,

2000:8). Al-Biag adds that yet another motivation towards political participation is a defensive measure against imminent danger (Al-Biag, 1997). When examining the Palestinian case, these factors seem to have played an important role in creating political awareness in the Palestinian society's who lives politics in his daily life and is, due to a number of factors driven towards political participation:

1. Expected Dangers: The dangers that the Palestinians experienced during Israeli attempts of uprooting them from their lands, forced emigration, massacres committed by Zionist gangs during the 1948 war, and the Occupation's daily practices of repression and torture. All these forced the citizen to become involved in political action, after the Palestinian citizen found himself either a refugee, who lost the land he is a proud of, or a citizen living under Egyptian or Jordanian guardianship. The citizen started to take part in politics and his interest in the public affairs that serve his people and country was piqued. Because of the common suffering and joint fate that faces the citizen under occupation, the researcher concludes that the imminent dangers the Palestinian people face, their common fate, combined desire to get rid of occupation, and desire to obtain stolen freedom, may be the most important factors that oblige the Palestinian citizen to take part in politics.

The motivations for political participation may differ, according to the conditions surrounding the individual. For example, the Palestinian who is forced to become a refugee, where they live a miserable daily routine, may be a motive for the political participation. Many such people live in miserable conditions in UNRWA administered refugee camps, where they live in small houses, and barely have the basic necessities of life, while they wait for a political decision that should put an end to suffering and restore their right of return to their native villages and cities. The result of a study by Martyrs Figures and Facts (2010) showed that most of the Palestinian martyrs who participated in carrying out suicide operations were refugees, at a rate of 3.5%, and whose families were exposed to displacement from their lands in 1948 (Banat, 2010). See table No. (75).

2. Resentment of new lifestyle: The policy of collective punishment of the Palestinian people, including closures of camps and villages, curfews, imposing complete Israeli security closures on Palestinian lands, prohibiting workers from entering Israel, in addition to assassinations of many Palestinian leaders and opposition activists, especially in the second Intifada, and

bombing and destruction of Palestinian villages and camps, leaving many children, elderly, and women dead. Irrespective of class or group, all Palestinians suffered yet persevered in resisting the Occupation. At the beginning of the first Intifada, the majority of Palestinians took part in the uprising that erupted as a result of the oppression and injustice, which led to widespread popular demonstrations, marches, and protests, which gave all Palestinians a real motive to participate and they did participate, in many different ways.

3. Personal motives: Returning to motivations, it was mentioned that they differ according to political climate. After the foundation of the PNA in the West Bank and Gaza, the motivations towards political participation, post-Oslo, multiplied and stretched Palestinians out, given that they now had to think of internal politics and not just ending the Occupation. Some politicians were motivated by a need to influence the Palestinians' policy making, to suit their needs and desires, which would gain the politician fame, respect, and admiration, satisfying the personal need for participation. Human needs are divided into five levels: these are the essential needs like food and clothing, need for security and comfort, the need for participation, the need for sympathy and appreciation, the need to self-assert and achieve self-interest represented in control and influence, making financial gain, etc. (Elaiwa & Mahmud, 2000:8, Gasem 2009, Al-Biag 1997). Political participation can fulfil a need for a political post or a job, and could also be a manifestation of family solidarity (Al-Biag, 1997). Whatever the form or type of these motives are, the fact is that these differ from time to time or place to place. **Some notes relating to the citizen's motives towards the political participation can be clarified:**

A: Political participation for financial gain:

Before the introduction of the PNA, student elections were characterised by creating a motive for students to participate in expressing their national rights, where the competition among the student blocs was held in the context that they were Palestinian factions sacrifice for the Palestinian cause. Although many student elections were held to express political awareness, the present state of competition amongst the student blocs for votes are based on buying votes by offering some kind of incentives. This resulted in the Palestinian factions' agendas being based upon offering more and more incentives, taking into account the economic situation of students and their families, in combination with the high university fees.

Rasem E'beedat said 'We have to admit that the economic concerns, the political finances and power, produced something akin to employment, relationships based on offering incentives, which are among the important factors for such result. Students, for example, were exempt from tuition, as a result of the grants and scholarships the universities received from abroad. Now, donations are less, so any person who can pay on behalf of those students and provide for their needs, such as tuition food, books, accommodation, has the power (Abidat, 2009).

The 2006 local elections were stage to the competition between Fatah and Hamas, even in terms of the financial support provided for their candidates. Some parties provided financial support for some candidates, in return for that candidate to commit to the party line of the supporting party, if successful. Some candidates, intent on becoming municipal employees saw an opportunity to receive financial support and worked to attract party attention, during elections. Indeed, some political factions made payments on behalf of nominees, due to be paid to municipalities or village councils, before the nominee's candidacy was accepted. Village and towns people, in light of the miserable economic conditions and military closures, accumulated heavy debts, and were not able to produce the money to cover the fees.

B: Political participation as a manifestation of family solidarity:

Families played a vital role in the local elections and competed for candidature and formed strategic alliances. The influence of the tribes over the parties and the elections was clear and argued over what positions would be held by whom, after their wins. The clan and tribal support clearly was used to nominate candidates while electoral alliances among families were formed to secure the success of family nominated candidates.

Findings of a survey conducted in the West Bank and Gaza, by the Mass Institute showed that 40.7% of took part in activities for the clan or family they belonged to, during the year before the survey. The highest rate was in the governorates of Jerusalem though no significant differences arose among the residential areas (city, village, camps). Greatest participation was found amongst employees of the public sector rather than those working privately. After that came those working in Israel, namely in settlements more than those working for businesses.

The lowest proportion was among the housewives (2.6%), those who drop out or leave studying, and those choose to study. Supporters of the Palestinian left and Islamic Jihad were

the least to participate in activities of family and clan, while Fatah supporters and PLO members demonstrate the highest tendency to participate in politically motivated activities and do favours. Then came those affiliated with Hamas, though the activities varied according to family or whether they were politically related things (such as influence local elections) while about 34% of those belonging to families or clans in the West Bank took part in activities of political nature during the year before the survey. The southern West Bank had fewer participants in this activity than the central or northern West Bank, with no significant difference according to the residential locations (village, city, camp). The participation of males, however, of this activity was double that of females. There is no a relationship between the educational level and participation in such activities.

As for the profession, the rate of types most likely to participate in politically related tribal activities were (from greatest to least): managers, government employees, private sector workers, and the unemployed. The results also showed that types most active in this activity, at least once a month, were supporters of the Palestinian left, then supporters of the national independents then the supporters of Fatah, then supporters of Hamas, and finally Islamist independents (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:80). Table No. (76) For percentage of participation in activities of families and clan.

C. Political participation as means to obtain a political post or a job:

Post-Oslo, with Israeli recognition of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians, many people who had ulterior motives flocked to join Fatah, clearly the most powerful team, as the spoils of recognition were divided. Some believed that joining Fatah would secure them jobs, as many jobs became limited to Fatah and its supporters, namely jobs in security. People now felt affiliating with Fatah was no longer a risk, as before, when sanctions were imposed on those proved to be affiliated with Fatah.

Al-Sorani said 'Most jobs and appointments were not governed by a law based on equal opportunity but were given mainly to PNA people, namely relatives of senior officials, who live comfortable lives. At the same time, the non-elites, who did not enjoy favouritism or strategic connections, were deprived from these posts despite their possession of higher degrees and experience (Al-Sorani, 2006).

These motivations are clearly different from those of the first Intifada, when there were authentic national motives that were focused solely on getting rid of the Occupation and

attaining freedom. This is what distinguishes the first Intifada. It was a popular uprising; there was mass participation, and clear expressions of pure nationalistic feeling, and a collective frustration against the suppressive politics of the Occupation. After the creation of the PLO and its absorption of Fatah, however, membership of Fatah ballooned a phenomenon occurred, known among the public and Fatah supporters as 'Fatah Oslo.' What was implied was that many who joined Fatah post-Oslo did so to secure one of the jobs restricted to Fatah supporters, namely security positions. Even mercenaries joined Fatah to get a share of the spoils of the Accords.

1.10.2 Forms of political participation

The extent to which the voters participate in political action depends first on the citizen's interests and secondly, on the political climate of the society. The form of the political participation varies from one society to another, and within the society itself, from time to time and with its particular political system. This is based on certain conditions like whether opportunities are available, which allow or restrict the participation of citizen's turnout to contribute to public work (Ali, 2010:32-34). The researcher distinguishes between many forms of political participation. Some differentiated between two forms of political participation:

Form one: Typical and organized activities: Registering at the election stations, voting, conducting campaign media, affiliating with an organization dealing with social issues (union or interest group), public political debates, affiliating with a party, attending political meetings, and organized participation at election campaigns.

Second form: These include the short term activities that express an urgent concern about issue or an event, manifested by protests acts like sit-ins, demonstrations, and acts of violence. It is not necessarily the case that these forms are illegal; rather, some may be lawful such as peaceful demonstrations. This form could also be described as an expression of displeasure and resentment by a group of people towards a certain policy taken by the government (Bro, 1998:336-337).

In the early 1930's, Carl Dutch made a study on political participation. He determined its levels as following:

Level One: The highest level of the participation, the group, which needs to consist of at least three people and meet the following conditions:

- Membership of political organization
- Donate for a political organization or candidate for general elections
- Attend political meetings regularly
- Participate in election campaign
- Distribute letters concerning public issue of the political
- Discuss politics out of range of the family

Level Two: Voters follow up the political issues and participate in elections.

Level Three: Voters who participate in seasonal activities or take part in emergency cases, when their interests are endangered (Ghalom et al, 1997).

Wright (1992) distinguishes between three forms of political participation:

1. Free or voluntary participation,
2. Participation as required by the government,
3. Participation for personal advantage.

Wright stated that free participation is the basis for liberal democracies, where individuals can choose whether to participate or not. As for the third world, the traditional form of participation is a subordinate/master relationship, where low-class people offer their political support to the master businessman, political elites, religious leaders, and other influential people in their society, in return for a kind of protection or favours, such as a job. This pattern of participation is simply a personal swap among individuals' resources (Shaqfa, 2008).

1.10.3 The major form of the political participation in Palestine

Basic forms of the political participation in Palestine are not clearly defined, which is attributed to the constantly changing political climate, political instability, and the overhaul that the political system experienced after the PLO was established, which can explain the most recent appearance of forms of political participation, vastly different from previous ones. These may be associated with the recent Palestinian experiment with the creation of the PNA,

as a first experiment the Palestinians practise on land consequently; we try to talk about some forms of the political participation society during different stations:

1. Protest: Acts of protest against the Occupation, such as sit-ins, demonstrations, and marches represent common forms of political participation, during the first Intifada, when political participation was characterised by daily shows of opposition to the Occupation policy. This form of political participation is characterised by the extensive popular participation of even the youth and the elderly. Despite the heavy losses of life that the unarmed Palestinians suffered, along with the repressive practices of the Occupation, the Palestinians continued the Intifada for about 10 years.

The result of the survey conducted by the Mass Institute, in the West Bank and Gaza, found that over a third of respondents in the West Bank took part in political marches and demonstrations. The results also showed that levels of voter participation were higher in certain demographic groups. It was found, for example, that villagers participated in political demonstrations and marches more than did city dwellers, followed by camp dwellers and then city dwellers. The participation of males was more than double that of females (44.1% and 20%), while those who were 26 years of age made the strongest showing at demonstrations and marches. Amongst students, highest levels of participation came from holders of degrees, excluding holders of Master and PhD degrees (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:72). See table No. (77)

In spite of the harsh measures of the Occupation, such as fines upon and imprisonment of any citizen proved to be a member of Palestinian parties, active membership was commonplace, as Palestinians refused to surrender their right to affiliate, even secretly, with their party of choice. Despite the fact that Palestinians had to tread carefully to affiliate, the findings of the Mass' Institute's survey found that about 21.1% of adults claimed they were members of political organizations and that 60% of total party members were active. These are considered high rates, compared to the numbers found in Arab countries, where the percentage of the party members in Jordan never exceeded 1%, and in Lebanon, 4.4%. These results show Palestinians are distinguished in their rate of participation in political parties and organizations, especially in terms of rate of active participation (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:57). The highest rate of affiliation with parties was in amongst villagers, followed by cities, then camps (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:63). The results showed that there were variances in the percentages of

active members, according to region; 10.4% in the rest of West Bank, 70% in Greater Jerusalem, and 18.1% in Gaza. (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:60).

2. Participation in rallies: The tone, prior to the elections, is celebratory and charged by widespread participation in assemblies, where rival candidates would rally their campaign supporters. During annual university student council elections, student blocs hold their meetings with their supporters and advocates, to stir up students' excitement and urge them to vote for the desired candidate. Likewise for general and legislative elections, held semi-annually, since the creation of the PNA, parties and their candidates occasionally call for assemblies and rallies, particularly right before a vote or when there are emergencies to be dealt with.

3. Formation of pressure groups: This form of political participation is limited in Palestine, mostly limited to stealthy circles working in high government bodies or aristocrats who use their connections and financial status to push private economic policies and transform them into national policy (Ali, 2010:66).

4. Following politics: Palestinians have a saying that goes 'Politics are like onions in the food' because with every move, physical or mental, they encounter the physical and mental barriers of the Occupation. From roadblocks to annexation of inherited farmlands; to assassinations of activists to the Separation Wall; to unbearably long waits to make shorts trips, often through treacherous settler dotted back roads; Palestinians do not perform simple daily acts without being faced with a politically charged occupation. All these things, impose themselves on the Palestinian citizen, forcing him to think, talk, and breathe politics as they agonize over what form of politicking will win them sovereignty.

5. Seasonal political participation: This participation is activated when there is an elections campaign underway, before the actual election. After the PNA arrive, Palestinians practised this pattern of political participation and most social classes took part.

In this context, the competing political parties themselves react to the fact that there is an election coming and they set in motion their own battle for votes. In the first presidential and legislative elections held on 20 December 1996, of eligible voters, 57% West Bankers and 88% Gazans voted, whereas in the second legislative and general polls, the fact that all parties

campaigned, the rate of the participation was higher at 77%, across the board (Ladadweh, 2007:60; Ali, 2010:66). See table No. (78)

6. Distributing informational materials: During the first Intifada, leaflets were the instrument of communication between the population and the Intifada leadership. Periodical or urgent statements were issued and distributed in different parts of the Palestinian Territories. Through them, the population knew when acts of protest, such as strikes, were to take place. During student elections, leaflets were also distributed, sharing the parties' platforms. Other Palestinian factions distributed leaflets, occasionally.

The Mass Institute's study showed that the rate of participation in distributing political leaflets was low but the highest rate was found in the central West Bank, while participation in Jerusalem was the lowest, compared to the north, west or centre of the West Bank. Villagers' participation was the highest, compared to camp and urban dwellers. Male participation was double that of females while youths were noted as the highest attendants of political meetings and seminars, suggesting that students, who constitute an important part of a society's human capital, are also political capital (Nasr & Hilal 2007: xiii). See table No. (79).

7. Affiliation with organization that deals with social issues or societies or unions:

After the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the PLO had to recourse to strengthen its presence, amongst Palestinians, by setting up institutions that supported the steadfastness of the Palestinians on the inside. The majority of politically active women wanted to participate in the resistance effort by joining institutions that provided social services.

After the creation of the PNA the range of civil work and institutions expanded, despite lack of popular support. The institutions supported by some Palestinian political parties represented a form of the citizen participation in the civil and mass work.

The results of the Mass study indicated that the proportion of those who join vocational or labour unions, federations, and chambers of commerce and industry were lower than that in political organizations, at 15.6% in the Palestinian Territories and this also applies to active membership, at slightly above 6.5%. The findings also showed that the proportion of those affiliated with vocational unions, chamber of commerce and industry was higher in the West Bank than in Gaza and Jerusalem (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:58).

In conclusion, despite the various forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, the important point to be argued is that the range of the authentic political participation in the political process remains somewhat limited. It could be said that the great majority of Palestinian political parties have not been able to fully crystallize, according to the principles of participation and democratic choice. This situation, in itself, represents a manifestation of the subpar political culture that the ordinary Palestinian, who is still under the influence of the one man show type leadership. This scenario inevitably will marginalize the role of the citizen and lower the ceiling of the democratic process within political parties. This will in turn reflect the fall in the ceiling of democracy and free, voluntary participation in politics, at all levels (Ali, 2010:65).

1.11 Obstacles of political participation in Palestinian society

The core of political participation, of any society, is the opportunity that is given for voters to be involved in the decision making process, a characteristic that benefits a society greatly. Partaking in the political process is civilizations' way of avoiding deadlock political disputes and the ideal way to bring about substantial changes in the political system. A by-product of political participation might be this so allows citizens to develop and think critically and logically. This idea is still under debate at present, and in part of the 'sustainable development of societies' framework, particularly of interest to the development of third world countries (Qasem, 2009:1-2).

The form, value and effect of participation is closely associated with the form and nature of the prevailing democratic mechanism in the society. A democracy is characterized by decentralized power and distribution of power within the community. In order for political participation to be effective and authentic, the conditions must be fertile, ideally, sufficient presence of democratic liberty which enables citizens to practise their political rights, in accordance with international laws on political and civil rights, so far ratified by most nations in the world. Amongst these political rights, the most important political rights are freedom of expression (Act 19), the right to hold opinions, the right to peacefully assembly, the right to construct societies, and the right to participate in running public affairs (Act 21) the right to vote and be elected in free and fair elections (Act 25) (Awad, 2005:2-6).

The political process is considered a major cornerstone in the life of an individual, as it plays a vital role in organizing and managing the daily life of the society to which the individual belongs. The political process is a natural product of the culture of the life of the individual. The political process runs and is organized according the political and social hierarchy and is reflected in the daily life of the citizens. It is affected by economical and social crises while it is reflected in the nature and quality of the political participation of the individual in their relationship to the state and the community to which they belong or, as the case may be, do not feel they belong to. In the case of the Arab political world, the abundance of crises and problems suggests that political participation is inadequate (Al-Biag, 1997:64).

When talking about the Palestinian concern the nature of the present stage accompanied by socio-political factors and complications and organizational crises that have double and constituted an obstacle in front of the active role of the citizens in the political life.

1.11.1 Abstention from political participation

Not necessarily all potential voters participate in politics, for instance, when the government is riddled with practices which turn citizens away and hold at arm's length anything political. Problems could be, the repressive practices by the state against a citizen who participates politically, citizens' feelings of the futility of participation, the absence of a sense of duty towards their society, are common reasons which compel citizens to abstain from political participation.

In politically stable democratic countries, political participation is kept to a reasonable minimum (Miari, 2003:60), as voters often feel assured and confident in the political system. As for Arab countries, the reasons discourage voters from politics are reasons of fear for personal safety, oppression, repression, or feeling that participation is a wasted effort due to election rigging. Elections in the Arab world are not characterized as being free and fair and voters feel the weight of being deprived of the freedom to become active political participants. Haleem Barakat stated that "The systems, structures, and attitudes of some governments never allow people to share in the making of their fate and abuse their rights, preventing his development. They turn him into a helpless being (Barakat, 1985:19). He also stated that Arab governments are totalitarian ones; concerned mainly with repression. They resort to intimidation rather than persuasion. The people have lost the freedom to search, discuss, and participate in their self-determination (Barakat, 1985:450).

1.11.2 The political expatriation in the society

The extent to which citizens participate in the political action mainly depends on, the interests and capabilities of the citizens and on the country's climate; socially, materially, politically, and intellectually. In western countries, political participation is a civic duty on citizens and

that is considered an indicator of the integrity of the political climate. Although political participation is limited in stable, democratic countries (Miari, 2003:60), where the individual feels politically assured and secure, citizens' refusal to engage in politics represents the only way available for them to express their feelings through political non-violence. This is what political expatriation, referred to by Al-Jawhari, who explains it as the citizen's feeling that both the government and society are apathetic to him or her, and that their worthless to the community, feelings which deplete one of enthusiasm both for personal or political goals (Al-Jawhari, 1984:18).

The relationship between participation and expatriation are divergent. That is, the more the individual's expatriation increases, the less his political activity is. In some cases, an expatriated voter may choose not to vote or may choose to vote as opposition or engage in 'negative voting' (Jum'a, 1984:43).

1.11.3 The reality of political participation in the Palestinian society

The present situation indicates that political participation amongst Palestinians is low and that the present level of the political participation does not correspond to the extent to which Palestinians sacrificed. To talk about this present state of affairs, some questions must be raised:

1. How could a people, who initiated a bold and popular revolution in 1987, sparked by Run over to Palestinian workers, and made the ultimate sacrifices of life and limb, idly stand by in the West Bank, as their Gazan brothers, in 2008, were destroyed by the Israeli Army?
2. What about the people that started another uprising when Ariel Sharon entered the Haram Al-Sharif (Dome of the Rock) but that do not rise up to combat the constant excavation that threatens the foundations of that same mosque?
3. Why, when the entire world took to the streets to protest the storming of the Turkish flotilla that was carrying humanitarian aid to besieged Gaza, did the Palestinians in the West Bank do nothing?
4. Why is there no longer protest against the Occupation, as if the Occupation had left?
5. Why those who stand in solidarity with the Palestinians come from all over the world to defend the rights of the Palestinians, while the Palestinians themselves are silent?

It is necessary to raise more questions:

1. Why did all forms of popular resistance against the Occupation disappear, even though it has become more aggressive than previous years, in great part due to settlers policy, siege, and judaization wherever possible?
2. Why were once popular political parties and national organizations now weak and deferent in their effect on decision makers in the Palestinian society, concerning the fateful issues of the Palestinian people as well as regularly postponing elections rather than regularly holding them?

These questions necessitate a discussion of the obstacles.

1.11.4 The Obstacles for the political participation in the Palestinian Society

The political participation of third world citizens are in dire straits, which can be attributed to the structural and organizational framework of life in the community, with its dimensions (psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural). Ability to participate requires political stability which is reflected in all aspects of the citizens' lives (Ghalom et al, 1997:16) This same situation is much like that of Palestine, except that Palestinians have the additional crises brought on by the Occupation, as well as a pilot government, which brought with it a range of restrictions resultant of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements.

The Occupation is well equipped with all forms of weaponry, enabling it to control all parts of Palestinian life and land and ensure the realization of the continuation its policy to conquer the Palestinians and their native lands. It is important to discuss the major types of obstacles to present day Palestinian political participation:

1.11.5.1. Cultural / social obstacles:

The components of the Palestinian culture are similar to the general structure of the pan-Arab culture in terms of traditions, tribal customs. The Arab mentality is still traditional, based on the principle of inequality. The structural pattern of the Arab society affirms the authority of the ruling father, religious men, and other authority figures in the community; a patriarch. Barakat stated "The Arab society is one featured by personal, close social relations. The social relations

in the Arab community are still, and even in cities, primary group relations, which provide personalised, close, informal, and cooperative group ties from which the individual takes warmth, assurance, and through which he can totally be committed to relatives and close people in his life (Barakat, 1985:20).

The Palestinian political culture contains non-democratic traditional values such as the patriarchy, membership tendency, and fatalist beliefs (Miari, 2003:28) which hinder effective political participation of citizens. The prevalence of parental values, submission to the tribe's figureheads prevent many sons of the elites in the Palestinian governorates from being impervious from public opinion or consensus of the tribe leaders. The weak Palestinian Authority strengthens the tribal or clan power in the Palestinian society. The notice Robinson referred to was that "The clans and their sheikhs have great local influence but doesn't reach the level of influence on the national level. This means that clan by its individual reputation to dominate or influence in the Palestinian national policies on a large scale. However, the clans or tribes gain political significance in two ways:

One way that clans and tribes may gain political influence, is by being an institution with its own members, and second, clans and tribes are used strategically and have great importance in electing, representatives in the same constituencies, when organizing the elections, on the basis of constituencies or when holding the local elections (Robinson, 2008:4).

Clans and tribes have played a role in the Palestinian society, regardless of the value of this role, the researchers interest in implications of presence of clans and tribes in Palestine; forming a clan and tribe department in the PNA, appointing a PNA advisor to the head of Clan and Tribal Affairs, the government appointments which take into consideration the clan and tribal aspect, all these demonstrate and affirm the power of clans and tribes. The individual's role and motivation to participate politically is weak but the clans and tribes are strengthened.

This pattern of loyalties differs in its intensity from one place to another or from time to time, however, it is a dividing factor which offers weakness or strength, in front of the power of the intellectual and political belonging. This patterns nevertheless, is similar to the patterns existing throughout the Arab world, where blood relations take precedence and that the tribalism still influence peoples political, social, and cultural relations. The tribalism coming from the relatives has an immediate correlation in the nature of the national and local belonging because

blood relations, classes, and tribalism influence how the Arab identifies himself. Firstly, he is the son of his family, then the son of his tribe and/or clan, then the son of his neighbourhood, then the son of his village, town or city; all before he identifies himself as a son of his country (Diab, 2005:7). The regional, tribal, and family considerations, being basic and important elements in forming the constituent of the political, cultural awareness, represent restrictions and hindrances to the active participation and political development (Qasem, 2009:13).

The Mass Institute survey revealed that the rate of participation in family activities in the West Bank is higher than participation in the political protest marches and demonstrations whereas, sometimes political activities associated with vocational trade unions reflect a national dimension, due to relations beyond the regional, local, tribe/clan or family, linking people together in a common relationship of belonging to a profession, for example: The family or birthplaces different from those upon which the political parties or the mass movements, unions or associations (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:79).

Sometimes the traditions and customs play a negative role, especially those related to women, as the Palestinian society is a male dominated community. The inherited, traditional culture is still a stumbling block in the way of women in actively participating in public life and enjoying all the rights of citizenship. The continuing traditional division of the roles between man and women, where women's roles are almost limited to secondary ones, where the prevalent role for some Palestinian women never goes beyond being the family's primary caregiver and the homemaker. Although the women's job opportunities have expanded recently, some families prefer women work in traditionally female populated professions, such as teaching. This paternal outlook on women prevents them from participating in public life.

Within a culture that divides work on the basis of gender, political participation seems to be complicated and women's participation in public life in Palestine was still in its beginning despite the abundant sacrifices Palestinian women have had through the Palestinian history. On the party level, women represent 5% of the members of the central committee of Fatah, 4% out of the members of the high level offices of Fatah, and about 15% of total members of the Central Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and 15.5% out of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front. It is also notable that women generally do not enjoy leading in the front line positions of parties (Al-'Eelah, 2007:324). This is emphasized

through the data on the extent of women's participation in national and governmental institutions (Qasem, 2009:20). See table No. (80).

There is a consensus among political scientists that a democratic culture includes notions of equality, justice, freedom, loyalty to society, readiness for participation, trust in others, accepting the concept of politics, intellectual pluralism, tendency to identify with the people of homeland regardless of their background, rejection of the centralization of power, and nominations based on merit and political worthiness (Al-Azar, 1996:44).

The subpar democratic climate in Palestine deters citizens from political participation. The Palestinian political culture does not promote political participation and Palestinians have become used to the pattern and culture. Al-Jirbawi says that, "The political culture the Palestinian people are used to is a non-participant culture, attributed to the succession of several powers imposed on the Palestinian people. These forces were foreign and never concerned with educating people rather, emphasis was placed on indentifying people with his duties towards these powers, without discussing his rights. In the final analysis, there is a weakness in the concept of citizenship (Al-Jirbawi, 1996:25).

When political participation is restricted to the election and nomination process, this is a sign that of subpar political participation and even lifestyle. In other words, the participation process is viewed as a seasonal process ending with the election, not taking into consideration any permanent, systematic political effort and continuing participation representing effective activity of the political parties and organizations of civil society (Qasem, 2009:17).

1.11.5.2. Economic obstacles:

Palestinians are very busy making a living, especially following successive economic crises during which government workers, a huge sector of the labour force, underwent extended suspensions of their salaries, adding to the basket of worries of the Palestinians. This situation, which lasted for a long time, greatly diverted voters' attention away from politics, stances of donor countries on the matters at hand, and the Occupation; instead trying to eke out a living, in many cases.

Abrash stated "The dominating elite, powers, and parties in Palestine converted the fighters and militants into mercenaries and employees and gave them the curse or damnation of salary for many of them the pay was more significant than country" (Abrash, 2007). This analysis corresponds with the description of Halem Barakat, in his discussion on Arab citizens. He stated, "The prevailing system transformed Arab men to helpless and hopeless humans. Under these authoritarian systems, the Arab man lives on the margin of existence, seeking his basic needs and superficial interests occupy his spirit and intellect. He thinks not of himself. He feels but not for his existence but for those around him. He achieves but not for himself rather for the other. He establishes relations but at their core, they are relations of necessity and fear. He lives on the margin of existence rather in its core (Barakat, 1985:19).

The Palestinian economy suffers from a lack of natural resources and capital and being under absolute subordination of the Occupation, which created a hard economic situation. On the one hand they suffer from the rising prices of commodities, unemployment, growing rate of poverty, and few job opportunities while the siege on Gaza prevented many Palestinian labourers from entering Israel for precious job, accompanied repeated closures by the Israeli military on the West Bank. See table No. (81) The total number crossing closures into Israel, during the second half of 2009, reached 846. The erection of the permanent and 'flying' Israeli roadblocks barriers throughout the Palestinian Territories and rose to 2499 during the second half of 2009 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010:50).

1.11.5.3. Political hindrances

Political obstacles in Palestinian society are the key barriers of citizen's active participation in politics. The political culture of a society is an important element and it is a priority to understand this facet of a society that has not witnessed political independence and sovereignty, on the ground, over the last centuries. This resulted in the Palestinians not having enjoyed security or stability, which is reflected in the citizens lives. Therefore, to examine the political barriers becomes even more vital.

a. Obstacles due to the dominance of incumbent parties:

With the ascension of Hamas to power after the second legislative elections in 2006, the hidden conflict between Hamas and Fatah became plain. Unprecedented and grave consequences took place; the suspension of the political process, a deep rooted geographical division between West Bank and Gaza, followed by political division, even in the administration, institutions, military, judiciary, and services. This is what created a crisis with no end in sight (Eenaty, 2008:115). Each side seems to be satisfied with the existing situation, however, the violence that broke out between the two largest political representatives of the Palestinian people, so dismayed and frustrated them, they turned their backs on politics.

Many Palestinians have come to see political parties as a burden more than a means to resist the Occupation. Abrash expresses that "We notice the dominance of the political parties on the political stage, with marked absence of the independents or independent parties. We also see that there is no progress in the national project, neither as a national liberation scheme nor a plan for establishing a state. We are sorry to say that the great following of parties and factions no longer constitutes a healthy phenomenon or a national necessity, as it was at beginning, because of the absence of independence of decision within the majority these parties and the sharp conflicts between their slogans (Abrash, 2010).

The focus is on the competitive role among the Palestinian factions instead of on the resistance of occupation and instead of involving citizens in programmes aimed at dismantling the Occupation; they are now competing for party and personal interests. Their thoughts removed from the everyday residents, who are hopeless about the Palestinian state of affairs, how the Occupation undermined their development over the past years, watching Palestinian parties being served up on priceless dishes, because of internal Palestinian disputes, focusing on sharing their imagined authority. Abrash states "If the bad conditions we are facing merely refer to the enemy, and its practices, alliances and to the territorial encroachment, the issues would be simpler and it would be easy; a pride and honour for the people, who walk down the same road, ready to sacrifice. It is impossible to wait from the enemy but repression and terror. However, the fact is that the internal actors' mistakes played a great role in enabling the enemy to achieve its goals, whether thwarting the Palestinian peace project or besieging the spirit of resistance. These things bring about internal disputes

and division while Israel intensifies its settlement construction and the completion of judaizing Jerusalem.

The major burden dilemma is upon the problem of elites and parties, rather than the burden of a problem of a people aged over 4000, which all sorts of legions, invasions, and empires could not wipe off the face of the earth. This is a source of pride of the Palestinian people and is a source of worries for the Zionist entity (Abrash, 2007).

b. The existing political situation:

The modern events that the Palestinian people went through are the worst, whether on the domestic level, due to the violent political division, or on the international stage.

The Palestinians have become mistrustful of the successive Palestinian governments, which are restrictive and fruitless in meeting the needs of the Palestinians. On the international stage, the absolute support of the American administration for the Israeli policies in the region, and the pervading Arab weakness, which submits to the demands of America or Israel? The Palestinians lost hope in the UN or the American administration, or the international quartet to find a just solution to the Palestinian case. Consequently, the state of frustration the Palestinians have felt has increased.

Many citizens have given up resisting the Occupation or being a part of political participation due to the current policy of the PNA, which is trying to contain the resistance. The Palestinians saw attempts by the PNA to prevent the citizens from resisting the Occupation, where demonstrators were prohibited from reaching a friction point with the Occupation forces on the edges of towns and cities, or arrested under the pretext of protecting the Palestinian security or Palestinian interests.

This policy followed by the PNA, which rejects the idea of violent resistance as an existing political reality, created by external pressures on Palestinian political leaders. The citizen is divided on the internal level, politically and geographically, while living in the absence of a democratic climate, due to the dominance of a few Palestinian political leaders who are not faced with a political opposition.

Many citizens, who became frustrated, became that way due to the belief that their previous sacrifices were useless, due to political agreements that never satisfied even the minimum

aspirations of the Palestinians. Moreover, now there are many high powered figures who reaped the fruits of civilians' struggle and sacrifice, through occupying positions in the PNA, and there are even many political activists who joined the PNA. Their political activity was restricted by the framework of the policy set by the PNA and their positions prevented them from opposing the authority of the PNA. The majority of Palestinian security service members were active politically and before the PNA, they were leaders who resisted the Occupation. It should be pointed out that many of these leaders played a major role in the second Intifada, after negotiations reached a deadlock. They encouraged Yasser Arafat to return to the role of revolutionary against the Occupation.

c. The failure of confidence in the political process:

Confidence in the existing political parties has steadily diminished, thus parties have lost ability to arouse the populace to take part in the political process. Confidence reflects mutual or joint expectations' and obligations. The results of the Mass Institute survey showed the general Palestinian public has low confidence in their political institutions. See table No.(82) The percentage of those who have great confidence in their political parties does not exceed 5.1%, compared to those who do not have confidence at all, estimated to be 38%. In the governorate of Jerusalem, the rate does not exceed 1.9%, compared to those who do not have confidence is estimated to be 39%. In addition, the lowest rate of confidence was found in the central West Bank. It was higher in cities and camps than in villages. Those who had no confidence in the parties were of many different professions but those who were employers, civil service employees or unemployed displayed the least confidence. Even for those who support a particular party, they also exhibited a low rate of confidence. The percentage of those who said that they have great confidence in the political parties did not reach 9.4% whereas those who said that they didn't have any confidence in the parties didn't exceed 31% (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:89).

There was also a lack of confidence observed in PNA, its institutions, and the legislative council. One survey found that a third of the sample of the West Bank, do not trust in the legislative council (Nasr & Hilal, 2007:90).

The percentage of non-confidence in the institutions of the PNA is not less than 32.5% in the governorates of Jerusalem, 30.2% in the West Bank, against a rate of confidence not exceeding 8.1% in the West Bank and 3.1% in Gaza. The highest rate of non-confidence in

the institutions of the PNA was exhibited by Hamas supporters, reaching 60.4% and the lowest by Fatah supporters (29.1% if excluded are the Islamists and national independents). One of the groups exhibiting the lowest rate of confidence was amongst those working in PNA institutions (Nasr & Hilal 2007:90).

d. The non-institutional pattern:

The absence of essential social and political institutions means there is opportunity or way for the populace to take part in the political process, decision-making, and implementation. In addition to the absence of institutionalization from the political process, there is reflected a weakness of system and the failure of the system to cope with social change (Al-Biag, 1997:71) Present Palestinian institutions represent defunct bodies. The real decisions are made external to their deliberations, meaning the institutions represent are merely a formality. The failure of holding regular elections harms the efficacy and potency of public opinion in the decision-making process. The bodies that make the decisions when holding periodical elections fear conveying them to the centres of decision-making, so they will make policy in line with the voter's demands, at least out of concern for their political careers. Issues that matter to the voters must be subject to the examination of the populace, rather than the leadership's own private deliberations, when it is time for decision making. Palestinian politicians are disinterested in public opinion and often make their decisions apart from what the street wants. All the agreements signed with the Israelis, for example, were never offered or displayed in public forums, for view by the voters, as is often the case in developing countries.

In conclusion, obstacles to political participation are:

- Weakness in the political socialization process the individual receives in the Palestinian society.
- Absence of the media's role in enhancing political participation.
- Restrictions on freedom.
- Frustration resultant of the existing political situation.
- Presence of political corruption.
- Formalized political domination.
- Poor democratic climate.
- Weakness in the political, social institutions such as the political parties and the nature of the party system

1.11.5.4 Conclusion:

The current situation indicates that political participation amongst Palestinians is low, completely antithetical to the amount of sacrifice Palestinians made pre-PNA. This may be due to reasons related to the psychological, social, economic, cultural, and political dimensions.

The weak democratic climate, the prevalence of non-democratic traditional values such as patriarchalism, allegiance to clan or tribe, imposed beliefs, the occupying of citizens to earn a living, all these have doubled the consecutive economic crises, the dominance of incumbent parties, the constant suspensions of the elections, and the geographic and political division between the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, political division in the judiciary, military, administration, and organizations, will never, provide an opportunity for citizens to be active participants in the political process. The extent to which citizens may participate in the political action depends mainly on the citizens' interests, the political and general conditions; socially, ideologically, and materialistically. The nature of the present phase the Palestinians are in, set on by structural crises, social and political failures which were compounded by the doubly devastating Occupation and then the foundation of a national authority (the PNA), together constituting an obstacle for a robust political culture.

1.12 Study design

1.12.1 The study problem

Research on political participation is mainly focused on democracy in the Western countries, without giving attention to others; however, in recent years researchers have started to research the global implications of democracy to political participation, due to the growing phenomenon of democracy in Third World countries. This area has become of particular interest after the emergence of the so-called "New World Order;" which focuses on the call for a democratic alternative to traditional forms of political governance. There is deficit of field studies in political participation of citizens, namely, information on the process of political participation in Arab and Islamic countries, which remains scarce and uncategorized (Ghalom et al, 1997:11).

This study is tray to fill voids left by previous studies (Nazzal, 2004; Rahal, 2004; Dunia Ishmael, 2004; Qasem, 2009), analyzed only the reality of the political participation of Palestinian women. This study, however, will be devoted to investigating the political participation of Palestinian citizens in general, and try new topics: forms, motives and obstacles of political participation of Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These issues were not addressed in the study of Miari (The Cultural Politics in Palestine, 2003; The Political Behavior of Students in Palestinian Universities, 1996).

These considerations have resulted to the need to address the issue of political participation, in terms study and analysis, through identification of the degree of political participation in the Palestinian community in an attempt to address the theme of political participation, by answering the questions of study.

1.12.2 Questions of study

1. What is the degree of political participation in the Palestinian community?
2. What are the main forms of political participation in the Palestinian community?
3. What are the main motives of political participation in the Palestinian community?

4. What is the extent of the impact of the socio-economic background of the citizen on the degree of political co-citizens?
5. Is there relationship between the exposure to Israeli violence and political participation in the Palestinian society?
6. What are the obstacles to political participation in Palestinian society?

1.12.3 The Significance of the study

The significance of this study lies in its attempt to fill in voids left by previous studies (Rahall, 2004; Nazzal, 2004; Ismael; 2004; Qasem,2009; Miari, 1996, Miari, 2003)

Where she studied new field in political participation like forms, motives and obstacles to political participation as well as on the study of the impact of socio-economic background of the citizen on political participatio, and effect of the exposure to Israeli violence to the political participation in the Palestinian society.

Ali Ghalom says that the reason for the lack of field research on political participation in the Arab and Islamic world is that there are several constraints, including restricted geographical factors, spread of illiteracy, political conditions, lack of resources allocated for research, absence of the role of the centres and institutions that foster social research, and insufficient libraries. Therefore, it is important to conduct field studies related to political participation in Islamic and Arab state (Ghalom et al, 1997).

Besides the importance of political participation as a subject of research, comes from the significant impact it has in the establishment of the institutional structure of the state at various political, social, and economic levels. The importance of this study stems from the fact that it examines an important topic,"political participation,"a controversial topic in the Palestinian community; a community which subsists under very difficult conditions and anxiously awaits a political solution. This study will be an important reference for those interested in the area of political participation, as it will reveal important information about theme and will add new scientific knowledge to this field.

Local studies on the Palestinian society have not discussed the impact of the socio-economic background of the citizen on political participation. The absence of such research is due to

constraints related to political conditions, a lack of resources allocated for research, and the absence of the role of centres and institutions that foster social research, in addition to inadequate libraries and resources. Accordingly, data on the political participation of young people remains scattered and disorganized, so it is imperative to conduct studies on political participation in the Palestinian society, to form an integrated and clear picture. This study will attempt try to fill the vacuum left by previous studies.

1.12.4 Hypotheses of the study

- 1.12.4.1 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's gender.
- 1.12.4.2 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's religion.
- 1.12.4.3 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work status.
- 1.12.4.4 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work sector.
- 1.12.4.5 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's refugee status.
- 1.12.4.6 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's party affiliation.
- 1.12.4.7 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's region.
- 1.12.4.8 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of living.
- 1.12.4.9 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's exposing to Israeli violence.
- 1.12.4.10 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 1996 elections.

- 1.12.4.11 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 2006 elections.
- 1.12.4.12 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in the local municipal elections.
- 1.12.4.13 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's social status.
- 1.12.4.14 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification.
- 1.12.4.15 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of residence.
- 1.12.4.16 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of residence.
- 1.12.4.17 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's degree of religion.
- 1.12.4.18 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank.
- 1.12.4.19 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian statistically according to the participant's family members.
- 1.12.4.20 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian statistically according to the participant's monthly income.
- 1.12.4.21 There are no statistically significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction.
- 1.12.4.22 There is no statistically significant correlation at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between the participant's age group and their political participation in the Palestinian society.

1.12.5 Study variables

The current study contains the following independent variables: gender, age, place of residence, social status, religion, and the degree of religiosity, political affiliation, political orientation, monthly income, level of education, profession, number of family members, living in the same residence, place of residence, exposure to Israeli violence, proximity to Israeli settlements, proximity to military posts, proximity to the Apartheid Wall, classification of residential areas, involvement in the presidential and legislative election of 1996 and 2006, and involvement in the local municipal elections. The dependent variable, is the political participation.

1.12.6 Study terms

1.12.6.1 **Political Participation:** Every action, whether successful or unsuccessful, structured or non-structured, continuous or progressive, resorting to legal or illegal means, in order to influence political decisions; the conduct of public affairs, or the selection of leaders of government on local and national levels (Arabi, 1987:157). It shows the desire through the will of the individual in general membership and in political participation for the protection from life conditions and crises (Arabi, 1987:172).

Freihat thinks that political participation, includes a series of acts designed to engage and influence the functioning of the political process, implementation, evaluation, support and participation at all administrative, and organizational levels, which in turn affect the decisions made by the official government bodies of one of the three powers: (legislative, executive, and judicial). So, we can organize and collate these activities in a range of broad headings, such as voting election, participation in election campaigns, and participation in non-traditional activities, such as demonstrations, marches, etc (Freihat, 1999:14).

The researcher thinks that political participation is the behaviour of individuals and their voluntary activities, which symbolize the contribution of citizens and their role to the framework of the political system. It is a behaviour of the ordinary citizens or

politicians, politically framed, in order to influence decisions made by the important bodies in the decision-making, whether government party, parliament, or whether this activity is individual or collective, organized or spontaneous, progressive or continuous, peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, and effective or non-effective.

1.12.6.2 **Political parties:** The political party is referred to as those organizations, which generally include a number of people who profess the same political ideas and work to ensure their effectiveness in the management of political affairs of the State. The emergence of political parties is associated with the emergence and development of parliamentary assemblies, which have exercised democracy in political discussions. Thanks to the existence of these parties in Palestine, parliamentary blocs have emerged to exercise democratic life in political parties (Al-`Eelah, 2007:99).

1.12.6.3 **The political process:** The process of interaction between all main and marginal elements, in the political environment of the internal or external system, for the purpose of establishing the general policies of the society or to positively or negatively influence such policies (Assaf, 1994:91).

1.12.6.4 **Political culture:** The set of knowledge, views, and prevailing attitudes towards politics, government affairs, State, authority, loyalty, and belonging. It also means the system of beliefs and symbols and given values of how society considers the appropriate role of government and its controls, and the appropriate relationship between the ruler and the ruled (E'Laiwa & Mahmud, 2000:43-44).

1.12.6.5 **Intifada (Civil Uprising; Shaking Off):** It is a popular social rebellion movement against undesirable conditions in order to change them to a better situation, through mobilizing popular behaviour and exploiting its activities against the occupier in order to regain the stolen rights. It refers to the first Intifada, which began in the year 1987, as well as to the second one (Al-Aqsa Intifada), which started in 2000 (Abu-Hin, 2001).

1.12.6.6 **WAR OF 1948** Broke out after the declaration of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 between Israeli forces and Arab armies. By the end of the War of 1948, Jewish forces

had captured 54% of the territory assigned to the Arab state in UN Res. 181 and Israel controlled 77.4% of the land. Palestine was fragmented, its society dismantled and its people rendered a nation of displaced refugees (UN estimates: 726,000 Palestinian refugees located outside the armistice lines and some 32,000 inside). 418 Palestinian villages had been depopulated and erased from the map as a result of Jewish military activities, massacres and expulsion orders (Passia, 2002).

1.12.6.7 **WAR OF 1967** Also June or Six-Day War; launched by an Israeli attack on Egyptian posts on 5 June 1967. Also referred to as *An-Naksa*. Resulted in the Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine, i.e., the Gaza Strip and West Bank, incl. East Jerusalem, which was subsequently annexed. Israel illegally declared its jurisdiction over all the OPT on 27 June and formally annexed Arab Jerusalem on 28 June 1967 (Passia, 2002).

1.12.6.8 **Palestinian National Authority (PNA)**: Established on the basis of the DoP signed by the PLO and Israel on 13 Sept. 1993 and governs Palestinian affairs in the self-rule areas. It consists of the elected President (Yasser Arafat), the appointed cabinet (executive committee currently composed of 32 PNA Ministers) and the Palestinian Legislative Council (88 elected members). The PNA is subject to the agreements signed with Israel and as such has no foreign relation powers. It will be responsible for negotiating the permanent status issues towards a final settlement with Israel (Passia, 2002).

1.12.6.9 **Palestinian Refugee**: Refugee is any Palestinian expelled from his natural place of residence in Palestine for the year 1948, later or departed from it for any reason but Israel did not permit him/her to return to his/her original home. Palestinian refugees are distributed into 59 official camps; 19 are in the West Bank, 8 in Gaza Strip, 10 in Jordan, 10 in Syria in addition to 12 in Lebanon; the rest are in the Arab Diaspora in the Arab countries outside camps and in the international Diaspora i.e. outside the limits of the Arab World in the two Americas, Australia and other countries; it is estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees today is more than five million (Banat 2002).

1.12.6.10 **UNRWA The UN Relief and Works Agency** for Palestine Refugees in the Near East was established by UNGA Res. 302 of Dec. 1949 to give emergency assistance to Palestinians displaced by the War of 1948 and began to operate in May 1950. Its mandate, to provide essential education, health and relief services to Palestine refugees living in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the WBGs, has been renewed repeatedly ever since. Headquarters are in Gaza (Passia, 2002).

1.12.7 The limits of the study

The survey was limited by the following factors:

- **Spatial boundaries:** The various Palestinian areas that fall within the land known as 1967, which includes both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- **Temporal boundaries:** The process of data collection was carried out in the period from 1 June-20 October 2010.
- **Boundaries of humanity:** The Palestinians citizens residing in the lands of the West Bank and Gaza and are entitled to vote according to the Palestinian law.
- **Study tool:** A questionnaire that was been prepared for the measurement of political participation in the Palestinian society.

2. Chapter Two: Previous Studies

In this chapter the most important Arab and foreign studies about the political participation were summarized, with emphasis on studies that have examined political participation in the Third World. The order of the studies was arranged from the most recent to the oldest as follows:

Nadia Abu-Zahira's study (2010) the objective of this study in to identify the phenomenon of the social political expatriation of the Palestinian refugees and "specifically" the people of the Palestinian camps. The researcher has used (Seaman Scale) to measure the political expatriation. The study has concluded that there was a Social expatriation of people of Palestinian camps as being the least involved in the Societal life compared the role of that in internal structure attached to subjects of democracy, pluralism, human rights, sovereignty of the law and others. The researcher has examined his study in a historical and analytical content to illustrate and clarify the changes that accompanied the march of Fateh movement over four decades. The Findings of the study have shown that the contribution of Fateh movement to promote and enhance the issue of the political development wasn't a cording to the scope and range expected whether on the Occupation Resistance Level are issues of internal structure. Currently, The Fateh Movement is suffering from a state of imbalance between the political action and military action and the loss of the self-entity.

Robert Dowd and Michael Hoffman study (2009) Study of Religion, Gender and Political Participation in Africa: Lessons from Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda, Objective of this study is to identify the impact of religious belief and communal religious involvement on political participation among men and women in Africa. This study addresses the following questions: (1) Do religious belief and practice encourage or discourage political participation by women? (2) Do religious belief and practice have a greater impact on the likelihood that women will be politically engaged than on the likelihood that men will be politically engaged? (3) To what extent does the impact of religious belief and communal practice on women's political participation depend on the type of religion in question or the particular denomination? These questions are addressed using the results of a mass survey of Christians and Muslims conducted in Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda during 2006 and 2007. First, we found out that, although Christianity and Islam are not more encouraging of men political participation than

women political participation, neither of these two religions depresses women political participation. Second, the results indicate that religious belief has a more positive impact on political participation than communal religious practice especially for women. Third, religious belief has a more powerful and positive effect on political participation among Muslim women than among Christian women.

In a study of the Lammie (2009) Young Adults and a Model for Political Participation, The objective of the study is to know the effects of age on the political participation in the U.S. Age differences in political participation are examined in order to better understand political participation among older and younger Americans, Among the many unsolved puzzles in research on participation in American politics is the apparent disengagement of young adults.

Yet empirical research, so far, has not addressed the fundamental question: Do the models explaining the participation of younger adults differ from those explaining participation of older adults? Age differences in political participation are examined in order to better understand political participation among older and younger Americans. The results indicate that exactly the same model for political participation applies to both older and younger adults. The participation gap is a result of differences in political interest, discussion, knowledge, media use, mobilization, and partisanship.

Sahay study (2009) this study is based upon the political behaviour of high and low caste rural women of the district of Allahabad in the state of Uttar Pradesh in India. It centrally deals with the political awareness and political participation of the rural women in the district. It also focuses upon the level of political awareness and participation among the higher and the lower caste women. The findings suggest that there exists inversely proportional relation between political awareness and political participation among the low and high caste rural women in India. Whereas the higher caste women were found politically more aware than the lower caste women, the lower caste women were more participant in all sorts of political activities and agenda. Despite being unaware of the developments taking place in national and international politics, the lower caste women were very active in politics. The enactment of 73rd Amendment Bill in the Constitution, through which 33% of the seats were reserved for women in the elections, has given a new dimension to rural politics in India. A number of

extra-constitutional power centres have emerged in rural India; this constitutes a threat to the Indian democracy.

In a study of the theory of Dasuki (2008) "The Right of Political Participation of Women"; the study aimed to highlight the views of the thinker secular and Muslim women's right on political participation; the researcher concluded that in Islamic thought, Islamist thinkers were split into several teams; each has a vision and method of interpretation, Some are against woman going out of her house, others believe that Islam has given her all the political rights even the right to mandate, and others came in the middle between the two groups; they believe that Islam allowed women to work or take public policy positions with the exception of the state, and there are those who believe that Islam created woman and created women's work, but it doesn't specify the nature of the work and the Quran makes no distinction between women and men in terms of the fact that work is for both, and that participation in the issues is the duty of every Muslim. The researcher concluded that Islam does not deprive women of political action, and other topics urge women to work to build society. The perception of women under the secular law gives women equal justice with men, but the facts about secular countries says that a woman never practices policy at the allowed level.

The result that the researcher came up with is that both the secular and Islamic societies show the political rights granted to the women under the constitutional, legislative laws as confined to the level of application and in the exercise of their right as voters. The researcher concluded that there is a combination of factors that limit women's participation in political work, including cultural, factors such as weak test of democracy in Arab societies, and cultural stunting that Western and Islamic communities have produced. It is a culture specialized in the prevailing stereotypes about the roles of men and women. Women do not know, but men do. This culture emerges in Arab and Islamic societies, and legal stunting. In some Islamic countries, there are some legislations that degrade the role of women and prevent them from going out to work. In secular states, there were differences between the legal text and the reality of women life in society, but they do not provide other foundations like economic and financial support and the religious stunting, and these belong to Islamic societies, in particular. The secular communities stayed away from religion and considered it as a constraint or impediment.

In study of Jassem Al-Hariri (2008) Impact of the political participation of the development citizenship: In a case study of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the researcher confirmed that there are points of convergence between political participation and citizenship, especially in the performance of the people of their political role. The researcher pointed out the presence of evolution in the nature of political participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Civil society organizations play an increasing role in the educational definition of human rights and political life in the Gulf. He said, the party experience in the GCC countries suffers a lot, under the Gulf regimes that prevent the establishment of political parties. The government system in the nations of the Council is still an absolute rule, and the style of a silent opposition exists; this led to the delayed practice of the party in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Osman study (2008) It is on the political participation of Palestinian youth: the goal of this study is to examine the reality of the political participation among Palestinian youth at the official level within the structures of the Palestinian political system which was formed after 1994. The study has adopted varied research methodology characterized by a descriptive approach where the data from the field sample is dependent on questions and interviews with decision makers from political parties and youth organizations around the party; this was the instrument used for data collection. The study limits included the political participation of youth in the Palestinian Territories within the scope of the National Authority in general.

One of the most important outcomes is that the participation of youth in Palestine is associated with the march of national struggle and political history over a period of approximately for a century. However this participation did not crystallize specifically and clearly within explicit youth slogans only following the formation of youth organizations and frameworks that are concerned with the youth sector and seek to achieve their needs and promote their participation in the political professional action and national decision-making. The study showed that the political participation of young people is weak and reached zero participation in all parties. The figure rises slightly at the leadership levels two and three; the proportion of youth representation had decreased in the second Legislative Council in relation to the first Legislative Council. The researcher concluded that the political participation in decision-making at the public or national level. The presence of young people in policy formulation and monitoring of implementation and evaluation is weak and non-scheduled.

The researcher concluded that there are obstacles to political participation of young people that stem from the cultural factor which plays an embedding factor before the progress of young people towards political participation. The traditional perspective of the prevailing culture has always tended to narrow the area of youth participation objectively through following conservation criteria that attenuate the capacity of young people and discourage any effort to carry out leadership tasks in the prime of life, under the pretext of lack of experience and the fear of failure. The researcher has explained, that highlighted problems facing young people and limiting their political participation, are represented in the political rhetoric, which nourishes a culture of intolerance and hatred and the refusal to accept the different others. This discourse is very dangerous to the extent that it threatens the unity and civil peace of the community.

The study Adawi (2008) *Role of Organizations of Civil Society in Promoting Political Participation in the Province of Bethlehem*”; the study aimed to identify the role of civil society organizations in promoting political participation in the province of Bethlehem. It also aimed to identify the contribution of these organizations to influence the awareness of citizen towards the concept of political participation in the Bethlehem district, Moreover, it sought to identify the point of view of activists in civil society organizations in promoting political participation in the province of Bethlehem. The researcher used the method of the survey sample and a questionnaire as an instrument for the collection of the study data. The study community consisted of organizations of civil society in Bethlehem. The study showed that the respondents view of the role of civil society organizations in promoting political participation scored average on the total scale.. It also showed that there are no statistically significant differences attributable to the variables of sex, marital status, place of residence and political affiliation, while the study showed the existence of differences attributable to the variable of religion that were for the benefit of respondents of the Christian religion. It also showed the existence of differences attributable to the variable of age and for the benefit of the age group of 41years and above. Also there were differences attributable to the changing nature of the profession for the benefit of government officials. The researcher said that this result is a reflection of the fact that government officials are informed the institutions of civil society through contact with citizens.

In another study by Ali (2008) The role of civil society organizations in promoting political participation in the Palestine; the study aimed to identify the reality of Palestinian civil society organizations and their potential role in promoting political participation in the Palestine. The researcher discussed the origins and roots of these organizations since the beginning of the last century and the circumstances they had gone through with the emergence of these organizations at various subjective and objective levels. The researcher also discussed the research process through the Palestinian civil society organizations, the emergence of the theories of civil society in Europe and the rest of the world, and the changes that have affected these theories. The time frame of the study ranged, between 1993-2006, in which the descriptive analytical approach was adopted. One of the most notable results is the inability of civil society organizations to identify strategic priorities for their goals, programs, projects and internal and external relations and their adoption in many cases, to make a reaction without planning or to make genuinely carefully targeted in initiative. Moreover, it is their inability to deliver their concept and objectives to broader and more inclusive sectors; these organizations and their activities are centralized within the cities and large towns, and they have a weak presence in rural communities that are socially and economically marginalized at the overall Palestinian national levels.

Khader study (2008) It is called "The Student Movement at Najah National University in Establishing the Concept of Political Participation, 1994-2000". The study dealt with the student's movement in the Palestinian-an Najah National University in terms of their potentials to contribute to bringing about a qualitative change in the foundations of a political participation among the large Palestinian community. The researcher used descriptive and analytical approaches, as well as a personal interview with the leaders of student work. One of the most important findings of the study was the retreat of the role of the student movements following Israeli-Palestinian agreements, as the student movement is in a state of mass attendance in the phases of confrontation with the occupation, while being in a state of decline and contraction in its role in the case of calm and light intensity of the confrontation with the occupation; the relationship of the student movements has declined with the social environment; there is no voluntary work by students to help social groups. The study showed that students are not partners in the policy related to education and student reality, whether it is in the context of the university or within a framework of references for the Palestinian institutions of higher education. The student movement was not able to create modern and

sophisticated techniques to work with the students and to be consistent with the developments taking place in the environment in which students live. The communications of the student movements in the Palestinian territories with the regional and global student movements was limited; thus, they lived in a state of ossification and stagnation. The study showed the steps and practices which students were involved in before and during the electoral process in order to expand the students' understanding of the importance of political participation at the grass-roots and various trade unions.

Valdez and Bacey study (2008): "Group-Based Resources and Political Participation among Latinos in the U.S." The objective of this research is to focus on racial group differences between blacks and whites. The findings suggest that specific social capital resources (i.e. group self-identification and consciousness) affect the type and extent of Latinos' political participation:

1. The likelihood of voter registration is lower among ethnic, pan ethnic, and racially-identified Latinos when compared against Latinos who identify themselves as "American". However, panethnic-identified Latinos with a belief in group consciousness are more likely to register for vote.
2. The likelihood of political participation beyond voting is lower for panethnic-identified Latinos when compared against ethnic, racial, or American-identified Latinos.

Krilova (2008), the research question is: "what are the effects of remittances on political participation in the recipient countries?" The researcher answers this question by testing two opposing hypotheses:

The first hypothesis argues that just as dependence on remittances can lead to 'moral hazard' problem on the economic side, it can result in a passive citizenship and decline in political involvement.

The theory behind this hypothesis is that voters are rational; they measure the costs and benefits of political participation. When the costs of political participation are higher than the benefits the voters are likely to receive from the state, they choose to withdraw their participation.

The other hypothesis argues that dependence on remittances has the opposite effect; it results in an increase in political participation. The argument for this hypothesis is embedded in the modernization thesis. Since remittance funds represent an increase in income and are often

invested in education; the researcher would expect an increase in political participation due to the increase in the socioeconomic status of the recipients. The results of the regression analyses provide support for the first hypothesis.

Anduiza et al, study (2008) This paper tests the impact of exposure to political information in traditional and new media on different dimensions of political participation. The models are run using data from a survey conducted in Spain in 2007.

First, in order to analyze the scope of the impact of media use on political participation, media exposure is categorized according to the degree of its political content.

Second, a set of political attitudes that are usually associated to political participation are included in the analysis and have been also used to control the indirect effects of exposure to new and old media.

The results demonstrate that impacts on political participation of the use of new media on one hand and exposure to old media on the other are quite different, and that Internet use is not only an intermediate variable between attitudes and participation, but searching for information in the net and conducting other interactive activities also foster motivations with impact on political participation.

Khader's study (2007), the political participation of women in Japan is a study on the position of Japan in the world in terms of the political representation of women, both at the ministerial or at the parliamentary level. The aim of the study was to determine the relationship between economic progress of the state and political representation of women. The sample included 134 states, 27 of them are developed countries, including Japan; the subject of the study, while there are 107 developing states. The study showed that the economic progress of the State is not the essential condition for increasing the representation of women at ministerial level. In the first ten countries in terms of parliamentary representation of women, developed countries represented seven countries at a rate of 25.9% of the developed 27 countries of the sample. The developing countries accounted for three countries of Rwanda in the first place, Cuba in the seventh, and Costa Rica in ninth place, or 2.8% of the developing countries of the sample of 107 countries. As for women's representation at ministerial the level, the first ten countries in the developed countries were represented by eight countries, 29.6% of the sample

of developed countries, while two came only of Colombia and Zimbabwe, or 1.8% of the sample of developing countries within the first ten countries.

The researcher concluded that Japan has come in late in relation to political representation of women among the world's developed and developing countries alike. Japan came in No. 95 position among the nations of the world. In the proportion of the Japanese parliament, representation of Japanese women, ranked No.(72) among world nations in the proportion of ministerial representation of women.

The researcher believes that the economic progress is one of the factors that help to increase the political representation of women, but it is not the only one though. There are other factors that may be the most influential in increasing the representation of women. The most important of these are customs and traditions that may sometimes stand in the way of achieving greater political participation of women, even in developed countries, such as Japan.

In another study by Awad (2008) titled:"The role of Palestinian women's organizations in activating women's political participation in the period between (2000-2006)"; the study aimed to determine the role of Palestinian women organizations and the effectiveness of various programs and activities in the promotion of women issues, especially at the level of political participation as it has a significant impact on overall community development process. This study also aims to show the extent of acceptance of the Palestinian community to attend women political participation in politics and decision-making positions. It also addressed the issue of woman quotas and its impact on women increased political participation, and the role of women in media and participation in the development of the Palestinian economy.

The field aspect of the study adopted a questionnaire to gather information on Palestinian women organizations in the Palestinian territories. The questionnaire was distributed over the entire study sample of women organizations totalled 75 in the West Bank. For this purpose the historical approach and the descriptive analysis were followed and are questionnaire was distributed over the full sample study.

The study showed that the Palestinian decision-makers have worked to increase the political participation of Palestinian women through laws, and new legislations that have increased the political role and contribution of women in decision-making. An example of this is the quota system and the development of services for women in the various ministries, as well as insistence on the presence of women in international forums.

The study showed that women organizations and frameworks have contributed to the increased political awareness of women through their women educational, political, and cultural programs that have maintained their traditional roles on women empowerment and related income-generating programs and they were linked to development. These worked to increase the effectiveness of women' political role through their contribution to support of women access to decision-making centres, through awareness of elections, and the organization of meetings with candidates, support of election campaigns, and provide as much as possible funding for electoral campaigns for women candidates. This was with regard to the role and size of women political participation and her role in Palestinian decision-making. The researcher noted that it did not match the magnitude of the sacrifices made by women since the British Mandate to the present and her exposure to the repressive practices of Israeli occupation from the killing, displacement and arrest. She stood side by side with men in all fields and locations, and that is very natural in an oriental, parental society in which women continue to shadow man; this needs lot of time and effort so that the community can get used to accept woman as a partner. The study also concluded that the liberation of women economic, social, and increased education is a key to activate women political participation; women who are not working and non-educated are more dependent on man-the decision maker than the women who are economically independent and educated. The interests of illiterate women don't usually come from the family environment and they are more inclined to play the traditional role of women.

In study of Atta Ahmed Shaqfa's (2008), this study aims at identifying the nature of the relationship between self appreciation and political participation of the students of Al-Quds Open University at Gaza-Rafah district during variables of sex and socio-economic levels for recognition of the psychological state. In this study, the researcher has followed the descriptive approach where he applied the field procedures to the tools of study on a simple random sample of students of Rafah Educational Area at Al-Quds University in Gaza. The

total number of the original community study has reached (2000) students of both sexes, registered in the second semester of the Academic year 2006/2007.

The study results have also illustrated that the political participation of the members of the study sample was high for the students of Al-Quds University at Rafah Educational Area. This indicates that the sample members fully comply to a lot of manifestations and aspects of the political participation in word and deed and that the political participation is not associated with the degree of self appreciation of sample members. The findings have shown that there are distinctions between males and females in the political participation in favour of the males. That is, the male members of the study sample were more politically involved than the student females. There were also differences in the extent of participation among the students on the economic level. These were also in favour of the students of the higher economic level.

Robnett study (2006) African Americans, Political Participation, and the Gender Divide, The objective of this study is to find out whether African-American women political participation differs from that of African-American men. Although numerous studies discuss the political implications of class divisions among African Americans, few studies analyze gender differences in political participation. Employing data of a national cross-sectional survey with a sample of 1205 adult African-American respondents from the 1993 National Black Politics Study (NBPS) conducted by the Center for the Study of Race at the University of Chicago.

Dawson, Brown, and Jackson (1993), this study concludes that:

- 1) African American women political participation is less than that of African-American men;
- 2) While the Black church facilitates political participation; its affects are stronger on men than on women;
- 3) Belonging to an organization that improves the status of Black Americans facilitates equal gender political participation;
- 4) Black feminist consciousness decreases political participation on part of men, but it has no effect on Black women participation;
- 5) Black Nationalism facilitates Black women political participation while it has a negative influence on men's participation.

Alwati study (2006) "Women and Political Participation are Difficult Challenges", aims to review the reality and history of women political participation, and to show the main challenges faced by women in political participation; the researcher found out that the political representation of Egyptian women is weak, and weaknesses is in various political aspects including women representation in political parties, which are still limited, as well as in parliamentary assemblies and participation in elections; the nominations of the ruling National Democratic Party and opposition parties in the elections of House of The People are disappointing to the hopes of women seeking representation in parliament for the ruling National Democratic Party nomination could nominate only 6 women in all constituencies out of the 444 candidates.

Suhail Khalaf's study (2005), the study aimed at measuring the effect of freedom of press on the political development in Palestine (West Bank and Gaza strip) at the time of the PNA from 1994 until 2004. The study has shown that the period the study has covered from 1994-2004 wasn't an ideal one to the media and press, which was reflected on freedom of opinion and expression at the Palestinian areas. The study findings have concluded that the PNA has provided a legal background to legalize the media action. However, these laws haven't received the respect required from the Departments and systems, of the PNA.

Abdul-Karim Ismael (2005), the studies aimed at identifying the roles of the Palestinian local authorities to enhance and consolidate participation and bring about political development. The researcher used the experimental approach by means of designing a field questionnaire. The sample consisted of (238) local bodies at West Bank as Community study. A random diarchal sample was chosen from municipalities, villager councils and enterprise committees. The findings of the study concluded that the foreign authorities ruling Palestine successively created the authorities of local government that serve and achieve their aims and objects rather than serve the citizens there fore, the goal of these successive central power on Palestine regarding the local authorities was not to develop them so that they will not be independent official institutions in their activities and purposes and the scope of their representation for population for central authorities. They become independent that helps them control and dominate the country and people.

The findings have shown that aspects of independence, decentralization, democracy, accountancy and participation were still weak. The findings have also indicated that the extent of decentralization and independence enjoyed by the local authorities is meager and inappropriate with the concept of local government based on independency and decentralization. The findings have shown that the level of democracy the local bodies enjoy is little and poor.

The findings of study confirmed that the scope and domain of political participation and opening the door towards the emergence of political leaders are still poor, moreover, the Palestinian institutions and local authorities submit to an institutional reality featured by an administrative centralization where decision making refer to the top of hierarchy. This makes the scope of participation limited to the extent of receiving rather than making decisions except within marginal limits.

Haddad said in his study (2005), a comparison of the psychological study of samples from the participants and the Palestinians not involved politically. It examines the issue of political participation in the psychological dimension on a community in which policy controls their daily lives; the study sought to link between political participation as a phenomenon and many psychological variables. The study aimed to identify the nature and extent of the relationship between each of the dimensions of personality: "extroversion, neuroticism, lying", psychological security is the source of control on the political participation in the variables of gender, socio-economic level, age and occupation in order to try to determine the psychological state of participants and non-participants in the Palestinian political community. The study sample consisted of students from Aqsa University and the Islamic University in Gaza, and it covered a sample of security officers and members of the teaching staff working at both universities and Al-Quds Open University as well. The study found out that political differences existed between participants and non-participants on the political variables (age, political participation and extroversion), while there were not significant differences between the two groups regarding variables (economic and social levels, psychological security, lying and security). The study concluded that there are differences between males and females on variables (age, political participation and neurotic and lying, low psychological security and a source of internal control); the sample variances were for the interest of males regarding most variables except the variable of (psychological security), which was in favour of the

females. There were no differences between the two sexes for the rest of the study variables regarding (social and economic level and extroversion and a high security psychiatric settings and the source of the external) control.

Leong study (2004) Race and Religiosity as Predictors of Political Participation. The objective of this study was to clarify the relationship between religion and political participation of African Americans, who historically have relied on churches as instruments for protest and power. The results of this study showed the existence of a relationship between religion and political participation, with more distinct effects among African Americans. Hence, the relationship between race and political participation is mediated through religiosity. Finally, although educational level is a significant, direct predictor of political participation, the effects of religiosity are more pronounced. It suggested that African Americans religiosity is a more compelling factor in stimulating political participation than educational attainment alone.

In study of Iman Babys's (2004), the women political participation. The study aimed at displaying dimensions of the issue of political participation of the Egyptian woman: describing it, it's Obstacles, how to activate it. The study sees that the Obstacles that prevent woman from taking part in political life are the sense of in security, insults by candidates and the funds the nominees spend highly to bug votes.

The finding of the study have revealed that the high percentage of illiteracy, lack of education for participation, the negative influence of habits and values, lock of acquaintance with civil rights for woman, the prevailing view to woman in the village, the burdens laid on the woman, the parties feeling less excited toward woman's Obstacles towards woman's participation in political life.

Osman, Husein study (2004) the purpose of the study is to identify the hampers and hindrances to the political participation of the Jordanian woman. The study has made clear that the most significant Obstacles to the political participation of the Jordan woman are represented in:-

- 1-The Jordanian Social Structure: A conventional structure dominated by parental authority, supported by the familial, social, religious economical, educational and political institutions that enhance the traditional roles of the social type.
- 2-The prevailing Jordanian culture: A conservative conventional culture based on values and traditions that draw a pattern picture of woman by means of socialization.
- 3-Instability and immaturity of the political participation in the Jordan society in general and woman's lack of experience in the political action, the poor institutions of civil community in Jordan, the weak political awareness of the members of the Jordanian society in general and the woman in particular about the significance of the woman's political participation woman's economic subordination to man due to the low participation in the economic activity man's ownership for few resources in the community, the slow social change in the system of values, habits, traditions (culture) especially on corning the woman's roles in the political action.

Al-Sheikh, Abdul-Samee' study (2004)"The political participation and the village (rural) woman in Palestine". The study aimed at examining the concept of the political participation of the village woman in Palestine and the factors associated.

The study sample consisted of (180) village woman. The researcher has used the question are as an instrument for gathering data. The study has concluded that:-

- The education level of the villager woman in Palestine is closely related to the degree of the political participation.
- The working women are the most initiative in backing up the representation of woman in the national official in situations.
- The inheriting traditions reflect negatively on the freedom and in dependency of woman in the political life.

Lammie study (2004) the objective of this study is to better understand what drives young adults to community-based volunteerism and keeps them away from participation in American politics. This study focuses on the effects of age and perceived government relevance on the relationship between dissatisfaction and involvement.

The results highlight the crucial role of perceived relevance in translating dissatisfaction into political activity. This study shows that perceived government relevance has an important,

direct and interactive impact on political participation. Those who feel that the government is relevant are more likely to participate in political activities. Perceived government relevance also serves as an important role in moderating the relationship between dissatisfaction and political activity. However, results suggest that those who do not have these feelings are somewhat less likely to participate in political activities. They also suggest that young adults are less likely than older adults to perceive the government as relevant. Therefore, this study indicates that age itself may not be a very influential factor in the amount of political activity citizens undertake, but instead the underlying problem may well rest with a failure to perceive the relevance of government to problems young citizens face.

Uwayda says in her study (2004) the reality of the political participation of Palestinian women. The objective of this study is to assess the reality of women participation in political life and to identify obstacles before the advancement of women rights in general and participation in political life in particular. It also assesses the actions that were taken at the level of National legislation of women participation in political life. This study is an analytical study dealing with the reality of women participation in political life in terms of the extent of their participation in decision-making and policy-making at both formal and informal structures. It also analyzes the reflection of such participation on the reality of the Palestinian women. The study indicated the low participation of women in relation to economic conditions, the right to work, job opportunities and good participation in political life. It also indicated the weak presence of women in unions and professional associations in terms of numbers. The study showed that as the ratio of women participation in decision-making positions is still low, the political parties lag behind the position of the public with regard to women participation in political life. While the ordinary candidate does not hesitate to elect the women, the parties are still reluctant to nominate women for fear of failure, citing the traditional address about the lack of faith of the community in women political work. The study pointed out that obstacles and reasons to the participation of Palestinian women in the political life are multiple. The laws and legislation are still impeding the possibility of the independence of women although it constitutes a basic introduction to women access to public office, For example, the man is still, according to the Islamic courts that continue to rule on family issues, able to prevent and order his wife not to travel or move, or take custody of her children, in case that it was proved that she is woman preoccupied regardless of the fact that the other is busy or not. He has the right to take custody even if he is working 24 hours, as

well as the social legacy continues to deliver a toll on the reality of social life for both women and men in Palestine, so she cannot in any way hold the responsibility for this social heritage which considers that women as incompetent. Therefore, the women who are holding leadership positions because these positions inconsistent with their emotional nature, also, other constraints include the absence of democracy in the appointments which are imposed by the power the local elections. It also means the subjection to the political will which will not even take into account the importance of the integration of women in positions of political decision-making. The researcher, in talking about women participation in political life, believes that we can not in any way ignore the political history of Palestine which resulted in a series of defeats that embedded the formation of a Palestinian state, depriving the Palestinian people, primarily from achieving its hopes for an independent state, in which it practices the meanings of freedom, participation and democracy.

In another study by Atallah (2004) on Women's political participation through trade unions and unions, it aimed to identify the reality of the political participation of Palestinian women; the researcher explained that the problem of the women participation is a global one, and the weak presence of women constitutes a global crisis. However, that does not mean that the same societies and nations practice inequity in the right of women in terms of legal, social or other aspects. The researcher explained that the historical circumstances of the Palestinian community have played a key role in the contribution to the increased participation of women in Palestinian society. The impact of the catastrophe and displacement in the years 1948-1967 shock the structure of Palestinian society, so women played an important role in their participation in the process of production, in spite of the decline in the participation of women in due to immigration and displacement. The status of women without a role to play has changed with the national state of stagnation between 1966-1948. The researcher pointed out that Palestinian women played a role since the General Federation of Palestinian women was formed in the context of the emerging national movement, and within political parties, where military apparatus included a number of women trained in arms alongside the men. However in view of the participation rates of women in leadership roles their weakness and limitation in this role, as well as in the base of institutions and associations. The researcher concluded that there is an inverse relationship between the number of women and the level of the leadership, that is the number of women cadres decreased as the level of authority is high to be almost non-existent in the sub-bodies of the first command. The researcher showed that

there are many reasons that contributed to the marginalization of the role of women, including perception of women in oriental community, the dominant culture is based on the consideration that the male is number one in the social structure in the role crisis of Arab citizens. With the participation of national and social programs where priority was given to national liberation attention to women issues was ignored or postponed. Left-wing parties almost declined in the Palestinian arena, although they were considered the main supporters for women issues liberation and equality with men, early marriages, which involve women in the responsibilities that prevent them from the continued participation and integration into society.

Rahall study (2004) examines the issue of political participation of Palestinian women; the author reviewed the theoretical frameworks that deal with every issue and concluded that form, value and impact of political participation are closely related to the form and nature of the mechanisms of democracy prevailing in the community; moreover, the development of women participation in political life in Palestine is still in its infancy despite the size of the sacrifices made by Palestinian women through Palestinian history.

Kataneh (2004) study examines and reviews the reality of the political participation of Palestinian women, under occupation and the Authority. It talked spoke about the numbers, statistics and indicators of women participation. The study came to the conclusions that many of the existing and dominant, powers, whether in the regime or in the community, do not want to see the new forces take their place in public life. It also concluded that the participation of women in political and public life is low. Part of which is connected with political and public party action. The last part is the result of deviating policies toward women by institutions, professional associations and unions.

Aljbai study (2004) on "The Participation of Syrian Women in Political life", aimed to shed light on the participation of Syrian women in the political life in terms of two variables, namely the rights of Syrian women and the freedoms they enjoyed. The study is based on assumptions that the individual, from both sexes, is the natural foundation of civil society; moreover, the citizen from both sexes is the political and civil basis for the modern state. Therefore, it seems that is essential to discuss the theme of political participation to examine

the extent of liberalization of individuals from normal links or primary and pre-national groups like extended family, clan, caste and so forth.

The researcher concluded that Syrian women have attained the right to work and education; equality between men and women in some rights; the researcher also concluded that not being equated with the rights of others is a legal and practical expression to the reality of inequality, and this had an impact on their participation in public life particularly in political life. It can be considered that what had been achieved as a passive partnership with the inequality namely the terms of men and their leadership, according to the established rules.

Banat & Salama study (2003)"The Political Participation of the Palestinian Refugees in the Arroub camp and its Relationship with Some Variables"aimed to identify the degree of political participation among residents of the Arroub camp and its relation to some variables; the instrument of study was applied to a sample of (100) residents of the camp. They were selected in a stratified random manner. The study reached the following findings that include: the degree of political participation among residents of the camp was medium. This was reflected in the manifestations of this partnership represented in the track of the tendency to participate in the upcoming Legislative Council elections, the avoidance of the sense of belonging to Political parties and pessimism of the future of political action in the Palestinian society. The results showed the existence of significantly statistical differences in the degree of political participation among members of the sample according to sex variable for the males was more involved than females. The research team, considers this result logical if we look at the reality of the Eastern societies and the nature of values which allow more freedom for males than for females, moreover, there are differences according to the changing political affiliation in favour of the politically affiliated members. The politically affiliated has even a small area of freedom inside the party. This allows him to express himself, and to participate in the determination political participation. This was also associated with party support and for the interest people in the most active left-wing political participation.

It was inversely associated with the variables involved and the degree of religious life, so the greater the age, or degree of religiosity, the less the political participation and vice versa. The research team explained that the older you get, the less focus will be on the issues and

concerns with the regular activities that require effort and the vital energies. Their focus will be on the issues that concern the family.

Bagi's study, (2004) entitled: "Did the American Muslims start to turn to the political participation and see that the civic rights are the most essential issues for them?"

The aim of the study was to identify the opinions and attitudes of the American Moslems in relation to the political participation.

The researcher has concluded that:-

-After the Muslims opinions were taken in Detroit city at Michigan and the areas around it, the most populated area of the Muslim community at the US, it has become clear that the Moslem communities who were considered as introverted and never interested but in the recent affairs have now sought for the political participation to a greater degree at the US.

-93% of Muslims frequently go to mosques has agreed on the necessity of the participation of Moslems in the political life this result shows that the Moslem community is obviously willing not to isolate it self from the American society and that two thirds of most Moslems who are religious and conservative support the positive participation in the American policy.

-Over 60 of those interviewed view that the civil rights come at the top of their interests relating the public policy. This was a direct result of the opinions and concepts that spread in the American Moslems about Moslems in the wake of September 11 attacks in 2001.

Alsaly study (2003) "Political Participation in Yemen, Comparative Social Study of the Parliamentary Electoral Processes Between the Period 1990-2003", at University of Sana'a aimed to identify the social and political realities of political participation in the parliamentary and electoral processes, through the identification or disclosure of the nature of social and political-consciousness of the voters and the elected (MPS), and to identify the role of political parties and organizations in the parliamentary electoral process, and the factors affecting the success of the candidates and their continuation to win more than one electoral cycle, along with the disclosure of determinants of the voting behaviour of the voter and obstacles to political participation.

The most important findings of the study reveal that there was an increase in the level of the electoral and political awareness of voters, through their recognition of the importance of elections and participation due to their knowledge of the nature of the current electoral

system, the nature of the role of a member of the House of Representatives and the functions of the Council of Deputies. The study showed that voters view, at all levels of education, for the existence of political parties and organizations, and the importance of their role in society has remained weak, due to many reasons including: the negative role of political parties and organizations towards the economic, social and cultural issues and problems that the members of the community suffered from, the nature of political awareness of the citizens and political elites was alike, the continuation of traditional culture, the low level of education and cultural development of most members of society. The study showed that political parties play a positive role in pushing people to participate in the parliamentary elections, as a party activity in elections, representative of what most citizens realize and through which they can recognize political parties and organizations.

The study showed that there were two types of constraints that prevented the creation of real political participation. The first one is associated with the nature of society, such as the current cultural system as it is from a culture of non-traditional date for the most part, and the nature of economic activity (agricultural traditional), which is the main activity of the majority of the population, the lack of income and high poverty rates at levels of different social groups, a high rate of unemployment, lack of the real economic, social and cultural development, decline in indicators, the limited financial resources allocated to the investment programs in the state budget, the decline many of the development projects because of financial and administrative corruption in the bodies and institutions of the State, and many of the members of the community lack economic independence and increased social inequality and, inequality in the distribution and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few members of the community represented in the ruling and traditional elite. The second type of constraints is related to the nature of the state and political system.

In an analytical study Osaid (2003) the Role of student Councils in the West Bank in the Promotion of Political Participation of the Student Movement and the impact of this role in the development of events in Palestine, 1979-2000; the researcher conducted an analytical discussion of the role of council elections in the practice of students to the electoral process and acceptance of the results. The researcher divided the stage of study which addressed the period between 1979-2000 into three phases. The first phase of 1979 and until the first "Intifada" in 1987, the second phase, which extends from the first "Intifada" 1987 until the

Oslo Accords, and the third phase of the Oslo accords until the year 2000. The researcher concluded that there was no clear and precise definition of the Palestinian student movement; he agreed with most of those who wrote about the student movement on the main feature of the student movement, which is characterized by politicization and highly partisan work and practice of student leaders. He also noted the important role played by the student movement and the periodicity of elections and respect of results. He demanded that the Palestinian community should benefit from this experience despite the decline in the students role following the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.

Khabas Study discussed (2003) the impact of the increase in political violence at the level of formal political participation of Islamists in the Arab world after the September Eleven (2001): There is a large and deliberate confusion between these concepts by Arab internal parties (official), and other external ones that have an interest in the perpetuation of this confusion. The researcher pointed out that the Arab region is the most prominent model of the form and content of the relationship between political violence (formal and informal) and the political participation of community-based sectors in these countries. The researcher concluded that the official political violence, took a prominent manifestation of tyranny, expressed in different ways like uniqueness of Arab resolution by the State, in addition to the security pursuit and prosecution of those who ever think of change or development, whether individual or organization. The relationship between the Islamists and the official Arab regimes has witnessed this state of increased pace of official political violence against the Islamists after the September 11, 2001, through the prosecution of security and financial and security coordination with the Americans; this was reflected on the behaviour of Islamists and their supporters. It appeared as if it was evidence on the rush in political participation in any elections held in any Arab country.

Miari study (2003) Political Culture in Palestinian Society Specifically in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on two field surreys; it focused on the study of public attitudes towards democracy, evaluation of the performance of the Authority, and the extent of political involvement. The study community consisted of adults of more than 18 years of age; a stratified cluster of random sample was selected. The researcher distinguished between abstract political orientations that support the principles and values of democracy in general, and the real democratic political orientations, as reflected in the opposition to the Palestinian

Authority in non-democratic kind practices. The researcher found out that a large majority of respondents support the application of a number of abstract elements of democracy in the State of Palestine, and nearly half of respondents agree that the Palestinian Authority respects the right of the citizen to belong to a political party or organization of his choice. He also found out that the Authority respects, the right of political opposition to hold peaceful protest and meetings; few of the respondents agreed that the Palestinian Authority is the power of democracy. The researcher explained that the satisfaction with the performance of the Palestinian Authority is not big particularly in the areas of bridging the gap between the rich and the poor especially the creation of new job opportunities for citizens. The researcher pointed out that the political participation of the Palestinian public is not low, especially when compared to the slow political participation in modern and negative democracies in the rest of the Arab world. He also noted that political participation has fallen a little after the Palestinian Authority was established, and there was a decline in political activity of the parties.

Alkhuyt & Saed study (2002) aimed to measure the contribution of education in increasing the effectiveness of the political participation of the Egyptian women. The study was based on a descriptive, analytical approach to identify the most important features, and determinants of political participation in the Egyptian society. The study was confined to determine the impact and effectiveness of the formal educational system (school, university) on the political participation of women. The study showed a decline in the political participation of Egyptian woman, and that the more educated the individual is, the more he is effective in political participation; he is more likely to engage in political discussions and dialogues with others. The study reported the presence of a series of obstacles that hinder the effective participation of women like social, political, economic, and cultural stunting.

Naqshabandi study (2001)"The political participation of Jordanian women and some Arab countries,"focused on the political role of Arab women, particularly women of Jordan, but it took another course in the study by examining the variables affecting the political participation of women in the interpretation of the theory of the state of political Islam and women organizations The researcher found out that the Arab women had a political engagement through their fight against colonialism to win independence, and that after the emergence of the modern Arab states, Islamic movements and organizations of women had a role in influencing the increase or drop in such participation.

Researchers Naqshabandi & Mkhademeh study (2001) on the political participation of students of the University of Jordan and the University of Applied Sciences aimed to study the nature of political participation of students of political science at the University of Jordan and the University of Applied Sciences and to identify the factors affecting the participation? In this study, the researchers found out that male participation outside the framework of the university is more than that of females in the same framework. But as for the participation of women outside the university, it is higher than their participation inside. This participation is close for the two sexes due to the fact that students spend most of their time at university, and that political participation within the University is less than that outside university. The causes that led to the low participation of the students are lack of confidence in the political climate; students engage in politics with suspicion and caution despite their faith in its importance. The role of the family doesn't promote political participation of girls more than boys. As for the economic factor, it did not have any effect on males or females.

Suleiman's study (2001) this study examines the issue of political participation of Gulf woman, it seeks to identify the reality of women participation in the GCC through answering the study questions: What is the nature of the relationship between political participation in general and women political participation in the scope of these systems, and the nature of the relationship between the process of modernization in these countries and the process of political participation of the women.

The researcher concluded that the Gulf states were careful to take measures that provide effective participation for women as an essential way in the development and elaboration of plans and programs to ensure the participation of women in the areas of education, health, employment and social affairs and the formation of civil and national mechanisms committees to participate in the outline of comprehensive development strategies, as well as the formation of national committees for women represented by the follow-up mechanism to implement the resolutions of international conferences on women, and the government supports NGOs work on their participation in all areas.

Al-Faqih (2001) Parties and Political Education in Yemen; it aimed to identify the assets of the political system in Yemen, and the methods of political education; the researcher believes that political parties suffer from deficiencies in various aspects, and that democracy cannot be

achieved in public political reality unless it is realized first among the parties. The starting point for the researcher was in terms of metaphysical awareness among citizens in all aspects of life and the political education practised by the parties of Yemen. The researcher concluded that there are many factors that had affected the Yemeni political system, including the views of Islamic political groups which have affected the Yemeni political thought on the issue of dispute over power. The political system was also affected by the political currents from outside the country, and that Yemen is still in the process of growth. Thus, it still suffers from deficiencies in the political modernization, where most of the parties are still subject to influence and control of the tribe. There are also many programs, means and methods that must be taken into consideration by the Yemeni political parties, especially as the experience of pluralism is still in the process of growth.

Aldmor study (2001) on "Social building and political participation in the village of Algoer in Jordan", came to the conclusion that the clan has a prominent influence on the political participation of the village to determine their reference on the basis of the clan, especially at election time; the attention of members of the village in policy is primarily economic interest however, loyalty to the state and its institutions is more than that to the tribe because the state provides many of the requirements of the village, such as water, electricity and others.

Abu-Shawish study (2000) entitled the relationship between the parental treatment and political integration of the University students. The study aimed at identifying the levels of the political integration of the students of the two levels one and two at Al-Azhar University in Gaza, and detecting the differences in the political integration according to independent variables of study. The study has aimed to identify the relationship between methods of parental treatment and the political integration. The sample of the study consisted of (359) University students. The most important thing the study has concluded was that the University students have a middle level of the political integration. The study has also shown that there were statistically significant differences between male and female students in the dimension of the political interest, activity, competence and knowledge. All these were in favor for the males whereas no statically significant distinction shave appeared in the dimension of abiding by the duty of citizenship.

Salem Study (2000) talked in Chapter II entitled The Tasks of National Liberation and Democratic Construction on the Beginnings of the Student Movement. He pointed out that they date back to the twenties of last century, and they were through the students speeches which were present in different parts of Palestine, and their first beginning was in 1925. Also the first student conference was in 1930 in Haifa, which called for a general strike in protest against the Zionist immigration to Palestine. The researcher pointed out that the student movement had chosen the National Action since its first beginnings, and the promotion of the national product and civil education are involved in national construction. The researcher pointed out that the General Union of Palestine Students, and in spite of its establishment in 1959, before the formation of a PLO was contained by the organization after the threat, especially after the control of factions on the Palestine Liberation Organization. The researcher also discussed the student movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He also discussed the student movement after 1967. He concluded that the tasks of the coming student movements are to fulfil the needs of students within each educational institution itself, the student are a component of the youth, and part of the Palestinian social fabric. Finally, the researcher spoke about the regression of the student movement as a result of the decline in Palestinian political forces in general.

Mani (2000) the reality of women participation in the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority; this study tries to answer the question: what are the forms and manifestations of discrimination by gender in the distribution of posts at senior levels, its reasons and justifications? The research community consisted of six ministries in the Palestinian National Authority, and the researcher used interviews as a tool for data collection. The study revealed considerable variation in the proportion of men who work in senior positions and that of the women who work in the same post. The study also revealed the presence of top positions, such as Undersecretary of the Ministry that is never occupied by any two women. Two women were appointed to the position of Assistant Deputy Minister, there the study showed that the proportion of women increases as the hierarchy decreases, and that the majority of women are occupying executive posts and not policy-making positions. The study revealed the impact of three factors, gender, socialization and social pressures and the status of structural constraints. These have a major impact in the exclusion of women from the public domain.

The low percentages of the presence of women compared to that of men in senior positions are existent in all stages of male and female life. The study showed that women will be outside the scope of the decision making unless a social change based on a comprehensive community-based direction takes place. The study showed many points that impede women access to decision-making positions, the most prominent of which is that men in the ministries felt that the women were not right in the decision-making positions, and are equal in government decision-making. The study also indicated that the ministries do not give special priority to women despite the existence of services for women in many ministries.

Abdel-Moneim study (2000) on Egyptian Women and Political Participation, aimed to analyze the performance of Egyptian women participation in the extent of political interest in issues relating to women, and to raise the key question:

Was the political performance of the parliamentary or political party female member after membership of the legislative institution, or the party characterized by seasonal official nature, persistence or continuity. The researcher used the analytical approach in addressing the subject of the study that revealed the different performances of members of women parliamentarians on issues of women members of political parties. The performances of women members of political parties are more persistent, continuous, and wider. The women members of political parties differ in performance from the female parliamentarians towards women issues. The performance of the female party members was more persistent and continuous than that of the female parliamentarians. This difference was due to the special women agenda and action plan for implementation, and the presence of the secretariats due to the standing of women with the women agenda and work plan for its implementation.

Naqshabandi study (2000) the political Participation of Jordanian Women is a study of students of political science at the University of Jordan and the University of Applied Sciences. The objective of this study identifies the extent of the participation of students within and outside the University through their participation in elections, media and various cultural clubs and students' council. The study revealed that there were no differences between the answers of the students in the two universities. The study emphasizes that the participation of female students outside the university is still limited compared to their participation inside; moreover, the political climate did not encourage girls to increase their participation. The concerns of students about the political participation were through the

discussion of political affairs in different media, for there is reluctance among students to participate in elections and parties. In addition, the political climate does not encourage students to participate in the political participation where their confidence is shaken by the experiment of democracy.

Alsharhi study (2000) on Trends of the Faculty of Education Students at the University of Sana'a, about the Yemeni Women Participation in Politics. The study confirmed that if the woman had the opportunity for political participation, she would be a successful politician. The study concluded that Yemeni women have a weak political and even sub-absent role in holding state public offices. The study found out that there are five variables that play an influencing role in the participation of Yemeni women in politics. The variables are religious, social, political, economic and psychological; furthermore, political action requires a collective and individual effort to eliminate all the negative customs and social traditions that are contrary to Divine Revelation and constitutional legislation; the participation of women in politics would be beneficial to both the society and women since the values of democracy will entrenched in Yemen.

In another study by Alkadi (1999), the political System and Political Participation of Political Parties in Jordan for elections in 1993. The study aimed to illustrate the relationship between the Jordanian political system and political participation of parties in 1993 elections. The study concluded that the political system by virtue of its authority, has the ability to influence the course of events on the political arena, especially in elections, and that political parties are able to influence some decisions of the Authority.

Freihat concluded (1999) in his study on the forms of Participation in Political Life and the Role of Education in the Arab World, researcher explained that the problem of participation in political life in the Arab world is found in many of the obstacles that have characterized the political Arab life. They can be summed up in two types: constraints of the perception and awareness, such as illiteracy, media blackout, frustration, and cool relations, and constraints such as the practice of military rule and martial law, states of emergency and the imbalance in the social environment and the restructure of the administrative system. The researcher explained that the problem of participation in political life has many indications in the Arab political action. It has limited enjoyment of freedoms of different kinds and political freedoms

in particular, despite the existence of parliamentary bodies, political parties, unions and professional organizations and despite the adoption of national constitutions of these rights and the endorsement of international conventions by Arab States, and the declaration of the organizations. However such constitutions are meaningless in the context of a building legislation based on the profound belief in the principle of monopoly of power and lack of circulation among the various socio-political groups. However, the executive power across the Arab world does not hesitate to resort to methods of rigging local and national elections in order to ensure the survival of power in the hands of the ruling group. The study revealed that the Arab citizen is excluded from decision-making in his life and the life of society; the Arab state carries out everything on his behalf; the researcher explained that education plays an important and active role in the upbringing of the younger generation, but the educational policy in the Arab world is linked with the national policy; this creates a problem that the political systems which are not interested in democracy, do not contribute to the creation of a democratic generation.

Edward Carmines study (1978) entitled: "political participation and its relationship to the source of control"

The study aimed at identifying the role played by the source of control (internal and external) to motivate its owners to take part in the political participation. The study sample consisted of (100) males and females from high schools.

The findings of the study have revealed that there is a positive tendency for the student of the internal discipline source towards the political participation like voting. More over, students of the internal control source realize the positive role that the good citizens have to play.

Biage Study, (1997) on Political Participation and the Political Process in Developing Nations aims to identify specific nature of the process of political systems of developing countries, and seeks to identify their impact on political participation in developing nations. The researcher concluded that the crisis of political participation is one of the major crises facing the political regimes of developing countries. It has been the direct source for the spread of the political instability, as a result of the increasing number of political forces seeking to engage in political participation. The factors stemming from the nature of the ongoing political process in the political regimes in developing countries constitute the main element in the emergence of the crisis. The researcher revealed that most of the dominant features of

the political process of the developing countries prevent the achievement of the lowest level of political participation, including non-institutionalism, because the political process is not within the scope of political institutions, or these countries do not have the political institutions that are capable of transferring the claimant to the decisions and policies, and their leaders don't have the desire to build political institutions to frame the political process. Thus, they would contribute to the achievement of the forces of the people in political decision-making and non-statutory factors, in the sense that the political process for the systems of these countries is being regulated out of the constitutional rules and the organization of decision-making process within the systems of governance. The ruling elites don't not recognize the existence of rules determining their powers and authority in the insurance of decisions-making and the tendency to exercise it away from the institutional frameworks and constitutional rules, as for personalization in the political process, it represents the nature of the operation, It represents the most distinguished character of the political agent of the systems of developing countries, where the leaders, the heads of the strategic or tactical political decision-making are strategic in the framework of narrow pattern of relations. In these countries leaders usually replace the heads of political institutions.

Ghalom et al study (1997) this study examines the issue of political participation in Kuwait by the incentives that encourage Kuwaitis on various dimensions to have political participation, and to acquire theoretical and practical knowledge of the aspects of conviction in Islam. It also examines whether this is an incentive or impediment to the political participation in Kuwait. This study aims to test the hypothesis, which states that individuals who follow different mass media and are aware of the existence of conflict between social groups are more active in various political activities, and individuals who belong to social groups and participate in social hobbies are more involved in politics. The study also assumes different models of participation for both men and women. The data obtained by the study are the results of a social survey conducted at the level of Kuwait. The findings of the research revealed a positive relationship and statistically significant variable between the centres of social, economic and political participation, and women who are active in cultural associations don't visit salon or court"Aldionat"policy are more involved than men.

In study of Mohammad Tawfig Elaiwa (1996),"The differences between the two sexes in participant's behavior and its relationship with some forms of the political participation". The

study aimed at identifying the concept and nature of for the individuals from the two sexes, showing the extent of the correlation or relation between the participant's behavior and the different political forms of participation of those in areas of electoral behavior and party belonging.

The study sample consisted of (160) male and female students, males and female employees. The findings of the study have shown that there no distinctions of statistically significant between the two student groups on the study variables. There were also no statistically significant differences for the study groups whether male or female employees or male or female student on the measure of attitude towards the political participation, and those who abstained from taking part in particular especially concerning the electoral behaviour.

Al-Hayek and Alsoa study (1996) on Social Determinants of Political Integration, aims to measure the political integration of Jordanian secondary students and to identify the impact of some variables. The study found that the level of integration with lower female student was less than that of males. The researchers attributed this to socialization and influence of parents, their educational level and family income because it affects the political integration since parents prefer to keep children away from political affairs. Also there is no stimulation or encouragement from the other schooling institutions and the media to encourage students to be par of political integration. There is little awareness among the Jordanian society of the importance of engagement of students in the follow-up of political affairs.

Another study by Mari (1996) on "Youth and Political Participation in Jordan" aimed to analyze the political participation of young people affected by family economic and social circumstances and the extent of their influence by political climate. The study pointed out that there was still fear of political participation and that democratic climate did not encourage many of the students to participate politically. However, as for the economic factor the low and middle-income individuals participate more than those of high-income. Families affiliated to parties play an important role in influencing the participation of young people. There was a statistically significant difference between the participation of youth, gender and age. The participation of young people is not affected by place of birth. The researcher attributed this to the fact that the sample members had changed their residence. However, as for religion, there are no statistical differences that show its impact on the participation of young people.

Afaf Al-Omar's study (1995) entitled: "A Psychological Study of Samples of the Participants Partially in Decision-Making at the state of Kuwait a field study that aims to attempt to detect some personality dimensions of a sample of the political decision-makers at state of Kuwait. The study sample consisted of (13) of leaders at the state of Kuwait. The researchers have relied on the direct interview as an instrument for collecting data. The findings of the study have shown the orientation of the sample peers towards the political action and that the political and religious figures preferred this type of participation.

Another study by Tariq Hamza (1995) entitled "Political participation psychology a comparative psychological study between politically participants and non participants". This study aimed at identifying whether there are statically significant differences between the politically participants and non-participants in the political expatriation and religious Orientation and Authority.

The study sample was composed of (442) of male and female students, media people and member of the teaching staff.

The findings of the study have shown that the politically participants are less politically expatriate and more submissive to the Authority and have a high religious orientation, more relieved and less bad temporal more liar and higher in the Socio-economical level than non-participants. The findings of the study have revealed that males are more concerned with politics and have political activity greater than females.

In an analytical study by Mani`a (1994) on Political Parties and Organizations in Yemen, it focused on the practice of party before unity and the phenomenon of multi-party politics in Third World countries. The researcher found out that most of the parties turned to pressure groups sustained by the tribe. This made them lose the organizations characteristics of modern societies. There is still an absence of political awareness that is required for the establishment of a multi-party system. Political parties have practised their role indiscriminately after Yemeni unity so political conflicts and differences between parties guided the political activity of those parties.

The study by Aziza Mohammad Al-Sayyed (1993) entitled "The psychological structure for the political activists". This study is intended to identify the psychological aspects for these who practice the political action of three Egyptian parties. The sample consisted of (75) of

males and females practicing the party action in three Egyptian parties. The findings of the study have shown that there was no relationship between the low self-assessment and political participation and that there were positive political attitudes for sample peers towards the political involvement.

Qandeel's study (1992) entitled, political participation and evaluation of party practices of a sample of members of vocational groups. The study aimed at identifying the opinions of the study sample in the parties and party practices. The study sample consisted of (267) members of the vocational groups. The researcher has used opinion poll as a tool to collect data. The findings of the study have concluded that over a quarter of the sample peers join political parties and that the most important mean that may positively influence the political participation is building confidence between the citizen and system and seeking to provide an inclusive democratic climate.

Ellison and London study (1992) entitled: "The social political participation of the black Americans-A second view on the ethnic and compensatory groups."

The study aimed at examining the relationship between the social factors as a feature for personality and the political participation of a sample of the Black Americans as one of the ethnic groups in the American community. The sample of the study consisted of (406) of members of the society.

The findings of the study have concluded that there was a statically significant relationship between the Social factors and political participation, and that the political participation have a great deal of self-appreciation. However, self-appreciation is low for the Black compared to other ethnic groups.

Another study by Finkel and Opp (1991), "The effect of party unification on the political participation".

The study aimed at identifying the extent of the relationship between joining a particular political party and the political participation. The study sample consisted of (150) of males and females in the Republic of western Germany before the unification. The findings of the study have shown that the binary associations between the party unification and political participation could be their mutual relationship with motives of participation. It has also been found out that people who have shown a stronger unification to a political party tend to cast

their votes in the elections and have more tendency to take part in the political campaigns and work to make the party successful in the elections more than as in the case of those who have poor connections or don't have any links to any party.

A field study by Al-Azzam (1991): on Political Participation in Jordan and its Relationship With Some Demographic Variables, such as Social and Place of Residence"aimed at testing the hypothesis that there are statistically significant differences between political participation and the variables of age, gender, educational level, place of residence, income, employment and family size. It also aimed to test the validity of the premise that the Jordanian society in general, is still a conservative society that considers political participation as basic a means of improving the economic and social conditions, rather than as a social value or a target by itself.

The findings of the research revealed the existence of statistically significant differences between the political participation and all variables except the variable of gender. The results of statistical analysis confirmed the validity of the hypothesis about the society perception of the political participation as a means of improving the social and economic conditions and not as a goal by itself; the study also provided some explanations for the relations that exist between political participation and the abovementioned variables.

Davidson and Cottor study (1989) this study is entitled:"The political participation and its relationship to the sense of homeland".

The study aimed at identifying which political activities significant to the expression of citizenship to the citizens. The study sample consisted of (546) citizens-males and females.

The findings of the study have concluded that there was a relationship between participation in the political tusk and the sense of homeland and that talking about political matters id not an indicator for the sense of citizenship, and that the citizen's participation in voting in the elections is an evidence of the sense of homeland.

Another study by Al-Azzam (1989) which is a field study on the Political Alienation of the Educated Youth and its Relationship with Some Variables (gender, level of educational attainment, monthly income, type of control in the family... etc). The researcher applied the political alienation scale developed by Hendreshaft Eckhardt at sample that consisted of (836) students chosen at half random from the University of Jordan. The most important findings of the study are that more than 20% of the young members of the sample felt political alienation, and this phenomenon was spread more among males than among females. The results also indicated the existence of a negative relationship between political alienation and political participation of young people; on the contrary, alienation was positively associated with the political views of members of the sample. That must be the political work and specifications.

Guyton`s study (1988) entitled the relationship between the political participation and critical thinking. The study aimed at examining the relationship between the critical thinking as a means of thinking and attitude towards the political participation. The study sample consisted of (118) University students of the two sexes.

The findings of the study have concluded that the critical thinking has positive effect on the orientation towards the political participation and on self-control and political competence.

Nasr's study (1986) entitled: "attitudes of some instructors towards the political action". This study aimed to identify the attitudes of the study sample of teachers towards the different aspects of the political action. The study sample was composed of (150). The researcher has applied the measure of attitude towards the political action.

The findings of the study have concluded that the attitudes of male teachers towards the political action are more positive than those of female ones and that age difference has no effect on changing or adapting the attitude. Moreover, it was evident that it is impossible to separate education from politics. Both are closely related whether we start with politics or the opposite. Each one depends on the other.

Al-Sharqawi's and Mustafa study (1986) entitled: "The psychological dimensions of the popular participation a study in the fields of elections and calling for family planning"

The study aimed at detecting the difficulties that hinder the effective and popular participation of the individuals in development of their society. The study sample consisted of (150). The researcher has applied the question are and personal interviews as an instrument for gathering

data. The research has concluded that the reasons behind failing to participate could be summarized in Skepticism in the fairness of the election, not taking interest in political data.

Fugita & Obrien study (1985) entitled: "The ethnic structural representation of the groups and its relationship to the political participation of the Americans of Japanese origin." The study aimed at examining the relationship between the structural representation of the Americans of Japanese origin and the comparison of this between two generations. The study sample consisted of (634) of the two generations, the second and third who were living in California. The researcher has applied the question are as an instrument to collect data.

The study has concluded that more than (91%) of the total sample are active in the political fields and that over (86%) of the sample members belong at least to one of the institutions of the voluntary work.

Saa'd Ibrahim Jum'a study (1984) entitled: "The Poetical Participation of the Young". The goal of this study is to identify the reality currently present for the participation of the Egyptian youth in the political action and nature and quality of this participation, the effects of the political, social, economic educational and famial variables on the young and the extent of their political participation.

The researcher has applied the question are content analysis, report analysis us a loot to collect data. The findings of the study have shown that there was sem-consensus that socialization was regard as a major variable for political participation of the young and that the family has an important part in this mother. There was a correlation relation between the educational level of students and their involve enhtin the political activity where students from rich elasses are more politically involved than others.

Muawad Study (1983) the study aimed to identify the crisis of political participation in the Arab world. The study tried to discuss the different dimensions of this crisis; it tried to set several dimensions. The most prominent of these are the imbalance in the political segment of society in which there is a clear reduction in the levels of the participants and interested. In contrast, there is a marked increase in the segments of non-interested people, the extremists. There is also non-formal seasonal, effective participation in the sense of a single candidate; other dimensions are the unfair elections and disappearance of real opposition, and controlled

mandatory participation that took the form of mobilization in order to create the formal support for the ruling regime. There is also no consideration of the real participation that stems from the citizen's interest of what is happening around him in the political community, its will and its ability to influence decisions. The researcher identified the main factors of the crisis of political participation in the Arab world; the most prominent of these are social and economic inequalities in all Arab organization, where there is an apparent imbalance in the distribution of income and wealth and the inequality in the living conditions. The Arab countries are deeply divided into the rich and poor with no real middle classes. Moreover there is reduction in factor of the degree of political awareness, as a result of widespread illiteracy, lack of experience, absence of free press, domination of the personal element over the political process and the weakness of the central organization of political parties and interest groups.

Knutson and et al study (1982) entitled:"political participation and its relationship to some psychological needs of the ordinary citizens".

The study aimed at identifying the nature of the relationship between the extent of self-realization and the political participation. The sample of the study consisted of (495) ordinary citizens of males and females. The researcher has applied the question are as an instrument to collect data. The findings have indicated that there was a correlation between the degree of self-realization and political participation but with a low rate.

Saed Mohammad Nasr (1982) this study is entitled: Woman's attitudes towards the practice of socio-political action. The study was intended to identify the attitudes of sample individuals towards the woman's political action. The study sample was made up of (24) men and woman the researcher has applied the questionnaire as a tool for assessment. The findings of the study have shown that the cultural heritage and role conflict between man and woman are considered as the most significant obstacles for woman's work in the socio-political action. Also there is a resistance from the community for the woman's political action. It has become obvious that there differences in the attitudes of the Egyptian man and woman involved in political action towards the woman working in this action. The educated woman has a strong a attitude forwards the political action, while the man doesn't favor that the man should go into the area of the political action. It has also become clear that the woman working or not in the political action sees that she practices this out of wide knowledge and understanding of the

political issues. Besides, there were differences between the attitudes of the woman participating in the political action and these who are not involved in that field. As for the psychological dimension, we find that the woman working in political action is more psychologically prepared and more confident.

Carlson and Hyde study (1980) entitled: "The relationship between the political participation and self-realization". The study aimed at examining the relationship between the political participation and the concept of self-realization within the American Society. The study sample was made up of (138) peers, divided into two groups based on the question: Does the individual seek to hold a political position or not.

The findings of the study have concluded that those who are looking for political posts are more self-appreciate than those who are not searching for them and that the political activists have often positive assessment.

Field and Connelly Study (1954) on "The Social Structure and Political Participation in American Society"; the study aimed to measure the relationship of the political participation with the variables of gender, age, income, level of education, employment and place of residence. It found out that women political participation was less than that of men; rural communities are less involved politically than members of urban communities; the study also concluded that there was a relationship between political participation and the age variable. Participation is becoming greater as the individual is getting older. The study indicated that income, education and urbanization are of the most important social forces affecting the political participation of individuals; these independent factors affect the political participation in all societies, but to varying degrees.

2.2 Conclusions:

After a review of some previous studies on political participation, we can conclude the following:

1. We notice that previous studies in a variety of rised and selected topics related to political participation were varied in the choice of method of analysis; theoretical studies were descriptive and analytical studies; other studies adopted the comparative or historical approach. Field studies followed descriptive analytical approach, case study or the way of survey sample
2. Young people political participation that is linked to the march of national struggle and political history in Palestine showed that it was vulnerable and almost zero participation in all parties without exception. The most important finding of the studies is the retreat in the role of the student movements following Israeli Palestinian agreements. The student movements lived in a state of popular presence in the different stags of confrontation with the occupation, while it is in a state of decline and contraction in its role in the case of calm and light intensity of the confrontation with the occupation, On the other hand they undergone a state retreat and contraction in their role at times of calm and drop in the intensity of confrontations with the occupation. Moreover, the relationship of student movements with their social surrounding became weak. There are no longer any voluntary works carried by students to help different social sectors., there is no work by the students, Studies have shown that students are partners in the policy that is not related to student education and better acquaintance whether in the context of university or within the terms of reference of the Palestinian institutions of Higher Education. (Khader, 2008) (Osman, 2008)
3. The political participation of the Palestinian public is not low, especially when compared it is with the rest of the Arab world. There was a reference to the decline in political participation, a little after the Palestinian Authority, and the decline in political activity of the parties.(Miari, 2003; Al-Azzam, 1991), which examines the issue of political participation in Jordan and its relationship to some demographic variables, such as social and place of residence revealed the existence of statistically significant differences between the task of political participation and the variables of age, gender, educational level, place of residence, income, employment and family size except for the change in gender. This result

is logical if they were to look at the reality of the Eastern societies and the nature of values, which allow more freedom for males and females. The results of statistical analysis confirmed the validity of the hypothesis regarding the society perception of political participation as a way to improve the social and economic conditions, and not as a goal by itself. The study mentioned some interpretations of the relations that existed between political participation and the above mentioned variables.

The study, as well as researchers (Naqshabandi & Naqshabandi, 2001) found out that male participation outside the framework of the Jordanian University and the University of Applied Science was more than that of the females in the same context. As for the participation of females outside the university, it was higher than their outside participation. Participation was close in the gender variable; the reason for this is that the students spend most of their time at university, and political participation within the University has less responsibility than that of outside the university. One of the reasons that led to the low participation of the students is lack of confidence in the political climate; students engaged in politics with suspicion and caution. The family does not promote political participation of girls to more than boys. As for the economic factor, it did not have an impact on males or females. The results of the study by Zine Alahabk, Alsoa and Ghazi (1996) were identical to previous results. The impact of social upbringing, parents' influence, level of parental education and family income affect political integration, as parents prefer that their children to stay away from the dimensions of political affairs. Moreover, there is no stimulation or encouragement from other schooling institutions and the media to encourage students to integrate in political activity. Studies have shown that the more educated the individual is the more effective will his political participation be. He is more likely to engage in political discussions and dialogues with others. (Alkhuyt & Saed, 2002; Connelly & Field, 1954) study on social structure and political participation in American society also found out that women had a less political participation than that of the men, Political participation in rural communities was less than that of urban communities. It also came to the conclusion that there was a relationship between political participation and the age variable. Individual participation became greater by age. The study indicated that income, education and urbanization were the most important social forces affecting the political participation of individuals. These independent factors affect the political participation of all communities but to varying degrees.

4. The state political system the role and functions of political parties influenced the political participation. There are many factors that affect the political participation starting from the tribe, which controls the opinions and attitudes of individuals, and the political climate. There are those who believe that the political climate is not conducive to political participation (Naqshabandi, 2000; Al-Azzam, 1991; Alkadi, 1999), however, Alsharhi study (2001) gave the opposite result for this factor; the researcher found out that the political climate will help to increase political participation. It was further agreed that the results of a pilot study (2003) indicated a negative role of the political parties and organizations to economic and social issues and problems and the cultural rights suffered by the members of the community. The nature of political awareness among the citizens and the political elites is alike. There is also a continuation of traditional culture, low level of education and cultural development of most members of society. The study showed that political parties play a positive role in pushing people to participate in parliamentary elections. This party activity in elections is the best way to introduce citizens to political parties and organizations.

5. The inability of civil society organizations to encourage citizens to take part in political participation, and to identify strategic priorities for its goals, programs, projects, internal and external relations. The reaction without the planning or the fact that it is carefully targeted, and the inability of civil society organizations for the delivery, dissemination and popularization of the concept and objectives of civil society to wider and more inclusive sectors, instead of only stationing themselves within the cities and large towns lead to their failure in encouraging political participation. They also have a weak presence in rural communities which are socially and economically marginalized at the entire Palestinian national level (Ali, 2008; Adawi, 2008).

6. A number of studies were consensus on the identified obstacles to political participation in the Arab world. These studies agreed on a set of obstacles that hinder effective political participation, including social, political, economic and cultural obstacles (Dasuki, 2008; Alkhuyt & Saed, 2002; Osman, 2008) The studies were also unanimous that the issue of participation in political life in the Arab world was found in many of the obstacles that have characterized the Arab political life. These obstacles can be summed up in two types, constraints by the perception and awareness, such as illiteracy, misinformation, and

frustration, and cool relations, and constraints such as the practice of military rule and martial law, emergencies and imbalance in the social environment and restructure of the administrative system. The problem of participation in political life has many impediments in the Arab political action; it is limited freedoms of different types and political freedoms in particular despite the existence of parliamentary bodies, political parties, unions and professional organizations and despite the adoption of national constitutions, these rights and the endorsement of international conventions and the declaration of the organizations by Arab States; however, However such constitutions are meaningless in the context of a legislation based on the deep belief in the principle of monopoly of power and insufficient circulation among the various socio-political groups, but the executive power across the Arab world doesn't not hesitate to resort to methods of counterfeiting local and national elections in order to ensure the survival of power in the hands of the ruling group. The studies revealed that for the Arab citizens, decision-making is being carried out from the early beginning of his life and the life of society by the Arab state on his behalf in both large and small matters. Studies also indicate that education plays an important and active role in the upbringing of the younger generation, but the educational policy in the Arab world is linked to national policy; this creates political systems that do not care for democracy, so they do not contribute to the creation of a democratic generation. (Alsalo, 2003; Freihat, 1999), whereas, some studies (2004) view that there reason behind these obstacles is the absence of democratic political participation in the appointments by the Palestinian Authority in the local elections and the political will (Atallah, 2004; Osman, 2004; Miari, 1996).

2.3 Comment on the previous studies:

Previous studies have shown the interest of researchers and thinkers in the subject of political participation They found out that it addressed the issue of political participation; researchers in different segments have distinct efforts in their approach to tackle this subject in various aspects, The subject enjoyed attention in the whole in general and a special prominent place in the Palestinian society in which the Palestinian daily life is controlled by politics. The aim of these studies as a whole is to be introduced to this topic in terms of motives, forms, manifestations, and obstacles to political participation. It was agreed that

these studies were motivated by the forms and manifestations and multi-obstacles of political participation; however these studies have the following shortcomings:

1. Paucity of field studies related to the subject of direct study.
2. The focus of the majority of previous studies on the subject of political participation on the intellectual aspect of theory, historical narrative, and personal analysis of this issue.
3. Previous studies have adopted in the analysis of this subject secondary resource of the media and personal articles, and neglected primary sources; this has distracted the reader, and contributed to more conflicting interpretations of the subject.
4. They did not address the different dimensions in their study of this phenomenon such as the social and economic dimensions.
5. They dealt with a limited sample of respondents; there has not been a study of Palestinian society as a whole.
6. Many of these studies did not focus on the specificity of the Palestinian society and the historical context in the study of this subject within the context of this unique community.
7. Inability of some researchers to clarify the truth, sometimes behind the weakness of political participation in communities of developing countries in general and in Arab society in particular.

As for the previous studies (Omar Rahall; Yusuf Ghalom et al Ali; Rima Nazzal; and Samaa Suleiman) which have a very close relationship with the subject, they have the following shortcomings.

These studies come out in a purely theoretical manner; the study of Omar Rahall on the political participation of Palestinian women, is no more than a view of the writer on the subject of political participation since the study of the past or the presupposed adoption of a concept of the nature of political participation based on that did not specify the tools and means to help us in the interpretation of the phenomenon. Moreover, the output summary says that "the form, value and impact of participation, are closely linked to the form and nature of the mechanisms of democracy prevailing in the society" For the reasons stated above, this is applicable to the study of Rima Kataneh which is still away from the realities of political participation of Palestinian women.

In the study of Solomon on the political participation of women as the Gulf did not exceed a vision for the future and a strategy for the activation of the role of women since the survey was limited to published figures and statistics previously published about the reality of women's political participation in the Gulf, and it spoke about the vision for the future of women's participation in the Gulf, but it did not explain studied concepts or relations.

The study of Yusuf Ali Ghalom et al on political participation in Kuwait discussed a range of independent variables that measure the structural inequality, social network links, common hobbies and political awareness, the analyzes went through the building of traditional theories and the theory of the mobilization of resources. The researcher in the study ignored the impact of a changing social environment that can positively or negatively affect the political behaviour of individuals. The study of Abdel-Majid Al-Azzam on the trends of the selected sample of Jordanian society towards political participation did not agree with the objectives of the research questions to identify the status and extent of the loyalty of individuals to the political system. The importance of political parties as an organization of political participation does not measure trends in the Jordanian society towards political participation.

Based on the shortcomings of the studies, we found out that it is necessary to select a field study on political participation and focus on important aspects neglected by previous studies; this study includes variables that measure the dimensions of the social background of political participation, taking into account the dimensions of additional studies such as the impact of the previous cultural and environmental dimensions on the degree of political participation.

However, these studies are quoted in the current research to shed light on the subject of the various dimensions of political participation. This has motivated the researcher to move forward in the study of this phenomenon, and the current research will complement these studies as mentioned in the recommendations.

3. Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter presents the methodology of the study, its population, the tools of data collection and the methods of verifying its validity and reliability, the procedures of the study and statistical analysis.

3.1 Study Approach

The present study used the descriptive quantitative and qualitative approaches since both of them are considered to be the most suitable research approaches to study the political participation in the Palestinian society; both approaches are the most convenient to fulfill the study objectives since both work on describing facts regarding positions as they stand or describing what is already existent and collection of data and information which would be later classified, organized and expressed quantitatively; they would also be interpreted accordingly in order to reach an understanding of the relationship between the phenomenon and its different factors using convenient research tools.

3.2 Study Population

The study population consists of all the Palestinian citizens over 18 year old (who can vote in the election) in West Bank and Gaza Strip in the years 2009/2010, which includes (1883567) citizens; (1175294) in the West Bank and (1416543) in Gaza Strip, as it is clear in table no (1).

Table No. (1). Distribution of study population in West Bank and Gaza Strip by district

NO.	DISTRICT	POPULATION OVER 18 YEAR OLD	SAMPLE
	Jenin	128310	26
	Tubas	25131	5
	Tulkarem	78994	16

	Nablus	160415	33
	Qalqilya	45609	9
	Salfit	29785	6
	Ramallah	139865	29
	Jericho	21160	4
	Jerusalem	181825	37
	Bethlehem	88118	18
	Hebron	276082	56
	North Gaza	135123	28
	Gaza	248206	50
	Der Al-Balah	102768	21
	Khan Younis	135490	28
	Rafah	86686	18
Total		1883567	384

3.3 Study Sample

The study sample consists of (384) Palestinian citizens; (239) in West Bank and (145) Gaza Strip, selected by random stratified method as it is clear in figure no. (25). The sample size was calculated using the web."<http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm>", sample size calculator, with an error 0.05 (figure No. 25). The sample constituted (0.02%) of the study population. Tables' number (2-25) showed below present the main characteristics of the participants.

Table No. (2). Sample distribution by district

DISTRICT	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Jenin	26	6.8
Tubas	5	1.3
Tulkarem	16	4.2
Nablus	33	8.6
Qalqilya	9	2.3
Salfit	6	1.6
Ramallah	29	7.6
Jericho	4	1.0
Jerusalem	37	9.6
Bethlehem	18	4.7
Hebron	56	14.6
North Gaza	28	7.3
Gaza	50	13.0
Der Al-Balah	21	5.5
Khan Younis	28	7.3
Rafah	18	4.6
Total	384	100

Table no (2) clarifies the distribution of the sample participants by district in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as follows: 6.8% from the city of Jenin, 1.3% from Tubas, 4.2% from Tulkarem, 8.6% from Nablus, 2.3% from Qalqilya, 1.6% from Salfit while 7.6% were from Ramallah district. Besides, 1% from Jericho, 9.6% from the district of Jerusalem, 4.7% from Bethlehem, 14.6% from Hebron district, 7.3% from North Gaza, 13% from Gaza district, 5.5% from Der Al-Balah, 7.3% were from Khan Younis, while 4.6% of the participants were from Rafah.

Table No. (3). Sample distribution by gender

GENDER	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Male	205	53.4
Female	179	46.6
Total	384	100

Table no (3) shows the sample distribution of the participants according to gender, as 53.4% males compared to 46.6% females.

Table No. (4). Sample distribution by age group

AGE GROUP	NUMBER	PERCENT %
30-	175	46.2
30-44	135	35.6
45+	69	18.2
Total	379	100

Missing=5

Table no (4) clarifies the distribution of participants according to their age group, as the majority (46.2%) of them are in the age group below 30 years, 35.6% between 30-44 years, while 18.2% are 45 years and above.

Table No. (5). Sample distribution by social status

SOCIAL STATUS	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Single	136	35.4
Married	223	58.1
Other	25	6.5
Total	384	100

Table no (5) clarifies the distribution of respondents by social status, the majority (58.1%) of them are married, 35.4% single, while 6.5% are in other cases.

Table No. (6). Sample distribution by academic qualification

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
None	17	4.4
Basic (elementary-preparatory)	33	8.6
Secondary	90	23.4
Diploma	67	17.4
Bachelor and above	177	46.1
Total	384	100

Table no (6) shows the distribution of participants according to academic qualification, as 4.4% are illiterate, 8.6% have a basic (elementary-preparatory) level, 23.4% secondary, 17.4% have a diploma degree, while 46.1% have a bachelor degree and above.

Table No. (7). Sample distribution by family birth rank

FAMILY BIRTH RANK	NUMBER	PERCENT %
First	120	31.3
Med.	208	54.2
Last	56	14.6
Total	384	100

Table no (7) clarifies the distribution of the participants according to the birth rank in the family as follows: the majority (54.2%) of them are in the middle, 31.3% the youngest while 14.6% are the eldest.

Table No. (8). Sample distribution by region

REGION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
West Bank	239	62.2
Gaza Strip	145	37.8
Total	384	100

Table no (8) shows that 62.2% of the sample participants from the West Bank while 37.8% of them from Gaza Strip.

Table No. (9). Sample distribution by place of residence

PLACE OF RESIDENCE	NUMBER	PERCENT %
City	160	41.7
Village	127	33.1
Camp	97	25.3
Total	384	100

Table no (9) shows that 41.7% of the participants were from cities, 33.1% from villages and 25.3% from refugee camps.

Table No. (10). Sample distribution by area of residence

AREA OF RESIDENCE	NUMBER	PERCENT %
A	283	73.7
B	55	14.3
C	46	12.0
Total	384	100

Table no (10) clarifies the participants by area of living, as follows: 73.7% are in living in area A, 14.3% in B, while 12% were from C areas.

Table No. (11). Sample distribution by place of living

PLACE OF LIVING	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Close to the apartheid wall	155	40.4
Far from the apartheid wall	229	59.6
Total	384	100

According to the data in table no (11), 40.4% of the participants are living close to the apartheid wall, while 59.6 are not.

Table No. (12). Sample distribution by exposing to Israeli violence

EXPOSING TO ISRAELI VIOLENCE	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Yes	198	51.6
No	186	48.4
Total	384	100

According to data reported in table no (12) the majority (51.6%) of the participants were exposed to various forms of Israeli violence, while 48.4% were not exposed.

Table No. (13). Sample distribution by religion

RELIGION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Muslem	354	92.2
Christian	30	7.8
Total	384	100

Table no (13) clarifies the participants by religion, 92.2% were muslems, while 7.8% were Christians.

Table No. (14). Sample distribution by degree of religion

DEGREE OF RELIGION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
High	167	43.5
Middle	167	43.5
Low	50	13.0
Total	384	100

According to data reported in table no (14) 43.5% of the participants are deeply religious, 43.5% in the middle, while 13% are none religious.

Table No. (15). Sample distribution by family members

FAMILY MEMBERS	NUMBER	PERCENT %
(1-4)	109	29.0
(5-9)	198	52.7
10+	69	18.4
Total	376	100

Missing=8

Table no (15) clarifies the distribution of the sample by size of family as follows: the majority (52.744%) came from families of between 5-9 members, 29% with 1-4 members, while 18.4% of them from households of 10 members and above.

Table No. (16). Sample distribution by work status

WORK STATUS	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Working	230	59.9
Non working	154	40.1
Total	384	100

Table no (16) shows that the majority (59.9%) of the sample participants are working while 40.1% are not.

Table No. (17). Sample distribution by work sector

WORK SECTOR	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Public	106	46.1
Private	124	53.9
Total	230	100

Missing=154

Table no (17) clarifies the distribution of the sample participants by work sector: the majority (53.9%) are working in private sectors, while 46.1% are working in public sectors.

Table No. (18). Sample distribution by profession

PROFESSION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Employee	136	59.1
Craftsman	22	9.6
Worker	35	15.2
Business	26	11.3
Other	11	4.8
Total	230	100

Missing=154

Table no (18) clarifies the distribution of the participants by profession: 59.1% are employees, 9.6% craftsman, 15.2% are workers, 11.3% had businesses, and 4.8% are working in different areas.

Table No. (19). Sample distribution by monthly income (NIS)

MONTHLY INCOME (NIS)	NUMBER	PERCENT %
1500-	62	27.0
1500-3000	144	62.6
3000+	24	10.4
Total	230	100

Missing=154

Table no (19) shows that the monthly income to 27% of the participants are less than 1500 shekels, 62.6% are between 1500-3000 shekels while 10.4% having a monthly income more than 3000 shekels.

Table No. (20). Sample distribution by refugee status

REFUGEE STATUS	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Refugee	200	52.1
Non refugee	184	47.9
Total	284	100

Missing=154

According to data reported in table no (20), 52.1% of the participants were refugees while 47.9% were non refugees.

Table No. (21). Sample distribution by party affiliation

PARTY AFFILIATION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Yes	231	60.2
No	153	39.8
Total	384	100

According to the findings in table no (21), the majority (60.2%) of the participants were affiliated to different Palestinian factions, while 39.8% were not.

Table No. (22). Sample distribution by political faction

POLITICAL FACTION	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Fateh	160	41.7
Hamas	41	10.7
Popular Front	25	6.5
Democratic Front	13	3.4
Initiative	12	3.1
People Party	7	1.8
Islamic Jihad	12	3.1
Independent	55	14.3
Others	59	15.4
Total	384	100

Table no (22) clarifies the distribution of the participants by political faction, as follows: 41.7% are from Fateh, 10.7% from Hamas, 6.5% from the Popular Front for Liberation Palestine, 3.4% are from the Democratic Front for Liberation Palestine, 3.1% form the initiative party, 1.8% affiliated to People Party, 3.1% from Islamic Jihad, 14.3% independents, while 15.4% belong to other Palestinian factions.

Table No. (23). Sample distribution by participant's involving in 1996 elections

INVOLVED IN THE ELECTIONS 1996	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Yes	150	39.1
No	234	60.9
Total	384	100

According to data reported in table no (23), 39.1% of the participants had been involved in the Palestinian elections in the year 1996, while 60.9% had not.

Table No. (24). Sample distribution by participant's involving in 2006 elections

INVOLVED IN THE ELECTIONS 2006	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Yes	262	68.2
No	122	31.8
Total	384	100

Findings in table no (24) show that, 68.2% of the participants had been involved in the Palestinian elections in the year 2006, while 31.8% had not.

Table No. (25). Sample distribution by involved in the local municipal elections

INVOLVED IN THE LOCAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	NUMBER	PERCENT %
Yes	165	43.0
No	219	57.0
Total	384	100

According to data reported in table no (25), 43% of the participants had been involved in the Palestinian local municipal elections, while 57% had not.

3.4 Method and Tools of Data Collection

The present study used the approach of sampling survey, and the questionnaire (Appendix A; B), as tools for data collection. Based on literature review in order to examine the political participation in the Palestinian society, the researcher develops a questionnaire which consists of four sections. The first has the demographic characteristics of the Palestinian citizens like: gender, age, social status, educational qualification, region, place of residence, district, refugee status, work status, profession, income...etc. The second includes the motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society, which consists of (31 items). The third has the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society (38 items), with its different dimensions: self, social, religious, and national. The fourth includes the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society, which consists of (41 items). Five-point Likert Scale (Strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree) was used in the questionnaire. The tool of validity and reliability was checked as follows:

3.4.1 Validity of the Study Tool

The questionnaire was validated by being reviewed by a group of referees and expert arbitrators (Table No. 83), who provided some comments on the tool. These comments were incorporated into the final version of the questionnaire. On the other hand, the validity was also measured statistically by factorial analysis, in order to examine the internal consistency of the questionnaire items. Tables number (26-28) shown below present the results.

Table No. (26). Factor Analysis for the motivations of political participation sub-scale

NO.	SCALE ITEMS	ALPHA
	Doing the national duty	0.60
	A process of self-validation	0.58
	A tool to express my demands	0.67
	A response to the call of my doctrine	0.68
	A response to the call of the political direction (the party)	0.63
	Compatibility with the Authority	0.57
	Seeking a political position	0.67
	Searching for an employment position	0.69
	Realizing a self-interest	0.70
	In solidarity with the family/clan	0.50
	Defensive policy against an expected danger	0.52
	Expression of political awareness	0.60
	To express public demands (political, social, ...)	0.63
	The desire for making friends	0.65
	To exercise one of my political rights.	0.52
	To gain respect or appreciation from others.	0.70
	To gain the popularity of others.	0.72
	Compliment of others.	0.61
	For the significance of political action in the Palestinian society.	0.51
	To enhance democracy	0.55
	To influence the government	0.60
	The desire to change reality	0.57
	To enhance the independent Palestinian political decision	0.63
	Everyone has the right to express his or her opinion	0.61
	Displaying leaderships and proficiencies of Palestinian society	0.65
	Other's participation in the development and improvement of the society.	0.71

	Strengthen ties among the different sections and fragments of the Palestinian society.	0.65
	Influence the general policy-making process in the Palestinian society.	0.60
	Realizing public interest	0.50
	Existence of moral and material motivations.	0.60
	Being furious on the living reality	0.50

Table No. (27). Factor Analysis for the forms of political participation sub-scale

NO.	SCALE ITEMS	ALPHA
	I am a member in a political organization	0.67
	I donate to a political organization or a candidate	0.69
	I attend to the political meetings regularly	0.78
	I participate in the electoral campaigns	0.66
	I send letters on political issues to those who have political positions	0.67
	I talk about policy with people outside my family or friends	0.60
	I care of political issues	0.74
	I care of political work	0.74
	I devote time for political activity	0.72
	I know the political parties and the aims behind their formation.	0.70
	I participate in political activities in times of crisis	0.70
	I participate in political activities when feel that my interests are threatened	0.56
	I participate in promotion of a political	0.67
	I participate in the public meetings of the political parties	0.64
	I participate in the demonstrations which are against the occupation	0.53
	I take care of participating in the elections (the Legislative Council, Presidential and local)	0.64
	I participate in the political debates	0.61
	I draw graffiti on walls	0.63
	I take care of symposiums that concern the political issues	0.71

	I follow with interest the political programs of the various parties.	0.67
	I closely watch the political news in the different mass media. (newspapers, radio and television)	0.55
	I love to be active in a movement for the citizen's rights.	0.62
	I take care of the programs concerning political issues	0.68
	I follow up what's happening in the political arena	0.68
	I contact the official bodies on public issues	0.72
	I submit complaint on community issues to the official bodies	0.74
	I know the personalities who have political role in the society at local and national levels	0.60
	I participate in volunteer works dealing with serving the society	0.65
	I feel with responsibility to community issues	0.59
	I get involved in the election campaigning for a particular party	0.72
	I collect signatures on protest memos.	0.68
	I distribute political leaflets concerning a particular party.	0.68
	I criticize the policy of the Palestinian government when it fails or makes mistakes	0.72
	I am interested in participating in expressing the rejection of the government policy when it fails or makes mistakes	0.73
	I take care of registering in the local or national electoral lists	0.66
	I take care of voting in any local or national elections	0.74
	I encourage others to participate politically	0.71
	I find it easier to participate in political discussions	0.51

Table No. (28). Factor Analysis for the Impediments of political participation sub-scale

NO.	SCALE ITEMS	ALPHA
	Bad choice of candidates	0.80
	Mistrusting the candidates	0.79
	Weakness of political and social institutions such as political parties	0.67
	Suppression of parliamentary, media and popular censorship	0.58
	Spread of illiteracy	0.50

Absence of mass agencies, associations and clubs	0.63
Dominance and its existence in its official and popular forms	0.64
Absence of popular participation and suppression and frustrating it	0.62
Lack of knowledge of the political parties and their aims of formation	0.55
Personification of political decision-making and the dominance of powerful personality inside the institutions and political parties	0.60
The prevalence of cronyism in the political system	0.62
Weakness of political issues and thesis	0.52
Fear about my personal safety	0.71
Fear of the tension of relations with others	0.74
Fear of losing job/action	0.68
I am not convinced in political work	0.56
Weakness of the overall political climate such as the institutions and organizations existed in the society and the constitution, and the nature of the factional system	0.67
Lack of respect to voters from the political parties	0.64
The nature of the dominant culture in the society doesn't encourage to political participation	0.62
The Israeli occupation is a stumbling block for the political participation	0.52
The organizational differences between the Palestinian parties prevent me from political participation	0.58
Politicians are not interested as I am	0.73
Being interested in improving my financial position, will prevent me from political participation	0.60
The traditional mentality in the Palestinian society never urges political participation	0.74
The poor process of the political participation received by the individual in the Palestinian society	0.65
Absence of role of mass media to enhance the political participation in the Palestinian society	0.58
The outside effects in the Palestinian political decision	0.61
Feeling that no benefit of political participation in influencing the political decisions in the Palestinian society	0.65
Limitations and laws that restrict public properties	0.68
Torture and suppression practiced by some Palestinian factions	0.70

0.	Frustration from prevailing political situation in the Palestinian society	0.69
1.	The absence of responsibility sense towards the national and social issues	0.63
2.	Prevalence of political corruption	0.52
3.	Control and domination of the family tribe	0.62
4.	Political disorder and confusion spread in the Palestinian society	0.61
5.	Lack of elected members connected to people	0.56
6.	Absence of national sensation	0.66
7.	I'm convinced that nobody like me has any influence on the government and its policies	0.69
8.	I'm not confident in my position in political topics	0.67
9.	I would like to participate more in politics if things were not so complicated	0.60
0.	If you get away from politics, you will relax	0.72

Findings in tables' number (26-28) indicate that they all the study items combined measured the phenomena of political participation in the Palestinian society in light of the theoretical framework which the tool of study is based upon.

3.4.2 Reliability of the Study Tool

In regards to the questionnaire reliability, it was tested by calculating the internal consistency of the questionnaire sub-scales using the Cronbach Alpha Formula, as it's clear in table no. (29).

Table No. (29). Cronbach Alpha reliability analysis for the questionnaire sub-scales

NO.	SUB-SCALE	NO. OF ITEMS	ALPHA
	Motivations of political participation	31	0.91
	Forms of political participation	38	0.97
	impediments of political participation	41	0.93
	Total degree	110	0.96

Findings in table number (29) indicate that the questionnaire with its different dimensions is highly reliable. The results were as follows: the reliability of the motivations of political participation is (0.91), forms of political participation (0.97), impediments of political participation (0.93), while the reliability of the total degree was (0.96).

3.5 Study Procedures

The statistics of the study population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were obtained from the Central Committee of Palestinian Elections. This took place following coordination between the Committee and the researcher in formal correspondence through the supervisors on the study.

Following the completion of the study tools, the researcher with the participation of a skilled field team which consisted of ten researchers (Appendix.D) completed the data collected from the Palestinian citizens in West Bank and Gaza Strip. The data collected averaging was more than one hour each.

The process of data collection was carried out in the period from 1 June-20 October 2010. The participants were very cooperative in such an important topic in the Palestinian society.

3.6 Statistical Analysis

Following data collection, it was reviewed in preparation for processing into the computer; they were allocated certain numbers to i.e. transformed verbal answers into numbers (strongly agree 5, agree 4, neutral 3, disagree 2, strongly disagree 1) in order to carry out the required statistical procedures for the data which took place through obtaining: numbers, percentages, means, standard deviations and graphics. In addition, the following statistical tests were used: Pearson Correlation, T.test, One way analysis of variance, Tukey test, Cronbach Alpha, Factor Analysis, and figures, using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). In order to understand the findings of the study, the mean key in table no. (30) shown below will be useful.

Table No. (30). Mean key for the findings of the study

NO.	MEAN	KEY	STANDARD
	1-2.33	Low	One Standard Deviation below
	2.34-3.67	Moderate	Mean
	3.68-5	High	One Standard Deviation above

4. Chapter Four: Findings of the Study

The current study aimed at identifying the phenomena of political participation in the Palestinian society. The findings are as follows.

4.1 Motivations of Political Participation in the Palestinian Society

What are the motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society?

Numbers means and standard deviations were used to identify the above question. Table's number (31-32) had shown below present the results.

Table No. (31). Degree of motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Degree of motivations of political participation	384	3.63	0.65

Table no (31) shows that the degree of motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society is moderate, with an average (3.63).

Table No. (32). Mean scores and standard deviation for the motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society ranked in a descending order

MOTIVATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATIONS	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Everyone has the right to express his or her opinion	4.32	1.03
Doing the national duty	4.18	1.04
The desire to change reality	4.14	1.06
A process of self-validation	4.10	1.05
Other's participation in the development and improvement of the society	4.02	1.08
A tool to express my demands	4.02	1.05
To enhance the independent Palestinian political decision	4.01	1.11
Expression of political awareness	4.00	1.05
Realizing public interest	3.96	1.16
To express public demands (political, social, ...etc)	3.96	1.03
Strengthen ties among the different sections and fragments of the Palestinian society	3.96	1.10
To enhance democracy	3.95	1.14
Displaying leaderships and proficiencies of Palestinian society	3.91	1.18
A response to the call of my doctrine	3.84	1.18
To gain respect or appreciation from others	3.82	1.19
To exercise one of my political rights	3.74	1.17
Influence the general policy-making process in the Palestinian society	3.73	1.16
Being furious on the living reality	3.65	1.25
For the significance of political action in the Palestinian society	3.60	1.24
Defensive policy against an expected danger	3.51	1.33
To influence the government	3.46	1.32
To gain the popularity of others	3.46	1.27

The desire for making friends	3.40	1.31
A response to the call of the political party	3.31	1.42
Motivations of political participations	Mean	Standard deviation
In solidarity with the family/clan	3.17	1.50
Searching for an employment position	3.09	1.51
Existence of moral and material motivations	3.07	1.38
Compatibility with the Authority	3.03	1.40
Compliment of others	2.94	1.38
Realizing a self-interest	2.82	1.44
Seeking a political position	2.43	1.37
Total	3.63	0.65

***Mean out of 5 points**

Table no (32) clarifies the motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society ranked in a descending order as follows: the right to express his or her opinion, doing a national duty, the desire to change the reality, a process of self-validation, other's participation in the development and improvement of the society, a tool to express the demands, to enhance the independent Palestinian political decision, and expression of political awareness. Besides, the realizing public interest, and to express public demands (political, social, ...etc), strengthen ties among the different sections and fragments of the Palestinian society, to enhance democracy, displaying leaderships and proficiencies of Palestinian society, a response to the call of my doctrine, to gain respect or appreciation from others, to exercise one of my political rights, influence the general policy-making process in the Palestinian society, being furious on the living reality. The participants emphasize the significance of political action in the Palestinian society, and the defensive policy against an expected danger. Also, to influence the government to gain the popularity of others the desire for making friends. Besides, it's a response to the call of the political party, and in solidarity with the family/clan, searching for an employment position, existence of moral and material motivations, compatibility with the Authority, compliment of others, realizing self-interest and seeking a political position.

4.2 Forms of Political Participation in the Palestinian Society

What are the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society?

Numbers means and standard deviations were used to identify the above question. Table's number (33-34) had shown below present the results.

Table No. (33). Degree of practicing the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Degree of practicing the forms of political participations	384	3.30	0.83

Table no (33) shows that the degree of practicing the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society is moderate, with an average (3.30).

Table No. (34). Mean scores and standard deviation for the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society ranked in a descending order

FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATIONS	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
I closely watch the political news in the different mass media (newspapers, radio and television)	3.86	1.11
I feel with responsibility to community issues	3.82	1.04
I follow up what's happening in the political arena	3.81	1.06
I participate in volunteer works dealing with serving the society	3.77	1.10
I love to be active in a movement for the citizen's rights	3.74	1.24
I take care of voting in any local or national elections	3.68	1.14

I take care of participating in the elections (the Legislative Council, Presidential and local)	3.63	1.30
I take care of the programs concerning political issues	3.61	1.10
I participate in the demonstrations which are against the occupation	3.59	1.32
I criticize the policy of the Palestinian government when it fails or makes mistakes	3.59	1.19
I know the personalities who have political role in the society at local and national levels	3.57	1.08
I encourage others to participate politically	3.53	1.16
I am interested in participating in expressing the rejection of the government policy when it fails or makes mistakes	3.52	1.16
I care of political issues	3.51	1.19
I know the political parties and the aims behind their formation	3.49	1.17
I take care of registering in the local or national electoral lists	3.42	1.17
I care of political work	3.33	1.27
I find it easier to participate in political discussions	3.33	1.14
I participate in political activities in times of crisis	3.29	1.19
I participate in the political debates	3.25	1.17
I participate in the electoral campaigns	3.24	1.25
Forms of political participations	Mean	Standard Deviation
I talk about policy with people outside my family or friends	3.24	1.25
I am a member in a political organization	3.24	1.36
I follow with interest the political programs of the various parties	3.22	1.18
I submit complaint on community issues to the official bodies	3.17	1.16
I contact the official bodies on public issues	3.17	1.15
I take care of symposiums that concern the political issues	3.09	1.24
I send letters on political issues to those who have political positions	3.09	1.25

I get involved in the election campaigning for a particular party	3.09	1.29
I participate in political activities when feel that my interests are threatened	3.05	1.23
I participate in promotion of a political	3.00	1.21
I devote time for political activity	2.92	1.20
I collect signatures on protest memos	2.90	1.24
I participate in the public meetings of the political parties	2.86	1.25
I attend the political meetings regularly	2.84	1.30
I donate to a political organization or a candidate	2.83	1.26
I distribute political leaflets concerning a particular party	2.76	1.25
I draw graffiti on walls	2.41	1.27
Total	3.30	0.83

***Mean out of 5 points**

Table no (34) clarifies the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society ranked in a descending order as follows: closely watch the political news in the different mass media (newspapers, radio and television), feel with responsibility to community issues, follow up what's happening in the political arena, participate in volunteer works dealing with serving the society, and the love to be active in a movement for the citizen's rights. In addition to, take care of voting in any local or national elections, and participating in the elections (the Legislative Council, Presidential and local), take care of the programs concerning political issues, participate in the demonstrations which are against the occupation, criticize the policy of the Palestinian government when it fails or makes mistakes. The participants also indicate the form of knowing the personalities who have political role in the society at local and national levels, and encouraging others to participate politically, the interested in participating in expressing the rejection of the government policy when it fails or makes mistakes, the care of political issues, know the political parties and the aims behind their formation, take care of registering in the local or national electoral lists. Also, the care of political work, the easy to participate in political discussions, participate in political activities in times of crisis, involve in the political debates, participate in the electoral campaigns, talk about policy with people outside my family or friends, be a member in a political organization, follow with interest the political programs of the various parties. In addition to, submit complaint on community

issues to the official bodies, and contact the official bodies on public issues, take care of symposiums that concern the political issues, and to send letters on political issues to those who have political positions. Also, to get involved in the election campaigning for a particular party, participate in political activities when feel that my interests are threatened, and to involve in promotion of a political, devote time for political activity, collect signatures on protest memos, participate in the public meetings of the political parties, attend the political meetings regularly, donate to a political organization or a candidate, distribute political leaflets concerning a particular party and draw graffiti on walls.

4.3 Impediments of Political Participation in the Palestinian Society

What are the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society?

Numbers means and standard deviations were used to identify the above question. Table's number (35-36) had shown below present the results.

Table No. (35). Degree of impediments in the political participation in the Palestinian society

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Degree of impediments in the political participations	384	3.52	0.61

Table no (35) shows that the degree of impediments in the political participation in the Palestinian society is also moderate, with an average (3.52).

Table No. (36). Mean scores and standard deviation for the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society ranked in a descending order

IMPEDIMENTS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATIONS	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Bad choice of candidates	3.99	1.15
Prevalence of political corruption	3.89	1.11
Mistrusting the candidates	3.84	1.13
Frustration from prevailing political situation in the Palestinian society	3.82	1.09
The outside effects in the Palestinian political decision	3.78	1.09
Political disorder and confusion spread in the Palestinian society	3.77	1.12
The prevalence of cronyism in the political system	3.76	1.10
The Israeli occupation is a stumbling block for the political participation	3.73	1.23
Lack of elected members connected to people	3.73	1.11
Dominance and its existence in its official and popular forms	3.70	1.06
Torture and suppression practiced by some Palestinian factions	3.70	1.16
Weakness of political and social institutions such as political parties	3.69	1.07
The organizational differences between the Palestinian parties prevent me from political participation	3.68	1.20
Personification of political decision-making and the dominance of powerful personality inside the institutions and political parties	3.66	1.10
Absence of popular participation and suppression and frustrating it	3.65	1.11
Limitations and laws that restrict public properties	3.62	1.06
Suppression of parliamentary, media and popular censorship	3.60	1.12
Weakness of political issues and thesis	3.58	1.06
Feeling that no benefit of political participation in influencing the political decisions in the Palestinian society	3.58	1.08
Impediments of political participations	Mean	Standard Deviation
Absence of mass agencies, associations and clubs	3.55	1.07
Lack of respect to voters from the political parties	3.55	1.17
The poor process of the political participation received by the individual in the Palestinian society	3.55	0.97
Spread of illiteracy	3.54	1.22
The nature of the dominant culture in the society doesn't encourage to political participation	3.53	1.10
Absence of role of mass media to enhance the political participation in the Palestinian society	3.45	1.07
Politicians are not interested in a person like me	3.45	1.24

The absence of responsibility sense towards the national and social issues	3.44	1.25
The traditional mentality in the Palestinian society never urges political participation	3.43	1.04
Lack of knowledge of the political parties and their aims of formation	3.42	1.20
Fear about my personal safety	3.41	1.27
I would like to participate more in politics if things were not so complicated	3.41	1.21
Weakness of the overall political climate such as the institutions and organizations existed in the society and the constitution, and the nature of the factional system	3.40	1.07
Being interested in improving my financial position, will prevent me from political participation	3.34	1.27
Control and domination of the family tribe	3.33	1.26
Fear of the tension of relations with others	3.32	1.22
If you get away from politics, you will relax	3.28	1.41
Fear of losing job/action	3.22	1.39
Absence of national sensation	3.18	1.25
I am not convinced in political work	3.15	1.24
IMPEDIMENTS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATIONS	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
I'm convinced that nobody like me has any influence on the government and its policies	2.99	1.25
I'm not confident in my position in political topics	2.80	1.25
Total	3.52	0.61

***Mean out of 5 points**

Table no (36) clarifies the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society ranked in a descending order as follows: bad choice of candidates, prevalence of political corruption, mistrusting the candidates, frustration from prevailing political situation in the Palestinian society, the outside effects in the Palestinian political decision, the political disorder and confusion spread in the Palestinian society, the prevalence of cronyism in the political system, the Israeli occupation is a stumbling block for the political participation. In addition to, the Lack of elected members connected to people, dominance and its existence in its official and popular forms. The participants also emphasize the torture and suppression practiced by some Palestinian factions, weakness of political and social institutions such as political parties, the organizational differences between the Palestinian parties prevent me from political participation, the personification of political decision-making and the

dominance of powerful personality inside the institutions and political parties, the absence of popular participation and suppression and frustrating it, the limitations and laws that restrict public properties, suppression of parliamentary, media and popular censorship, the weakness of political issues and thesis, feeling that no benefit of political participation in influencing the political decisions in the Palestinian society. Besides, the absence of mass agencies, associations and clubs, the lack of respect to voters from the political parties, the poor process of the political participation received by the individual in the Palestinian society, spread of illiteracy, the nature of the dominant culture in the society doesn't encourage to political participation, the absence of role of mass media to enhance the political participation in the Palestinian society, politicians are not interested in person like me, the absence of responsibility sense towards the national and social issues, the traditional mentality in the Palestinian society never urges political participation, the lack of knowledge of the political parties and their aims of formation, fear about my personal safety, the desire to participate more in politics if things were not so complicated, the weakness of the overall political climate such as the institutions and organizations existed in the society and the constitution, and the nature of the factional system, being interested in improving my financial position, will prevent me from political participation. In addition to, the control and domination of the family tribe, fear of the tension of relations with others, the believe in "if you get away from politics, you will relax", the fear of losing job/action, the absence of national sensation, the unconvinced in political work. Also, the participants convinced that they have no influence on the government and its policies, and the unconfident in the political topics.

4.4 Differences in the Political Participation in the Palestinian Society

4.4.1 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's gender.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (37) shown below present the results.

Table no. (37). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's gender

SUB-SCALE	GENDER	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Male	205	3.68	0.65	382	1.755	0.080
	Female	179	3.57	0.64			
Forms	Male	205	3.47	0.78	382	4.423	0.000
	Female	179	3.10	0.85			
Impediments	Male	205	3.47	0.62	382	-1.665	0.097
	Female	179	3.57	0.59			
Total Degree	Male	205	3.53	0.50	382	2.323	0.021
	Female	179	3.41	0.52			

Table no (37) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's gender. The differences were in the sub-scale of the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the males, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.2 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's religion.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (38) shown below present the results.

Table no. (38). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's religion

SUB-SCALE	RELIGION	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Muslem	354	3.62	0.65	382	-0.648	0.517
	Christian	30	3.70	0.63			
Forms	Muslem	354	3.26	0.84	382	-3.436	0.001
	Christian	30	3.68	0.61			
Impediments	Muslem	354	3.51	0.61	382	-1.345	0.180
	Christian	30	3.66	0.57			
Total Degree	Muslem	354	3.46	0.51	382	-2.284	0.023
	Christian	30	3.68	0.44			

Table no (38) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's religion. The differences were in the sub-scale of the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the Christians, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.3 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work status.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (39) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (39). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work status

SUB-SCALE	WORK STATUS	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Work	230	3.68	0.64	382	1.913	0.057
	Un work	154	3.55	0.65			
Forms	Work	230	3.39	0.83	382	2.835	0.005
	Un work	154	3.15	0.82			
Impediments	Work	230	3.48	0.59	382	-1.650	0.100
	Un work	154	3.58	0.62			
Total Degree	Work	230	3.51	0.51	382	1.519	0.130
	Un work	154	3.42	0.52			

Table no (39) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work status. The differences were in the sub-scale of the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the working citizens, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.4 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work sector.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (40) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (40). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work sector

SUB-SCALE	WORK SECTOR	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Public	106	3.74	0.59	228	1.266	0.207
	Private	124	3.63	0.68			
Forms	Public	106	3.42	0.83	228	0.446	0.656
	Private	124	3.37	0.83			
Impediments	Public	106	3.50	0.63	228	0.512	0.609
	Private	124	3.46	0.56			
Total Degree	Public	106	3.54	0.50	228	0.926	0.355
	Private	124	3.48	0.51			

Table no (40) indicates that there are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's work sector.

4.4.5 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's refugee status.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (41) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (41). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's refugee status

SUB-SCALE	REFUGEE STATUS	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Refugee	200	3.68	0.64	382	1.657	0.098
	Un Refugee	184	3.57	0.65			
Forms	Refugee	200	3.33	0.82	382	0.825	0.410
	Un Refugee	184	3.26	0.84			
Impediments	Refugee	200	3.59	0.60	382	2.260	0.024
	Un Refugee	184	3.45	0.61			
Total Degree	Refugee	200	3.52	0.52	382	2.045	0.042
	Un Refugee	184	3.42	0.49			

Table no (41) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's refugee status. The differences were in the sub-scale of the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the refugee citizens, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.6 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's party affiliation.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (42) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (42). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's party affiliation

SUB-SCALE	PARTY AFFILIATION	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Affiliated	231	3.81	0.61	382	7.175	0.000
	Un affiliated	153	3.35	0.60			
Forms	Affiliated	231	3.66	0.70	382	12.306	0.000
	Un affiliated	153	2.75	0.71			
Impediments	Affiliated	231	3.50	0.58	382	-0.906	0.366
	Un affiliated	153	3.55	0.65			
Total Degree	Affiliated	231	3.64	0.47	382	8.498	0.000
	Un affiliated	153	3.22	0.46			

Table no (42) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's party affiliation. The differences were in the sub-scales: the motivations and the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the affiliated citizens, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.7 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's region.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (43) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (43). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's region

SUB-SCALE	REGION	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	West Bank	239	3.59	0.62	382	-1.607	0.109
	Gaza Strip	145	3.70	0.68			
Forms	West Bank	239	3.29	0.84	382	-0.306	0.760
	Gaza Strip	145	3.31	0.81			
Impediments	West Bank	239	3.46	0.59	382	-2.494	0.013
	Gaza Strip	145	3.62	0.62			
Total Degree	West Bank	239	3.44	0.50	382	-1.837	0.067
	Gaza Strip	145	3.54	0.53			

Table no (43) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's region. The differences were in the sub-scale the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the citizens in Gaza Strip, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.8 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of living.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (44) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (44). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of living

SUB-SCALE	PLACE OF LIVING	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Near the apartheid Wall	155	3.57	0.61	382	-1.493	0.136
	Far from the apartheid Wall	229	3.67	0.67			
Forms	Near the apartheid Wall	155	3.27	0.82	382	-0.497	0.620
	Far from the apartheid Wall	229	3.31	0.84			
Impediments	Near the apartheid Wall	155	3.48	0.58	382	-0.938	0.349
	Far from the apartheid Wall	229	3.54	0.63			
Total Degree	Near the apartheid Wall	155	3.43	0.47	382	-1.220	0.223
	Far from the apartheid Wall	229	3.50	0.54			

Table no (44) indicates that there are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of living.

4.4.9 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's exposing to Israeli violence.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (45) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (45). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's exposing to Israeli violence

SUB-SCALE	EXPOSING TO ISRAELI VIOLENCE	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Yes	198	3.69	0.58	382	2.029	0.043
	No	186	3.56	0.70			
Forms	Yes	198	3.48	0.77	382	4.439	0.000
	No	186	3.11	0.85			
Impediments	Yes	198	3.49	0.61	382	-1.045	0.297
	No	186	3.55	0.60			
Total Degree	Yes	198	3.54	0.47	382	2.697	0.007
	No	186	3.40	0.55			

Table no (45) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's exposing to Israeli violence. The differences were in the sub-scales: motivations and forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the citizens that have been exposed to Israeli violence, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.10 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 1996 elections.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (46) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (46). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 1996 elections

SUB-SCALE	PARTICIPATION IN 1996 ELECTIONS	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Yes	150	3.68	0.61	382	1.341	0.181
	No	234	3.59	0.67			
Forms	Yes	150	3.46	0.84	382	3.165	0.002
	No	234	3.19	0.81			
Impediments	Yes	150	3.46	0.68	382	-1.346	0.180
	No	234	3.55	0.55			
Total Degree	Yes	150	3.53	0.53	382	1.601	0.110
	No	234	3.44	0.50			

Table no (46) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 1996 elections. The differences were in the sub-scale forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the citizens that have been participated in the Palestinian elections in the year 1996, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.11 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 2006 elections.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (47) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (47). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 2006 elections

SUB-SCALE	PARTICIPATIO N IN 2006 ELECTIONS	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATIO N	DF	T- VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Yes	262	3.69	0.62	382	2.510	0.012
	No	122	3.51	0.69			
Forms	Yes	262	3.47	0.77	382	6.088	0.000
	No	122	2.93	0.84			
Impediments	Yes	262	3.54	0.65	382	0.828	0.408
	No	122	3.48	0.51			
Total Degree	Yes	262	3.55	0.51	382	4.576	0.000
	No	122	3.30	0.49			

Table no (47) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in 2006 elections. The differences were in the sub-scales: the motivations and the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the citizens that have been participated in the Palestinian elections in the year 2006, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.12 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in the local municipal elections.

T-test was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (48) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (48). T-test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in the local municipal elections

SUB-SCALE	PARTICIPATION IN THE LOCAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	N	MEAN	STD. DEVIATION	DF	T-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Yes	165	3.68	0.57	382	1.433	0.153
	No	219	3.59	0.70			
Forms	Yes	165	3.45	0.77	382	3.258	0.001
	No	219	3.18	0.86			
Impediments	Yes	165	3.53	0.61	382	0.312	0.755
	No	219	3.51	0.61			
Total Degree	Yes	165	3.55	0.46	382	2.466	0.014
	No	219	3.42	0.54			

Table no (48) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's participation in the local municipal elections. The differences were in the sub-scale the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society, in favor to the citizens that have been participated in the Palestinian local elections, as it clears from the mean scores in the above table.

4.4.13 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's social status.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (49) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (49). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's social status

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	0.491	0.245	0.576	0.562
	Within groups	381	162.189	0.426		
	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	0.655	0.327	0.469	0.626
	Within groups	381	265.752	0.698		
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	0.934	0.467	1.251	0.287
	Within groups	381	142.216	0.373		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	2	0.165	0.082	0.307	0.736
	Within groups	381	102.319	0.269		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (49) indicates that there are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's social status.

Table no. (50). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's social status

SUB-SCALE	SOCIAL STATUS	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	Single	136	3.65	0.65
	Married	223	3.60	0.65
	Other	25	3.74	0.64
Forms	Single	136	3.28	0.85
	Married	223	3.32	0.80
	Other	25	3.16	1.00
Impediments	Single	136	3.58	0.54
	Married	223	3.49	0.64
	Other	25	3.41	0.66
Total	Single	136	3.50	0.50
	Married	223	3.47	0.51
	Other	25	3.42	0.59

4.4.14 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (51) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (51). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	4	2.120	0.530	1.251	0.289
	Within groups	379	160.559	0.424		
	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	4	8.273	2.068	3.037	0.017
	Within groups	379	258.134	0.681		
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	4	2.207	0.552	1.484	0.206
	Within groups	379	140.943	0.372		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	4	2.288	0.572	2.164	0.072
	Within groups	379	100.196	0.264		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (51) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification. The differences were in the sub-scale the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society. Tukey test was used to identify the source of these differences. Table number (52) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (52). Tukey test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification

ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION	NONE	BASIC	SECONDARY	DIPLOMA	BACHELOR+
None		-0.05793	-0.08151	-0.37732*	-0.36596
Basic			-0.02358	-0.31938	-0.30803
Secondary				-0.29581	-0.28445
Diploma					0.01135
Bachelor+					

Table no (52) indicates that the statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the sub-scale the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification were between the citizens with the academic qualification diploma and the none, in favor to the citizens with the diploma, as it clears from the mean scores in table no. (53).

Table no. (53). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's academic qualification

SUB-SCALE	ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	None	17	3.43	0.76
	Basic	33	3.48	0.52
	Secondary	90	3.63	0.67
	Diploma	67	3.74	0.64
	Bachelor+	177	3.63	0.64
Forms	None	17	3.04	1.25
	Basic	33	3.10	0.76
	Secondary	90	3.12	0.79
	Diploma	67	3.42	0.73
	Bachelor+	177	3.40	0.83
Impediments	None	17	3.63	0.62
	Basic	33	3.29	0.72
	Secondary	90	3.57	0.64
	Diploma	67	3.54	0.60
	Bachelor+	177	3.52	0.56
Total	None	17	3.37	0.68
	Basic	33	3.28	0.54
	Secondary	90	3.43	0.53
	Diploma	67	3.55	0.49
	Bachelor+	177	3.51	0.48

4.4.15 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of residence.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (54) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (54). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of residence

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	1.299	0.649	1.533	0.217
	Within groups	381	161.381	0.424		
	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	0.191	0.095	0.136	0.872
	Within groups	381	266.216	0.699		
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	0.397	0.199	0.530	0.589
	Within groups	381	142.753	0.375		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	2	0.158	0.079	0.294	0.745
	Within groups	381	102.326	0.269		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (54) indicates that there are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of residence.

Table no. (55). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's place of residence

SUB-SCALE	PLACE OF RESIDENCE	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	City	160	3.56	0.72
	Village	127	3.67	0.57
	Camp	97	3.69	0.61
Forms	City	160	3.27	0.83
	Village	127	3.32	0.79
	Camp	97	3.31	0.88
Impediments	City	160	3.54	0.60
	Village	127	3.47	0.59
	Camp	97	3.54	0.64
Total	City	160	3.45	0.50
	Village	127	3.47	0.49
	Camp	97	3.50	0.56

4.4.16 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of residence.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (56) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (56). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of residence

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	0.681	0.341	0.801	0.450
	Within groups	381	161.998	0.425		

	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	1.427	0.713	1.026	0.360
	Within groups	381	264.980	0.695		
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	3.113	1.556	4.234	0.015
	Within groups	381	140.038	0.368		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	2	1.112	0.556	2.090	0.125
	Within groups	381	101.372	0.266		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (56) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of residence. The differences were in the sub-scale the impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society. Tukey test was used to identify the source of these differences. Table number (57) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (57). Tukey test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of living

AREA OF LIVING	A	B	C
A		-0.22782	-0.28011*
B			-0.05229
C			

Table no (57) indicates that the statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the sub-scale impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of living were between the citizens in area A and C, in favor to the citizens living in area C, as it clears from the mean scores in table no. (58).

Table no. (58). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's area of residence

SUB-SCALE	AREA OF RESIDENCE	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	A	283	3.65	0.68
	B	55	3.53	0.58
	C	46	3.61	0.54
Forms	A	283	3.33	0.83
	B	55	3.15	0.86
	C	46	3.29	0.78
Impediments	A	283	3.28	0.62
	B	55	3.51	0.54
	C	46	3.56	0.61
Total	A	283	3.51	0.52
	B	55	3.39	0.50
	C	46	3.37	0.46

4.4.17 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's degree of religion.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (59) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (59). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's degree of religion

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	0.109	0.054	0.127	0.880
	Within groups	381	162.571	0.427		
	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	3.260	1.630		

	Within groups	381	263.147	0.691	2.360	0.096
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	0.152	0.076	0.203	0.817
	Within groups	381	142.998	0.375		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	2	0.435	0.218	0.813	0.444
	Within groups	381	102.049	0.268		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (59) indicates that there are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's degree of religion.

Table no. (60). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's degree of religion

SUB-SCALE	DEGREE OF RELIGION	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	High	167	3.61	0.66
	Moderate	167	3.65	0.60
	Low	50	3.62	0.76
Forms	High	167	3.26	0.83
	Moderate	167	3.26	0.85
	Low	50	3.54	0.75
Impediments	High	167	3.54	0.57
	Moderate	167	3.50	0.64
	Low	50	3.54	0.59
Total	High	167	3.46	0.54
	Moderate	167	3.46	0.50
	Low	50	3.56	0.47

4.4.18 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (61) shown below present the results.

Table no. (61). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	3.825	1.912	4.587	0.011
	Within groups	381	158.855	0.417		
	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	1.967	0.983	1.417	0.244
	Within groups	381	264.440	0.694		
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	0.808	0.404	1.081	0.340
	Within groups	381	142.343	0.374		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	2	1.179	0.590	2.218	0.110
	Within groups	381	101.305	0.266		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (61) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank. The differences were in the sub-scale motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society. Tukey test was used to identify the source of these differences. Table number (62) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (62). Tukey test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank

FAMILY BIRTH RANK	FIRST	MED	LAST
First		0.19774*	0.25864*
Med			0.06090
Last			

Table no (62) indicates that the statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the sub-scale motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank were between the citizens in the first family birth rank and the med., in favor to the first family birth rank. Also, it was between the citizens in the first family birth rank and the last, in favor to the first family birth rank, as it clears from the mean scores in table no. (63).

Table no. (63). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family birth rank

SUB-SCALE	FAMILY BIRTH RANK	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	First	120	3.77	0.65
	Med	208	3.58	0.62
	Last	56	3.51	0.70
Forms	First	120	3.32	0.77
	Med	208	3.33	0.86
	Last	56	3.12	0.83
Impediments	First	120	3.50	0.62
	Med	208	3.55	0.60
	Last	56	3.42	0.60
Total	First	120	3.52	0.50
	Med	208	3.48	0.51
	Last	56	3.35	0.55

4.4.19 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family members.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (64) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (64). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family members

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	1.143	0.572	1.356	0.259
	Within groups	373	157.243	0.422		
	Total	375	158.386	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	1.307	0.654	0.935	0.394
	Within groups	373	260.865	0.699		
	Total	375	262.173	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	1.884	0.942	2.560	0.079
	Within groups	373	137.228	0.368		
	Total	375	139.112	---		
Total	Between groups	2	0.035	0.018	0.065	0.937
	Within groups	373	101.552	0.272		
	Total	375	101.587	---		

Table no (64) indicates that there are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family members.

Table no. (65). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's family members

SUB-SCALE	FAMILY MEMBERS	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	1-4	109	3.66	0.69
	5-9	198	3.66	0.61
	10+	69	3.52	0.66
Forms	1-4	109	3.29	0.85
	5-9	198	3.34	0.82
	10+	69	3.18	0.84
Impediments	1-4	109	3.50	0.65
	5-9	198	3.49	0.60
	10+	69	3.67	0.53
Total	1-4	109	3.47	0.57
	5-9	198	3.48	0.49
	10+	69	3.46	0.51

4.4.20 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's monthly income.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (66) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (66). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's monthly income

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	2	3.143	1.571	3.826	0.023
	Within groups	227	93.230	0.411		
	Total	229	96.373	---		
Forms	Between groups	2	2.481	1.240	1.810	0.166
	Within groups	227	155.549	0.685		
	Total	229	158.030	---		
Impediments	Between groups	2	0.837	0.418	1.173	0.311
	Within groups	227	80.997	0.357		
	Total	229	81.834	---		
Total	Between groups	2	0.633	0.317	1.214	0.299
	Within groups	227	59.194	0.261		
	Total	229	59.827	---		

Table no (66) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's monthly income. The differences were in the sub-scale motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society. Tukey test was used to identify the source of these differences. Table number (67) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (67). Tukey test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's monthly income

MONTHLY INCOME (NIS)	1500-	1500-3000	3000+
1500-		-0.22440	0.05450
1500-3000			0.27890*
3000+			

Table no (67) indicates that the statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the sub-scale motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's monthly income were between the citizens in moderate monthly income (1500-3000) and the high (3000+), in favor to the citizens with moderate monthly income, as it clears from the mean scores in table no. (68).

Table no. (68). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's monthly income

SUB-SCALE	MONTHLY INCOME (NIS)	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	1500-	62	3.55	0.59
	1500-3000	144	3.77	0.65
	3000+	24	3.49	0.68
Forms	1500-	62	3.23	0.80
	1500-3000	144	3.44	0.83
	3000+	24	3.53	0.82
Impediments	1500-	62	3.55	0.61
	1500-3000	144	3.47	0.58
	3000+	24	3.33	0.60
Total	1500-	62	3.44	0.48
	1500-3000	144	3.55	0.51
	3000+	24	3.44	0.54

4.4.21 There are no statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction.

One way analysis of variance was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (69) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (69). One way analysis of variance for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction

SUB-SCALE	SOURCE	DF	SUM OF SQUARES	MEAN SQUARE	F-VALUE	SIG.
Motivations	Between groups	8	19.012	2.376	6.203	0.000
	Within groups	375	143.668	0.383		
	Total	383	162.679	---		
Forms	Between groups	8	58.472	7.309	13.181	0.000
	Within groups	375	207.935	0.554		
	Total	383	266.407	---		
Impediments	Between groups	8	2.370	0.296	0.789	0.613
	Within groups	375	140.781	0.375		
	Total	383	143.151	---		
Total	Between groups	8	13.289	1.661	6.984	0.000
	Within groups	375	89.195	0.238		
	Total	383	102.484	---		

Table no (69) indicates that there are statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction. The differences were in the sub-scales: motivations and forms of political participation in the Palestinian society. Tukey test was used to identify the source of these differences. Table number (70) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (70). Tukey test for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction

SUB-SCALE	POLITICAL FACTION	F.	H.	P.	D.	I.	PE.	J.	IN.	OTH
Motivations	Fateh		0.42*	0.10	0.11	0.15	0.57	0.15	0.41*	0.53*
	Hamas			-0.32	-0.30	-0.27	0.14	-0.26	-0.01	0.11
	Popular Front				0.1	0.05	0.46	0.05	0.31	0.43
	Democratic Front					0.03	0.45	0.03	0.29	0.42
	Initiative						0.41	0.00	0.26	0.38
	People Party							-0.41	-0.15	-0.03
	Islamic Jihad								0.25	0.38
	Independent									0.12
	Others									
Forms	Fateh		0.42*	-0.06	0.48	0.48	0.04	0.16	0.65*	1.03*
	Hamas			-0.49	0.05	0.05	-0.38	-0.26	0.23	0.60*
	Popular Front				0.54	0.54	0.10	0.22	0.72*	1.10*
	Democratic Front					-0.00	-0.44	-0.31	0.17	0.55
	Initiative						-0.43	-0.31	0.17	0.55
	People Party							0.12	0.61	0.99*
	Islamic Jihad								0.49	0.87*
	Independent									0.37
	Others									

Table no (70) indicates that the statistical significant differences at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ in the political participation in the sub-scales: motivations and forms of political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction were as follows: in the motivations sub-scale the differences were between citizens in Fateh and Hamas, the Independents, others, in favor to the citizens with Fateh. While in the forms sub-sacle, the

differences were between citizens in Fateh and Hamas, the Independents, others, in favor to the citizens with Hamas. Besides, they were between citizens with Popular Front and Independents and others, in favor to Popular Front. Also, the differences were between citizens with People Party and others, in favor to the People Party. In addition, findings show differences between citizens with Islamic Jihad and Others, in favor to the others, as it clears from the mean scores in table no. (71).

Table no. (71). Mean scores and standard deviation for the differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the participant's political faction

SUB-SCALE	POLITICAL FACTION	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Motivations	Fateh	160	3.85	0.56
	Hamas	41	3.42	0.82
	Popular Front	25	3.75	0.69
	Democratic Front	13	3.73	0.44
	Initiative	12	3.69	0.62
	People Party	7	3.28	0.78
	Islamic Jihad	12	3.69	0.46
	Independent	55	3.43	0.63
	Others	59	3.31	0.58
Forms	Fateh	160	3.63	0.70
	Hamas	41	3.20	0.88
	Popular Front	25	3.69	0.57
	Democratic Front	13	3.14	0.66
	Initiative	12	3.15	0.78
	People Party	7	3.59	0.77
	Islamic Jihad	12	3.46	0.78
	Independent	55	2.97	0.72
	Others	59	2.59	0.80
	Fateh	160	3.46	0.59
	Hamas	41	3.51	0.65

Impediments	Popular Front	25	3.76	0.45
	Democratic Front	13	3.63	0.38
	Initiative	12	3.52	0.39
	People Party	7	3.54	0.49
	Islamic Jihad	12	3.43	0.51
	Independent	55	3.54	0.61
	Others	59	3.56	0.76
SUB-SCALE	POLITICAL FACTION	N	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Total Degree	Fateh	160	3.63	0.44
	Hamas	41	3.38	0.60
	Popular Front	25	3.73	0.46
	Democratic Front	13	3.49	0.34
	Initiative	12	3.44	0.45
	People Party	7	3.48	0.41
	Islamic Jihad	12	3.51	0.40
	Independent	55	3.31	0.52
	Others	59	3.16	0.52

4.4.22 There are no statistical significant correlation at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between the participant's age group and their political participation in the Palestinian society.

Pearson correlation was used to identify the above hypothesis. Table number (72) has shown below present the results.

Table no. (72). Pearson correlation for the correlation between the participant's age group and their political participation in the Palestinian society

Sub-scale	N	R-value	Sig.
Motivations	379	-0.013	0.800
Forms	379	0.148*	0.004
Impediments	379	-0.039	0.451
Total	379	0.060	0.241

Table no (72) indicates that there are statistical significant positive correlation at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ between the participant's age group and their political participation in the Palestinian society. The more age group increased the degree of political participation in the Palestinian society, and vice versa.

5. Chapter Five: Discussion of the Findings and Recommendations

5.1 Discussion of the Study Findings

The study aims to identify the current reality of political participation in the Palestinian society, and to identify the motives, forms and patterns of political participation exercised by the citizens, as well as to identify the barriers that prevent the active political participation, and aims to discuss the results and make some important recommendations on the subject of study.

The results showed that the degree of political participation was moderate in the Palestinian society. The special circumstances experienced by the Palestinian people, may have an impact on the degree of political participation. The Palestinian people live under the supervision of the Palestinian Authority, at the same time are subject to the Israeli occupation, there are no safe areas away from the occupation, even in areas known as (Area A), which is supposed to be subject to the full sovereignty of the Palestinian Authority, but the occupation does not respect the peace agreements, and often contrary to the conventions.

These results can be understood and recognized within the framework of the special circumstances experienced by the Palestinian society, in light of the continued existence of the occupation, along with the Palestinian Authority with demilitarized sovereignty, and limited powers.

These special circumstances are related to:

First, the existence of the Israeli occupation that work on the uprooting of Palestinians from their lands, and force them to leave, and committed the massacres at the hands of Zionist gangs during the War of 1948, and practiced on a daily basis of repression and abuse, prompting citizens to engage in political action. The Palestinian citizen became either as a refugee who lost his land that he used to be proud of, or a citizen looted freedom.

Second, concerning the existence of authority with demilitarized sovereignty, and limited power. The Palestinian Authority was a depressing factor, where it suppresses freedoms, and

spreads corruption and nepotism, and exists in a political chaos, which resulted in frustration of the current situation.

The Palestinian dream of an independent state that puts end to the suffering of the people, turned after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority to a state of frustration. Palestinians felt that after the sacrifices for tens of years and thousands of martyrs, wounded and prisoners, they did not get the independent state, but instead they got beleaguered authority that transformed the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories into a cost-free occupation.

These circumstances, the bilateral presence of the occupation and authority, led to the frustration of the Palestinian citizen and reluctance to active political participation, and thus the result was a moderate degree of political participation. These are same people who ignited two uprisings each lasted for long years, during which the occupation practiced all forms of intimidation and repression. And despite the tyranny of occupation, it was unable to stop the uprisings, although the Palestinian people were unarmed, except by stones that they through as a means to express rejection of the occupier, and so incur thousands of victims in the Palestinian people, but the people's faith in their rights, and their quest for freedom was stronger than the might of the occupation.

In his study about the political culture in the Palestinian society, (Miari, 2003), has concluded that the political participation of the Palestinian public is not low, especially when compared to the political participation in the rest of the Arab world. However, the researcher indicated a little decline of political participation after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and a decline in the political activity of the parties.

Another study by (Banat & Salama, 2003) concluded that the degree of political participation was low among the Palestinian refugees at Al-Aroub camp.

The results of the study have shown that the motives toward political participation for the vast majority of the respondents were moderate and the most prominent of these motives were: Practicing the right to express opinions, national duty, changing to better reality, self-assertion, participation with others in the development and improvement of society and to express their demands.

The keenness of citizens to political participation, and their interest in public affairs that serves their country and people, was a result of the common suffering they are living and the common destiny that citizens may face under the Israeli occupation of their land. The Palestinians displacement and uprooting from their homeland and their daily suffering may be a motivation for them toward political participation. They are looking forward to a political decision that puts an end to their pain and suffering, a decision that brings back their right to return to their towns and villages, and bring them the independence and sovereignty over their lands and allow them to establish their state and determine their own fate.

Moreover, the policy of Israeli collective punishments against Palestinian people, such as: tight closure on cities, villages and refugee camps, curfews, and the comprehensive security restrictions imposed on Palestinian access to land and work places inside Israel. In addition to that, Israel assassinated many Palestinian leaders, and resistance activists, especially during the second Intifada in 2000. Israel has also bombarded Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps causing massive destructions. As well as, the siege imposed by the occupation on Gaza Strip and its military checkpoints and other forms of collective punishments including: house demolitions, uprooting of trees, building the apartheid wall and building settlements in the West Bank. All these forms of collective punishments enforced the various denominations of the Palestinian people to participate in activities resisting the occupation.

The results of the study showed that the majority of the people subject to this study think that the right to express their views is their motive toward political participation. No one can deny the right of freedom of expression for the Palestinian people, though they were deprived from this right by being under Occupation. However, they gave a lot of sacrifices to take it back, and it became part of the heritage and traditions of the Palestinian people, despite all the compelling circumstances and harassment by the Israeli authorities, including censorship, the arrest of journalists, banning demonstrations or any means to express opinions in contrary to all norms and international laws.

The Palestinian law has emphasized on the freedom of expression, as the Declaration of Independence in 1988 provided the ethical environment to exercise the freedom of expression and opinion. In 1994 the PLO declared that the Palestinian Authority is committed to treaties and conventions on human rights. By the end of September of the same year the late

President, Yasser Arafat, issued a presidential decree requiring the formation of the higher Palestinian body for Human rights. The legislation composed of 51 articles that incorporate all the publications and press work, comprising the fundamental guarantees of freedom of opinion and expression for all citizens and freedom of: access, distribution and circulating information and the freedom of response and observation. However, the subsequent articles of the law included a number of texts that detract from the human right with respect to freedom of opinion and expression. Whereas, the Palestinian Law of press and publications issued on 1995, ensures freedom of opinion and expression under Article (51) and according to what was the text of Article II, as well as it ensures freedom of the press as a form of freedom of opinion and expression (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

At present, the Palestinian society suffers from serious problems regarding the violation of the rights of journalists and media institutions. The right to express their opinion freely without fear or restriction became a hope for each individual working in this field. This right is one of the determinants of social, political and cultural life of the individual and society, and is merely from considerations of the circumstances surrounding it. The right of expression must never be restricted in any way unless it comprises threat of lives.

The freedom of media in Palestine ranges between an extended margin in addressing issues of simple social situations and being limited in issues of corruption and murder crimes and lawlessness. The Palestinian media is now experiencing a revival that might lead to a better reality, especially after the repeated targeting of journalists by the Israeli occupation authorities, in addition to internal attacks by Palestinian sides.

Mass media, like radio, TV and newspapers, contribute in the promotion of political and social awareness and intensification of political values and political participation and keeps people aware of what is happening around them, both at the internal and external levels (Tabeel, 2006).

The events that took place in Palestine in 2007 i.e; after the political division, and the Hamas control on Gaza Strip, and Fatah control the West Bank, resulted in violations of human rights at various levels, such as, the suppression of freedom of expression, the attack on journalists, political arrests and killing people based on their factional and partisan backgrounds. In addition, it resulted in a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

The year 2007 was the worst for the Palestinian people since the establishment of the PNA in 1993. They have faced too many violations of the public freedoms and the suppression of freedom of opinion.

Statics indicates that journalists suffered alot during 2007. They faced assaults on them and their families or possessions by the armed groups, who in the absence of law and the state of a bloody conflict and military determination, never hesitated to attack any journalist or media outlet that criticized them. Those attacks extended to include foreign journalists working in international news agencies. Ninety two attacks on Palestinians, including three killings, were recorded. Several journalists were beaten or injured by rubber-coated bullets and gas, or arrested; In addition other violations such as headquarters storming and probation of photographing.

Three media people were executed (sleiman Al-Ashi, Mohammad Abdu, from Palestine Newspaper, Isam Al-Jogo from Newisite live Palestinian). Many journalists were detained, arrested or threatened, media institutions and headquarters were captured or controlled, equipments were seized or destroyed, and some were prevented to work. Such as (Palestine TV, Sawt Al-Ommal TV, Sawt Palestine TV, Sawt Al-Hurriya TV and Sawt Sha'b TV in Gaza. Office of Al-Aqsa TV and office of Ruwad Al-Sahafa in Nablus, and office of Bayan for press in Selfit) Many newspapers were prohibited from printing or distribution such as Palestine and Al-Risalah in the West Bank, and Al-Sabah in Gaza Strip (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

Besides after 2007, we have witnessed harassment on public liberties from the PNA in the West Bank and the government of Hamas in Gaza strip. They practised pressure on the voices that opposed their policies. Arrests were based on political backgrounds, closure of many newspapers and media stations, banning of marches and demonstrations opposing to the Occupation, or the policy of the Authority, or the government of Hamas.

The price of liberty including the freedom of speech was highly paid by the Palestinians over the years of occupation. Palestine has lost thousands of martyrs and injured, and thousands of prisoners that are still serving long terms, some of them exceeded 30 years in captivity paying for the freedom they are banned from.

Therefore, it is not so strange that the motive for the Palestinian people to take part in the political participation is seeking the freedom of opinion and expression.

Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of democratic rights and freedoms. International charters guaranteed this right. In its very first session in 1946, before any human rights declarations or treaties had been adopted, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution No. (1946/59) stating Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated efforts to diet.

Then the international declaration of human rights in 1948 followed, which states in the 19th article that "Everyone has the rights to the freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through and media and regardless of frontiers".

The journalists who are doing serious civil tasks in areas of armed struggles are considered civilians, who must be protected in accordance with international laws and agreements and the article (79) of the first additional protocol of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians at the time of the 1949 war (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

The great number of violations of the media liberties which took place during the year 2007, in addition to the decisions and actions that prevent peaceful gatherings and demonstrations, has seriously affected the citizens and the press right of freedom of opinion and expression in the Palestinian territories, despite being guaranteed by the Palestinian fundamental law, and the law of publishing and printing, and by the international charters. So, it's not surprising that Palestine territories, according to Reporters without Borders, ranked 158 last year in the annual rankings of freedom of the press out of 169 countries, while it ranked 134 in 2006 (Abu-Ghannam, 2009).

These factors might have urged the citizens to search for untying the freedom of opinion and expression and thus widen their area of freedom, which is reflected in the political participation.

The results of the study showed that the majority of the people subject to this study consider their motive toward political participation is to perform their national duty. This might be related to the continuous existence of Occupation, accompanied by the continuous arrests, killings, demolition of houses, scaring out citizens, barricades that cut off the parts of

homeland, the continuous Zionist plans to control Al-Aqsa through the excavations and the repeated break-ins to the mosque by the extremist settlers.

This reality has created belief for Palestinian citizens that the march of the national struggle hasn't finished yet. The existence of Occupation and its procedures on the ground, and the existence of settlers and settlements made people lives tough and miserable through the assault on the armless citizens, capturing lands and houses.

This region 'as some believe' is destined to struggle (Jihad), and is identified as land of bond (Ribat) and that Al-Jihad is Muslims duty that aims to liberate this land from Occupation.

Moreover, this duty is attached to the loyalty to the prisoners and detainees languishing in the prisons of the occupation, these people have sacrificed themselves for the defense of national issues. Some spent more than 30 years in captivity, and some of them are women and children; this loyalty causes a motive for citizens toward political participation.

This duty is also related to the construction of the country institutions and preparation for state-building. Fatah, which supports the government of Salam Fayyad, believes it carries out its duty through building institutions and preparation for the birth of the Palestinians state.

Some see that they performing this duty through working in civil society organizations that provide services to citizens and strengthen their presence on the ground.

The political platforms of the different Palestinian parties promote citizens to participate in activities that are held by these parties. They carry out activities in the social and political events, and activities related to the Palestinian historical events, such as the anniversary of the Nakba (catastrophe), the day the earth, and prisoners day..... etc.

The Palestinian people are now living a stage of national liberalism. It is not strange for a nation under occupation that sacrificed very much, to agree that the motive toward political participation is performing national duty.

A study of (E'Laiwa & Mahmud, 2000) concluded that the general motives toward political participation is the feeling that the participation is a duty and obligation of every individual to the community in which he lives, which requires effective public participation in the public life of the community. They express their views, ideas and wishes in what need to be taken of

decisions and laws and policies. Programs and policies made in response to the needs of citizens, and their love of public action and their desire to share with other community members in the development and improvement of the levels of service by working in various fields that aim at improving the face of life on homeland. In addition to the desire to play a pivotal and influential role in community different activities, which affects their present and their future, and makes them feel the importance of their role and its implications on the support of the development process, and the desire to strengthen ties between the various segments of society and groups in order to achieve the kind of integration and interaction between these groups to achieve their common interests (E'Laiwa & Mahmud, 2000).

In the study of (Davidson & Cotte, 1989) which aimed at identifying any political activities of significant expression of citizenship for citizens, it was concluded that there is a relationship between participation in the political tasks and the sense of homeland, and that the citizen's participation in voting in the elections is an evidence of the sense of responsibility toward homeland.

The findings of the study have emphasized that the willingness to change the reality forms a motive toward political participation to most people that were subject to this study. The present situation indicates the continuing existence of the Occupation that keep on with the uprooting of the Palestinian people out of their lands through a series of direct and indirect economic, military, administrative and settlement policies, such as, the continuation of blockade, erecting barricades, constructing the separation wall, the continuous settlement construction, confiscation of lands, Judaization of Jerusalem, assassinations, air strikes on Gaza ...etc.

The present situation reflects the failure of the option of the peace negotiations which have reached a dead end. Since, The Occupation had set aside its obligation to what has been agreed in many cases. Also, it reflects the fact that they continued blockade of Gaza and isolated its people from the world and turned it into a big prison. As a result, the proportion of the poor has increased, and siege caused shortage of medicines and basic foods, and construction materials.

The reality points to the deterioration of the economic situation in the Palestinian society, and the inability of the Authority in many times to pay the salaries of public sector employees. The Palestinian economy is dependent on donor countries, making it hostage to the mercy of donors.

The current reality of the Palestinian situation is a division of political and geographic parts of the homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the uncompleted project of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, and the continuation of political arrests, and the continuation of political exclusivity in the resolution. Also, reality points to the persistence of corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and the decline in the level of services provided to citizens even after a series of strikes by workers in some of the Palestinian Authority institutions such as workers in the health sector or education, demanding raise their salaries in light of the global rise in the prices of the commodities and food supplies globally.

This is the bitter reality witnessed by the Palestine people, which they are looking forward to change, through their defiance of the policy of Occupation, and through criticism of the political leadership, which became disappointing, and their slogans became meaningless. This reality that is rejected by citizens who are eagerly hoping to change via the accomplishment of the national dream of freedom, and self destiny-determination

The results of the study showed also that the process of self-assertion constitutes a motive toward political participation, which is based on faith that the human was born with a free will, and he is able to choose his way. The process of self-assertion is a motive toward political participation, in the sense that the individual considers political involvement is a way to achieve national or religious freedom, etc.....

In the Palestinian society, people are seeking self assurance, and considering having impact on important political issue. Successive Palestinian uprisings embodied the continuous revolutionary situation aiming at ending the occupation and achieving the national goals of our people. Great sacrifices were made based on a platform of deep faith in the justice of their case and understanding the nature of the enemy, and its projects aiming to cease the existence of our national case. For decades, the Palestinian people practiced all form of struggle, violent and peaceful ones, political, economic and intellectual providing unique models of civilians uprisings that withstand arsenal of military occupation with will of the solid and the hope of

freedom and independence, in the reality of regional and international support to the occupation and the continued disregard for his crimes, and to deny the rights of our people, and our resistance as a legitimate right guaranteed by international conventions.

The findings of the study have come in harmony with those of (Carlson & Hyde, 1980), in his examining of the relationship between the political participation and self-realization. Those who are looking for political participation have higher self-appreciation than the others and that the positive self-appreciation often exists in the politically activists.

Whereas, the findings of Atta Shaqfa, (2008) study which aimed at identifying the nature of the relationship between self-appreciation and political participation, have concluded that the latter is not associated to the level of self-appreciation. This is what the findings of the study Aziza Mohammad Al-Sayyed, (1993) have concluded about the psychological structure of the political activists. They have shown that there was no relationship between the low self-appreciation and political participation.

The findings of the study have also illustrated that most of the people subject to this study view that the obstacles for the political participation refer to the present political state of affairs after the creation of the PNA from which employments, relations and buying of conscience were produced. These are major factors that hindered the effective political participation. The findings have shown that the bad choice of candidates, the prevalence of political corruption, mistrust in the nominees, frustration from the prevailing political situation in the Palestinian society, the outside effects on the Palestinian political decision, political chaos and confusion in the Palestinian society and the spread of favouritism in the Palestinian political system are the major factors that stand in the way of citizens towards active political participation.

The findings of the study have indicated that most of the people subject to the study have confirmed that the poor selection of candidates, constitute an obstacle to political participation.

In the recent elections of the legislative council in 2006, Fatah failed in the formation of a majority in the Legislative Council, and the poor selection of candidates admitted to the

masses, one of the reasons behind the loss, so votes of the members Fatah movement were not committed to Fatah candidates, so votes scattered, which led to the loss of a number of the council seats.

Add to that the candidates in the Fatah movement did not agree on a common propaganda campaign. Each candidate staged an independent campaign, which resulted in dispersion of the candidates in the second legislative elections in 2006.

Fatah movement leaders, were unable to persuade its members to support its candidates, after they took control of the old generation of Fatah seats internal elections (primaries) in 2005, which took place amid an atmosphere of tension and mutual recriminations and sometimes violence, to choose their candidates for the legislative elections planned on January 25, in the cities of Tulkarm and Hebron, Salfit and Qalqilya, despite some problems, especially in Tulkarm, Salfit and Hebron.

In Gaza, militias occupied governmental offices demanding the resumption of the primaries that were halted because of acts of violence. On the other hand, the primaries to choose 132 candidate representing Fatah in the legislative elections in West Bank that began on 25 Nov. 2005 was suspended in some constituencies due to violence acts (Al-Saleh, 2005).

According to some observers, many frauds was found in the internal elections to Fatah, resulting in the choice of some candidates who were previously accused of corruption, or candidates occupying who multiple positions in the Palestinian Authority. For example, some candidate was ex-minister or a former deputy in the outgoing parliament, and some occupied a collection of various positions in the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement. They did not give opportunity to the younger groups, and this reduced the chances of success of the Fatah movement in legislative the elections of the legislative council.

On the other hand, the candidates of Hamas movement enjoyed a desirable social reputation; no internal differences emerged during the elections, and their campaign was organized and unified. In addition, the masses searched for an alternative. In light of the failure of the national project, and the option of negotiations with the occupation, Hamas movement was

successful in the selection of its candidates for the elections of the Legislative Council, which is reflected on the landslide victory in legislative elections.

The findings of the study showed that the obstacles to the political participation ascribe to the spread of political corruption. Azmi Al-Shu'aybi, the general commission of coalition (Aman) for fighting corruption in the Palestinian areas, said that Palestine needs long years to become clear of corruption. He affirmed that political corruption is one of the most common types of corruption in the Palestinian case. He pointed out that political corruption starts from the top of the pyramid and is restricted considerably between the duties of a minister and general director. Simultaneously, he stressed on the importance of the presence of a political will at the top of the Palestinian political pyramid to fight corruption and protect homeland from its dangers.

Al-Shu'aybi said that the president Mahmud Abbass desire, to fight corruption is not sufficient. There is a need of willingness to work and a need of human staffs capable of translating determination into practical actions. He criticized the Authority's performance in this area and considered that they do not pay enough attention to issues of corruption.

Al-Shu'aybi, who was an active member in the former Legislative Council, thinks that the continuation of the Authority normal activities in the absence of a parliament in the West Bank and Gaza is a political corruption. (Al-Shu'aybi, 2011). He also said that among the other forms of corruption is the interference in the tenders for the particular interests and appointments on an unfair basis, adding that political corruption has recently emerged on the Palestinian arena after division.

He went on saying that this corruption is represented in the liquidation of the political accounts, where one party prevents the work of the other party, postpones the general elections for the sake of party interests, using means of public ownership like lands of the state for special accounts (Al-Shu'aybi, 2011).

And perhaps what was published by "Al-Jazeera TV," broadcast hundreds of secret documents relating to the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations during the last ten years, and detection of more than 1,600 classified documents relating to the negotiations the Palestinian-Israeli, was an evidence on political corruption of the negotiators. Add to that the major unprecedented

concessions to Israel which the Palestinian negotiator conceded without reference to the Authority institutions to the Palestinian political parties or the parliament. Al-Jazeera channel has launched a website intended for the release of these documents.

The reform issues represented the common denominator during this campaign, due to the strong desire for change which was explicit in the largest sector of the voters. The Foundation Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (Aman), offered a document to the factions, electoral rolls, and candidates in the second legislative elections in 2006, requiring them to abide if elected in the Legislative Council to work to combat corruption in all institutions, especially since all the slogans were calling for the fight of corruption. Most polls on the elections showed that the issue of corruption plays an important role in determining the voter choice. For example, the opinion poll that was conducted by the Centre for Development Studies in Birzeit resulted in 98% of respondents has confirmed that fairness and honesty are the most important criteria that determine the candidate that they will choose.

The results of the study showed that the lack of confidence in the candidates is one of the major obstacles to political participation. The percentage of confidence in the Palestinian political system is low, and the political parties have lost their ability to mobilize citizens and urge them to political participation, especially under the waning hopes of the citizens in the future. Trust reflects the expectations and mutual commitments. A survey conducted by (Mas Institute) have revealed a low confidence in the Palestinian political institutions (Nasr & Hilal, 2007), as well as a declining rate of trust of the successive restricted Palestinian governments that failed to meet all the needs of the Palestinian people.

According to the survey conducted by the (Shark Youth Forum) in 2009, about 70% of the Palestinian Youths defined them selves as politically non active. The poll has shown that separation from the political policy is partly related to the disappointment, disbelieve and mistrust in the Palestinian factions. Whereas, 33% of the Youth included in the study have expressed high or middle confidence in the political parties. The findings of the poll have shown that over a half of the Palestinian Youths (52%) have no confidence in any political faction on the Palestinian arena, 30% expressed confidence in Fatah Movement and 12% expressed confidence in Hamas Movement, and 6% expressed confidence in other factions.

The findings of the study reflect that the increasing rate of those who have no confidence in any Palestinian political organization has started to ascend after Jan 2006. That is after the second legislative elections followed by armed conflicts between the two major organizations (Fatah and Hamas Movements), which ended in a state of geographical political division between West Bank with a government led by Mahmud Abbass, the president of the Authority, and a government formed by Hamas movement in Gaza strip (Zama'rah & Abu-Kamesh, 2010).

The findings show that the poll (Shark Youth Forum) conclusions were close to some extent to those of the foundation of Al-Sharq Al-Adna for consultations in the period between Jan 2006 to Feb 2010. Both findings have shown high rates of those who have no confidence in any of the Palestinian political organizations.

On Jan 2006, the rate of those who expressed their mistrust in any organization reached 13%. On June of the same year, it reached 25%, on Jan 2007, it stands at 33%, and on Feb 2010 it reached 39%.

We can say that, who doesn't have trust in the political party has no confidence in the candidates chosen by the political parties, mistrust is something mutual. That mistrust in the candidates will constitute an obstacle for the political participation of the citizens.

The findings of the study have also emphasized that the obstacles to the political participation in the Palestinian society refer to a frustration from the current political situation in the Palestinian society, where the general political situation reached to a serious crisis, and also the Palestinian internal dialogues about the completion of the national reconciliation between the two parties, Fatah and Hamas, that have failed so far to reach an agreement. These dialogues were supposed to give the people an opportunity to have his word on a way out of this potential crisis of failure.

We all know well that the solution to our problems is the responsibility of these two parties, Fatah and Hamas. Today, the powerless people have become the one who pay the tax of crises and piled accumulative problems because of the different viewpoints between the two parties. This hurt us and our issue before the world, which led to obstacles facing citizens who wish to participate in an active political participation.

The findings have shown the state of frustration that has expanded among the Palestinian society following the recent Palestinian elections on 2006 which was followed by the internal fighting. The most dangerous of all this, is the suspended Palestinian political system and deep-rooted geographical division between the West Bank and Gaza accompanied by political division in the institutions and administrations: judicial, military and services. This has created a crisis that doesn't seem to end soon (Eenaty, 2008: 115). Each side seems to be pleased with the existing situation.

The acts of violence that broke out between the two major parties on the Palestinian arena has affected the attitudes of the Palestinian citizens to refrain from the political participation as a result of the state of frustration the citizen feels. Many citizens think that political parties have become a burden on the Palestinian issue more than a merely political ones resisting the occupation. Ibrahim Abrash stressed that we see the dominant political parties in the absence of the independents or independent groups, and without any tangible progress, in the national project as a national liberal scheme rather than a plan for building a state.

We regretfully say that the great attendance of the groups or parties no longer form a healthy phenomenon and a national necessity as it was, due to the lack the decision independency in these parties and the conflicting among the slogans raised and the reality in practice (Abrash, 2010).

The findings of the study point out that the state of the political confusion which the Palestinian people are experiencing led to obstacles preventing citizen's from effective political participation. The constants that the Palestinian political factions call for, no longer exists following all the concessions made by the leadership of the Authority to the Occupation. The leadership calls for a slogan then soon it becomes forgettable. How much did we hear about the slogan, "No negotiation with settlements", no sooner, few days do pass then the Authority leadership give it up. There are lots more examples on that. This created political confusion causing obstacles in front of the political participation of citizens.

Following the war on Gaza, the UN appointed a fact-finding mission for war crimes violated against the civilian in Gaza strip, in which Israeli was convicted. On Oct 2 2009, the PNA asked under pressure from Israel and the American administration to postpone the voting on a

resolution supporting (Goldston's report) at the human rights council in the UN. The president, Mahmud Abbess, admitted the PNA had actually demanded delaying under the pretext of ensuring more of the international support prior to the voting.

The (Goldston's report) was re-proposed to the board of human rights at the UN following strong criticism to the Authority leadership by mass media and the resentment of the Palestinian masses. Al-Jazeera net (2009), shows to what extent the political confusion is outspread in the Authority.

While the findings of the study confirms the conclusion of the study conducted by (Ismael, 2004) that the obstacles to the political participation of the Palestinian woman are inseparable from those of the society as a whole. The political climate creates a state of frustration and sense of indifference among the Palestinian society.

This causes a negative sense of inability to make a change. As evident by the resulting decrease of popularity of current parties and its failure to renew its members, they were not able to raise alternative policies or solutions to the daily public suffering issues.

The findings of the study have shown that the obstacles to the political participation according to most researches refer to the spread of favouritism in the Palestinian political system. Corruption has spread after the PNA was established monopolization practices, which was obvious in policies of employment, promotions, misuse of public funding as direct result to lack of transparency and accountability. Azmi El-Shu'aybi, the general commissioner of coalition of fairness and transparency stated that the form of corruption in the Palestinian society was represented in gaining from public job, practising mediation and favouritism, misuse of public findings for personal interests (Al-Shu'aybi, 2011).

Corruption in the Palestinian society has its own features because of its special circumstances. It is, historically, associated with the occupation. It was linked to spying. When the Authority was there it was related to specific names of people occupying influencing positions.

The Centre for Survey and Political Researches has pointed out in a survey conducted in the Palestinian areas about citizen's opinion on issues of mediation and favouritism. 52% of those

surveyed said that the phenomenon of mediation is the most commonly form in the Palestinian society to get high positions in the PNA.

The great majority (82%) sees that corruption is more widely spread in the public sector, such as ministries and security systems, whereas (6%) indicated that it is more widely prevalent in the private sector and only (5%) believes that the phenomenon is more widely spread in the national sector.

It has become obvious that mediation phenomena were mainly used in the search for jobs. (32%) of the surveyed needed mediation of a member of their families or friends for getting a job, (27%) stated that the mediation for jobs used in police force or in the security systems (The Palestinian center for political and survey researches, 2005).

A report by (Azmi Al-Shu'aybi) points out that the poor link poverty to corruption and misuse of positions. They also show mistrust in the methods of treatment and the priorities that governments and non-government organizations adopt for a solution. It seems that favouritism, mediation and bribe have reached the basic aspects of life of the Palestinian (especially the poor) such as education services healthy, work and social security-The poor also pointed to the aspects of corruption in the appointments in governmental positions base on favouritism and party considerations (Al-Shu'aybi, 2005).

The findings of the study have shown that the external effects in the Palestinian political decision hinder the political participation. The absolute support from the American administration to the policies of Israel in the region and the dominant Arab weakness get down the Palestinian citizens. Palestinian people in any fair resolution neither by the UN nor the American administration or the international community.

Moreover, the external financing is directed according to political agendas, hence it gives priority to the continuation of the political process between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, and are, in many cases, to weaken the dimension of the resistance through the coping mechanisms funded from this support. The categorical nature of some of the external support also weakens the possibility of developing the community's ability to confront the occupation and its procedures.

In addition to the spreading of the mentality of reliance, which is a result of the increasing dependence on the external support (governmental or non-governmental institutions). These mechanisms lead to weakening the resistance dimensions in the work of these institutions.

The foreign support goes through an institutional structure in which the Israeli occupation enjoys veto to any project conflicting with its interests.

Besides, the support related to certain programs and a limited period time keeps the funded institutions unstable and concerned with opportunities of its survival. How can such institutions contribute effectively to produce resisting activities or enhance the resisting pattern of the people initiatives? (Al-Malki et al, 2004).

Many citizens give up resisting the occupation as part of the political participation because of the PNA which tries to encircle the resistance. The Palestinian areas subject to the Authority witness attempts by the PNA to prevent citizen to resist the occupation, demonstrators are prevented at points of contact with the occupation forces on the edges of cities and towns, or arrested under the pretext of Palestinian security protection or hurt the Palestinian interests. This policy taken by the PNA, and which reject the idea of resistance or the violent one as they say, has forced many political activists to give up the idea of political participation. It has drawn an idea to the citizens that resistance of the occupation is no longer fruitful under amerced existing political reality due to effects and pressures away from the Palestinian political decision.

Many foreign countries linked their support to the PNA by the attitudes adopted by that Authority. Lots of means of pressures have been practised on the PNA; these countries refrained from paying the PNA its financial commitments unless PNA changed its political stance.

Actually, the Palestinian situation featured by internal fighting and division between the two political factions, Hamas and Fatah, truer in the first place to the foreign pressures practised on the government of Hamas to recognise Israel and abide by the agreements signed with the PLO. This is what Hamas government rejected. It was punished by the international community by being suspending humanitarian aids. And thus the government has failed to pay the salaries of staff, adding to the citizen's economic bad conditions.

Furthermore, the extortion practiced by the occupation by refrain of payment of taxes collected by the border crossings and on behalf of the Authority. They refrain to pay in many cases pay for multiple excuses, although they take a commission for collecting taxes. These factors with no doubt led, according to great majority of the examined people, to diminish the rate of political participation in the Palestinian society.

The findings of the study have shown the most important of the political forms the citizen practises are following closely the political news in different mass media (newspapers, radio and TV). As well as, sense of responsibility towards the societal issues, following what going on in the Palestinian arena, and taking part in the voluntary works that are concerned with the service of the society.

The problem of Palestine has constituted an axis of interest of many means of mass media as a source of news media material. Mass Media plays an important role through transmitting what's going on in the Palestinian arena. With the development of News Arab media like Al-Jazeera news Channel. They attract the viewers in the Palestinian society as they have a high capacity of passing authentic pictures of the Palestinian political events and access to news disclosing the hidden secrets. So Mass media were influential and effective and emerged as a basic form of the political participation.

Besides, space mass media started to attract the viewers in the Palestinian society. Being far from the policy of the state media, which follow the policy of the praise and compliment for political leaders and presidents, and concerned with passing protocols for the ceremonies of receiving leaders. The Palestinian viewer was sick of the state media, and the free space media have become an ideal alternative for viewers in the Palestinian society, because of its independence, credibility and professionalism at work. For these reasons, following mass media has become part of the citizen's political participation.

The study results confirm that the sense of responsibility towards the community issues is a vital aspect of the majority of respondents. Political participation from the perspective of sociology, is the process by which the individual can play a role in political and social life, since sacrifices made by the Palestinian people, affirmed the keenness of his compatriots to their sense of responsibility towards societal issues.

Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, broke out after Sharon breaking into Al-Aqsa Mosque, which is a holy place for the Palestinians and Muslims, and the Palestinians named their uprising after Al-Aqsa, as a symbol of the sanctification of this place that they can never allow such attack. The sense of threatening danger to this holy place was the motive pushing Palestinians to start the intifada, which lasted several years, claimed the lives of thousands of martyrs, wounded, detainees and deportees.

What forced hundreds of suicide bombers to blow themselves in the places inside occupation areas, is the sense of injustice, and responsibility towards the the national issues. These operations which are considered the highest type of self-sacrifice where there depicted as the greatest examples taken at any time before on pages from the international struggle. This phenomenon attracts large numbers of the Palestinians from different sections men or woman, which they do for the sake of the Palestinian issue (Banat, 2010).

Moreover, the protest demonstrations held in villages of Al-Walaja and Ni'lin, in protest against the separation wall setup by Israel in the Palestinian areas are the sense of responsibility towards the vulnerable Palestinian citizens, despite the Israeli violence represented by teargas, detention, killing or strike.

The sense of responsibility motivates citizens to setup set-in camps or stage marches solidarity with prisoners in jail and express loyalty to them.

The results of the study have shown that the majority of the people subject to the study following what are happening in the political arena. Politics is the daily life of citizens as all the economic and social problems in Palestinian society, is the result of the political problems resembled by the occupation and its consequences. This is attributed to changing political climates and the absence of the political stability in West Bank and Gaza strip.

The Palestinian society is concerned with politics as being its daily diet that they have to live with. The surrounding circumstances of the Palestinian citizen like; barricades erected by the Occupation between Palestinian cities and long waiting hours to pass these barricades, the repeated closures of entering to Jerusalem or Israel, the assignments violated by the Occupation against the Palestinian activists, the daily detentions, confiscation of lands or

annexed them within the separation wall, and assault from settlers or the Israeli Occupation forces, all these reasons impel the Palestinian citizen to take interest in the political events.

The hot political events of that in the Palestinian arena do not only affect the Palestinian citizens, but also affect the stability of the region and the world. Due to the fact that this region is located in the middle of the world, and the fact that this is one of the unresolved issues that still need just solutions to the people spent long years under occupation.

The findings of the study have confirmed that the majority of those who were subject to this study participated in the voluntary work that is concerned with the service of the society. The Palestinian people have long known history of voluntary work. This forms part of his heritage and inherited values. Palestinian people used to volunteer and cooperate during the days of harvest, olive picking, and in building. These values have been passed from our grandparents.

Currently, programs for voluntary work are set in the Palestinian Universities. Each student has to do voluntary hours in the service of the society. This will help pass this heritage from one generation to other.

Voluntary work increases at times of crises and difficult circumstances. Many committees have been formed during the popular uprising in 1987 to help areas under blockade or curfews through collecting donations and food supplies for these areas.

In addition, charitable societies play a leading role in voluntary work; it provides free services to citizens, such as Dar Alaytam society that offers free education to orphaned children, the Agricultural Relief society supports agricultural projects, and Committees of the Medical Work, and the Health and Agricultural Work Committees offering its services to the Palestinian citizens.

The results of the study shown that there were no differences in motivations and obstacles to political participation in Palestinian society according to the gender differences emerged, while differences in the forms of participation were favouring males.

The Palestinian society is still a male and a parent community by which father and sheikh of the tribe determines whether to participation or not.

The prevailing law in a tribal society is still governed by customs, traditions and is conservative view of women. That is evident in the political action which comes from a local familial self-interest and a traditional view that doesn't recognize the status and role of women.

We can say that the society-based culture within the Palestinian framework is directly linked to the Arab-societal culture, in which religion customs, habits and traditions constitutes major societal controls. This is governed by (Halal and Haram) shame and legal, respect of the authority, compliance, religion, ethics, and obedience to parents and so on. This cultural complex in the Palestinian society is also determined by a set of realistic conditions, such as the uniqueness of the population group to which the individual belongs.

The Palestinian society takes no interest in the issue of woman. The Palestinian woman's institutions, though relatively old, are scattered and the political parties don't rely on the political participation of women except in literariness. The status of woman in the Palestinian parties and factions is still similar to her status in the society and vocational institutions, means still generally restricted to men.

On the Palestinian levels the Palestinian women face real challenges in terms of participation in power and decision-making process, despite her active participation in the process of the Palestinian struggle in all its stages, and despite all the steps taken by the Palestinian women in terms of political participation, but women engage in political activity remained limited, and that is obvious in the weak presence in the formal political arena, especially in the decision making positions (the Palestinian Authority through the legislature and the presidency and the Central Committee) and representative institutions (municipalities and local government) and on the informal arena, especially in the institutions of civil society and political parties (Awad, 2008).

Exclusion of women from exercising their political action in previous periods has reinforced the belief among the citizens that women are not appropriate for these important positions, and that these political positions will obstruct women from their social and educational duties. The women work in limited fields is attributed to reasons relating to her emotional tendency towards some matters, which hinders considering her in any role in political action institutions including the representative institutions. Despite that legal texts and legislation that do grant women the right to elect and to be elected and other political rights.

We can conclude that women's political participation is modest, not commensurate with the size of the sacrifices made by women. Women have been exposed to the oppressive practices of the Israeli occupation such as killing, detention and displacement. Women have stood with men side by side in all fields and in all locations, and this is quite normal in oriental parental society where women are subordinate to the man.

In spite of all what was presented in this study, which gives an impression that the Palestinian's woman's role is limited due to her ordinary participation in the political affairs, the reality of the Palestinian situation confirms that the percentage of woman participation in the public affairs had overcome all the circumstances and restrictions of the society culture.

The studies (Omar Rahall, 2004; Abdul Sattar Qasem, 2009) stated that political participation is difficult and complex in light of the prevailing culture, which divided work on the basis of sex. And the status of women's participation in political life in Palestine is still in its infancy, despite the size of the sacrifices provided by the Palestinian women over the Palestinian history, this is confirmed by the data and official figures of the extent of participation of women.

For example, we noted that the participation of Palestinian women in the first legislative elections in 1996 were low as evident by rates of female candidates and women elected, as was the proportion of the presence of women in 1996 in the decision-making positions (higher ones) is low, with increased participation in the least important centers. For example; "the percentage of women in the Palestinian National Council, 7.5% out of 744 members in 1996, while the women were not represented on the Executive Committee, which is most important in making decisions in the PLO.

That was due to the dominant attitudes of males in the Palestinian society through discrimination against woman, which is associated in a way or another to the nature of politicization, customs and traditions where many families (husbands or parents) prevent their wife's or woman from taking part in the election (Nazzal, 2004).

In her study about the reality of the political participation of the Palestinian woman, (Rima Nazzal, 2004) has concluded that the woman's participation in the general and political life was low. Part of it because of her refrains from party participation and general political action

for a while. This is also due to the policies of excluding women practiced by unions, and vocational institutions. Moreover, many of the dominant and existing forces whether in power or in the society, don't want to see new powers replacing them in the public life.

On her findings of the study Dunia Ismael (2004) has concluded that there was an absence of woman in the public jobs, directly connected to the formation of public policies and that the presence of the Palestinian woman in positions of decision making, and higher governmental posts was still limited and poor.

The findings of the study have agreed with what the findings of the studies (Atta Shaqfa, 2008; Saed Nasr, 1986, Tariq Hamza, 1995), have reached that there were distinctions between males and females in the political participation and these were in favour of the males. That's males of members of the study sample were more politically involved than females. And the results of the study was an agreement with the findings of the results of studies conducted by (Atta Shaqfa, 2008, Saed Nasr 1986, Tariq Hamza, 1995) that there are differences between male and female political participation and the differences in favour of males, means that males subject to the study sample were more involved politically than females.

The findings of the study have concluded that religion determines the form and degree of the political participation in the Palestinians society, the results have confirmed that the difference was in favour of Christians. The rate of Christians to the total number of people in Palestinian was about 13%. While at beginning of the British mandate on 1917, it declined to 6.9%, on 1931 it became 8.8%. On 1948, the year of disaster, it reached 8% whereas on 2000 it was 6.1%.

Nevertheless, the Palestinian Christians became prominent in the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. They had a large presence in the national struggle since 1917 and up until today. Christians of Palestine suffered the mostly after the occupation on 1967 from land confiscation. For example, Israel has confiscated 11 thousand acres of land with olive trees in the town of Beit Jala to build a settlement (Gilo) on them. And also, Israel has confiscated thousands of acres of lands, belonging to Christians, to construct a highway linking the Jewish settlements at south Bethlehem to Jerusalem (Abu-Fakhr, 2010).

The Christian presence in the Palestinian political institutions was strong, especially after the advent of the Palestinian Authority, which granted privileges to the Christians, as it gave a number of seats in all political and community bodies to Christian. For example, there is in the occupied territories 10 heads of municipalities.

The Authority has allocated a number of municipalities chair seats for Christians. Ten senior officials work in the office of the president in the PNA, seven ambassadors to the Authority, two ministers in the government of Ramallah (The government of Salam Fayyad), seven Christian members won seats in the recent Palestinian Parliament that was suspended due to the conflict between Fatah and Hamas.

Moreover, the total Palestinian Christians that are affiliated with political party exceeds 20% of the total Christians, whereas a large percentage is active within institutions of the Palestinian civil community; in the occupied territories there is 575 non-governmental Christian organizations.

In his study, (Elias Is'eed) adds that Christians are found in all national parties. And the majority of founders of the Palestinian revolutionary movements are of Christian origin like Nayef Hawatmeh, George Habash, Saleem Nassar and Hanan Ashrawi (Is'eed, 2009).

The findings of the study differ from results of a study by Jamal Mari (1996) on youth and political participation in Jordan, where he found that there were no statistical differences that indicate the influence of religion on youth participation.

The findings of the study have shown that there were differences between workers and non-workers in the form of political participation in the Palestinian society and these were in favour of workers.

During the first quarter of 2010, the rate of participation in manpower in the Palestinian areas reached 40.7%. The findings have shown that the rate of woman's participation in the work market has reached 14.1% and the number of those working in the Palestinian areas reached 744,000 in the first quarter of 2010. The rate of the unemployed individuals reached 28.0% in the first quarter of 2010 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

Relating to the previous figures, we notice that the rate of the working males is greater than females. That constitutes a difference in the level of the political participation as males are more politically involved than females based on the study findings.

Most of workers in the Palestinian society are employees in the public sector, and the majority of these affiliated with Palestinian political parties, mostly, to Fatah

Movement. Thus, they are more concerned with politics than non-workers.

Besides, the political parties constructed civil institutions where they have appointed its members. So those who are working in these institutions are often interested in the political affairs, by being affiliated with political parties.

Moreover, it seems that the workers by virtue of their work are more interested in issues of their community; it may be because they are working and are able to secure their needs which enable them to take part in public issues. They can serve their community, care for society-based issues, follow political events in the Palestinian arena, or donate to any particular body like a party or political candidate.

The findings of the study have shown that there are no differences between those who are working in the public sectors and those in the private sector in the rate of the political participation. The number of employees in the Authority has reached 160,000; of which 72,000 in the West Bank, and 78,000 in Gaza. The number of military employees is 64,000, whereas 96,000 employed in civil sectors in the West Bank and Gaza strip (Al-Zaitona News, 2010).

Although most workers in the military system are those who are affiliated to Fatah movement, the recent attitudes of the Authority prevent every employer in that system to join any political faction or perform any political activity. This explains the result that there is no difference between those working in the public sector and those in the private one in the extent of the political participation.

Many private institutions were constructed by the participation political parties. So, there is no difference between the public and private sectors in the political participation.

The findings of the study have emphasized that there are differences between refugees and non-refugees in the degree of the political participation, where those were in favour of refugees despite the obstacles they face for the political participation.

On 1948, the Zionist movement announced the formation of the Israel state on 78% of the Palestinian lands, and forced the Palestinian out of their homes, displacing 700,000 Palestinian from about 20 cities and 400 villages at a rate of 66% of the population of Palestine, who scattered in West Bank, Gaza strip and the neighbouring countries: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the rest of the world. So, they became homeless. This led to the collapse of the Palestinian society and created a new phenomenon in the Palestinian society: "refugee camps" which attest on this catastrophe (Banat, 2010).

The Palestinian refugees have lived in difficult living conditions in camps under the supervision of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Working Agency). They lived in small overcrowded houses that lack the simplest basic necessities for life. After the refugee displaced and uprooted from their homeland; Therefore their feeling of the society-based issues and their following of the political events were different from others, since they have tasted the bitterness of the Occupation, and their exceptional circumstances forced them to do so.

The findings of a study about "Martyrdom between figures and facts 2010" revealed that the majority of the Palestinian suicide bombers who participated in carrying out martyr operations (53.5%) are refugees whose families were uprooted and displaced from their land on 1948 (Banat, 2010).

What's going on in the Palestinian political arena from negotiation about the right of return makes refugees watch closely, as it affects their issues directly, for fear that their rights are abandoned. They have the right of self determination. They have the right to correct the stance of the Palestinian negotiator in favour of the commitment to the right of return to the homes and property. And here is the central struggle of the refugees to call for political participation in the Palestinian decision through the degree and form of political participation for refugees in the Palestinian society.

However, the hard living condition of the refugees, postponing the issues of refugees until the negotiations of the final stage, confessional initiatives of the refugee's rights, after the Palestinian refugees have made lots of sacrifices for the sake of fulfilling their dreams on the ground, to return to their original areas, where there are still waiting for a political decision that put an end to their pains and sufferings but to no avail. This was an obstacle facing them in political participation.

Add to that the economic and social situation of the Palestinian refugees lives, and what they have faced of repression, imprisonment, torture, and suffering as a result of their political participation. These discouraging factors might be the reason behind the decline in their political participation. In this regard, a study of (Banat & Salama, 2003) concluded that the degree of political participation among the people of Arroub refugee's camp was moderate. That was reflected among the group study on the framework of their political participation, which was wretched, both in terms of their unwillingness in the political leadership or membership of the present political parties, or in their tendency for participation in the election of the legislative council. They also expressed pessimism in the future of political action in the Palestinian society.

The results of a study by Nadia Abu-Zahera (2010) concluded that the people of the Palestinian refugee camps are suffering from political expatriation as they tend to political isolation and not joining political life, and the rejection of reality and their desire to change. The study showed that in comparison with the inhabitants of villages and cities, inhabitants of the camps have the lowest affiliation to political parties, the lowest rate of participation in the distribution of political leaflets, and the lowest rate of participation in political meetings and seminars.

The findings of the study have shown that there were differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to the political affiliations of the citizens. These differences were in levels, motives and forms of political participation in favour for the affiliated citizens.

The political affiliation represents pertinence to homeland on political bases, as well as the sense of political personality. The political affiliation can be defined as "the extent which

determines the individual's nationalism in the society by means of his love and loyalty to his country, his willingness to sacrifice for it and embracing its ideologies, values and culture".(Abrash, 2010)

The parties played an important role in the Palestinian society in the sixties of the last century. It has worked to mobilize national sentiment, through its armed and political approach, and through agitating people against the projects conflicting with their national rights (Abrash, 2010).

One of the most important functions of the party is to express the needs and desires of the masses; as well as the empowerment of individuals and groups to express their views and to defend their interests in an effective, systematic way, orderly and effective (Al-Khazragi, 2004: 214).

During the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip, the political parties have tried to engage the Palestinian citizens in various political programs. They formed masses frameworks, most notably, the students Unions at Universities. These frameworks played a leading role during years of the first uprising, where they strongly resisted the occupation.

After the Oslo Accords and the organization of legislative and presidential elections and local communities, the political parties are competing on gaining the support of the Palestinian citizens. The parties organized numerous political activities to attract voters, such as events and festivals including honoring families of wounded, prisoners, martyrs and high school graduates...etc. They raise flags and signs in the significant social occasions such as the annual feasts and catastrophe (Al-Nakba) and the relapse (Al-Intikasa) anniversaries, and others events.

That affiliation to political parties drives affiliates to actively participate in political activities organized by the party. The study showed that the affiliated citizens she parties are more politically involved than others, and their political affiliation drives them towards the active political participation.

The results of the study have pointed to the existence of differences in the constraints of political participation in Palestinian society according to the residential area (the West Bank or Gaza Strip) and that these constraints are more intense in the Gaza Strip.

About 1.5 million people live in the Gaza Strip in an area not exceeding 365 km², most population are Palestinian refugees who fled from their villages and towns that were occupied in 1948. The estimated population density in Palestinian territories for the year 2010 was about 672 persons/ km², among which 444 persons/ km² in the West Bank compared to 4.206 persons/ km² in the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip is one of the most congested areas of population in the world. The proportion of refugees in the Gaza Strip constitutes two thirds of the population. The youth population in the society of Gaza strip is higher than that in the West Bank.

The population of Gaza strip was ruled by Egyptian Military over different periods of time, and the laws were following the Egyptian regime until the Israeli occupation. In the West Bank they were subject to the Jordan guardianship until the Israeli occupation emerged. The two areas then were united under one Occupation.

The Palestinian society in general and in Gaza strip in particular live under the pressure of the Israeli siege since the Intifada of Al-Aqsa broke out on 28/9/2000. A few days after the launch of Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli occupation forces closed all border crossings between the Gaza Strip and the outside world, and have closed all doors for Palestinian workers and deprived them of work within the so-called Green Line, and no longer give them the necessary permits that allow them to enter "Israel" in order to go to the places of their work (Elayan, 2009).

Since the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising in 2000, the occupation separated the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the possibility of movement between the two regions was forbidden for Palestinians. After the second legislative elections in 2006, i.e. after Hamas took over the Legislative Council and formed a government, the Occupation tightened the siege on the Gaza Strip, and isolated it from the outside world.

The internal fighting and bloody conflicts which led to the Palestinian division on 14/7/2007, the Hamas movement takeover in Gaza Strip and the provisions of Israel's blockade of the

Gaza Strip, all resulted in a sharp decline in the Palestinian economy growth rates and to an increase in rates of unemployment and poverty (Elaiwa, 2009).

Since then, increased deterioration of economic situations and the isolation of Gaza strip people from the rest of the world, they partly depend on relief aid from UNRWA and foreign donations for their living, which have created what is called parallel economy relief economy. It also lead to an increase in the activities of black market economy and monopolists, and various smugglers and mafia especially after the decline in most of the major economic activities (Al-Sorani, 2010).

This situation also increased poverty and unemployment rates, lowered standards of living and caused loss of markets to many essential food items and medicines. So life substitutes for the individual in the Gaza Strip became rare or even absent compared to other communities. These barriers lead to a significant decline in the level of political participation in the Gaza Strip.

Also that the government of Hamas in the Gaza Strip took control with an iron fist, as they performed political arrests and prevented many of the demonstrations that do not have permission from the government, they restricted freedom of opinion. Some armed groups in the sector were prevented of the armed action and launch rockets without the permission of the movement. Hamas control of the Gaza Strip to urged many of the supporters of Fatah to escape out of Gaza, thereby reducing the area of freedom available to citizens and therefore caused reluctance to political participation.

The results of the study showed that there was no effect how far from the wall of apartheid Palestinian people live on the political. There is almost no spot in the Palestinian society that is spared Israeli checkpoints that controls the traffic of the Palestinians, or spared from the settlement that affected the quality of citizen lives by being personally or their property subject to attacks. The apartheid wall cuts off the society limbs, and prevents citizens from reaching their land or visits their relatives.

All Palestinians share this suffering; hardly anyone was not subjected to such harassment and obstacles on a daily basis, but with the extent of distance or proximity from these points,

settlements or the Wall. Therefore no proximity or distance from these points is of great importance. Since the actual status quo imposed by occupation, even if your home is not adjacent to a military check point, then you will pass inevitably from one, or go near this settlement or that, or even the wall, which extended about 788 km from the north to south the West Bank truncating large parts of its territory into separate sections.

The action brought by the occupation in the West Bank by checkpoints and other Israeli measures such as the gates and road closures have led to the existence of pockets surrounded by the wall and is separated from the rest of the West Bank. This situation ensures a continued settlement that was built on the territory of the West Bank, and transformed the Palestinian territories into big prisons.

The Department of the affairs of the Palestinian election indicates that constructing the wall with its western and eastern parts, will lead harm to 865300 Palestinian citizens directly. This equals 37.5% of the number of citizens in the West Bank. These live in 91 population compounds (Jabr, 2005).

The findings have shown that there are differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society relative to the Israeli violence that participants are exposed to. These have also shown that the differences are in favor of people who were exposed to the Israeli violence in motives, forms and degrees of participation.

Perhaps the Palestinian experience under occupation was remains one of the most significant stations regarding the number of victims that it left behind, due to killing or injury, physical abuse, demolition of homes, prevention of travel, exposure to deportation, and house arrest, confiscation of land and water and other forms of violence. The Palestinians are facing most brutal and fierce Occupation that history has ever known.

The findings of the doctoral thesis "The Palestinian Martyrs": figures and facts from their family's perspective (2010), have shown that most the families of the Palestinian Martyrs are facing at a rate of 73.5% the different types of the Israeli violence. The Martyrs themselves were previously exposed to the Israeli violence. About 46% were exposed to shocking experiences including physical and verbal insult, storming of their houses, mistreatment on barriers and the surrounding environment, hitting, close friend or relative being martyred,

detention, not getting permits to get into the Palestinian 48 areas for humanitarian purposes, loss of work inside the green line of 1948, or exposition to pursuit and prevention from travel (Banat, 2010).

We also notice that the families of detainees are interested in participating in the activities concerned with the issues of prisoners, such as solidarity marches, sit-in on hunger strikes ... etc.

The Israeli military Occupation practices force and violence and can't live without them, what happened in Kufur Qasem, Deer Yassin and Sabra and Shatil'a are pure examples on that. Israeli military attacks on Gaza strip specifically is a catastrophe for the Palestinian, which cannot be described by hundreds of researchers, due to the great variance in balance of power between the Israeli and Palestinian forces. The last was the Israeli aggression on Gaza strip that lasted 23 days (27/12/2008-18/1/2009). In which the occupation forces used all kinds of weapons, including internationally banned in the broader process of land, sea and air against the unarmed Palestinian people. The woman and children victims have constituted over 43% of the armless civilians. Many areas have disappeared, the brutal operation led to the killing of 1285 Palestinian citizens, injured about 4336 including 1133 kids, 735 woman and about 2400 houses were destroyed. The material loss was estimated to be about 1.9 Milliard dollars (Palestinian Center for Human Rights PCHR, 2009).

The study of "Palestine Center: The Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development" on the violence of Jewish settlers against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank reported more than 3000 attacks in the years 2004 to 2011. The study has classified the attacks by settlers into five major categories, the physical assault, and stone-throwing, destroying prosperities, and setting on fire. These types constituted 70% of the assaults by settlers. The other types vary between kidnapping, molestation and harassment, laying hand on the houses or lands, fire, theft, and run over.

The majority of attacks occurred in areas classified as "B" and "C" which are occupied Palestinian territories under complete control of the Israeli security and is inhabited by a small percentage of the Palestinian population. In contrast, only a small percentage of these attacks carried out in Area A which is under Palestinian Authority control where the majority of

Palestinians live, and the study indicates that the major attacks occurred on main roads and points of intersection areas (A, B, C), which allows the settlers to escape easily after committing their attacks (Palestine Center: The Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development, 2011).

A person who is subjected to violence will have a reverse reaction; consequently that violence only begets violence. The uprising in 1987, for example, broke out after exposure of Palestinian workers to run over by the Occupation forces. The findings of the study have shown that the degree of political participation for people who have been exposed to violence is greater than others. This is a logical result and normal reaction since the pressure generates a blast.

The results indicate that there are differences in political participation in Palestinian society according to the participation of citizens in the 1996 elections. The differences were in favour of the participants in the elections of 1996, in the form of political participation. That might be due to the fact that the majority of candidates and voters are affiliated with Fatah Movement, or with other allied factions. The results of the study indicated earlier that citizens affiliated to Fatah movement are more involved politically than the rest of the factions. It also indicated that citizens who are affiliated to a political faction are more involved politically than unaffiliated citizens, and this explains the difference in political participation in favour to the participants in the elections of 1996.

The participation in the first legislative elections in 1996 was limited to Fatah movement and factions allied with it, while the rest of the PLO factions abstained from participation as an expression of rejection of the Oslo Accords that was signed between the PLO and Israel in 1993, as well as of rejection of the election law of 1995, where they called for the proportional representation system which gives more opportunity for small parties. The various Palestinian Islamic powers also abstained from participating in the elections for the same reasons (President Divan, 2008).

The presidential and legislative elections of 1996 were held in unusual and difficult political circumstances. The negotiations between the PNA and the Israeli government were still in place. The isolation imposed on Gaza strip, Jerusalem and West Bank, the policy of the Israeli

closures and military barriers have led to difficulties in communication and transition and the movement of voters, which has hampered the electoral process and caused a drop in the proportion of political participation in the voting process. This particularly reflected in the departments of Hebron and Jerusalem, these were still under the Israeli control during the election period (Central Elections Commission Palestine, 1996).

The West Bank and Gaza were divided into 16 constituencies, resulting in tribal and individual promotion, and the monopoly of power to one party. The election results have reflected the dominance of traditional institutions of the PLO on the Palestinian Authority, and Fatah movement formed two thirds of the legislative council.

The findings of the study have shown that there were differences in the forms, motives and levels of the political participation of the Palestinian society based on the participation of citizens in the 2006 elections. These differences were in favour of those who participated in that year. The Palestinian legislative elections took place on the 25th Jan. 2006. All the Palestinian forces and factions including Hamas have participated in the elections with the exception of Islamic Jihad. It resulted in landslide victory for Hamas. Thus, Hamas Movement moved from opposition of the Authority through the legislative council in which it obtained 76 seats out of 132 in the legislative council.

The condensed Palestinian popular participation reflects the desire for change to better political reality and better living conditions. On the other hand, it increased the polarization that dominates in the Palestinian arena between the two major groups, Fatah and Hamas. This election gained great importance due to the participation of all Palestinian forces of national and Islamic factions, which gave a climate of assertive party competition. Eleven parties' lists have competed on the elections as well as many independent candidates. This gave rise to a high degree of political participation represented by the large number of parties and candidates, and this pluralism formed a clear challenge to all political forces. This produced a strong competition among these parties and strengthens the political participation and attracted the attention of citizens (Nofal, 2007).

The percentage of voting in all constituencies was 77.69%. The total number of voters in the constituencies the West Bank was 585,003 at a rate of 74.18% whereas, the total voters in

Gaza was 396.079 at a rate of 81.65% of the total voters, bringing the total number of voters to 981.082 voters (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006).

These results suggest that was keen to vote in legislative elections in 2006, which is the most important event and the largest at the level of political participation in the Palestinian society, would be interested in political participation, in turn, who did not participate in the legislative elections in 2006, is not expected to be interested in participating in other political activities.

Moreover, the majority of the main Palestinian factions participated in the elections, and the results of the study showed that political parties play an important role in pushing its affiliates to political participation, it is expected that all persons affiliated to political factions were keen to vote. Therefore, the results of our study have indicated that people who participated in the 2006 elections were distinguished from those who did not participate in the form or aspects of the political participation. These elections, from one hand, occupy a major role in the creation of the legislative institutions in the state, and on the other hand, it supports the citizen's rights in the political participation. It is a tool for expression of the people aspirations and the main indicator of what aspires to be achieved.

The findings of the study have shown that there are differences in political participation in Palestinian society according to the participation of citizens in local municipal elections, and these differences in the form of political participation are in favor for the participants in the local elections.

Elections of local councils and local village and the municipality in the West Bank and Gaza Strip took place for the first time since nearly three decades. It has been characterized by transparency and high integrity, as described by many international observers. It was attended by the majority of political parties and Palestinian political factions, even the factions which abstained in previous elections (Hamas and the Popular Front) participated strongly in the elections that took place at different time stages.

It should be emphasized that local elections are of a political nature in the first place for political parties, even if the talk in the electoral programs on the issues of services, and therefore one of the main objectives of the local elections is to identify how extent is the masses and the impact in the local community for each side. It is also a referendum and

success of for this program or that, and the degree of masses acceptance. For that reason, there is a close link between political participation, political parties and elections.

A tribal competition that is mingled with the party attitudes was observed in the elections. Hamas candidates won the elections in the majority of the local and municipal councils. These elections were marked by the same situation in the legislative elections in 2006, in terms that, those who were interested in participating in local elections have shown an interest in practicing all forms of the political participation. This is a natural result since those who are interested in public affairs, are keen on political participation.

In addition, most of the factions participated strongly in local elections and urged their candidates to win and forged alliances with the tribes. Thus, the factions had a chance to attract the tribes. The citizens have shown interest in these elections, where the participation was high in the majority of the electoral sites. The citizens have shown a high degree of awareness of the importance of these elections and the importance of their participation. So we can say that those who participated in the local elections whether supported by parties or clans, recognize the importance of the political participation, and that participating by voting, electing and political activities has an effect that reflect on their lives and future. This explains why those who took part in local and municipal elections would be interested in political participation more than others. For the reasons mentioned previously, most notably that most of the participants are either those who are affiliated to the Palestinian political parties, or those who are aware of the importance of political participation which is and its reflects on their lives.

The findings of the study have emphasized that there was no difference between single or married in the political participation in the Palestinian society. The social status doesn't constitute variations among citizens in their political participation. We can understand this finding since political participation is a society based concern that interests both the single and married to the same extent, despite the responsibilities that may be abound to married couples. Their understanding of the significance of the political participation may be the cause of their desire to participate, to the same extent as young bachelor with not many family responsibilities.

Family responsibilities might be the motive for the political participation as it has a repercussion on the future of citizens

The results indicate that there are differences in the forms of political participation, according to the academic qualification variable, where the results indicated that the differences in the forms of political participation among holders of a diploma and the illiterate, in favor of diploma holders.

This indicates that the increase in the level of education increases political participation. The higher level of political participation among the diploma holders might be attributed to the age of this group where graduates in the years of the eighties constituted a significant portion of this group. The study findings have shown an increase in political participation with the increase of age due to greater awareness. So this factor may have a great role in differentiating the diploma holders.

In addition, the university graduates are bachelor's degree holders, and the results of study showed earlier that workers are more involved politically than unemployed, so this result is logical and consistent with reality.

The decline in political participation for the holders of General Secondary School Certificate or lower may be due to the lack of political awareness of the importance of political participation. In addition to that, a large proportion of them work in the construction sector in Israel. Their estimated number is about 140,000 workers, they work from morning till late hours, and may not have enough time to take interest but on their own affairs and away from politics. Israel is punishing every person accused of political action by depriving him from getting a work permit. So workers try to keep away from politics in order to maintain their livelihoods.

The finding of the study agrees with the findings of the studies by (Al-Hayek & Alsoa, 1996; Al-Azzam, 1991), which concluded that the higher education increased the involvement in political life, whereas, the lack of awareness, decrease the political participation.

Education increases the moral pressure that urges voting, and provides citizens with knowledge about the political issues that will enable them to contribute positively and a gives them sense of political world. Ghazi al-Khalili said the participation of women reflected in

revolutionary politics, but such participation for women were limited initially to those women who were educated (Al-Khalili, 1981).

Educated people tend to participate in the intrinsic value of the voting, and they have sense of emotional satisfaction when they elect. Education raises the cognitive skills that make it easier to acquaintance with the political matters, as education increases an individual's ability to understand and deal with complex and intangible issues such as politics. Thus, education reduces the cost of voting by giving individuals the skills necessary to deal with political information and political decision-making. Education also increases the possibility of learners getting better education and more self-satisfaction due to political participation. This will increase the sense of national duty and moral pressure towards participation in voting and receiving significant benefits from voting. It also gives a range of expertise in required bureaucratic relations, such as learning needs, and filling out forms and applications and waiting in line in order to overcome procedural obstacles that are required to register and then vote.

The study of (Wolfinger & Rosinston, 2007) has concluded in analysing the phenomenon of the decline in number of participants in the general elections in the USA that about 60% of University postgraduates embody a strong sense of national duty compared to the half of secondary certificate holders and approximately 40% to those who received less education.

The data of the report issued by UN under the title of (The Young people Egypt are the builders of the future) have shown that most of those who participated in the recent parliamentary elections were males at a rate of 45%, whereas, the percentage of female did not exceed 17%. Most of the males obtained university education. Most of those who refrained from political participation were females or uneducated people (UNRWA, 2010).

The findings of the study have agreed with the results of the study of Saed Mohammad Nasr (1986) on trends in some of the teachers about political action, where, according to findings it is impossible to separate between education and political action. Both are linked to the progress of the other, whether we started with politics, or vice versa, and both depend on each other and control Platform in the other.

The findings of the study have emphasized there is no difference between (village, city, camp) in the political participation in the Palestinian society. The place of residence has nothing to

do with the political participation. This may be due to the fact that the social weaving of the Palestinian society is one, and there are no substantial differences among the Palestinian population. Although the ministry of local government classified the Palestinian communities into three categories, there were no differences among these (Urban, rural and camp).

These groups:

Urban: Community that has a population of 10,000 people or more, and all the provincial centers, regardless of size.

Rural: Community that has a population less than 4,000 people, and every community that has a population of between 4,000-9,999 people.

Camp: All the communities are referred as camp and run by the UNRWA (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009).

And these groups did not show differences in the degree and form and motives of political participation.

The percentage of urban population based on population estimates in mid-2010 was about 73.7%, and the percentage of the population living in rural areas was 17.0%, while the proportion in the camps was 9.3%. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

Besides, these communities suffer from a common problem, which is the dominance of the occupation, which seeks to empty the land of its population through restrictions on citizens to force them to immigration and displacement. The occupation is working on the dismemberment of Palestinian society and isolating Palestinian areas from each other through the establishment of military checkpoints and wall or settlements, or bypass roads. It does not differentiate between the camp or village or city, all Palestinian communities suffered from the arbitrary measures of the occupation.

The data of Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) indicated that most of the demographic characteristics of the population of the camps aren't much different from the demographic characteristics of urban and rural population in the Palestinian territories. This may be due to the fact that the Palestinian people are characterized by a single social system and many refugees have left camps and went to live in rural and urban areas (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2002: 70).

The findings of the study have agreed with the survey results done by (Mass Institute) in the West Bank and Gaza strip about the participation in the activities of the big family or tribe. It was revealed that there were no differences in participation in the activities of the family among the residential areas (city, village, camp).

About 34% of those belonging to big families or clans in areas of the West Bank have participated in political activities. The findings did not show differences in the importance of political participation by residential location (village, city, camp) (Nasr & Hilal, 2007).

The results of the study have shown that there are differences in the impediments to political participation, according to the residential area (A, B, or C). The results of the study showed that obstacles to political participation in the regions (C) which are controlled by Israel were more than other regions.

The Palestinian areas were divided into three areas according to the Israeli-Palestinian agreement (Taba agreement in Egypt), which was signed in great ceremonies in Washington on 28 September, 1995. It included dividing the West Bank into three areas (A, B and C). This means the following:

Areas "A" are centers of major cities in the West Bank with the exception of Hebron, which comprise less than 3% of the West Bank area. It will be under the Palestinian administrative and security supervision.

Areas "B" which comprise 25% of West Bank area is under the Palestinian administrative supervision, while security will be under participant Israeli-Palestinian supervision.

Areas "C" which comprise about 70% of West Bank area, is under Israeli administrative and security supervision. (Mohsen, 2002: 266; Palestinian Media Center, 2003)

The subjection of Area C to Israeli sovereignty means to retain these areas without development, and to maintain the barriers and the demolition of houses and building settlements, etc. The presence of the occupation in Area C is enough to damage the daily lives of citizens who are tired of the daily measures of the occupation and the continuing inspection

with every entry or exit from areas close to the settlers, especially in the old cities of Hebron and Jerusalem.

The Israeli dominance on (C areas) constitutes an obstacle towards the political participation. The Occupation suppresses the marches and demonstrations and prohibits even peaceful gatherings in areas under its control, as well as the residence of the barriers that impaired the quality of citizen's lives and prevents them from moving easily.

The findings of the study have shown that there were no differences in the political participation in the Palestinian society according to religious tendency. The Palestinian society tends to religion; however, this religion is not the source of motivation for political participation. Religious factions in the Palestinian society are diverse: some do have interest in politics, and others have no interest at all, such as Sufism groups or Liberation Party whose political interest is limited to raising awareness rather than action.

Moreover, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not a religious one as some like to depict it. The conflict with the occupation is an existential one (Colonial conflict). Palestinians believe that this land is the cradle of the three monotheistic religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism). The Zionists ideology is to percept that the conflict is between the Islam and Jewish religion on one hand, and between Islam and Christianity on the other. Zionist ideology exploited the name of religion and the perception that the land of Palestine is the Promised Land to justify the occupation on behalf of the Jewish religion. Religions call for tolerance and coexistence; Palestinian people have always been used to that. For example, Samaritan group that follow Judaism are Palestinians with all reserved duties and rights of Palestinian citizens. They live with dignity and respect among their own people.

The results of this study confirmed that there is no difference between religious and non religious citizens in the extent, motivations and obstacles to political participation. This demonstrates that the forms of political participation practiced by Palestinian citizens did not differ between citizens according to the level of religiosity. Because, as it was discussed earlier, the motive for political participation is not a religion but a sense of national duty.

The religious struggle, as some depict, is either a source of the political polarization for some factions, or a response to the extreme Zionist intellect that uses religion as a justification for the Occupation. The Hebrew newspaper "Yedioth Aharonot" carried out an opinion poll on 30/7/2009 where 64% of the Israelis showed support to the idea of building (Suleiman Temple) that would replace Al Aqsa Mosque. In addition significant increase was recorded in the frequency of raids carried out by extremist Jews and officials and the Israeli security against the Mosque, in total 43 raids were recorded between 12/8/2008-12/8/2009. Also Israel continues its excavations under Al-Aqsa Mosque. The total number of excavations has reached 25 sites until 2009 (Al-Zaytouna Centre For Studies and Consultations, 2009).

Oslo failures, as well as work and advocacy of the Islamic stream of expanding religious trends in the years after 1999, contributed in the break out of the Al-Aqsa uprising. The national forces no longer had choices but to return to the option of armed in order to maintain a presence first and then catch up with Islamic movements which found this uprising as a precious opportunity to mix the whole political game cards.

The years following the Al-Aqsa uprising, which preceded the election of the Palestinian legislative have witnessed general confusion in the concept of national and religious identities. The political and social frustrations have urged large segments of the Palestinian society to look for possible or even non-feasible alternatives. They lost confidence in the national system and the national slogans in at the same time the when national political parties were deteriorating; this led to the resolution of the battle once again to the predominance of religious identity, and the decline of Palestinian national political ideology in favor of the political Islam.

This was obviously shown in the results of the last Palestinian legislative elections in 2006, indicating an evolution in the Palestinian identity, and its transformation tending to be more religious, as apparent in the victory of "Hamas" who declared representing Islam.

However, the Hamas movement has committed mistakes that might be crucial during its ascent towards the highest levels in the political systems of the Authority, which would affect the Palestinian community that was biased to religion, and start once again agitating the concepts of democracy and secularism.

The division lead by Hamas in Gaza strip has changed how people view the Movement, driving them away from its religious political ideologies. The phase of political polarization of Palestinian factions has ended, and they lost people's support. Palestinians have reached a state of despair from the current Palestinian political parties, who did wrong to the Palestinian cause.

The findings of the study have shown that there was no difference in motives, levels and forms of Palestinian participation between the religious and non religious people. The study results disagreed with the findings (Banat & salama, 2003) study which has concluded that the political participation is inversely related to the level of religiosity.

The results of the study have shown that there were differences in the motives behind political participation in the Palestinian society according to the individual order in the family. The differences were in favor of the eldest son.

In the Palestinian family parents give the eldest son wide authorities. This might be ascribed to their special feelings toward their first child. Such policy established nurturing based on the distinction between the elder son and his brothers across generations in the Arab and Palestinian society. Elder son also carry bigger familial responsibilities than other family members which grant him a special position in the Arabic family. It also raises him with a sense of responsibility toward his family, society and nation, which is reflected on his tendency toward political participation. For this reason, political parties compete to gain the support of eldest sons as they realize his great impact on the rest of the family members.

The findings of the study have shown that the difference in the number of the family member's in the Palestinian society makes no difference in their political participation. The data of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has indicated that there was a decline in the average size of the Palestinian family, from 5.8 members in 2007 to 5.5 members in 2010. The average size of the family in the West Bank declined to 5.3 members in 2010 compared to 5.5 members in 2007. As for the Gaza strip, the average size of the family declined to 5.8 members in 2010 compared to 6.5 in 2007 (Palestinian Central Election Commission, 2010).

The findings of the study have shown that the level, motives and form of political participation are not related to the number of the family members. Palestinian families regardless to its size face same political situation. Therefore, there were no differences in the

political participation based on family size. This result disagree with with the results of (Al-Azzam, 1991) study, which have concluded that the bigger the family size the lower the political participation levels.

The results of the study have shown that there are differences in the motives of political participation by the monthly income per capita. The study showed that the differences are in favor of the individuals of moderate or middle income.

The low-income individuals are generally busy with ensuring their essential needs. The poor are engaged in the daily struggle for survival. They don't have time or motive for participation in issues that looks less important for them. The statistics according to the Central System for the Palestinian Statistic's have revealed on 2008 that over 50% of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza strip are living below poverty line. And so, their top priorities would be securing their basic needs driving them away from political participation.

While the high-income individuals showed low levels of political participation. Their interests may be different because of their unique economic situation causing personal financial concerns on top of their priorities, rather than national issues.

Also, a majority of the middle-income individuals are employees in the public sector, who as discussed earlier, have special political interests due to administrative promotions that is mediated by the political parties for the benefit of its supporters.

Many jobs consider the political affiliation to the party as the major criteria for employment, especially Fatah Movement. For this reason, those who are working in public sector are keen to political participation.

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has estimated in a report of average poverty line of the Palestinian family of six members in 2007, about 580 U.S. \$. While the severe poverty line for the same family size about 482\$ U.S. The poverty rate among Palestinian households during the year 2007 according to actual consumption patterns was 34.5%, with rate of 23.6% in the West Bank and 55.7% in the Gaza Strip. Whereas, 57.3% of the Palestinian families earn monthly income below the national severe poverty line, with rate of 47.2% in the West Bank and 76.9% in the Gaza Strip.

On 2009, these values were estimated as, 23.8% of the Palestinian families are suffering from extreme poverty according to actual consumption patterns of the family with a rate of 13.9% in the West Bank and 43.0% in the Gaza Strip. Whereas, 48.0% of the Palestinian families earn monthly income below the national severe poverty line, with rate of 37.3% in the West Bank and 69.0% in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009)

Commenting on the poverty rate of the total population the World Bank has issued a report to show that about 47% of Palestinians are still below the poverty line (which is well below the Israeli poverty line). According to the data given, about 600 thousand Palestinians live on less than \$ 1.5 per day, which are the minimum limit, required providing the basic needs of food, clothing and housing.

The policy of closure imposed by Israel is the major cause of the Palestinian economic crisis afflicting the West Bank. (Palestinian Central Election Commission, 2009).

The results of the study disagree with the results of a study by (Wolfinger & Rosinston, 2007) in the analysis of the phenomenon of decline in the number of participants in the general elections in the United States. There was a direct relationship between income and participation in the elections which increased with the increase of income. However, the interpretation of the phenomenon may be different.

According to author's point of view, many reasons could be proposed: The poor are busy with daily struggling to survive. They don't have time and motive for participation in issues that seems of less importance. And the rich tends more to acquire the skills and interests that lead to participation in political life. The income also determines the social environment that may be encouraging or discouraging life of political participation.

The rich have interests associated with the political system, and this is a motivation to participate in the political life so that they can elect the desired political system that protects these interests.

The findings of the study have shown that there were differences in the degrees, motives, and forms of political participation in the Palestinian society according to a political faction. The

findings have shown there were differences between Fatah and Hamas and others in motives for political participation. These were in favor of Fatah movement.

The motives for the political participation were arranged as follows: Fatah, the Popular Front, Democratic Front, Al-Mubadara, Islamic Jihad, Independents, Hamas, other factions, and finally the People's Party.

The results have shown that there were differences between Fatah, Hamas, AlMubadarah, and others in the forms of the political participation, this were in flavor of the Fatah movement. There were differences between Hamas and others in favor of the Hamas movement and those there differences between the Popular Front and ALmubadara and others in favor of the Popular Front. There were differences between the Islamic Jihad and others, in favor of the Islamic Jihad movement.

The forms of the political participation in the Palestinian society were arranged as follows: The popular front, Fatah, the People's Party, the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, ALmubadara, the Democratic Front, Independents, and finally the others factions.

The researcher estimated that differences between Fatah and Hamas came because of the internal Palestinian division and control of the Fatah movement on the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Despite the large number of supporters of Hamas, but the number of actual Hamas members has declined due to political division. Here, the difference between supporters and affiliates should be pointed out, the first may be politically independent who supports Hamas's political positions, but not necessarily affiliated to Hamas.

It could be that a number of the respondents to this study in the West Bank, who are affiliated to Hamas movement feared to answer the question of political affiliation for self-security reasons, which explains the results concerning the difference between Fatah and Hamas in the motives and forms of political participation.

The study (Banat & Salama, 2003) has concluded that there were differences in the level of the political participation for the people of Al-Aroub Camp according to the variable of the political attitude in favor of individuals of leftist trends. These showed greater levels of political participation compared to those with other political tendencies. This result agrees

with what (Miari, 1996) has concluded about the relationship between the political participation and the partisan support, in favor of the leftist forces.

The findings of the study have concluded that there was a positive relationship between the age class and political participation in the Palestinian society. The Palestinian society is considered as a youthful community. The percentage of the individuals under 15 in the late 2010 was estimated to be 41.1% with a clear difference between the West Bank (39.2 %) and Gaza Strip (44.2%). In addition, the percentage of the individuals over 65 in the Palestinian society was estimated to be 2.9%, with 3.2% in the West Bank and 2.4% in Gaza strip.

The Palestinian Bureau of Statistics data points to a slight rise in the median age in the Palestinian territories. It rose from 16.4 years in 1997 to 18.5 years in 2010. Where, in the West Bank it rose from 17.4 years in 1997 to 19.4 years in 2010, while in Gaza Strip it rose from 14.8 years in 1997 to 17.2 years in 2010. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

That the political decisions interests all segments of the Palestinian people regardless of their age because it affects their daily lives, However, age may play an important role due to the increase of political awareness for older individuals, and thus increase levels of political participation.

It seems also that young people are recently away from the political arena due to the fact that the envelope of the current state of affairs does not require the youth enthusiasm. This is dissimilar with the former uprising situation which required a young generation. Now Palestinians live in confusing conditions oscillating between the pause and the continuation of the negotiation process between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Consequently, the reluctance of young people from effective political participation may be due to lack of options offered by the Authority. On the other hand, they are banned from demonstrating against the occupation by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and therefore young people's zeal has almost stopped.

The results of the survey conducted by Shark Al-Shababi Forum in 2009 indicated that approximately 70% of young Palestinians defined themselves as politically inactive. The young people in the Gaza Strip consider themselves more politically active than their peers in

the West Bank. About 37% of Gaza's youth stated that they were politically active against 26% in the West Bank (Zama'rah & Abu-Kamesh, 2010).

Osman concluded in his study (2008) that the political participation of young Palestinians are weak and reach zero in all parties without exception. The research concluded that the political participation in decision-making, on the public or national issues, lacks the youth participation.

The findings of the study have agreed with the findings of a study by Connelly and Field (1954), which concluded that there is a relationship between political participation and the age variable, with increasing participation with the increase of the individual's age.

The findings of the study have also agreed with the results of (Wolfinger & Rosinston, 2007) have concluded that turnout for elections is increasing with age.

Perhaps getting older is associated with the economic and educational progress but it also independently increase the rate of participation in the political life-Generally speaking, it seems that in the USA, the young are less turnout for participation in the elections that the old.

A report issued by the United Nations under the title "Egypt's youth builders of the future" has revealed that there is a very low interest of young people in politics and political action. The report has also shown that the percentage of who are greatly interested in politics doesn't exceed 6% of the youth study sample, and that their voting in the recent parliamentary elections did not exceed 29%. In addition, their affiliation to political parties is extremely limited, the number of those who are affiliated in any party did not exceed 3% of the study sample (UNRWA, 2010).

The findings of the study have disagreed with the conclusion of (Banat & Salama, 2003) study, where the political participation is inversely related to the age variable. This means, the higher the age, the lower the degree of political participation, and vice versa. This result agrees with the study (Miari, 1996) which indicated that the higher the age, the less the interest in the regular issues and activities that require vital energies and efforts.

5.2. Conclusions

The eagerness of citizens for political participation, and their interest in public affairs emerges from their desire to express their views, the belief that their political participation is a national duty, their desire to change the current reality, as well as working with others to develop and enhance their society.

However, the donor countries have conditioned their support to the Palestinian Authority with the positions it adopts. They have exercised different kinds of pressure on the Palestinian Authority, such as halting funds unless the PNA changes its political position. This dependence on the donor countries renders the PNA to the mercy of donors, who are unwilling to see any act of resistance. Therefore, the PNA has taken several procedures on the ground to stop any act of resistance. All this have had an impact on the Palestinians' effective political participation.

In addition to the current political reality, the suppression of freedoms in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the continuation of political arrests, the spread of corruption and nepotism, and the overall political confusion, have resulted in a widespread frustration of the current situation.

The Palestinian people's effective political participation has also been affected by factors such as the collective punishment people face as a result of their democratic choice, the subsequent political fragmentation, crippling the role of the Legislative Council, the postponement of legislative and presidential and local elections, the failure of the negotiations with the Israel, the continued blockade imposed on Gaza isolating it from the outside world and turning it into a big prison, the increase of poverty, the inability of the PNA to pay salaries for employees, the continued Israeli occupation and its arbitrary actions against the Palestinian people.

The prevailing law in a tribal society that is still governed by customs and traditions with a very conservative view of women indicates that political action is based on personal, familial, and local interests. This is a very narrow traditional point of view as it does not recognize the status and role of women. Overall, the interest of the Issue of Women in the Palestinian civil society is still below the required levels. Palestinian Women organization, though established long time ago, are still fragmented; political parties have little interest in women's political

participation, except in their literature and theoretical jargon. This situation is also reflected in society and national institutions exclusively controlled by men.

In contrast, the Christian presence in the Palestinian political institutions is strong, especially after the coming of the Palestinian Authority which granted privileges to the Christians, as it established the Christian presence in all political and community bodies. Christians have presence in all the national parties, and most of Palestinian revolutionary movements, who have representatives in the PLO, were founded by Christians.

Palestinian Refugees are following the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations very closely since these negotiations directly affect their future. This interest in the negotiations is also due to the refugees' concern over attempts to compromise their rights. However, the difficult conditions in which they live, and the delay in negotiation the issue of the refugees as it is considered one of the permanent status issues, and the many compromising initiatives have all hindered their political participation.

In Gaza, the Israeli blockade, the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, political arrests, the ban on demonstrations without permission from the Hamas government, restrictions on freedom of speech, and the departure of most Fatah members out of the Gaza Strip, have all affected Gazans' political participation.

The Palestinian society tends to be a religious one. However, religion cannot be considered a source of motivation for political participation. Religious factions in the Palestinian society are diverse: some do have interest in politics, and others-such as Sufism groups-have no interest at all. Moreover, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not a religious one as some like to depict it. The conflict with the occupation is an existential one (Colonial conflict). Palestinians believe that this land is the cradle of the three monotheistic religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism), but the Zionistic ideology portray the conflict as a religious one in order to justify the occupation and achieve extremist political objectives.

In the traditional Palestinian family the eldest son is given great authority. He also has many responsibilities; he is a model for his siblings to follow. Thus, he is naturally more politically involved than the other siblings affecting their political orientations.

The Fatah movement still plays an important role in the mobilization of citizens to political participation, through programs and activities other factions have no resources to carry on. The difference between Fatah and Hamas resides in the degree of political participation. Fatah has a political vision based on negotiations and on their history of resistance. On the other hand, Hamas' political options are limited, and despite its success in managing Gaza Strip, the internal Palestinian division has contributed to the decline of Hamas' popularity.

5.3. Recommendations:

1. Studies researching the reality of the political parties in the Palestinian society and their impact on political participation should be conducted.
2. Civil society organizations and political parties should involve women in the political process.
3. The Palestinian Authority and the Hamas government should do:
 - promote integrity and transparency,
 - as well as making efforts to change their internal policies towards more freedoms.
 - They should also stop political arrests and refrain from compliance to outside players.
4. Political parties should refrain from political harassment, and should give priority to political reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.
5. Translation of the current study into Arabic, and publishing its results due to the importance of this issue in Palestinian society.

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Table No. (73)
Characteristics of the population in the Palestinian society

Number of schools	1848 West Bank	640 Gaza Strip	2488 Total
Number of Students	657,000 West Bank	452000 Gaza Strip	Total 1.1 million
The sex ratio	103.1		
Dependency ratio	83.6		
Rate of natural increase	2.87		
Proportion of the population in the age group 014 years	42.5		
1564 year	54.5		
65 +	3.0		
Expected to survive	Male 70.2	72.9 Female	
Illiteracy rate (individuals 15 years and over)	5.9		

Table No. (74).
Distribution of seats in the Legislative Council by the electoral lists

List	Number of seats	Percentage%
Change and Reform (affiliated to Hamas)	76	57.6
Fatah	43	32.6
Independents (supported by Hamas)	4	3.0
Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP)	3	2.3
Alternative (the formation of the forces of the Palestinian left)	2	1.5

Independent Palestine (headed by Mustafa Barghouti)	2	1.5
The Third Way (led by Hanan Ashrawi, and Salam Fayyad)	2	1.5
Total	132	100%

Table No. (75)

Distribution of martyrs the Palestinians according to the state asylum (Banat, 2010)

Number	Refugee status	Numbers	Percentage
1.	Refugee	107	53.5%
2.	Non-refugee	93	46.5%

Table No. (76)

Participate in activities Alhamail and clans (Nasr and Hilal, 2007: 79)

Areas	The rate of participation	Gender	The rate of participation	Level of education	The rate of participation
The southern West Bank	61.5%	Men	56%	Diploma	48.7%
The northern West Bank	33.3%	Women	25.7%	Bachelor's campaign	51.3%
The central West Bank (without Jerusalem)	22.1%			Campaign Higher Diploma	58%
				Campaign Master	73.3%

Table No. (77)

Rate of participation in marches and demonstrations. (Nasr and Hilal, 2007: 72)

Maintain	The ratio	Position Type	The ratio	Political affiliation	The ratio
Jerusalem Governorate	15%	Government officials and private	46%	Palestinian supporters of the left	56.8%
The southern West Bank	72%	Workers in non-governmental institutions	42.9%	Supporters of the Islamic Jihad	51.9%
The central West Bank	35.2%	Self-employed	40.3%	Fatah supporters	46.3%
The northern West Bank	28.5%			Independent national	41.%
				Other organizations in the PLO	40.6%
				Supporters of Hamas'	378.2%
				Individuals who do not support any of the political organizations	17.4%
				Independent Islamists	20.5%

Table No.(78)

Numbers and participation rates in the early stages of the owners of the electoral right to vote in presidential and legislative elections II 2006 (for PSR director, 2007: 61)

Number	Voters and the owners the right to vote	Presidential election	Legislative
1.	Number of entitled to be registered (estimated)	1,760,481	1,778,343
2.	Number registered on the electoral register	1,092,299	1,350,655
3.	The number of owners the right to vote	1,760,481	1,350,655
4.	Number of voters	802.077	1,042,424
5.	Ratio of the number of voters of the owners of the right to vote	46%	77%
6.	Ratio of the number of voters who are entitled to be registered	46%	59%

Table No. (79)**The rate of participation in the distribution of leaflets (Nasr & Hilal.2007: 69-70)**

	The ratio	The residential area	The ratio	Areas of the West Bank	The ratio	Members of both parties	The ratio	Workers	The ratio
Gaza Strip	6.2 %	Villages	7%	The central West Bank	11.4%	Palestinian supporters of the left	14.9%	Employed by the family without pay	25%
West Bank	6.1 %	Cities	6.4%	The northern West Bank	6.5%	Fatah supporters	10.9%	Government employees	13.6%
		Camps	6.3%	The southern West Bank	3%	Supporters of the Islamic Jihad	9.8%	Students	9.9%
						Hamas supporters	7.9%	Unemployed	9.7%
								Housewives	1%
								Employers	3.9%

Table (80)**Indicators on women's political participation (Qasem, 2009: 7)**

Number	Indicator	Alnspho number
1.	Indicators of women's participation in the governing bodies of the PLO	7.5%
2.	The number of women in the Palestinian National Council, a group of 744	56
3.	Number of women in the Central Council's total of 124 members	5
4.	Number of women in the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization	0
5.	Number of women candidates for membership of the Palestinian Legislative Council in the legislative elections of the first and the number of 672 candidates	28
6.	The number of women who have been able to win in the membership of the Legislative Council first	5 for 83 men
7.	Women's participation in the permanent status negotiations	0
8.	Participation in the technical staff of the Madrid Peace Conference	66 women out of participants
9.	Participate in the executive branch with the rank of Zarmen total of 24 ministers	2
10.	Appoint women in the municipal and village councils and committees for 1997 projects a set of 3055	15 women by 0.5
11.	Appoint women in village councils and municipal committees and projects for the year 1999 a group of 3680	40 women
12.	Appoint women in the municipal and village councils and committees for 2000 projects	63 women for 35
13.	Participation of women in the judiciary of the 1997 total of 68 judges and a judge	3 by 4.4%
14.	Participation in the institutions of civil society	Ranging between
15.	Membership of trade unions Faadarh	6.7%

Table No. (81)

Distribution relative to the standard of living true to the Palestinian territory for the year 2007 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008)

Number	Standards of living	The ratio
1	Better levels of less than 30%	28.5%
2	Middle-class 30-40%	47.3%
3	Level of less than 45, 100%	24.2%

Table No. (82)

Confidence levels of the Palestinian political institutions (Nasr & Hilal, 2007: 51)

Present	0.092	Elementary or less	0.111	Employees in the government sector	0.021
Countryside	0.254	Preparative	0.067	-Employees in the private sector	0.021
Camp	0.177	Secondary	0.115		
The value of statistical significance	0.0005	Diploma	0.091	Employees in the form of international / UN	-0.211
Remaining West Bank	0.133	Bachelor	0.030	Employee in a non-governmental sector	0.204
Jerusalem Governorate	0.015	Higher Diploma	0.044	Employer	-0.270
Gaza Strip	0.236	Master And above	0.896	Self-employed	-0.096
Value of significance Statistical	0.0005	Value of significance Sta	0.011	Working for the family without pay	0.332
The northern West Bank	0.168			Working in Israel or the settlements	0.058
The central West Bank	0.208			Unemployed	-0.085
The southern West Bank	0.146			Student full-time study	-0.147
Value of significance Statistical (0.045			A full-time home business	0.126
				Other	0.462
				The value of statistical significance (P-Valu	0.010

Table No. (83)Group of referees and expert arbitrators

No.	Professor Name	University/Institution	Country
1.	Jorge Riezu	University of Granada	Spain
2.	Margarita Latiesa Rodríguez	University of Granada	Spain
3.	Jaime Jose Andreu	University of Granada	Spain
4.	Antonio Robles	University of Granada	Spain
5.	Francisco Entrena Durán	University of Granada	Spain
6.	Inmaculada Puertas Cañaverl	University of Granada	Spain
7.	José Luis Paniza	University of Granada	Spain
8.	Ángel Cazorla	University of Granada	Spain
9.	Remedios Castillo Pérez	University of Granada	Spain
10	Angel Manuel Molina	University of Granada	Spain
11	Sharif Kana`na	Birzeit University	Palestine
12	Bassam Banat	Al-Quds University	Palestine
13	Subhi Al-Badawi	The University of New South Wales	Australia
14	Fadwa Labadi	Al-Quds University	Palestine
15	Ibrahim Sweiti	Palestinian Ahliya University	Palestine
16	Sadiq Dabbas	Palestinian Ahliya University	Palestine
17	Mohammed Ibrahim `Ukeh	Palestinian Ahliya University	Palestine
18	Suleiman Abu Samh	Palestinian Ahliya University	Palestine
19	Farid Ahmed	Palestinian Ahliya University	Palestine
20	Eyad Ammari	Palestinian Ahliya University	Palestine
21	Ali Mahmoud Saleh	Al-Quds University	Palestine
22	Abdul Rahman Haj	Al-Quds University	Palestine
23	Said Zeidani	Al-Quds University	Palestine
24	Ahmad `Oda	Al-Quds University	Palestine
25	Ahmed Abu-Dayya	Al-Quds University	Palestine
26	Abdul Sattar Qasem	An-Najah University	Palestine
27	Issa Abu Zahira	Al-Quds University	Palestine
28	Mahmoud Miari	Birzeit University	Palestine
29	Mahmoud Moharib	Al-Quds University	Palestine

Figure no. (1). Sample distribution by district




Figure no. (2). Sample distribution by gender




Figure no. (3). Sample distribution by age group




Figure no. (4). Sample distribution by social status




Figure no. (5). Sample distribution by academic qualification




Figure no. (6). Sample distribution by region




Figure no. (7). Sample distribution by place of residence




Figure no. (8). Sample distribution by religion




Figure no. (9). Sample distribution by family members




Figure no. (10). Sample distribution by degree of religion




Figure no. (11). Sample distribution by area of residence




Figure no. (12). Sample distribution by work status




Figure no. (13). Sample distribution by profession]




Figure no. (14). Sample distribution by work sector




Figure no. (15). Sample distribution by monthly income (NIS)




Figure no. (16). Sample distribution by refugee status




Figure no. (17). Sample distribution by party affiliation




Figure no. (18). Sample distribution by participant's involving in 1996 elections




Figure no. (19). Sample distribution by participant's involving in 2006 elections




Figure no. (20). Sample distribution by participant's involving in the local municipal elections




Figure no. (21). Sample distribution by participant's place of living




Figure no. (22). Sample distribution by participant's exposing to Israeli violence




Figure no. (23). Sample distribution by participant's family birth rank





Figure no. (24). Sample distribution by participant's political faction



Figures No. (25)The method of calculating the sample

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Internet Explorer browser window displaying a website titled "Sample Size Calculator - Confidence Level, Confidence Interval, Sample Size, Population Size, R". The browser's address bar shows the URL "http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm". The website content includes a "Research Aids" sidebar with links to "Sample Size Calculator", "Sample Size Formula", "Significance", "Survey Design", and "Correlation". The main content area features a "Sample Size Calculator" section with an introductory paragraph: "This Sample Size Calculator is presented as a public service of Creative Research Systems. You can use it to determine how many people you need to interview in order to get results that reflect the target population as precisely as needed. You can also find the level of precision you have in an existing sample." Below this, a paragraph explains that before using the calculator, users need to know "confidence interval" and "confidence level", with links to "click here" for more information. A "Google Translate" widget is visible on the left. The calculator itself is a grey box titled "Determine Sample Size" with the following fields and controls: "Confidence Level" with radio buttons for "95%" (selected) and "99%"; "Confidence Interval" with a text input field containing "5"; "Population" with a text input field containing "1883567"; "Calculate" and "Clear" buttons; and "Sample size needed:" with a text input field containing "384". The Windows taskbar at the bottom shows the "Inicio" button, a taskbar icon for "Sample Size Calculato...", and the system tray with "Internet" and the time "11:17".

Figure No.(26) Palestine: West Bank and Gaza Strip




Figure No. (27) The Oslo Accords between Palestinians and Israelis



Figure No. (28) The Separation Wall



Figure No.(29) Palestinian Refugees






Figure No. (30) The path of Displacement of Palestinian refugees




Figures No.(31) Palestinian Parliamentary Election 1996 and 2006

PALESTINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS - 1996 AND 2006



Registered voters - 1,028,280
Turnout - 71.66%



Registered voters - 1,341,671
Turnout - 75%

SOURCE: Central Elections Commission - Palestine

Figure No. (32)




Figure No.(33)



Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)

Appendix A. The Questionnaire of the Study in English



The University of Granada

Department of Sociology-Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology

PhD Program: Socio-Political Analysis of Contemporary Society

Political Participation in Palestinian Society

Ladies and Gentlemen

With Best Greetings

The researcher is doing a study about the "*Political Participation in the Palestinian Society*" and you have randomly been chosen to be included in the sample of the study, thus we hope you to cooperate with us by filling this Questionnaire. That should be in accordance with your point of view, with the knowledge that the data of this study is only for scientific research, and its secrecy will be preserved. You'll not be asked to give your name or anything refers to you. With our deep thanks for your good cooperation.

Prepared By: Shaher A. A. Salama

Supervised By: Professor Fernando Fdez.-Llebrez

Professor Ángel Manuel Molina Montoro

First Part: General Information

Please, circle the most appropriate answer that suits you

- 1-Gender: a-Male b-Female
- 2-Age:-----years
- 3-Marital Status: a-Single b-Married c-Other

- 4-Education: a-Illiterate b-Primary (Elementary-Secondary)
- 5-No. of family member's-----people.
- 6-Community: a-West Bank b-Gaza Strip
- 7-Place of residence: a-City b-Village c-Camp
- 8-Religion: a-Islam b-Christianity c-Other
- 9-Living in an area that is proximate to Israeli settlements or military posts or near to the Apartheid Wall: a-Yes b-No
- 10-Classification of residential area a-Area A b-Area B c-Area C
- 11-Degree of religiosity: a-Very religious b-Rather religious c-Non-religious
- 12-Congenital order in the family: a-First b-Middle c-last
- 13-Employment: a-Employed b-Unemployed
- 14-Type of profession: a-Employee b-Craftsman c-Construction worker d-Other,
(define)
- 15-Sector of work a-Public sector b-Private sector
- 16-Monthly income-----NIS
- 17-Refugee status: a-Refugee b-Not refugee
- 18-Have you been exposed to any kind of Israeli violence: a-Yes b-No
- 19-Have you ever involved in the presidential and legislative election of 1996?
a-Yes b-No
- 20-Have you ever involved in the presidential and legislative election of 2006?
a-Yes b-No
- 21-Have you involved in the local municipal elections?
a-Yes b-No
- 22-Political affiliation: a-Affiliated b-Not affiliated
- 23-If the elections are held this day(participated by all Palestinian political parties) who will you give your vote to mostly:
a-Fatehb-Hamas c-Popular Front d-Democratic Front
e-Initiative f-People Partyg-Islamic Jihad h-Independent
i-Other (select)

Second Part: the questionnaire parts

Please, read the following items carefully, then circle the answer you see most appropriate:

First pivot: motivations of political participation in the Palestinian society.

No	From your own point of view, to what extent do you consider these factors as motivations for your political participation in the Palestinian society?	Strongly agree	Agree	neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
1.	Doing the national duty					
2.	A process of self-validation					
3.	A tool to express my demands					
4.	A response to the call of my doctrine					
5.	A response to the call of the political direction (the party)					
6.	Compatibility with the Authority					
7.	Seeking a political position					
8.	Searching for an employment position					
9.	Realizing a self-interest					
10.	In solidarity with the family/clan					
11.	Defensive policy against an expected danger					
12.	Expression of political awareness					
13.	To express public demands (political, social,)					
14.	The desire for making friends					
15.	To exercise one of my political rights.					
16.	To gain respect or appreciation from others.					
17.	To gain the popularity of others.					
18.	Compliment of others.					
19.	For the significance of political action in the					

	Palestinian society.					
20.	To enhance democracy					
21.	To influence the government					
22.	The desire to change reality					
23.	To enhance the independent Palestinian political decision					
24.	Everyone has the right to express his or her opinion					
25.	Displaying leaderships and proficiencies of Palestinian society					
26.	Other's participation in the development and improvement of the society.					
27.	Strengthening ties among the different sections and fragments of the Palestinian society.					
28.	Influence the general policy-making process in the Palestinian society.					
29.	Realizing public interest					
30.	Existence of moral and material motivations.					
31.	Being furious on status quo.					

Second pivot: forms of political participation in the Palestinian society

No.	From your point of view, to what extent do you practice the forms of political participation in the Palestinian society?	Strongly agree	Agree	neutral	Disagree	Strong disagree
32.	I am a member in a political organization					
33.	I donate to a political organization or a candidate					

34.	I attend to the political meetings regularly					
35.	I participate in the electoral campaigns					
36.	I send letters on political issues to those who have political positions					
37.	I talk about policy with people outside my family or friends					
38.	I care of political issues					
39.	I care of political work					
40.	I devote time for political activity					
41.	I know the political parties and the aims behind their formation.					
42.	I participate in political activities in times of crisis					
43.	I participate in political activities when feel that my interests are threatened					
44.	I participate in promotion of a political					
45.	I participate in the public meetings of the political parties					
46.	I participate in the demonstrations which are against the occupation					
47.	I take care of participating in the elections (the Legislative Council, Presidential and local)					
48.	I participate in the political debates					
49.	I draw graffiti on walls					
50.	I take care of symposiums that concern the political issues					
51.	I follow with interest the political programs of the various parties.					
52.	I closely watch the political news in the different mass media. (newspapers, radio and television)					
53.	I love to be active in a movement for the citizen's rights.					
54.	I take care of the programs concerning political issues					
55.	I follow up what's happening in the political arena					
56.	I contact the official bodies on public issues					
57.	I submit complaint on community issues to the official					

	bodies					
58.	I know the personalities who have political role in the society at local and national levels					
59.	I participate in volunteer works dealing with serving the society					
60.	I feel with responsibility to community issues					
61.	I get involved in the election campaigning for a particular party					
62.	I collect signatures on protest memos.					
63.	I distribute political leaflets concerning a particular party.					
64.	I criticize the policy of the Palestinian government when it fails or makes mistakes					
65.	I am interested in participating in expressing the rejection of the government policy when it fails or makes mistakes					
66.	I take care of registering in the local or national electoral lists					
67.	I take care of voting in any local or national elections					
68.	I encourage others to participate politically					
69.	I find it easier to participate in political discussions					

Third pivot: Impediments of political participation in the Palestinian society

No.	From your point of view, to what extent do these factors are obstacle to your political participation in the Palestinian society?	Strongly agree	Agree	neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
70.	Bad choice of candidates					
71.	Mistrusting the candidates					
72.	Weakness of political and social institutions such as political parties					
73.	Suppression of parliamentary, media and popular					

	censorship					
74.	Spread of illiteracy					
75.	Absence of mass agencies, associations and clubs					
76.	Dominance and its existence in its official and popular forms					
77.	Absence of popular participation and suppression and frustrating it					
78.	Lack of knowledge of the political parties and their aims of formation					
79.	Personification of political decision-making and the dominance of powerful personality inside the institutions and political parties					
80.	The prevalence of cronyism in the political system					
81.	Weakness of political issues and thesis					
82.	Fear about my personal safety					
83.	Fear of the tension of relations with others					
84.	Fear of losing job/action					
85.	I am not convinced in political work					
86.	Weakness of the overall political climate such as the institutions and organizations existed in the society and the constitution, and the nature of the factional system					
87.	Lack of respect to voters from the political parties					
88.	The nature of the dominant culture in the society doesn't encourage to political participation					
89.	The Israeli occupation is a stumbling block for the political participation					
90.	The organizational differences between the Palestinian parties prevent me from political participation					
91.	Politicians are not interested as I am					
92.	Being interested in improving my financial position, will prevent me from political participation					

93.	The traditional mentality in the Palestinian society never urges political participation					
94.	The poor process of the political participation received by the individual in the Palestinian society					
95.	Absence of role of mass media to enhance the political participation in the Palestinian society					
96.	The outside effects in the Palestinian political decision					
97.	Feeling that no benefit of political participation in influencing the political decisions in the Palestinian society					
98.	Limitations and laws that restrict public properties					
99.	Torture and suppression practiced by some Palestinian factions					
100.	Frustration from prevailing political situation in the Palestinian society					
101.	The absence of responsibility sense towards the national and social issues					
102.	Prevalence of political corruption					
103.	Control and domination of the family tribe					
104.	Political disorder and confusion spread in the Palestinian society					
105.	Lack of elected members connected to people					
106.	Absence of national sensation					
107.	I'm convinced that nobody like me has any influence on the government and its policies					
108.	I'm not confident in my position in political topics					
109.	I would like to participate more in politics if things were not so complicated					
110.	If you get away from politics, you will relax					

Thanks for your cooperation

Appendix B. The Questionnaire of the Study in Arabic



The University of Granada
Department of Sociology
Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology
PhD Program: Socio-Political Analysis of Contemporary Society

Political Participation in the Palestinian Society

أخي المواطن / أختي المواطنة

تحية طيبة وبعد،،،

في ظل الظروف السياسية الصعبة التي يعيشها الشعب الفلسطيني، أعد الباحث هذا الاستبيان لاجراء دراسة علمية حول "المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني"، وقد وقع عليك الاختيار عشوائياً لتكون ضمن عينة الدراسة، لذا أرجو منك التعاون معنا بتعبئة هذه الاستبانة، وذلك بما يتوافق مع وجهة نظرك، علماً بأن بيانات الدراسة هي لأغراض البحث العلمي فقط، وسيتم الحفاظ على سريتها، ولا يطلب منك كتابة اسمك أو ما يشير إليك، شاكرين لك حسن تعاونك.

إشراف: د. فرناندو يديث بيرث د. أنخل مانويل

إعداد الباحث: شاهر سلامة

مولينا

القسم الأول : معلومات عامة

الرجاء وضع دائرة حول رمز الإجابة التي تنطبق عليك

- | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|------------|
| 1- الجنس | 1. ذكر | 2. أنثى | |
| 2- العمر | _____ سنة | | |
| 3- الحالة الاجتماعية | 1. أعزب/عزباء | 2. متزوج/ة | 3. غير ذلك |
| 4- المستوى التعليمي | 1. أُمِّي | 2. أساسي (ابتدائي - إعدادي) | 3. ثانوي |
| 4- دبلوم | 5. بكالوريوس فأكثر | | |
| 5- عدد أفراد الأسرة | _____ فرد | | |
| 6- التجمع | 1. الضفة الغربية | 2. قطاع غزة | |

- 7- مكان السكن 1.مدينة 2.قرية 3.مخيم
- 8- الديانة 1.الإسلام 2.المسيحية
- 3.غير ذلك
- 9- أسكن في منطقة قريبة من مستوطنات إسرائيلية أو نقاط عسكرية أو جدار الفصل العنصري 1. نعم
2. لا
- 10- تصنيف منطقة السكن A .1 B .2 C .3
- 11-درجة التدبير 1.متدين 2.متدين إلى حد ما 3.غير متدين
- 12-الترتيب الولادي في الأسرة 1.الأول 2.الوسط 3.الأخير
- 13-العلاقة بقوة العمل 1.يعمل 2.لا يعمل
- 14-المهنة 1.موظف 2.مهني 3.عامل
- 4.أعمال حرة 5.غير ذلك (حدد)
-
- 15-قطاع العمل 1.عام 2.خاص
- 16-الدخل الشهري -
- شيكل
- 17-حالة اللجوء 1.لاجئ 2.غير لاجئ
- 18-هل تعرضت لأي شكل من أشكال العنف الاسرائيلي 1.نعم 2.لا
- 19-هل شاركت في الانتخابات التشريعية والرئاسية عام 1996 1.نعم 2.لا
- 20-هل شاركت في الانتخابات التشريعية والرئاسية عام 2006 1.نعم 2.لا
- 21-هل شاركت في انتخابات المجالس البلدية المحلية 1.نعم 2.لا
- 22-الانتماء السياسي 1.منتمي 2.غير منتمي
- 23-إذا أجريت الانتخابات اليوم، وشاركت بها جميع الأحزاب السياسية الفلسطينية، لمن ستدلي بصوتك على الأغلب:
- 1.فتح 2.حماس 3.جبهة شعبية 4.جبهة ديمقراطية 5.مبادرة
- 6.حزب شعب 7.جهاد إسلامي 8.مستقلين 9.غير ذلك (حدد)

القسم الثاني: فقرات الاستبيان

أرجو منك قراءة الفقرات الآتية بعناية والإجابة عليها بوضع دائرة حول رمز الإجابة التي تراها / ترينها مناسبة.

المحور الأول: دوافع المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني

الرقم	من وجهة نظرك، إلى أي مدى تعتبر العوامل الآتية كدوافع لمشاركتك السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني؟	درجة كبيرة جداً	درجة كبيرة	درجة متوسطة	درجة قليلة	درجة قليلة جداً
1.	تقديم الواجب الوطني	1	2	3	4	5
2.	عملية إثبات الذات	1	2	3	4	5
3.	أداة للتعبير عن المطالب	1	2	3	4	5
4.	استجابة لنداء العقيدة	1	2	3	4	5
5.	تلبية لنداء الاتجاه السياسي (الحزب)	1	2	3	4	5
6.	تمشياً مع سياسة السلطة	1	2	3	4	5
7.	طلباً لمنصب سياسي	1	2	3	4	5
8.	بحثاً عن موقع وظيفي	1	2	3	4	5
9.	لتحقيق مصلحة شخصية	1	2	3	4	5
10.	تضامناً مع العائلة / الحمولة	1	2	3	4	5
11.	سياسة دفاعية ضد خطر متوقع	1	2	3	4	5

الرقم	من وجهة نظرك، إلى أي مدى تعتبر العوامل الآتية كدوافع لمشاركتك السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني؟	درجة كبيرة جداً	درجة كبيرة	درجة متوسطة	درجة قليلة	درجة قليلة جداً
12.	تعبيراً عن الوعي السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
13.	ببيرة عن مطالب عامة (اجتماعية، سياسية،...)	1	2	3	4	5
14.	رغبة في تكوين الأصدقاء	1	2	3	4	5
15.	ممارسة حق من حقوقك السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
16.	كسب احترام وتقدير الآخرين	1	2	3	4	5
17.	كسب شعبية الآخرين	1	2	3	4	5
18.	مجاملة الآخرين	1	2	3	4	5
19.	لأهمية العمل السياسي في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
20.	لتعزيز مبدأ الديمقراطية	1	2	3	4	5
21.	للتأثير على الحكومة	1	2	3	4	5
22.	الرغبة في تغيير الواقع	1	2	3	4	5
23.	لتعزيز استقلالية القرار السياسي الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
24.	لكل شخص الحق في أن يعبر عن آرائه	1	2	3	4	5
25.	إبراز القيادات والكفاءات في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
26.	مشاركة الآخرين في تطوير وتحسين المجتمع	1	2	3	4	5
27.	تقوية الروابط بين مختلف شرائح وفئات المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
28.	التأثير في عملية صنع السياسات العامة في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
29.	لتحقيق مصلحة عامة	1	2	3	4	5
30.	وجود حوافز مادية ومعنوية	1	2	3	4	5
31.	سخطاً على الواقع المعاش	1	2	3	4	5

المحور الثاني: أشكال ومظاهر المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني

الرقم	من وجهة نظرك، إلى أي مدى تمارس/ين أشكال المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني؟	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	غير موافق	غير موافق بشدة
32.	أنا عضو في منظمة سياسية	1	2	3	4	5
33.	أقوم بالتبرع لمنظمة سياسية أو مرشح	1	2	3	4	5
34.	أحضر الاجتماعات السياسية بشكل دوري	1	2	3	4	5
35.	أشارك في الحملات الانتخابية	1	2	3	4	5
36.	أوجه رسائل بشأن قضايا سياسية لذوي المناصب السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
37.	أتحدث في السياسة مع أشخاص خارج نطاق عائلتي وأصدقائي	1	2	3	4	5
38.	أهتم بالأمر السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
39.	أهتم بالعمل السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
40.	أخصص أوقات للنشاط السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
41.	أعرف الأحزاب السياسية وغايات تشكيلها	1	2	3	4	5
42.	أشارك في الأنشطة السياسية في أوقات الأزمات	1	2	3	4	5
43.	أشارك في الأنشطة السياسية عندما أشعر بأن مصالحهم مهددة	1	2	3	4	5
44.	أشارك في الترويج لبرنامج سياسي	1	2	3	4	5
45.	أشارك في الاجتماعات العامة للأحزاب السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
46.	أشارك في المظاهرات التي تناهض الاحتلال	1	2	3	4	5
47.	أهتم في المشاركة في الانتخابات (التشريعية، الرئاسية والمحلية)	1	2	3	4	5
48.	أشارك في المناقشات السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
49.	أرسم شعارات على الجدران	1	2	3	4	5
50.	أهتم بالندوات التي تعنى بالأمر السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
51.	أتابع باهتمام البرامج السياسية للأحزاب المختلفة	1	2	3	4	5

5	4	3	2	1	أتابع الأخبار السياسية في وسائل الاعلام المختلفة (الصحف، الراديو والتلفزيون)	.52
5	4	3	2	1	أحب أن أكون نشيطاً في حركة من أجل حقوق المواطن	.53

غير موافق بشدة	غير موافق	محايد	أوافق	أوافق بشدة	من وجهة نظرك، إلى أي مدى تمارس/ين أشكال المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني؟	الرقم
5	4	3	2	1	أهتم بالبرامج التي تعنى بالأمر السياسي	.54
5	4	3	2	1	أتابع ما يحدث على الساحة السياسية	.55
5	4	3	2	1	أتصل بالمؤسسات الرسمية بخصوص قضايا عامة	.56
5	4	3	2	1	أقدم شكوى بشأن قضايا مجتمعية للجهات الرسمية	.57
5	4	3	2	1	أعرف الشخصيات السياسية في المجتمع على المستوى المحلي أو الوطني	.58
5	4	3	2	1	أشارك في الأعمال التطوعية التي تعنى بخدمة المجتمع	.59
5	4	3	2	1	أشعر بالمسؤولية تجاه القضايا المجتمعية	.60
5	4	3	2	1	أشارك في الدعاية الانتخابية لصالح حزب معين	.61
5	4	3	2	1	أجمع توقيع على عرائض احتجاجية	.62
5	4	3	2	1	أوزع نشرات سياسية تخص حزب معين	.63
5	4	3	2	1	انتقد سياسة الحكومة الفلسطينية عندما تخطئ أو تقصر	.64
5	4	3	2	1	أهتم في المشاركة السياسية للتعبير عن رفض سياسة الحكومة عندما تخطئ أو تقصر	.65
5	4	3	2	1	أحرص على أن أسجل في القوائم الانتخابية المحلية والوطنية	.66
5	4	3	2	1	أحرص على التصويت في أي انتخابات محلية أو وطنية	.67
5	4	3	2	1	أشجع الآخرين على المشاركة السياسية	.68
5	4	3	2	1	سهل لي المشاركة بنقاشات سياسية	.69

المحور الثالث: معوقات المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني

الرقم	من وجهة نظرك، إلى أي مدى تقف العوامل الآتية عائقاً أمام مشاركتك السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني	درجة كبيرة جداً	درجة كبيرة	درجة متوسطة	درجة قليلة	درجة قليلة جداً
.70	سوء اختيار المرشحين	1	2	3	4	5
.71	عدم الثقة بالمرشحين	1	2	3	4	5
.72	ضعف المؤسسات السياسية والاجتماعية كالأحزاب السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
.73	قمع الرقابة البرلمانية والإعلامية والشعبية	1	2	3	4	5
.74	انتشار الأمية	1	2	3	4	5
.75	غياب المنظمات الجماهيرية والتجمعات النقابية والروابط والأندية	1	2	3	4	5
.76	وجود الهيمنة بشكلها الرسمي والشعبي	1	2	3	4	5
.77	غياب المشاركة الشعبية وقمعها وإحباطها	1	2	3	4	5
.78	عدم المعرفة بالأحزاب السياسية وغايات تشكيلها	1	2	3	4	5
.79	شخصنة اتخاذ القرار السياسي وهيمنة الشخصية السلطوية داخل المؤسسات والأحزاب السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
.80	شيوع الشللية في النظام السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
.81	ضعف القضايا والطروحات السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
.82	الخوف على سلامتي الشخصية	1	2	3	4	5
.83	الخوف من توتر العلاقات مع الآخرين	1	2	3	4	5
.84	الخوف من فقدان الوظيفة / العمل	1	2	3	4	5
.85	عدم قناعتني بالعمل السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
.86	ضعف المناخ السياسي العام، مثل المؤسسات والتنظيمات القائمة في المجتمع والدستور، وطبيعة النظام الحزبي	1	2	3	4	5
.87	عدم احترام الأحزاب السياسية لأصوات الناخبين	1	2	3	4	5
.88	طبيعة الثقافة السائدة في المجتمع غير مشجعه على المشاركة السياسية	1	2	3	4	5

5	4	3	2	1	الاحتلال الإسرائيلي يقف عقبة أمام المشاركة السياسية	.89
5	4	3	2	1	الخلاقات بين الأحزاب السياسية الفلسطينية تمنعني من المشاركة السياسية	.90
5	4	3	2	1	عدم اهتمام السياسيين بتفكير إنسان مثلي	.91

الرقم	من وجهة نظرك، إلى أي مدى تقف العوامل الآتية عائقاً أمام مشاركتك السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني	درجة كبيرة جداً	درجة كبيرة	درجة متوسطة	درجة قليلة	درجة قليلة جداً
.92	اهتمامي بتحسين وضعي الاقتصادي يمنعني من المشاركة السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
.93	العقائدية التقليدية في المجتمع الفلسطيني غير مشجعه على المشاركة السياسية	1	2	3	4	5
.94	ضعف عملية التنشئة السياسية التي يتلقاها الفرد في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
.95	غياب الدور الاعلامي لتعزيز المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
.96	التأثيرات الخارجية في القرار السياسي الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
.97	الإحساس بعدم الجدوى من عملية المشاركة السياسية في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
.98	كثرة القيود والقوانين المقيدة للحريات العامة	1	2	3	4	5
.99	القمع والتكيد الذي تمارسه بعض الفصائل الفلسطينية	1	2	3	4	5
.100	الاحباط من الوضع السياسي السائد في المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
.101	غياب الإحساس بالمسؤولية تجاه القضايا الوطنية والمجتمعية	1	2	3	4	5
.102	تفشي الفساد السياسي	1	2	3	4	5
.103	سيطرة العشائرية القبلية	1	2	3	4	5
.104	التخبط السياسي الذي يعيشه المجتمع الفلسطيني	1	2	3	4	5
.105	فقدان الأعضاء المنتخبين الصلة مع الشعب	1	2	3	4	5
.106	غياب الحس الوطني	1	2	3	4	5

5	4	3	2	1	107. اقتناعي بأنه لا يوجد لانسان مثلي أي تأثير على الحكومة وسياساتها
5	4	3	2	1	108. لست واثقاً من موقفي في المواضيع السياسية
5	4	3	2	1	109. كنت أود المشاركة أكثر بالسياسة لو لم تكن الأمور معقدة بهذا الشكل
5	4	3	2	1	110. إذا ابتعدت عن السياسة ترتاح ويرتاح ضميرك

شاكراً لكم حسن تعاونكم،،،

الباحث

Appendix (C) Letter from My Adviser to facilitate data collection



To Whom It May Concern

This is to certify that Mr. Shaher A. A. Salama, passport number (1870713), a Palestinian student in the PhD program of Sociology “Socio-Politics Analysis of the Contemporary Society”, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology, The University of Granada, Spain is conducting a sampling survey in the Palestinian society titled "Political Participation in the Palestinian Society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" to obtain a Doctorate degree in sociology.

I highly appreciate your help in facilitating his mission in this important subject, which will have good returns on the Palestinian society and the scientific research.

In Granada, May 26, 2010.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink is written over a blue circular stamp. The stamp contains the text 'UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA' around the top edge and 'DPTO. DE SOCIOLOGIA' around the bottom edge. In the center of the stamp is a smaller circular emblem, similar to the university's logo.

Profesor Ángel Manuel Molina
Program Coordinator,
Department of Sociology,
Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology,
The University of Granada.
Teléfono: 0034 958244143
Fax: 0034 958244191
E-mail: ammolina@ugr.es

C/ Rector López Argüeta, s/n
18071 GRANADA
Tlf.: 958 246 198
Fax: 958 244 191

Departamento de Sociología

Appendix D. A list of field researchers

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Al-Quds University

Faculty of Arts

Department of Applied Sociology



جامعة القدس

كلية الآداب

دائرة علم الاجتماع التطبيقي

Dear Professor Angel Molina
Department of Sociology
Faculty of Political Sciences & Sociology
The University of Granada
Spain.

Subject: List of field researchers

This is to certify that the following field researchers have worked in the data collection process for the PhD dissertation done by Shaher A. A. Salama titled "Political Participation in the Palestinian society":

No.	Name	ID	Location
1.	Inas Khalil Abu Matar	901264580	Gaza Strip
2.	Mohammed Ahmed Abu Dayer	901494237	Gaza Strip
3.	Susan Taleb Abu Zaid	900990235	Gaza Strip
4.	Mahmoud Ibrahim Abu Rahma	900764283	Gaza Strip
5.	Fatima Mustafa Asi	852485309	West Bank
6.	Haitham Mohammed Awad	852734383	West Bank
7.	Ismail Ibrahim Al Biss	411344617	West Bank
8.	Tamara Akram Shweki	086953692	West Bank
9.	Ahmed Ibrahim Ajarma	852935634	West Bank
10.	Bawasel Abdel Qader Masharqa	852864966	West Bank

Thanks a lot for your cooperation.

In Jerusalem, May 23, 2012.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Bassam Banat
Chairman



Main Campus
Jerusalem, Abu Dies
Palestine
Telefax: +972 2 2791296

الحرم الجامعي الرئيس
القدس، أبو ديس
فلسطين
تلفاكس: +972 2 2791296